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♪

[Crowd cheering]

TV ANNOUNCER: We will hear

from the President
of the United States.

He will address the country
in mere moments now,

speaking from the east room.

It is going to be a confirmation
of a huge development.

BARACK OBAMA:
Good evening.

Tonight, I can report
to the American people

and to the world--

the United States has conducted
an operation that killed

Osama bin Laden,
the leader of al-Qaeda.

Tonight we give thanks
to the countless intelligence

and counterterrorism
professionals

who worked tirelessly
to achieve this outcome.

OBAMA: The American people
do not see their work,

nor know their names,

but tonight they feel
the satisfaction of their work.

♪

[Man speaking foreign language]

♪

WOMAN, VOICE-OVER: I think women
make fantastic analysts.

We have
patience and perseverance.

And we're not always looking
for the sexy payoff immediately.

DIFFERENT WOMAN, VOICE-OVER:
You know, trying to keep track

of all the threads
of various threats,

and which ones are real
and which ones aren't real

and what connects to what.

And, you know, people say,

"Why didn't you
connect the dots?"

"Well, because
the whole page is black?"

DIFFERENT WOMAN, VOICE-OVER:
To pull a story

out of all of
this information,

but there is no one
single intelligence looking

at all this information.

It's a lot of different
brains looking.

So the more that you
can bring people together

and, you know,
share what's important,

the better it works.

At that time, the people
who had

really deep expertise
in al-Qaeda...

you know, they were women.

And they did a job that
at first did not make them

very popular
with their managers.

I was counseled once
in a performance review

that I was spending too much
time working on bin Laden.

[Chuckles]

They said we
were obsessed crusaders,

overly emotional.

You know, using all
those women's stereotypes.

Men throw chairs.
Women cry.

I ask you,
Which one is better?

Yes, we were
borderline obsessed,

but I thought it was
for a good reason.

And were we crusading?

I wouldn't call it
a crusade.

Were we passionate about
what they were doing?

Absolutely.

And that's
another bureaucratic
norm of the time.

You weren't supposed to be
passionate about anything,

which I think
is ridiculous.

How can you do something
like this without passion?

You can't.

[Osama bin Laden
speaking foreign language]

DIFFERENT WOMAN: "Take a stand.
We drove out the Russians.

"We destroyed
the Russian empire.

"Now we'll drive out
the Americans

"and we'll destroy
the U.S. empire.

It worked then,
it'll work here."

He felt
like the United States

was driving a world movement
against Muslims

and was the driver
for everything

that was happening
that was bad.

[Osama bin Laden speaking
foreign language on recording]

CINDY STORER: Your starting
point is Afghanistan.

Abdullah Azzam is the godfather
of the Afghan jihad.

He is the one who called
everyone to go and fight

in Afghanistan
against the Soviets.

He helped set up a council
of charities to bring

people and money to help
with jihad.

And his partner
was Osama bin Laden.

SUSAN HASLER: A link chart
is the visual representation

of a terrorist network.

And it's what terrorism
analysts spend

much of their time
building.

STORER: My mental image is
that, you know, I'm doing

Jacob's ladder.

You've got the string
where you're pulling

the strings
in your fingers.

I feel like that's
what I'm doing mentally.

♪

STORER: Well, we
certainly didn't know

that al-Qaeda existed.

We didn't know there was
a terrorist organization.

We knew there was
a very wealthy man

named Osama bin Laden,

who was funding a lot
of terrorist groups.

We knew that there were
people from terrorist groups

from all over the world,
hanging out in Afghanistan

and in bin Laden's
circle.

So you start to see
signs of what looks like

an organization.

But is this bin Laden
as a financial manager

with a bunch of
companies funding

various terrorist groups

or is there a separate
terrorist group here?

And that was
a big question.

♪

Even in the analytical
community, there's

a relatively smaller
percentage of people

who are really good
at making sense

of information that doesn't
appear to be connected.

So this is what we call
pattern analysis--

trying to figure out
what things look like.

And those people, you really
need those people to work

on an issue like terrorism,
counter-narcotic,

international arms
trafficking

because you've got

bits and pieces
of scattered information

from all over the place

and you have to try to
make some sense of it.

And these are
organizations--

certainly al-Qaeda
was one--

didn't even want to announce
their presence to the world

for a long time.

You have to try to
figure out they're there

when they're trying to
deny, even to their friends,

that they exist.

That takes this talent,
which is also a skill,

and people would refer
to it as magic.

Not the analysts
doing it,

but other people who
didn't have that talent

referred to it as magic.

What I have here
are four half-dollars.

MAN, VOICE-OVER:
When you're following

an intelligence event,
sometimes things move

and change in ways
that you can't see.

You might think
it's in one place,

and it pops up in another,

and you can't see
how that happens.

MAN: So these coins
are gonna jump one at a time

from here all the way
over to here.

But they're going
to do it invisibly.

1, 2, 3, 4. Watch.

See it jump? Heh. Heh.

JOHN McLAUGHLIN, VOICE-OVER:
Reality is changing

all the time.

A single fact may come in
which dramatically changes

your understanding
and your projection

of where something's going.

McLAUGHLIN: Two and two.

Are you with me?

McLAUGHLIN, VOICE-OVER:
Now, an analyst

in the intelligence
profession

is dealing
with highly ambiguous situations

in which information is
arriving incrementally,

in fragments.

Are you with me?

McLAUGHLIN, VOICE-OVER:
You never get the whole picture.

The picture changes
as these pieces arrive.

Your perception
of reality changes.

You have to be very clear
about what you concretely

know and what you
don't know.

♪

Alec Station was
a collection of people

who had backgrounds
in everything

from analysis to operations.

When you think
about the CIA,

there's a few
different cultures there.

One is an analytic culture--

people who try
to assess things,

figure out what is actually
happening somewhere

and project ahead--

and an operational culture,

that is, people who go out
and collect intelligence,

develop human spies,

handle them,
run them, if you will.

♪

The unique thing
about Alec Station was

the fusion
of analysis and operations.

We pushed the analysts
and the operations people

together, so the operations
people knew everything

the analysts were thinking

and the analysts knew
everything

the operations people
were doing.

Covertly, clandestinely,
secretly, dangerously.

And the fusion
of those two things gave

that organization
the magic it had.

STORER: The people I worked
with in the beginning were

six women.

I walked
in my first day there.

I turned around
to my colleagues--

this is a bay
of six analysts--

and I said, "Does
anybody have any Tums?"

And all these drawers
open

with these gigantic
bottles!

I thought,
"Oh, my God.

What have I done
to myself?" Ha ha!

When I moved over, there was

a group of women
that I reached out to.

We were trying to protect
the United States.

Whether we could do that,

it's a big...it's a big
burden.

I was drawn to those women

because of the job
that they were doing.

I mean, substantively they
were so immersed in finding

bin Laden and tracking,

and some of them had been
around working

this subject matter
for so long

that they were
the people I went to.

It wasn't even
because they were women.

Gina Bennett was a mentor
of mine and still is.

She worked on al-Qaeda
for 20 years.

Gina and Barbara, they put
a stake in the ground

and said, "It's OK if we're
not operations officers.

We can be
just as effective."

BARBARA SUDE:
The rest of the organization

didn't necessarily think
much of terrorism analysts.

They said, "Well, the terrorism
people are just tracking

"things. That's not--
real analysis.

That's just tracking
things."

So we poor, lowly
terrorism analysts,

we were tracking things.

You're gonna have certain
kinds of people who are

going to be the first
ones to see something.

When you're
the first one

off the block,
by definition

you're going to be
in the minority.

That's what we were.

NADA BAKOS: She was
very dedicated to her job.

She was there a lot.

STORER: You know, Jennifer
was one of that first group,

and she was always very
intense, very focused,

really passionate about
it from the beginning

and a real hard-charger
from the beginning.

Jennifer was focused
on finding bin Laden.

She was adamant that she was
gonna stay around

on that team
until it was done.

♪

She could be
really abrasive.

[Laughs]

Yeah, but, you know,
teams are made up

of people with all different
kinds of personalities.

And at the end of the day,
that doesn't really matter.

What matters is getting
the job done.

And she certainly
could do that.

We had a camaraderie.

And in the beginning, we
were such a small organization

that we really had
a very close relationship.

♪

[Birds chirping]

BAKOS:
On the operations side,

this is where
all the spies work.

STORER: Which are the ones
you always see in the movies

running around
recruiting assets

and playing James Bond
or whatever.

It is dangerous.
It is dangerous.

These guys need confidence
to be able to pull that off.

BAKOS: There is
a fair amount of bravado.

You know, we're
case officers, right?

We're the jet fighters,
we're the gangsters,

we're the doers.

You know, analysts?
Come on, man.

I think a component
of the personality

in some cases for the job.

There's varying degrees
of that.

♪

MAN, VOICE-OVER: I was out
in the bush, in that arena,

downrange,
regardless of environment.

Often times,
you see in the movies--

you talk about agents.

You know, he's a CIA agent.

Well, the agents are
the people we recruit.

"Hi. I'm CIA. I'm
assigned to this embassy.

Would you like to be a spy?"

That's why it
doesn't work that way.

MARTY MARTIN:
A case officer's job is to spot,

assess, and develop...

♪

find people who have
access to secrets,

get to know them,

get them to trust you,

recruit them,

and then keep them safe.

In my particular experience,
because I do speak Arabic...

[Marty Martin speaking
foreign language]

I have been asked to meet
some of our friends

in risky areas,
dangerous areas.

Obviously, you need
to get to the point

of building trust.

They look in your face,
and they see an American

who has risked a lot
to get there

to sit down and meet
with them.

They do believe, honestly,
that you care

for their welfare,
you care for them,

and you respect what
they're providing you with.

You're playing
this chess game.

[Osama bin Laden
dialogue continues]

MAN, VOICE-OVER:
He was recruiting

basically very idealistic
Saudi university students

to come to fight
the Soviets.

Then some of them
went to Afghanistan,

including
bin Laden himself.

♪

It's intensely religious.

I mean, coming here was

an intensely religious
experience

for these very idealistic
young Muslim men.

And, you know, these
magazines have many stories

about people being martyred
fighting the Soviets

and their bodies
don't decompose

or their bodies
smell of perfume.

And this was a highly
effective propaganda to get

other people
to come and volunteer.

[Osama bin Laden speaking
foreign language continues]

PETER BERGEN: This
magazine called "Jihad"

was on sale in countries
around the Islamic world.

The very first copy
was published in 1984.

There's a guy called
Abu Abdullah

in these magazines,
and that was bin Laden.

No one really knew who
bin Laden was at the time.

[Osama bin Laden speaking
foreign language]

STORER: So during
the Afghan-Soviet war,

the camps were set up
by bin Laden and others

to train Afghans
and people from--

who came
from all over the world

to go and fight
against the Soviets.

♪

Towards the end of the war,
some of these camps

got converted over

into urban guerilla
warfare camps.

And this is as,
what we now know

was al-Qaeda, were taking
over some of these camps,

and they were starting
to train people

to conduct
urban guerilla warfare

in various countries,
like Egypt and Algeria.

♪

One of the prominent figures
in the training camps

in Afghanistan is
a gentleman who went

by the war name
of Abu Zubaydah.

He was definitely running
parts of the camps network.

♪

So now it's after the war
in the early nineties.

We started to get
all these reports

about things blowing up
all over the world,

who were from people who
had fought in Afghanistan.

So that's when we started
to say to ourselves,

What is going on here?

Let's try to figure out,
Is there some kind of

an organization?

Is it a social movement?
What is it?

And we're starting
to warn,

"Look this is going
to be a problem."

And we actually issued
some of that warning

before the first
World Trade Center bombing.

[Sirens]

[Vehicle horns honking]

Ramzi Yousef, I'm sure,
everybody knows

from the first
World Trade Center attack.

He is the cousin/nephew
of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed

and the attack
was partly funded

by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.

[Helicopter]

The same year there is
the incident referred to

as the Black Hawk Down
incident.

[Gunfire in distance]

We didn't learn until later
the extent to which

al-Qaeda at least
was involved.

[People chanting
in foreign language]

STORER: These plots
are multiple nationalities.

This is not your
typical events, right?

We can't pin this on
any one terrorist group.

What's going on here?

Oh, I mean, it was
bin Laden.

There was no doubt that
the common purpose had to be

bin Laden.

All of a sudden,
it just hit me

that this is
a bureaucracy.

[Osama bin Laden speaking
foreign language]

STORER: So by 1998, we were
able to say with confidence

this is a worldwide
terrorist organization.

Bin Laden is the head
of this organization.

Their goal is global jihad.

They want to create
a global Islamic government.

It's not
just about Saudi Arabia.

There was still some
debate what it was called

because some said it
was called the Islamic Army.

It was
my analytical judgment

that it was called
al-Qaeda.

♪

BERGEN: At that time
in '97, Osama bin Laden

had declared war
on the United States

in an Arab language
newspaper,

and no one paid
any attention.

You know, the case that I
made to them was, you know,

if you're going to declare
war on the United States,

don't do it on the BBC.

Do it
on an American network.

And CNN is seen
all around the world.

And also we have
a reputation for being fair.

It was a lengthy process.

They were very concerned.

"Are you agents of the CIA?"

"Will you give
Osama bin Laden a fair shake

if we allow you to do
this interview?"

Eventually after a month
or so, we got the sort of

coded message that we're
gonna go and see bin Laden.

♪

BERGEN: They picked
us up at dusk

in a van sort
of like this, right?

Yeah, very similar
to this. Yeah.

But in the evening. Yeah.

Yeah, in
the evening. Yeah.

And then they gave
us the sunglasses

that had cardboard
inside them.

Right. And sort of
crude blindfolds.

That's right.

Did they put those on--
immediately on us?

Yep, they did.
Right.

[Vehicle horn honks]

PETER JOUVENAL:
The interesting thing is

that when you go
to Kabul,

you go through
these tunnels.

So the fact that we
were blindfolded,

you could hear--
feel the change

in air pressure
and actually hear

the difference in sound
in the tunnel.

So you had something
of a good idea

of where we were
heading?

Yeah, yep.

And on the other
side of this,

this is where
al-Qaeda had its

chemical weapons,

crude chemical
weapons facility.

Straight down.
Yeah.

BERGEN:
So we got to--sort of

this plateau, right?

I think it was about
6,000 feet up maybe

or something like that.

Something
like that, yeah.

And there was
a small village,

the type that would be
used by shepherds

to put their sheep
in at night.

Yeah.

BERGEN, VOICE-OVER: Peter
Arnett was a correspondent.

He was at the time
arguably the most famous

journalist in the world.

JOUVENAL, VOICE-OVER:
They put carpets down,

so they made it
respectable.

And then, as I recall,
we waited

for some period of time

and had some sort of
goat-like dinner.

That's right, yeah...

BERGEN: This is, like,
the hostage video.

Yeah, the hostage video.

BERGEN, VOICE-OVER: Do you
recall when he came in?

JOUVENAL, VOICE-OVER:
Yep.

BERGEN: And he shook
your hand, right?

Yep. Yep.

Do you remember
what that felt like?

It was sort of
like a dead fish.

I mean, it wasn't
a strong grasp.

Cold, a bit like...

[unintelligible].

I compare it sometimes

to a bank manager's
shake, you know?

[Laughs]

PETER ARNETT: Thank you,
Mr. bin Laden.

TRANSLATOR: Is there
anything you'd like to add?

Hmm?

Anything you'd like
to add?

We should
change the tape.

PETER ARNETT: I think
we'll just relax a minute,

I think.
BERGEN: OK, fine.

Just relax now.

PETER ARNETT:
Just get my knees.

I'm not used to this.

[Chuckles]

MAN: Not quite
finished. The feed...

Well, Mr. bin Laden's
voice is in good...

Good condition.

Good condition.

It got better as you got...

Hot.

more into the subject,
as you talked about it.

[Speaking foreign language]

BERGEN, VOICE-OVER:
I did think that this was

an amazing interview. Yeah.

He declared
war on the United States

for the first time to

an English-speaking
audience.

BERGEN, VOICE-OVER:
We asked him why.

You know, he basically
gave a laundry list

of complaints about
American foreign policy

in the Muslim world.

BERGEN, VOICE-OVER:
We asked him to clarify,

Did that mean a war
against American soldiers

or American civilians?

BERGEN, VOICE-OVER: He sort
of said American soldiers

were the primary target.

If American civilians
got in the way,

that was their problem.

BERGEN, VOICE-OVER:
He said that in his mind,

the United States
was as weak

as the former Soviet Union.

BERGEN, VOICE-OVER:
And eventually

the United States,
if it was subjected

to enough violent pressure,
would pull out

of the Middle East,

and basically
he would get his wish.

PETER ARNETT: What
are your future plans?

[Translator speaking
foreign language]

Can we get a couple
of still pictures now?

Some photographs?

[Camera shutter clicking]

BERGEN: The impact
of the interview at the time

was, I would say,
pretty muted.

You know, it didn't get
a lot of play,

because at the time,
of course,

he hadn't really done
anything.

Imagine if in 1937

the Japanese army had gone
on NBC or RKO to say,

"Hey, we are planning

to attack
the United States."

You know, Pearl Harbor
might have turned out
differently.

These guys repeatedly
said publicly,

"We are planning
to attack

the United States,"

and no one paid
any attention.

[Wind]

♪

[Speaking foreign language]

[Different man speaking
foreign language]

♪

SUDE: I always watched
their latest statements.

Their choices
of what they're gonna say

are very important.

Oh, yeah they were cagey at
first about claiming credit

for anything.

They didn't
want to claim credit.

Then later on, they become
more willing to take credit,

in fact demanding credit
for it.

♪

[Gunfire]

HASLER: You know, it's all
this stuff hitting you,

all these horrible
images hitting you.

It's just this rapid fire,

horribly evil music video/
horror film, slash...

[Men speaking foreign
language, gunfire]

♪

STORER: Al-Qaeda is
a global organization

made up of people
from over 60 countries

who speak 60 different
languages.

So they really have to
communicate in the clear

through
these statements.

And they're also under
a religious obligation

to warn their enemy.

So for all of those reasons,
it made complete sense

that they meant
what they said.

♪

SUDE: They're planning
something.

But where? When? What?

Is it going to be
an armed assault?

Is it going
to be a hijacking?

Is it going to be
an assassination?

A bomb? You know, where?

There were no real answers.

♪

McLAUGHLIN: The CIA
did very good warning

in that period of time.

There are dozens
and dozens of reports

in which we express the view

that bin Laden is intending
to attack the United States.

We would have weekly
or biweekly meetings

sometimes on exactly

what was going on.

It's so frustrating

when you can't figure
out date and time.

McLAUGHLIN: There's always
a large band of uncertainty,

and that's fertile ground

for argument.

STORER: And if you warn
about every little thing,

then you're crying wolf

and nobody pays
attention to you at all.

SUDE: Middle East,
South Asia, Europe,

United States. Where?

You just don't know.

MCLAUGHLIN: We did not
at this time

and in this report have

what I would call
"actionable intelligence."

"I want to know when,
I want to know where,

I want to know who."

McLAUGHLIN: We could not
determine time,

target, and method.

STORER: You know, I really
wish I could tell you

when and where.

But it's not that easy with
a clandestine organization.

"Well, if you just had
more human assets and you

"did less analysis,
then we would know

all these things."

Well, that isn't true.

You can say we're pretty
sure it's gonna happen,

but we can't make
that decision to say,

you should do or not do.

We can say that
our bottom line is,

"It looks pretty dangerous."

The headline says,

"Bin Laden Determined
to Strike In U.S."

There were just warning
after warning after warning

all spring.

Well, you know with
the benefit of hindsight...

We knew something
huge was gonna happen.

it would seem that this was

a perfect warning

in August of 2001

that the United States
was about to be attacked.

Everybody was
completely tense.

McLAUGHLIN: Why didn't we
do something about this?

The language being used
by these guys was like,

"Oh, my God.
What are they gonna do?"

[Man speaking
foreign language]

♪

[Different men speaking
foreign language]

♪

♪

On the morning of 9/11,

I was sitting
in my office.

My office was here.

The office of the group
chief was right next to it.

And I had my door open,
and I looked,

and there was an analyst

running through the row
between the cubicles.

And it was one
of the older analysts.

And you don't see
older analysts running.

I was in Jordan.

I was at the CIA.

9/11, I was in my office at NSA.

I was at the Executive Office
Building of the White House.

I was in the Pentagon
when it got hit.

The first breaking news
was coming in.

Somebody has it
on RealPlayer

on their--at their desk.

The report was saying
there was a small aircraft

that apparently had hit.

STORER: Right then, second
plane into the second tower,

and I knew.

There was no doubt in
that office at that moment

that this is what we were
waiting for.

This is it.

That's the words that went
through everybody's mind.

This is it.
This is bin Laden.

"It's an attack,
it's terrorism,

and it's al-Qaeda."

I knew who they were.

I knew what
their intentions were.

This is it.
They pulled this thing off.

We're going
to battle stations.

And we were all evacuated
after that second plane

went in because we thought
the next one--that is,

the Shanksville plane--
might be headed for us.

It was complete chaos.

The plane flew in
under my office.

My two assistants looked out
the window and saw a 757

fly in under their feet.

The order then went out

for the building
to be evacuated, except

for the counterterrorism
analysts.

We essentially decamped
from the high-rises

and moved on into
the operations center.

I said, "Look, chief says
we can't go, but, you know,

if you want to leave,
I'll cover for you."

And not one
of those people left.

MARTIN, VOICE-OVER:
19 guys.

Look at their faces
and think

about the tragic,
terrible, consequences.

19. Only 19.

19 representing thousands

who went through training
camps in Afghanistan.

19 representing all those
who were sponsored

and trained and blessed
these young men on that day.

♪

This is where
it gets hard to talk.

[Chuckles nervously]

I have to say the worst
moment in my life

happened
in about November

because right
after the bombing,

you're just so busy.

And everybody, you know--
cry at home; come to work;

be professional;
do your job;

go home; cry at home;
come to work;

be professional;
and do your job.

And people were very
focused, running around,

getting the job done.

On about November,
things started

to slow down
a little bit,

and the guilt sets in.

And that is
just the worst.

I'm sorry.
I'm gonna cry now.

Um...

feeling like you wish you
could have done something,

but especially
when all the criticism

starts to come in.

People would say things
in Congress like,

"You were negligent."

I was like, "Really?

"What did you know about
bin Laden before 2001?

"Nothing! You didn't
help us at all.

And now you're blaming
us for having tried--"

MAN, VOICE-OVER: This is not
a matter of scapegoating.

This is a matter
of accountability.

There has been...

DIFFERENT MAN, VOICE-OVER:
What does the term

"accountability"
mean to you?

DIFFERENT MAN, VOICE-OVER:
Prior to September 11th,

U.S. intelligence officials

possessed
terrorist information

that, if properly handled,
could have disrupted

or possibly prevented
the terrorist attacks.

DIFFERENT MAN, VOICE-OVER:
It seems

from your testimony...

DIFFERENT MAN, VOICE-OVER:
That information was

not distributed to the FBI.

[Overlapping men speaking
in voice-overs]

DIFFERENT MAN, VOICE-OVER:
...The CIA analysts

and FBI officials in
the New York field office...

DIFFERENT MAN, VOICE-OVER:
Has anyone in the CIA

been held accountable
for the failures

of September 11th

or the events
leading up to it?

♪

STORER: Jennifer called me
not long after 9/11,

screaming at me
on the phone.

And we were just in--
we were,

a two-second walk
from each other

in different vaults.

But, "You did this.
This is your fault.

You didn't report
on..." so-and-so.

Blah-blah-blah-blah-
blah-blah-blah...

And I screamed
back at her

and slammed
the phone down.

And at the time,
I was really angry,

and I actually really
never spoke to her again.

But looking back on it,

I think it's just--
it was just

a manifestation
of her passion

and her sense of--
her own sense of guilt.

I mean,
everybody felt it.

[Child speaking
foreign language]

MAN, VOICE-OVER: We were
told to evacuate Yemen.

The entire team
already boarded the plane,

and I was asked

that I will stay,
I should stay

and to talk to
an individual named

Nasser al-Bahri--
Abu Jandal.

♪

We showed him
a photo book

that has a lot
of photos in it.

He identified bin Laden,

he identified
Ayman Zawahiri...

He identified
the usual suspects

that there is no way
he would never know.

But he didn't
identify anyone

from the, you know,
second tier.

No one.

And then he closed
the book.

"I don't have
anything else.

Don't know anyone."

So I ask him, "Please.
Can you look at it again?"

But I just said,
"Please. You know,

come on.
Look at it again."

He was annoyed.

He said, "I just did.
There is nothing..."

"For friendship's sake,
you know?

We're now friends..."

So he did. Same thing.

So I laughed.
I went like...

[Laughs]

To Bob, I said,
"See? I told you."

"What's goin' on?
What did you tell me?"

"Well, I told Bob--
my friend--I told him

"here--I said that
you're basically faking.

"You're not
cooperating at all.

And I think
I won the bet."

"What are you talking
about? I'm cooperating."

"Come on. Really?
You're cooperating?

"Do you think
I just flew

"all the way from D.C.
to talk to you

"about this kind of
like small talk

"and I don't know
who you are?

I don't know
what you know?"

"This guy,
for example...

"He was in your
guesthouse in 1999.

"He was sick. You were
taking care of him,

"putting soup
on his lips

"and you claim you have
no idea who this guy is?

I know a lot about
your organization."

"Maybe some of these
people in the book are

in my custody."

"Maybe some of
the people in the book

"are friend of mine's.

"Maybe they are
my sources.

"Every time I ask
you a question,

"most probably
I know the answer for.

"And that's how I gauge

"if you're cooperating
or not.

So do you want to start
from the beginning?"

He said, yes.

So we showed him
the book again.

He identified almost
everyone in the book

that we know--
we'd assembled--

from the East Africa
Embassy bombing,

from the "USS Cole,"

to include eight
of the hijackers.

And he still insisted
that bin Laden

would never do anything
like this.

And I insisted
that he did.

And I said, "No,
bin Laden did it."

And he said,
"Oh, bin Laden did it?

Who told you?"

"You did."

And he was mad.
He was furious,

because he thought

I was putting words
in his mouth.

I said, "No, you
told me that al-Qaeda

was behind it,
definitely."

And I took a manila
envelope that I had,

and I put the photos
that he identified

the seven hijackers--
or the eight hijackers--

I put them all
in front of him.

I said, "Do you want to
know who the hijackers?

Those are
the hijackers."

♪

"You told me they
were Qaeda members.

You told me that."

He was in total shock.

He put his hand
like this,

and he starts shaking,

and he asked for,
you know, five minutes.

We gave him five
minutes, came back.

I said, "So what do
you think now?"

And he said, "I think
the Sheikh went crazy.

What do you want?"

[Wind]

[Osama bin Laden speaking
foreign language]

♪

MARTIN: A small group of
people--many of them women--

were blamed.

They were blamed.

"They failed to connect
the dots!"

"Connect the dots."

If I hear that...

The Washington machine
turned on them

and said, "It's your fault."

"Sit and do a line diagram,
where you failed

to connect the dots..."

The dots were there,

It's us who decided to--
we need to erase the dots.

Hello! They're coming at us!

That was--
those were late nights.

You go home, you're driving,

you roll over what
operations are going on,

what threats you
believe are genuine.

You're thinking about your
friends and colleagues

downrange.

Sometimes you're thinking
about some talking head

who launched a bunch
of empty bullets,

you know, of blame trying
to get their face on the TV

and not understanding
the sincerity

of the people involved.

That would cause me
grief the next day

because I knew I was
gonna have to go in

and tell people,
"Listen, they don't

"understand what you do.

"Don't you know that?

Now, let's get it on."

♪

McLAUGHLIN: Something that
people don't fully grasp is

how alone the CIA felt
in this period of time.

Just by virtue of
the evolution of events

in history, we ended up
at this moment in time

with kind of
unique knowledge

about this phenomenon,
al-Qaeda.

I think the feeling
all of us had was,

This is on our shoulders
to prevent this

from ever happening again.

The day of 9/11,
the President pulled us

together and said, "I want
to see a war plan here."

Well, we had been working
on this for a long time.

We were ready to go.

♪

MAN: The challenge
when you look at al-Qaeda

after 9/11 was
to understand it well enough

first to disrupt it
and then dismantle it.

We're not in the business
of disruption alone,

because if you disrupt
an organization,

the adversary's so committed.

I mean, they believe

that what they do is
inspired by a holy book,

that they'll just go on
and plot another attack.

So the business really
became dismantlement:

How do we destroy it?

And that's
a people business.

[Overlapping conversations
in foreign language]

PHIL MUDD: How do you find
the operators, financiers,

trainers, et cetera?

And how can you know where
they're gonna be tomorrow

so you can pick them up?

[Conversations in
foreign language continue]

The explosion
of intelligence at CIA

after 9/11 is
hard to imagine.

You have a small group
of people in Alec Station

who are looking
at the problem pre-9/11.

They had limited resources.

After 9/11, that small
core group of people

is dwarfed by the newcomers
into the center post-9/11.

It was a foundational
change in the organization.

♪

MAN, VOICE-OVER: They needed
managerial horsepower

to support the increase
in people and budget.

I did not know enough
about al-Qaeda.

Just what little I had
read in the press.

Was not my specialty.

But, you know,
if you've had 25 years

of experience, you come

with a pretty good sense
of what needs to be done,

even if it's a new
target for you.

Pretty quickly, you learn
what you need to learn

about that target.

I became the head of
the Counterterrorism Center

just about the time
when we were dealing

with all these threats.

I mean, it was daily
constant intelligence

coming about a second wave
of attacks.

But I had a reputation
for building strong teams.

♪

MARTIN, VOICE-OVER:
The phone rang.

A senior came on the line,
basically said,

"We need you to come back.

"You know the gravity
of the situation.

You need to come back
and do what you do."

I basically came back
to be the senior manager

for the worldwide effort
against al-Qaeda.

I had a multidimensional
responsibility.

I had to protect my people,
you know?

We changed the rulebook
a bit.

We were empowered more.

We did things
more aggressive.

"My job is
to kill al-Qaeda."

"Either get
shoulder-to-shoulder,

get with us,
or get out of our way."

JOSE RODRIGUEZ: We had
been focusing on capturing

Abu Zubaydah.

♪

He knew who
the leadership was.

He knew their methods
of attack, their targets.

He was the highest level
al-Qaeda terrorist

that we had ever captured.

When we captured
him in March, he was

severely wounded,

and we knew we had to get
him out of Pakistan.

And in the past, the way
the U.S. had dealt

with issues like this was
to transfer the terrorist

to a friendly country
for interrogation,

but we needed to take
responsibility

for high level terrorists
ourselves.

So we understood
what we had to do.

And we did it.

MARTIN: We took a lot of
bad guys off the streets.

And they got put up--
and it's now public knowledge--

in a nice little, uh...

let's just say...
boutique locations.

ALI SOUFAN: Basically you
have two things you have

to bring with you
to an interrogation room,

especially with
individuals like al-Qaeda.

You have to bring knowledge,

and you have to bring
empathy.

And if you don't have
those two,

I think most probably,
you're gonna fail.

He gave us a couple of
pieces--information

during that early phase.

But then he stopped talking.

When he regained
his strength,

he stopped talking.

And we became convinced

that we had to come up
with a new alternative

to doing this
because it was not working.

♪

Eight of the 12 techniques,
in my humble opinion,

were pretty wimpy stuff.

You know, like, slapping.
Give me a break.

OK, it might be unpleasant
to slap somebody,

but it's not torture.

Grabbing someone
from the lapel,

bringing him in to you may
be unpleasant

and it's
an attention grabber,

but it's not torture.

We didn't ask for this.

We did not ask
to get attacked.

They did it.

And so if we can't make them
uncomfortable to save lives,

then--we've missed
the boat here.

I believe that
the intention was,

"We can never allow
this to happen.

Let's do whatever
needs to be done."

MARTY MARTIN:
They're straight-up haters.

There is no reasoning
with them.

Some individuals who were
at the time in places

to make decisions
believe that the only reason

you deal with
these individuals is by

techniques like this.

If you deal with some
of the hardcore--

our detainees--they
might have become compliant

and then maybe jovial
and engaging,

but if you ask them,
"What are you gonna do

if you ever get out?,"

they'll go, "I'm gonna
come kill you, my friend."

All the information that
came from Abu Zubaydah

we got
before waterboarding.

Most of
these things came

from traditional
interrogation techniques--

by showing people
evidence.

by putting detainees
against each other,

by pocket litter.

So the traditional
interrogation techniques

worked tremendously.

♪

RODRIGUEZ:
We had the interrogators,

and we had the debriefers.

The interrogators would work
with the detainee.

And once they became
compliant,

they would step back
and the debriefers--

the targeting analysts,
the people who knew the most

about the target
would step in

and would begin
to question them.

Jennifer Matthews was there
sitting in front

of Abu Zubaydah,
asking him questions.

There is
a big difference

between being an expert

behind a desk and being
a field expert.

You can't argue
with success.

And the fact
of the matter is

that we were extremely
successful.

Once we started
using the techniques

on Abu Zubaydah and once
he became compliant,

we started to collect
incredible intelligence.

Abu Zubaydah gave us
the play book of how to go

after these individuals.

♪

So in short order, every
chief of operations was

either captured or killed.

MARTIN: Ramzi bin al-Shibh,
Nashiri, Hambali.

KSM. Remember that guy?
That was a nice one.

But they had him
in an Arab yuppie outfit.

You know, he was looking
very prim and proper.

I'm like, Forget this.

I want every guy, bad guy,
downrange should know

what their future is.

This is their mack daddy.

This is
their chief gangster.

This is your future.

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed

was waterboarded
183 times.

They tried to quantify
the numbers

of pourings of water,

and eventually the pourings
of water used

in waterboarding
became "times."

So 183 total pourings
of water

on Khalid Sheikh Mohammad
became 183 times,

which is crazy.

Look, it's not
FBI versus CIA.

I know for a fact
that everything

that we've been told,
that resulted,

because of
waterboarding,

that's not true.

Only three terrorists

with American blood
on their hands

were ever waterboarded.

In many cases,
it was just a few days.

In the case of Abu Zubaydah
and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed,

it was just a few weeks.

SOUFAN:
This program evolved

because, you know,
some of the stuff

that they tried to do
is not working.

And during the evolution
process, I realize

that we shouldn't be
part of this

and--I shouldn't be even
a witness for this.

And I put it
to our headquarters,

and headquarters
pulled us out.

We all knew Americans
would find out at some point

about everything we
were up to.

There were no illusions.

And so you have to try to
provide a lens of history

that doesn't exist yet.

I understand people are
uncomfortable with this,

but the options
we had were not very good.

[Osama bin Laden speaking
foreign language]

MARTIN: In the aftermath
of 9/11, people expected

and realized he would
probably go to Tora Bora,

which he did.

♪

After Tora Bora, he more
likely than not went up

to Kunar and then somewhere.

Well, it could
have been in--

I always thought of him
as running around--

maybe
in the Afghan-Pak border,

maybe even if Afghanistan.

That's what my favorite
would have been--

having him in Afghanistan,
because that was

his spiritual home,
so to speak,

from the Afghan jihad.

RODRIGUEZ: I was asked,
"Where is bin Laden,"

all the time.

When I went to testify
to the Congress,

the first thing they
wanted to know was,

"Where is bin Laden?"

♪

I went to the Oval Office
a number of times.

I was asked by the president
"Where is bin Laden?"

Everybody
would ask the same question:

"Where is bin Laden?"

It was very frustrating to
basically have to admit

that you didn't know.

One time, one of my
colleagues came in to talk

to me about,
"Where's bin Laden?"

And I told him, "Look, you
know, I am so tired of this.

"The next time that
the next person asks me,

"'Where is bin Laden,'

"I'm gonna say,
'You know what? Fuck you.

Fuck you.'"

♪

And later that day,
I went home.

And the first thing my wife
asked me when I get home is,

"Where is bin Laden?
And why can't you find him?"

MARTIN: The toughest
position to be in al-Qaeda

then was number three,
number four.

Because why?
You had to communicate.

You had to communicate
to get attacks done.

You had to communicate--
and if you were doing that,

we're on you.

RODRIGUEZ:
Frankly, even though

in the back of our minds,
we knew we had

to get him some day,

we were actually
too busy going after those

who were actually
plotting against us.

♪

Congratulations,
Abu Butthead.

You're now number three
in al-Qaeda.

That's the good news.
The bad news is,

you're now number
three in al-Qaeda.

You'd better buckle
your chinstrap

because your
career path is

probably going
to be short-lived.

MUDD: There is an aspect
of the intelligence business

called targeting.

I think this is a revolution
for a couple of reasons.

Just in the past ten years,
the agency

has transitioned
from strategic intelligence

to tactical intelligence
that helps you identify

the movements and locations
of one specific individual.

I'm not just worried about
what al-Qaeda

looks like strategically;

I want an analyst

who's spending
all their time looking

at one target
with one name...

[Computer mouse clicking]

and people
whose whole goal in life

is following
one human being.

I went to the other women
who had become

targeting officers
when I moved over--

Jennifer Matthews
and some of the other women

who had already paved
the way--

just to ask them,
"How do I do this?

I have to build this
from the ground up,"

kind of like they did
on the bin Laden side.

You know,
"How do I do this?"

We still didn't have a great
technical tool to do that.

I built a spreadsheet.

And when I reached out
to Barbara and Gina

and a few other women,
they just said,

"That's how we do it.

Go for it. That's exactly
how you get it done."

♪

MUDD: You're leaving
a digital trail every day.

So are terrorists...

when that person travels,

when that person
gets on a phone,

when we get information
from a courier in al-Qaeda

about who he's touching

and we bounce it against
information we might have

found out two years ago.

MUDD: They're looking at
a human terrorist in a field

and they might send
a cable to a station

that results in action
against that target

the next day.

MUDD: Somebody who wants
in the fight.

That's what a targeter is.

You have to intimately know
the target

that you're going after,

how you think that person
is gonna act, react,

what they're gonna do
that day,

what their strategy is,
who they're gonna talk to.

What are their
priorities in life?

Is it wife number one,
is it wife number two?

♪

I was in Baghdad shortly
after the war started,

and it was kind of like
being in the Wild West.

It was complete chaos.

Bin Laden was initially
excited about this.

He was excited about Iraq.

This is something he

couldn't, at the time,
pull off.

So he was happy
to support the endeavor.

♪

[Gunfire]

BAKOS: He was such
a brutal terrorist.

I just felt like we owed
it to the people of Iraq

to remove him.

BAKOS: It seems so strange
that I never met Zarqawi.

My former colleagues

in the Jordanian
Intelligence Service

used to call him
my boyfriend.

[Computer mouse clicking]

[Man speaking
foreign language]

BAKOS, VOICE-OVER: I felt
like I knew Zarqawi too well.

BAKOS: He was a quiet guy...

in a pathological
sort of way.

I mean, he was a monster.

There were calls at
2:00, 3:00 in the morning

from the group chief

every time a bombing
happened,

every time
he set off a VBID,

every time he targeted
a mosque or anything.

♪

You know, I was
thinking about him 24/7,

and it just wasn't
pleasant after a while.

MARTY MARTIN: The model
to me is very clear.

Our special forces,
our JSOC operators,

their analysts,
our analysts,

their operators,
our operators,

were working hand-in-hand.

They were downrange.

They were downrange
in our field stations

assisting in operations,

bringing that expertise
there.

And the lessons
and the ability to take

intelligence operations
combined

with special operations
to create a synergy,

a deadly synergy.

And your job
as a targeting officer

in a war theater
is to help point

boots on the ground
or something up above

toward a target and be
as accurate as possible.

♪

[Explosions]

MAN: Wait!

MAN, VOICE-OVER: For me,
war is sort of like

something radioactive
that you shouldn't touch

unless you've done
a tremendous amount

of understanding of just
the damage that it will do.

You can flirt with the idea
that "I can cross the line

"and go into the dark side
and then I can walk back

"because I'm going
in the dark side

for a good purpose."

And there are times when
that may be appropriate,

but it is dangerous.

♪

It's easier next time
to cross.

[Explosion]

[Men speaking
foreign language]

♪

I did not like being
on the raids.

That wasn't--I was
an analyst.

Wasn't--I just didn't...I...

♪

I think there are
questions

about an intelligence
organization

that slowly gets involved
in executing these types

of global counterterrorism
operations.

That's a real
mind-set change.

The war was not
an agnostic video game.

It was a personal game
where you know

you're responsible

not only for the lives
of Americans,

but for going up
against an adversary

that you got to kill
or capture.

August of 2004,
I think we did 18 raids

that month in Iraq,

our force.

Two years later in 2006,
same month,

Iraq, also,
we did 300 raids.

[Man speaking foreign language]

STANLEY McCHRYSTAL:
Our ability to collect

intelligence,
act on intelligence,

and then collect more
intelligence had taken

an almost industrial
size and speed to it.

[Dialogue continues
in foreign language]

BAKOS: It was definitely
a well-oiled machine.

There were rolling raids.

Sometimes
those were fruitful,

and sometimes not so much.

I think
sometimes the momentum

sort of overtook
the substance

of what we were going after.

You know, it's like,
"There's another target.

Let's go after it,
just because we can."

The machine just kept going.

[Airplane engine starts]

MAN, VOICE-OVER:
We had executed thousands

of these kinds of raids
in Iraq

and Afghanistan,

and we got better
and better at them.

So it was that evolution
in particular with the CIA

in ways that we
just couldn't have imagined

in 2001 or 2002,

but were absolutely
critical, as it turns out,

in order to be able
to meet this threat.

♪

BAKOS: But you
definitely need to know

what your moral center is
and how you define that

for yourself in order
to be able to do that job.

I mean, I worked in a center
where my job was to hunt

a person down
to capture or kill.

I mean, I had to be
OK with that.

And, you know, the paradox
of wanting to save

the women and children
of Iraq

and kill someone
in order to do that

wasn't lost on me
by any means.

But, you know, I...

I can justify that
for myself.

HASLER: The war on terror.

[Explosion]

How can you have
a war on terror

when terrorism is a tactic?

You have a war
against people.

♪

So the question
immediately becomes,

Who are the people
that we're fighting

the war against?

♪

[Explosions]

And I think still most
people don't understand

why they hate us.

[Man speaking foreign language]

Some strikes are necessary,
but if our solution

to this kind of problem is
to just strike

without trying to take
effective efforts

to prevent the rise of
threats, it's endless.

♪

HASLER: Shock and awe does
not end wars on terrorism.

It only creates
more terrorism.

Money starts to flow
to terrorist groups,

people become
more radicalized.

[Crowd cheering]

[Men chanting
in foreign language]

HASLER: Wars on terror
should be fought

under the radar,
as quietly as possible.

But counterterrorist
operations are,

by their nature,

not very satisfying
to a frightened public.

♪

BAKOS:
And we were working closely

with the bin Laden unit,

and the dynamic of
the relationship

between Zarqawi
and core al-Qaeda

sort of turned a lot
of assessments on

what was happening with
core al-Qaeda on its head.

Bin Laden didn't know,
I'm sure, what he was

getting into with Zarqawi--

how fundamentally
different he was

from some of his
other al-Qaeda leaders.

He did not have the same
academic background

that a lot of
the al-Qaeda scholars had.

He didn't have the same--

for a lack of a better way
to put it--

professional sense
of jihad as al-Qaeda did.

He didn't understand
the rules of the game.

He just thought
he could enact

any strategy regardless
of how brutal it was.

[Man speaking foreign language]

♪

BAKOS: It was surprising
to hear

that Zarqawi was not
being deferential.

He was being insubordinate.

[Computer mouse clicking]

♪

Hassan Ghul was
an emissary from al-Qaeda.

He was actually
bringing over another letter

from al-Qaeda central
to Zarqawi about

how he should be conducting
operations in Iraq.

When we realized
that Hassan Ghul

would be traveling to Iraq,

we decided this was
an opportunity for us.

So we actually planned
an operation--

it was my team with our base
and the Kurdish government--

to capture him.

And we definite--

the Kurdish government
kept him, and we

definitely gained a lot
of information out of him,

including
Al-Kuwaiti's name

and the role that he
played with bin Laden.

Did that answer...

INTERVIEWER:
Do you know how his name,

Ahmed al-Kuwaiti's,
came up?

[Chuckles]

Within the course
of a debriefing

with the Kurdish
government,

Hassan Ghul gave up
the name of Al-Kuwaiti,

the courier.

RODRIGUEZ:
Ahmed from Kuwait.

It was
significant information,

even though we knew that
the pseudonym al-Kuwaiti

was a throwaways.

I mean, who--
It's like saying

"Jose the Puerto Rican,"
you know?

It could be anybody.

The key is what
he told us about bin Laden

not using any other
means of communicating.

♪

We asked
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed

about the information
of the courier...

and he kind of just...

He jumped back.

His body language
jumped back. He changed.

And he said, "No, no, no."

Look, we all know,
even as little kids,

if suddenly you react
and go, "No, no, no,"

it probably means
"Yes, yes, yes."

He had not been truthful.

But later--and this
is the benefits

of having black sites--

we intercepted
a communication from him

to some of the other
detainees.

He told his fellow
detainees not to say a word

about the courier,

thereby telling us
a lot about the courier...

♪

that he's of
tremendous importance

and that we were
on to something.

[Vehicles passing in distance,
whistles blowing]

MICHAEL HAYDEN:
In late 2007,

the bin Laden cell
came to me.

♪

Some of these people
had been doing this

well before 9/11.

I mean, they go all the way
back to Alec Station.

These people had spent
their lives on this target.

They said, "We're going to
try another approach.

"It's got to be
the courier network.

"We've got some information
on couriers.

We're gonna begin
to build from that."

The way it works
is information comes in.

You catalogue it,
you organize it.

You know, that little
nugget there could sit

fallow on your shelves
for four or five years

until something else comes
in that's suddenly

very illuminating
about something that you

may have had for a very
long period of time.

That actually happened
in the work

we did to hunt
for Osama bin Laden

by trying to track
his courier.

♪

RODRIGUEZ: It took years
for the agency

to recruit the human source

that eventually gave us
the true name.

That's why we're
in the business

of clandestine
human intelligence,

because in many cases,
all these fancy gadgets

and everything else

won't give you
the information

that you really need--

a true name.

And we finally
got his true name...

which is whatever it is.

[Laughs]

Whatever Arabic name,
you know?

But the true name,
we were able to find out

a lot about him.

From then on, you know,

the agency was able to do
what it does so well--

track the guy and find him.

HAYDEN:
Very soon after that,

I briefed the President.

I said, "I got to tell you,
Mr. President, my guys,

"they seem a little
optimistic about this.

They actually think
this could lead somewhere."

[Overlapping conversations
in foreign language]

MARTIN: You're projecting
force and intelligence

and assets
across that border.

And that's
what Khost represented.

Their focus was across
over there in Waziristan,

because that's where
the enemy was.

[Vehicle horns honking]

MAN: Jen Matthews
was the chief of base,

of the CIA base down there.

She was there
to have her fingers

right on the pulse
of the information

that was coming
through the base.

She never enunciated
that, so to speak,

in such stark terms,

but my sense was she was

there to target and kill

senior al-Qaeda leaders.

I asked her, "Do you think
we're going to get him?"

She smiled and said,

"We'll get him eventually,

and I hope
I'm a part of it."

So...

♪

[Man speaking foreign language]

MAN: He's not at all what
you'd expect as a radical.

He's a doctor; he's working
in a refugee clinic.

It turns out he had
this very dangerous hobby

on the side, which was
writing this blog

and getting himself
in trouble.

Over a period of months,

he becomes one of

the most visible writers

on the internet, and the CIA

and the Jordanian
intelligence

go all out to recruit
Balawi to be a spy.

Over several weeks,
they convince him

to go to work for them.

[Humam al-Balawi speaking
foreign language]

[Overlapping conversations
in foreign language]

♪

JOBY WARRICK: Balawi finds
his way into Pakistan

and essentially disappears.

Very likely somebody
suspected him

as being an informant
and maybe cut his head off.

Nobody hears anything from
Balawi for three months.

Suddenly he's back
on the radar screen again,

and he's saying,
"I've gotten inside."

Balawi is a doctor.

He is now beginning to treat

the number two leader
of al-Qaeda,

Ayman al-Zawahiri.

[al-Balawi speaking
foreign language]

When Balawi sends
this information

to the CIA headquarters,
the place goes crazy.

Even the White House
gets briefed.

This young man, Balawi,

is gonna take us
right to number two

and maybe even
to number one.

[al-Balawi speaking
foreign language]

WARRICK: The meeting
has to take place

in a place where the CIA
can completely control

the environment,
and by default,

this becomes
the CIA base at Khost.

It falls
to Jennifer Matthews

to come with a plan
to get Balawi

inside this base at Khost
without being detected.

Well, the problem is

that nobody in the CIA
has ever met with Balawi.

♪

WARRICK: They make
arrangements for him to come

into the base
without even being searched

or checked because
they're afraid

that somebody might
recognize him,

his identity might
be compromised.

♪

People have been
too quick to blame Jennifer,

and that I reject totally

because there were
many people

looking at this operation.

♪

RODRIGUEZ: People wanted
to believe that the source

was good.

♪

There were also pressures
coming from the White House

and elsewhere, saying,
you know,

"Pursue, pursue, pursue.
We need to do this."

I'm sure there were people,
voices out there saying,

"Uh, maybe not."

"Maybe we should slow down."

♪

That happens
in many operations.

Didn't happen in this one.

WARRICK: So they set up
a plan to get him

through the checkpoints
without being even looked at

by the guards.

He gets further
into the base,

goes through
a second checkpoint,

goes to a third checkpoint,

and gets all the way
in to the innermost heart

of the base,
the inner sanctum.

WARRICK: There are a total
of 14 CIA officers lined up

to meet him.

WARRICK: Balawi gets out of

the car on the wrong side,

and he's chanting the words

in Arabic "God is great."

Before anyone
could stop Balawi,

he fumbles
for his detonator.

You will be sent
to the hell.

WARRICK:
Balawi hits a switch,

blows himself up, and
there's a terrific explosion

that kills almost everybody
who's within direct sight

of Balawi at the time
of the explosion.

MICHAEL WALTZ:
We heard the explosion,

but when we saw
the smoke coming up

from exactly where I knew
Chapman was,

then I knew the base
had been hit.

We knew that someone
had gotten

inside the base,

and we knew that
it was the agency

that had been hit.

And we knew it was bad.

♪

By the time we got
on the scene,

it was an ugly scene.

There were, you know,
parts everywhere.

The conventional unit
that was there landed--

the helicopter right
in the courtyard

and evaced as many of
the wounded as possible.

You know, he said
Jen didn't make it.

Uh...

Her logistics chief
that we had worked with

to close the base on a daily
basis didn't make it.

And some of
her case officers

never made it even
back to--you know,

they died on the scene.

RODRIGUEZ: When you do this
and do this and do this,

eventually you lose one.

And we lost...

and we lost
really good people.

♪

BAKOS: When I heard that
Jennifer was in Khost...

I was shocked that she...

was taken out by bin Laden.

I mean, that was just--

that just seemed so surreal

that that would happen
to her.

You know, after she spent so
many years trying to prevent

another tragedy by him,

You know, he, in effect,

had anything
to do with her death,

it's incredibly
disheartening.

HAYDEN: There was some
criticism of the agency.

Frankly, I understand that.

But you don't get
Abbottabad without Khost.

An agency that's not willing
to take the risks that were

evident at Khost,

which unfortunately
ended tragically...

that agency, if it's not
willing to do that

is not an agency to do
what it had to do

to build that trail
all the way to Abbottabad.

In fact, some of
the human beings who built

the trail to Abbottabad were
actually killed at Khost.

It was kind of Team America
in the hunt for bin Laden

and the fight
against al-Qaeda.

And there is powerful
connective tissue

between the two events.

♪

[Man speaking foreign language
in voice-over]

♪

[Mustafa Ansara speaking
foreign language in voice-over]

STORER: The hunt
for the courier to bin Laden

makes complete sense to me.

It was based on all of these
years of experience working

with a very tight-knit
group of people

who really cared about this
and supported each other.

♪

We invented the technique
that works,

and it's the technique that
got bin Laden in the end.

♪

I got a call from another--
a former colleague,

and he said,
"Turn on the news."

You know, I was at home.

"Turn on the news.

The President's going
to make an announcement."

And I had a feeling
that it's been a good day

at the office...

OBAMA: Good evening.

And then finally it's him.

They got him.
They got him finally.

That was--yeah,
that was really something.

[Crowd cheering]

[Crowd chanting "USA"]

CROWD MEMBERS: ♪ Na na na na ♪

♪ Na na na na ♪

♪ Hey hey hey ♪

♪ Good-bye... ♪

SECOND GROUP:
♪ Obama, Obama ♪

♪ We fucking killed Osama ♪

♪ Obama, Obama ♪

♪ We fucking killed Osama ♪

♪ Obama, Obama ♪

♪ We fucking killed Osama ♪

♪ Obama, Obama, we... ♪

McCHRYSTAL: I'm not sure
America has made the effort

that it needs to

to understand what it
is we just went through.

The really key part is not
how to do these operations;

the thing to understand is,

why are the people
that we are fighting

doing what they're doing?

Why is the enemy the enemy?

If you don't understand why
they're doing it,

it's very difficult to stop.

[Vehicle horns honking]

We don't speak
the language enough.

We don't understand
the culture enough.

We haven't taken the time to
not be blind, deaf, and dumb

in areas of the world
that matter to us.

MARTIN: It's a nice chapter
to close,

nice chapter to close.

It's not over.

Sadly enough, I think
we're gonna

be in this situation again.

BAKOS: Bin Laden achieved,
you know, spreading

his ideology beyond what he
probably expected it to.

How do you kill an ideology?

Killing one person doesn't
end that.

MUDD: I don't like it.

I don't want it to continue.
I hope it stops.

I hope we don't live
in a world

where you deal
with an adversary

that loses respect for
the sanctity of human life.

But, look,
this isn't a picture

from a video arcade.

This is a human being who
has a family and a soul.

So when you confront that,
what are you gonna do?

There are philosophical
debates you can have,

but at the end of
the day, the question is:

Are you gonna move
or not? Yes or no?

Go or no go? That's it.

♪