All language subtitles for The.Vietnam.War.S01E03.The.River.Styx.January.1964-December.1965.720p.WEB-DL.AAC2.0.H.264-BOOP-HI

ANNOUNCER: Major support
for "The Vietnam War"

was provided by members of
The Better Angels Society,

including Jonathan and Jeannie Lavine,

Diane and Hal Brierley,

Amy and David Abrams,

John and Catherine Debs,

the Fullerton Family Charitable Fund,

the Montrone Ffamily,

Lynda and Stewart Resnick,

the Perry and Donna
Golkin Family Foundation,

the Lynch Foundation,

the Roger and Rosemary
Enrico Foundation,

and by these additional funders.

Major funding was also provided

by David H. Koch...

The Blavatnik Family Foundation...

The Park Foundation,

the National Endowment
for the Humanities,

the Pew Charitable Trusts,

the John S. and James
L. Knight Foundation,

the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation,

the Arthur Vining Davis Foundations,

the Ford Foundation JustFilms,

by the Corporation for
Public Broadcasting,

and by viewers like you.

Thank you.

ANNOUNCER: Bank of
America proudly supports

Ken Burns' and Lynn Novick's
film "The Vietnam War"

because fostering different perspectives

and civil discourse
around important issues

furthers progress, equality,

and a more connected society.

Go to bankofamerica.com/
betterconnected to learn more.

(BIRDS CHIRPING, DOG
BARKING IN DISTANCE)

("WITH GOD ON OUR SIDE"
BY BOB DYLAN PLAYING)

DYLAN: ♪ Oh, my name,
it ain't nothin' ♪

JEAN-MARIE CROCKER: Well, I
wanted to name him after his dad,

Denton Winslow Crocker.

So that was the name we chose.

He was a colicky little baby.

And, uh, so we were up
night and day with him.

And my husband was a wonderful dad

and very loving and attentive.

He'd walk the floor with him.

And then he said one day,
"He's a regular little mogul

the way he rules our lives."

So that's where the name came from.

We called him Mogie.

NARRATOR: Mogie Crocker
was born June 3, 1947,

the oldest of four children.

His father was a biology teacher,

and Mogie was raised in college towns:

Ithaca, Amherst, and
finally Saratoga Springs,

to which the family moved
in 1960, when he was 13.

My mother read books to all of us.

My brother was definitely the one

who probably gravitated
towards them more than I did.

He really feasted on books.

NARRATOR: Mogie was an unusual boy.

Intelligent, independent-minded,
and too nearsighted

to do well at team sports,

he loved books about American
history and American heroes.

At 12, he started a diary

in which he kept track
of Cold War events.

"I hate Reds!" he wrote,

and he admired most those
who had proved willing

to sacrifice themselves for a cause.

President John F. Kennedy's
call for every American

to ask what he or she
could do for their country

had mirrored ideas he'd held
since he was a small boy.

One evening when I was reading to Denton

before he went to sleep, I chose
a passage from Henry V,

which is, "He today that
sheds his blood with me

shall be my brother.

And gentlemen in England now a-bed

shall think themselves accurs'd

they were not here and
hold their manhood cheap

while any speaks that fought
with us upon St. Crispin's Day."

(DISTANT BOMBS ECHOING)

DYLAN: ♪ If another war comes... ♪

JEAN-MARIE CROCKER: I think
that it was that sort of thing

that made Denton want to be

part of something important and brave.

DYLAN: ♪ With God on their side. ♪

("WITH GOD ON OUR SIDE" CONTINUES)

LYNDON JOHNSON: I just
stayed awake last night

thinking about this thing.

The more I think of it, I
don't know what in the hell...

it looks like to me we're
getting into another Korea.

It just worries the hell out of me.

I don't see what we can ever
hope to get out of there with

once we're committed.

I don't think it's worth fighting for

and I don't think we can get out.

And it's just the biggest
damn mess I ever saw.

MCGEORGE BUNDY: It
is, it's an awful mess.

JOHNSON: I just thought about
ordering those kids in there,

and what in the hell am I
ordering them out there for?

BUNDY: One thing that
has occurred to me...

JOHNSON: What the hell
is Vietnam worth to me?

What is it worth to this country?

BUNDY: Yeah, yeah.

JOHNSON: Now, of course, if you
start running the communists,

they may just chase you
right into your own kitchen.

BUNDY: Yeah. That's the trouble.

And that is what the rest
of that half of the world

is going to think if this
thing comes apart on us.

LYNDON JOHNSON: It's
damned easy to get in a war,

but it's going to be awfully
hard to ever extricate yourself

if you get in.

BUNDY: It's very easy...

JOHNSON: I'd like to hear Walter
and McNamara to evaluate this thing.

BUNDY: To debate it?

JOHNSON: Yeah.

BUNDY: All right, what's
a possible time... ?

NARRATOR: Tragedy had brought
Lyndon Johnson to the presidency

in November of 1963.

And he would not feel
himself fully in charge

until he had faced the
voters the following year.

But his ambitions for
his country were as great

as those of his hero,
Franklin Roosevelt.

During his years in the White House,

he would lead the
struggle to win passage

of more than 200 important
pieces of legislation...

the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
the Voting Rights Act of 1965,

federal aid to education,
Head Start, Medicare,

and a whole series of bills
aimed at ending poverty

in America, all intended to create

what he called "The Great Society."

In foreign affairs, Johnson
was less self-assured.

"Foreigners are not like the
folks I'm used to," he once said.

To deal with them, he retained in office

all of John Kennedy's top advisors...

Dean Rusk at State,

Robert McNamara at Defense,

McGeorge Bundy as his
National Security Advisor.

"I need you," he told them,
more than his predecessor had.

Publicly, Johnson pledged

that "This nation will
keep its commitments

from South Vietnam to West Berlin."

But privately, Vietnam
filled him with dread.

"It's going to be hell in
a handbasket out there,"

his ambassador told him.

"I want the South Vietnamese
to get off their butts

and get out into those jungles

and whip the hell out of some
communists," the president said.

"And then I want 'em to leave me alone,

because I've got some
bigger things to do

right here at home."

Johnson had opposed the
military coup that had overthrown

and murdered South Vietnamese
president Ngo Dinh Diem,

fearing it would make
a bad situation worse.

It had.

(GUNFIRE, SHOUTING)

The National Liberation
Front... the Viet Cong...

was making coordinated attacks
throughout the countryside,

some 400 of them in just two weeks.

NARRATOR: An estimated 40% of
the South Vietnamese countryside,

and more than 50% of the people,

were effectively in the
hands of the Viet Cong.

And the Vietnamese generals
who had overthrown Ngo Dinh Diem

were bickering among themselves.

The assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem
set in motion a series of coups.

Each government was less
effective than the one before.

NARRATOR: In January 1964,

with U.S. encouragement,

General Nguyen Khanh
staged yet another coup.

In March, Johnson sent McNamara
to Vietnam with instructions

to show the people that
Khanh was "our boy."

SAM WILSON: Johnson said,

"Let's get him out and
get him speaking to people,

and let McNamara go with him as well

so that people can see
that the United States

is solidly behind this man."

We fully support the
people of South Vietnam.

BUI DIEM (SPEAKING ENGLISH):

When Khanh gave a tedious, long,
laborious speech ending up with,

"Vietnam (SPEAKING VIETNAMESE),
Vietnam (SPEAKING VIETNAMESE),

Vietnam a thousand years."

McNamara leaned over to
the microphone and said...

(ATTEMPTING TO REPEAT VIETNAMESE PHRASE)

BUI DIEM:

(MCNAMARA ATTEMPTING TO
REPEAT VIETNAMESE PHRASE)

What he was saying was something like,

"The little duck, he wants to lie down."

(ATTEMPTING TO REPEAT VIETNAMESE PHRASE)

WILSON: He wasn't aware
of the tonal difference.

And McNamara grabbed one
fist and held them up.

And the crowd practically

disintegrated on the cobblestones.

NARRATOR: "No more of this coup shit,"

President Johnson told his advisors.

But Khanh, too, lacked
popular legitimacy,

and other generals continued
to jockey for power.

Washington turned a deaf
ear to Buddhist calls

for the genuinely
representative government

they'd hoped they'd get
when Diem was overthrown.

Between January 1964 and June of 1965,

there would be eight
different governments.

All of their leaders were
so close to the Americans

that they were seen as puppets.

(SHOUTING, WHISTLING)

One weary Johnson aide suggested

that the national
symbol of South Vietnam

should be a turnstile.

MURRAY FROMSON: These demonstrating
students seem to symbolize

the kind of anarchy that is
descending on Saigon these days.

This kind of political
backbiting is having

serious consequences in the countryside,

for until a strong
government begins to function

here in Saigon,

the war against the communists
will continue to founder.

DONG SI NGUYEN:

NARRATOR: Ho Chi Minh was still
a beloved figure in North Vietnam,

still concerned that his
country remained fragile,

still wary that stepping
up the conflict in the South

might force the Americans to
take a still more active role.

But Ho now shared power with
younger, more impatient leaders.

There had been change and
turmoil in North Vietnam, too,

just as there had been
in Saigon and Washington,

though Americans knew
almost nothing about it.

HUY DUC:

NARRATOR: At the Ninth Party
Plenum that began in Hanoi

on November 22, 1963,

the day President Kennedy
was killed in Dallas,

the Politburo had argued over
how best to proceed in the war.

North Vietnam's two communist patrons,

the Soviet Union and China, were
giving them conflicting advice.

NGUYEN NGOC:

NARRATOR: In two weeks of
sometimes bitter debate,

Ho Chi Minh, who favored
the Soviet strategy,

was outmaneuvered by party
First Secretary Le Duan,

who sided with the Chinese.

NGUYEN NGOC:

NARRATOR: Le Duan believed
that with Diem gone,

and the Saigon government in disarray,

it was time to move quickly in 1964.

He proposed a two-phase plan
for victory in South Vietnam.

The first phase would
destroy ARVN forces

through big, "decisive battles";

the second, an attack on
the cities, Le Duan believed,

would then set off popular
revolts within them.

Party leaders and others

suspected of having opposed the plan

were denounced as
"revisionists," demoted,

dismissed, imprisoned.

Hundreds were sent to
"re-education camps."

"Uncle Ho wavers," Le Duan said,
"but I have only one goal...

final victory."

WOMAN: Secretary McNamara on line 0.

JOHNSON: Bob?

MCNAMARA: Yes, Mr. President?

JOHNSON: I hate to bother you, but...

MCNAMARA: No trouble at all.

JOHNSON: Tell me, have we got anybody

that's got a military mind that
can give us some military plans

for winning that war?

Let's get some more of
something, my friend,

because I'm going to have a heart attack

if you don't get me something.

We need somebody over
there that can get us

some better plans than we got,

because what we got is
what we've had since '54.

We're not getting it done.

We're-we're losing.

MCNAMARA: Well, it's one
reason I want to go back.

Kick 'em in the tail a little bit

will help here at this point.

JOHNSON: Yeah.

What I want is somebody
to lay up some plans

to trap these guys and
whup hell out of 'em.

Kill some of 'em.

That's what I want to do.

MCNAMARA: I'll try and
bring something back

that will meet that objective.

JOHNSON: Okay, Bob.

MCNAMARA: Thank you.

(PHONE HANGS UP)

NARRATOR: When his
counselors urged him to do so,

Johnson increased the number
of American military personnel

from 16,000 to more than
23,000 by the end of the year.

But he wanted his own team in Saigon.

He replaced Henry Cabot Lodge,

making General Maxwell
Taylor his ambassador,

and selected 49-year-old
General William Westmoreland,

a decorated commander
from WWII and Korea,

to lead the American military effort.

The president hoped to force
Hanoi to abandon its support

for the guerrilla struggle in the South

by gradually escalating
military pressure.

He authorized American pilots
to bomb North Vietnamese troops

and installations in the
neighboring country of Laos.

And he directed the military

to oversee South Vietnamese shelling

of North Vietnamese islands
and raids on coastal bases.

All of it was to be conducted in secret.

The American people were not to be told.

It was an election year.

Meanwhile, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff felt strongly

that the United States was fighting

on the enemy's terms

and urged far more drastic
and dramatic action...

air strikes against "critical
targets" in North Vietnam itself

and the deployment of U.S.
forces in South Vietnam...

boots on the ground.

Johnson refused, fearing
that such aggressive moves

would pull China into the conflict

just as it had entered
the Korean War in 1950.

JOHNSON: They say get in or get out.

MCGEORGE BUNDY: Yeah.

JOHNSON: And I told them,

we haven't got any Congress
that will go with us,

and we haven't got any
mothers that will go with us

in the war, and I got to win an election

and then you can make a decision.

(CROWD CHEERING)

NARRATOR: Polls showed
him with a commanding lead

over his likely Republican opponent,

Senator Barry F. Goldwater of Arizona,

a blunt, uncompromising
critic of what he charged

was the administration's weakness

in the face of communist aggression.

BARRY GOLDWATER: Why does he
put off facing the question

of what to do about Vietnam?

Does he hope that he can
wait until after the election

to confront the American
public with the...

BILL EHRHART: Here were these communists

who were overrunning Southeast Asia

and Johnson's doing nothing about it.

My opponent has not told you

what he plans to do about the Cold War.

I rode around the back of
a flatbed truck in Perkasie

with a bunch of my classmates

singing Barry Goldwater campaign songs

because Lyndon Johnson
was not tough enough

on those communists.

NARRATOR: Johnson felt he did
not yet have the political capital

to take further action in
Vietnam, but he asked his aide,

William Bundy, to draft
a Congressional resolution

authorizing him to use force if needed

to be sent to Capitol Hill
when the time was right.

On July 30, 1964, South Vietnamese ships

under the direction of the U.S. military

shelled two North Vietnamese
islands in the Gulf of Tonkin.

The tiny North Vietnamese
Navy was put on high alert.

What followed was one
of the most controversial

and consequential events
in American history.

On the afternoon of August 2,

the destroyer U.S.S.
Maddox was moving slowly

through international waters in the gulf

on an intelligence-gathering
mission in support

of further South Vietnamese
action against the North.

The commander of a North
Vietnamese torpedo-boat squadron

moved to attack the Maddox.

The Americans opened fire and missed.

North Vietnamese torpedoes also missed.

But carrier-based U.S. planes damaged

two of the North Vietnamese boats

and left a third dead in the water.

Ho Chi Minh was shocked to
hear of his navy's attack

and demanded to know who had ordered it.

The officer on duty was
officially reprimanded

for impulsiveness.

No one may ever know who
gave the order to attack.

To this day, even the
Vietnamese cannot agree.

But some believe it was Le Duan.

HUY DUC:

NARRATOR: Back in Washington,

the Joint Chiefs urged
immediate retaliation

against North Vietnam.

The president refused.

Instead, the White
House issued a warning

about the "grave
consequences" that would follow

what it called "any further
unprovoked" attacks...

even though Johnson knew
the attack had been provoked

by the South Vietnamese raids
on North Vietnam's islands.

Both sides were playing
a dangerous game.

On August 4, American radio
operators mistranslated

North Vietnamese radio traffic

and concluded a new military
operation was imminent.

Actually, Hanoi had simply called upon

torpedo boat commanders
to be ready for a new raid

by the South Vietnamese.

The Maddox and another
destroyer, the Turner Joy,

braced for a fresh attack.

So did the White House.

LYNDON JOHNSON: Go ahead, Mac.

MCNAMARA: I... I personally
would recommend to you,

after a second attack on our ships,

that we do retaliate against
the coast of North Vietnam

some way or other...

JOHNSON: What I was thinking
about when I was eating breakfast:

when they move on us
and they shoot at us,

I think we not only
ought to shoot at them,

but almost simultaneously
pull one of these things

that you've been doing on one
of their bridges or something.

MCNAMARA: Exactly.

I quite agree with you, Mr. President.

JOHNSON: But I wish
we could have something

that we've already picked out,

and just hit about three of
them damn quick, right after.

NARRATOR: No second
attack ever happened,

but at the time, anxious
American sonar operators

aboard the Maddox and Turner
Joy convinced themselves one had.

The attack was probable but
not certain, Johnson was told,

and since it had probably occurred,

the president decided it
should not go unanswered.

JOHNSON: Aggression by terror
against the peaceful villagers

of South Vietnam has now
been joined by open aggression

on the high seas against
the United States of America.

Yet our response, for the present,

will be limited and fitting.

We Americans know, although
others appear to forget,

the risk of spreading conflict.

We still seek no wider war.

EVERETT ALVAREZ: If that came to
be where we would be called upon

to carry out our responsibilities,

and having been well trained for this,

I never really gave it much thought.

It was part of my duty.

NARRATOR: Lieutenant Everett
Alvarez from Salinas, California,

was aboard the U.S.S.
carrier Constellation.

His squadron of Skyhawk A-4 planes

was ordered to attack
torpedo boat installations

and oil facilities near
the port of Hon Gai.

For the first time, American
pilots were going to drop bombs

on North Vietnam.

ALVAREZ: When we approached the target

coming down from altitude,

it was obvious that they could
pick us up on their radar.

I remember my knees shaking.

And I was saying, "Holy
smokes, I'm going into war."

"This is war."

I was a bit scared.

Once we went in and they
started firing at us,

the fear went away.

Everything became smooth,
deathly quiet in the cockpit.

It was sort of like a symphony

in the sense that my plane was
just like a ballet in the sky,

and I was just performing
what I was doing.

And then I got hit.

MAN: Mayday, Mayday.

(INSTRUMENTS BEEPING)

NARRATOR: Coastal
militiamen captured Alvarez

and turned him over to the
North Vietnamese military.

ALVAREZ: One fella was yelling at me

in Vietnamese and saying something.

I started talking to him in Spanish.

Don't ask me why.

It seemed like a good idea at the time.

After when they discovered
U.S.A. on my ID card

and then they started
speaking to me in English.

NARRATOR: Alvarez assumed he would
be treated as a prisoner of war.

ALVAREZ: I was sticking
to the code of conduct,

which is giving them
name, rank, service number,

and date of birth.

But they quickly reminded me
that there was no state of war,

no declaration of war.

So I could not be
considered a prisoner of war.

I recall thinking about it,

and I says, "You know what?

They're right."

NARRATOR: Everett Alvarez
was the first American airman

to be shot out of the
sky over North Vietnam

and the first to be imprisoned there.

Now, the president
sent up to Capitol Hill

the resolution he had asked
his aide William Bundy to draft

two months earlier.

JAMES WILLBANKS: Johnson is sort
of prepositioned to move anyway,

and it gives him really
the incident that he needs

to go to Congress and
ask for a resolution

that will allow him to
deal with what he sees

as aggression in Vietnam.

And what he gets is the
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution,

which is, what he says, like
"Grandma's nightshirt"...

it covers everything.

I think what Johnson is
looking for is the opportunity,

the right time to send a
message to North Vietnam

that we're serious about
supporting South Vietnam.

That message is sent,

I think we misread the enemy

because they're just
as serious as we are.

NARRATOR: On August 7, 1964,

by a vote of 88-2, the Senate passed

what came to be called
the Tonkin Gulf Resolution.

In the House, not a single
congressman opposed it.

Senator Goldwater could
no longer plausibly claim

Johnson was failing to fight back

against North Vietnam,
while those voters concerned

that the United States was in danger

of becoming too deeply involved

admired the president's
measured response.

Support for Johnson's handling
of the war jumped overnight

from 42% to 72%.

The American public
believed their president.

Le Duan and his comrades
in Hanoi did not.

They had little faith
in the president's claim

that he sought no wider war.

They resolved to step up their efforts

to win the struggle in the South

before the United States
escalated its presence

by sending in combat troops.

For the first time,

Hanoi began sending
North Vietnamese regulars

into the South, down
the network of paths

they had hacked out of
the Laotian jungle...

the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

PETER KALISCHER: This
is Bien Hoa Air Base,

the biggest in South Vietnam,

hours after being hit by
a communist mortar barrage.

NARRATOR: On November 1,
Viet Cong guerrillas shelled

the American airbase
at Bien Hoa near Saigon.

Five Americans died.

Thirty were wounded.

Five B-57 bombers were
destroyed on the ground

and 15 more were damaged.

PETER KALISCHER: Mr. Ambassador,

do you think this
shows any new capability

that they've got, the Viet Cong?

Uh, I would simply say
they've never done this before.

NARRATOR: The Joint Chiefs
advised the president to mount

an immediate all-out air attack
on 94 targets in the North

and to send in regular
Army and Marine units...

not more advisors...
to South Vietnam as well.

He would not do it.

The election was just two days away.

Lyndon Baines Johnson won the
presidency in his own right,

and he won it by a landslide.

Within a month, the
president would approve

what was called a
"graduated response"...

limited air attacks on the
Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos

and "tit for tat" retaliatory raids

on North Vietnamese targets.

But he refused to undertake
sustained bombing of the North

until the South Vietnamese
got their own house in order.

In private, Johnson doubted that
airpower alone would ever work

and believed that he would eventually
have to send in ground troops,

though he was not yet
willing publicly to say so.

JEAN-MARIE CROCKER: In the
fall of '64, Denton was 17

and he was determined
to go into the service.

NARRATOR: Mogie Crocker had
been restless since the summer.

After the Gulf of Tonkin
incident, he had confided

to his sister that he
wanted to join the Navy,

but he knew his parents would
not sign the consent form

that would have allowed
a 17-year-old to enlist.

He was talking about wanting
to go into the service

and that his attempts to
go underage had failed.

And that he wanted my parents
to support him in that.

NARRATOR: His parents
tried to persuade him

that he could be more
useful to his country

with a college education
than as just another private.

Mogie was adamant.

JEAN-MARIE CROCKER: Monday
morning he left for school.

And I watched him leave.

But that night he
didn't come in for supper

and he hadn't called.

The day that my brother
ran away has to be

one of the most bizarre
experiences in my life.

I eventually happened
to look in my piggy bank

and he had taken the money
I had and left a note for me.

He had promised he would pay me back.

JEAN-MARIE CROCKER: He
was gone about four months

and said that he would not come home

unless we agreed to sign for him.

And he wouldn't be 18 until June.

But we did agree and he did come home.

My husband felt it was
an honor-bound agreement.

I was hoping that I
could change his mind.

("THE MARINES' HYMN" PLAYS)

PHILIP BRADY: To my mind, the Marine
Corps represented the very best.

And it does.

They are the best.

And I wanted to be part of the best.

I was competitive.

I was pugnacious.

But I wanted to get in the Marine Corps

and go to the first war I could find.

NARRATOR: Lieutenant Philip Brady,
from Port Washington, New York,

arrived in Saigon just a few days

after Lyndon Johnson's election,

one of the new advisors
sent to help shore up

the South Vietnamese military.

We must ensure that women
and children are not injured.

NARRATOR: General Westmoreland
himself greeted the newcomers.

He was an impressive-looking
man with an impressive record.

Many of the men he'd led in
Tunisia, Sicily, and Normandy

during World War II called him Superman.

He'd fought with distinction in Korea,

commanded the 101st Airborne,

served as superintendent of West Point.

TIME magazine called him

"the sinewy personification
of the American fighting man."

But at the same time,

win the hearts and the
minds of the people.

BRADY: General Westmoreland
told us that we were down

on the five-yard line and
we just needed a few more

to go get the touchdown.

Then I went out and
then I got on the ground.

And then I found out,
"Don't you realize?

We're losing this war."

NARRATOR: Lieutenant Brady was
assigned to assist Captain Frank Eller,

senior advisor to the 4th Battalion

of the Vietnamese Marine
Corps, an elite unit

whose members called
themselves the "Killer Sharks."

You were told that you were
going over there to guide,

educate, and elevate
essentially these "little fellas"

on how to fight a war

when, in fact, they knew
exactly how to fight the war.

You were just an appendage.

You were there simply to guide
assets that they didn't have:

American artillery,
American air strikes.

NARRATOR: Brady did
his best to get to know

the South Vietnamese
marines in his unit.

TRAN NGOC TOAN (SPEAKING ENGLISH):

NARRATOR: Lieutenant Tran Ngoc
Toan, the son of a trucker,

had escaped life with
a hostile stepmother

by entering the South Vietnamese
Military Academy at Dalat.

He'd been fighting the Viet
Cong for more than two years.

Toan was one of the junior officers.

I think he was a...

I think he was a company commander.

I knew him, I liked him.

He was a Dalat graduate,
which is like their West Point.

Very dedicated.

NARRATOR: Brady, Toan, and the 4th
South Vietnamese Marine Battalion

were stationed near the
Bien Hoa Airbase in reserve,

waiting to be called into action.

There were new rumors now,

of larger enemy units moving
through the countryside.

Le Duan's plan to win a quick
and decisive victory was underway.

NGUYEN VAN TONG:

NARRATOR: Nguyen Van Tong
was a political officer

in the newly created
Viet Cong 9th Division,

one of perhaps 2,000 Viet Cong
and North Vietnamese troops

who had for weeks been quietly
filtering into Phuoc Tuy,

a supposedly "pacified" province

less than 40 miles southeast of Saigon.

NGUYEN VAN TONG:

NARRATOR: The target
for Tong and his comrades

was the strategic hamlet of Binh Gia,

home to some 6,000 Catholic
anticommunist refugees.

Their plan was to seize the hamlet

and then annihilate the
forces Saigon was sure to send

to retake it.

To ensure success,

tons of heavy weapons were
smuggled onto the coast

under cover of darkness...

mortars, machine guns, recoilless rifles

capable of blasting tanks.

The communists had never attempted

anything on this scale before.

Before dawn on December 28,

Viet Cong advance units easily
overwhelmed the village militia

and occupied Binh Gia.

(SHOUTING, GUNFIRE)

When two crack South
Vietnamese Ranger companies

were helicoptered in the next day,

they were ambushed and shot to pieces.

On the morning of the 30th,

Philip Brady, his friend Tran Ngoc Toan,

and the 4th Marine Battalion
were flown in to relieve

and reinforce the Rangers.

The enemy withdrew east of the village.

NGUYEN VAN TONG:

All of a sudden you could
see the tracers come out

of the plantation, hit
the helicopter, it crashed.

We were ordered to go down
and retrieve the remains

the following morning.

NGUYEN VAN TONG:

BRADY: The lead company
got to the remains

and then was pounced
on and mauled badly.

(GUNFIRE)

NARRATOR: Twelve South Vietnamese
Marines from Toan's unit were killed

getting to the downed helicopter.

Their comrades wrapped them in ponchos

and laid them out next
to the dead Americans.

An American chopper
dropped into the clearing.

The American crew jumped out under fire,

picked up the four Americans,

climbed back into their
chopper, and took off again.

TRAN NGOC TOAN:

NARRATOR: For three hours, Toan and
his men stayed with their own dead

waiting for a helicopter to
carry them off the battlefield.

BRADY: Meanwhile, I am
getting a little bit antsy

because, first of all,
we're losing light.

Second of all, we are now
outside of artillery range.

We've got to get out of there.

TRAN NGOC TOAN:

BRADY: I went to the Major
Nho, his name was, and I said,

"Major, we have to get out of here now."

And Nho said, "Don't
you forget I am a major,

and you are a lieutenant,"

turned on his heel and walked away.

Ten minutes later all hell broke loose.

TRAN NGOC TOAN:

(MAN SHOUTS IN VIETNAMESE)

NARRATOR: The shelling
eventually died down.

But then bugles blew,

and wave after wave of enemy troops

advanced toward the
badly outnumbered men.

BRADY: It was as if you turned
a soundtrack of shooting...

And just went (IMITATES RAPID GUNFIRE).

Just like that.

All of a sudden it came out of nowhere.

We used what little air strikes
we had left with helicopters,

calling in the strikes on
our position to slow it down.

There was no way.

TRAN NGOC TOAN:

(EXPLOSIONS)

BRADY: What we did was
we tried to get out.

Twenty-six of us broke through.

Eleven ultimately made it.

(GUNFIRE)

NARRATOR: All that night,

the Viet Cong moved among the trees,

carrying away their wounded

and shooting any South Vietnamese troops

they found alive.

TRAN NGOC TOAN:

NARRATOR: Cradling
his rifle in his arms,

Toan began trying to
crawl toward Binh Gia.

He was not found for three days.

TRAN NGOC TOAN:

NARRATOR: When it was all over,
five Americans had died at Binh Gia.

Thirty-two Viet Cong bodies had
been left on the battlefield.

200 South Vietnamese were killed;

200 more were wounded.

NGUYEN VAN TONG:

BRADY: What it really said was

they were capable of
marshaling this kind of force.

The Vietnamese officers I
talked to in the Marine Corps

figured they had six
months before the end.

NARRATOR: The big
question after Binh Gia,

an American officer
at headquarters said,

is how a thousand or more enemy troops

could wander around the
countryside so close to Saigon

without being discovered.

That tells you something
about this war."

Hanoi was exultant.

Ho Chi Minh called it
"a little Dien Bien Phu."

Le Duan was convinced
his strategy was working.

"The liberation war of
South Vietnam has progressed

by leaps and bounds," he said.

"After the battle of
Ap Bac two years ago,

the enemy knew it would
be difficult to defeat us.

After Binh Gia, the enemy realizes

that he is in the process
of being defeated by us."

NGUYEN VAN TONG:

JOHNSON: I, Lyndon Baines Johnson,

do solemnly swear...

NARRATOR: Twenty-six days
after the Binh Gia battle ended

and just a week after President
Johnson's inauguration,

McGeorge Bundy handed the
president a memorandum.

I will to the best of my ability.

NARRATOR: The current strategy
was clearly not working, it said.

The Viet Cong were on
the move and on the rise,

supplied and now steadily reinforced

with soldiers from North Vietnam.

If an independent South
Vietnam was to survive,

the United States needed to act fast.

The administration faced
two choices, Bundy said.

It could go along as it had been going

and try to negotiate some
kind of face-saving settlement.

Or they could use still
more American military power

to force the North to abandon
its goal of uniting the country.

Bundy and McNamara favored that option.

Unless the president
chose it, they said,

South Vietnam would fall.

"I don't think anything,"
Johnson told McNamara,

"is going to be as bad as losing."

Then, a little over a week later,

guerrillas struck an American
helicopter base at Pleiku

in the Central Highlands,

killing eight American advisors
and wounding over 100 more.

MCNAMARA: Approximately 24 hours ago,

the first attack in the Pleiku area...

NARRATOR: Johnson immediately
approved an air strike

on a North Vietnamese army barracks.

On February 10, 1965,

the Viet Cong blew up
a hotel in Qui Nhon,

killing 23 Americans and pinning
21 more beneath the rubble.

Johnson ordered another airstrike.

Anxiety about what
seemed to be happening

spread around the world.

France, which had spent
nearly a century in Vietnam,

now called for an end to all
foreign involvement there.

The British prime
minister urged restraint.

Many leaders of the
president's own party agreed,

though not in public.

In a private memorandum,

Johnson's own vice
president, Hubert Humphrey,

warned him that widening
the war would undercut

the Great Society, damage
America's image overseas,

and end any hope of improving
relations with the Soviet Union.

Johnson never responded.

Instead, on March 2, 1965,

the United States began
a systematic bombardment

of targets in North Vietnam,

code-named Operation Rolling Thunder.

It was meant to be a "mounting
crescendo" of air raids,

Ambassador Taylor wrote,

intended to bolster morale in the South

and destroy morale in the North.

WILSON: The thesis
behind Rolling Thunder,

as I understood it, was that
as we ratcheted up the tempo

and the volume of this effort
against the North Vietnamese,

sooner or later they would cry uncle.

And there'd be a pause,

and we would begin to negotiate
our way out of this situation.

This became an article of faith.

And this article of faith
was a fallacious assumption.

They weren't going to give up.

They read us better than we read them.

NARRATOR: The president
insisted on strict secrecy...

the American people were not to be told

that the administration
had changed its policy

from retaliatory airstrikes
to systematic bombing;

that he had, in fact, widened the war.

They jointly agreed that
joint retaliatory action

was required.

NARRATOR: General Westmoreland,
who had initially been hesitant

about committing ground
troops to Vietnam,

now asked for two battalions
of Marines... 3,500 men...

to protect the Danang airbase

from which fighter-bombers
were hitting the North.

Ambassador Taylor, who had
once called for ground troops,

now objected to the whole idea.

"Once you put that first
soldier ashore," he wrote,

"you never know how many
others are going to follow him."

But the president felt he had no
choice but to give Westmoreland

what he asked for.

He knew he would be blamed if
more American advisors died.

"I feel like a jackass
caught in a Texas hailstorm,"

he complained.

"I can't run, I can't hide,
and I can't make it stop."

("HELLO VIETNAM" BY
JOHNNIE WRIGHT PLAYING)

In March of 1965,

Johnson finally took the action he
had managed to avoid for so long.

WRIGHT: ♪ Kiss me goodbye... ♪

NARRATOR: He was putting
American ground troops in Vietnam.

WRIGHT: ♪ Goodbye, my
sweetheart; hello, Vietnam ♪

NARRATOR: The government of South
Vietnam was not even consulted;

the United States of America
had larger considerations.

ROBERT GARD: Clearly, we saw
it in terms of the Cold War.

Assistant Secretary of
Defense John McNaughton said...

He said our interests there

were 70% to avoid humiliation,

20% to contain China,

and ten percent to help the Vietnamese.

NARRATOR: Johnson quietly
told his good friend

Senator Richard Russell of Georgia

what was about to happen.

JOHNSON: I guess we got no choice,
but it scares the death out of me.

I think everybody's going to think,

"We're landing the Marines.

We're off to battle."

Of course, if they come up there,

they're going to get them in a fight.

And if they ruin those airplanes,

everybody is going to give
me hell for not securing them,

just like they did last
time they made a raid.

RUSSELL: Yeah.

JOHNSON: What do you...
what do you think?

RUSSELL: Well, Mr. President,

it scares the life out of me.

But I don't know how to back up now.

It looks to me like we
just got in this thing,

and there's no way out.

JOHNSON: I don't know.

Dick, the great trouble I'm under...

A man can fight if he can see daylight

down the road somewhere.

But there ain't no daylight in Vietnam.

There's not a bit.

NARRATOR: On March 8,
1965, Dr. Phan Huy Quat,

yet another prime
minister of South Vietnam,

called his chief of staff, Bui Diem.

BUI DIEM:

NARRATOR: The Marines
were landing at Danang

on the east coast of South
Vietnam, some 100 miles south

of the demilitarized zone

that divided the North from the South.

They were prepared to
fight their way ashore.

They did not need to.

PHILIP CAPUTO: What struck me

was how beautiful
Vietnam was to look at.

There were just these endless acres

of these jade-green rice paddies.

And these lovely villages
inside these groves

of bamboo and palm trees.

And way off in the distance
these bluish jungled mountains,

and they looked like Shangri-La.

And I remember seeing this
line of Vietnamese women,

or schoolgirls I think they were.

They actually looked
like angels come to earth

or something like that.

So it was really quite
striking but a little unsettling

because...

so how can a place like this...

so beautiful and so
enchanting... be at war?

DUONG VAN MAI: My father was very happy.

We're such a small and poor country

and the Americans have
decided to come in to save us

not only with their
money, their resources,

but even with their own lives.

We were very grateful.

We thought the...

sure enough with this power,
the Americans are going to win.

NARRATOR: Seeing foreign troops
marching past his village,

an old man emerged from his home
shouting, "Vivent Les Français!"

He thought the French had returned.

"The problem around here,"

a Marine captain leading
a patrol told a reporter,

"is who the hell is who?"

WILSON: As a voting member
of Saigon Mission Council,

I was opposed to the entry of
American ground combat forces.

I felt if the Vietnamese
had to beat them off

with a bloody stump, they
had to do it themselves.

We had to do everything we
humanly could to help them,

but we could not win it for them.

So, I think we crossed the
River Styx at that point.

TRAN NGOC TOAN:

BILL ZIMMERMAN: The first protest
I went to against the war in Vietnam

was a protest at a
Dow Chemical facility.

Dow was manufacturing napalm.

They were dropping napalm
on villages in Vietnam.

It was a very disappointing experience

because only 40 people came.

And we seemed very out of place

and very ineffectual, impotent,

standing outside with 40 people.

NARRATOR: Most Americans
understood little about Indochina,

rarely knew anyone actually
involved in the fighting,

saw no reason to question
the government's assertion

that the United States
had vital interests

8,000 miles from home.

("I AIN'T MARCHING ANYMORE"
BY PHIL OCHS PLAYING)

Still, there was a small
but growing number of people

who had begun to oppose the
war for any number of reasons...

because they thought
it unjust or immoral,

believed it was unconstitutional

or simply not in the national interest.

OCHS: ♪ Oh I marched to
the battle of New Orleans ♪

NARRATOR: Two weeks after
the Marines landed at Danang,

members of the University
of Michigan faculty organized

a night-long discussion
between professors

and some 3,000 students about
the escalation of the war.

The demonstration was called a teach-in

because the idea originated

with a group of university professors.

What do you hope to accomplish?

DR. ERIC WOLF: I'd like to open
up communication between people

and the government because I believe

that they are not telling
us what is going on,

and the people have the right
to know, and we have the right

to tell the government what we think.

NARRATOR: Soon, there were teach-ins
on most major university campuses.

There is no morally wonderful way out.

NARRATOR: NYU in Manhattan, the
University of Wisconsin in Madison,

the University of
California in Berkeley.

The teach-ins were
really raucous affairs.

A lot of contention.

STUDENT: We want to discuss

is what's wrong with
the Vietnam War, and...

OCHS: ♪ And so many others ♪

♪ But I ain't marchin' anymore ♪

REPORTER: Do you endorse

the administration's
policy in South Vietnam?

Whole-heartedly.

ZIMMERMAN: There were plenty of times

when people who were
supportive of the war

came to these teach-ins

to try to give an alternative
anticommunist point of view.

They were often shouted down.

(CROWD BOOING)

NARRATOR: The bombing of the
North and the Marines' arrival

also drew protestors to
Washington that spring.

The demonstration was organized

by the Students for a
Democratic Society... the SDS.

I saw SDS calling for a
demonstration at the White House

in the spring of 1965.

I didn't want to go because I
didn't want to be disappointed

in the same way again and, you know,

go all the way to Washington

and stand outside the
White House with 40 people.

(CROWD CHEERING)

25,000 people attended that rally.

And that suddenly told me

and others I was
working with at the time

that it might be possible
to build an antiwar movement.

JEAN-MARIE CROCKER: It was
quite astounding to think

that he had that degree of commitment.

And it made sense

in what we knew of him,
as drastic as it was.

("IT'S MY LIFE" BY THE ANIMALS PLAYING)

NARRATOR: Nothing Mogie
Crocker's parents could say or do

since Mogie had come home

shook his determination to serve,

and recent developments in Vietnam

had only strengthened his resolve.

He wanted to become a
paratrooper and get into combat.

His parents finally, reluctantly,

agreed to let him go, and on March 15,

a week after the first
Marines landed at Danang,

Denton Crocker, Jr. entered
the United States Army.

JEAN-MARIE CROCKER: So Denton
bounced down the steps one morning

and was off to Fort Dix.

It was in a way a sort
of relief, actually,

that the conflict and the anxiety

over whether he would
or would not go was done.

And he was happy.

And we just tried to believe
that this was the right thing

for him to do.

LE MINH KHUE:

NARRATOR: Le Minh Khue was
orphaned as a small girl,

her parents victims of
the brutal land reforms

the communists had imposed.

She was raised by her aunt and uncle,

who encouraged her to
read American literature.

She was 16 when Operation
Rolling Thunder began.

LE MINH KHUE:

NARRATOR: Khue was assigned
to an organization called

the "Youth Shock Brigades
Against the Americans

for National Salvation,"

and along with thousands
of other young people

was sent south to work keeping
open the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

LE MINH KHUE:

NARRATOR: As Johnson had feared,

it quickly became clear that
the bombing campaign alone

was not working.

Troops and supplies continued
steadily to filter down

the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

General Westmoreland
and the Joint Chiefs

called for more men,
tens of thousands of them.

The president was cautious.

He wanted to do "enough,
but not too much," he said.

But he quietly agreed to send
two more Marine battalions

and changed their mission from
base security to active combat.

For the first time,

American troops were being asked

to fight on their own in Vietnam.

Johnson did not want that fact revealed

to the American public either.

But the bombing of the North

and rumors of harsher measures to come

had heightened concern around the world.

UN Secretary-General
U Thant had proposed

a three-month ceasefire.

Great Britain, America's closest ally,

publicly offered to
reconvene the Geneva Talks

that had divided Vietnam in 1954,

with the goal of reuniting it.

JOHNSON: The people of South
Vietnam be allowed to guide

their own country...

NARRATOR: On April 7, at
Johns Hopkins University,

Johnson sought to persuade the world

of America's good intentions

and again to calm American
fears of a wider war.

In recent months, attacks on
South Vietnam were stepped up.

Thus, it became necessary for
us to increase our response

and to make attacks by air.

This is not a change of purpose.

It is a change in what we
believe that purpose requires.

NARRATOR: Nothing was said about
the new orders sending Marines

directly into combat.

Instead, the president called
for "unconditional discussions"

with Hanoi, and as an old New Dealer,

proposed a massive development program

for all of Southeast Asia.

JOHNSON: The vast
Mekong River can provide

food and water and power

on a scale to dwarf even our own TVA.

(GUNFIRE)

BRADY: I was outside of the village.

We're getting some
fire from the village.

I had the little transistor radio.

And I'm sitting there listening to LBJ.

JOHNSON: ... will use
our power with restraint

and with all the wisdom...

At the same time we got to
lay some nape on the village.

So I'm calling in the nape

and listening to the
president talk peace.

JOHNSON: We will try to
keep conflict from spreading.

BRADY: It was surreal.

JOHNSON: We have no desire to devastate

that which the people of
North Vietnam have built

with toil and sacrifice.

This war, like most wars, is
filled with terrible irony.

What do the people
of North Vietnam want?

(SIRENS WAILING)

NARRATOR: Hanoi denounced the
president's offer as a trick.

Johnson's advisors and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff

continued to debate how many
men would actually be needed

and how rapidly they should be deployed.

Meanwhile, the president sent
the first Army combat troops

to the country.

It was increasingly clear

that the United States was
in it for the long haul.

You can't just be a neutral
witness to something like war.

It crawls down your throat.

It eats you alive from
the inside and the out.

It's not something that you
can stand back and be neutral

and objective and all of
those things we try to be

as reporters,
journalists, photographers.

It doesn't work that way.

MAN (ON RADIO): ... defense
and they're real quick...

and check it out...

NARRATOR: The growing presence of
American combat troops in Vietnam

attracted flocks of journalists.

There was no press censorship,

as there had been in World War II.

Reporters just had to agree
to follow military guidelines

so as not to compromise the security

of ongoing operations.

It was dangerous work.

More than 200 journalists
and photographers would die

covering the fighting in Southeast Asia.

Joseph Lee Galloway
was a young UPI reporter

from Refugio, Texas.

He stopped in Saigon just long
enough to get his credentials.

Then he headed for Danang.

GALLOWAY: The Marines
originally came ashore there

to guard the airbase.

And they quickly figured out
you can't just guard an airbase.

You've got to spread out

because they're going to mortar it,

they're going to shoot rockets.

So you've got to reach
out 15 or 20 miles.

That means you've got to
run operations that far out.

And once you're doing that,

you're no longer guarding an airbase...

(GUNFIRE)

... you're operating
in hostile territory.

(SOLDIERS CHEERING)

NGUYEN THANH SON:

CAPUTO: It wasn't so much the
Viet Cong that were intimidating

at that point as it was the terrain.

Going from Point A to
Point B in the jungle

was so difficult.

As it happened to me
once, it took four hours

to move a half a mile,

cutting through this bush with machetes.

GALLOWAY: The Viet Cong knew the terrain

far better than the Marines did,

and ran circles around them.

(GUNFIRE)

MOGIE CROCKER (DRAMATIZED):
Fort Dix, June 10, 1965.

Dear Mum,

Basic is now all over and I am
presently waiting for orders.

Waiting for orders could be very dull

but I have found there
are excellent chances

to do some reading.

Recently I have read Wuthering Heights,

Animal Farm, Seven Pillars of
Wisdom, and Lord Jim.

I hope you are all well.

Love, Mogie.

NARRATOR: Mogie Crocker was
allowed two weeks at home

before shipping out to Vietnam.

JEAN-MARIE CROCKER: We
were at dinner one evening

just talking, I guess, in
generalities about the war

and the general situation.

And Mogie said, "Of course
if I were a Vietnamese,

I would be on the
side of the Viet Cong."

That... I puzzled over that.

I suppose relating like
to our American Revolution

that he saw their need
for their own freedom.

But as an American citizen,

he saw the larger picture of
trying to prevent communism.

CAROL CROCKER: I remember
one night in particular

he and I were up late.

And he suddenly leaned
his head in his hands.

And he said, "I don't want to go back."

I was dumbstruck.

And said to him, "But this
is what you want to do."

It had never occurred to me
that he was torn about this,

that he was afraid and
yet was determined to go.

("PLAY WITH FIRE" BY THE
ROLLING STONES PLAYING)

NARRATOR: In South Vietnam,
things were steadily growing worse.

JAGGER: ♪ Well, you've
got your diamond. ♪

NARRATOR: In May, the Viet Cong,

supported now by four regiments
of North Vietnamese regulars...

approximately 5,000 men...

were destroying the equivalent
of a South Vietnamese battalion

every week.

JAGGER: ♪ But don't play with me ♪

♪ Because you're playing with fire. ♪

NARRATOR: South Vietnam now seemed
only weeks from complete collapse.

Desperate, General
Westmoreland requested

tens of thousands of more
American troops right away.

But neither the continuing bombing

nor the growing likelihood of
full-scale American intervention

seemed to intimidate Hanoi.

Le Duan, having failed to win the war

before the United States
sent in ground troops,

was now persuaded the American public,

like the French public before
them, would eventually weary

of a costly, bloody war
being waged so far from home.

By contrast, he said, "The
North will not count the cost."

Le Duan's confidence was bolstered

by the help American
intervention had forced

the Soviet Union and China to offer him.

Moscow agreed to supply vast
amounts of modern weaponry

and materiel.

Hanoi would eventually become the
most heavily defended city on Earth.

And China agreed to send support troops,

freeing North Vietnamese
soldiers for combat

in the South.

320,000 Chinese would
eventually serve behind the lines

in the North.

"We will fight," Le Duan promised,

"whatever way the United States wants."

JOHN NEGROPONTE: In June of 1965,

Secretary McNamara, the
Secretary of Defense,

came out to Saigon.

There were a lot of captains
and majors and lieutenants.

And every person said to Mr. McNamara,

"The situation is so dire

we must bring in United States forces."

So, whatever doubts we may have had,

whatever people may say after the fact,

I recall distinctly at the time

telling the Secretary of
Defense that I thought we needed

to bring troops in there.

NARRATOR: For three weeks,

the president and his advisors
argued over how to respond

to Westmoreland's urgent
request for more troops,

differing mostly over how
many should be sent how fast.

Undersecretary of State
George Ball made the argument

against further escalation.

He told the president
the war could not be won.

The American people
will grow weary of it.

Our troops will get bogged down

"in the jungles and
rice paddies," he warned,

"while we slowly blow
the country to pieces."

No one else agreed.

JAGGER: ♪ But don't play with me... ♪

NARRATOR: In the end, Johnson
sent Westmoreland 50,000 men.

But he pledged another
50,000 by the end of 1965,

and still more if they were needed.

JAGGER: ♪ Because you're
playing with fire. ♪

SOLDIERS: ♪ Gory, gory,
what a hell of a way to die ♪

TRAN NGOC TOAN:

MAN: Hold your fire!

Hold your fire.

JOHN SCALI: Does the fact

that you are sending
additional forces to Vietnam

imply any change in the existing policy

of using American forces to
guard American installations

and to act as an emergency backup?

It does not imply any
change in policy whatever.

It does not imply any
change of objective.

Uh...

LOU CIOFFI: The month
of June saw soldiers here

taking what appears to be...

NARRATOR: Most television
reports from Vietnam

echoed the newsreels
Americans had flocked to see

during the Second World War...
enthusiastic, unquestioning,

good guys fighting
and defeating bad guys.

But at dinnertime on August 5, 1965,

Americans saw another side of the war.

MORLEY SAFER: We're on the
outskirts of the village of Cam Ne

with elements of the 1st Battalion...

NARRATOR: CBS correspondent
Morley Safer and his crew

went on patrol with Marines near Danang.

Their orders were first
to search a cluster

of four villages for
caches of arms and rice

meant for the enemy and
then to destroy them all.

This is what the war
in Vietnam is all about.

(SPEAKING VIETNAMESE)

The old and the very young.

The Marines have burned

this old couple's cottage

because fire was coming from here.

And now when you walk into the village

you see no young people at all.

(WOMAN SPEAKING VIETNAMESE)

The day's operation
burned down 150 houses,

wounded three women, killed one baby,

wounded one Marine, and
netted these four prisoners.

Today's operation is the
frustration of Vietnam

in miniature.

There is little doubt
that American firepower

can win a military victory here.

But to a Vietnamese
peasant whose home is a...

means a lifetime of backbreaking labor,

it will take more than
presidential promises

to convince him that we are on his side.

NARRATOR: The next morning,
the president called

his friend Frank
Stanton, the head of CBS.

"Hello, Frank, this is your president.

Are you trying to fuck me?"

Safer had defaced the
American flag, Johnson said.

He was probably an agent of
the Kremlin, had to be fired.

The Marines claimed Safer
had provided a zippo lighter

and asked the Marines to
burn the hut for the camera.

A major at the Danang
Marine press office

called CBS the "Communist
Broadcasting System."

But after the operation,

Safer interviewed some of the
Marines who'd burned Cam Ne.

Do you ever have any private thoughts,

any private regrets
about some of these people

you are leaving homeless?

I feel no remorse.

I don't imagine anybody else does.

You can't expect to do your job

and feel pity for these people.

NARRATOR: When some viewers
registered their shock,

Westmoreland admitted,
"We have a genuine problem

which will be with us as
long as we are in Vietnam.

Commanders must exercise
restraint unnatural to war

and judgment not often
required of young men."

CAPUTO: You kind of thought at first

that it was going to be
like the GIs, you know,

rolling through Paris
after the liberation.

Well, you know, it sure
didn't work out that way.

I can remember once
going in this one ville.

And I remember finding this
entire Vietnamese family

cowering in a bunker.

And they were terrified of us.

And I remember thinking
to myself, I said,

"Well, I wonder if back
in the colonial days,

when the Redcoats barged
into Ipswich, Massachusetts,

or wherever,

if this is how Americans must have felt

looking at these foreign
soldiers coming in here."

FREDERICK ACKERSON: The Viet Cong

have terrorized you, and
have burned your homes.

We are here to help you.

To show how much we
are able to protect you,

we are going to have the Air Force

hit some Viet Cong on the
other side of the valley.

That will be at 10:30.

(PLAYING "COLONEL BOGEY" MARCH)

(DISTANT EXPLOSION)

MOGIE CROCKER (DRAMATIZED):
Dear Mum and Dad,

I am now with the 1st Brigade,
101st Airborne Division

in Vietnam.

("THE WAR DRAGS ON" BY DONOVAN PLAYING)

What is taking place in America?

We who are in Vietnam
find these protests

very hard to comprehend,

and many people here are
quite bitter about them.

DONOVAN: ♪ Let me tell you
the story in South Vietnam. ♪

MOGIE CROCKER (DRAMATIZED): The
belief I have in our present policy

has been completely confirmed
by what I have seen here.

My chief worry is that
these pacifist bleatings

might effect even a small
change in government policy

at a time when we
appear close to success.

DONOVAN: ♪ And the war drags on. ♪

JEAN-MARIE CROCKER: As Vietnam
began to be more and more chaotic,

I certainly wondered very much
whether we should be there.

But I never expressed that to him.

That's one of those conflicts
that's just too difficult

to bring up, or at least it was for me.

("BIG RIVER" BY JOHNNY CASH PLAYING)

CASH: ♪ Now I taught the
weeping willow how to cry ♪

♪ And I showed the clouds how
to cover up a clear blue sky. ♪

GALLOWAY: We were all
excited about the arrival

of the 1st Cavalry Division,
an experimental unit.

They've been trained
in air-mobile warfare

using these helicopters to
the absolute maximum benefit.

They're moving their artillery
by helicopter, jumping it,

leapfrogging troops, chasing
the enemy, driving him crazy.

This is something new,

and it's going to
change the way we do war.

CASH: ♪ I found her
trail in Memphis... ♪

NARRATOR: In September of 1965,

the newly created 1st
Cavalry Division...

16,000 men, 1,600
vehicles, 435 helicopters...

had begun arriving at An
Khe, a massive base carved out

of the grasslands at the
edge of the Central Highlands.

Its heliport would come to
be called the "Golf Course."

As the 1st Cavalry got used
to its new surroundings,

thousands of North Vietnamese
regulars were slipping south

into the Highlands along
the Ho Chi Minh Trail,

joining Viet Cong
units already in place.

They established their
own base on and around

a jumble of thickly forested
mountains and ravines

south of the Ia Drang River.

On the evening of October 19,

communist commandos
slipped to within 40 yards

of the perimeter wire of the
U.S. Special Forces outpost

at Plei Me,

which was defended by a 12-man
team of U.S. Green Berets,

14 ARVN, and some 400
mountain tribesmen.

Nine of the 12 Green Berets were hit.

They managed to hold out for two days

before 15 more Green Berets
and 160 South Vietnamese Rangers

were helicoptered in, commanded
by Major Charles Beckwith,

known to his fellow
soldiers as Chargin' Charlie.

(EXPLOSION)

The next day,

Joe Galloway managed to
talk a helicopter pilot

into flying him into the besieged camp.

GALLOWAY: That's where I
met Major Charles Beckwith.

He said, "I need
everything in the world.

"And what has the Army
in its wisdom sent me

but a godforsaken reporter?"

He drug me over and showed me

a 30-caliber air-cooled machine gun.

He showed me how to load
it, how to clear a jam.

NARRATOR: "You can shoot the
little brown men outside the wire,"

Beckwith told Galloway.

"You may not shoot the little brown men

inside the wire; they are mine."

GALLOWAY: And I'm
sitting there thinking,

"Ah, I'm a civilian noncombatant."

I tried that line on
Beckwith and he said,

"Ain't no such thing in
these mountains, son."

NARRATOR: For nearly a week, the
North Vietnamese launched assault

after assault on Plei Me.

It was only after
American bombs and napalm

turned the surrounding
terrain into a moonscape

that the enemy withdrew.

JOHN LAURENCE: What kind of fighters

are the Viet Cong that you met here?

I would give anything to have
200 of them under my command.

They're the finest
soldiers I've ever seen.

The Viet Cong.

That's right.

They're dedicated, and
they're good soldiers.

They're the best I've ever seen.

NARRATOR: Despite the losses
his men had suffered at Plei Me,

the North Vietnamese
commander, General Chu Huy Man,

was eager for another confrontation

with the Americans.

He was determined to
learn how to fight them.

Reinforcements streaming
down the Ho Chi Minh Trail

to the Ia Drang Valley included

a newly minted second
lieutenant, Lo Khac Tam,

who had volunteered
to fight in the South.

NARRATOR: On the morning
of November 14, 1965,

1st Cavalry helicopters
belonging to the 1st Battalion

of the 7th Regiment...

George Armstrong Custer's old outfit...

flew west along the Ia Drang
toward the Chu Pong Massif,

looking for the enemy.

Their commander, Kentucky-born
Korean-War veteran

Lieutenant Colonel Hal Moore,

had been told there was
a large enemy base camp

somewhere on its slopes.

His orders were to take
his understrength outfit...

29 officers and just 411 men...
find the enemy and kill him.

There were two clearings large
enough for Moore to bring in

eight choppers at once.

He chose the one closest to the
mountain... Landing Zone X-Ray.

Moore made a point of
leading from the front.

He was the first man
off the first chopper.

He sent four six-man squads
100 yards in every direction.

The Ia Drang Valley was so beautiful,

one soldier remembered,

it reminded him of a
national park back home.

Within minutes, Moore's
men captured a deserter.

Terrified and trembling,

he said there were three
battalions of soldiers

on the mountain... 1,600 men.

They wanted very much to
kill Americans, he said,

but so far had been unable to find any.

Moore quickly set up a command post

behind one of the huge termite
mounds that dotted the clearing.

It would take until mid-afternoon

for all of his men to be ferried in.

He had no time to waste.

"We needed to get off the landing zone

and get at them before they
could hit us," Moore remembered.

He sent two companies up the
slope toward the hidden enemy.

Most of the North Vietnamese,
like the Americans,

were new to combat.

They were ordered to fix bayonets.

LO KHAC TAM:

NARRATOR: Colonel Moore
had no way of knowing

that instead of 1,600 enemy
soldiers on the mountain,

there were 3,000...
seven times his strength.

(GUNFIRE)

Within minutes, the
Americans found themselves

under attack from hundreds
of North Vietnamese soldiers.

In the fighting, an
overeager second lieutenant

led his platoon of 28 men too far away

from the rest of his
company and was surrounded.

(GUNFIRE, SHOUTING)

The lieutenant was killed.

The sergeant who took his
place was shot through the head.

By late afternoon, only seven
of the trapped platoon's men

were still capable of firing back.

(GUNFIRE, SHOUTING)

Moore was now engaged in
three simultaneous struggles...

to defend the landing zone,
attack the North Vietnamese,

and find a way to rescue
his trapped patrol.

That night, Joe Galloway
again managed to talk his way

onto a chopper taking
ammunition and water

to the besieged Americans.

As the helicopter
approached the battlefield,

Galloway was sitting
on a crate of grenades,

peering out into the darkness.

GALLOWAY: And I could see
these little pin pricks of light

coming down the mountain.

This was the enemy approaching
for the next day's attacks.

We flew in there.

As they pulled on out, it was dead dark.

And we're lying there waiting
for someone to come tell us

what to do.

And the next morning, all of
a sudden the bottom fell out.

(GUNFIRE)

There was an explosion of fire.

The noise is horrendous, unimaginable.

(RAPID GUNFIRE,
FOLLOWED BY SHORT BURSTS)

(GUNFIRE, SHOUTING)

And in the middle of
all of this, you know,

I-I just flattened out on the ground

because all that was being
fired seemed to be about two,

two-and-a-half feet off the ground.

(GUNFIRE, WHISTLING)

NARRATOR: Hundreds of enemy
soldiers hurled themselves

at the Americans.

They wore webbed helmets
camouflaged with grass,

and as they came, blowing
whistles, screaming,

they looked like "little
trees," one American remembered.

They were trying to overrun us.

And they came close.

They came close.

(GUNFIRE, SHOUTING)

But we had two things going for us.

We had a great commander
and great soldiers.

And we had air and artillery
support out the yin-yang.

We had it, and they didn't.

NARRATOR: But using that air and
artillery support could be dangerous.

Each of Moore's units carefully
marked its position with smoke

to keep from being
mistaken for the enemy

by American airmen overhead.

LO KHAC TAM:

NARRATOR: Some 18,000 artillery
shells would be called in

over the course of the battle,

some of them landing just 25
yards from Moore's own men.

Helicopter gunships fired
3,000 rockets into the enemy.

The forward air controller

called for every available
aircraft in South Vietnam

to come and help.

Warplanes, including B-52
long-range strategic bombers,

were stacked at 1,000-foot
intervals above the battlefield,

from 7,000 to 35,000 feet,

impatiently awaiting targets
to strafe or bomb or burn.

"By God," Moore said, "they sent
us over here to kill communists

and that's what we're doing."

I looked up...

and there were two jets aiming
directly at our command post.

He's dropped two cans of napalm
and it's coming toward us,

loblolly, end over end.

And these kids, two or three
of 'em, plus a sergeant,

had dug a hole or two over on the edge.

And I looked as the thing exploded...

And two of them were
dancing in that fire.

And there's a rush, a roar,

from the air that's being consumed

and drawn in as this-this
hell come to earth

is burning there.

And as that dies back a little,
then you can hear the screams.

And someone yells,
"Get this man's feet."

And I reach down and the boots crumble,

and the flesh is cooked
off of his ankles.

And I feel those bones
in the palms of my hands.

I can feel it now.

He died two days later.

A kid named Jim Nakayama
out of Rigby, Idaho.

NARRATOR: By 10:00 that morning,

American airpower had beaten
back the enemy assault.

The survivors from the trapped platoon

were rescued that afternoon.

They had been pinned to
the ground and under fire

for so long that they had to be coaxed

into getting to their feet again.

On the morning of the next day,

enemy soldiers hurled themselves
against the same sector

of Moore's line four more times

and were obliterated by
artillery and machine gun fire.

The surviving North
Vietnamese and Viet Cong

withdrew into the forest,

leaving behind a ghastly
ring of their dead

surrounding the landing zone...

634 corpses, shot,
blasted, blackened by fire.

LO KHAC TAM:

NARRATOR: After three days
and two nights of combat,

helicopters began lifting
out the American survivors

and gathering up the dead.

SOLDIER: When you look at them,

it doesn't even resemble a human body.

It just, it looks just like a mannequin.

You look at them and say,
"That couldn't happen to me."

SHEEHAN: I saw them fight at Ia Drang.

It always galls me when I read or hear

about the World War II generation

as the greatest generation.

These kids were just as
gallant and as courageous

as anybody who fought in World War II.

NARRATOR: Seventy-nine of Hal
Moore's men lost their lives

at Landing Zone X-Ray
in the Ia Drang Valley

and another 121 were wounded.

Please convey to the American people

what a tremendous
fighting man we have here.

He's courageous, he's
aggressive, and he's kind.

And he'll go where you tell him to go.

And he's got self-discipline.

And he's got good unit discipline.

He's just an outstanding man.

And...

Having commanded this
battalion for 18 months...

You must excuse my emotion here,

but when I see some of these
men go out the way they have...

I haven't...

I can't tell you how
highly I feel for them.

They're tremendous.

NARRATOR: Hal Moore refused to leave

until every single man in his
command had been accounted for.

He had been the first of his men
to step onto Landing Zone X-Ray,

and he made sure he was
the last to leave it.

LO KHAC TAM:

NARRATOR: The North Vietnamese
suffered terrible losses

in the Ia Drang Valley

and many of the survivors
were traumatized.

"The units were enveloped
in an atmosphere of gloom,"

a North Vietnamese colonel remembered.

Some men would not leave
their rope hammocks.

Some refused to wash.

One soldier wrote a poem
expressive of their plight:

"The crab lies still
on the chopping block

Never knowing when the knife will fall."

GALLOWAY: In the Ia Drang we killed
ten of them for every one of us.

That's a ten-to-one kill ratio
is how the military puts that.

But the enemy, he was fully
prepared to pay that price

and more for the value
of the lessons he learned.

LO KHAC TAM:

JOE GALLOWAY: Grab
'em by the belt buckle.

That means you've got to get so close,

they can't use the artillery and
the aerial bombardments on you

for fear of killing their own.

Get in so close that it's man-on-man.

And then everything is even.

The Vietnamese suffered hundreds of dead

attacking Hal Moore's
battalion at LZ X-Ray.

But then they ambushed another
battalion a couple of days later

and wiped it out.

NARRATOR: In the fighting
near Landing Zone Albany,

the enemy had gotten too close
for artillery to be called in.

Out of some 425 Americans
involved, 155 were killed.

124 more were wounded.

Both sides claimed victory
in the Ia Drang Valley.

The Americans talked up
the number of enemy dead

at Landing Zone X-Ray.

The ratio of losses to your kill...

NARRATOR: The North
Vietnamese took their lessons

from Landing Zone Albany.

WILLIAM WESTMORELAND: I don't anticipate

that this conflict
will end any time soon,

and we could find that we
have more difficult days ahead.

Certainly we must be prepared for this.

EHRHART: In the fall of my
senior year, November 1965,

was that huge battle
at the Ia Drang Valley,

which was the first time
there was actually confirmed

North Vietnamese regular
soldiers as opposed

to Viet Cong.

And of course my way of
interpreting that was,

"There it is, that's the proof.

The North Vietnamese
are the aggressors here."

And that's when I began
thinking in terms of

maybe I don't want to
go to college right away.

Maybe I'll join the Marines.

And it was always the Marines.

I never... there was no question.

The Marine Corps is full
of little guys like me

with chips on our shoulder.

("EVE OF DESTRUCTION
BY BARRY MCGUIRE PLAYS)

MCGUIRE: ♪ The eastern
world, it is explodin'. ♪

NARRATOR: The battles in the Ia
Drang Valley may have been declared

American victories, but
privately, General Westmoreland

and the Johnson
administration were worried.

In spite of the Americans'
new airborne mobility,

the enemy had been able to choose

the place and time of battle.

The intelligence on which
basic decisions had been made

in Washington had been uniformly bad.

There were now believed to
be 12 Viet Cong regiments

in South Vietnam, not just five;

nine North Vietnamese
regiments, not three.

Despite months of bombing,

three times as many
North Vietnamese regulars

were now slipping south
of the demilitarized zone

as originally believed.

Hanoi seemed to be escalating, too.

And American casualties were climbing.

When Senator Fritz
Hollings visited Saigon

shortly after the Ia Drang battles,

General Westmoreland told him,
"We're killing these people

at a rate of ten to one."

Hollings warned him,

"Westy, the American people
don't care about the ten.

They care about the one."

Westmoreland, who had
said he could win the war

in three years, now sent an
urgent cable to Washington

asking for 200,000 more troops.

MCGUIRE: ♪ Yeah, my blood's so mad... ♪

NARRATOR: "The message
came as a shattering blow,"

Robert McNamara remembered.

Once again, he offered
Johnson two options:

try to negotiate a
compromise with Hanoi,

or accede to Westmoreland's
request for more men,

though the chances of victory,
the secretary of defense said,

might be no better than one in three.

GALLOWAY: And then they all sat down

and voted for option two.

MCGUIRE: ♪ Over and over and over... ♪

KARL MARLANTES: My bitterness about
the political powers at the time

was, first of all, the lying.

I mean, I can understand a policy error

that is incredibly, incredibly painful

and kills a lot of
people out of a mistake

if they made that with noble hearts.

That was, you know, when
Eisenhower and Kennedy

were trying to figure things out.

And you read that, you
know, McNamara knew by '65...

it was just three years
before I was there...

that the war was unwinnable.

That's what makes me mad.

Making a mistake, people can do that.

But covering up mistakes,

then you're killing
people for your own ego.

And that makes me mad.

NARRATOR: Tens of
thousands of American troops

continued to prepare
to deploy to Vietnam

from all over the country,

and General Westmoreland
and his commanders

drew up plans for major offensives

in the new year of 1966.

Meanwhile, hoping the
Soviets might help bring Hanoi

to the bargaining table,
McNamara urged the president

to declare a halt to the
bombing of North Vietnam.

Over the objections of the military,

who worried it would give
the enemy time to rebuild

its defenses, Johnson
agreed to stop the bombing

on Christmas Eve.

If it achieved nothing else, he said,

it would show the American people

that before he committed
more of their sons to battle,

"We have gone the last mile."

("LITTLE DRUMMER BOY"
BY BURL IVES PLAYING)

JEAN-MARIE CROCKER: Well,
Christmas always meant

a great deal in our family.

We sent packages to Denton, of course.

Then a neighbor mentioned to me

that she heard a local
television station was offering

free tapes to be made to
send to a soldier overseas.

We dressed up for the cameras.

The idea was that we would
each just say something

about what we were
doing and wish him well.

It was a horrible day for me.

It made it so real that he was far away.

Well, Mogie, here we are.

It's... let's see what day is today.

Here it is, Saturday...

November 13.

November 13,

and station WTEN has given
us a chance to talk to you.

We all wish you a Merry
Christmas to start out with.

Rand, what do you got to say to Mogie?

Merry Christmas.

Merry Christmas.

Merry Christmas, darling.

We sent your packages

and there's one that's
waiting for you at home.

It's a record of fife and drum music

that we got for you at Williamsburg.

Candy?

My teacher isn't very nice,
and she always is crabby,

and I don't like school at all.

Now I'm a brownie.

Merry Christmas.

Happy Christmas, Mogie.

I think I'm getting
new skis for Christmas.

So when you get home, we
can get together sometime.

We do all wish you a
very Merry Christmas,

and we'll be thinking
of you on Christmas Day.

JEAN-MARIE CROCKER: We
miss you, sweetheart.

IVES: ♪ Me and my drum. ♪

("TURN! TURN! TURN!"
BY THE BYRDS PLAYING)

♪ To everything, turn, turn, turn ♪

♪ There is a season, turn, turn, turn ♪

♪ And a time to every
purpose under heaven ♪

♪ A time to be born, a time to die ♪

♪ A time to plant, a time to reap ♪

♪ A time to kill, a time to heal ♪

♪ A time to laugh, a time to weep ♪

♪ To everything, turn, turn, turn ♪

♪ There is a season, turn, turn, turn ♪

♪ And a time to every
purpose under heaven ♪

♪ A time to build up,
a time to break down ♪

♪ A time to dance, a time to mourn ♪

♪ A time to cast away stones ♪

♪ A time to gather stones together ♪

♪ To everything, turn, turn, turn ♪

♪ There is a season, turn, turn, turn ♪

♪ And a time to every
purpose under heaven ♪

♪ A time of love, a time of hate ♪

♪ A time of war, a time of peace ♪

♪ A time you may embrace ♪

♪ A time to refrain from embracing ♪

♪ To everything, turn, turn, turn ♪

♪ There is a season, turn, turn, turn ♪

♪ And a time to every
purpose under heaven ♪

♪ A time to gain, a time to lose ♪

♪ A time to rend, a time to sew ♪

♪ A time for love, a time for hate ♪

♪ A time for peace, I
swear it's not too late. ♪

- Synced and corrected by chamallow -
- www.addic7ed.com -

ANNOUNCER: Learn more about the film

and find additional resources
at PBS.org/vietnamwar

and join the conversation
using #VietnamWarPBS.

"The Vietnam War" is
available on Blu-ray and DVD.

The companion book, soundtrack,

and original score from
the film are also available.

To order, visit shoppbs.org

or call 1-800-play-PBS.

Episodes of this series also
available for download from iTunes.

ANNOUNCER: Bank of
America proudly supports

Ken Burns' and Lynn Novick's
film "The Vietnam War"

because fostering different perspectives

and civil discourse
around important issues

furthers progress, equality,

and a more connected society.

Go to bankofamerica.com/
betterconnected to learn more.

ANNOUNCER: Major support
for "The Vietnam War"

was provided by members of
the Better Angels Society,

including Jonathan and Jeannie Lavine,

Diane and Hal Brierley,

Amy and David Abrams,

John and Catherine Debs,

the Fullerton Family Charitable Fund,

the Montrone Family,

Lynda and Stewart Resnick,

the Perry and Donna
Golkin Family Foundation,

the Lynch Foundation,

the Roger and Rosemary
Enrico Foundation,

and by these additional funders.

Major funding was also
provided by David H. Koch...

The Blavatnik Family Foundation...

The Park Foundation,

the National Endowment
for the Humanities,

the Pew Charitable Trusts,

the John S. and James
L. Knight Foundation,

the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation,

the Arthur Vining Davis Foundations,

the Ford Foundation JustFilms,

by the Corporation for
Public Broadcasting,

and by viewers like you.

Thank you.