All language subtitles for Air Disasters S18E08 Racing the Storm 1080p PMTP WEB-DL DDP5 1 H 264-maldini_track3_[eng]

FLIGHT ATTENDANT:
Ladies and gentlemen,

we are starting our approach.

PILOT: We lost both engines.

FLIGHT ATTENDANT: --the
mask over your nose.

Emergency descent.

PILOT: Mayday, Mayday.

FLIGHT ATTENDANT:
Brace for impact.

INVESTIGATOR 1:
This is a nasty one.

INVESTIGATOR 2: Investigation
starting ..

MAN 1: It's going to crash.

I can't see anything.

Damn, we're off course.

No, I can't see it.

We're way off.

On June 1, 1999, as an American
Airlines jet prepared to land

amidst fierce thunderstorms,
passengers knew

they were flying into trouble.

NEEDS ID: I don't
know what made me

aware, so doggone aware, that
we were going to have a problem.

Oh, no.

NARRATOR: Within minutes, their
worst fears would be realized.

Other one.

Other one, other
one, other one.

COPILOT: Hold on.

I'm yelling, get
away from the plane.

Run.

Get away from the plane.

EMT (OVER RADIO): Yeah, I
don't know where we're at.

But there's a road that
goes around the airport.

But we've got a
lot of people hurt.

NARRATOR: This is the story of
a tragic and avoidable disaster.

The investigation would reveal
a lethal combination of pilot

error, the devastating
effects of severe weather,

and a dangerous race to
keep the plane on schedule.

It will also uncover
disturbing evidence

of an industry-wide failing.

Despite reliable aircraft
and extensive training,

modern airlines and their crews
face unprecedented pressures.

For a large operator
like American Airlines,

the pressures start
with the complex task

of scheduling their vast fleet.

Dispatchers direct the
planes around the world in a

carefully-choreographed dance.

The strain of maintaining
this efficiency

affects the entire system.

GREGORY FEITH: Of
course, competition

has become very intense, a lot
of pressure on the dispatchers,

pilots, flight
attendants, and basically

the whole infrastructure,
to accomplish the mission

and make a dollar.

NARRATOR: Every effort is made
to ensure that nothing disrupts

these fragile schedules.

But there is one
variable that no airline

can control, the weather.

On June 1, 1999, American
Airlines Flight 1420

is running late.

It's the movement
of the storms.

Everything is sliding
to the Southeast.

So yes, we do have a stormy
evening headed our way.

NARRATOR: The delay
of Flight 1420

put pressure on the pilots
even before takeoff.

The responsibility can
fall on flight crews

to keep a tight
schedule on track.

Dispatch please.

Yeah, it's Michael Argo.

NARRATOR: Crews have
strict legal limits

on their duty time.

The first officer
warned the dispatcher

that they were in danger
of running out of time.

--time limit at around 11:16.

NARRATOR: The flight had to
take off in the next hour

or be canceled.

The pilots also became
aware of another pressure

caused by deteriorating
weather near their destination.

I mean, well, we've
got this whole situation.

DON EICK: Pilots had
a weather briefing

that they got
before they departed

Dallas-Fort Worth, which
provided the forecasts,

the weather alerts.

The dispatcher and the captain
preparing for the flight

looked at the
weather information

and thought they could
get to Little Rock

before the
thunderstorms impacted.

NARRATOR: The 139 passengers
just wanted to get home.

I was traveling with
my son and my daughter.

We were coming home
from our vacation.

It was my daughter's
first flight.

The plane was late
and there were

a lot of delays, of course.

It was tiring.

It was frustrating.

It was late at night.

NARRATOR: Finally, over
two hours behind schedule,

Flight 1420 leaves Dallas.

Unknown to the crew,
the storms are already

massing around Little Rock.

40 minutes later, 1420 is 100
miles from its destination.

At this point, the
voice-recorder transcript

reveals a calm and
steady cockpit routine.

DISPTACHER (OVER RADIO):
American 1420, you're

going to still want lower.

So far it's OK.

So far, so good, Ma'am.

American 1420 will let you know.

GREGORY FEITH: The first
officer on American 1420

was a new hire.

He had just recently
completed training.

And he had been paired
on one of his first trips

with this management captain.

So now you had a very
experienced pilot sitting

in the left seat, with
the company, paired

with a relatively new hire.

NARRATOR: The pilots are keeping
a close eye on the storms

ahead.

On-board weather radar scans
a cone-shaped area of sky

in front of the plane.

Potentially-severe
storms show up in red.

There's your big what diddly.

Yeah, we've got to get
over there real quick.

I don't like that.

That's lightning.

Sure is.

NARRATOR: The American
Airlines dispatcher

issues an update on
the shape and formation

of the thunderstorms.

GREGORY FEITH: The
dispatcher gave this flight

crew the weather information.

It appeared to him that
there was going to be a gap,

or what he called the bowling
alley, where you had two types

of thunderstorms or
two thunderstorms

with an alley between it, and
that the flight crew, if they

had expedited their
travel to Little Rock,

could probably make
it up that alley

before the two storms
closed together.

NARRATOR: But as
Flight 1420 descends,

the plan to beat the storms is
about to go seriously wrong.

The pilots do not realize that
the walls of the bowling alley

are closing in.

With 80 miles to go,
the path to Little Rock

still appears to be clear.

This is the bowling
alley, right here.

COPILOT: Yeah, I know.

PILOT: In fact, there are the
city lights, straight there.

COPILOT: You want to go down?

PILOT: Not yet, but pretty soon.

American Airlines--

The lightning seem to be
on both sides of the plane.

It lit up the
inside of the plane.

Very quick, you know, just
kaboom-type lightning,

which was a little scary.

NARRATOR: Transcripts of a
cockpit voice recordings show

that as the plane
descends, the pilots are

aware of rough weather ahead.

Descent checks complete.

We've got to get there quick.

NARRATOR: As they
prepare for landing,

the pressure on the pilots
will now steadily rack up.

--not required.

Manual brakes?

Manual is fine.

NARRATOR: At first,
as the crew pick

their way around the storms,
everything seems steady.

Yeah, actually, there's
a city right there.

Yeah.

Breaking through this crowd.

Good, doing good.

NARRATOR: Even when
the first indication

comes that the
storms are advancing,

the pilots take it in stride.

Whoa, it looks like it's
moving this way, though.

Yeah.

Just some lightning
straight ahead.

I think we're going to
be OK, though, right there.

Yeah.

Right down the bowling alley.

NARRATOR: But when pilots
contact the controller

at Little Rock, he gives
the first of a series

of alarming weather alerts.

CONTROLLER (OVER RADIO):
We've got a thunderstorm just

Northwest of the airport,
moving through the area now.

The wind is to 280
at 28, gusts 44.

And I'll have new weather for
you in just a moment, I'm sure.

NARRATOR: Gale-force
winds are gusting

at up to 50 miles
per hour, enough

to blow tiles of a rooftop.

High winds pose a severe
hazard for flight 1420.

Crosswinds could make
it difficult to control

the plane on landing.

The pilots must
quickly determine

if they're within safe limits.

They calculate the strength of
the crosswind from its angle

to their final approach.

The crosswind limit for landing
is 30 knots on a dry runway.

But

Buschmann and Origel
now become confused

about what happens if it rains.

Well, 30 knots is the
crosswind limitation.

But see, 30 knots, but wet--

That's the dry.

PILOT: Yeah, dry.

What's the wet?

20.

It's 25.

NARRATOR: The discussion
is never resolved

and the cross winds will soon
be gusting well over the limit.

PILOT (OVER INTERCOM):
Flight attendants,

prepare for landing, please.

NARRATOR: The pilot's
attention now returns

to the bad weather ahead.

But the task of tracking
the shifting storms

is made more difficult by the
lack of sophisticated radar

at Little Rock.

American 1420,
your equipment's

a lot better than what I have.

How's that final
for 22-F looking?

What's that?

We can see the airport but
we can just barely make it out.

We should be able to make to 22.

That storm is moving closer,
like your radar says.

But it's a little farther
off than you thought.

The controllers are
going, well, your radar is

better than mine and so forth.

The controller in this
accident had a monochromatic,

or basically almost a
black-and-white set of a radar

and could not determine the
intensities of the storm.

NARRATOR: Just eight
miles from the airport,

the pilots now face another
key decision, how to approach

the runway through bad weather.

Controllers routinely ask pilots
if they want to land visually

instead of relying on the
airport's electronic Instrument

Landing System or ILS.

But a visual approach means they
must be able to see the runway.

And this is proving difficult.

No, we can't really
make it out right now.

We're going to have to stay
with you as long as possible.

NARRATOR: Now as the wind
suddenly changes direction,

the pilots problems
quickly mount up.

CONTROLLER (OVER RADIO):
And the winds kind of kicked

around a little bit right now.

It's 330 at 11.

Whoa.

That's a little
better than it was.

Yet 330 is the tailwind, though.

NARRATOR: The crew
now faces the problem

of having the wind behind
them when they land,

greatly increasing the dangers
of overshooting the runway.

Then the controller calls
in with more bad news.

Right now I have
a wind-shear alert.

NARRATOR: Wind shear is a
sudden change of wind direction

over a short distance.

It is one of the
most feared elements

of a severe thunderstorm.

To combat
constantly-shifting winds,

the pilots are forced to throw
away their previous approach

plans and start again.

They have to reverse the
direction of their approach

so they will be
landing into the wind.

Yeah, we're going to need--

or we would rather go
into the headwind, Sir.

NARRATOR: The pilot's
decision to land

in the opposite direction
is a prudent move.

But it will create
serious problems.

turn to their new approach,
the aircraft's weather radar,

which scans in
front of the plane,

loses track of
the thunderstorms.

Worse still, the
turn delays landing

by more than 10 minutes.

And with every passing
moment, the storms

are growing in intensity.

Runway Four Right,
111.3042, I think--

I think that was the
airport below us.

PILOT: Yeah, right.

OK.

NARRATOR: Switching runways
and keeping track of the storms

all adding greatly to the
pilot's heavy workload.

Airline pilots, they make
their money when they're

flying into bad weather.

When the weather goes
down, now all of a sudden,

the workload starts to
increase because you

have to factor in
low clouds, rain,

lightning, thunderstorms, wind.

All of these elements start to
bombard you, the closer you get

into the airport environment.

CONTROLLER (OVER
RADIO): American 1420,

it appears we have a second part
of this storm moving through.

The wind, now, is
340 at 16, gusts 34.

NARRATOR: With the
storms worsening,

the pilots need to
make it to the airport

as quickly as possible.

Do you want to accept the
short approach, keep it tight?

Yeah, but if you
can see the runway

because I don't quite see it.

Yeah, it's-- it's right there.
PILOT: All right.

You see it?

PILOT: You just point me
in the right direction.

I'll start slowing down.

Give me flaps 11.

PILOT (OVER RADIO) Damn, it's
heading right over the field.

American 1420,
did you call me?

Yeah, we got the airport.

But we're going right
in between clouds.

I think it's to my right,
off my 3 o'clock low,

about four miles.

American 1420, that's it.

Do you want to shoot
the visual approach

you want to go out for the ILS?

NARRATOR: A visual
approach will allow 1420

to reach the airport
faster than one

that depends on instruments.

Well, yeah, I can start
the visual if we can do it.

American 1420s cleared,
visual approach, runway 4-Right.

If you lose it, need some
help, let me know, please.

NARRATOR: But a
visual approach means

the pilots must keep the
runway in sight at all times.

The transcripts now reveal
rising confusion of the flight

deck as the captain
struggles to fix

the position of the airport.

OK, did you notice something?

Did you see the airport there?

Where?

There, OK.

You're on a base for it, OK?

It's right there.

PILOT: Well I'm on a base now?

It's like a dogleg.

We're coming in and-- and
there it is, right there.

PILOT: I lost it.

NARRATOR: The pilots
now have to abandon

their direct visual approach and
request help from Little Rock's

Instrument Landing System.

But this delays
landing even further.

Approach American 1420.

CONTROLLER (OVER RADIO):
American 1420, yes, Sir?

Yeah, there's a cloud
between us and the airport

and we've lost the field.

We're on a vector.

Well basically, we're on
the last vector you gave us,

which is like a
dogleg, it looks like.

CONTROLLER (OVER
RADIO): American

1420, can you fly heading 220?

I'll take you up for the ILS.

NARRATOR: This news
footage shows the storm

on the night of the crash.

As heavy rain cuts
visibility even further,

Captain Buschmann
becomes frustrated.

PILOT: See, I hate
droning around

visual, at night in
weather without having

any clue where we are.

RANDY HILL: The thing that
was really getting to me

was I knew we were
getting very low.

I knew that the rain
was not letting up

and that we were being
jolted around quite heavily.

See how we're going right
in the middle of this crap.

Right.

Approach, American 1420.

I know you're doing
your best, Sir,

but we're getting really
close to this storm.

And we'll keep it really
tight if we have to.

NARRATOR: Four minutes from
touchdown, severe thunderstorms

give the pilots
another major problem.

Blinding rain and thick clouds
are obscuring the airfield.

The visibility on the
runway, known as RVR,

is getting dangerously low.

We're going right into this.

CONTROLLER (OVER RADIO):
American 1420, right now we

have heavy rain on the airport.

I don't have new
weather for you.

But visibility is
less than a mile.

And the runway
4-Right RVR is 3,000.

NARRATOR: Visibility
is down to 3,000 feet.

Can we land?

030 at 45 American 1420.

3,000 RVR, we
can't land on that.

No 3,000 if you--

PILOT: What do we need?

No it's 2,400 RVR.

OK, right.

Yeah, we're fine.

All right, 15, and
landing gear down.

And lights, please.

RENEE SALMANS: As we descended,
we descended through a very

dark, black cloud.

The rain seemed to
be going horizontal.

NARRATOR: The cross winds
are way over the limit.

The pilots could divert
to another airport.

But they don't, even as
the weather gets worse.

Wind-shear alert, center
field wind, 350 at 32, gusts 45,

north boundary wind
310 at 29, Northeast

boundary wind 320 at 32.

The jolts seemed to be much
stronger than I'd ever felt.

You could tell that
the thunderheads were

extremely close to the plane.

I said words to the effect
that, if he tries to land

in this weather, we'll crash.

Flaps 28?

Add 20.

NARRATOR: Then visibility falls
drastically below the limit.

American 1420, the runway
Four Right RVR is now 1,600.

Damn.

NARRATOR: The crew are rattled.

Under pressure, they
begin to make mistakes.

I can't see anything.

Looking for 460.

COPILOT: It's there.

MARK SCHMIDT:
Couldn't see anything.

The wind was throwing the
plane around so violently.

I think it was
enough of a crosswind

that I was afraid we were
going to land on the wing.

We felt like were
going to tip over.

I mean, it just felt that bad.

You want 40 flaps?

Yeah, I thought I called it.

I knew, the way he
was jockeying the plane

and the sounds of the
engines, that he was trying

to get lined up for the runway.

And I couldn't see it.

I couldn't see it.

But I could tell we were close.

And I kept thinking,
where's the runway?

Wind is 330 at 28.

PILOT: I'm going to
stay above it a little.

There's a runway
up to your right.

You got it?
- No.

COPILOT: I got the
runway in sight.

You're right on course.
PILOT: I got it.

- Stay where you are.
- I got it.

I got it.

MARK SCHMIDT: Most of the people
at that point, in the plane,

were just holding on really
tight, just looking forward,

I mean, like rigid.

I suspected the worst.

I mean, I really did.

We might not get down.

Flight 1420 is about to
land at Little Rock Airport.

Low visibility and
high winds make

the final approach treacherous.

Wind 330 at 25.

500 feet.

Plus 20.

CONTROLLER (OVER
RADIO): Winds 330 at 23.

Damn, we're off course.

No, I can't see it.

We're way off.

I can't see anything.

Got it?

Got it.

COPILOT: 100 feet, 50
feet, 40, 30, 20, 10,

We hit the runway real hard.

We didn't slow down.

COPILOT: We're down.

We're sliding.

Oh, no.

RANDY HILL: We were still
going very, very, very fast.

And at that point, I
thought, we're dead.

On the brakes.

PASSENGER: Help me.

MARK SCHMIDT: It was just chaos.

It was terrifying, quite
literally, terrifying.

Other one.

PILOT: Other one, other one.

RANDY HILL: When the
plane actually stopped,

there was a moment of
absolute, total silence.

RENEE SALMANS: There
was fire in front of me.

And I could see debris.

And it was silent.

And I thought, oh,
my gosh, I'm dead.

MARK SCHMIDT: Well, I knew
we were in deep trouble.

You know, it's a process
that started in some way.

It's got to end.
It's going to end.

And when it ends, how
do I get out of here?

RENEE SALMANS:
Within those minutes,

I heard a small scream.

And I heard it get louder
and louder and louder,

like it was on a megaphone.

And it hit me,
that's my daughter.

And it's like, oh, OK, we got
to get out of here, you know,

we got to do something.

NARRATOR: The passengers
struggled to get out

before fire engulfed the cabin.

MARK SCHMIDT: I had
a broken scapula,

a dislocated shoulder,
and cracked ribs,

and all sorts of stuff going on.

But I didn't feel a thing.

I just wanted to get out.

I was not going to
die in that thing.

I got out of that plane,
probably, in 10 seconds.

I'm yelling, get
away from the plane,

run, get away from
the plane, go, go, go.

Some folks looked like
they'd been in an explosion.

Their clothes were tattered.

I saw a man using his cell
phone to call for help.

EMT (OVER RADIO): OK, I
don't know where we're at.

But there's a road that
goes around the airport.

Well, we got a lot
of people hurt.

NARRATOR: Traveling at
over 100 miles an hour,

the aircraft ran off
the end of the runway,

plowed down a
25-foot embankment,

and slammed into
a steel walkway.

The plane was ripped
into several pieces.

The wreckage finally came
to rest on the muddy banks

of the Arkansas River.

10 passengers died in the crash.

Captain Bushman was
killed instantly

when the cockpit was split
open by the steel walkway.

It was a shame I hadn't--
literally, a shame, that I had

not done more to save people.

That's the worst
nightmare I have.

NARRATOR: The US National
Transportation Safety

Board was immediately notified.

Greg Feith was NTSB's
chief investigator.

The night American
1420 happened,

I received a phone call about
1 o'clock in the morning,

from our communications
center at the NTSB,

advising that there
had been an aircraft

accident at Little
Rock and there may

be some fatalities involved.

NARRATOR: Fellow
investigator, Don Eick,

was quickly on the scene.

There's a sense of
adrenaline as an accident

occurs like this,
where you're being

launched to the accident scene.

And there's a strong urge to get
there to try to find out what

happened, to document
the facts so we

can prevent it from happening.

NARRATOR: The NTSB
set up a command

center close to the site.

They would spend
the next 18 months

piecing together the events
that led to the crash.

GREGORY FEITH: We did have
a basic idea, when we got

on scene, of what had happened.

We just didn't know why.

We knew the airplane went
off the end of the runway.

We knew that the pilots
couldn't stop it.

We knew that the
aircraft was destroyed

going through this catwalk.

We knew that the subsequent
post-crash fire killed people.

We just didn't
why at that point.

NARRATOR: The NTSB worked
backwards from the impact,

piecing together the
sequence of events

from the final approach, all the
way back to Dallas-Fort Worth.

The first question
for investigators

was why the pilots had been
unable to stop the plane.

Analysis of the tire tracks
left by the skidding plane

showed a complete loss of
control after touchdown.

GREGORY FEITH: When you look at
the width of those tire tracks,

you then see that the airplane
wasn't going straight,

but in fact, it was
sliding sideways.

Here you have this machine that
weighs 130, 140,000 pounds.

It has 100 or so people on it.

It is sliding, uncontrolled,
off to this runway.

NARRATOR: Something had gone
terribly wrong on landing

and investigators
had to find out why.

They questioned the
survivors of Flight 1420,

who would provide an
extremely important clue.

The NTSB investigators
needed to find

out why Flight 1420 had slid,
uncontrolled, off the runway.

They set out to interview
surviving passengers--

--many of whom were
local to Little Rock.

Their eyewitness testimony
would point the inquiry

towards the most important
mechanical system used to slow

a plane down after landing.

We were really interested in,
were those passengers that were

sitting in a position right near
the wings, who could look out

the windows and
tell us whether they

saw the ground spoilers deploy.

NARRATOR: Spoilers
are large flaps that

flip up on landing,
literally spoiling

the airflow over the wings.

This prevents them
from giving lift

and allows braking
to take effect.

Crucially, none
of the passengers

saw the spoilers deploy.

To check their
testimony, the NTSB

examined information from
the airplane's black boxes.

The flight data recorder, which
monitors the systems on board

during flight, confirmed
that the spoilers

had failed to deploy.

The implications
were catastrophic.

Flight 1420 had no hope
of stopping in time.

COPILOT: On the brakes.

We're sliding.

PILOT: Oh, no.

NARRATOR: So was the
failure of the spoilers

to deploy a mechanical problem?

Or in the confusion of final
approach, was it pilot error?

To find out, the NTSB would make
clever use of the Cockpit Voice

Recorder, or CVR.

PILOT (ON CVR): --just
barely make it out.

(ON FAST FORWARD)
Sliding ..

COPILOT (ON CVR):
You want 40 flaps?

PILOT (ON CVR): Yeah,
I thought I called it.

GREGORY FEITH: One
of the key elements

that the CVR team was
listening for was the setting

of the spoiler handle.

We saw, on the
flight data recorder,

that the ground
spoilers didn't deploy.

We wanted to know if the handle
had been actually armed or not.

And we were looking for
a specific click sound.

We couldn't find that sound on
the accident CVR, which led us

to believe that the handle was
never in the armed position

at touchdown.

NARRATOR: Intensely busy in
the cockpit, the pilot simply

forgot to arm the spoilers.

Have they deployed, the MD-80
aircraft might have overshot

the runway, but it
would have stopped

before hitting the catwalk.

The pilots had made serious
and ultimately, fatal errors.

But investigators
wanted to know why.

They suspected that pressures
earlier in the flight

led to these mistakes.

They turned their
attention to the weather.

It was clear to us that severe
weather had been in the area

around the time of the accident.

How it played a part
was one of the things

we had to try to discover.

And putting the radar
images in, the observations,

trying to put it all together,
would take weeks, of course,

to get this information done.

NARRATOR: The NTSB wanted to
know what role the weather had

played in the crash,
and had the pilots been

fully aware of the dangers.

See how we're going right
in the middle of this crap.

GREGORY FEITH: One of the
concerns that all pilots have,

when they're trying
to land an aircraft,

is of course, making sure that
the crosswinds that they may

experience don't
exceed the capabilities

of either themselves
or the aircraft.

The winds now, 350 at 30 45.

Can we land?

This particular
flight crew had

a limitation not
imposed by themselves,

but imposed by the company.

And that they were not allowed
to exceed a 10-knot crosswind

on a wet runway.

NARRATOR: Crosswind
limitations are clearly

stated in the operating manual.

The crew of 1420 were flying
beyond regulation limits.

The effect of the winds can be
seen in this NTSB animation,

showing the captain's
desperate last maneuvers.

DON EICK: Winds definitely
impacted the flight.

If you look at the
animation, you'll

see him fighting the winds.

Definitely not good.

COPILOT (ON CVR): We're down.

On the brakes.

PILOT: Other one, other one.
COPILOT: Other one.

DON EICK: But when
you start talking

about wet runway, thunderstorms,
not a good scenario.

NARRATOR: But we're the crew
of 1420 aware of the hazards

posed by the severe weather?

For the NTSB, previous
accidents had made the dangers

of thunderstorms all too clear.

In 1994, a US Air DC-9
fell victim to wind

shear in North Carolina.

The plane stalled at 250
feet and fell from the sky.

A Delta TriStar crashed
after flying into the most

severe kind of wind
shear that created

an intense downdraft of air.

So should the crew of 1420
have aborted the approach?

This NTSB weather
animation overlays

the path of the
aircraft with ground

radar images of the storm.

Bushman and Origel
landed in lightning,

torrential rain, and
hail, and the cross winds

gusting well over the limit.

DON EICK: Based on the
information that we had

from ground-based weather
radar, the flight crew of 1420

should have been seeing
majority of that storm.

They would have been
seeing the leading

edge going green,
rapidly changing

the yellow, to bright red.

I can't see anything.

Looking for a 460.

GREGORY FEITH: As they
progressed towards Little Rock,

they started to paint
the bad weather, not only

their on-board
radar, but they could

see, out the window, lightning.

And one of the key statements
that this captain made,

which basically summarized
the entire flight,

was the captain saying,
I hate droning around

visual at night, in
weather, without having

any clue where we are.

I hate droning around at night
when I don't know where I am.

That was such a key statement.

It was at that point,
by an experienced,

10,000-hour captain, that
he should have abandoned

the approach going
into Little Rock

and either gone to his alternate
or made his way back to Dallas.

But to make a
statement like that

and then continue an approach
to an airport, where you have

a thunderstorm in
progress over the airport,

is a recipe for disaster.

NARRATOR: But the pilots
were not the only ones

to be heavily criticized.

As the investigation continued,
American Airlines flight policy

would come under fire.

And an industry-wide scandal
was about to be exposed.

the NTSB dug deeper
into the circumstances

surrounding the accident.

The question was, who
would take responsibility?

American Airlines was
reluctant to admit

that their pilots
had knowingly flown

into a severe thunderstorm.

Initially, they tried to pin
the blame on the controller

at Little Rock.

American started legal action
against the authorities

responsible for
airport controllers.

American's lawyers claimed
that the crew of Flight 1420

had not been given all
current weather information.

American 1420,
your equipment's

a lot better than what I have.

How's that final
for 22F looking?

NARRATOR: But after interviewing
the controller at Little Rock,

investigators were unconvinced.

It's highly unlikely that the
flight crew wasn't sufficiently

informed about the
nature of the weather

and the severity of the
weather, not only en route,

but of course, during the course
of the landing at Little Rock.

NARRATOR: The focus
turned back on the pilots.

Lawyers representing
the passengers

were determined to get
American Airlines to accept

liability for the crash.

I mean, it is about
money, in a way,

because you want to make them
pay because I saw the letters

that they would write
back to my lawyer,

minimizing what we
had been through,

minimizing my daughter's burns,
cuts, the psychological effects

that had on my son, at age
15, and my daughter and me,

and just minimizing everything.

So you want to find
a way to hurt them.

NARRATOR: Renee Salmans
and many other survivors

attended the NTSB
public hearings

held in Little Rock, eight
months after the disaster.

With the captain
dead, the copilot

was the first to testify.

As we went off the
end of the runway,

I could see the runway
lights coming up.

And I knew we were going
off the end of the runway.

I couldn't see anything
in front of us.

All I thought was, the
gear would collapse

and we would continue to slide.

It's got to be OK.

And then all of a sudden,
I felt the impact.

Well, I followed it
as close as I could.

You bet.

I wanted to know what happened.

I went to all of
the NTSB hearings.

I was outraged.

I was mad.

For me, they didn't ask him
the right questions, you know?

I wanted to ask him,
what were you thinking?

Why did you all play
chicken with our lives?

NARRATOR: The
co-pilot's testimony

was highly controversial.

In his account of the final
moments of the flight,

he claims to have told the
captain to abort the approach,

otherwise known as a go around.

OFFICIAL: Who can call for
abandoning the approach?

Either pilot.

OFFICIAL: Did you call for
a go around at any time?

MICHAEL ORIGEL: Yes, Sir, I did.

It sounds like, after
reviewing the tape,

you can definitely hear the go.

And the around, it seems like
he talked the same time I did.

And I looked over at him.

And he brought the
airplane back on course.

NARRATOR: However,
when NTSB specialists

studied the cockpit
voice tapes, they

couldn't hear this statement.

PILOT (ON CVR): Damn,
we're off course.

No, I can't see it.

We're way off.

Even though he stood
by that statement,

we could never validate it.

That led to a
controversial finding

because we weren't really sure
if that took place or not.

NARRATOR: The NTSB asked
the copilot tough questions.

But was American Airlines
training also at fault?

Greg Feith put an American
Airlines manager on the stand.

What were the rules for pilots
flying near thunderstorms?

GREGORY FEITH: When
asked the question,

he basically
responded that he just

didn't want his pilots flying
into that type of weather.

Our pilots are forbidden to
enter or depart a terminal area

blanketed by thunderstorms.

NARRATOR: To the NTSB, this
policy simply wasn't clear

cut enough.

Well, that's a very
subjective call for a pilot.

Pilots need boundaries.

You have to set limits.

If there's convective activity,
that is thunderstorm activity,

it's within five nautical
miles of the airport,

there's lightning, there's
wind shear, don't go there.

NARRATOR: The
deeper they looked,

the more the NTSB found that
flying into thunderstorms

was disturbingly widespread.

Extraordinary evidence
given at the hearings

reveal that the problem spread
through the whole industry.

Expert analysts
from MIT spent weeks

recording the flight
paths of planes landing

at Dallas-Fort Worth.

They waited for thunderstorms
and watched how pilots reacted.

Their animation plots
the planes coming

in to land, overlaid with
radar images of the storms.

Anything yellow or orange
is a potentially-severe

thunderstorm.

Of the 2000 encounters
with thunderstorms,

two out of three pilots
flew into the storm

and landed their aircraft.

GREGORY FEITH: I was very
surprised by the testimony

at the public hearing.

Given the fact that they're
flying the best equipment,

typically have the best
training, have the best

information available to
them, for those decisions

to be made to continue
into harm's way,

it was very surprising to me
that they tried to do that.

Pilots know that if we go
into that thunderstorm,

we may not come out
of that thunderstorm.

And if we do, it may not
be, basically, in one piece.

NARRATOR: Why did so many
pilots fly into danger?

The MIT researchers found pilots
were more reckless if they were

behind schedule,
if it was night,

and if aircraft in
front of them were

also flying into bad weather.

DON EICK: In the
Little Rock case,

two of those three
elements were present.

It was night and they
were running late.

NARRATOR: The MIT investigation
was chilling evidence

that the crash at
Little Rock was

part of a much wider problem.

We're not seeing a major
improvement, to put it baldly.

There's a limited
time for training.

Weather was a
significant part that set

up the stage of this accident.

We do not condone
any operation to be

conducted in such weather.

It is a known
severe-weather hazard.

And it should have been
suspended, no operation.

NARRATOR: Ironically,
it also emerged

that new technology
may be partly to blame

for bad decision making.

DON EICK: Might it be
we're desensitizing pilots?

We're putting weather
radar on board aircraft.

We're putting wind-shear
detection systems on airplanes.

Most of these systems only
react when you're in the hazard.

That time, it may be too late.

NARRATOR: The root causes
behind the crash of 1420

went even deeper.

Why were the pilots
so determined to land?

Greg Feith found the answer,
back at Dallas-Forth Worth,

before the flight
even left the ground.

There, he found signs of a
deadly condition in aviation

known as, "get-there-itis."

GREGORY FEITH: There may have
been a sense of get-there-itis.

The flight crew
knew that they were

pushing their 14-hour duty day.

It had been a long duty day.

The airport's right there.

Let's try it.

Let's see if we can
accomplish the mission.

Pilots are goal oriented.

We're mission oriented.

We will stick our nose in
there to try and see if we

can accomplish the mission.

Sometimes we will
accomplish that mission.

But sometimes we get too far
into it that we can't bail out,

we don't have any more
options, and bad things happen.

NARRATOR: For Flight 1420, the
pressures of get-there-itis

sparked a fatal series of
mistakes and misjudgments.

--460-- 60

NARRATOR: At the end of a long
day, rushing to beat the storms

and get the passengers to their
destination, the crew of 1420

made a basic mistake that
cost 11 people their lives.

They forgot to arm the spoilers.

MARK SCHMIDT: They
were so busy trying

to get the plane on the
ground that they forgot

to do what they needed to do.

They didn't have time to do it.

NARRATOR: After the accident,
American Airlines revised

their checklist procedures.

Both pilots must now
confirm that the spoilers

are armed, ready for landing.

In October, 2001, the NTSB
published their report.

They concluded that the two
main causes of the crash

were first, the decision
to land in a thunderstorm,

and second, the pilot's
failure to arm the spoilers.

American Airlines declined
to take part in this program

or comment on the findings.

As an investigator,
I had over two years

to basically criticize, and
determine what the captain

was trying to accomplish.

That particular captain had
seconds to make decisions,

based on the information
he was getting.

And while it's unfair for
an accident investigator

like myself to start pointing
the finger, I wasn't there.

They'd got nothing but flak.

You can understand it.

But I can't understand a person
wanting to kill himself either.

We've been out and visited his
grave at the Air Force Academy

a couple, three times.

And the guy just got caught
up in a bad, bad situation.

I mean, been there, done that.

NARRATOR: One year after
the crash, the survivors

of Flight 1420
gathered at the site

to remember those who died.

For surviving passengers,
the effects of the crash

are long lasting and profound.

RENEE SALMANS: We, as a family,
worked long and hard to work

through it.

We had many talks.

It blew apart a lot
of relationships.

You find out who your
real friends are.

SURVIVOR: The
impact of the crash

is something that I try
to block out of my mind

because I still feel a reaction.

MARK SCHMIDT: People
ask me if I'm OK.

Well, no, I'm not OK.

No, we'll never be OK.

I mean, what is this OK stuff?

You're different.

And deal with it.

I mean, that's the
way we're going to be.