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SPEAKER 1: Ladies and gentlemen,
we are starting our approach.
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SPEAKER 2: We lost both engines!
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SPEAKER 3: Don't be
alarmed, emergency detected.
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00:00:12,746 --> 00:00:13,480
SPEAKER 4: Mayday!
Mayday!
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00:00:13,546 --> 00:00:15,415
SPEAKER 5: Brace for impact!
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SPEAKER 6: I think I lost one.
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SPEAKER 7:
Investigations start--
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00:00:19,486 --> 00:00:20,954
SPEAKER 8: It's gonna crash!
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NARRATOR: Modern airliners
are among the most complex and
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reliable machines in the world.
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00:00:36,903 --> 00:00:40,807
Their safety record is high, and
dangerous incidents are rare.
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00:00:40,874 --> 00:00:43,543
But when they do happen,
aviation authorities
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commit to finding the cause.
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It's rarely easy.
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This is the story of
one such investigation.
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When a 747 suffered a
devastating explosion
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00:00:54,421 --> 00:00:57,223
at high altitude, the
crew and passengers
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faced an unprecedented
crisis, and
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one family's grief
helped authorities
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uncover the full truth.
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KEVIN CAMPBELL: Lee kind
of died for nothing.
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You know, you've got to
find out why he died,
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and you've just got to make sure
that it never happens again.
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NARRATOR: Hawaii is a
natural stop for any flight
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across the Pacific.
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On this morning,
a United 747 was
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undergoing routine
inspection for a trip
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to Auckland, New Zealand.
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But as flight 811
prepared for takeoff,
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everyone's guard is up.
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Just a few months earlier, a
terrorist bomb had brought down
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a 747 over Lockerbie, Scotland.
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LAURA BRENTLINGER: We were in
the aftermath of Lockerbie,
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and I had instructed the crew
to be particularly aware,
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because it was a through
flight from Los Angeles
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going through to New Zealand.
37
00:02:00,086 --> 00:02:02,789
So in my pre-flight
briefing, I'd
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asked them to make sure that
they checked any baggage that
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00:02:06,659 --> 00:02:09,596
looked suspicious or
anything, because we
40
00:02:09,662 --> 00:02:13,433
wanted to be extra cautious.
41
00:02:13,500 --> 00:02:16,002
NARRATOR: Flight 811
was heavily loaded.
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00:02:16,069 --> 00:02:20,507
337 passengers packed cargo
holds and a full fuel load.
43
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The doors closed on time,
and the plane left the gate
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just before 2:00
in the morning, for
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00:02:30,583 --> 00:02:32,051
a routine eight-hour flight.
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LINDA BAHNA: Well, we were going
to New Zealand on vacation,
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someplace that we had really
thought was interesting,
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and somebody had told
us how beautiful it was.
49
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So this was kind of
a dream come true.
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00:02:48,568 --> 00:02:51,437
BRUCE LAMPERT: I was seated in
what's called the upper deck.
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I hadn't had a
vacation in five years,
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and I took all my MileagePlus
points from United Airlines,
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and I purchased a business-class
ticket to Auckland, New
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00:03:00,413 --> 00:03:02,115
Zealand, and Sydney, Australia.
55
00:03:02,181 --> 00:03:04,183
I was going to finally
make that dream vacation
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I'd always wanted--
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to get to Australia
and lay on a beach
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somewhere, and forget
about airplanes,
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00:03:09,656 --> 00:03:12,492
forget about
accidents, and get this
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00:03:12,559 --> 00:03:13,760
out of my mind for a while.
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00:03:23,369 --> 00:03:24,771
NARRATOR: On the
flight deck captain,
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Dave Cronin was hugely
experienced, just
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two months short of retirement.
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Rotate.
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00:03:36,950 --> 00:03:40,486
DAVID CRONIN: I flew almost
35 years with United.
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00:03:40,553 --> 00:03:42,789
I've got over 30,000
hours of flight time
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00:03:42,855 --> 00:03:49,262
and just about everything
military as well as civilian.
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My co-pilot, our first
officer, was Al Slader.
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And I'd known Al at that
time for probably 20 years.
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00:03:59,706 --> 00:04:02,575
And the second
officer, Mark Thomas--
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00:04:02,642 --> 00:04:05,111
was the first time I
had flown with him,
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00:04:05,178 --> 00:04:09,349
but we got along real well.
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Tell them we can handle
33 if it's available.
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00:04:11,618 --> 00:04:12,518
OK.
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00:04:12,585 --> 00:04:13,920
NARRATOR: The pilots
wanted to climb
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00:04:13,987 --> 00:04:17,657
to 33,000 feet above the Pacific
Ocean to avoid turbulence.
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00:04:17,724 --> 00:04:19,792
OK, it looks like
196 put us direct--
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00:04:19,859 --> 00:04:22,362
DAVID CRONIN: We did notice
that there were thunderstorms
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100 miles south, right on
course, which was rather
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unusual for that time of night.
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00:04:28,401 --> 00:04:32,639
So I left the seatbelt sign on.
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00:04:32,705 --> 00:04:34,240
NARRATOR: Captain
Cronin's decision
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00:04:34,307 --> 00:04:39,812
to keep people fastened in their
seats would save many lives.
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00:04:39,879 --> 00:04:41,347
LAURA BRENTLINGER: We
were still climbing out,
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00:04:41,414 --> 00:04:43,282
and the seatbelt
sign was still on,
86
00:04:43,349 --> 00:04:47,587
and just basically, getting
ready to serve beverages,
87
00:04:47,654 --> 00:04:49,222
and then to tuck everyone
in for the evening,
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00:04:49,288 --> 00:04:51,024
because it was going to
be a long flight down
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00:04:51,090 --> 00:04:52,892
to New Zealand.
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00:04:52,959 --> 00:04:55,995
OK, tell them we're going
to detour over to left.
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00:04:56,062 --> 00:04:57,597
Center, United 811, heavy.
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00:04:57,664 --> 00:04:58,698
We're going to be detouring.
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00:04:58,765 --> 00:05:00,133
Some weather here.
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00:05:00,199 --> 00:05:02,402
It'll be to the left of course.
95
00:05:02,468 --> 00:05:05,738
NARRATOR: 100 miles from
Honolulu, as flight 811
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00:05:05,805 --> 00:05:09,442
climbed through 23,000
feet, a huge malfunction
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00:05:09,509 --> 00:05:12,045
was about to occur.
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00:05:12,111 --> 00:05:15,548
There was now a big air pressure
difference between the inside
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00:05:15,615 --> 00:05:18,151
and the outside of the aircraft.
100
00:05:18,217 --> 00:05:21,721
Suddenly, passengers sitting
just above and behind the cargo
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00:05:21,788 --> 00:05:23,589
door heard a noise.
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00:05:23,656 --> 00:05:25,958
LINDA BAHNA: Then, it was
kind of a grinding noise.
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00:05:31,631 --> 00:05:33,332
I heard, like, a thud.
104
00:05:37,170 --> 00:05:38,071
The hell?
105
00:05:38,137 --> 00:05:40,907
In the next
nanosecond, it was pure,
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00:05:40,973 --> 00:05:43,409
unadulterated pandemonium.
107
00:05:52,285 --> 00:05:53,653
We lost number three.
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00:05:53,720 --> 00:05:54,821
Going down.
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00:05:54,887 --> 00:05:56,422
It looks like we've
lost number three engine,
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00:05:56,489 --> 00:05:58,057
and we're descending rapidly.
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00:05:58,124 --> 00:05:58,925
Coming back.
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00:06:02,161 --> 00:06:06,065
The next thing I knew, I
found myself on the stairwell,
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00:06:06,132 --> 00:06:09,335
hanging on to the rungs,
and I immediately knew it
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00:06:09,402 --> 00:06:11,170
was an explosive decompression.
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00:06:13,873 --> 00:06:15,641
NARRATOR: The cargo
door had torn off
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00:06:15,708 --> 00:06:18,711
and ripped a large section
of the plane with it.
117
00:06:18,778 --> 00:06:21,214
The pressurized air
inside had blasted
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00:06:21,280 --> 00:06:23,983
out with explosive force.
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00:06:24,050 --> 00:06:25,852
I immediately
thought of Lockerbie.
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00:06:25,918 --> 00:06:29,722
We actually thought it
was a bomb that went off.
121
00:06:29,789 --> 00:06:31,824
BRUCE LAMPERT: It
was hell on earth.
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00:06:31,891 --> 00:06:33,593
Everything on the
airplane that wasn't
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00:06:33,659 --> 00:06:38,965
fastened down, tied down,
or secured became airborne.
124
00:06:39,031 --> 00:06:40,833
The noise was incredible.
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00:06:43,703 --> 00:06:45,404
BOB BAHNA: Everything
in front of us was gone.
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00:06:45,471 --> 00:06:48,941
Where we were sitting, we were
about 6 inches from the hole,
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00:06:49,008 --> 00:06:52,245
so there was nothing in front
of us or to the side of us.
128
00:06:52,311 --> 00:06:54,280
The whole side of
the plane was gone.
129
00:06:54,347 --> 00:06:56,349
Actually, our feet were
dangling on the hole.
130
00:06:56,415 --> 00:06:59,652
And my first thought-- we
weren't going to make it.
131
00:06:59,719 --> 00:07:03,923
You know, I just didn't
think there was any hope.
132
00:07:03,990 --> 00:07:06,092
NARRATOR: With the
pressurized air blown out,
133
00:07:06,159 --> 00:07:08,561
the lack of oxygen
at 23,000 feet
134
00:07:08,628 --> 00:07:11,931
was now suffocating the
passengers and the crew.
135
00:07:11,998 --> 00:07:14,367
It felt like someone had
kicked me in the stomach
136
00:07:14,433 --> 00:07:16,369
and knocked the wind out of me.
137
00:07:16,435 --> 00:07:23,276
And I remember trying to
catch my breath, and couldn't.
138
00:07:23,342 --> 00:07:25,478
You're supposed to
wrap those oxygen masks
139
00:07:25,545 --> 00:07:28,915
and put them on, except the
oxygen masks in that cabin--
140
00:07:28,981 --> 00:07:30,750
they were ripped out of
the ceiling, and they
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00:07:30,817 --> 00:07:32,285
weren't-- they weren't there.
142
00:07:32,351 --> 00:07:35,121
And I remember
thinking to myself,
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00:07:35,188 --> 00:07:37,557
this is what it feels
like to suffocate.
144
00:07:37,623 --> 00:07:38,624
United know, 811 heavy.
145
00:07:38,691 --> 00:07:41,093
We're doing an
emergency descent.
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00:07:41,160 --> 00:07:43,262
NARRATOR: The pilots could
tell from their instruments
147
00:07:43,329 --> 00:07:45,531
that the number-three
engine was failing,
148
00:07:45,598 --> 00:07:48,334
but they couldn't tell the
full extent of the damage.
149
00:07:48,401 --> 00:07:51,304
Their priority was to get the
plane down to a level where
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00:07:51,370 --> 00:07:53,039
they could breathe normally.
151
00:07:53,105 --> 00:07:54,140
Put your mask on, Dave.
152
00:07:57,610 --> 00:07:59,111
NARRATOR: But the
pilots didn't know
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00:07:59,178 --> 00:08:03,983
that the explosion had destroyed
the entire oxygen supply.
154
00:08:04,050 --> 00:08:05,284
Can't get any oxygen.
155
00:08:05,351 --> 00:08:06,552
We're not getting any oxygen!
156
00:08:06,619 --> 00:08:07,353
Are you getting any?
157
00:08:07,420 --> 00:08:09,222
I can't get any either.
158
00:08:09,288 --> 00:08:11,390
NARRATOR: With the plane
heading steeply down
159
00:08:11,457 --> 00:08:13,860
and no word from the
cockpit, the cabin
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00:08:13,926 --> 00:08:15,895
crew were thinking the worst.
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00:08:15,962 --> 00:08:18,531
I remember thinking
that the cockpit, which
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00:08:18,598 --> 00:08:20,833
is up in the upper
deck, had probably
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00:08:20,900 --> 00:08:22,235
blown off the airplane, too.
164
00:08:22,301 --> 00:08:26,772
Because as far up as we could
see, there was nothing there.
165
00:08:26,839 --> 00:08:29,909
Now, we're doing
this nose dive.
166
00:08:29,976 --> 00:08:32,945
My next thought was, oh my god,
we're just going straight down.
167
00:08:33,012 --> 00:08:36,048
We're going to
crash into the sea.
168
00:08:36,115 --> 00:08:37,717
NARRATOR: With the
airplane ruptured,
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00:08:37,783 --> 00:08:40,953
severe damage to the right
wing and engines, and its crew
170
00:08:41,020 --> 00:08:43,923
forcing it down to
an emergency descent,
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00:08:43,990 --> 00:08:46,792
the problems on flight
811 had only just begun.
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00:08:55,768 --> 00:08:59,105
Two minutes after suffering
a devastating explosion,
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00:08:59,171 --> 00:09:03,242
flight 811 was still in a
steep emergency descent,
174
00:09:03,309 --> 00:09:07,513
passing rapidly through 15,000
feet to reach breathable air.
175
00:09:07,580 --> 00:09:10,316
SPEAKER (ON RADIO): United 811
heavy, say your altitude now.
176
00:09:10,383 --> 00:09:11,450
Believe me, 15.
177
00:09:11,517 --> 00:09:14,787
United 811, heavy,
we're out of 15.5.
178
00:09:14,854 --> 00:09:17,056
SPEAKER (ON RADIO):
United 811, roger.
179
00:09:17,123 --> 00:09:18,791
I think we blew a
door or something.
180
00:09:18,858 --> 00:09:21,460
Tell the flight attendant to
get prepared for an evacuation.
181
00:09:21,527 --> 00:09:23,162
NARRATOR: The crew
finally began to level
182
00:09:23,229 --> 00:09:25,765
out at a safer altitude.
183
00:09:25,831 --> 00:09:30,236
But they now faced a
barrage of problems.
184
00:09:30,303 --> 00:09:32,438
The most immediate
was the disintegration
185
00:09:32,505 --> 00:09:35,341
of the number-three engine
nearest to the explosion.
186
00:09:38,010 --> 00:09:40,446
We don't have any
fire indications?
187
00:09:40,513 --> 00:09:44,050
I-- I don't have anything.
188
00:09:44,116 --> 00:09:46,285
OK, we lost number three.
189
00:09:46,352 --> 00:09:47,286
Let's shut it down.
190
00:09:47,353 --> 00:09:48,321
There's no N-1.
191
00:09:48,387 --> 00:09:49,755
Yeah, OK.
192
00:09:49,822 --> 00:09:52,258
Ready for number-three
shutdown checklist.
193
00:09:56,195 --> 00:10:00,132
Before you shut down number
three, the generator went off.
194
00:10:00,199 --> 00:10:01,634
Looks all right to try it now.
195
00:10:10,543 --> 00:10:12,411
Well, that stopped
the vibration anyway.
196
00:10:12,478 --> 00:10:13,679
Feel jettison procedure.
197
00:10:13,746 --> 00:10:15,881
Main boost pumps.
198
00:10:15,948 --> 00:10:17,550
Center, United 811.
199
00:10:17,616 --> 00:10:19,118
We need the equipment
standing by.
200
00:10:19,185 --> 00:10:20,286
Company notified, please.
201
00:10:20,353 --> 00:10:22,388
We got a control problem.
202
00:10:22,455 --> 00:10:25,291
Center-wing,
left-right valves, on.
203
00:10:25,358 --> 00:10:26,625
Start dumping the fuel.
204
00:10:26,692 --> 00:10:27,827
I am dumping.
205
00:10:30,129 --> 00:10:33,799
One stewardess was seriously
injured by falling debris.
206
00:10:33,866 --> 00:10:36,802
As Laura Brentlinger helped
her, the full gravity
207
00:10:36,869 --> 00:10:39,739
of this situation
suddenly became clear.
208
00:10:39,805 --> 00:10:42,174
As I'm holding her in
my arms, I looked up,
209
00:10:42,241 --> 00:10:44,110
and as I looked up,
that was the first time
210
00:10:44,176 --> 00:10:46,879
I saw this tremendous
hole on the side
211
00:10:46,946 --> 00:10:51,384
of the aircraft that was just
a void, and seats were missing.
212
00:10:51,450 --> 00:10:54,153
And I immediately knew that
we had lost passengers.
213
00:10:57,123 --> 00:10:58,824
NARRATOR: Five rows
of seats had been
214
00:10:58,891 --> 00:11:03,095
blown out in the decompression,
killing nine passengers.
215
00:11:03,162 --> 00:11:06,265
On the flight deck, the crew had
turned the stricken plane back
216
00:11:06,332 --> 00:11:09,635
to Honolulu, but with
80 miles still to go,
217
00:11:09,702 --> 00:11:12,204
the crisis now got far worse.
218
00:11:12,271 --> 00:11:14,707
We got a hell of a
control problem here.
219
00:11:14,774 --> 00:11:16,308
I got almost full
rudder on this thing.
220
00:11:16,375 --> 00:11:17,610
Are you dumping
as fast as you can?
221
00:11:17,676 --> 00:11:19,078
I'm dumping everything.
222
00:11:19,145 --> 00:11:21,414
We got a problem with
number-four engine?
223
00:11:21,480 --> 00:11:22,548
Yeah.
224
00:11:22,615 --> 00:11:24,550
NARRATOR: Debris from
the explosion that also
225
00:11:24,617 --> 00:11:26,819
damaged the number-four engine.
226
00:11:26,886 --> 00:11:30,623
If it failed completely, the
implications would be severe.
227
00:11:30,689 --> 00:11:34,560
If you are on two engines
and you weigh 700,000 pounds,
228
00:11:34,627 --> 00:11:36,896
that is a big deal.
229
00:11:36,962 --> 00:11:39,532
Simply because with
that kind of weight,
230
00:11:39,598 --> 00:11:43,002
two engines are not going
to keep you in the air.
231
00:11:43,069 --> 00:11:43,936
You're going to come down.
232
00:11:48,607 --> 00:11:51,310
NARRATOR: Although their
number-four engine was failing,
233
00:11:51,377 --> 00:11:53,579
the pilots pushed it
along with the remaining
234
00:11:53,646 --> 00:11:55,414
engines to full power--
235
00:11:55,481 --> 00:11:58,484
a setting they should not run
up for more than four minutes.
236
00:11:58,551 --> 00:12:01,921
But the nearest land
was 15 minutes away.
237
00:12:01,987 --> 00:12:04,457
I look out the window
on the right-hand side,
238
00:12:04,523 --> 00:12:08,027
and I see flames, big flames.
239
00:12:08,094 --> 00:12:10,296
And I know what flames
in engine means.
240
00:12:10,362 --> 00:12:11,597
It's not good.
241
00:12:11,664 --> 00:12:13,099
NARRATOR: The
pilots were unaware
242
00:12:13,165 --> 00:12:15,968
that the number-four
engine was now on fire.
243
00:12:16,035 --> 00:12:17,336
You've got 250 knots now.
244
00:12:17,403 --> 00:12:18,137
That's good.
245
00:12:18,204 --> 00:12:19,438
7,000--
246
00:12:19,505 --> 00:12:21,373
Yeah, we're
getting more rumble.
247
00:12:21,440 --> 00:12:22,241
Watch your heading.
248
00:12:22,308 --> 00:12:23,075
Watch your heading.
249
00:12:23,142 --> 00:12:24,210
You want to go direct Honolulu.
250
00:12:24,276 --> 00:12:25,611
OK.
251
00:12:25,678 --> 00:12:27,513
I'm going to go downstairs and
see what the hell is going on.
252
00:12:27,580 --> 00:12:28,714
Yeah.
253
00:12:28,781 --> 00:12:31,350
Go ahead and run down
and see what's happening.
254
00:12:31,417 --> 00:12:33,385
LAURA BRENTLINGER: I
saw the flight engineer
255
00:12:33,452 --> 00:12:36,555
descend down the stairwell.
256
00:12:36,622 --> 00:12:41,227
And when I saw him, my relief
was, oh my god, they're alive.
257
00:12:41,293 --> 00:12:44,230
And there was a huge
sense of relief for me.
258
00:12:44,296 --> 00:12:47,466
He saw the hole, turned
as white as a sheet,
259
00:12:47,533 --> 00:12:50,402
and I screamed to him, dear
god, please get us down.
260
00:12:52,905 --> 00:12:54,373
We've got a fire out there.
261
00:12:54,440 --> 00:12:57,376
Oh, yeah, we got a
fire in number four.
262
00:12:57,443 --> 00:12:58,677
Go through the procedure.
263
00:12:58,744 --> 00:13:00,012
Shut down the engine.
264
00:13:00,079 --> 00:13:01,647
We're not going to be able
to hold this altitude on two.
265
00:13:09,021 --> 00:13:11,223
We got a fire
on the right side.
266
00:13:11,290 --> 00:13:12,558
We're on two engines now.
267
00:13:12,625 --> 00:13:14,994
The whole right side-- it's
just gone from about the one
268
00:13:15,060 --> 00:13:16,962
right back to-- it's just open.
269
00:13:17,029 --> 00:13:18,564
You're just looking outside.
270
00:13:18,631 --> 00:13:19,365
What do you mean?
271
00:13:19,431 --> 00:13:20,299
It looks like a bomb.
272
00:13:20,366 --> 00:13:21,100
Fuselage?
273
00:13:21,167 --> 00:13:21,967
Yeah, the fuselage.
274
00:13:22,034 --> 00:13:23,102
It's just-- it's just open.
275
00:13:27,439 --> 00:13:29,275
OK, it looks like
we got a bomb that
276
00:13:29,341 --> 00:13:31,544
went off on the right side.
277
00:13:31,610 --> 00:13:32,912
The whole right side is gone.
278
00:13:32,978 --> 00:13:36,048
Yeah, from-- from about
the one right back to--
279
00:13:36,115 --> 00:13:38,884
Anybody--?
280
00:13:38,951 --> 00:13:40,019
Some people are probably gone.
281
00:13:40,085 --> 00:13:40,886
I don't know.
282
00:13:44,957 --> 00:13:46,792
I knew that we
had lost people.
283
00:13:46,859 --> 00:13:49,562
I didn't know how many.
284
00:13:49,628 --> 00:13:53,666
In fact, I didn't know until
the next day how many were lost.
285
00:13:53,732 --> 00:13:58,537
But you know, it's
a terrible thing
286
00:13:58,604 --> 00:13:59,972
when you're a captain
of an airplane
287
00:14:00,039 --> 00:14:01,807
and you lose passengers.
288
00:14:08,247 --> 00:14:10,482
NARRATOR: Lee Campbell,
flying home to New Zealand,
289
00:14:10,549 --> 00:14:13,485
was sitting in row 10 just
in front of the cargo door.
290
00:14:17,223 --> 00:14:22,494
I woke up with such a start,
because I'd seen Lee standing
291
00:14:22,561 --> 00:14:26,765
by the bed, just with a
gray jacket over his arm
292
00:14:26,832 --> 00:14:29,235
and a small smile on his face.
293
00:14:29,301 --> 00:14:33,072
Of course, as I woke up,
it faded slowly, uh--
294
00:14:33,138 --> 00:14:36,041
And then, we woke up in the
morning, and we discussed this.
295
00:14:36,108 --> 00:14:38,344
I said, oh, it was
strange in the night,
296
00:14:38,410 --> 00:14:41,814
but it's such a vivid dream.
297
00:14:41,880 --> 00:14:44,984
Lee was standing there.
298
00:14:45,050 --> 00:14:50,256
And then, the radio came on,
and the first item of news
299
00:14:50,322 --> 00:14:54,660
is that there'd been problem
with a United aircraft.
300
00:14:54,727 --> 00:14:56,996
And I said, that was Lee.
301
00:14:57,062 --> 00:15:00,232
It's Lee, and my
blood just ran cold.
302
00:15:00,299 --> 00:15:02,635
I knew he was dead,
from that moment.
303
00:15:08,841 --> 00:15:10,476
Center, do you read?
304
00:15:10,542 --> 00:15:12,544
We evidently had a
bomb or something.
305
00:15:12,611 --> 00:15:14,213
A big section of the right
sidebar of the airplane
306
00:15:14,280 --> 00:15:16,015
is missing.
307
00:15:16,081 --> 00:15:17,549
SPEAKER (ON RADIO):
Unite 811, heavy, roger.
308
00:15:17,616 --> 00:15:21,020
I wouldn't go any faster than
I had to, because that hole--
309
00:15:21,086 --> 00:15:22,955
I mean, I wouldn't
get it over 250 knots,
310
00:15:23,022 --> 00:15:23,922
because that's a big--
311
00:15:23,989 --> 00:15:25,958
OK, what's-- what's
our stall speed?
312
00:15:26,025 --> 00:15:27,726
I wouldn't go below 240.
313
00:15:27,793 --> 00:15:29,395
Yeah.
314
00:15:29,461 --> 00:15:31,130
I don't know if we're
going to make this.
315
00:15:31,196 --> 00:15:33,799
We didn't know that we
were going to make it back,
316
00:15:33,866 --> 00:15:36,935
so we were actually preparing
to ditch that airplane
317
00:15:37,002 --> 00:15:40,306
at night in the
Pacific Ocean, which
318
00:15:40,372 --> 00:15:42,908
has never been done before.
319
00:15:42,975 --> 00:15:46,145
NARRATOR: In the cabin, the
crew prepared for the worst.
320
00:15:46,211 --> 00:15:47,513
LAURA BRENTLINGER: My
training kicked in,
321
00:15:47,579 --> 00:15:51,617
and I got up from my
jump seat and started
322
00:15:51,684 --> 00:15:54,253
instructing the crew.
323
00:15:54,320 --> 00:15:55,721
We have to prepare the cabin.
324
00:15:55,788 --> 00:15:58,257
We have to prepare
for a ditching,
325
00:15:58,324 --> 00:16:00,626
which I thought was inevitable.
326
00:16:04,196 --> 00:16:05,864
You're running around
getting life vests on,
327
00:16:05,931 --> 00:16:08,467
and I do remember
thinking, I'm not
328
00:16:08,534 --> 00:16:10,269
sure this is going to matter.
329
00:16:10,336 --> 00:16:14,073
Because when we hit
the water, you know,
330
00:16:14,139 --> 00:16:15,808
I just imagine planes
getting split apart.
331
00:16:19,511 --> 00:16:21,180
I knew that if
we hit the water,
332
00:16:21,246 --> 00:16:22,881
it'd be tantamount to
hitting the ground,
333
00:16:22,948 --> 00:16:25,250
and there would be very
few, if any, survivors.
334
00:16:25,317 --> 00:16:27,386
So my mind went to--
335
00:16:32,391 --> 00:16:35,627
the thing that meant something
to me, and at that point
336
00:16:35,694 --> 00:16:36,795
in my life, it was my son.
337
00:16:39,331 --> 00:16:41,367
NARRATOR: Believing
they were going to die,
338
00:16:41,433 --> 00:16:44,036
one of the passengers
took these photographs.
339
00:16:48,440 --> 00:16:51,844
For 15 minutes, the plane
steadily lost altitude.
340
00:16:51,910 --> 00:16:56,715
Then, at 4,000 feet, there
was a glimmer of hope.
341
00:16:56,782 --> 00:17:01,220
After an imponderable time, I
remember one of the passengers
342
00:17:01,286 --> 00:17:05,290
began to point out one of the
windows on the right side.
343
00:17:05,357 --> 00:17:08,660
And everybody looked, and we
looked to this little window
344
00:17:08,727 --> 00:17:13,132
from wherever we were, and we
could see a point of light,
345
00:17:13,198 --> 00:17:15,401
and another point of
light, and another point.
346
00:17:15,467 --> 00:17:17,970
Pretty soon, you could
make out of coastline.
347
00:17:18,036 --> 00:17:20,105
OK, I've got lights over here.
348
00:17:20,172 --> 00:17:21,707
OK.
349
00:17:21,774 --> 00:17:22,574
OK.
350
00:17:22,641 --> 00:17:23,909
We're at 4.
351
00:17:23,976 --> 00:17:26,011
We're 21 miles out.
352
00:17:26,078 --> 00:17:26,879
We're in good shape.
353
00:17:29,515 --> 00:17:32,785
NARRATOR: At Honolulu Airport,
an emergency was declared.
354
00:17:32,851 --> 00:17:34,820
All other aircraft
were diverted,
355
00:17:34,887 --> 00:17:37,589
and the rescue services
prepared for the crash landing
356
00:17:37,656 --> 00:17:38,891
of a fully loaded airliner.
357
00:17:44,897 --> 00:17:46,131
Hey, you want to
give me some speeds?
358
00:17:46,198 --> 00:17:48,133
Yeah.
359
00:17:48,200 --> 00:17:52,604
150 is going to be
your two engine.
360
00:17:52,671 --> 00:17:53,906
Use a 160.
361
00:17:53,972 --> 00:17:54,706
SPEAKER (ON RADIO): United
811, I need souls on board,
362
00:17:54,773 --> 00:17:55,707
if you have it.
363
00:17:55,774 --> 00:17:57,309
OK, souls on board.
364
00:17:57,376 --> 00:17:59,011
160 is the minimum.
365
00:17:59,077 --> 00:18:00,879
Stand by, United 811, heavy.
366
00:18:00,946 --> 00:18:02,714
I don't know how
many is on board.
367
00:18:02,781 --> 00:18:07,186
200 and-- I don't have the
paperwork in front of me here.
368
00:18:07,252 --> 00:18:09,555
Uh, we're too busy right now.
369
00:18:09,621 --> 00:18:11,223
200 and something.
370
00:18:11,290 --> 00:18:12,658
SPEAKER (ON RADIO): OK.
371
00:18:12,724 --> 00:18:14,960
NARRATOR: Six minutes
from the airport, the crew
372
00:18:15,027 --> 00:18:18,197
now had to slow the
overweight plane for landing.
373
00:18:18,263 --> 00:18:19,898
But the effect of
this was unknown.
374
00:18:23,735 --> 00:18:25,704
What's going to happen
when I start coming out
375
00:18:25,771 --> 00:18:29,842
with flaps and landing gear?
376
00:18:29,908 --> 00:18:33,245
We're either going to land
on the airport in the water
377
00:18:33,312 --> 00:18:36,815
or downtown Honolulu.
378
00:18:36,882 --> 00:18:38,851
OK, inboards
are coming to ten.
379
00:18:38,917 --> 00:18:41,954
How do the controls feel?
380
00:18:42,020 --> 00:18:42,888
All right, so far.
381
00:18:45,691 --> 00:18:47,125
NARRATOR: But the
flaps were damaged
382
00:18:47,192 --> 00:18:49,127
and could not fully extend.
383
00:18:49,194 --> 00:18:52,764
This meant that flight 811 would
have to land dangerously fast.
384
00:18:56,835 --> 00:18:58,036
SPEAKER (ON RADIO):
United 811, heavy.
385
00:18:58,103 --> 00:18:59,838
Do you have the
airport in sight?
386
00:18:59,905 --> 00:19:01,473
It's over here to
the right, Captain.
387
00:19:01,540 --> 00:19:02,708
OK.
388
00:19:02,774 --> 00:19:04,042
OK, we have the airport.
389
00:19:04,109 --> 00:19:06,678
United 811, heavy.
390
00:19:06,745 --> 00:19:09,915
SPEAKER (ON RADIO): 811 is
clear to land, eight left.
391
00:19:09,982 --> 00:19:11,049
Equipment standing by.
392
00:19:11,116 --> 00:19:15,087
Wind at 05012.
393
00:19:15,153 --> 00:19:16,655
Clear to land.
394
00:19:16,722 --> 00:19:20,425
Eight left, United 811, heavy.
395
00:19:20,492 --> 00:19:23,929
NARRATOR: As the unstable
747 lined up for landing,
396
00:19:23,996 --> 00:19:26,999
the pilots knew they would
only have one attempt.
397
00:19:27,065 --> 00:19:29,067
But even if they got
it on the runway,
398
00:19:29,134 --> 00:19:31,136
the nagging question remained.
399
00:19:31,203 --> 00:19:34,640
Would the stress of impact
cause the damaged and overweight
400
00:19:34,706 --> 00:19:36,575
aircraft to disintegrate?
401
00:19:43,682 --> 00:19:46,451
Severely damaged, with
an unstable airframe,
402
00:19:46,518 --> 00:19:49,621
losing altitude, and
on only two engines,
403
00:19:49,688 --> 00:19:53,492
flight 811 began its final
approach to Honolulu airport.
404
00:19:57,329 --> 00:19:59,031
Two-engine approach.
405
00:19:59,097 --> 00:20:00,098
Two-engine approach.
406
00:20:02,601 --> 00:20:04,770
We still had no idea how
far off the ground we were,
407
00:20:04,836 --> 00:20:06,538
if we were going to make
it to Honolulu or not.
408
00:20:06,605 --> 00:20:08,941
But that seemed like
an appropriate time,
409
00:20:09,007 --> 00:20:10,876
if we're somewhere around
land, that we're probably going
410
00:20:10,943 --> 00:20:14,580
to try and land somewhere
to get the passengers
411
00:20:14,646 --> 00:20:15,881
in their brace positions.
412
00:20:15,948 --> 00:20:17,783
So that's when we
started yelling for them
413
00:20:17,849 --> 00:20:19,518
to get down to brace positions.
414
00:20:19,585 --> 00:20:25,958
Every molecule in my
body combined to express,
415
00:20:26,024 --> 00:20:30,228
get this damn airplane
on the ground.
416
00:20:30,295 --> 00:20:32,364
How are we doing
on the hydraulics?
417
00:20:32,431 --> 00:20:35,233
Hydraulics are good.
418
00:20:35,300 --> 00:20:37,603
We got brakes?
419
00:20:37,669 --> 00:20:39,671
Normal hydraulics.
420
00:20:39,738 --> 00:20:41,073
So we got brakes.
421
00:20:41,139 --> 00:20:46,345
But, uh-- you're only going to
have reversing on one and one.
422
00:20:46,411 --> 00:20:48,714
Though I thought maybe there
was a chance that we were going
423
00:20:48,780 --> 00:20:51,149
to actually be able
to attempt to land,
424
00:20:51,216 --> 00:20:52,684
the thought came to my mind.
425
00:20:52,751 --> 00:20:54,019
What happens now?
426
00:20:54,086 --> 00:20:57,489
Do we-- on impact,
do we explode?
427
00:20:57,556 --> 00:21:01,360
Do we fall out this huge hole?
428
00:21:01,426 --> 00:21:03,829
NARRATOR: Despite dumping
fuel, the aircraft was
429
00:21:03,895 --> 00:21:05,364
still critically overweight.
430
00:21:05,430 --> 00:21:06,665
192.
431
00:21:06,732 --> 00:21:08,667
NARRATOR: But without full
flaps to keep it in the air,
432
00:21:08,734 --> 00:21:10,302
it had to approach fast.
433
00:21:10,369 --> 00:21:11,703
1,000 down.
434
00:21:11,770 --> 00:21:14,206
NARRATOR: The danger was that
the undercarriage would shear
435
00:21:14,272 --> 00:21:16,675
off and the plane break up.
436
00:21:16,742 --> 00:21:17,976
A dot and a half high.
437
00:21:22,080 --> 00:21:27,819
190.
438
00:21:27,886 --> 00:21:32,758
185.
439
00:21:32,824 --> 00:21:33,558
A little slow.
440
00:21:33,625 --> 00:21:35,260
A little slow, Dave.
441
00:21:35,327 --> 00:21:36,228
It's below what we want.
442
00:21:43,435 --> 00:21:44,569
Coming up on the glide slope.
443
00:21:47,205 --> 00:21:48,940
OK.
444
00:21:49,007 --> 00:21:50,008
Let's try the gear.
445
00:21:52,744 --> 00:21:54,646
NARRATOR: No one
knew if the explosion
446
00:21:54,713 --> 00:21:56,314
damaged the landing gear.
447
00:21:56,381 --> 00:21:58,283
I remember Laura saying
to me that she didn't
448
00:21:58,350 --> 00:21:59,985
hear the landing gear go down.
449
00:22:00,052 --> 00:22:00,819
And it was loud.
450
00:22:00,886 --> 00:22:02,120
You know, it was still loud.
451
00:22:02,187 --> 00:22:04,322
And I didn't hear the
landing gear go down.
452
00:22:04,389 --> 00:22:05,724
So that's another thought--
453
00:22:05,791 --> 00:22:07,325
maybe they can't get
the landing gear down.
454
00:22:07,392 --> 00:22:11,029
Maybe it's not down.
455
00:22:11,096 --> 00:22:13,532
You got the gear down.
456
00:22:13,598 --> 00:22:15,267
We're clear to land,
and everything's taken
457
00:22:15,333 --> 00:22:16,635
care of, as far as we know.
458
00:22:27,345 --> 00:22:32,484
195.
459
00:22:32,551 --> 00:22:33,351
Half a dot high.
460
00:22:37,055 --> 00:22:38,323
Looking-- looking good.
461
00:22:41,026 --> 00:22:46,031
192.
462
00:22:46,098 --> 00:22:47,065
195.
463
00:22:47,132 --> 00:22:47,999
Coming off in the power.
464
00:22:51,403 --> 00:22:52,204
100 feet.
465
00:22:58,443 --> 00:22:59,244
50 feet.
466
00:23:04,816 --> 00:23:05,617
Center thhe trim.
467
00:23:05,684 --> 00:23:06,485
Center the trim.
468
00:23:10,188 --> 00:23:12,724
30.
469
00:23:12,791 --> 00:23:13,592
10.
470
00:23:18,029 --> 00:23:20,098
Zero.
471
00:23:20,165 --> 00:23:20,966
We're on.
472
00:23:25,937 --> 00:23:28,473
Gear's holding.
473
00:23:28,540 --> 00:23:29,508
LEONARD JENKINS: We landed.
474
00:23:29,574 --> 00:23:30,776
It felt fast.
475
00:23:30,842 --> 00:23:32,778
And that was my next concern--
is that we weren't going
476
00:23:32,844 --> 00:23:34,212
to stop at the
end of the runway,
477
00:23:34,279 --> 00:23:35,580
that we were just
going to keep going.
478
00:23:46,925 --> 00:23:50,362
And all of a sudden, we were
slowing down, slowing down.
479
00:23:50,428 --> 00:23:53,165
And I said, oh my
god, we've landed.
480
00:23:53,231 --> 00:23:55,167
We're on the ground.
481
00:23:55,233 --> 00:23:58,003
And the people
started applauding.
482
00:24:08,013 --> 00:24:11,249
DAVID CRONIN: Probably the
best landing I've ever made.
483
00:24:11,316 --> 00:24:14,319
When we finally
stopped on the runway,
484
00:24:14,386 --> 00:24:18,490
we deployed all 10 chutes,
and the flight attendants
485
00:24:18,557 --> 00:24:22,227
evacuated all the passengers.
486
00:24:22,294 --> 00:24:24,296
LEONARD JENKINS: It's amazing
how fast everyone went.
487
00:24:24,362 --> 00:24:28,733
My understanding is, like, less
than 45 seconds, 330 people
488
00:24:28,800 --> 00:24:31,369
were off the airplane.
489
00:24:31,436 --> 00:24:33,271
BRUCE LAMPERT: We were probably
20 feet off the ground,
490
00:24:33,338 --> 00:24:35,407
and I would have stepped out of
the airplane without a slide.
491
00:24:35,473 --> 00:24:37,342
I wanted to get off so bad.
492
00:24:37,409 --> 00:24:38,844
Fortunately, there was a slide.
493
00:24:38,910 --> 00:24:41,713
I stepped into the abyss,
fell into the slide,
494
00:24:41,780 --> 00:24:43,849
flew down to the
bottom of the thing,
495
00:24:43,915 --> 00:24:48,587
and then you hit, feet running.
496
00:24:48,653 --> 00:24:50,922
LAURA BRENTLINGER: The slide
kind of kicked me up and flew
497
00:24:50,989 --> 00:24:54,092
me up into the air, and
my thought was, oh my god,
498
00:24:54,159 --> 00:24:55,560
I'm going to survive
this whole thing,
499
00:24:55,627 --> 00:24:58,396
and I'm going to get wiped
out here on the evacuation.
500
00:24:58,463 --> 00:25:00,665
Because it just really threw me.
501
00:25:00,732 --> 00:25:02,901
And I landed and
scraped up my legs
502
00:25:02,968 --> 00:25:05,837
pretty badly, and
landed on my feet.
503
00:25:05,904 --> 00:25:09,407
And it wasn't until that
moment that I had the sense of,
504
00:25:09,474 --> 00:25:11,610
I'm here, I'm OK,
I'm on the ground.
505
00:25:15,146 --> 00:25:18,783
DAVID CRONIN: When we
got all our switches off,
506
00:25:18,850 --> 00:25:20,685
I ran through the
airplane, made sure there
507
00:25:20,752 --> 00:25:23,321
wasn't no one else on the
airplane, came up to the door--
508
00:25:23,388 --> 00:25:24,189
one left--
509
00:25:24,256 --> 00:25:25,957
and went down the slide.
510
00:25:26,024 --> 00:25:27,425
And I came around
the front, and I
511
00:25:27,492 --> 00:25:29,394
saw that humongous
hole in the side,
512
00:25:29,461 --> 00:25:30,762
and I just couldn't believe it.
513
00:25:38,136 --> 00:25:39,537
By the grace of god, we made it.
514
00:25:39,604 --> 00:25:41,940
And it was an
awesome experience.
515
00:25:42,007 --> 00:25:45,210
I would never want to
go through that again.
516
00:25:45,277 --> 00:25:46,478
LINDA BAHNA: It was crazy.
517
00:25:46,544 --> 00:25:47,479
It was wild.
518
00:25:47,545 --> 00:25:56,855
It was scary, all
at the same time,
519
00:25:56,922 --> 00:25:59,357
I just thought that that was the
end, that we were going to die.
520
00:25:59,424 --> 00:26:02,127
I mean, that was
my first thought--
521
00:26:02,193 --> 00:26:03,595
that this is the end.
522
00:26:08,633 --> 00:26:10,402
NARRATOR: But for the
families of the nine people
523
00:26:10,468 --> 00:26:13,939
who were killed, the
ordeal was just beginning.
524
00:26:14,005 --> 00:26:18,643
Kevin and Susan Campbell's
son, Lee, had been flying home.
525
00:26:18,710 --> 00:26:21,146
KEVIN CAMPBELL: About
3:00 in the afternoon,
526
00:26:21,212 --> 00:26:25,550
I think they said that there
was no New Zealanders involved.
527
00:26:25,617 --> 00:26:29,454
But we just knew
that it was Lee.
528
00:26:29,521 --> 00:26:32,357
And then, about, I suppose,
1/4 of an hour later,
529
00:26:32,424 --> 00:26:35,160
we got a phone
call from Chicago.
530
00:26:35,226 --> 00:26:37,295
And they just said
that they regret
531
00:26:37,362 --> 00:26:41,366
to inform us that our son
was missing, presumed dead.
532
00:26:41,433 --> 00:26:44,903
And I guess about
another hour after that,
533
00:26:44,970 --> 00:26:46,838
a policeman arrived at the door.
534
00:26:46,905 --> 00:26:48,673
And he took one look
at us, and he says,
535
00:26:48,740 --> 00:26:51,609
I can see that
you've had the news.
536
00:26:51,676 --> 00:26:53,678
So it was just--
537
00:26:53,745 --> 00:26:57,716
just an awful, awful day.
538
00:26:57,782 --> 00:27:02,020
And it certainly didn't get much
better for a long, long time.
539
00:27:08,693 --> 00:27:11,162
NARRATOR: Although Lee's
body had not been recovered,
540
00:27:11,229 --> 00:27:13,798
the Campbells flew straight
to the wrecked aircraft
541
00:27:13,865 --> 00:27:15,266
in Honolulu.
542
00:27:15,333 --> 00:27:18,136
KEVIN CAMPBELL: Your initial
feeling is that you want to be
543
00:27:18,203 --> 00:27:24,542
as close to the spot
where your relative died,
544
00:27:24,609 --> 00:27:25,944
and that was the aircraft.
545
00:27:26,011 --> 00:27:32,150
So we had to immediately
go and see the aircraft.
546
00:27:32,217 --> 00:27:34,252
SUSAN CAMPBELL: The damage
inside was horrific.
547
00:27:34,319 --> 00:27:36,554
Just a total mess.
548
00:27:36,621 --> 00:27:38,823
And the hole in the
side of the aircraft
549
00:27:38,890 --> 00:27:41,926
was much bigger than I
had thought it would be,
550
00:27:41,993 --> 00:27:46,831
even though we had seen
television newsreel reports.
551
00:27:46,898 --> 00:27:48,967
And it was so sad to
get in and actually
552
00:27:49,034 --> 00:27:51,636
see where Lee's seat had been.
553
00:27:51,703 --> 00:27:54,039
The legs of the seat
were still there.
554
00:27:54,105 --> 00:27:57,942
There was a good bit of fuselage
beside him, and still a window.
555
00:28:01,312 --> 00:28:02,447
NARRATOR: But the
Campbells' desire
556
00:28:02,514 --> 00:28:05,250
to find the cause of
Lee's death inevitably
557
00:28:05,316 --> 00:28:08,987
brought them face-to-face
with dreadful details.
558
00:28:09,054 --> 00:28:12,857
They took us to the medical
examiner's office as well.
559
00:28:12,924 --> 00:28:17,162
Because they had found body
parts and that sort of thing.
560
00:28:17,228 --> 00:28:21,533
So they didn't actually
show us the body parts,
561
00:28:21,599 --> 00:28:23,101
but they showed us bits
and pieces that they
562
00:28:23,168 --> 00:28:25,036
had recovered from the engines.
563
00:28:25,103 --> 00:28:28,907
And we got the medical
examiner's report
564
00:28:28,973 --> 00:28:31,476
on what they had recovered.
565
00:28:31,543 --> 00:28:34,612
So you know, we really would
have preferred that it was Lee
566
00:28:34,679 --> 00:28:36,147
that went through the
engine, because it would
567
00:28:36,214 --> 00:28:38,216
have been an immediate death.
568
00:28:38,283 --> 00:28:40,852
Because it was a four-minute
fall down to the ocean,
569
00:28:40,919 --> 00:28:42,887
and we know that the
people could have been
570
00:28:42,954 --> 00:28:44,956
alive as they were falling.
571
00:28:45,023 --> 00:28:48,827
And when you think about
that, that's just horrific.
572
00:28:48,893 --> 00:28:51,429
NARRATOR: As it became clear
that their son's body would
573
00:28:51,496 --> 00:28:53,698
never be found,
the Campbells' need
574
00:28:53,765 --> 00:28:56,267
to find the cause of the
accident that killed him
575
00:28:56,334 --> 00:28:59,404
grew stronger.
576
00:28:59,471 --> 00:29:01,339
Lee kind of died for nothing.
577
00:29:01,406 --> 00:29:04,075
You know, you've got to
find out why he died,
578
00:29:04,142 --> 00:29:07,512
and you've just got to make sure
that it never happens again.
579
00:29:16,588 --> 00:29:19,190
NARRATOR: Susan and Kevin
Campbell traveled to America
580
00:29:19,257 --> 00:29:21,359
to begin researching
possible causes
581
00:29:21,426 --> 00:29:24,162
of the disaster on flight 811.
582
00:29:24,229 --> 00:29:26,631
With the cargo door at
the bottom of the ocean,
583
00:29:26,698 --> 00:29:30,869
no one had any hard evidence.
584
00:29:30,935 --> 00:29:33,605
MAN: The engines
number 3 and 4--
585
00:29:33,671 --> 00:29:36,508
NARRATOR: Two months after
the accident on flight 811,
586
00:29:36,574 --> 00:29:39,110
the NTSB held
preliminary hearings,
587
00:29:39,177 --> 00:29:41,012
and the Campbells were there.
588
00:29:41,079 --> 00:29:43,081
But they soon grew frustrated.
589
00:29:43,148 --> 00:29:46,584
The NTSB would not complete
its report for months.
590
00:29:46,651 --> 00:29:49,420
The Campbells
wanted answers now.
591
00:29:49,487 --> 00:29:51,189
--the probable
cause of this accident
592
00:29:51,256 --> 00:29:52,390
was the sudden opening--
593
00:29:52,457 --> 00:29:54,993
We certainly weren't going
to leave it to the NTSB
594
00:29:55,059 --> 00:29:56,027
to come up with the findings.
595
00:29:56,094 --> 00:29:58,163
We were going to follow through.
596
00:29:58,229 --> 00:29:59,531
And when the
hearings ended, they
597
00:29:59,597 --> 00:30:01,099
had said that we
could take whatever
598
00:30:01,166 --> 00:30:02,767
we wanted off the press table.
599
00:30:02,834 --> 00:30:06,137
And Susan walked up to the
top table and yelled out,
600
00:30:06,204 --> 00:30:08,840
there's a really
good set up here.
601
00:30:08,907 --> 00:30:13,545
So I grabbed a box and loaded
in all of the documents
602
00:30:13,611 --> 00:30:15,280
that we could find up there.
603
00:30:15,346 --> 00:30:17,782
Kevin's the most
honest of people I know.
604
00:30:17,849 --> 00:30:19,817
But here he was,
taking something
605
00:30:19,884 --> 00:30:23,788
that we hadn't specifically
been told we could take.
606
00:30:23,855 --> 00:30:25,323
KEVIN CAMPBELL: And we're
heading out the door
607
00:30:25,390 --> 00:30:28,259
just as the NTSB were arriving
back in with the trolley
608
00:30:28,326 --> 00:30:30,261
to pick up all their documents.
609
00:30:30,328 --> 00:30:32,664
So we were out the door
and into a taxi and gone.
610
00:30:38,169 --> 00:30:40,972
SUSAN CAMPBELL: So we quickly
realized we'd got a really good
611
00:30:41,039 --> 00:30:43,341
set of papers, with a
lot of things that hadn't
612
00:30:43,408 --> 00:30:45,710
been released to the public.
613
00:30:45,777 --> 00:30:47,979
We were able to really
start our investigation
614
00:30:48,046 --> 00:30:49,447
in earnest at that stage.
615
00:30:56,888 --> 00:30:58,823
NARRATOR: With the
NTSB investigation
616
00:30:58,890 --> 00:31:03,228
ongoing, suddenly, the
Campbells had an insider's view.
617
00:31:03,294 --> 00:31:06,998
Documents revealed that other
cargo doors opened inward,
618
00:31:07,065 --> 00:31:09,033
so the plane's internal
pressure helped
619
00:31:09,100 --> 00:31:11,603
jam the door into its frame.
620
00:31:11,669 --> 00:31:15,340
But the cargo door on
the 747 opened outward,
621
00:31:15,406 --> 00:31:18,209
allowing for more cargo
space, but requiring
622
00:31:18,276 --> 00:31:22,380
a more robust locking system
to handle the pressure.
623
00:31:22,447 --> 00:31:25,083
What they do is they build
in multiple redundancies
624
00:31:25,149 --> 00:31:26,684
to make sure the
door is properly
625
00:31:26,751 --> 00:31:29,887
latched and does not open.
626
00:31:29,954 --> 00:31:34,659
And you build an end to a point
that it's extremely improbable
627
00:31:34,726 --> 00:31:36,160
that the door would ever open.
628
00:31:40,098 --> 00:31:44,569
NARRATOR: So what went
wrong with flight 811?
629
00:31:44,636 --> 00:31:47,438
Kevin Campbell thought the
problem lay in the design
630
00:31:47,505 --> 00:31:48,906
of the locking mechanism.
631
00:31:51,476 --> 00:31:54,479
To lock the cargo
door on the 747,
632
00:31:54,545 --> 00:31:57,448
electric motors rotate
C-shaped latches
633
00:31:57,515 --> 00:31:59,517
around pins in the door frame.
634
00:31:59,584 --> 00:32:02,387
A handle then moves
arms known as locking
635
00:32:02,453 --> 00:32:05,523
sectors over the
top of the C latches
636
00:32:05,590 --> 00:32:07,325
to prevent them from reopening.
637
00:32:14,132 --> 00:32:16,401
Campbell, an
engineer by training,
638
00:32:16,467 --> 00:32:19,570
built a model to approximate
the Boeing design.
639
00:32:19,637 --> 00:32:21,172
KEVIN CAMPBELL: Initially,
the locking sectors
640
00:32:21,239 --> 00:32:22,674
were made in aluminum.
641
00:32:22,740 --> 00:32:25,243
And in 1975, Boeing
realized that they weren't
642
00:32:25,310 --> 00:32:28,680
strong enough, and they
actually doubled up the aluminum
643
00:32:28,746 --> 00:32:30,581
to make it double thickness.
644
00:32:30,648 --> 00:32:33,418
But it still wasn't
strong enough.
645
00:32:33,484 --> 00:32:34,919
And a lot of the
airlines didn't even
646
00:32:34,986 --> 00:32:37,055
put the doublers on anyway.
647
00:32:37,121 --> 00:32:39,157
NARRATOR: He thought the
weakness of the aluminum
648
00:32:39,223 --> 00:32:42,994
increased the risk of the
door accidentally opening.
649
00:32:43,061 --> 00:32:45,663
With the aluminum
locking sectors,
650
00:32:45,730 --> 00:32:49,300
if the C-locks
tried to back-wind,
651
00:32:49,367 --> 00:32:52,570
open electrically, it
would just push the locking
652
00:32:52,637 --> 00:32:55,206
sector out of the way.
653
00:32:55,273 --> 00:32:58,009
It just simply wasn't up to the
job that it was designed for.
654
00:33:00,678 --> 00:33:02,313
NARRATOR: If
Campbell was correct,
655
00:33:02,380 --> 00:33:05,683
this could happen again, and
more lives were at stake.
656
00:33:08,619 --> 00:33:11,723
They redoubled their efforts to
conduct their own investigation
657
00:33:11,789 --> 00:33:16,728
into the flight that killed
their son and eight others.
658
00:33:16,794 --> 00:33:19,664
SUSAN CAMPBELL: We bought a
car and set off in the United
659
00:33:19,731 --> 00:33:23,167
States to see as many
people who were involved
660
00:33:23,234 --> 00:33:25,770
with the accident as possible.
661
00:33:25,837 --> 00:33:31,342
We started at Seattle, down
to Denver, across to Chicago,
662
00:33:31,409 --> 00:33:37,982
through to Washington, DC,
down to Kentucky, on to Miami,
663
00:33:38,049 --> 00:33:43,354
and back across to San Diego,
back up through San Francisco,
664
00:33:43,421 --> 00:33:45,523
back to Seattle.
665
00:33:45,590 --> 00:33:47,024
And that was just one trip.
666
00:33:49,827 --> 00:33:51,162
NARRATOR: The Campbells
soon discovered
667
00:33:51,229 --> 00:33:54,165
a similar incident to
flight 811 when cargo
668
00:33:54,232 --> 00:33:56,200
doors had failed mid-flight.
669
00:33:59,303 --> 00:34:03,107
In 1987, two years
before flight 811,
670
00:34:03,174 --> 00:34:06,077
a Pan Am 747 had
been climbing out
671
00:34:06,144 --> 00:34:10,648
of Heathrow when it had failed
to pressurize at 20,000 feet.
672
00:34:10,715 --> 00:34:13,951
The pilots had to turn back.
673
00:34:14,018 --> 00:34:16,354
When it got back to Heathrow,
they found that the door was
674
00:34:16,421 --> 00:34:18,389
hanging open an inch and
a half at the bottom,
675
00:34:18,456 --> 00:34:21,926
and all of the locks were open.
676
00:34:21,993 --> 00:34:23,561
When it got to the
maintenance base,
677
00:34:23,628 --> 00:34:27,165
they found that all
of the locking sectors
678
00:34:27,231 --> 00:34:30,168
were either bent or broken.
679
00:34:30,234 --> 00:34:31,602
NARRATOR: Boeing
blamed the failure
680
00:34:31,669 --> 00:34:34,138
on mishandling of the
door by the ground crew--
681
00:34:34,205 --> 00:34:35,640
a common problem.
682
00:34:35,706 --> 00:34:39,444
But Campbell thought it
didn't explain this problem.
683
00:34:39,510 --> 00:34:41,512
The door had been
closed manually.
684
00:34:41,579 --> 00:34:43,714
And what they said
happened was that the guy
685
00:34:43,781 --> 00:34:46,050
wound the C-locks closed--
686
00:34:46,117 --> 00:34:48,586
98 turns of a speed wrench.
687
00:34:48,653 --> 00:34:53,758
He closed the outer handle,
and then wound it open again.
688
00:34:53,825 --> 00:34:56,661
And to be in the position
that they were found in when
689
00:34:56,727 --> 00:34:58,029
the aircraft got
back, he would have
690
00:34:58,096 --> 00:35:00,898
had to wind them open
98 turns, and that's
691
00:35:00,965 --> 00:35:03,100
just absolutely ridiculous.
692
00:35:03,167 --> 00:35:04,902
NARRATOR: Were the
doors really getting
693
00:35:04,969 --> 00:35:07,972
mishandled by ground crew,
weakening the latches?
694
00:35:08,039 --> 00:35:11,242
Or was there a problem
baked into the system?
695
00:35:11,309 --> 00:35:14,979
Campbell suspected
an electrical fault.
696
00:35:15,046 --> 00:35:18,282
It had a fault in the S2
master latch lock switch
697
00:35:18,349 --> 00:35:21,452
that should have turned
off the power to the door
698
00:35:21,519 --> 00:35:22,920
when the outer
handle was closed.
699
00:35:26,624 --> 00:35:28,659
NARRATOR: When the
outer handle was closed,
700
00:35:28,726 --> 00:35:31,162
the S2 master lock
switch was meant
701
00:35:31,229 --> 00:35:34,699
to disconnect the power supply
and stop the C-latch motors
702
00:35:34,765 --> 00:35:35,766
from turning.
703
00:35:35,833 --> 00:35:38,069
So could this have
failed, allowing
704
00:35:38,135 --> 00:35:40,471
the motors to open the door?
705
00:35:40,538 --> 00:35:43,608
Boeing asked the airlines
to do a simple test.
706
00:35:43,674 --> 00:35:46,277
Close the outer
handle, then press
707
00:35:46,344 --> 00:35:48,145
the switch to open the door.
708
00:35:48,212 --> 00:35:51,415
It should remain closed,
but in some cases,
709
00:35:51,482 --> 00:35:53,184
the door tried to open.
710
00:35:53,251 --> 00:35:56,120
KEVIN CAMPBELL: When they hit
the switch, it actually worked.
711
00:35:56,187 --> 00:35:58,422
Boeing thought, this
is not going to work,
712
00:35:58,489 --> 00:35:59,524
but it actually worked.
713
00:35:59,590 --> 00:36:01,692
There was power
to the door locks,
714
00:36:01,759 --> 00:36:05,329
with the outer handle closed.
715
00:36:05,396 --> 00:36:07,298
And the lock started
to move, and it
716
00:36:07,365 --> 00:36:11,002
started to force the locking
sectors out of the way.
717
00:36:11,068 --> 00:36:13,971
And a few days
later, the airlines
718
00:36:14,038 --> 00:36:16,874
started ringing in and saying
it was damaging their planes.
719
00:36:16,941 --> 00:36:19,377
So Boeing stopped
the test, but it
720
00:36:19,443 --> 00:36:22,880
meant that on those aircraft,
the S2 switch had failed, which
721
00:36:22,947 --> 00:36:25,583
is a silent failure, and
all of those aircraft
722
00:36:25,650 --> 00:36:29,620
were likely to have the
same problem as 811.
723
00:36:29,687 --> 00:36:31,556
They were just waiting
for a short circuit
724
00:36:31,622 --> 00:36:33,291
to open the doors.
725
00:36:33,357 --> 00:36:35,293
NARRATOR: The Campbells
now became convinced
726
00:36:35,359 --> 00:36:39,530
that the accident on flight 811
began with a failure of the S2
727
00:36:39,597 --> 00:36:40,698
switch.
728
00:36:40,765 --> 00:36:43,901
Power remained on to
the C-latch motors.
729
00:36:43,968 --> 00:36:46,304
All it might take would
be a short circuit
730
00:36:46,370 --> 00:36:50,942
in an aging plane's wiring
to start the motors up.
731
00:36:51,008 --> 00:36:53,511
The aluminum locking sectors
would be through waiting
732
00:36:53,578 --> 00:36:56,347
to stop the latches
turning, and the cargo door
733
00:36:56,414 --> 00:36:57,448
could burst open.
734
00:37:04,255 --> 00:37:06,357
The National
Transportation Safety Board
735
00:37:06,424 --> 00:37:09,026
determines that the probable
cause of this accident
736
00:37:09,093 --> 00:37:10,294
was the sudden--
737
00:37:10,361 --> 00:37:12,930
NARRATOR: After waiting a
year for the NTSB report,
738
00:37:12,997 --> 00:37:14,999
Kevin and Susan
Campbell expected
739
00:37:15,066 --> 00:37:17,134
it to match their
theory of what had led
740
00:37:17,201 --> 00:37:19,503
to the accident on flight 811.
741
00:37:19,570 --> 00:37:21,772
I'd assumed that we would have
a report come out that this was
742
00:37:21,839 --> 00:37:24,175
an electrical
malfunction, and were
743
00:37:24,241 --> 00:37:26,744
staggered when they came out
and said that the door had
744
00:37:26,811 --> 00:37:27,945
been mishandled.
745
00:37:28,012 --> 00:37:30,514
The report focused
entirely on the fact
746
00:37:30,581 --> 00:37:33,484
that the door lock must
have been mishandled
747
00:37:33,551 --> 00:37:36,554
by the ramp attendant.
748
00:37:36,621 --> 00:37:38,422
That was disappointing.
749
00:37:38,489 --> 00:37:42,727
And we felt that they must have
been at a different hearing
750
00:37:42,793 --> 00:37:45,363
from the one we were at.
751
00:37:45,429 --> 00:37:49,700
NARRATOR: So how had the NTSB
come to their conclusion?
752
00:37:49,767 --> 00:37:51,969
There was other
evidence that we had found
753
00:37:52,036 --> 00:37:55,806
during our investigation
of improper procedures
754
00:37:55,873 --> 00:37:58,976
by the United mechanics
and ramp people.
755
00:37:59,043 --> 00:38:01,679
So we were convinced
that there was--
756
00:38:01,746 --> 00:38:04,715
we could use the word, "abuse,"
being done on the doors.
757
00:38:04,782 --> 00:38:07,218
The doors were sort
of abused and weren't
758
00:38:07,284 --> 00:38:08,819
maintained very well.
759
00:38:08,886 --> 00:38:13,758
We concluded that the
probable cause was mechanical.
760
00:38:13,824 --> 00:38:16,594
NARRATOR: The Campbells thought
the NTSB report was simply
761
00:38:16,661 --> 00:38:20,197
incomplete and incorrect.
762
00:38:20,264 --> 00:38:24,669
What they said happened
was, the door was closed.
763
00:38:24,735 --> 00:38:27,471
The locks didn't fully close.
764
00:38:27,538 --> 00:38:32,710
The doors partially closed,
just hanging on the pins.
765
00:38:32,777 --> 00:38:34,111
And then, they closed
the outer handle,
766
00:38:34,178 --> 00:38:37,014
but that just
simply can't happen.
767
00:38:37,081 --> 00:38:40,084
Because that part of the
locking sector is still intact.
768
00:38:40,151 --> 00:38:43,220
It just simply can't happen.
769
00:38:43,287 --> 00:38:46,290
You can't close the outer
handle, unless these are
770
00:38:46,357 --> 00:38:49,193
in the fully locked position.
771
00:38:49,260 --> 00:38:52,129
It's the only way that the
outer handle will close.
772
00:38:52,196 --> 00:38:54,999
And just closing
this manually, you
773
00:38:55,066 --> 00:38:58,602
can't exert enough force to
actually damage this part
774
00:38:58,669 --> 00:38:59,970
of the locking sector.
775
00:39:00,037 --> 00:39:02,173
All it does is just
backs up against there.
776
00:39:02,239 --> 00:39:04,141
If the locks aren't
fully closed,
777
00:39:04,208 --> 00:39:07,144
it just simply backs up against
them and goes no further.
778
00:39:15,953 --> 00:39:18,889
NARRATOR: The Campbells didn't
accept the NTSB findings
779
00:39:18,956 --> 00:39:19,757
and kept digging.
780
00:39:28,632 --> 00:39:31,435
After the Pan Am
incident in 1987,
781
00:39:31,502 --> 00:39:34,138
it turned out that Boeing
had issued a directive
782
00:39:34,205 --> 00:39:37,241
to the airlines on how to
correct the weak aluminum
783
00:39:37,308 --> 00:39:39,944
locking sectors.
784
00:39:40,010 --> 00:39:42,246
RON SCHLEEDE: The
directive that came out
785
00:39:42,313 --> 00:39:45,282
was to replace the
aluminum sectors with steel
786
00:39:45,349 --> 00:39:47,151
sectors that could not be bent.
787
00:39:47,218 --> 00:39:50,554
And there were additionally
some interim requirements
788
00:39:50,621 --> 00:39:53,958
for inspections to be
performed until what
789
00:39:54,024 --> 00:39:56,627
they call terminating
action-- the steel
790
00:39:56,694 --> 00:39:57,928
sectors were installed.
791
00:40:01,665 --> 00:40:03,467
NARRATOR: The Federal
Aviation Administration
792
00:40:03,534 --> 00:40:06,470
required these improvements
but gave the airlines
793
00:40:06,537 --> 00:40:08,038
18 months to comply.
794
00:40:14,945 --> 00:40:17,548
Within a year, Lee
Campbell and eight others
795
00:40:17,615 --> 00:40:26,757
would die on flight 811.
796
00:40:26,824 --> 00:40:29,360
After the deaths,
the FAA instantly
797
00:40:29,426 --> 00:40:32,696
shortened the deadline
for fixing the cargo door
798
00:40:32,763 --> 00:40:35,599
from 18 months to just 30 days.
799
00:40:40,437 --> 00:40:44,308
Still thinking the
NTSB got it wrong,
800
00:40:44,375 --> 00:40:47,278
the Campbells took
their case to the press
801
00:40:47,344 --> 00:40:49,613
and were invited
to United Airlines.
802
00:40:49,680 --> 00:40:51,015
KEVIN CAMPBELL: One
of them actually
803
00:40:51,081 --> 00:40:56,120
broke down, because they'd never
had to meet next of kin before.
804
00:40:56,187 --> 00:41:00,291
And Eddie ended up with the
vice president of United
805
00:41:00,357 --> 00:41:03,594
taking us around the
maintenance facility.
806
00:41:03,661 --> 00:41:05,796
And he had people running
off in all directions
807
00:41:05,863 --> 00:41:09,366
just to get the information that
we wanted, questions answered.
808
00:41:09,433 --> 00:41:12,136
We could go anywhere
that we wanted.
809
00:41:12,203 --> 00:41:15,506
And we just-- everything
was laid on for us,
810
00:41:15,573 --> 00:41:17,608
because at that
stage, they realized
811
00:41:17,675 --> 00:41:21,579
that we really did know
what we were talking about.
812
00:41:21,645 --> 00:41:25,783
NARRATOR: Other families of
the victims added pressure.
813
00:41:25,850 --> 00:41:29,186
The vital piece of evidence,
flight 811's cargo door,
814
00:41:29,253 --> 00:41:33,557
still laid 2 miles down
in the Pacific Ocean.
815
00:41:33,624 --> 00:41:36,093
With headlines driving
up public interest,
816
00:41:36,160 --> 00:41:41,732
the NTSB commissioned the
US Navy to search for it.
817
00:41:41,799 --> 00:41:45,169
100 miles south of
Honolulu, a deep submersible
818
00:41:45,236 --> 00:41:46,737
began to trawl the seabed.
819
00:41:49,440 --> 00:41:51,008
KEVIN CAMPBELL: We
went to Honolulu
820
00:41:51,075 --> 00:41:54,612
and waited there while
they had their attempts.
821
00:41:54,678 --> 00:41:56,747
And they finally
recovered the door
822
00:41:56,814 --> 00:41:59,717
from 14,000 feet of water,
which was the deepest
823
00:41:59,783 --> 00:42:02,653
recovery ever at that time.
824
00:42:02,720 --> 00:42:04,655
And we were phoned
within an hour
825
00:42:04,722 --> 00:42:07,424
of it coming out of the water.
826
00:42:07,491 --> 00:42:10,027
NARRATOR: The recovered door
came under intense scrutiny.
827
00:42:14,465 --> 00:42:18,969
Then, in June 1991, another
incident appeared to confirm
828
00:42:19,036 --> 00:42:20,337
the Campbells' theory.
829
00:42:20,404 --> 00:42:24,108
A four-year-old United 747 was
sitting on the apron in New
830
00:42:24,174 --> 00:42:27,144
York when the C-latch
motor started up
831
00:42:27,211 --> 00:42:29,413
and the door opened itself.
832
00:42:29,480 --> 00:42:33,117
After recovery of the
door was that in fact,
833
00:42:33,183 --> 00:42:35,219
the actual pieces had--
834
00:42:35,286 --> 00:42:37,321
NARRATOR: Finally,
the NTSB publicly
835
00:42:37,388 --> 00:42:39,423
issued a revised
report that concurred
836
00:42:39,490 --> 00:42:41,225
with the Campbells' version.
837
00:42:41,292 --> 00:42:45,329
There was an inadvertent
failure of either the switch
838
00:42:45,396 --> 00:42:48,866
or the wiring that caused
an uncommanded opening
839
00:42:48,933 --> 00:42:50,534
of the door.
840
00:42:50,601 --> 00:42:52,536
KEVIN CAMPBELL: It's nice that
other people know that you're
841
00:42:52,603 --> 00:42:56,006
right and had been all along,
and that the support that they
842
00:42:56,073 --> 00:42:59,810
had given you was vindicated.
843
00:42:59,877 --> 00:43:01,345
NARRATOR: The Campbells
spent thousands
844
00:43:01,412 --> 00:43:04,949
of dollars of their own
money on their campaign.
845
00:43:05,015 --> 00:43:07,885
They were never interested in a
financial settlement for Lee's
846
00:43:07,952 --> 00:43:10,354
death, but they
did persuade United
847
00:43:10,421 --> 00:43:12,423
and Boeing to set
up a university
848
00:43:12,489 --> 00:43:15,392
scholarship in his name.
849
00:43:15,459 --> 00:43:16,694
SUSAN CAMPBELL: I
couldn't have lived
850
00:43:16,760 --> 00:43:20,731
with myself if we had done
no investigating ourselves.
851
00:43:20,798 --> 00:43:23,867
It was just something we
both felt we needed to do.
852
00:43:23,934 --> 00:43:25,302
We didn't even discuss it.
853
00:43:25,369 --> 00:43:27,972
We just knew that's
what we would do.
854
00:43:28,038 --> 00:43:28,839
Yeah.
855
00:43:34,878 --> 00:43:37,748
NARRATOR: For some of the
survivors of flight 811,
856
00:43:37,815 --> 00:43:40,217
the cost has been heavy.
857
00:43:40,284 --> 00:43:42,252
Each crew member
handled it differently.
858
00:43:42,319 --> 00:43:46,223
I know there are still two
crew members that have never
859
00:43:46,290 --> 00:43:49,326
set foot on an aircraft again.
860
00:43:49,393 --> 00:43:51,428
It was very difficult for me.
861
00:43:51,495 --> 00:43:56,233
I was diagnosed with severe
post-traumatic stress disorder.
862
00:43:56,300 --> 00:43:58,202
You can't reason.
863
00:43:58,268 --> 00:43:59,403
You can't think.
864
00:43:59,470 --> 00:44:03,941
Making the slightest
decision is very difficult.
865
00:44:04,008 --> 00:44:05,876
You're just at a total loss.
866
00:44:05,943 --> 00:44:08,946
So it was very
difficult to cope with.
67632
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