All language subtitles for Cold War - S01E21 - Spies (1944–1994) (480p x265 EDGE2020).eng

One of the CIA's
greatest spies,

Dmitri Polyakov,

is caught by
the KGB

and strip searched.

His head is held
in an arm-lock

to prevent him
taking poison.

[man speaking German]

INTERPRETER:
The invisible front,

that's what it was
in the Cold War,

and for us
it was war.

The soldiers may
have been on alert,

but for us and the others
who went out into the cold,

it was actual war.

D ♪

NARRATION:
Dawn on the 16th of July, 1945.

Allied scientists
at Los Alamos leave

for the New Mexico
desert,

to watch the test
of the first atomic bomb.

They have been working
for years

under a blanket
of total secrecy.

Ted Hall,
at 19,

was the youngest scientist
on the project.

HALL:
I was there.

Or at least I was there
in a truck or lorry

some distance away.

It was considered to be
a safe distance away.

I can't remember
if there was

any signal circulated

that the test
was about to be made.

But anyway,
the damn thing went off,

and it was
a rather awesome sight.

NARRATION:
For Ted Hall,

the Cold War had begun
the year before.

I decided to give
atomic secrets

to the Russians

because it seemed to me
that it was important

that there should be
no monopoly,

which would turn one nation
into a menace

and turn it loose
on the world

as Nazi Germany developed.

There seemed to be
only one answer

to what
one should do.

The right thing to do
was to act

to break
the American monopoly.

NARRATION:
Others thought the same way.

The KGB had several sources
inside Los Alamos,

unknown
to one another.

The scientist Klaus Fuchs
and Ted Hall

both passed on details

of how to detonate
nuclear weapons by implosion --

a principle
so new to Soviet science

that there was
no equivalent word in Russian.

In 1949,

the Soviets exploded
their first atom bomb.

Triggered
by implosion,

it copied key elements
of the American bomb

that destroyed Nagasaki.

The atom spies had
saved the Soviet Union

perhaps two years
of research.

Ted Hall was questioned
by the FBI

in March, 1951,

but not charged,
for lack of evidence.

A month later,

KGB agents
Julius and Ethel Rosenberg

were sentenced
to death.

Amid the anti-Soviet fervor
of the time,

they became the only spies
ever executed

in peacetime
America.

HALL:
It was gruesome.

And certainly brought home
the fact

that there were flames
consuming people,

and that we were pretty close
to being consumed.

NARRATION:
The intelligence war was lopsided.

The KGB operated
in the West,

but the CIA confronted
a closed world.

Trains crossing
the Finnish border into Russia

were sealed
by steel shutters.

The United States faced
a long famine of information.

MAN:
This lack of understanding

of how the Soviet system
functioned,

would dog us
in CIA

throughout
the entire Cold War,

whether it was
the Soviet Union itself

or the carbon copies
of the Soviet Union

in East Germany
and in Cuba,

and you name it.

NARRATION:
Most early infiltration operations

into the Soviet Union

were doomed
from the start.

Western agents were
betrayed by KGB spies,

like the British
intelligence officer

Kim Philby.

Philby came
to public attention

because of his association

with fellow double agents
Guy Burgess

and Donald Ma clean.

NARRATOR: Philby, on the
right, holds a press conference

to deny charges
that he was involved

in the disappearance
of Burgess and Ma clean.

REPORTER:
Well, if there was a third man,

were you, in fact
the third man?

No, I was not.

Do you think
there was one?

No comment.

Well, Mr. Philby,
the disappearance

of Burgess and Ma clean
is almost as much

of a mystery today as it was
when they went away

about four years ago
or more.

Can you shed
any light on it at all?

No, I can't.

[ Man speaking Russian ]

INTERPRETER:
Philby told us a lot about those missions.

He told us
about the numbers of people.

He told us
about the coordinates,

where and how the operations
would be carried out,

whether they would be
parachuted in

or sent in
by sea.

Those areas were of course
surrounded

by Soviet
counterintelligence

and they were caught.

The normal routine was

that the agents
were interrogated.

Some were very hostile
and kept silent.

In doing so,

they signed
their own death warrants.

NARRATIONI
In 1953,

Soviet émigré
Mikhail Kudriavtsev

parachuted
into Russia

to spy
for the CIA.

[speaking Russian ]

After we were dropped in,
we were tied up

and taken off
to the KGB.

When the investigator
from Moscow arrived --

and he arrived suspiciously
quickly by nightfall...

I got the impression
that they had been

waiting for us,

that somehow the KGB knew
we were coming.

NARRATION:
Kudriavtsev saved his life

by telling the KGB
everything

and agreeing to parrot
a prepared statement

at this heavily stage-managed
press conference.

[ Kudriavtsev
speaking Russian ]

INTERPRETER:
This is me.

Before we spoke
at that conference,

we were given scripts

that we had two days
to learn by heart.

NARRATION:
Kudriavtsev told the world of his great error

in ever thinking ill
of the Soviet Union --

let alone
trying to topple it.

[speaking Russian ]

It was hard for me
to say those things --

very hard.

But I had to do it,

in order not to be
taken back to the Lubyanka.

You begin to believe

that this was a service

that really had
enormous coverage

and that everything
we did --

you know, not a sparrow
could fall

without this enormous KGB
finding out about it

because in terms of our own
individual experiences,

we know --
or we knew --

that the operations
we were involved in

had been betrayed
by people like Kim Philby.

NARRATION:
The KGB put vast arrays

of captured CIA equipment
on show.

The West had suffered
failure abroad

and betrayal at home.

It was back
to the drawing board.

[explosions]

The Korean War provided
further blows

to the CIA's self-confidence,

highlighting gaps
in forecasting

and assessment.

MAN: The CIA was wrong
about the start of the war.

They were wrong
about the Chinese involvement

and intervention
in the war.

And they were wrong about
the capabilities

of the North Korean forces.

I think the Korean War,

in terms of
its intelligence failures,

left a lot of lessons
for the policy community

and the intelligence
community.

And one of those
lessons was

that indeed,
we would have to get

better
technical intelligence

and make more
of a commitment

to signals intelligence
and communications intelligence.

And with this,
you get resources put

with the National
Security Agency,

under the Pentagon,

in order to develop
a capability

to intercept messages
around the world.

And this produced
extremely vital information

to the intelligence
community.

NARRATION:
Berlin was a communications nub,

where countless Soviet Bloc
phone and teleprinter lines

cries-crossed
beneath the city.

To intercept them,

The Americans and British
drove a tunnel

deep into
the Soviet sector.

MURPHY:
The purpose of the Berlin tunnel

was to tap
the communications lines

of the Soviet forces
in East Germany,

in Poland,

and their links
with Moscow,

in order to provide
current intelligence

on those forces,

and also early warning.

The lines from the taps

would come down
into the tunnel itself,

and first they would
be amplified,

because then we had
to run the lines up

into the area
of the warehouse

where we had hundreds
and hundreds of recorders

that operated day and night

and recorded every single bit
of this stuff.

[ Overlapping conversations ]

NARRATION:
From the start,

this operation was
betrayed to the KGB

by a source inside
British intelligence --

George Blake.

I was
secretary at the meeting

at which this tunnel
was being planned,

and so I was able

to draw
a very simple sketch

which showed how
the tunnel was going to run

and what cables it was
intended to attack.

NARRATION: Blake had served
as a British intelligence officer

in Seoul.

Captured by
the North Koreans,

he witnessed the West's
bombing of civilians.

BLAKE:
When I saw these enormous

American flying fortresses

flying low
over what seemed to be

defenseless
Korean villages,

I felt a feeling
of shame.

I felt very acutely

that I was
on the wrong side

and that I should do
something about it.

Blake went home
to Britain

in the first group
of POWs

released from Korea

after the 1953 armistice.

How did you find
the food out there, Mr. Blake?

Well, the food was
adequate but monotonous.

It was monotonous,
was it?

- Very monotonous.
- Anything special?

I mean, any odd things
they gave you to eat?

No, just rice
and turnips, mainly.

Pretty impressive diet,
isn't it?

Three times a day.

NARRATION: Blake slipped
back into British intelligence,

only now he was
a KGB spy.

I was given
a Minox camera,

and I carried that
Minox camera with me

whenever I went
to work...

like I carried
my wallet with me.

And the reason was that
I never knew

what important documents

I might find
on my desk

which were worthwhile
photographing.

NARRATION:
Blake's warning about the tunnel

gave the KGB
a problem.

To move against it
risked exposing him.

[speaking Russian ]

This was an argument
not to take

any measures
against the tunnel,

not to send any
disinformation down the tunnel,

not to show that we knew
anything about the tunnel.

This was a very important
consideration

because as long
as Blake remained

inside British intelligence,

we knew he'd be
of great value to us.

[ Overlapping conversations ]

NARRATION:
So the Berlin tunnel operated

courtesy
of the KGB,

and the CIA basked in
a signals intelligence bonanza.

We got military order
of battle

on the Soviet forces
in Germany

and in Poland.

We got information

which came from Moscow --

for example, on the whole
reorganization

of the Ministry
of Defense.

But the real, real
kicker in all this was

the fact that we got
something

we never expected to get --

we got all kinds
of personality data,

operational data
on the operations

of the Soviet military
counterintelligence.

So that we were,
at that point,

totally on top,
we thought,

of the counterintelligence
picture

in Berlin.

NARRATION:
But the KGB was just choosing its moment

to pull the plug
on the tunnel.

They warned me beforehand

that it was
going to happen,

so I was rather
on tenterhooks,

and you can imagine,

what the outcome
would be.

NARRATION:
Heavy rain one April night in 1956

caused a cable failure,

giving the KGB
the excuse it needed --

turning the West's
intelligence feat

into a Soviet propaganda
victory.

Obviously, there --

I mean, there was
a feeling of, you know,

of great unhappiness.

On the other hand,
you know,

you just sort of
shrugged your shoulders

and said, "Well, we were
lucky it lasted that long."

NARRATION:
Five years later,

George Blake
was himself betrayed,

and sentenced
to 42 years in prison.

He had given the KGB
the names

of nearly 400 agents
working for the West,

supposedly on condition
that they wouldn't be harmed.

BLAKE:
During my trial,

which was held
in camera,

so everything could
be said there,

there was no mention
at all --

it wasn't part
of the prosecutor's case --

that I had been responsible
for the death

of any number
of agents.

NARRATION:
But armed with Blake's names,

Moscow simply waited

until they had
sufficient additional evidence.

MAN: George Blake had
that innocent mind in a sense.

He's still
a very naive man.

He didn't want to know

that many people
he betrayed

were executed.

And I think

we even discussed
this subject at one point,

and he wouldn't
believe it.

He would say,

"Well, I was told
that this would not happen."

It did happen.
He was not told.

As the Cold War
intensified

through the 1950s,

pressure
on the CIA increased.

The West was desperate
for detail

about the size and strength
of Soviet forces,

glimpsed
and photographed

at Moscow air shows
or May Day parades.

It was
the Soviet missile force

which worried
the CIA the most,

and about which
they knew the least.

There was limited
human intelligence

about the missile
deployments

in the Soviet Union.

There were some
communications intelligence

which would suggest

that this facility
or this town

may be involved
in missile activities,

because of communications
with known missile sites.

But what we were missing

was any firm, hard evidence

of actual deployment
of missiles.

NARRATION:
From 1956,

American technical superiority
started providing answers.

The CIA's own
reconnaissance plane,

the U2,

flew high over Russia
to photograph Soviet bases.

But in four years
of searching,

found no operational

intercontinental ballistic
missile launch sites.

Then in 1960,

the Americans successfully
launched

a satellite fitted
with a camera.

After 17 orbits,

the film capsule
was ejected,

caught mid-air,

and brought back
to earth for analysis.

A subsequent flight
confirmed the existence

of just one Soviet ICBM
launch site.

The rest of the puzzle's pieces
were provided

by perhaps the greatest spy
of the Cold War.

MAN:
This is a photograph of Oleg Penkovsky,

colonel
in the Red Army,

with all of his medals
which he earned

during World War ll --

a handsome soldier

and a great
American patriot.

This photograph was taken
in the hotel

in London
in April 1961,

after one
of our meetings,

where Oleg Penkovsky
on the left

and me on the right

enjoying
a small glass of wine.

NARRATION:
Penkovsky provided further reassurances

about the limitations
of Soviet power.

BULIK:
While they were still a serious threat,

no question about it,
they were strong militarily,

absolutely strong
militarily,

but they were not
as strong

as our estimators
had felt,

and he helped us
bring it down

to the level
where they really were.

They were not
ten feet tall.

They were about my size,
six foot two.

NARRATION:
Penkovsky revealed

the Soviefs
lack of atomic warheads

and their problems
with guidance systems.

He acted
out of resentment

that his career in military
intelligence had stalled

but also out of fear
that Khrushchevs adventurism

would bring disaster
on the world.

Khrushchev told Kennedy,
"I want peace.

But if you want war,
that is your problem."

But Penkovsky told
the CIA

that Khrushchev
was bluffihg.

"Kennedy should be firm,"
he said.

"Khrushchev is hot going
to fire any rockets.

He is not ready
for any war."

If you can get
into the mind

of the Khrushchevs
of the world...

then you've got
a weapon

that no technical amount
of information

can give you

and this is what Penkovsky
was able to give us.

NARRATION:
Penkovsky's information

was critical
to the United States

during the 1962
Cuban Missile Crisis.

U2 photographs revealed
the presence on Cuba

of Soviet missiles,

for which Penkovsky
had already handed over

the operating manuals.

With the world
closer to nuclear conflict

than at any time
in the Cold War,

intelligence experts were
summoned to the White House

to brief President Kennedy.

The first question
the President asked was,

"How long before
they can fire those missiles?"

And Art Lundahl said,

"Well, Mr. Graybeai is
the missile expert."

So he turned to me.

I stood up behind the President,
McNamara, and Rusk,

and for the next
probably five to ten minutes

they fired one question
after the other.

In answer to
the President's question,

"How long can
they fire these missiles?"

I replied primarily
on the combination

of intelligence sources,

but mainly Penkovsky's
information,

which told us how
these missiles operated

in the field.

NARRATION: The CIA assessment
is said to have bought the President

three precious days'
breathing space.

Ironically,
Penkovsky himself was now

under KGB surveillance.

The last time Joe Bulik
had seen him

was in Paris.

BULIK: I never had the
feeling that he was in danger,

otherwise I would have
insisted that he stay.

In fact, forced him,
if I had to kidnap him.

But I never really had
the feeling that he was --

at that time,
our last meeting in Paris,

I never felt
that he was in danger.

NARRATION:
Back in Moscow,

Penkovsky sent what seemed
like a routine message.

BULIK:
We'd gotten a signal from Penkovsky

that a dead drop
was loaded,

and then we sent Dick Jacobs
to service that dead drop.

He was arrested, and as soon
as that happened,

we knew the case was over.
It was dead.

And that Penkovsky was
in the hands of the KGB.

Punkt.

[speaking Russian ]

The chief KGB interrogator

was Alexander Zagvozdin.

[speaking Russian ]

We questioned him
not once, not 10 or 20 times,

but perhaps 100 times.

He realized
that his actions

were punishable by death,

and he used to ask me,

"Will I be executed?"

I never said
he wouldn't.

I never said
he wouldn't be executed.

I used to say
one thing --

"Only if you
confess everything

and repent fully,

can you hope
for mercy."

That's probably why
Penkovsky's life was not spared.

He didn't confess
everything.

I know for sure
that Penkovsky was shot.

I can't tell you
anything else.

I know his body
was cremated.

I don't know any more,

and I'm not interested.

NARRATION:
Not all spies wound up famous.

These are the home movies

of Galina and Mikhail Fedorov,

KGB officers who operated
under deep cover

for 20 years.

They were never caught.

In the event of war,

they would be in place
to spy behind enemy lines.

The KGB never lacked
recruits.

Some served for money,
some for ideology,

and some for
the sheer excitement

of living a secret life.

[speaking Russian ]

I love espionage.

Why'?

Because there is
this smell of adventure,

the smell of risk,

the smell of uncertainty.

Because when you go off
to meet an agent,

you never know whether you're
going to be arrested.

It adds color to life.

[ explosion ]

I need O07.

No, Mr. Bond.
I expect you to die.

[ Luibimov speaking Russian]

Spy mania in London
started

about the time
I arrived.

In 1961,

we used to be asked
everywhere.

We were very popular.

We would be invited
to private parties,

and the attitude towards us
was good.

But as the '60s went on,

there were those big
disasters --

with Blake
and the other KGB spies.

And you had
the Profumo scandal,

with the prostitute
Christine Keeler.

That shook Britain
up a bit.

After that,
when I turned up somewhere,

people would ask,
"Are you a spy?"

So I'd say, "Of course,
I'm a spy!"

NARRATION:
Western governments grew weary

of the huge KGB presence
in their midst.

In 1971,
the British expelled

105 Soviet intelligence
officers,

identified
by a defector.

Technology increasingly
assumed the burden

of spying-

NARRATION:
Satellites could now intercept

radio communications
and data

from test launches
of the oppositiorfs missiles.

Film taken in space

no longer even had
to be returned to earth.

The satellite would take
the picture of the sky,

and this image could be
beamed back

to an analyst
at his desk

in the United States

who could actually see
what was happening

in the international arena
without leaving his desk.

NARRATION: Here lay the
greatest intelligence successes

of the Cold War --

through photography
and electronic eavesdropping,

each side received
huge flows of information,

often too much
for the analysts to handle.

Technological spying
even played a part

in helping the superpowers
edge towards peace.

The technical systems
were almost essential

to our arms control
process.

We learned just
all kinds of things

about Russian
military systems

from the photographs

and from the electronic
listening.

At one point,
when we were negotiating

the SALT ll
arms control treaty,

I had to go to the Senate
and say,

"|f you ratify this treaty,

this is how closely
I can monitor it

and check on whether
they are complying

with the terms
of the treaty."

[electronic beeping,
chirping ]

NARRATION:
Despite a fleet of spy ships,

listening posts worldwide,

and sputniks overhead,

Soviet technical intelligence
lagged behind the West.

Even so, they claimed
to have cracked

the ciphers of over
6O countries,

obtaining many codes
by theft and blackmail.

Soviet technical intelligence
was far inferior

to Soviet human
intelligence.

The Soviets
were extremely good

at persuasive tactics,

which would ultimately
bring many people

into their ideological
embrace.

NARRATION:
KGB spying methods

spread beyond
superpower conflict --

routine surveillance
of ordinary citizens

by the East German
secret police, or Stasi.

The Stasi inhabited
a moral world of its own.

Interrogations were
routinely filmed...

and they had cameras
everywhere.

[Speaking German ]

Relations
between the various

areas
of counterintelligence

and with the department
which handled interrogations

were very amicable.

There were all sorts
of people there,

and it was
a friendly atmosphere.

They weren't the kind
of devious types

who'd use
atrocious methods

to force
confessions out of people.

[Speaking German ]

[Speaking German ]

Well, terrible things
did happen.

There were many cases
of injustice,

particularly
in the later years

which really
bothered me.

Reprisals were taken
against people

solely on the grounds
that they had

different political opinions,

or against people who wanted
a different,

better form
of socialism.

NARRATION: Vera Wollenberger
joined the East German peace movement

in 1981,

encouraged by
her husband Knud.

[Wollenberger speaking German ]

INTERPRETER: My personal
motivation for opposing state policies

was the decision
in the early '80s

to station nuclear
missiles in the GDR

and to introduce
military instruction in schools.

NARRATION: Vera and her
family were constantly harassed

by the Stash

who burgled her house

and made sure she lost
her teaching job.

Her husband stood by her
throughout.

In 1988,

Vera was arrested on her way
to this demonstration.

Her crime --
carrying a banner

which bore
Rosa Luxemburgs words,

"Freedom is how free
your opponent is."

She was interrogated
and imprisoned.

In 1991,

after the collapse
of the GDR,

Vera got access
to her Stasi file,

in which she learned

that the main informer
against her

had been
her own husband.

[Speaking German ]

I can't really say
how I felt.

It was such
an extreme situation,

rather as if one had
died for a moment,

and then returned
to life.

The surprising thing
was

the reports were written
as if about a stranger,

not about a wife.

To him I was
an enemy of the State,

and he had done everything
to fight me --

the enemy.

NARRATION:
Some "enemies of the State"

received more
drastic treatment.

In 1978,
Bulgarian intelligence

asked the KGB
to help them kill

the émigré writer
and broadcaster,

Georgi Markov.

Markov was murdered
at a London bus stop

by a stranger who
"accidentally" prodded him

with the tip
of an umbrella.

The Bulgarians were given
a choice of weapons,

and finally
they picked up

this umbrella

8S a COVE!"

To shoot the man
with a poisoned pellet.

It was not supposed
to be uncovered

because the pellet would
dissolve in his body

within 24 hours,
if I recall correctly.

I did not conceive,
I did not plan,

I was not involved
in any execution,

but I was aware.

And I always say

that knowledge does not
imply misdeed,

does it?

Do you suppose
I would go

over to the United States
or UK

and announce publicly?

I would hang myself.

NARRATION:
The temptation was always there

for the spymasters to earn
favor from the leadership

whether by covert action,

or just slanting
a routine report.

[speaking Russian ]

When we drew up reports,

of course we dramatized
those bits

which pointed out
the threat to the Soviet Union.

By emphasizing
the right things,

I'd ensure that my report
would go

straight
to the top --

to the Politburo.

If the report was
dull and boring

it would just
get filed away.

This was the problem

with all suppliers
of information.

We'd tailor it to get
a high rating from Moscow.

NARRATION: But did it matter
if spies skewed their reports?

How much did
political leaders heed

their intelligence services?

I would argue that
we probably exaggerate

the significance
of intelligence.

Once policy-makers
decide on a course,

I don't think
correct intelligence

or incorrect
intelligence is going

to bring any great changes
in that course.

NARRATIONI
1988.

Kim Philby is buried
with full honors

in a Moscow cemetery.

He first betrayed Britain

half a century before,

passing a wealth of secrets
to the KGB.

And yet converts were
never wholly trusted.

To the end,
the KGB opened his mail

and bugged his phone.

It seemed as if
the age of the spy was over.

In fact,
throughout the '80s,

the CIA had been
carefully establishing agents

within Soviet intelligence
and defense circles --

precious sources
like avionics expert,

Adolf Talkachev,

seen here on his way
to a meeting in Moscow

with his CIA contact.

The KGB suddenly started
to arrest

the CIA's most important
Soviet spies.

WOMAN:
In 1985,

we began to lose
cases,

by which I mean
Soviet officials working for us

and some of them
disappeared.

This led us to believe
that something was wrong.

It did not lead us
to believe,

"Aha, there must
be a mole."

NARRATION: Then the West
lost General Dmitri Polyakov,

of Soviet
military intelligence.

Polyakov had retired
after 18 years of spying,

when the KGB pounced.

He had been recruited
while at the United Nations

in New York.

Polyakov returned
to Europe in 1962

on the Queen Elizabeth.

His picture was taken
by the ship's photographer

at the Captain's dinner.

Seated just
a few tables away,

the FBI man
who recruited him,

John Mabey.

He said, "|'m dissatisfied
with the way

things are
in the Soviet Union.

The government
does not

look out for the people.

They're headed
on a course of war

with the United States,

and they can't possibly
win it.

And the only people that
are gonna suffer out of this

are the Russian people."

We'd met
on the Queen Elizabeth

every day
that it was at sea,

sometimes twice a day.

We reviewed literally
thousands of pictures

of Soviets who had been
in the United States

or stationed
around the world

and he identified
a number of them

by picture
and by name.

GRIMES:
Polyakov was our crown jewel.

He worked for us
for so many years,

and he achieved
such a rank

that rather than us

loomng
at an organization

through the eyes
of one of our sources,

looking at that organization
from the bottom up,

with Polyakov eventually
we were able

to look at that organization,
the GRU,

his organization
from the top down

as well as look
at the KGB,

and the Soviet Ministry
of Foreign Affairs,

and the Communist Party
apparatus.

NARRATION:
In 1991, Sandy Grimes joined the team

investigating the CIA's
agent losses.

In charge,
Jeanne Vertefeuille,

now suspicious there was
a KGB mole in their ranks.

Trying to pin down

a counterintelligence case

when you're looking
for a mole

is always a very difficult
and long-term job.

When we compiled a list

of how many people
could have done it,

we came up with 198 people.

NARRATION:
The mole hunt took three years,

homing in on CIA
counterintelligence officer,

Aldrich Ames.

The FBI filmed him
secretly in Bogota in 1993.

AM ES:
I was walking up and down,

wondering what had happened
to my KGB contact,

who had been there
an hour earlier.

I was reasonably alert,

but I didn't see
the surveillance.

And I suppose it was
frustrating for the FBI

because they were
scared to death

of me
seeing the surveillance

so they had
to stay way back.

As a result, they never
saw me doing anything.

They had no evidence
of any operational activity

on my part.

NARRATION:
The FBI staked out Ames' house

and tapped his phones.

The breakthrough had come
from CIA analysis

of his bank statements.

GRIMES:
We had just received records

from one
of the banks Rick had,

and Dan is reading these
things off

and I'm entering them
in the computer,

and my God,
it was unbelievable.

On 17 May,
Rick would have --

had reported having had
a lunch

with his Soviet contact
Chuvahkin.

18, May,
there's a deposit

into his checking account
for $9,000.

NARRATION:
On the 21st of February in 1994,

Ames was arrested
for spying,

along with his wife
Rosario,

after years
of high-living.

Shock, depression,

instant recognition,
you know.

You know, one's life
flashes before one.

A sense of things
coming to an end.

But no sense
of relief.

It's much more
painful than that.

NARRATIONI
In April 1985,

Aldrich Ames had walked

into the Soviet Embassy
in Washington

and started selling secrets
to the KGB.

They paid him
a total of $2.7 million.

Well, the reasons
that I did what I did

in April of 1985,

were personal,

banal,

and amounted really
to kind of greed and folly.

As simple as that.

VERTEFEUILLE:
I attribute it heavily to Rosario.

She was the one who was
interested in spending money

and who liked to live
high on the hog

and I think he wanted
to sort of to buy her love

and the way to buy her love

was to get her
expensive things.

NARRATION:
Ames had no illusions

about the real price
of his treachery.

AMES:
I knew quite well,

when I gave the names

of our agents

in the Soviet Union,

that I was exposing them

to, uh...

the full machinery

of counterespionage
and the law,

and then prosecution,
and capital punishment

certainly in the case
of KGB and GRU officers.

Obviously these folks

I knew
would have to answer

for what they'd done.

And certainly, I felt...

I inured myself

against, you know,

a reaction to that.

NARRATION: Dmitri Polyakov
was one of the 25 agents

betrayed by Am es.

10 were executed

and one committed suicide.

One alone was smuggled
to safety

by the British
Secret Service.

[speaking Russian ]

I was seized by the KGB
in May 1985.

I was put
under house arrest,

but I managed to escape
in July --

alive, well,
and safe.

I was lucky.

The others were shot

in the dungeons
of some KGB prison,

after long months
of continuous threats

and interrogations.

They lost everything --

family, children,
work,

and then their lives.

They spent a year,
two years,

or in the case
of General Polyakov,

nearly three years

expecting to die
at any minute.

NARRATION:
Polyakov was tried in secret,

critical of the Soviet
leadership to the end.

He had given
the West

precious information
on Soviet missiles,

nuclear strategy,
chemical and biological warfare.

Yet so many spies
paid with their freedom,

or their lives,

in destructive cycles
of tit for tat.

AM ES:
The men like Polyakov

QQVE Up names,

they gave up secrets.

I did the same thing,

for reasons
that I considered sufficient

to myself.

I gave up the names

of some
of the same people...

who had earlier
given up others.

It's a nasty kind
of circle,

with terrible human costs.

Aldrich Ames is sewing
a life sentence

with no remission.

Dmitri Polyakov
was sentenced to death.

He was executed
in 1988

with a bullet
in the back of the head,

then buried
in an unmarked grave.

For half a century,

the spies had peered
intently at each other

through a fog
of ignorance and deceit.

They produced ever more
realistic appraisals

of their opponents'
strength.

But very few
were able to answer

the toughest question --

"Does our enemy
intend to fight us?"

Despite the CIA
and KGB's vast resources,

the answer lay hidden
not in a satellite photo,

or an agent report,

but in the minds
of their opponents.