All language subtitles for Cold War - S01E16 - Detente (1969–1975) (480p x265 EDGE2020).eng

ARCHIVE - CARTOON NARRATION:
Once upon a time there lived two neighbors.

One of them
bought a shotgun.'

Ah ha!',
thought the other.

'Alright.
I'll buy myself a bigger gun!'

'What could this mean?'
thought the first neighbor.

'I'll buy myself
something bigger!'

NARRATION: By the end of
the 1960s, the Soviet Union

seemed likely to match
America's nuclear arsenal.

The two superpowers
faced a choice -

slow down their
competition -

the process that would
be called détente -

or continue an arms race that
could end in all-out war.

Richard Nixon
had new ideas

about how to make the
Cold War less dangerous.

He was ready to accept
the Soviet Union

as America's
nuclear equal.

When President
Nixon came into office,

the conventional
wisdom of all the media

and the people who thought of
themselves as intellectuals

was that he was
a war monger

and that they had
to moderate him.

And we were under
enormous pressure to start

negotiations on trade,
on SALT,

on a whole
complex of things.

This was not a
foreign policy politician,

particularly in
his early years.

He had gained notoriety
and power, as you know,

on the wave of the
great Red scare,

the great McCarthy period
in American politics.

He also knew -
and this was very important -

the bureaucracy.

He knew that often

the most difficult belligerent
powers with which he

had to deal were not
the Soviet Union or China

but the Department of State,

the Central Intelligence Agency,
the Pentagon -

the Department of Defense-

those belligerents arrayed
along the Potomac.

NARRATION: Although Nixon wanted
to revise America's Cold War strategy,

his first priority was
to get American troops

out of the war in Vietnam.

By 1969,

this war had cost the lives
of thirty thousand Gls

and there was still no end.

When I became
Secretary of Defense,

there were five
hundred and fifty thousand men

on the ground in
Vietnam,

another million
two hundred thousand in Asia,

in the Navy and the Air Force
supporting this operation.

It was a big war.

NARRATION: America's ally
President Thieu of South Vietnam

met Nixon on Midway Island.

Nixon told Thieu he planned
to pull out American troops

and hand over the ground war
to the South Vietnamese.

"Vietnamization"
was the term

that I coined in order to get
people thinking about the

responsibilities that the
Vietnamese had there.

So we came in
and said,

"That's fine,
as long as, you know,

you leave behind a well-trained
South Vietnamese army

and equip us so that we could
take care of our own destiny".

NARRATION:
In July 1969,

the first American troops
were pulled out.

ARCHIVE - AFN RADIO ANNOUNCER:
the Third Brigade of the 82nd Airborne

ARCHIVE- CHEERING GLS:
Hurrah!

Both Nixon and Kissinger knew
what it was doing

to our society, the controversy,
the distractions,

the financial cost, the cost -
the terrible human toll

in terms of lives lost
and wounded -

not only of Americans
but Vietnamese and others.

And also the distractions

from other foreign policy
initiatives.

It's one reason that
Nixon and Kissinger

wanted to open up with China
and to improve relations

with Russia: partly to
try to bring pressure

on the Vietnamese to
negotiate a settlement,

partly to show a dramatic
forward movement in

our foreign policy,
that we were not crippled

and paralyzed by
the Vietnam war.

NARRATION:
But Hanoi put on its own pressure

with a new offensive
in the South.

American generals proposed
bombing North Vietnam's

bases in neutral Cambodia.

Nixon agreed
to the bombing

but insisted the raids in
Cambodia be kept secret.

ARCHIVE -VOICES:
Bomb doors open at Thirty PG!

Coming up at Thirty PG!

- I see it coming up.
- Roger!

Stand by to release-
ready, ready, now! Bombs away!

Impact time-
ready, ready, now!

[ Bomb explodes]

I was all for bombing the
sanctuaries in Cambodia

but I could not tell the
President of the United States,

the Secretary of State

or the National Security
Adviser, Henry Kissinger,

that I could
keep it secret.

And I thought it
would be a very bad thing

if that came
out at a later time.

And I knew it would - because
we had twelve thousand people

that had all that information
and you just can't keep secrets.

NARRATION:
Laird was right.

Anti-war demonstrators
protested.

CROWD VOICES:
US out of Vietnam!

US out of Vietnam!

DEMONSTRATOR:
James Hutton, Illinois!

DEMONSTRATOR:
Dennis Hyland, Colorado!

NARRATION: They called out the
names of soldiers killed in Vietnam.

Richard Nixon could
look out the window

of the White House and
see a mob of people marching

in the street protesting
the war in Vietnam, for instance.

He could take a three-by
five card out of his pocket

and take a look.

And the polls showed him with
the confidence of 70-75%

of the American people.

And he'd say, "|'m not going
to let those people

in the street make foreign
policy for this country".

And so tonight-
to you,

the great silent majority
of my fellow Americans-

I ask for your support.

I pledged in my campaign
for the presidency to end

the war in a way that we
could win the peace.

I have initiated a plan of
action which will enable me

to keep
that pledge.

The more support I can have
from the American people,

the sooner that pledge
can be redeemed.

For the more divided
we are at home

the less likely the enemy
is to negotiate.

Nixon believed,
I think correctly,

that the opposition to
the war was mostly about

the draft
and the casualties

and not about the
American presence there.

Americans didn't care if
we were bombing Hanoi-

they didn't care if there were
American airplanes around.

What they didn't like was the
fact that young American men

were being drafted, sent to
Vietnam and being killed.

NARRATION:
The bombing of the communist bases

in Cambodia was
no miracle cure.

SFX OVER BATTLE NOISE: GI: OK
one zero zero meters away from it now!

I'll get you from there!

NARRATION: American Gls still
came under attack in South Vietnam.

ARCHIVE- GPS VOICE:
Right, who's wounded?

All right,
give me some cover!

[machine gun fire]

OK, can you move him?

OK, try and bring
him back here!

Remember to stop
the bleeding!

You gotta stop!

[ explosion ]

NARRATION: Nixon now ordered
a ground assault into Cambodia.

ARCHIVE- GPS VOICE:
Anybody out here?

[rifle gunfire]

ARCHIVE- REPORTER: Do you feel the people
are united behind you, Mr. President?

ARCHIVE- NIXON: Er, as far
as the people are concerned,

I have no
judgment on that.

Er, all that I can say is
that I know that I did what

I believe was right and what
really matters is as far as the

people are concerned is
whether it comes out right.

If it comes out right,
that's what really matters.

ARCHIVE - OHIO NATIONAL GUARD OFFICER
OVER BULLHORN: Leave this area immediately!

Leave this area immediately!

[crowds shouting ]

NARRATION: Nixon's invasion of
Cambodia produced violent protests

on American campuses.

At Kent State University,

National Guardsmen shot
four students dead.

ARCHIVE - COMMENTARY: Every year
in the early spring and in the late autumn,

the Soviet army gets
its new recruits.

The forces are
inconceivable without strong,

agile men possessing stamina.

These are fighting men.

NARRATION: Fighting men
alone could not guarantee security.

Soviet leaders wanted arms
agreements that recognized their

nuclear parity
with America.

They also wanted American
understanding in their

quarrel with China.

The Communist party
chief Leonid Brezhnev

championed relaxation of
Cold War tension with America -

the policy that would
be called détente.

He was on his way to the
very top of Soviet power.

[speaking Russian ]

Brezhnev was a
sincere person in many ways.

He had been through
the great Patriotic War

from beginning to end.

He returned with the
very strong conviction

that he had to do his
best to prevent war.

This was illustrated every time
he went to a collective farm,

or factory.

He would ask people,
"How are things?"

And they would complain
but then they would say,

"Well, we can put up with it
as long as there is no war."

[speaking Russian ]

Every leader in any
country has the need to express

his character and to leave
his mark in history.

He wanted to become the leader
of the Soviet government.

One of the ways he had of
strengthening his position

was making foreign policy
his priority.

[speaking Russian ]

American-Soviet relations were
always at the center

of our diplomacy.

I would say that,
basically,

whether the West
believed it or not,

our attitude was to
have a more constructive

relationship with
the United States.

NARRATION: In Europe, the Cold
War showed itself most painfully

in the Iron Curtain that
divided the two Germanys.

West Germany's
new Chancellor,

the Social Democrat
Willy Brandt,

had his own ideas for
relations with the Soviet bloc.

The Germans called it
Ostpolitik.

[Speaking German ]

We are a people who want to be
and will be a good neighbor

in Germany and beyond.

[ Applause ]

[Speaking German ]

The main thing that
got the ball rolling

was the decision of
the Chancellor

to call
East Germany a state.

This was a fundamental
change in our position,

which led to fierce criticism
from the opposition.

In Moscow,
people were all ears.

[speaking Russian ]

In our opinion,
there were more sober voices

among the Social Democrats,

those who would seek common
points of interests with us -

not similarities
in our outlook

but similarities in
our interests.

I would like to stress the
difference.

If we found points in common
which would preserve

a balance of interests,

this could lead relations
between the Soviet Union

and West Germany
out of a dead end.

NARRATION: Willy Brandt became
the first West German Chancellor

to visit East Germany.

[Speaking German ]

NARRATION:
Brandfs visit was a triumph.

To ordinary East Germans, he
seemed to bring hope of change.

But the Americans
were worried.

My first reaction
to Ostpolitik

was concern that it
would lead to German nationalism,

that if Germany operated
on its own vis-a-vis the East,

it would emphasize its
own national concerns,

if not immediately then
over a period of time.

[Speaking German ]

The response we
got from Nixon

and Kissinger was one of
doubt and suspicion.

Had we thought
about everything?

I had informed
Kissinger shortly before

we got into office what
we planned to do.

He asked a lot of questions.

We reached the point
where I said,

"I am not here to
consult but to inform."

This was a tone unheard
of in Washington.

While the danger that we
feared was real the best

way to avert it was not
to fight it and then

be accused of being the cause of
permanent German partition,

but rather to help guide it in a
direction that was compatible

with Allied policy.

And so we established
another back channel to

Brandt through his
associate Egon Bahr

and to the Soviets via
Dobrynin and Falin.

And we insisted that
before anything could

be concluded with
respect to Germany,

absolute assurances
had to exist with respect

to our position in Berlin.

NARRATION:
Brandts next destination was Moscow.

He hoped to remove Russia's
fear of its old German enemy.

Brandt was willing to recognize
Europe's post-war borders

and the division
between East and West.

[Speaking German ]

The Moscow accords were the key
to our bi-lateral treaty system

with the East.

The Federal Republic
ceased being excuse

for the Soviet Union to keep
the Eastern bloc in line.

The treaty signing was a signal
from Moscow that there was

a readiness for change.

NARRATION: Willy Brandt flew
to another old German enemy.

GERMAN NEWSREEL
NARRATIONI

NARRATION: Brandt had come to
recognize Poland's western border

carved out of territory seized
from Nazi Germany in 1945.

The German Chancellor visited
the site of the Warsaw Ghetto.

Words failed him;
he knelt at the memorial to

Jewish fighters who
resisted the Nazis.

[Speaking German ]

Brandt was a stroke of
luck for German history.

For the Americans he
symbolized reliability-

he had proved himself
the defender of Berlin

against the menace
of the East.

And for the East, he was
a resistance fighter

against the Nazis-
without any doubt.

NARRATION:
In a divided Germany,

these steps towards detente

brought welcome cracks
in the Berlin Wall.

Families and friends
separated by the Wall

could see each
other once again.

ARCHIVE- NIXON:
OK, fine, fine, we'll call you later!

NARRATION:
The architects of America's new approach

to the Cold War
were Richard Nixon

and his National Security
Adviser, Henry Kissinger.

JOHN EHRLICHMAN:
Henry was very temperamental,

very bright, very
territorial, very insecure.

You could say the same
thing about Richard Nixon.

And they complemented one
another a lot of the time.

At the same time
they were rivals.

They fought
with one another.

They fought not with one another
but behind one anothefls backs -

they were devious.

NARRATION:
The two men preferred to work in secret.

Through secret back channels,
they setup summit meetings

in Beijing and Moscow.

ARCHIVE - KISSINGER: We have
a variety of independent sources.

ARCHIVE - NIXON:
I know, I know! None of them reliable.

ARCHIVE- KISSINGER:
None of them totally reliable.

ARCH IVE- NIXON:
That's right!

NARRATION: Nixon and Kissinger
wanted the summits in China

and the Soviet Union to help
America get out of Vietnam.

They also hoped to bring China
into their diplomatic game.

The principal reason
for seeking an

approchement
with China was to

restore fluidity to the
overall international situation.

If there are five players and
you can't deal with one of them,

this produces rigidity.

Secondly, we wanted to
demonstrate to the American

public that Vietnam
was an aberration,

that we had ideas for
the construction of

peace on a global scale.

NARRATION:
Soviet leaders were alarmed after Kissinger,

and then Nixon returned
jubilant from China.

ARCHIVE- NIXON: Not only have
we completed a week of intensive talks

at the highest levels,

we have set up a procedure

whereby we can continue
to have discussions in the future.

We have demonstrated that
nations with very deep

and fundamental differences
can learn to discuss those

differences calmly,

rationally and frankly without
compromising their principles.

[speaking Russian ]

It was a great scare for
our leaders who decided that

an anti-Soviet
coalition was being formed,

which included not only
America and NATO but also China.

We felt we were
being surrounded.

The Moscow reaction was
that a summit which

we had tried to achieve
before the trip to China,

and in which they had
been stone-walling us

and trying to use it to -
well, to put it kindly -

blackmail us into
untoward concessions,

or concessions we
thought were untoward,

suddenly they agreed
to the summit

and it unfroze
our relationship.

NARRATION:
In March 1972,

North Vietnam launched a
new offensive in the South.

Nixon responded with
more air attacks.

Would the Soviets
receive Nixon in Moscow

while his planes were bombing
their North Vietnamese ally?

The general debate
that took place in the

White House
situation room-

and I was in
many of these-

was: which is
more important -

the Vietnam front
or the Moscow front?

And Nixon was the
only important person

that I can recall who said,
"We can have both.

I'm wilting to lose
the Moscow Summit

but I predict the
Russians will go ahead

even if we bomb Hanoi
and mine Haiphong...

Nixon and Henry Kissinger
played sort

of good cop/bad cop with
the Russians particularly.

Kissinger would see
Anatoly Dobrynin,

the Russian Ambassador,

frequently and I mean
like almost daily.

And his line was -

'Look, I work for
this crazy man.

There's no telling
what he might do.

So, Anatoly, you and I
as reasonable men must

work together to
an accommodation

between our countries'.

NARRATION:
Kissinger was uncertain

whether Moscow would allow
the summit to go ahead.

[speaking Russian ]

I went to see
Kissinger.

He was nervous but
tried to hide it.

He said jokingly,
"OK, let's have a bet!"

Because he knew I had
a piece of paper

with the official
Soviet reply.

He said, "Let's bet whether
I can guess the answer!"

So we bet a crate
of champagne.

I asked him,

"So what do you think
the Soviet answer is?"

He was convinced
that the summit had

been postponed
to a later date.

In fact the official
Soviet reply was -

the summit is going
ahead as planned.

NARRATIONI
May 22nd 1972 -

Richard Nixon became the first
sewing American President

to be received
in the Kremlin.

The summit reached
agreements to limit offensive

and defensive
nuclear weapons,

and it laid the foundation of détente.

For Brezhnev and Nixon,

this was the most
dramatic proof yet of

the new relationship between
their two countries.

But first the Soviets had to
make their point on Vietnam.

President Nixon,
Dr. Kissinger,

myself and one other
officer, four of us,

went out to
Brezhnevs country dacha.

And there we saw
Brezhnev, Kosygin,

Podgorny and the national
security adviser on their side-

four on four.

We sat for three hours
in the dacha,

in which each of the Russian
leaders took an hour to blast

the United States for
its Vietnam policy,

absolutely attacking Nixon
and the United States.

Nixon knew what they
were doing, namely,

they were writing a
transcript to send to Hanoi.

So he listened patiently,

didn't get overly argumentative,
basically just took it.

After three and a half hours
of Soviet diatribe,

sort of a tag-team match
among the Soviet leaders,

we then went upstairs for dinner
and the entire mood changed.

Brezhnev broke
out the vodka.

There was singing and
jokes and toasts.

And then later that evening,
Kissinger went back -

I believe with Gromyko -
and did some more negotiating

on arms control.

ANATOLY DOBRYNIN:
[speaking Russian ]

The atmosphere was very
good, even friendly.

We were quite
aggressive in view of

Nixon's actions
on Vietnam,

but we made sure it didn't
overshadow the summit,

because the issues that Nixon
was going to raise had already

been agreed through the
confidential channel.

These were very
important nuclear issues.

All the members of the
Politburo knew that the text of

the treaty had
already been agreed.

Nixon knew that too
from Kissinger.

So if we gave in to our emotions
we would ruin everything that

had already
been achieved.

ARCHIVE- SERGEANT-AT-ARMS:
The President of the United States!

[ Applause ]

NARRATION: The American
Congress gave Nixon a hero's welcome.

Last Friday in Moscow

we witnessed the beginning
of the end of that era

which began in 1945.

We took the first step
toward a new era

of mutually agreed restraint
and arms limitation

between the two principal
nuclear powers.

With this step, we have enhanced
the security of both nations.

We have begun to check the
wasteful and dangerous spiral of

nuclear arms which has dominated
relations between our two

countries for
a generation.

We have begun to reduce the
level of fear by reducing

the causes of fear,

for our two peoples and for
all peoples in the World.

NARRATION: Two weeks
after Nixon's return from Moscow,

five men working for his
re-election campaign were

arrested for breaking into the
Washington headquarters

of the Democratic Party.

It was the start of
a major scandal-

Watergate.

As election day approached,

Kissinger returned from one of
his many negotiating rounds

with the North Vietnamese.

He told Nixon he at last
had a deal on Vietnam.

The North Vietnamese
negotiator Le Duo Tho

presented to Dr. Kissinger
a draft agreement

on restoring peace and
ending the war in Vietnam.

And the first thing he said
when he presented that document

to Dr Kissinger was,

"You are in a hurry,
are you not?"

And I recall Dr. Kissinger
nodding affirmatively

when Le Duo Tho made
that statement.

We knew that
Kissinger

had met with the
North Vietnamese side

in Paris
on October 9th.

So when he came on October 19th
and gave us the text -

in English, mind you -
and he asked us, well

we've got four
days to sign

and of course we politely said,
"Well, you know,

this is the first time we
have been given this text,

so we would like to
have time to study it.

By the way, you know, where is
the Vietnamese text?"

When I see the widows,
the orphans,

when I see so many
tombs, so many sacrifices

for the freedom and
liberty of Vietnam,

I reaffirm again that the
whole people of South Vietnam

will resist again any peace
which demand the rendition of

South Vietnam and
which will give South Vietnam

to the communist aggressors!

I have great sympathy for
Thieu and, at the same time,

I have great sympathy
for our problem.

We faced sixty-five
Congressional resolutions

in the year 1972 alone that were
urging unilateral withdrawal

from Vietnam.

And Mr. Kissinger said,

"Well, if you sign this,
we're going to bring peace

and we'll be-
South Vietnam will be developed,

people will be happy."

At which
President Thieu said,

"Listen, you know,

we have the interests and
the future of our country.

We are not looking
for Nobel Prize."

NARRATION:
South Vietnam refused to sign.

With his deal
facing collapse,

Kissinger hastily
reassured Hanoi

America still wanted an agreement.

We believe that
peace is at hand.

[ Cough ] We believe that a
an agreement is within sight.

[cough]

It is inevitable that
in a war of such complexity

that there should be [ cough]
occasional difficulties in

reaching a final solution.

NARRATION: This latest
setback in the Vietnam peace talks

did not damage Nixon.

He was easily re-elected
for a second term.

Back in Paris, Kissinger had
to put Thieu's objections

to the North Vietnamese.

KISSINGER:
How do I get outta here?

REPORTER: We thought you
weren't having a meeting today, sir.

Well, we do something
surprising!

REPORTER:
It's getting to be difficult to have

a secret rendezvous in Paris.

It certainly is!

REPORTER:
Will you be meeting again tomorrow, sir?

Er, we expect to, yes.

JOHN NEGROPONTE: One day we
were on the verge of finalizing the text.

The next day, there were
suddenly ten or twelve different

issues that popped up
and were unresolved.

And then Le Duo Tho said that
he had to go back to Hanoi

for consultations.

NARRATION: Le Duo Tho left
Paris and the talks broke down.

Nixon ordered air raids
on North Vietnam,

hoping to bludgeon
Hanoi into agreement

and at the same
time bolster the South.

Over twelve days,
Hanoi and Haiphong

came under the most sustained
bombing campaign of the war.

The bombing
served its purpose.

North and South Vietnam
were ready to agree

to the deal that
Kissinger put together.

Under the peace accords,

American troops
would leave Vietnam;

the Saigon government
would remain in power

but North Vietnam's troops
would stay in the South.

Nixon called it,
"Peace with honor".

It so happened that
with Mr. Kissinger,

who had wanted to
play the triangular,

to do the détente,

Vietnam had to go in order
for détente to happen.

This is my own analysis and then
that unfortunately, you know,

was not very good for the
South Vietnamese people.

Good evening.

The biggest White House
scandal in a century,

the Watergate scandal,
broke wide open today.

The Attorney General,
Richard Kleindienst,

has resigned because -
in his own words -

he had close personal and
professional associations

with people who may
have broken the law.

The two closest men
to the President,

HR. Haldeman,
his Chief-of-Staff,

and John Ehriichman,
his Chief Domestic Adviser,

have resigned.

Last week both men
were fighting hard

to keep their jobs.

We had a great staff
system in the White House

for dealing
with crises.

We didn't apply that
system to Watergate.

I think part of the reason was
we didn't consider it a crisis.

It was a very small
potatoes episode.

I had no prior knowledge
of the Watergate break-in.

I neither took part in nor knew
about any of the subsequent

cover-up activities.

I neither authorized nor
encouraged subordinates to

engaged in illegal or
improper campaign tactics.

That was and that is
the simple truth.

NARRATION:
Regardless of Watergate,

the process of détente continued.

Brezhnev came to America for
a second summit with Nixon.

In California,

the Soviet leader partied
with Hollywood film stars.

The Russians were
still keen to

deal with the
American President.

ARCHIVE- BREZHNEV:
[speaking Russian ]

Good bye!

Do svidanya!

NARRATION: In spite of Nixon's
denial of guilt over Watergate,

he was accused of obstructing
justice and faced impeachment

by Congress.

In August 1974,
Richard Nixon,

the man who took
America into détente,

gave up the fight
and resigned.

His successor
was Gerald Ford.

The Soviet leadership was
astonished by Nixon's downfall.

[speaking Russian ]

They thought, "How could
the most powerful person in the

United States, the
most important person in the world,

be legally forced
to step down

for stealing some
silly documents?"

It was so contrary to the
mentality of the Soviet leaders

that a person in such
a senior position

could be removed
by legal means.

They simply couldn't
understand it.

[speaking Russian ]

There were
various suspicions.

One of those
suspicions was that it was done

deliberately by the
enemies of rapprochement

between America
and the Soviet Union.

[gunfire]

NARRATION:
In Vietnam, the 1973 peace accords

had not stopped
the fighting.

By April 1975,

South Vietnamese troops
were struggling to defend

Saigon against
Hanoi's final offensive.

They could expect little
help from the Americans.

The Congress of the
United States

refused to supply

the kind of military
assistance that was necessary

to keep the South Vietnamese
military forces strong.

NARRATION:
South Vietnamese who had fought

and worked alongside the
Americans against the communists

besieged the US Embassy.

The Americans were
getting away -

but they had lost the war and
now they could not even save

thousands of their
South Vietnamese friends.

The American
experience in Vietnam -

and particularly
my own -

had been like a B-52 strike
from sixty thousand feet up.

Oh, we had done a lot of
damage but very seldom did

you have to gaze upon the
consequences of that damage.

That last day was like being in
a B-52 strike right on the deck.

You saw what our
actions had wrought

and the horror and
the shame was almost more

than you could bear.

[singing in Russian]

NARRATION: The Soviet
Union proclaimed it self-confident.

It believed it was a
superpower equal to America

and boasted history
was on its side.

This rosy view
ignored one problem.

The treatment of Soviet
dissidents like the writer

Alexander Solzhenitsyn
threatened to derail detente.

ARCHIVE- DOBRYNIN:
Mr. Canton...

DEMONSTRATORS:
Russian pig, go home!

Never again,
never again!

NARRATION:
American passions flared over

restrictions on the
emigration of Soviet Jews.

[speaking Russian ]

The questions of Jewish
emigration from the Soviet Union

and of human rights
were a very strong irritant.

These issues were raised
regularly by the US Congress

and by demonstrations organized
by pro-Israeli activists

and sometimes
by hooligans.

There was at the outset of
course a genuine backlash

in the Congress of
the United States

against the policy of détente -

not in the first instance
from where one might expect it,

from the right-wing pews
of the Republican Party.

It came instead from
the traditionally

right-wing Democrats,
the hard-line,

of Cold Warrior Democrats
like 'Scoop' Jackson.

When we have something
we feel strongly about -

and in this case it
is civil liberties

and freedom and what this
nation was founded upon,

that we should do something to
implement international law -

and it is
international law now,

the right to leave a country
freely and return freely,

that we should put that
issue of principle oh the

table knowing that the Russians
are not going to agree to it.

The debate about détente
took a very curious form,

because some liberals
seemed to take the view

that maybe tension
wasn't all that bad.

And they suddenly developed
theories of the need

to intervene in human rights
procedures that we'd never

heard before and that were
strenuously rejected before.

NARRATION:
In the Soviet Union,

where memorials kept alive
remembrance of a terrible war,

detente had few enemies.

Soviet leaders hoped to
guarantee their country's status

and security with a treaty
to be signed in Helsinki

which would recognize the
post-war division of Europe.

But this treaty had a
stumbling block -

human rights.

[speaking Russian ]

The members of the Politburo
read the full text.

They had ho
objections when they

read the first
and second articles.

When they got to the third
"humanitarian" article,

their hair stood on end.

Suslov said it was a complete
betrayal of communist ideology.

Gromyko then came up with
the following argument:

the main thing about
the Helsinki treaty is

the recognition
of the borders.

That's what we shed our blood
for in the Great Patriotic War.

All thirty-five signatory
states are now saying

these are the
borders of Europe.

As for human rights,
Gromyko said,

"Well, who's the
master of this house?

We are the masters of
this house and each time

it will be up to us
to decide how to act.

Who can force us?"

NARRATION: After overcoming
the doubts of his colleagues,

Brezhnev arrived
in Helsinki,

keen to out a figure among
leaders for the East and West.

ARCHIVE- BREZHNEV:
[speaking Russian ]

NARRATION: Both sides believed
they had the agreement they wanted.

GERALD FORD: The Soviet
Union and the Warsaw Pact nations

did not recognize that the
human rights provision

was a time bomb.

We the United States
believed that if we could get the

Soviet Union and the
Warsaw Pact nations

to respect human rights,

that was worth whatever
else was agreed to

in the
Helsinki Accords.

ARCHIVE: Three, two,
one, engine sequence start,

one zero, launch commence!

We have a lift-off!

NARRATION:
Thanks to détente, rockets could now point

the way to co-existence,
rather than war.

ARCHIVE:
Houston flight to Moskva...

Apollo Houston,
I got two messages for you.

Moscow is go for docking!

Houston is go
for docking!

It's up to you guys!
Have fun!

Less than five
meters distance!

NARRATION: Soviet and
American spacecraft made history,

docking together one hundred and
forty miles above the Earth.

ARCHIVE:
Contact! Alright, aha!

NARRATION:
In space, co-operation was replacing years

of Cold War
confrontation.

ARCHIVE:
Glad to see ya!

VALERI KUBASOV:
[speaking Russian ]

When we went to the United
States for training,

we met the Americans.

I remember one of
them saying to me,

"Since this
international project I have

begun to sleep
better at night.

I am no longer afraid
of nuclear war,

because we are
working together...