All language subtitles for Cold War - S01E09 - The Wall (1958–1963) (480p x265 EDGE2020).eng

NARRATOR:
It started as a barbed-wire fence...

dividing a city...

imprisoning its people.

The very image
of the Cold War.

The Berlin Wall.

D ♪

BRANAGH:
Memphis, Tennessee,

March, 1958.

I, Elvis Presley,

Do solemnly swear...

Do solemnly swear.

That I will bear
true faith and allegiance...

That I will bear true faith
and allegiance.

To the United States
of America.

PRESLEY:
I“ Give us a room I“

I“ with a view
of the beautiful Rhine I“

BRANAGH: Elvis Presley
hits West Germany.

REPORTER: The
well-known guitarist has come

to bolster NATO forces --
in particular,

a 3rd US Armored Division
tank unit.

I“ I got those
hut, 2, 3, 4 J“

I“ occupation G.|. blues I“

BRANAGH: West Germany
was NATO's front line

along the Iron Curtain.

Since 1955,
the Americans had been

training a new
West German army.

Some thought that could mean
a German finger

on NATO's nuclear trigger.

German rearmament
brought back nightmares

for many Europeans.

Above all, for the Russians.

The new weaponry
alarmed East Germany,

the German Democratic
Republic.

[man speaking German]

INTERPRETER:
The GDR made various offers

to prevent
the nuclear armament

of West Germany.

But it found no response,

no echo.

The GDR felt
directly threatened

by tactical nuclear weapons.

It accepted
that the Soviet army,

stationed
on GDR territory

also should arm itself
with tactical nuclear weapons.

BRANAGH: Berlin, deep
in East German territory

was under
the joint occupation

of the former
wartime allies.

Now in West Berlin,
12,000 British, American,

and French soldiers
were surrounded

by half a million
Soviet and East German troops.

Western rights of access

were protected
by Four-Power Agreement.

Each day, thousands
moved freely

between the Soviet
and Western sectors.

Berlin's open border
gave East Germans access

to the glittering west,

which Soviet and East German
leaders wanted to end.

[ Eberlein speaking German ]

West Berlin was becoming
increasingly dangerous

to the existence of the GDR

and the existence of socialism.

Khrushchev proposed
to create a free city of Berlin

with special rights
of its own,

with its own foreign policy,

its own police

and its own symbolic
foreign forces.

MAN: Khrushchev
thought that some pressures

should be put
on the Americans.

And the obvious place
was West Berlin.

So this was a sort
of shock therapy

oh the part
of Khrushchev, I would say.

BRANAGH:
In November, 1958,

the West rejected Khrushchevs
Berlin proposals.

Khrushchev how offered
East German leader

Walter Ulbricht
to a peace treaty.

It threatened
Western rights in Berlin.

MAN: He said that unless
agreement were reached,

that Berlin would be
turned over

to the East Germans
within six months.

We regarded that
as an ultimatum.

Eisenhower felt that
the Soviets were doing something

that was not really
in their interest.

His view was that
if there were to be

actual conflict

between the United States
and the Soviet Union,

it would move quickly
to large-scale all-out conflict

where everything would be
drawn into it,

and that was the danger.

That was the risk.

NARRATOR: A new
Red threat to West Berlin,

Khrushchevs demand
that the United States,

France, and Britain
agree to end

the Four-Power Pact
governing West Berlin,

turning it over
to Red East Germany --

hence a new
and major crisis.

The Western powers
reacted strongly,

affirming their determination

to keep the city free.

BRANAGH: American Secretary
of State, John Foster Dulles

seeking common ground
for a bargain over Berlin,

consulted
America's allies.

But talks between the West
and the Soviet Union

led nowhere.

WOMAN: The attempt to find
a compromise with the Soviets

was where we began to get
into serious trouble

because any concessions
that you made to the Soviets,

from the western side
would be an erosion

of the Western
position there.

And the Soviets themselves
were committed

to a situation in Berlin

that the Allies
could not tolerate.

So you were already --

I mean, there was
no possible outcome --

negotiated outcome
that was possible.

BRANAGH: But the talks
persuaded Khrushchev to shelve

his Berlin ultimatum
and head west.

He chose the world's largest
aircraft for the journey --

Soviet built.

In September, 1959,

Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev
became the first Soviet leader

to visit America.

MAUTNER: Khrushchev
got what he wanted --

which was a visit
to the United States,

and treatment
as an equal.

And ah exchange
with Eisenhower,

which gave him, I think,
a fair idea

that probably
if he continued

without too much provocative actions
on the ground,

he could get more
out of the western side.

BRANAGH:
In talks with Eisenhower,

a new spirit
of cooperation

eased the crisis.

But Khrushchevs hopes
for a Cold War truce

only lasted
six months.

On the eve of a grand
peace-making summit in Paris,

an American U2 spy plane
was shot down

in Soviet air space.

Khrushchev was enraged.

The summit collapsed
before it had even begun.

1959,

East Germany celebrated
10 years

of socialist achievement.

Walter Ulbricht,
party leader,

boasted of rapid
industrial progress

and of a socialist
democracy

that Germany had
never known before.

Official films portrayed
a paradise

for workers
and peasants.

The reality was
shortages and chaos.

Private farms were
forcibly collectivized,

and the states resources
poured into heavy industry

at the expense
of consumer goods.

Obediently, East Germany
copied the Soviet model

down to thought control
of its people.

[ Reporter speaking German ]

BRANAGH: East Germany,
its leaders claimed,

was succeeding
through sheer willpower.

But in spite of hard work
and enthusiasm,

only Soviet support
kept the economy going.

East Germany
could not compete

with the swelling prosperity
of the west.

MAN: The people in the
east looked toward the west

with, what I might say,
longing.

They would have liked
to have the same comforts,

the same goods,
the same chances.

And they saw

in what was called socialism
at the time

a system that demanded
of them sacrifices

with nothing but promises
for the future.

And as long as
the borders were open

it was relatively easy
to get there.

All you had to do
was board a subway

and you were
in another world.

And, uh, it was really
a crazy system.

Imagine, you go
from "socialism"

to capitalism
in two minutes.

BRANAGH:
Every month,

thousands
of East Germans fled

across the open Berlin border

and took refuge
in the West.

Most refugees were
young and skilled.

Their departure was bleeding
the East Germany economy

to death.

A foreman at a plant
in the East

wouldn't know
how many workers

he still would have
the next day

because part
of his working force

had left him --

had left the East,
had left the system

in order to go
over there.

And of course in West Germany
they made every effort

that people who came
from the East would get jobs

and would get comfortable
existence.

BRANAGH:
As his people drained away,

Ulbricht became anxious.

He urged Khrushchev
to recognize East Germany

as a sovereign state with
control over its own borders.

Khrushchev, outwardly
sympathetic, played for time.

[ Eberlein speaking German ]

The idea of a separate
peace treaty with the GDR

was put forward
mainly by Ulbricht,

who wanted to bind the GDR
into fixed treaties

and link it politically
with other countries.

But Khrushchev argued

that a separate peace treaty

would intensify
the Cold War.

BRANAGH: Ulbricht
argued that there could be

no lasting peace in Europe

until both German states,
East and West,

were recognized.

But Moscow was
in no hurry.

The German question
must wait

until after the American
Presidential election.

John F. Kennedy took office
in January 1961.

He had campaigned
for a more vigorous

American foreign policy.

I don't think the Communists
are about to collapse.

I believe we have
to build strength.

We have to stand for freedom.

We have to demonstrate some
vigor in our foreign policy.

BRANAGH: Kennedy agreed
to meet Khrushchev at Vienna,

in June 1961.

The President arrived
bruised.

His invasion
of Castro's Cuba

at the Bay of Pigs
six weeks before

had failed.

Khrushchev concluded
that Kennedy was weak.

He had decided
to bully the new President.

DOBRYNIN: He felt that
this young new President,

unexperienced,

and specifically after
he had the fiasco at Bay of Pigs

It was not really
a strong position.

He said, "Look here,
already so many years passed

Western countries
do nothing

about Germany
and the Peace Treaty

about specifically
West Berlin,

so I am going to press this
issue very strongly

in a meeting
with the new President.

What Khrushchev kept saying
was that, "We surround

all those troops you have
in West Berlin

and we could take them
any time we want to."

And Kennedy's reply
to him was

"Well, that may be,

but we fought
the second World War

and they're there because
of the second World War

by Fight.

He became very emotional,
very angry.

"This young fellow doesn't
wanna discuss with me

the issue
which is very important."

And this made him very angry.

And really influenced
his attitude.

So, it was mixture
of feeling about --

from one thing
he accept that he is tough

but from the other,
he is not wise enough.

He doesn't understand
quite well

the foreign policy.

BU N DY: The meeting
was unproductive.

And the longer it went on,

the more
that became apparent.

It was difficult,
it was disappointing.

It left us
with a Berlin crisis

that was still active

and oh which ho progress
had been made.

NARRATOR: At the summer white
house in Hyannis Port, Massachusetts

Defense Secretary McNamara
and Secretary of State Dean Rusk

confer with President Kennedy

on the increasingly ominous
words and actions from Moscow.

Premier Khrushchevs increase...

BRANAGH: Khrushchev
had renewed his ultimatum,

and increased the Soviet
arms budget.

Kennedy asked his advisors

to list America's military
options.

McNamara: It was conceivable that
there would only be two alternatives.

Surrender,
or use of nuclear force,

which might well
have brought destruction

of both East and West.

So, the President
was very anxious

to find a middle course.

BRANAGH:
In July,

Kennedy asked Congress
for extra defense funds

and called reservists
to arms.

The source of world trouble
and tension

is Moscow, not Berlin.

And if war begins,
it will have begun in Moscow

and not Berlin,

For the choice of peace or war
is largely theirs,

not ours.

Of all the Presidents

in this Cold War period,

I think the nuclear issue
bore hardest on Kennedy.

He took it
very seriously,

and he was sometimes afraid

that the good lord had
put him on earth

to start a nuclear war.

And he was not about
to get out of Berlin

no matter what it took.

It would be a mistake
for others to look upon Berlin

because of its location
as a tempting target.

The United States is there.

The United Kingdom
and France are there.

The Pledge of NATO is there.

And the people of Berlin
are there.

It is as secure in that sense
as the rest of us.

For we cannot separate its
safety from our own.

He made very clear

that he is going to defend
status of West Berlin

and the presence
of their troops there

but when he mention
this one,

we noticed one thing.

In his speech,
he mentioned a line

between West
and East Berlin,

a line of freedom.

And he didn't say anything

about the freedom
of movement

across this line --

East Berlin and West Berlin.

It is a fact that

we were not going to fight

about what the Soviets did
on their side of Berlin,

and that it is
quite likely

that Khrushchev was helped

to understand
that American position

by the July speech.

As the Berlin crisis darkened,

the flow of refugees
became a torrent.

Fear arose that East Germany
might collapse,

pitching NATO and Soviet forces
into conflict.

WOMAN: Everybody knew that
something is going to happen.

Not necessarily
only from the atmosphere,

but for weeks,

thousands and thousands
of people have come across

and everybody realized

that in some way
or another,

East Germany will have
to react.

BRANAGH: By July, the
East Germans were desperate.

They begged the Soviets
to let them stem the flow.

[ Man speaking Russian ]

INTERPRETER: Ulbricht
indicated to our ambassador

that they were fed up

with the promises
we'd given them

to sign a peace treaty
and take control.

Promises which
had been made ih 1958 [59

'60, and again
in 1961.

Ulbricht said that
all these promises did

was to stimulate
the population drain.

Either we had to act

or stop talking
about it.

BRANAGH: East German
border controls were intensified.

Undetected
by Western intelligence,

Khrushchev and Ulbricht
were planning harsher measures.

[man speaking German]

INTERPRETER: Sometime later,
a reply came back from Moscow.

That Nikita Sergeyevich
Khrushchev agrees

to the closing
of the border with West Germany

and with West Berlin,

and suggests the necessary
preparations

should be carried out.

[Speaking German ]

INTERPRETER:
The National People's Army,

the People's Police,
the custom's state security,

the transport authority,

were all brought together
in the Berlin area.

They were put
under strict observation

and they were not allowed
to telephone their families.

They didn't even have
a telephone.

For four to six weeks,

they worked
in total isolation

on the preparations.

BRANAGH:
On August 12,

Soviet and East German forces
were mobilized.

[ Bickel speaking German ]

At 23 hours
we were given our orders

and told that at 24 hours

the border with West Berlin
would be closed

by military force.

All the soldiers were
fully armed.

The People's Militia
had automatic pistols

and machine guns --

any weapons they can
get hold of.

BRANAGH:
By early morning,

East German troops
were ready.

Lined up in battle order
along the sector border.

It was Berlin's last hour
as one city.

On the morning of Sunday,
August 13,

Berliners woke to find
a divided city.

Teams of workers
under armed guard

started erecting
a barbed wire barrier

through the center.

DOBRYNIN: Khrushchev
preparing to this event

would have done everything
to minimize

or to prevent
any military conflict

between us
and the United States

and the Western countries.

Specifically, Ulbricht was
told by Khrushchev

two days before this was
happening

that he, Ulbricht,
would build this wall,

but he shouldn't infringe

even an inch
on American and Western rights.

So we expect for
a strong reaction,

but we didn't expect
any military clash between us.

BRANAGH:
The barrier split Berlin.

Families were torn apart.

HOSSEINI: My father
actually woke me up and said,

"Do you know
they closed the border?"

It was incomprehensible.

You know, it was so strange.

And then my mother
came in crying

and my older sister,

and we were thinking, you know,
how do we get my sister back.

My sister, that summer,
had stayed with my aunt

just outside
of East Berlin.

So we all took the S-bahn

and it was absolute chaos.

I mean it was terrible.

People crying, shouting.

Some were frightened,
some were angry.

And I just remember
I'm so frightened.

I thought we'll never
see my sister.

She's lost,
so to speak.

Pitiful old women
timidly walked

up the three stairs
and said,

"When is the next
train to West Berlin?"

Because these people
hadn't heard.

The first news
was at midnight

over the East Berlin radio.

And these people came
to the station thinking

they could go
to West Berlin.

And I'll never forget
the sneering tone

in which he said to her,

"None of that anymore,
grandma.

You're all sitting
in a mousetrap now."

[man speaking German]

INTERPRETER: The
people were swearing at us.

We thought we were
simply doing our duty.

But we were getting scolded
from all sides.

The West Berliners
yelled at us

and the Eastern demonstrators
yelled at us.

We were standing there
in the middle.

There was the barbed wire,
there were us guards,

West Berliners,
East Berliners.

For a young person,
it was terrible.

[ Man speaking German
on loudspeaker]

[crowd chanting
in German ]

BRANAGH: The anger of
West Berliners boiled over.

They demonstrated against
the division of their city.

[yelling in German]

They could not believe
that the Western allies

would allow the barriers
to remain.

The demonstrations continued,

but the West offered
little protest.

Mayor Willy Brandt tried
to calm the crowds.

He feared bloodshed
if they attacked the barriers.

The Allies were unsure
how to react.

Western rights had
not been challenged.

[Speaking German ]

INTERPRETER:
We were outraged

and also disappointed.

The mayor didn't manage

to persuade the Allied
commanders

to make even
a small protest.

People were not clear what
exactly was going on.

It was almost 12 hours
before it really registered

that this was going to be
a total sealing

of the inter-sector borders.

Nobody was quite sure
what to do about the subject.

What exactly
was the scope of it?

The focus
of all of the planners

had been on the threat --
the possible necessity

of having to take military
action

to block a Soviet move
on Berlin.

And here suddenly
everybody was relieved

to find out that
the Soviets had found a way

to resolve their problem
with the refugees

in a way that did not affect
Allied rights.

BRANAGH: For the
Allies, the closed border

stabilized
the tense Berlin situation.

It was ordinary Berliners
and their families

who paid the price.

In East Berlin,

one soldier saw
his last chance to escape.

[man speaking German]

INTERPRETER: At 2:00, I
assigned tasks to my soldiers.

I was in front,
and I spread the others out

so that it wouldn't look
suspicious.

Nobody noticed anything.

From 2:00 until 4:00

I was thinking
about the situation

and wondering what
was the right decision.

I would have to leave
my parents and my sister.

Finally, I took
the decision.

I jumped over
the barbed wire at 4:00.

Then I was in the West

and they received me
with a great cheer.

I was the first.

BRANAGH:
Three days later,

concrete blocks began
to replace the barbed wire.

Along the sector boundaries
rose the Berlin Wall,

carving the city
in two.

In West Berlin,
morale was low.

Confidence in Allied protection
crumbled.

Mayor Willy Brandt sent
an angry letter

to President Kennedy,

demanding action.

[ Bahr speaking German]

INTERPRETER:
The idea was,

since there had been
no reaction in Washington,

we had to make it
clear to the President

that there might be
a breakdown in morale...

a loss of trust.

Something more than
just a protest

had to be done.

I think it's probably
putting it mildly

to say he was furious.

He had -- Kennedy felt
that he had shown

that he was prepared
to go to the brink of war

maybe even over
the brink of war

to defend Berlin,
and here we was

being criticized
for doing nothing

by a --
as somebody put it --

a mere mayor.

BRANAGH: But Kennedy realized
that a gesture was needed --

a sign that America still meant
to defend West Berlin.

He ordered
a show of force.

An American troop convoy
was sent to Berlin

up the Autobahn
across East Germany.

The plan was
to test East German reaction.

And to reaffirm
Allied access rights to Berlin.

The Americans were stopped
and counted.

They waited.

And were let through.

The troops arrived
safely.

America's Vice President
Lyndon Johnson flew to the city

as Kennedy's personal
representative.

He was accompanied
by General Lucius Clay,

hero of the Berlin
airlift.

Johnson brought a message
from President Kennedy.

JOHNSON:
He wants you to know

that the pledge he has given

to the freedom
of West Berlin

and to the rights
of Western access to Berlin

is firm!

[ Applause ]

BRANAGH:
In the East, people risked death

to flee through the last
chinks in the barrier.

[woman speaking German ]

All of a sudden I saw
my friend running.

And I said to myself,
"Oh, my God,

you're not going to make it."

And I couldn't run.

I turned into
a pillar of salt.

An elderly woman
said to me,

"Go, girl.
Run, too.

You're still young.
Run!"

So I just started running.

My friend
had hurt her face,

but I'd only ripped
my sweater.

Apart from that,
I wasn't hurt.

We were incredibly happy.

We laughed
and cried.

We'd just made it.

BRANAGH: Many more made
an impulsive dive for freedom.

[woman speaking German ]

INTERPRETER: One
day he didn't return home.

I was waiting and waiting.

He didn't come
during the night

or the next day.

And I thought,
"What has happened?"

And then
my brother-in-law came.

"Don't you know?"
he said.

"He's in the West."

My whole world collapsed.

I had to collect
his things from work.

It was like collecting
the belongings of a dead person.

BRANAGH: Later, Heinz
Karstens helped his wife to escape.

Where the border ran down
the middle of the street,

windows overlooked the West.

Helping people escape
became a routine assignment

for West Berlin's
fire brigade.

[man speaking German]

INTERPRETER:
It became the custom

that people who
wanted to escape,

people who wanted
to leave

would throw little pieces
of paper out of the windows

into Bernauer Strasse --

the number of the building,
the floor, the window.

Second or third window
was written on it.

And a time --
for example, 10:00,

that they wanted to jump.

REPORTER: Here are perhaps
the most dramatic scenes

ever to come
out of Berlin.

Tossing belongings
from the window of an apartment

overlooking the western border
and freedom,

an escapee is prepared
to jump to safety

into a net held by police
and firemen of West Berlin.

Now here is a rescue episode
that is even more extraordinary.

An attempt is being made
by sympathetic Germans

to ensure the escape
of a brave woman.

While communist police try
to pull her back

through the window,

below there
is freedom's grip.

A blood-chilling sequence
that the News of the Day camera

follows to its dramatic
conclusion.

She's safe at last!

BRANAGH: The East Germans
blocked even this last loophole.

People swam lakes
and canals,

clung under trains,
hid in cars,

climbed barriers
under fire.

Hundreds failed.
Many died.

Despite the human suffering,

East Germany
justified the wall

as a bulwark of peace.

[Speaking German ]

INTERPRETER: When
the barbed wire was put up,

the main argument was
that peace had been saved.

It wasn't a question
of domestic difficulties.

Ulbricht drew a veil
of silence

over the economic
problems.

They talked always
of the anti-fascist barrier.

That's how it was
officially described --

the protective bulwark.

They did it
as a necessity.

And I thought,

"What kind of system
is it...

that can only exist

by keeping--

By keeping them
with force

in their own bailiwick.

And the wall
was the actual symbol

of a defeat,

of inferiority.

BRANAGH:
Escapes went on.

Killings went on.

Telephone lines
were out.

Now the two cities
could no longer talk.

At the few Allied
crossing points,

tension was high.

In October,
an American diplomat

was stopped
by East German guards

as he was crossing
to visit the theater

in East Berlin.

The Americans decided
to make an issue of it,

and assert their rights
to free movement in Berlin.

Lucius Clay was
back on the scene.

Clay's calculation was
the Soviets were responsible

for East Berlin,
not the East Germans.

And he was determined
that the Soviets would recognize

their responsibility there.

BRANAGH:
To test East German reaction,

Clay ordered armed
American soldiers

to escort vehicles
back and forth across the border

at Checkpoint Charlie.

He once told me,
he said,

"I learned early
in the game

of dealing
with the Russians

that the Russians understand
one thing,

and that's force,
that's strength.

You must never negotiate
or deal with the Russians

without having
a position of strength.

BRANAGH:
To underline his point,

Clay moved tanks
up to the checkpoint.

The Russians brought up
their tanks and guns.

The two sides
faced each other

barrel to barrel.

The telephone rang
in the command post.

They said, "Let me speak
to General Clay."

I said, "He's not here.
Who is this?"

He said, "This is
the military police officer

at Checkpoint Charlie."

He said, "Holy Christ,

the Russians have
rolled in here in force."

He said,
"They've got tanks."

He said, "The balloorfs
getting ready to go up.

He said, "The defecation
is about to hit the fan."

[speaking Russian ]

INTERPRETER:
The situation was dangerous.

The tanks stood
facing each other.

Our tanks crews were
told to exercise restraint...

to give no grounds
for provocation.

The dead seriousness of it

became more intense

with each hour.

The Western forces
went on alert.

Strategic air command
went on alert.

NATO went on alert.

Troops were being
cranked up around the world.

And one never knew

if the intensity
of the situation in Berlin

escalated,

where would be
the next sore point.

INTERPRETER: Khrushchev
ordered the commander

of Soviet troops in Germany

that if the West
used force,

they should respond
with force.

I had a phone by one ear
receiving information

from Soviet military headquarters
in Germany.

The other phone was
connected to the Kremlin.

As soon as I got
the information,

I reported to the Kremlin
what was happening

at Fredrichstrasse.

President Kennedy had
sent a message

to Khrushchev through
a new private channel

that had only been established
a month earlier

for a back channel

between the White House
and Khrushchev,

and President Kennedy had
asked Khrushchev

to take
the first move.

[speaking Russian ]

INTERPRETER:
The Americans sent a message.

It said, "In order for us
to move our tanks

without losing face,

you should move your tanks
back to a certain distance."

Our tanks stood 200 meters
from the Americans.

The lead Soviet tank
cranked up his engine

and backed up
some five or ten meters,

and we received instructions
to have the American tanks

to withdraw exactly
the same distance.

It wasn't a good enough reason
to start a war.

Khrushchev himself said,

"We're not unleashing
a third World War

because of Berlin."

The Americans
realized that, too.

BRANAGH:
The soldiers pulled back,

but the wall
remained.

The East Germans
built it higher

and backed it with fences,
trip wires,

and tank traps.

During the first year,

50 Germans died
trying to cross to the West.

One of them was
18-year-old Peter Fechtor.

MARGIT HOSSEINI:
The Americans gathered --

the soldiers gathered
on one side

not doing anything.

And on the other side,

the GDR,
the police there

were standing
on their side,

not doing anything.

And this young man
was huddled --

I remember he was lying
like an "S" shape.

And at first he screamed,
he cried,

he shouted for help.

And as the hours went on,

his voice got
weaker and weaker.

It was so heart rendering

that in the middle of nowhere

was a human being dying

and two groups were
facing each other,

too worried to act
because they didn't know

what the other one was
going to do.

It was --

it was...

It was
really horrible.

He was just standing there
and you thought,

"He's dying,"
and you can't do anything.

I mean, I've never been
in that situation before

neither after,

where you actually see
a person dying

and you can't do
anything.

And I am sure
everyone else around me

felt the same.

BRANAGH: The Wall
was the supreme symbol

of the Cold War's cruelty

and Europe's division.

Its message was
a bitter one.

Whatever happened
beyond that line,

the West might lament,

but would not
interfere.

The Wall was
a way out, really,

for Khrushchev.

And although
the Berlin affair

continued to be
discussed,

it was no longer
in a state of crisis

as it had been
before the war.

[band playing,
people cheering ]

BRANAGHI
In 1963,

President Kennedy visited
West Berlin.

Freedom is
indivisible.

And when one man
is enslaved,

all are not free.

When all are free,

then we can look forward
to that day

when this city
will be joined as one

and this country.

And this great continent
of Europe

in a peaceful
and hopeful glow.

When that day finally comes,
as it will,

the people of West Berlin
can take sober satisfaction

in the fact that they were
in the front lines

for almost two decades.

[ Applause ]

All free men

wherever they may live

are citizens
of Berlin.

And therefore,
as a free man,

I take pride
in the words

”/ch b/n e/n Berliner. ”

[cheers and applause]