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These are the user uploaded subtitles that are being translated: 1 00:00:01,620 --> 00:00:02,655 First Officer: Airfield in sight. 2 00:00:02,689 --> 00:00:04,551 Runway in sight. 3 00:00:04,586 --> 00:00:05,620 Narrator: Two pilots 4 00:00:05,655 --> 00:00:07,655 within a few feet of making a safe landing... 5 00:00:10,620 --> 00:00:12,793 crash short of the runway in Colombia. 6 00:00:19,448 --> 00:00:21,758 Woman: Our number-one priority was the passengers 7 00:00:21,793 --> 00:00:23,275 and getting everyone to safety. 8 00:00:28,413 --> 00:00:31,896 Brian Williams: A 737 broke apart upon hitting the ground. 9 00:00:31,931 --> 00:00:34,172 [Siren] 10 00:00:34,206 --> 00:00:37,413 Narrator: Investigators search for a possible cause 11 00:00:37,448 --> 00:00:40,310 but find no useful evidence. 12 00:00:40,344 --> 00:00:42,896 Investigator: and we still can't explain why. 13 00:00:42,931 --> 00:00:44,482 Narrator: It's not until they scrutinize 14 00:00:44,517 --> 00:00:46,620 the entire chain of events 15 00:00:46,655 --> 00:00:48,551 that they finally catch a break. 16 00:00:48,586 --> 00:00:49,620 Investigator: That's it. 17 00:00:49,655 --> 00:00:50,620 Investigator: What? 18 00:00:50,655 --> 00:00:51,724 First Officer: Climb, captain! 19 00:00:53,344 --> 00:00:54,689 Flight Attendant: ladies and gentlemen, 20 00:00:54,724 --> 00:00:55,793 we are starting our approach. 21 00:00:55,827 --> 00:00:57,241 Pilot: We lost both engines! 22 00:00:57,275 --> 00:00:58,413 Flight Attendant: Put the mask over your nose. 23 00:00:58,448 --> 00:00:59,448 Emergency Descent. 24 00:00:59,482 --> 00:01:00,344 Pilot: Mayday, mayday! 25 00:01:00,379 --> 00:01:02,379 Flight Attendant: Brace for impact! 26 00:01:02,413 --> 00:01:03,517 Controller: I think I lost one. 27 00:01:03,551 --> 00:01:05,931 Man:...Investigation starting into this tragedy... 28 00:01:05,965 --> 00:01:07,413 Man: He's gonna crash! 29 00:01:17,620 --> 00:01:20,758 Narrator: Just after midnight, Aires Flight 8250 30 00:01:20,793 --> 00:01:23,413 is carrying a planeload of tourists and locals 31 00:01:23,448 --> 00:01:24,689 from Bogota 32 00:01:24,724 --> 00:01:27,862 to the small Colombian island of San Andréés, 33 00:01:27,896 --> 00:01:30,724 an ocean playground in the Caribbean Sea. 34 00:01:30,758 --> 00:01:32,689 Camilo Pineros: So much for grabbing dinner on the ground. 35 00:01:32,724 --> 00:01:35,689 Wilson Gutierrez: Yeah, it's gonna be a late night. 36 00:01:35,724 --> 00:01:37,000 Narrator: Captain Wilson Gutierrez 37 00:01:37,034 --> 00:01:41,793 is a veteran pilot with almost 20 years of flying experience. 38 00:01:41,827 --> 00:01:44,724 Gutierrez: At least we're finally up in the air. 39 00:01:44,758 --> 00:01:46,482 Narrator: First Officer Camilo Pineros 40 00:01:46,517 --> 00:01:49,482 has flown for Aires for three years, 41 00:01:49,517 --> 00:01:52,758 With a full year on the airline's new Boeing 737. 42 00:01:56,551 --> 00:01:58,482 Pineros: It looks like there's some weather ahead of us. 43 00:02:00,448 --> 00:02:01,931 Gutierrez: Let's keep an eye on it. 44 00:02:05,758 --> 00:02:08,896 Narrator: There are signs of a thunderstorm in the distance. 45 00:02:12,896 --> 00:02:14,758 For the next hour and 30 minutes, 46 00:02:14,793 --> 00:02:17,034 the 737 will fly northwest 47 00:02:17,068 --> 00:02:18,310 to San Andréés 48 00:02:18,344 --> 00:02:19,482 at a cruising altitude 49 00:02:19,517 --> 00:02:21,206 of 36,000 feet. 50 00:02:23,724 --> 00:02:27,793 [Bottles Clinking] 51 00:02:27,827 --> 00:02:29,724 Passengers are restless 52 00:02:29,758 --> 00:02:32,965 after an unexpected four-hour delay getting off the ground. 53 00:02:35,793 --> 00:02:39,931 Flight Attendant: We should be landing just before 2 a.m. 54 00:02:39,965 --> 00:02:42,758 Narrator: Flight attendant Adriana Cardenas Medina 55 00:02:42,793 --> 00:02:45,793 is working hard to settle passengers, 56 00:02:45,827 --> 00:02:49,724 many heading to the small island for a holiday. 57 00:02:49,758 --> 00:02:52,413 [Speaking Spanish] 58 00:02:52,448 --> 00:02:54,310 Cardenas medina, Translated: The flight was running late 59 00:02:54,344 --> 00:02:55,931 because it was coming from Cali, 60 00:02:55,965 --> 00:02:58,413 and it was late due to poor weather. 61 00:02:58,448 --> 00:03:00,000 They said it was running two hours behind, 62 00:03:00,034 --> 00:03:02,758 but it actually ended up being twice that. 63 00:03:02,793 --> 00:03:07,275 [Speaking Spanish] 64 00:03:07,310 --> 00:03:10,310 Narrator: Just over 40 minutes into the flight, 65 00:03:10,344 --> 00:03:12,724 the captain sees the storm clouds ahead 66 00:03:12,758 --> 00:03:14,724 are building. 67 00:03:14,758 --> 00:03:16,758 John Cox: Airlines operate 24 hours a day, 68 00:03:16,793 --> 00:03:20,758 so pilots fly in all kinds of conditions, 69 00:03:20,793 --> 00:03:23,620 both daylight, dark, good weather, bad weather. 70 00:03:23,655 --> 00:03:25,000 As a professional pilot, you deal 71 00:03:25,034 --> 00:03:28,758 with these environmental challenges constantly. 72 00:03:28,793 --> 00:03:30,034 [Chime] 73 00:03:32,965 --> 00:03:34,931 Cardenas Medina: Prior to beginning our descent 74 00:03:34,965 --> 00:03:37,034 into San Andreés, 75 00:03:37,068 --> 00:03:39,379 we began to experience some light turbulence. 76 00:03:42,758 --> 00:03:44,379 Flight Attendant: ladies and gentlemen, 77 00:03:44,413 --> 00:03:46,931 please return to your seats and fasten your seatbelts. 78 00:03:52,586 --> 00:03:54,758 Cardenas Medina: It was raining. 79 00:03:54,793 --> 00:03:56,896 There was lightning, a lot of lightning, 80 00:03:56,931 --> 00:03:59,000 and the turbulence started to intensify. 81 00:04:07,862 --> 00:04:11,068 Narrator: Now past the halfway point of the trip, 82 00:04:11,103 --> 00:04:13,344 the captain is increasingly concerned 83 00:04:13,379 --> 00:04:15,034 with the possibility of heavy storms 84 00:04:15,068 --> 00:04:18,758 gathering over their destination. 85 00:04:18,793 --> 00:04:20,034 Gutierrez: It doesn't look like we're gonna get any relief 86 00:04:20,068 --> 00:04:21,758 from this storm. 87 00:04:21,793 --> 00:04:23,551 Pineros: Yeah, lots of activity tonight. 88 00:04:25,137 --> 00:04:27,517 Narrator: Closer to San Andréés, 89 00:04:27,551 --> 00:04:30,000 the already bumpy ride is getting worse and worse 90 00:04:30,034 --> 00:04:32,103 for the passengers. 91 00:04:32,137 --> 00:04:35,862 Cardenas Medina: Normally you go through a patch, 92 00:04:35,896 --> 00:04:37,517 and then it stops. 93 00:04:37,551 --> 00:04:38,551 In this instance, 94 00:04:38,586 --> 00:04:40,965 there was lightning bolt after lightning bolt, 95 00:04:41,000 --> 00:04:42,103 and the plane shook hard 96 00:04:42,137 --> 00:04:44,379 and the turbulence would not stop. 97 00:04:47,517 --> 00:04:50,068 [Thunder] 98 00:04:50,103 --> 00:04:51,379 Gutierrez: Check it out, Camilo. 99 00:04:51,413 --> 00:04:53,758 It's building all around the island. 100 00:04:53,793 --> 00:04:56,413 Will this bad weather be on San Andréés? 101 00:04:56,448 --> 00:04:58,931 Narrator: Less than 20 minutes away from the airport, 102 00:04:58,965 --> 00:05:02,758 the weather on the ground appears to be changing rapidly. 103 00:05:02,793 --> 00:05:04,965 Gutierrez: Get a report from San Andreés for me. 104 00:05:05,000 --> 00:05:06,137 Pineros: Okay, I'll ask. 105 00:05:08,172 --> 00:05:10,758 Narrator: The San Andreés air traffic controller 106 00:05:10,793 --> 00:05:14,137 is also keeping a close eye on changes to the weather. 107 00:05:14,172 --> 00:05:15,758 Pineros: San Andreés, good morning, 108 00:05:15,793 --> 00:05:17,482 Aires 8250. 109 00:05:17,517 --> 00:05:18,448 Controller: Go ahead. 110 00:05:18,482 --> 00:05:19,620 Pineros: We want to know how the weather is 111 00:05:19,655 --> 00:05:20,827 at the airport, please. 112 00:05:20,862 --> 00:05:22,862 Controller: Okay, Aires 8250, 113 00:05:22,896 --> 00:05:25,517 wind calm, visibility more than 10 kilometers, 114 00:05:25,551 --> 00:05:28,827 scattered clouds at 1,500 feet. 115 00:05:28,862 --> 00:05:30,586 There's some bad weather near the airfield, 116 00:05:30,620 --> 00:05:33,103 but right now there's no rain. 117 00:05:33,137 --> 00:05:35,758 Narrator: Despite the turbulent weather along the way, 118 00:05:35,793 --> 00:05:39,965 conditions in San Andreés seem to be much better. 119 00:05:40,000 --> 00:05:42,206 Controller: Aires 8250, descend 3,000 feet. 120 00:05:42,241 --> 00:05:45,758 Clear for approach, runway zero-six. 121 00:05:45,793 --> 00:05:47,965 Pineros: Roger, continue descending to 3,000. 122 00:05:50,517 --> 00:05:52,758 Narrator: In the cabin, 123 00:05:52,793 --> 00:05:56,206 passengers are growing concerned by the intensity of the storm. 124 00:06:00,620 --> 00:06:02,896 Flight Attendant: This shouldn't last long. 125 00:06:02,931 --> 00:06:08,517 [Thunder] 126 00:06:08,551 --> 00:06:10,758 Cardenas Medina: We told them 127 00:06:10,793 --> 00:06:13,137 that we were in an intense weather system 128 00:06:13,172 --> 00:06:15,793 and that we would be out of it shortly. 129 00:06:15,827 --> 00:06:18,724 But we never actually got out of it. 130 00:06:21,241 --> 00:06:28,586 [Thunder] 131 00:06:28,620 --> 00:06:29,965 Controller: Aires 8250, 132 00:06:30,000 --> 00:06:33,000 there is a thunderstorm over the airport right now. 133 00:06:33,034 --> 00:06:35,068 Pineros: Okay, Roger, thank you. 134 00:06:35,103 --> 00:06:36,482 Gutierrez: Gear down. 135 00:06:38,137 --> 00:06:39,862 Controller: Aires 8250, 136 00:06:39,896 --> 00:06:41,551 there is a little drizzle over the runway. 137 00:06:41,586 --> 00:06:42,586 Gutierrez: A little what? 138 00:06:42,620 --> 00:06:43,965 Pineros: Drizzle. 139 00:06:44,000 --> 00:06:47,068 Gutierrez: Ah. Okay. Give them the announcement. 140 00:06:47,103 --> 00:06:49,965 Pineros: Cabin crew to their stations for landing. 141 00:06:50,000 --> 00:06:51,655 Flight Attendant: Please raise your table. 142 00:06:54,827 --> 00:06:57,793 Narrator: As the storm continues to build, 143 00:06:57,827 --> 00:07:01,586 Aires 8250 is about to begin its final approach. 144 00:07:06,206 --> 00:07:07,689 Gutierrez: Okay, flaps 5. 145 00:07:11,586 --> 00:07:13,275 Pineros: Wet runway. Three on the auto-brake? 146 00:07:13,310 --> 00:07:16,689 Gutierrez: Let's leave it on two. 147 00:07:16,724 --> 00:07:20,931 Narrator: The crew configures the plane for landing. 148 00:07:20,965 --> 00:07:24,862 The weather in San Andréés is changing fast. 149 00:07:24,896 --> 00:07:25,965 Controller: Aires 8250, 150 00:07:26,000 --> 00:07:27,862 there is now heavy rain at the airfield, 151 00:07:27,896 --> 00:07:31,793 and visibility reduced to five kilometers. 152 00:07:31,827 --> 00:07:33,793 Pineros: Visibility down to five kilometers. 153 00:07:33,827 --> 00:07:35,103 Gutierrez: Oh, man. 154 00:07:35,137 --> 00:07:39,275 Cox: When you see particularly weather that's deteriorating, 155 00:07:39,310 --> 00:07:42,137 it causes you to be a little bit more cautious 156 00:07:42,172 --> 00:07:46,793 because the trend is not going in a positive direction. 157 00:07:46,827 --> 00:07:49,310 Cardenas Medina: The rain became even more intense, 158 00:07:49,344 --> 00:07:51,000 the turbulence more intense, 159 00:07:51,034 --> 00:07:53,344 and the thunder was more frequent. 160 00:07:53,379 --> 00:07:57,827 [Thunder] 161 00:07:57,862 --> 00:07:59,827 Narrator: In deteriorating conditions 162 00:07:59,862 --> 00:08:02,172 and just seven miles from landing, 163 00:08:02,206 --> 00:08:04,206 the captain confirms the procedure 164 00:08:04,241 --> 00:08:06,206 in the event they have to abort the landing 165 00:08:06,241 --> 00:08:07,827 at the last minute. 166 00:08:07,862 --> 00:08:08,827 Gutierrez: In case we miss the approach, 167 00:08:08,862 --> 00:08:10,103 we go right, correct? 168 00:08:12,655 --> 00:08:14,827 Pineros: Yes. Correct, sir. 169 00:08:14,862 --> 00:08:16,827 Cox: As you get closer to your destination 170 00:08:16,862 --> 00:08:19,827 and you start getting the latest weather, 171 00:08:19,862 --> 00:08:21,344 the thing that you're thinking about 172 00:08:21,379 --> 00:08:24,206 is, okay, how are we gonna position the airplane to land 173 00:08:24,241 --> 00:08:25,965 in these conditions? 174 00:08:26,000 --> 00:08:28,931 And if we don't land, what are we gonna do next? 175 00:08:30,793 --> 00:08:32,793 Narrator: Only minutes away from landing, 176 00:08:32,827 --> 00:08:35,827 the pilots run through their final checks. 177 00:08:35,862 --> 00:08:38,310 Gutierrez: Landing checklist. 178 00:08:38,344 --> 00:08:40,172 Pineros: Speed brakes? 179 00:08:40,206 --> 00:08:42,068 Gutierrez: Armed. 180 00:08:42,103 --> 00:08:43,206 Pineros: Landing gear? 181 00:08:43,241 --> 00:08:44,206 Gutierrez: Down. 182 00:08:44,241 --> 00:08:45,206 Pineros: Flaps? 183 00:08:45,241 --> 00:08:46,965 Gutierrez: 30. 184 00:08:47,000 --> 00:08:48,137 Pineros: Checklist complete. 185 00:08:50,206 --> 00:08:53,344 Cardenas Medina: We were about five minutes from landing. 186 00:08:53,379 --> 00:08:56,862 I started to see lights in the ocean from the island. 187 00:08:59,241 --> 00:09:02,310 Narrator: But less than 2 1/2 minutes from touchdown, 188 00:09:02,344 --> 00:09:05,965 visibility has reduced dramatically. 189 00:09:06,000 --> 00:09:09,758 Controller: Aires 8250, do you have the runway in sight? 190 00:09:09,793 --> 00:09:11,206 Gutierrez: Negative. Pineros: Not yet. 191 00:09:14,137 --> 00:09:17,103 Narrator: Seconds later... 192 00:09:17,137 --> 00:09:22,413 Pineros: Airfield in sight, runway in sight, Aires 8250. 193 00:09:22,448 --> 00:09:24,793 Narrator:...the clouds over San Andreés lift. 194 00:09:28,275 --> 00:09:30,379 [Thunder] 195 00:09:32,931 --> 00:09:34,275 Gutierrez: In sight landing. 196 00:09:34,310 --> 00:09:35,931 Pineros: Check. We're all set for landing. 197 00:09:35,965 --> 00:09:37,206 Computer: 500. 198 00:09:37,241 --> 00:09:39,034 Narrator: 500 feet from the ground, 199 00:09:39,068 --> 00:09:40,827 the crew spots the runway. 200 00:09:42,827 --> 00:09:44,931 The captain lines up his plane. 201 00:09:46,862 --> 00:09:51,413 Controller: Aires 8250, winds at 60 degrees at 15 knots. 202 00:09:51,448 --> 00:09:54,275 Narrator: Then the wind picks up. 203 00:09:54,310 --> 00:09:56,137 Gutierrez: 15 knots, head on. 204 00:09:59,931 --> 00:10:03,034 In case of wind shear, we use maximum thrust for a go-around. 205 00:10:03,068 --> 00:10:04,965 Don't touch flaps or gear. 206 00:10:05,000 --> 00:10:07,344 Pineros: Agreed. Yes, sir. 207 00:10:07,379 --> 00:10:09,724 Narrator: Caught in a sudden deluge, 208 00:10:09,758 --> 00:10:12,793 visibility decreases again. 209 00:10:12,827 --> 00:10:14,896 Computer: 50. 210 00:10:14,931 --> 00:10:16,068 Pineros: Look out, captain! 211 00:10:17,413 --> 00:10:19,896 Narrator: The first officer now realizes 212 00:10:19,931 --> 00:10:23,793 they are too low to make a safe landing. 213 00:10:23,827 --> 00:10:25,206 Computer: 40. 214 00:10:25,241 --> 00:10:26,862 Pineros: Can you make it? 215 00:10:26,896 --> 00:10:29,482 Computer: 30.20. 216 00:10:29,517 --> 00:10:30,482 Computer: Terrain. Terrain. 217 00:10:30,517 --> 00:10:32,068 Pineros: Climb, captain! 218 00:10:32,103 --> 00:10:35,137 Narrator: The captain pulls back on his control column. 219 00:10:37,172 --> 00:10:38,758 But it's too late. 220 00:10:41,517 --> 00:10:44,172 [Screaming] 221 00:10:44,206 --> 00:10:46,793 Cardenas Medina: We felt a hard and sudden crash. 222 00:10:46,827 --> 00:10:49,758 [Screaming] 223 00:10:53,344 --> 00:10:58,137 Narrator: At 1:47 a.m., Aires 8250 slams into the ground 224 00:10:58,172 --> 00:11:01,448 with 131 passengers and crew on board. 225 00:11:06,241 --> 00:11:08,344 Controller: There's been an accident. 226 00:11:11,241 --> 00:11:13,482 Narrator: Aires 8250 has crashed 227 00:11:13,517 --> 00:11:16,586 just short of touchdown in San Andréés 228 00:11:16,620 --> 00:11:19,379 and broken into three pieces. 229 00:11:19,413 --> 00:11:24,344 [People Crying And Coughing] 230 00:11:24,379 --> 00:11:26,896 Inside the front section of the airplane, 231 00:11:26,931 --> 00:11:29,482 flight attendant Adriana Cardenas Medina 232 00:11:29,517 --> 00:11:31,793 has survived the horrific crash. 233 00:11:34,620 --> 00:11:36,310 Flight Attendant: Are you okay? 234 00:11:51,000 --> 00:11:53,517 Narrator: Bruised and battered, passengers near the front 235 00:11:53,551 --> 00:11:56,206 start lining up toward the aircraft's main door 236 00:11:56,241 --> 00:11:58,000 and the emergency slide. 237 00:12:00,310 --> 00:12:02,551 But now a new problem. 238 00:12:02,586 --> 00:12:05,103 The main exit door is jammed. 239 00:12:09,206 --> 00:12:12,310 Cardenas Medina: My co-worker and I tried to open the door, 240 00:12:12,344 --> 00:12:13,586 but it would not open. 241 00:12:13,620 --> 00:12:15,862 A passenger helped us to open it. 242 00:12:23,310 --> 00:12:26,000 Narrator: The flight attendants work as quickly as possible 243 00:12:26,034 --> 00:12:30,586 to get all 125 passengers off the plane. 244 00:12:30,620 --> 00:12:33,241 Cardenas Medina: Our number-one priority was the passengers 245 00:12:33,275 --> 00:12:35,206 and getting everyone to safety, 246 00:12:35,241 --> 00:12:37,172 so we were all focused on that. 247 00:12:38,068 --> 00:12:42,137 [Sirens] 248 00:12:42,172 --> 00:12:44,275 Narrator: In the aftermath of the recovery, 249 00:12:44,310 --> 00:12:46,068 one passenger is dead 250 00:12:46,103 --> 00:12:50,275 after being hit in the chest by a tray table. 251 00:12:50,310 --> 00:12:53,655 A second passenger, who was severely injured on impact, 252 00:12:53,689 --> 00:12:56,000 dies in the hospital two weeks later. 253 00:12:59,034 --> 00:13:02,103 [Speaking Spanish] 254 00:13:02,137 --> 00:13:04,586 Cardenas Medina: When you think of boarding an aircraft, 255 00:13:04,620 --> 00:13:08,482 you imagine leaving it in the same manner, 256 00:13:08,517 --> 00:13:13,517 not forcibly or in pain, fear, frustration. 257 00:13:13,551 --> 00:13:16,620 It's something you can never imagine happening. 258 00:13:20,137 --> 00:13:23,482 Narrator: The crash and destruction of flight 8250 259 00:13:23,517 --> 00:13:28,586 is quickly becoming a major international news story. 260 00:13:28,620 --> 00:13:31,413 Williams: A plane crashed this morning in Colombia. 261 00:13:31,448 --> 00:13:35,310 The 737 broke apart upon hitting the ground. 262 00:13:38,655 --> 00:13:40,482 Narrator: The Colombian Aeronautical Authority 263 00:13:40,517 --> 00:13:43,172 needs to find out what brought down 264 00:13:43,206 --> 00:13:46,034 one of the most widely used passenger planes on Earth. 265 00:13:49,206 --> 00:13:50,586 Julian Echeverri 266 00:13:50,620 --> 00:13:53,137 is one of the first investigators on the scene. 267 00:13:55,103 --> 00:13:56,724 Julian Echeverri: Huh. 268 00:13:56,758 --> 00:13:58,551 Broken into three pieces. 269 00:14:04,137 --> 00:14:08,068 He was definitely lined up for a landing. 270 00:14:08,103 --> 00:14:10,241 Narrator: From the orientation of the wreckage, 271 00:14:10,275 --> 00:14:13,413 investigators can tell that Flight 8250 272 00:14:13,448 --> 00:14:16,344 was lined up perfectly with the runway at San Andréés. 273 00:14:18,241 --> 00:14:22,275 [Speaking Spanish] 274 00:14:22,310 --> 00:14:25,034 Echeverri, Translated: When we first looked at the debris, 275 00:14:25,068 --> 00:14:26,724 we observed that the initial impact 276 00:14:26,758 --> 00:14:32,206 was approximately 40 meters from the start of Runway Zero-Six. 277 00:14:32,241 --> 00:14:36,137 It was a low-angle impact at a relatively high speed. 278 00:14:40,206 --> 00:14:41,482 Narrator: Very quickly, 279 00:14:41,517 --> 00:14:46,034 both the flight data and cockpit voice recorders are recovered. 280 00:14:46,068 --> 00:14:47,758 Echeverri: Excellent work. 281 00:14:47,793 --> 00:14:51,034 Let's hope they provide some answers. 282 00:14:51,068 --> 00:14:53,448 Narrator: But until the recordings can be analyzed, 283 00:14:53,482 --> 00:14:55,137 investigators will need to rely 284 00:14:55,172 --> 00:14:56,655 on the wreckage at the crash site 285 00:14:56,689 --> 00:14:59,137 to explain the cause of the accident. 286 00:15:02,551 --> 00:15:04,482 The team studies the debris trail 287 00:15:04,517 --> 00:15:08,344 that extends 160 feet from the runway's threshold. 288 00:15:08,379 --> 00:15:10,275 Echeverri: Landing gear extended. 289 00:15:12,655 --> 00:15:14,344 It snapped off. 290 00:15:17,862 --> 00:15:20,275 Lined up and configured, 291 00:15:20,310 --> 00:15:23,241 but somehow they hit the ground hard, 292 00:15:23,275 --> 00:15:24,758 meters from the runway. 293 00:15:28,586 --> 00:15:30,620 Investigators can't understand 294 00:15:30,655 --> 00:15:32,793 why the jet got so close to the runway 295 00:15:32,827 --> 00:15:34,689 but ended up short. 296 00:15:37,517 --> 00:15:40,758 While wreckage crews transport the debris to a nearby facility 297 00:15:40,793 --> 00:15:43,275 for analysis, 298 00:15:43,310 --> 00:15:46,241 investigators wonder what role the severe weather played 299 00:15:46,275 --> 00:15:47,586 in the accident. 300 00:15:51,586 --> 00:15:53,793 Echeverri: What if the storm brought them down? 301 00:16:02,206 --> 00:16:05,137 Narrator: The team studies meteorological reports 302 00:16:05,172 --> 00:16:06,586 from the night of the crash. 303 00:16:11,137 --> 00:16:14,103 Echeverri: The meteorological condition during the accident 304 00:16:14,137 --> 00:16:15,517 was one of the things we considered 305 00:16:15,551 --> 00:16:17,793 in this investigation. 306 00:16:20,827 --> 00:16:22,724 Man: Based on the first information 307 00:16:22,758 --> 00:16:24,103 that we received... 308 00:16:24,137 --> 00:16:25,310 Echeverri: Turn that up, would you? 309 00:16:29,137 --> 00:16:31,551 Man:...a lightning bolt struck the airplane 310 00:16:31,586 --> 00:16:35,310 and caused the tragedy that we're all aware of. 311 00:16:35,344 --> 00:16:37,931 Echeverri: They're saying it's lightning? 312 00:16:37,965 --> 00:16:40,620 We'll see. 313 00:16:40,655 --> 00:16:42,551 Narrator: Echeverri and his team 314 00:16:42,586 --> 00:16:44,517 know that accidents caused by lightning 315 00:16:44,551 --> 00:16:46,413 are virtually unheard of. 316 00:16:46,448 --> 00:16:48,310 Cox: Lightning strikes, 317 00:16:48,344 --> 00:16:51,241 although they're very spectacular 318 00:16:51,275 --> 00:16:54,620 and can visually impair you just with that bright flash, 319 00:16:54,655 --> 00:16:57,241 they really don't pose a great threat 320 00:16:57,275 --> 00:17:00,379 to the airplane during landing. 321 00:17:00,413 --> 00:17:02,172 Narrator: Investigators need to know 322 00:17:02,206 --> 00:17:04,482 if there was lightning near the 737 323 00:17:04,517 --> 00:17:06,482 as it approached San Andréés. 324 00:17:08,344 --> 00:17:10,137 Echeverri: There was video evidence 325 00:17:10,172 --> 00:17:11,931 from a closed-circuit television camera 326 00:17:11,965 --> 00:17:14,862 which recorded the final moments prior to the accident. 327 00:17:18,482 --> 00:17:20,448 It sure looks like lightning. 328 00:17:22,689 --> 00:17:24,482 And the timing fits. 329 00:17:27,793 --> 00:17:29,689 There was a big flash in the video, 330 00:17:29,724 --> 00:17:31,482 which led us to think that the aircraft 331 00:17:31,517 --> 00:17:33,758 could have been struck by lightning. 332 00:17:38,379 --> 00:17:40,310 Narrator: The team studies the static wicks 333 00:17:40,344 --> 00:17:43,379 from the accident plane. 334 00:17:43,413 --> 00:17:44,827 Static wicks are located 335 00:17:44,862 --> 00:17:47,310 on the trailing edges of airplane wings 336 00:17:47,344 --> 00:17:51,206 and help discharge any build-up of static energy. 337 00:17:51,241 --> 00:17:53,827 Echeverri: If the plane was struck by lightning, 338 00:17:53,862 --> 00:17:57,000 they should be melted or burned. 339 00:17:57,034 --> 00:17:58,931 Narrator: But they are not. 340 00:17:58,965 --> 00:18:02,448 Investigators can find no signs of a direct lightning hit 341 00:18:02,482 --> 00:18:04,965 On the aircraft's surfaces. 342 00:18:05,000 --> 00:18:07,689 Echeverri: During the inspection of the debris, 343 00:18:07,724 --> 00:18:09,620 which was carefully performed, 344 00:18:09,655 --> 00:18:12,586 we found no traces of interaction with lightning. 345 00:18:14,689 --> 00:18:17,241 They're clean. 346 00:18:17,275 --> 00:18:18,137 Narrator: But Echeverri 347 00:18:18,172 --> 00:18:20,620 still has a lot of unanswered questions 348 00:18:20,655 --> 00:18:22,689 about the weather at the time of the accident. 349 00:18:25,310 --> 00:18:26,965 Echeverri: It looks like it was a big storm. 350 00:18:28,068 --> 00:18:31,344 [Speaking Spanish] 351 00:18:31,379 --> 00:18:33,241 The conditions in which the aircraft 352 00:18:33,275 --> 00:18:34,896 interacted with the terrain 353 00:18:34,931 --> 00:18:37,827 before arriving at runway zero-six 354 00:18:37,862 --> 00:18:40,620 raised the possibility of an encounter with wind shear 355 00:18:40,655 --> 00:18:42,586 in that last minute. 356 00:18:45,034 --> 00:18:47,448 Narrator: Wind shear is a phenomenon 357 00:18:47,482 --> 00:18:49,551 in which the wind's direction or speed 358 00:18:49,586 --> 00:18:54,034 changes extremely abruptly. 359 00:18:54,068 --> 00:18:59,689 Echeverri: 60-degree winds at 15 knots. 360 00:18:59,724 --> 00:19:01,413 The wind was picking up. 361 00:19:01,448 --> 00:19:04,413 Narrator: Could intense winds at the base of the runway 362 00:19:04,448 --> 00:19:06,413 have played a role in the crash? 363 00:19:08,379 --> 00:19:10,310 Echeverri: We need to look at wind shear. 364 00:19:12,068 --> 00:19:13,000 Narrator: The team learns 365 00:19:13,034 --> 00:19:14,793 that just two minutes before the crash, 366 00:19:14,827 --> 00:19:16,620 as the storm built, 367 00:19:16,655 --> 00:19:19,000 winds near the runway were gusting. 368 00:19:21,586 --> 00:19:24,448 Digging further into the flight data... 369 00:19:24,482 --> 00:19:29,310 Echeverri: So, lots of headwind. 370 00:19:32,620 --> 00:19:35,344 But almost no downdraft. 371 00:19:35,379 --> 00:19:36,896 Narrator: Investigator Julian Echeverri 372 00:19:36,931 --> 00:19:40,758 discovers the powerful winds were hitting the plane head on, 373 00:19:40,793 --> 00:19:42,000 not from above. 374 00:19:44,655 --> 00:19:47,758 Echeverri: Not enough to slam them to the ground. 375 00:19:47,793 --> 00:19:51,413 [Speaking Spanish] 376 00:19:51,448 --> 00:19:52,965 During the landing, 377 00:19:53,000 --> 00:19:55,551 there was an increase in wind speed, 378 00:19:55,586 --> 00:19:58,620 but in this case, it was a horizontal increase. 379 00:19:58,655 --> 00:20:00,793 There was no trace in the flight data 380 00:20:00,827 --> 00:20:02,586 of a vertical change of wind 381 00:20:02,620 --> 00:20:05,689 That would have caused the aircraft to lose altitude. 382 00:20:12,758 --> 00:20:14,793 Narrator: All investigators uncover 383 00:20:14,827 --> 00:20:18,413 is a moderate headwind at the time of the crash... 384 00:20:18,448 --> 00:20:21,793 a discovery that leads nowhere. 385 00:20:21,827 --> 00:20:24,344 Echeverri: So, we'll rule out weather for now. 386 00:20:25,586 --> 00:20:30,103 [Speaking Spanish] 387 00:20:30,137 --> 00:20:32,517 The fact that it was not wind shear 388 00:20:32,551 --> 00:20:34,551 made us focus on operational aspects 389 00:20:34,586 --> 00:20:37,482 that may have led to this accident. 390 00:20:45,827 --> 00:20:47,655 What about the aircraft itself? 391 00:20:49,448 --> 00:20:53,620 [Thunder] 392 00:20:57,827 --> 00:20:59,758 Narrator: Investigators now wonder 393 00:20:59,793 --> 00:21:05,000 if an engine malfunction led to the crash of Aires flight 8250. 394 00:21:05,034 --> 00:21:05,965 Echeverri: The blades are bent 395 00:21:06,000 --> 00:21:08,931 in the opposite direction of the rotation. 396 00:21:08,965 --> 00:21:11,413 Narrator: That tells investigator Julian Echeverri 397 00:21:11,448 --> 00:21:13,862 that the engines were working when they hit the ground. 398 00:21:15,172 --> 00:21:17,034 Echeverri: Let's move on. 399 00:21:20,137 --> 00:21:22,034 Narrator: Measurements of the flap settings 400 00:21:22,068 --> 00:21:24,620 show they were in the correct position for landing. 401 00:21:27,172 --> 00:21:28,793 Gutierrez: Okay, flaps 5. 402 00:21:32,862 --> 00:21:34,758 Pineros: Wet runway. Three on the auto-brake? 403 00:21:34,793 --> 00:21:36,103 Gutierrez: Let's leave it on 2. 404 00:21:39,482 --> 00:21:43,655 Echeverri: Flaps right where they should be. 405 00:21:43,689 --> 00:21:44,896 Narrator: In fact, 406 00:21:44,931 --> 00:21:47,551 investigators find nothing to indicate a mechanical cause 407 00:21:47,586 --> 00:21:50,068 for the crash of Aires 8250. 408 00:21:53,689 --> 00:21:56,620 [Speaking Spanish] 409 00:21:56,655 --> 00:21:59,724 Echeverri: We observed the flight control surfaces. 410 00:21:59,758 --> 00:22:01,827 We observed the flap configuration, 411 00:22:01,862 --> 00:22:04,034 the cockpit switches. 412 00:22:04,068 --> 00:22:07,655 Engines, rudder, control surfaces, 413 00:22:07,689 --> 00:22:09,655 you name it... they all check out. 414 00:22:13,275 --> 00:22:16,482 There weren't any system malfunctions 415 00:22:16,517 --> 00:22:18,586 or engine or GPS problems 416 00:22:18,620 --> 00:22:20,103 that would have caused the aircraft to land 417 00:22:20,137 --> 00:22:22,517 before the start of the runway. 418 00:22:26,137 --> 00:22:28,241 Narrator: Lieutenant Colonel Ever Sabogal 419 00:22:28,275 --> 00:22:32,862 from the Colombian Air Force joins the investigative team. 420 00:22:32,896 --> 00:22:34,655 [Speaking Spanish] 421 00:22:34,689 --> 00:22:36,551 Ever sabogal, Translated: The conditions that they had, 422 00:22:36,586 --> 00:22:39,000 conditions of extremely bad weather, 423 00:22:39,034 --> 00:22:41,206 a particularly dark night... 424 00:22:41,241 --> 00:22:43,172 They had a lot of lightning all around them, 425 00:22:43,206 --> 00:22:46,724 and they were feeling pressure to land. 426 00:22:46,758 --> 00:22:50,103 Were they prepared to land in these stormy conditions? 427 00:22:50,137 --> 00:22:52,620 Narrator: Investigators now need to find out 428 00:22:52,655 --> 00:22:55,241 if the storm took the pilots by surprise. 429 00:22:55,275 --> 00:22:56,482 If it did, 430 00:22:56,517 --> 00:22:59,586 that might have led them to make errors in their approach. 431 00:23:01,827 --> 00:23:05,758 [Thunder] 432 00:23:05,793 --> 00:23:07,551 Cox: The critical part is, 433 00:23:07,586 --> 00:23:10,034 what's the weather gonna be when we get there? 434 00:23:10,068 --> 00:23:12,689 It's less critical of what it is right now. 435 00:23:12,724 --> 00:23:15,034 So as you get very close to the airport, 436 00:23:15,068 --> 00:23:16,965 that's when you want to make sure 437 00:23:17,000 --> 00:23:18,000 that you have a good understanding 438 00:23:18,034 --> 00:23:21,206 of the weather that you're about to deal with 439 00:23:21,241 --> 00:23:23,862 in the final approach segment of the flight. 440 00:23:23,896 --> 00:23:27,068 Echeverri: Can I show you this? 441 00:23:27,103 --> 00:23:28,241 Narrator: The team already knows 442 00:23:28,275 --> 00:23:33,000 the weather was changing quickly just before the crash. 443 00:23:33,034 --> 00:23:34,758 But they need to determine 444 00:23:34,793 --> 00:23:38,034 if the air traffic controller kept them up to date. 445 00:23:38,068 --> 00:23:39,068 Controller: I updated them regularly 446 00:23:39,103 --> 00:23:42,137 once they were in my airspace. 447 00:23:42,172 --> 00:23:45,275 Pineros: San Andreés, good morning, Aires 8250. 448 00:23:45,310 --> 00:23:46,241 Controller: Go ahead. 449 00:23:46,275 --> 00:23:47,758 Pineros: We want to know how the weather is 450 00:23:47,793 --> 00:23:48,758 at the airport, please. 451 00:23:48,793 --> 00:23:50,827 Controller: Okay, Aires 8250, 452 00:23:50,862 --> 00:23:53,344 wind calm, visibility more than 10 kilometers, 453 00:23:53,379 --> 00:23:56,931 scattered clouds at 1,500 feet. 454 00:23:56,965 --> 00:23:58,586 There's some bad weather near the airfield, 455 00:23:58,620 --> 00:24:01,034 but right now there's no rain. 456 00:24:01,068 --> 00:24:04,931 Every time the weather changed even a bit, I told them. 457 00:24:04,965 --> 00:24:07,620 Gutierrez: Gear down. 458 00:24:07,655 --> 00:24:09,827 Controller: Aires 8250, 459 00:24:09,862 --> 00:24:11,172 there is a little drizzle over the runway. 460 00:24:11,206 --> 00:24:12,241 Gutierrez: A little what? 461 00:24:12,275 --> 00:24:13,965 Pineros: Drizzle. Gutierrez: Ah. 462 00:24:14,000 --> 00:24:15,068 Narrator: Minutes later, 463 00:24:15,103 --> 00:24:18,241 it turned into a full-blown storm. 464 00:24:18,275 --> 00:24:21,103 Controller: Aires 8250, there is now heavy rain at the airfield, 465 00:24:21,137 --> 00:24:24,275 and visibility reduced to five kilometers. 466 00:24:24,310 --> 00:24:27,068 Echeverri: Did they seem concerned about the weather? 467 00:24:27,103 --> 00:24:30,344 Controller: No, they didn't sound overly concerned. 468 00:24:30,379 --> 00:24:33,965 I was very careful to tell them everything. 469 00:24:34,000 --> 00:24:36,068 Cox: The controllers are very good 470 00:24:36,103 --> 00:24:39,724 about reading up changing weather conditions, 471 00:24:39,758 --> 00:24:41,827 particularly wind and visibility, 472 00:24:41,862 --> 00:24:43,137 which is the two most critical factors 473 00:24:43,172 --> 00:24:45,758 as they get very close to the airport, 474 00:24:45,793 --> 00:24:47,862 but the decision to land or not to land 475 00:24:47,896 --> 00:24:49,896 rests with the captain, 476 00:24:49,931 --> 00:24:54,034 and he or she is responsible to make the decision 477 00:24:54,068 --> 00:24:56,827 whether the conditions are safe to land or not. 478 00:24:56,862 --> 00:24:59,862 Controller: Aires 8250, do you have the runway in sight? 479 00:24:59,896 --> 00:25:01,379 Gutierrez: Negative. 480 00:25:01,413 --> 00:25:02,965 Pineros: Not yet. 481 00:25:09,068 --> 00:25:13,344 Airfield in sight, runway in sight, Aires 8250. 482 00:25:17,000 --> 00:25:18,724 Cox: And this is appropriate 483 00:25:18,758 --> 00:25:20,758 because it's really only the pilots 484 00:25:20,793 --> 00:25:23,758 that can see the exact conditions 485 00:25:23,793 --> 00:25:25,689 that the airplane is in 486 00:25:25,724 --> 00:25:28,827 and the visibility they have to be able to see the runway 487 00:25:28,862 --> 00:25:30,310 and land safely on it. 488 00:25:34,034 --> 00:25:35,689 Pineros: Look out, captain! 489 00:25:41,310 --> 00:25:43,689 Narrator: Investigators now have the flight data 490 00:25:43,724 --> 00:25:48,034 from Aires flight 8250. 491 00:25:48,068 --> 00:25:50,448 Cox: The digital flight data recorder 492 00:25:50,482 --> 00:25:54,758 records hundreds or thousands of different parameters, 493 00:25:54,793 --> 00:25:58,103 and it tells you everything that the airplane's doing, 494 00:25:58,137 --> 00:25:59,827 whether the landing gear is up or down, 495 00:25:59,862 --> 00:26:01,896 the altitude, airspeed, 496 00:26:01,931 --> 00:26:06,413 and numerous other functions of the systems within the airplane. 497 00:26:06,448 --> 00:26:08,241 Narrator: The team is looking for clues 498 00:26:08,275 --> 00:26:11,068 that might indicate how the pilots handled the plane 499 00:26:11,103 --> 00:26:13,310 in the thunderstorm. 500 00:26:13,344 --> 00:26:17,344 Sabogal: Here. 45 minutes before reaching the airport, 501 00:26:17,379 --> 00:26:19,206 They switched to vertical speed mode. 502 00:26:19,241 --> 00:26:21,862 Echeverri: That's a questionable choice. 503 00:26:21,896 --> 00:26:23,310 Narrator: The investigators notice 504 00:26:23,344 --> 00:26:26,034 that the pilots selected an autopilot mode 505 00:26:26,068 --> 00:26:27,758 called vertical speed. 506 00:26:29,862 --> 00:26:32,517 Controller: Aires 8250, descend 3,000 feet, 507 00:26:32,551 --> 00:26:35,034 Clear for approach, runway zero-six. 508 00:26:35,068 --> 00:26:36,862 Narrator: In vertical speed mode, 509 00:26:36,896 --> 00:26:40,000 the crew must manually select their rate of descent. 510 00:26:42,413 --> 00:26:45,103 Sabogal: This mode requires a lot of work 511 00:26:45,137 --> 00:26:47,000 because you have to be constantly calculating 512 00:26:47,034 --> 00:26:51,000 your altitude versus your distance. 513 00:26:51,034 --> 00:26:52,862 Cox: The Boeing procedures 514 00:26:52,896 --> 00:26:55,137 are typically to utilize automation, 515 00:26:55,172 --> 00:26:58,275 use the autopilot during approaches, 516 00:26:58,310 --> 00:27:00,448 particularly in bad weather. 517 00:27:00,482 --> 00:27:04,413 For these pilots to have reverted to a manual system 518 00:27:04,448 --> 00:27:06,862 where they turn the autopilot off 519 00:27:06,896 --> 00:27:13,034 is against the Boeing recommendation. 520 00:27:13,068 --> 00:27:17,551 Narrator: Investigators check the plane's rate of descent. 521 00:27:17,586 --> 00:27:19,034 Sabogal: Look at this. 522 00:27:19,068 --> 00:27:20,034 They were descending to the runway 523 00:27:20,068 --> 00:27:23,241 at 1,100 feet per minute. 524 00:27:23,275 --> 00:27:26,137 Echeverri: According to the manufacturer, 525 00:27:26,172 --> 00:27:32,137 rate of descent shouldn't exceed 900 feet per minute. 526 00:27:32,172 --> 00:27:35,275 Narrator: It's an important clue. 527 00:27:35,310 --> 00:27:38,896 Cox: If they are in excess of a thousand feet per minute, 528 00:27:38,931 --> 00:27:42,172 then it is unstable approach. 529 00:27:42,206 --> 00:27:43,965 Narrator: The team now has determined 530 00:27:44,000 --> 00:27:46,448 the plane was dropping too fast, 531 00:27:46,482 --> 00:27:50,000 and they have a theory as to why. 532 00:27:50,034 --> 00:27:51,379 Sabogal: They must have been trying to get 533 00:27:51,413 --> 00:27:55,172 a visual fix of the runway as soon as possible. 534 00:27:55,206 --> 00:27:57,448 Cox: By bringing the airplane down early, 535 00:27:57,482 --> 00:28:00,137 the hope is that you'll see the runway earlier. 536 00:28:00,172 --> 00:28:02,000 You'll be underneath the clouds, 537 00:28:02,034 --> 00:28:04,103 and your visibility will be improved 538 00:28:04,137 --> 00:28:07,896 the lower you get. 539 00:28:07,931 --> 00:28:09,448 Narrator: But that strategy didn't work 540 00:28:09,482 --> 00:28:12,448 for the crew of the Aires flight. 541 00:28:12,482 --> 00:28:16,034 The question is why not? 542 00:28:16,068 --> 00:28:18,965 The investigators can now compare the approach 543 00:28:19,000 --> 00:28:20,137 the crew should have flown 544 00:28:20,172 --> 00:28:24,241 to the one they actually did fly. 545 00:28:24,275 --> 00:28:28,275 Sabogal: They should have stayed on the glide path. 546 00:28:28,310 --> 00:28:29,413 Echeverri: But instead, 547 00:28:29,448 --> 00:28:32,103 they come in too low the entire way. 548 00:28:32,137 --> 00:28:33,413 Sabogal: And they didn't even try 549 00:28:33,448 --> 00:28:36,482 to get back on the glide path. 550 00:28:36,517 --> 00:28:38,655 He played instead the entire time 551 00:28:38,689 --> 00:28:40,586 with the vertical speed. 552 00:28:40,620 --> 00:28:43,344 They didn't have an angle or a constant path, 553 00:28:43,379 --> 00:28:46,413 and that made it so that they were always below it. 554 00:28:46,448 --> 00:28:47,620 They were never on the right path 555 00:28:47,655 --> 00:28:50,000 for the type of approach that they made. 556 00:28:53,448 --> 00:28:56,931 Didn't they know they were coming in too low? 557 00:28:56,965 --> 00:28:59,000 Echeverri: Wouldn't the PAPI lights have told them that? 558 00:29:01,068 --> 00:29:01,931 Narrator: PAPI lights, 559 00:29:01,965 --> 00:29:04,517 or precision approach path indicators, 560 00:29:04,551 --> 00:29:07,620 are color-coded lights along the side of the runway 561 00:29:07,655 --> 00:29:10,137 That tell pilots if they're too high or too low 562 00:29:10,172 --> 00:29:13,965 on their approach. 563 00:29:14,000 --> 00:29:17,620 The airport's PAPI lights were fully operational that night, 564 00:29:17,655 --> 00:29:20,482 yet the plane still came in low. 565 00:29:20,517 --> 00:29:24,034 [Speaking Spanish] 566 00:29:24,068 --> 00:29:27,034 Echeverri: Why would a person operating an aircraft 567 00:29:27,068 --> 00:29:29,172 make that type of approach 568 00:29:29,206 --> 00:29:31,586 even when the visual aids are indicating 569 00:29:31,620 --> 00:29:34,034 the correct path to the runway? 570 00:29:38,758 --> 00:29:41,379 Narrator: The team hopes the cockpit voice recorder 571 00:29:41,413 --> 00:29:45,206 can provide answers to all their unanswered questions. 572 00:29:45,241 --> 00:29:48,000 They focus on the final approach. 573 00:29:48,034 --> 00:29:50,206 Gutierrez: Landing checklist. 574 00:29:50,241 --> 00:29:52,034 Pineros: Speed brakes. 575 00:29:52,068 --> 00:29:53,103 Gutierrez: Armed. 576 00:29:53,137 --> 00:29:54,586 Pineros: Landing gear. Gutierrez: Down. 577 00:29:54,620 --> 00:29:58,000 Pineros: Flaps. Gutierrez: 30. 578 00:29:58,034 --> 00:29:59,379 Pineros: Checklist complete. 579 00:29:59,413 --> 00:30:01,482 Gutierrez: We're too low. 580 00:30:01,517 --> 00:30:05,034 Controller: Aires 8250, do you have the runway in sight? 581 00:30:05,068 --> 00:30:07,689 Gutierrez: Negative. 582 00:30:07,724 --> 00:30:09,379 Pineros: Not yet. 583 00:30:16,586 --> 00:30:20,034 Airway in sight, runway in sight, Aires 8250. 584 00:30:20,068 --> 00:30:21,310 Gutierrez: In sight landing. 585 00:30:21,344 --> 00:30:23,068 Pineros: Check. We're all set for landing. 586 00:30:23,103 --> 00:30:24,310 Sabogal: Stop. 587 00:30:24,344 --> 00:30:26,413 Did you catch that? 588 00:30:26,448 --> 00:30:29,000 Go back 30 seconds. 589 00:30:29,034 --> 00:30:31,034 Pineros: Checklist complete. 590 00:30:31,068 --> 00:30:33,034 Gutierrez: We're too low. 591 00:30:33,068 --> 00:30:36,517 Controller: Aires 8250, do you have the runway in sight? 592 00:30:36,551 --> 00:30:38,482 Sabogal: Stop. 593 00:30:38,517 --> 00:30:41,448 The captain realizes they're below the glide path. 594 00:30:41,482 --> 00:30:42,758 But there's no discussion about it, 595 00:30:42,793 --> 00:30:45,379 no go-around. 596 00:30:45,413 --> 00:30:48,517 Echeverri: They just keep going. 597 00:30:48,551 --> 00:30:49,724 Sabogal: Why? 598 00:30:51,206 --> 00:30:52,551 Continue. 599 00:30:54,068 --> 00:30:55,724 On the final approach, 600 00:30:55,758 --> 00:30:57,586 the captain simply continues to fly, 601 00:30:57,620 --> 00:31:01,310 Focused on trying to reach the runway. 602 00:31:01,344 --> 00:31:03,689 Gutierrez: 15 knots, head on. 603 00:31:03,724 --> 00:31:06,655 In case of wind shear, we use maximum thrust for a go-around. 604 00:31:06,689 --> 00:31:08,620 Don't touch flaps or gear. 605 00:31:08,655 --> 00:31:10,172 Pineros: Agreed. Yes, sir. 606 00:31:10,206 --> 00:31:13,344 Sabogal: Everything sounds okay. 607 00:31:13,379 --> 00:31:15,413 Computer: 50. 608 00:31:15,448 --> 00:31:16,482 Pineros: Look out, captain! 609 00:31:16,517 --> 00:31:20,172 Computer: 40.30.20. 610 00:31:20,206 --> 00:31:22,172 Pineros: Climb, captain! 611 00:31:22,206 --> 00:31:25,172 Sabogal: The first officer knows something isn't right. 612 00:31:25,206 --> 00:31:27,206 Echeverri: But the captain doesn't respond. 613 00:31:27,241 --> 00:31:28,620 Sabogal: Why not? 614 00:31:28,655 --> 00:31:32,034 Computer: Terrain. Terrain. Pull up. 615 00:31:32,068 --> 00:31:33,206 Narrator: The investigation 616 00:31:33,241 --> 00:31:35,413 finally has a solid lead to follow. 617 00:31:38,448 --> 00:31:39,448 Investigators are baffled 618 00:31:39,482 --> 00:31:43,413 by the captain's actions on board flight 8250. 619 00:31:45,827 --> 00:31:48,137 They question him about what happened 620 00:31:48,172 --> 00:31:51,379 on the approach to San Andréés. 621 00:31:51,413 --> 00:31:52,551 Gutierrez: I didn't think anything went wrong 622 00:31:52,586 --> 00:31:54,172 until the crash. 623 00:31:54,206 --> 00:31:55,413 It was stormy. 624 00:31:55,448 --> 00:31:57,172 It must have been the lightning or the wind. 625 00:31:57,793 --> 00:32:04,413 [Speaking Spanish] 626 00:32:04,448 --> 00:32:05,482 Sabogal: They never questioned 627 00:32:05,517 --> 00:32:08,448 the type of approach that they made. 628 00:32:08,482 --> 00:32:11,724 They never doubted that their procedure was adequate, 629 00:32:11,758 --> 00:32:13,620 and they said it was probably the wind 630 00:32:13,655 --> 00:32:15,517 that caused their accident. 631 00:32:21,827 --> 00:32:22,896 Narrator: But when the captain is asked 632 00:32:22,931 --> 00:32:25,689 about his use of the PAPI lights, 633 00:32:25,724 --> 00:32:30,482 his answer provides the first big break in the investigation. 634 00:32:30,517 --> 00:32:32,758 Gutierrez: I'm not sure what the PAPI lights were showing. 635 00:32:32,793 --> 00:32:36,103 I was focused on the green lights at the threshold, 636 00:32:36,137 --> 00:32:37,689 like I always do. 637 00:32:39,344 --> 00:32:43,517 Pineros: Airfield in sight, runway in sight, Aires 8250. 638 00:32:49,379 --> 00:32:50,758 Gutierrez: In sight landing. 639 00:32:50,793 --> 00:32:52,689 Pineros: Check. We're all set for landing. 640 00:33:01,586 --> 00:33:03,448 Sabogal: They were concentrated 641 00:33:03,482 --> 00:33:06,137 On the green lights at the start of the runway, 642 00:33:06,172 --> 00:33:10,586 and they ignored the information of the PAPI lights. 643 00:33:10,620 --> 00:33:12,827 Echeverri: Instead of landing in the touchdown zone, 644 00:33:12,862 --> 00:33:15,793 which is here, 645 00:33:15,827 --> 00:33:18,413 the captain says that he always lands here, 646 00:33:18,448 --> 00:33:20,310 on the threshold. 647 00:33:20,344 --> 00:33:24,655 [Speaking Spanish] 648 00:33:24,689 --> 00:33:26,827 We noticed in his statement 649 00:33:26,862 --> 00:33:28,862 a recurring flight technique 650 00:33:28,896 --> 00:33:32,344 that involved pointing the nose of the aircraft at the runway 651 00:33:32,379 --> 00:33:36,655 for approaches and landings. 652 00:33:36,689 --> 00:33:40,517 Cox: The thinking of some pilots has been, 653 00:33:40,551 --> 00:33:42,758 "I want on the runway as early as possible 654 00:33:42,793 --> 00:33:44,793 so that I can make sure that we get stopped 655 00:33:44,827 --> 00:33:47,344 if there's a problem with the brakes." 656 00:33:47,379 --> 00:33:52,862 So they deliberately land short of the touchdown zone. 657 00:33:52,896 --> 00:33:53,965 Sabogal: Possibly, 658 00:33:54,000 --> 00:33:56,206 that's what the pilot was doing the whole time... 659 00:33:56,241 --> 00:33:59,275 looking for the green lights and trying to make it. 660 00:33:59,310 --> 00:34:01,551 Narrator: Investigators ask the captain 661 00:34:01,586 --> 00:34:04,862 Why he performed the landing this way. 662 00:34:04,896 --> 00:34:06,310 Gutierrez: That's my training. 663 00:34:06,344 --> 00:34:08,275 I was just doing what we've always done. 664 00:34:10,551 --> 00:34:13,241 Echeverri: We saw that the crew decided to make an approach 665 00:34:13,275 --> 00:34:16,379 using their own criteria, 666 00:34:16,413 --> 00:34:20,310 not the criteria recommended by the manufacturer. 667 00:34:25,413 --> 00:34:26,724 Narrator: Investigators need to know 668 00:34:26,758 --> 00:34:29,482 what led the crew to do this. 669 00:34:29,517 --> 00:34:32,758 They dig into their backgrounds. 670 00:34:32,793 --> 00:34:35,793 Sabogal: Check this out. 671 00:34:35,827 --> 00:34:39,310 He's only been flying the 737 for eight months. 672 00:34:39,344 --> 00:34:44,482 Echeverri: 12 years before that, he flew turboprops. 673 00:34:44,517 --> 00:34:46,724 Narrator: The file reveals that Captain Gutierrez 674 00:34:46,758 --> 00:34:50,655 recently switched from commanding Dash 8 turboprops 675 00:34:50,689 --> 00:34:55,000 to the much larger 737 jets. 676 00:34:55,034 --> 00:34:57,931 The discovery provides a new clue. 677 00:34:57,965 --> 00:35:00,034 Sabogal: That's it. 678 00:35:00,068 --> 00:35:01,172 Echeverri: What? 679 00:35:01,206 --> 00:35:04,724 Sabogal: He was flying like he was in a turboprop. 680 00:35:04,758 --> 00:35:07,344 Echeverri: Not a 737. 681 00:35:07,379 --> 00:35:09,482 Cox: The investigators found 682 00:35:09,517 --> 00:35:14,551 that the higher rate of descent that they flew in the 737 683 00:35:14,586 --> 00:35:17,827 was much more like the profile that you would expect 684 00:35:17,862 --> 00:35:20,586 in the turboprop that they had flown previously. 685 00:35:24,689 --> 00:35:28,034 Sabogal: In accumulating so much experience in the turboprops, 686 00:35:28,068 --> 00:35:29,655 you develop habits, 687 00:35:29,689 --> 00:35:33,655 and when one translates this to the cockpit of jets, 688 00:35:33,689 --> 00:35:35,724 one starts to battle with all the tools 689 00:35:35,758 --> 00:35:37,862 that make your trip secure. 690 00:35:39,551 --> 00:35:41,827 We gotta find out if these guys were properly trained 691 00:35:41,862 --> 00:35:43,862 to fly a 737. 692 00:35:47,103 --> 00:35:50,448 Narrator: Aires started as a small regional airline 693 00:35:50,482 --> 00:35:54,724 flying turboprops around central Colombia. 694 00:35:54,758 --> 00:35:58,068 Then in 2009, the year before the crash, 695 00:35:58,103 --> 00:36:00,551 Aires underwent a huge expansion, 696 00:36:00,586 --> 00:36:03,034 adding nine 737s to its fleet. 697 00:36:06,034 --> 00:36:07,758 Normally, the industry practice 698 00:36:07,793 --> 00:36:10,620 is to hire experienced 737 pilots 699 00:36:10,655 --> 00:36:13,517 to fly the new jets. 700 00:36:13,551 --> 00:36:16,517 But that's not what Aires did. 701 00:36:16,551 --> 00:36:17,793 Sabogal: Okay, thanks very much. 702 00:36:20,068 --> 00:36:23,965 They didn't hire any new pilots for the 737s. 703 00:36:24,000 --> 00:36:28,896 They just transitioned the turboprop pilots into them. 704 00:36:28,931 --> 00:36:30,724 Echeverri: That's a big leap. 705 00:36:30,758 --> 00:36:34,689 Sabogal: In turboprops, everything is much easier. 706 00:36:34,724 --> 00:36:36,068 It's a slower plane. 707 00:36:36,103 --> 00:36:37,827 It reacts faster. 708 00:36:37,862 --> 00:36:39,758 It raises up easily. 709 00:36:39,793 --> 00:36:42,379 A turboprop is very forgiving. 710 00:36:42,413 --> 00:36:44,103 A jet doesn't forgive. 711 00:36:45,965 --> 00:36:47,586 Narrator: What did Aires do 712 00:36:47,620 --> 00:36:51,448 to safely transition their pilots onto the new 737s? 713 00:36:54,931 --> 00:36:57,068 The investigators take a closer look 714 00:36:57,103 --> 00:37:00,034 at the crew's training records. 715 00:37:00,068 --> 00:37:02,034 Sabogal: The captain switched over to a 737 716 00:37:02,068 --> 00:37:04,517 after only five weeks of training. 717 00:37:06,896 --> 00:37:11,724 Echeverri: The first officer only trained for two weeks. 718 00:37:11,758 --> 00:37:13,551 Narrator: The team concludes 719 00:37:13,586 --> 00:37:15,413 the pilots didn't have enough training 720 00:37:15,448 --> 00:37:18,482 to properly prepare them to fly the 737. 721 00:37:19,482 --> 00:37:23,758 [Speaking Spanish] 722 00:37:23,793 --> 00:37:26,655 Sabogal: The most important thing about the transition 723 00:37:26,689 --> 00:37:28,793 is to undo those concepts that one has 724 00:37:28,827 --> 00:37:30,482 of flying turboprops 725 00:37:30,517 --> 00:37:32,758 and really just start over. 726 00:37:32,793 --> 00:37:36,517 Jets are planes that require a lot of anticipation. 727 00:37:36,551 --> 00:37:39,448 They require a lot of concentration. 728 00:37:39,482 --> 00:37:42,586 They require you to understand what a computer is doing. 729 00:37:47,689 --> 00:37:49,620 Narrator: Investigators now conclude 730 00:37:49,655 --> 00:37:53,448 the captain likely reverted back to his turboprop habits 731 00:37:53,482 --> 00:37:57,896 while trying to land at the San Andréés airport. 732 00:37:57,931 --> 00:38:00,103 Sabogal: So just as he would in a turboprop, 733 00:38:00,137 --> 00:38:01,862 he aims for the threshold. 734 00:38:01,896 --> 00:38:04,758 Echeverri: But he crashes short of that. 735 00:38:04,793 --> 00:38:06,931 Sabogal: And we still can't explain why. 736 00:38:16,758 --> 00:38:20,517 Narrator: Investigators now know that the captain of Aires 8250 737 00:38:20,551 --> 00:38:22,827 was purposefully trying to land his airplane 738 00:38:22,862 --> 00:38:26,482 on the threshold of the runway... 739 00:38:26,517 --> 00:38:27,965 Gutierrez: In sight landing. 740 00:38:28,000 --> 00:38:29,862 Pineros: Check. We're all set for landing. 741 00:38:29,896 --> 00:38:33,000 Narrator:...the same way he used to land in a turboprop. 742 00:38:33,034 --> 00:38:34,620 Computer: 500. 743 00:38:34,655 --> 00:38:39,137 Controller: Aires 8250, winds at 60 degrees at 15 knots. 744 00:38:39,172 --> 00:38:42,275 Gutierrez: 15 knots, head on. 745 00:38:42,310 --> 00:38:44,206 Narrator: But that still doesn't explain 746 00:38:44,241 --> 00:38:47,586 why the crew crashed short of the runway. 747 00:38:47,620 --> 00:38:51,000 The last piece of the puzzle is elusive. 748 00:38:51,034 --> 00:38:54,517 The investigators listen to the cockpit recording once more, 749 00:38:54,551 --> 00:38:57,655 hoping to hear something they missed. 750 00:38:57,689 --> 00:38:59,137 Computer: 50. 751 00:38:59,172 --> 00:39:00,137 Pineros: Look out, captain! 752 00:39:00,172 --> 00:39:02,000 Computer: 40. 753 00:39:02,034 --> 00:39:03,034 30. 754 00:39:03,068 --> 00:39:04,586 Pineros: Can you make it? 755 00:39:04,620 --> 00:39:06,034 Computer: 20. 756 00:39:06,068 --> 00:39:07,896 Pineros: Climb, captain! 757 00:39:10,344 --> 00:39:13,000 Sabogal: So, from the point he gets a visual of the runway, 758 00:39:13,034 --> 00:39:15,827 the captain does nothing to correct his altitude 759 00:39:15,862 --> 00:39:17,586 right up to the crash. 760 00:39:17,620 --> 00:39:19,000 Echeverri: Not even when the first officer 761 00:39:19,034 --> 00:39:21,000 Gives him warnings. 762 00:39:21,034 --> 00:39:23,689 Sabogal: So what's going on in his head? 763 00:39:23,724 --> 00:39:26,241 Cox: When the investigators looked at the flight profile 764 00:39:26,275 --> 00:39:30,758 and they realized that it ended up impacting the ground 765 00:39:30,793 --> 00:39:32,068 short of the runway, 766 00:39:32,103 --> 00:39:35,241 without ever really arresting itself 767 00:39:35,275 --> 00:39:38,896 and trying to hop up to the runway 768 00:39:38,931 --> 00:39:42,931 or make, uh, power adjustments until the very last minute... 769 00:39:42,965 --> 00:39:47,103 The next question is, what is this consistent with? 770 00:39:47,137 --> 00:39:49,724 This is a classic undershoot accident 771 00:39:49,758 --> 00:39:51,034 in just about every sense. 772 00:39:51,068 --> 00:39:55,000 It's a classic black hole illusion accident. 773 00:39:57,034 --> 00:39:59,965 Narrator: The black hole illusion occurs on dark nights 774 00:40:00,000 --> 00:40:01,793 when there are no ground lights 775 00:40:01,827 --> 00:40:03,827 between an airplane and the runway threshold. 776 00:40:05,965 --> 00:40:08,793 The contrast between the lights and the total darkness 777 00:40:08,827 --> 00:40:09,896 creates an illusion 778 00:40:09,931 --> 00:40:12,137 that deceives pilots into thinking 779 00:40:12,172 --> 00:40:15,172 the runway is closer than it really is, 780 00:40:15,206 --> 00:40:17,965 causing them to put the plane down too early. 781 00:40:20,413 --> 00:40:23,000 Sabogal: This creates the visual illusion, 782 00:40:23,034 --> 00:40:24,689 like in a black hole, 783 00:40:24,724 --> 00:40:27,103 where you completely lose your depth perception. 784 00:40:30,379 --> 00:40:32,620 Echeverri: It was a nighttime approach 785 00:40:32,655 --> 00:40:34,689 on an island with no noticeable difference 786 00:40:34,724 --> 00:40:36,310 between land and water... 787 00:40:40,344 --> 00:40:44,206 and only the runway lights as reference. 788 00:40:44,241 --> 00:40:48,034 When doing this manually and visually, 789 00:40:48,068 --> 00:40:51,931 the risk for entering a black hole illusion increases. 790 00:40:53,344 --> 00:40:56,206 Sabogal: You have rain causing poor visibility. 791 00:40:56,241 --> 00:40:58,931 Some lights on the right, very few. 792 00:40:58,965 --> 00:41:00,965 The runway lights. 793 00:41:01,000 --> 00:41:03,379 That's about it. 794 00:41:03,413 --> 00:41:05,931 It's a black hole illusion. 795 00:41:05,965 --> 00:41:06,827 Gutierrez: In case of wind shear, 796 00:41:06,862 --> 00:41:09,137 we use maximum thrust for a go-around. 797 00:41:09,172 --> 00:41:11,172 Don't touch flaps or gear. 798 00:41:11,206 --> 00:41:12,655 Pineros: Agreed. Yes, sir. 799 00:41:15,310 --> 00:41:17,413 Sabogal: In this case, 800 00:41:17,448 --> 00:41:19,034 the black hole effect was made worse 801 00:41:19,068 --> 00:41:20,344 By another effect 802 00:41:20,379 --> 00:41:24,068 that was generated by the lights of the aircraft with the rain. 803 00:41:24,103 --> 00:41:25,758 Why? 804 00:41:25,793 --> 00:41:28,034 Because when the lights of the plane go on, 805 00:41:28,068 --> 00:41:30,689 you start to see the rain falling. 806 00:41:30,724 --> 00:41:34,034 The wipers start up and they also distract you, 807 00:41:34,068 --> 00:41:36,379 and the brain has to play with all that 808 00:41:36,413 --> 00:41:40,862 and be able to identify where the runway is. 809 00:41:40,896 --> 00:41:44,275 You take all the problems the Aires 8250 had, 810 00:41:44,310 --> 00:41:45,379 and it still doesn't necessarily 811 00:41:45,413 --> 00:41:47,241 give you a plane crash. 812 00:41:48,896 --> 00:41:52,068 But throw a black hole on there, and it makes sense. 813 00:41:54,068 --> 00:41:55,379 Narrator: The black hole illusion 814 00:41:55,413 --> 00:41:58,241 is the final piece of the puzzle. 815 00:41:58,275 --> 00:42:01,413 Sabogal: That's why the crew was constantly below the flight path 816 00:42:01,448 --> 00:42:03,172 without being aware of it, 817 00:42:03,206 --> 00:42:05,137 and they never made it to the runway. 818 00:42:07,482 --> 00:42:09,827 Narrator: The Colombian Aeronautical Authority 819 00:42:09,862 --> 00:42:12,034 issues a series of recommendations, 820 00:42:12,068 --> 00:42:14,931 including a revision of Aires Airlines' procedures 821 00:42:14,965 --> 00:42:16,827 For visual landings. 822 00:42:16,862 --> 00:42:19,000 [Thunder] 823 00:42:20,862 --> 00:42:24,965 Sabogal: In this accident, there is no one reason. 824 00:42:25,000 --> 00:42:28,000 There are many reasons that brought them to this... 825 00:42:28,034 --> 00:42:32,034 the type of approach, the kind of training. 826 00:42:32,068 --> 00:42:33,379 Computer: 40. 827 00:42:33,413 --> 00:42:34,758 Pineros: Can you make it? 828 00:42:38,413 --> 00:42:41,758 Echeverri: I think one of the most important recommendations 829 00:42:41,793 --> 00:42:45,448 from this investigation was strengthening crew training, 830 00:42:45,482 --> 00:42:47,379 especially for those transitioning 831 00:42:47,413 --> 00:42:50,000 from turboprop to jet. 832 00:42:53,310 --> 00:42:57,034 Narrator: For flight attendant Adriana Cardenas Medina, 833 00:42:57,068 --> 00:42:59,827 the memory of the doomed flight still haunts her. 834 00:43:01,827 --> 00:43:03,931 Cardenas Medina: My life became a struggle. 835 00:43:03,965 --> 00:43:06,448 I was left with irreparable physical injuries 836 00:43:06,482 --> 00:43:08,517 and with psychological trauma, 837 00:43:08,551 --> 00:43:12,448 which I will probably never fully overcome. 838 00:43:12,482 --> 00:43:15,103 What I experienced was outside of the norm 839 00:43:15,137 --> 00:43:17,344 and was totally devastating. 840 00:43:20,931 --> 00:43:22,103 Narrator: For investigators, 841 00:43:22,137 --> 00:43:25,965 The crash of Aires 8250 is a cautionary tale 842 00:43:26,000 --> 00:43:29,379 about the dangers of an under-trained crew. 843 00:43:29,413 --> 00:43:33,034 [Siren] 844 00:43:36,068 --> 00:43:39,137 Echeverri: The most important recommendation we gave 845 00:43:39,172 --> 00:43:44,000 was about ensuring and strengthening the crew training 846 00:43:44,034 --> 00:43:46,862 and following manufacturers' instructions 847 00:43:46,896 --> 00:43:50,310 so that they can prevent these types of accidents. 848 00:43:50,344 --> 00:43:58,034 [Beeping] 64747

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