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These are the user uploaded subtitles that are being translated: 1 00:00:02,836 --> 00:00:06,306 NARRATOR: In 1972, the Hawker Siddeley Trident is 2 00:00:06,373 --> 00:00:08,508 the pride of British aviation. 3 00:00:08,575 --> 00:00:12,912 Rotate. 4 00:00:12,979 --> 00:00:15,014 DAVID LEARMOUNT: The Trident was a completely 5 00:00:15,081 --> 00:00:16,750 British-built airplane. 6 00:00:16,816 --> 00:00:18,918 And the carriage up. 7 00:00:18,985 --> 00:00:20,086 COLIN WRIGHT: It was the equivalent 8 00:00:20,153 --> 00:00:21,187 of having a sports car. 9 00:00:21,254 --> 00:00:23,990 NARRATOR: When BEA Flight 548-- 10 00:00:24,057 --> 00:00:24,991 Look at the speed. 11 00:00:25,058 --> 00:00:26,292 Look at the speed. 12 00:00:26,359 --> 00:00:28,027 NARRATOR: --falls from the sky moments after takeoff. 13 00:00:31,798 --> 00:00:34,768 The carnage shocks the nation. 14 00:00:36,269 --> 00:00:38,405 FRANCES CASTLEDINE: It was so tragic that there 15 00:00:38,471 --> 00:00:41,674 wasn't anyone who survived. 16 00:00:41,741 --> 00:00:42,976 DAVID LEARMOUNT: It was the worst 17 00:00:43,042 --> 00:00:45,745 airline accident that Britain had ever experienced. 18 00:00:52,385 --> 00:00:54,421 Ladies and gentlemen, we are starting our approach. 19 00:00:54,487 --> 00:00:55,688 We lost both engines. 20 00:00:55,755 --> 00:00:57,424 - Put the mask over your nose. - Emergency descent. 21 00:00:57,490 --> 00:00:58,391 Mayday, Mayday. 22 00:00:58,458 --> 00:00:59,859 Brace for impact! 23 00:00:59,926 --> 00:01:01,828 I think I lost one. 24 00:01:01,895 --> 00:01:04,764 Investigation started on the tragedy. 25 00:01:04,831 --> 00:01:11,838 He's going to crash! 26 00:01:18,545 --> 00:01:23,883 NARRATOR: London's Heathrow Airport, 27 00:01:23,950 --> 00:01:26,119 Beeline 548 requesting start. 28 00:01:26,186 --> 00:01:29,589 NARRATOR: The crew of British European Airways Flight 548 29 00:01:29,656 --> 00:01:32,225 is completing final preparations for an afternoon 30 00:01:32,292 --> 00:01:35,161 flight to Brussels. 31 00:01:35,228 --> 00:01:36,262 Looks like the weather is going 32 00:01:36,329 --> 00:01:39,766 to give us a bumpy ride today. 33 00:01:39,833 --> 00:01:43,703 Beeline 548 cleared for start. 34 00:01:43,770 --> 00:01:45,104 NARRATOR: Captain Stanley Key was 35 00:01:45,171 --> 00:01:46,940 supposed to have today off, but was 36 00:01:47,006 --> 00:01:50,810 called in at the last minute. 37 00:01:50,877 --> 00:01:53,980 Key is a former Royal Air Force pilot and one of the airline's 38 00:01:54,047 --> 00:01:56,583 most qualified captains. 39 00:01:56,649 --> 00:01:58,985 Starter master. 40 00:01:59,052 --> 00:02:00,320 On. 41 00:02:00,386 --> 00:02:02,422 Captain Key had been on the aircraft for a long time. 42 00:02:02,489 --> 00:02:03,923 So he's very experienced. 43 00:02:03,990 --> 00:02:05,692 And if you expected to fly with him, 44 00:02:05,758 --> 00:02:08,294 you expected to fly to the book and to do 45 00:02:08,361 --> 00:02:12,532 it accurately with no arguing. 46 00:02:12,599 --> 00:02:14,534 NARRATOR: Many of the 112 passengers 47 00:02:14,601 --> 00:02:17,036 are business travelers taking advantage of BEA's 48 00:02:17,103 --> 00:02:23,176 rapid service to Brussels. 49 00:02:23,243 --> 00:02:24,811 The jet-powered Trident can make 50 00:02:24,878 --> 00:02:27,881 the trip in just 45 minutes. 51 00:02:27,947 --> 00:02:29,616 COLIN WRIGHT: The Trident was really 52 00:02:29,682 --> 00:02:33,086 competition for the propeller and the turboprop aircraft, 53 00:02:33,152 --> 00:02:35,121 which were much slower. 54 00:02:35,188 --> 00:02:37,757 So you now had an aircraft which was fast, 55 00:02:37,824 --> 00:02:40,393 it flew above the weather, and it was halving the time 56 00:02:40,460 --> 00:02:42,428 to European destinations, which is 57 00:02:42,495 --> 00:02:45,865 an enormous economic advantage to the airline. 58 00:02:45,932 --> 00:02:51,070 NARRATOR: It takes three pilots to fly the plane. 59 00:02:51,137 --> 00:02:52,171 Droops down. 60 00:02:52,238 --> 00:02:54,374 NARRATOR: Jeremy Keighley is the co-pilot. 61 00:02:54,440 --> 00:02:57,644 Flaps 20. 62 00:02:57,710 --> 00:03:01,281 Simon Ticehurst will help monitor the instruments. 63 00:03:01,347 --> 00:03:03,383 Engine one start. 64 00:03:03,449 --> 00:03:04,651 Engine one start. 65 00:03:07,854 --> 00:03:09,155 COLIN WRIGHT: It was an immensely popular 66 00:03:09,222 --> 00:03:11,024 airplane because it was the equivalent 67 00:03:11,090 --> 00:03:12,825 of having a sports car. 68 00:03:12,892 --> 00:03:15,194 It had terrific performance. 69 00:03:15,261 --> 00:03:18,097 It had very powerful controls, which were all hydraulic. 70 00:03:18,164 --> 00:03:23,836 It was a delight to fly once you got used to it. 71 00:03:23,903 --> 00:03:26,472 NARRATOR: Today's flight is getting off to a slow start. 72 00:03:26,539 --> 00:03:28,575 The airline has told the crew to wait for 73 00:03:28,641 --> 00:03:32,879 some last minute passengers. 74 00:03:32,946 --> 00:03:39,953 Another flight crew needs a ride to Brussels. 75 00:03:42,155 --> 00:03:43,156 Have a seat, captain. 76 00:03:43,222 --> 00:03:44,290 COLIN WRIGHT: It was over 30 years 77 00:03:44,357 --> 00:03:46,326 difference between Captain Key and the two 78 00:03:46,392 --> 00:03:49,128 other members of his crew. 79 00:03:49,195 --> 00:03:50,930 And this produces the natural differences 80 00:03:50,997 --> 00:03:56,235 you have between a generation. 81 00:03:56,302 --> 00:04:00,640 One regards the other as old and stuffy, and then 82 00:04:00,707 --> 00:04:02,442 one who regard the youngsters as being 83 00:04:02,508 --> 00:04:04,377 young and irresponsible. 84 00:04:04,444 --> 00:04:06,946 This produced a generational gap. 85 00:04:07,013 --> 00:04:12,585 Beeline 548 ready for takeoff. 86 00:04:12,652 --> 00:04:16,122 TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Beeline 548 clear for takeoff. 87 00:04:16,189 --> 00:04:18,024 548. 88 00:04:18,091 --> 00:04:20,226 NARRATOR: The captain calls for takeoff power. 89 00:04:20,293 --> 00:04:27,000 Maximum thrust. 90 00:04:27,066 --> 00:04:28,301 NARRATOR: The Trident gets its name 91 00:04:28,368 --> 00:04:35,375 from its three rear-mounted Rolls-Royce engines. 92 00:04:36,643 --> 00:04:41,648 Second officer Ticehurst monitors the plane's speed. 93 00:04:41,714 --> 00:04:43,316 100 knots. 94 00:04:43,383 --> 00:04:44,884 NARRATOR: They can't lift off until they reach 95 00:04:44,951 --> 00:04:50,289 rotation speed, 139 knots. 96 00:04:50,356 --> 00:04:52,625 Stopwatch on. 97 00:04:52,692 --> 00:04:55,762 NARRATOR: Meanwhile, Keighley keeps a close eye on the time. 98 00:04:55,828 --> 00:04:57,163 It's part of a special procedure 99 00:04:57,230 --> 00:05:02,001 designed to minimize aircraft noise over populated areas. 100 00:05:02,068 --> 00:05:04,971 It's a very noisy engine with a particularly 101 00:05:05,038 --> 00:05:06,372 nasty crackle to it. 102 00:05:06,439 --> 00:05:13,446 So noise abatement would be an issue wherever it flew. 103 00:05:16,582 --> 00:05:21,954 Rotate. 104 00:05:22,021 --> 00:05:23,790 NARRATOR: Once they've gained enough altitude, 105 00:05:23,856 --> 00:05:25,825 they'll have to throttle back slightly to reduce 106 00:05:25,892 --> 00:05:28,461 the noise of the engines. 107 00:05:28,528 --> 00:05:31,464 They've got to adjust the power, i.e. 108 00:05:31,531 --> 00:05:34,634 reduce it just when it would be really rather nice to keep 109 00:05:34,701 --> 00:05:37,470 the full power on, but they've got to reduce it 110 00:05:37,537 --> 00:05:40,406 for noise abatement reasons. 111 00:05:40,473 --> 00:05:42,375 NARRATOR: Officials at the airport measure the noise 112 00:05:42,442 --> 00:05:44,577 level after 90 seconds. 113 00:05:44,644 --> 00:05:49,282 If the pilots get it wrong, it'll go on their record. 114 00:05:49,348 --> 00:05:52,185 The pressure on you is to do it quickly 115 00:05:52,251 --> 00:05:53,953 and to do it accurately. 116 00:05:54,020 --> 00:06:00,660 Undercarriage up. 117 00:06:03,696 --> 00:06:05,765 60 seconds. 118 00:06:05,832 --> 00:06:07,767 NARRATOR: As the plane climbs, passengers 119 00:06:07,834 --> 00:06:11,904 are rocked by turbulence. 120 00:06:11,971 --> 00:06:13,506 It was a gusty day. 121 00:06:13,573 --> 00:06:18,010 And gusty days give you a bumpy ride. 122 00:06:18,077 --> 00:06:19,912 Left, heading 145. 123 00:06:19,979 --> 00:06:24,484 Heading 145. 124 00:06:24,550 --> 00:06:25,718 NARRATOR: The plane's flight plan 125 00:06:25,785 --> 00:06:28,654 calls for a left turn just after takeoff, taking 126 00:06:28,721 --> 00:06:30,523 it east of the town of Staines before it 127 00:06:30,590 --> 00:06:33,926 flies on to Brussels. 128 00:06:33,993 --> 00:06:36,696 Beeline 548 climbing as cleared. 129 00:06:36,763 --> 00:06:39,065 TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: 548 airborne at 09. 130 00:06:39,132 --> 00:06:40,633 Good day. 131 00:06:40,700 --> 00:06:43,236 Roger. 132 00:06:43,302 --> 00:06:45,438 NARRATOR: Keighley prepares to throttle back the engines. 133 00:06:45,505 --> 00:06:47,573 If he does it too soon, the plane won't 134 00:06:47,640 --> 00:06:52,011 have enough power to climb. 135 00:06:52,078 --> 00:06:54,614 JEREMY KEIGHLEY: 75 seconds. 136 00:06:54,680 --> 00:06:58,584 NARRATOR: He'll have just 5 seconds to get it right. 137 00:06:58,651 --> 00:07:00,620 There is a lag in the time that the engines 138 00:07:00,686 --> 00:07:02,054 take to respond to that. 139 00:07:02,121 --> 00:07:04,524 And on occasions, you can actually reduce the power 140 00:07:04,590 --> 00:07:05,892 by more than you intended. 141 00:07:05,958 --> 00:07:07,160 And it would take a while to actually 142 00:07:07,226 --> 00:07:09,228 get the engines to settle. 143 00:07:09,295 --> 00:07:12,932 85 seconds. 144 00:07:12,999 --> 00:07:14,200 90 seconds. 145 00:07:14,267 --> 00:07:21,274 NARRATOR: Keighley reduces power just in time. 146 00:07:23,976 --> 00:07:25,645 Passing 1,500 feet. 147 00:07:25,711 --> 00:07:28,214 NARRATOR: The procedure goes well. 148 00:07:28,281 --> 00:07:30,750 TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: 548 climbed to flight level 60. 149 00:07:30,817 --> 00:07:34,120 Squawk 6615. 150 00:07:34,187 --> 00:07:39,058 NARRATOR: The tower clears them to a higher altitude. 151 00:07:39,125 --> 00:07:40,059 Up to 60. 152 00:07:40,126 --> 00:07:42,695 NARRATOR: Then-- 153 00:07:42,762 --> 00:07:44,730 What was that? 154 00:07:44,797 --> 00:07:51,771 NARRATOR: --the plane begins to lose altitude. 155 00:07:53,573 --> 00:07:54,941 Look at the speed! 156 00:07:55,007 --> 00:07:57,877 Look at the speed! 157 00:07:57,944 --> 00:08:00,012 COLIN WRIGHT: The air speed dropped quite rapidly. 158 00:08:00,079 --> 00:08:03,416 It was in a very high rate of descent. 159 00:08:03,482 --> 00:08:05,618 They were just passengers in their own aircraft. 160 00:08:25,771 --> 00:08:28,541 NARRATOR: The plane has crashed in an empty field just yards 161 00:08:28,608 --> 00:08:33,145 from the town of Staines. 162 00:08:33,212 --> 00:08:37,783 I was at home with my baby of 12 weeks, 163 00:08:37,850 --> 00:08:41,053 and I heard a very loud thump. 164 00:08:41,120 --> 00:08:43,022 NARRATOR: Local resident Frances Castledine 165 00:08:43,089 --> 00:08:44,824 leaves her infant son with a neighbor 166 00:08:44,891 --> 00:08:48,094 and rushes to the crash site. 167 00:08:48,160 --> 00:08:49,996 If it had gone another 50 yards, 168 00:08:50,062 --> 00:08:53,165 it would have hit the center of Staines with the shops 169 00:08:53,232 --> 00:08:55,001 and the houses there. 170 00:08:55,067 --> 00:08:56,736 NARRATOR: Frances is a nurse. 171 00:08:56,802 --> 00:08:58,404 She immediately begins searching 172 00:08:58,471 --> 00:09:01,173 the wreckage for survivors. 173 00:09:01,240 --> 00:09:02,909 I was very much afraid there was 174 00:09:02,975 --> 00:09:06,946 going to be a fire because the vapor 175 00:09:07,013 --> 00:09:11,484 was very heavy in the air. 176 00:09:11,550 --> 00:09:14,954 And I had to decide, basically, whether I was going to go back 177 00:09:15,021 --> 00:09:17,290 home to my baby or whether I was 178 00:09:17,356 --> 00:09:19,492 going to go forward and help. 179 00:09:24,263 --> 00:09:26,866 But I had had a lot of intensive training 180 00:09:26,933 --> 00:09:29,669 in the accident and emergency department, 181 00:09:29,735 --> 00:09:32,872 and I really felt that I needed to be there. 182 00:09:32,939 --> 00:09:34,440 NARRATOR: Nearly everyone is dead, 183 00:09:34,507 --> 00:09:37,743 but Frances is able to help one survivor. 184 00:09:37,810 --> 00:09:38,744 Can you hear me? 185 00:09:38,811 --> 00:09:39,912 FRANCES CASTLEDINE: I did my best. 186 00:09:39,979 --> 00:09:40,913 I did what I could. 187 00:09:40,980 --> 00:09:43,683 Can you hear me? 188 00:09:43,749 --> 00:09:49,889 I manipulated his legs and put them into some wreckage 189 00:09:49,956 --> 00:09:51,891 splints with some bandages. 190 00:09:51,958 --> 00:09:55,528 You are going to be OK. 191 00:09:58,998 --> 00:09:59,932 Hey! 192 00:09:59,999 --> 00:10:03,836 Hey! 193 00:10:03,903 --> 00:10:05,004 Help is on the way. 194 00:10:05,071 --> 00:10:07,173 NARRATOR: The man's injuries are too severe. 195 00:10:07,239 --> 00:10:11,911 Despite her quick response, he dies. 196 00:10:11,978 --> 00:10:15,147 FRANCES CASTLEDINE: It just was so tragic that there 197 00:10:15,214 --> 00:10:18,317 wasn't anyone who survived. 198 00:10:18,384 --> 00:10:25,024 NARRATOR: All 118 people aboard BEA Flight 548 are killed 199 00:10:26,325 --> 00:10:28,394 DAVID LEARMOUNT: This accident was pretty horrifying 200 00:10:28,461 --> 00:10:32,064 because it was the worst airline accident that Britain 201 00:10:32,131 --> 00:10:36,469 had ever experienced and BEA was reckoned in those days 202 00:10:36,535 --> 00:10:40,006 to be the kind of airline that just didn't have crashes. 203 00:10:40,072 --> 00:10:45,077 And this time, they did. 204 00:10:45,144 --> 00:10:48,347 REPORTER: Flight BE 548 en route to Belgium crashes 205 00:10:48,414 --> 00:10:50,149 in a field not far from Heathrow 206 00:10:50,216 --> 00:10:52,885 and only a few feet from houses in the main road. 207 00:10:52,952 --> 00:10:55,021 NARRATOR: News that a plane crashed and narrowly 208 00:10:55,087 --> 00:10:57,823 missed the town of Staines is soon the top story 209 00:10:57,890 --> 00:11:01,093 across the country. 210 00:11:01,160 --> 00:11:03,829 Within an hour, the news reaches Chris Pollard, 211 00:11:03,896 --> 00:11:06,098 a new investigator with Britain's Accidents 212 00:11:06,165 --> 00:11:08,000 Investigation Branch. 213 00:11:08,067 --> 00:11:11,337 CHRIS POLLARD: At the time that I arrived on the site, 214 00:11:11,404 --> 00:11:16,275 the rescue attempt had started big time 215 00:11:16,342 --> 00:11:20,446 and the site was very, very active with people. 216 00:11:20,513 --> 00:11:23,416 NARRATOR: Investigators are struck by something unusual. 217 00:11:23,482 --> 00:11:26,786 In most accidents, momentum carries the wreckage forward 218 00:11:26,852 --> 00:11:29,688 after it hits the ground. 219 00:11:29,755 --> 00:11:33,259 The crash at Staines is different. 220 00:11:33,325 --> 00:11:35,895 CHRIS POLLARD: The tail had not moved 221 00:11:35,961 --> 00:11:39,065 very far from where it had initially struck the ground. 222 00:11:39,131 --> 00:11:44,103 And the rest of the aircraft probably hadn't moved forward 223 00:11:44,170 --> 00:11:48,607 more than about 50 yards, which for such a heavy aeroplane 224 00:11:48,674 --> 00:11:52,078 is very, very little distance. 225 00:11:52,144 --> 00:11:55,981 NARRATOR: Nearby, power lines tell part of the story. 226 00:11:56,048 --> 00:11:58,150 CHRIS POLLARD: The older investigators, they 227 00:11:58,217 --> 00:12:00,119 were pointing out the power lines, which 228 00:12:00,186 --> 00:12:02,788 it had passed over very, very shortly 229 00:12:02,855 --> 00:12:05,124 before the first impact point. 230 00:12:05,191 --> 00:12:07,126 PETER COOMBS: If you walked around the back of the remains 231 00:12:07,193 --> 00:12:10,196 of the tail unit, you could look backwards and upwards, 232 00:12:10,262 --> 00:12:12,598 and there were overhead high tension cables. 233 00:12:12,665 --> 00:12:15,701 This told you really that the aircraft must have been coming 234 00:12:15,768 --> 00:12:17,236 down at a very steep angle in order 235 00:12:17,303 --> 00:12:19,305 not to interfere with the cables. 236 00:12:19,371 --> 00:12:22,208 NARRATOR: The undamaged wires and compact crash zone 237 00:12:22,274 --> 00:12:24,810 tell investigators that the plane fell to the ground 238 00:12:24,877 --> 00:12:30,082 suddenly and steeply. 239 00:12:30,149 --> 00:12:34,753 It's a sure sign that the plane stalled. 240 00:12:34,820 --> 00:12:36,122 DAVID LEARMOUNT: An aircraft stalls 241 00:12:36,188 --> 00:12:39,024 when it's flying too slowly to generate 242 00:12:39,091 --> 00:12:42,294 sufficient wind over the wings to give it lift. 243 00:12:42,361 --> 00:12:44,497 When that aircraft hit the ground, 244 00:12:44,563 --> 00:12:46,699 it was actually slightly nose up. 245 00:12:46,765 --> 00:12:52,738 It was falling through the sky like that. 246 00:12:52,805 --> 00:12:55,307 All the sort of basic impact signs 247 00:12:55,374 --> 00:12:58,677 were that the aircraft was stalled. 248 00:12:58,744 --> 00:13:02,381 The first question is, why? 249 00:13:02,448 --> 00:13:05,184 NARRATOR: An airplane can stall for many different reasons 250 00:13:05,251 --> 00:13:11,123 from engine failure to pilot error. 251 00:13:11,190 --> 00:13:14,126 Pollard studies the wreckage in search of the specific reason 252 00:13:14,193 --> 00:13:15,594 for the stall. 253 00:13:15,661 --> 00:13:19,665 Every piece of debris is a potential clue. 254 00:13:19,732 --> 00:13:21,167 CHRIS POLLARD: You may come across something 255 00:13:21,233 --> 00:13:23,536 which-- which is unexpected. 256 00:13:23,602 --> 00:13:27,706 At which point, you have to try to explain it. 257 00:13:27,773 --> 00:13:30,075 It may prove to be a red herring. 258 00:13:30,142 --> 00:13:33,546 It may prove to be something crucial. 259 00:13:33,612 --> 00:13:36,315 How you do the salvage actually very much 260 00:13:36,382 --> 00:13:39,885 influences how easy you make things for yourself. 261 00:13:39,952 --> 00:13:43,289 Hang on, will you? 262 00:13:43,355 --> 00:13:46,759 You can by careless salvage make things incredibly 263 00:13:46,825 --> 00:13:50,963 difficult for yourself. 264 00:13:51,030 --> 00:13:52,364 NARRATOR: There's another challenge. 265 00:13:52,431 --> 00:13:55,401 In 1972, planes in the United Kingdom 266 00:13:55,467 --> 00:13:59,905 are not required to carry cockpit voice recorders. 267 00:13:59,972 --> 00:14:01,407 GRAHAM BRAITHWAITE: The modern investigator 268 00:14:01,473 --> 00:14:04,577 is helped enormously in so many accident situations 269 00:14:04,643 --> 00:14:07,646 where a cockpit voice recorder is present because it really 270 00:14:07,713 --> 00:14:09,114 does help you understand what was 271 00:14:09,181 --> 00:14:10,549 going on in the flight deck. 272 00:14:10,616 --> 00:14:12,251 I think we forget how difficult this 273 00:14:12,318 --> 00:14:14,954 must have been to investigate. 274 00:14:15,020 --> 00:14:16,355 NARRATOR: Investigators will only 275 00:14:16,422 --> 00:14:19,358 have the information from the Trident's flight recorders. 276 00:14:19,425 --> 00:14:26,031 It will take time to recover and process that data. 277 00:14:26,098 --> 00:14:27,666 The rest of the debris is carefully 278 00:14:27,733 --> 00:14:32,705 labeled and sent to AAIB headquarters in Farnborough. 279 00:14:32,771 --> 00:14:34,240 All this has to get back to the hangar. 280 00:14:34,306 --> 00:14:35,874 NARRATOR: There the plane will be put back 281 00:14:35,941 --> 00:14:38,744 together like a jigsaw puzzle, a process 282 00:14:38,811 --> 00:14:41,113 that could take months. 283 00:14:41,180 --> 00:14:42,681 PETER COOMBS: Following an impact of this sort, 284 00:14:42,748 --> 00:14:46,318 everything is comprehensively wrecked and jumbled up, 285 00:14:46,385 --> 00:14:49,622 and most of the components on the aircraft, 286 00:14:49,688 --> 00:14:51,457 particularly the electronic components, all 287 00:14:51,523 --> 00:14:53,125 look very similar. 288 00:14:53,192 --> 00:14:55,194 NARRATOR: The team has no time to lose. 289 00:14:55,261 --> 00:14:57,129 If there's a problem with the Trident, 290 00:14:57,196 --> 00:15:00,466 investigators need to know as soon as possible. 291 00:15:00,532 --> 00:15:05,137 There is enormous pressure to find the cause of the crash. 292 00:15:05,204 --> 00:15:06,472 DAVID LEARMOUNT: You have to recognize 293 00:15:06,538 --> 00:15:10,209 that the Trident was a completely British-built 294 00:15:10,276 --> 00:15:12,111 and British-engined aeroplane. 295 00:15:12,177 --> 00:15:14,747 Therefore, for British industry, 296 00:15:14,813 --> 00:15:17,316 it was very important that if there 297 00:15:17,383 --> 00:15:19,418 was anything wrong with the Trident, 298 00:15:19,485 --> 00:15:21,487 it should be found out and corrected. 299 00:15:21,553 --> 00:15:22,621 GRAHAM BRAITHWAITE: It's usually 300 00:15:22,688 --> 00:15:25,457 a very complex picture drawn painstakingly 301 00:15:25,524 --> 00:15:27,559 over months, sometimes years. 302 00:15:27,626 --> 00:15:29,461 And so the pressure to find the answer 303 00:15:29,528 --> 00:15:33,565 can be quite significant. 304 00:15:33,632 --> 00:15:37,102 NARRATOR: The weather could provide an early lead. 305 00:15:37,169 --> 00:15:40,205 COLIN WRIGHT: There was a cold front about 30 miles away. 306 00:15:40,272 --> 00:15:42,675 And at the airport at the time, there was low cloud 307 00:15:42,741 --> 00:15:45,044 at about 1,000 feet-- 308 00:15:45,110 --> 00:15:46,979 And the carriage up. 309 00:15:47,046 --> 00:15:48,847 COLIN WRIGHT: --and there was moderate turbulence, 310 00:15:48,914 --> 00:15:50,382 which would vary rather like driving 311 00:15:50,449 --> 00:15:56,488 a car over a rough road. 312 00:15:56,555 --> 00:15:59,158 NARRATOR: In bad weather, storm clouds sometimes create 313 00:15:59,224 --> 00:16:01,226 powerful columns of air that can 314 00:16:01,293 --> 00:16:03,262 force a plane to the ground. 315 00:16:03,329 --> 00:16:04,863 PETER COOMBS: Extreme wind shear or something of 316 00:16:04,930 --> 00:16:06,932 that sort can lead to a stall. 317 00:16:06,999 --> 00:16:10,069 NARRATOR: Planes are especially vulnerable during takeoff. 318 00:16:10,135 --> 00:16:12,571 They're so close to the ground that pilots have little time 319 00:16:12,638 --> 00:16:13,806 to recover from the problem. 320 00:16:15,174 --> 00:16:17,376 DAVID LEARMOUNT: The aircraft had only just taken off 321 00:16:17,443 --> 00:16:19,144 and it was still pretty low. 322 00:16:19,211 --> 00:16:23,048 If a stall like this had happened at multiple thousands 323 00:16:23,115 --> 00:16:25,918 of feet, there would have been plenty of time 324 00:16:25,984 --> 00:16:28,087 to recognize what the problem was 325 00:16:28,153 --> 00:16:29,955 and to do something about it. 326 00:16:30,022 --> 00:16:32,791 NARRATOR: Investigators need to just how severe 327 00:16:32,858 --> 00:16:34,593 the weather conditions were at Heathrow 328 00:16:34,660 --> 00:16:38,697 when the Trident took off. 329 00:16:38,764 --> 00:16:41,834 The AAIB receives detailed meteorological reports 330 00:16:41,900 --> 00:16:45,437 from the day of the crash. 331 00:16:45,504 --> 00:16:47,139 They reveal that the turbulence simply 332 00:16:47,206 --> 00:16:52,578 wasn't strong enough to knock a plane out of the sky. 333 00:16:52,644 --> 00:16:53,846 PETER COOMBS: There was no wind shear. 334 00:16:53,912 --> 00:16:55,914 There was nothing excessive in the weather. 335 00:16:55,981 --> 00:16:58,317 And certainly, it would have to be 336 00:16:58,384 --> 00:17:01,286 very extreme to contribute to a stall 337 00:17:01,353 --> 00:17:07,993 at that phase in the flight. 338 00:17:08,060 --> 00:17:09,428 NARRATOR: Meanwhile, investigators 339 00:17:09,495 --> 00:17:11,864 turn their attention to the preliminary information 340 00:17:11,930 --> 00:17:15,868 captured on the Trident's black box. 341 00:17:15,934 --> 00:17:17,669 PETER COOMBS: The amount of recording on the Trident 342 00:17:17,736 --> 00:17:21,340 was the greatest amount of any airliner 343 00:17:21,407 --> 00:17:22,941 I was aware of at that time. 344 00:17:23,008 --> 00:17:25,310 It was very much state of the art. 345 00:17:25,377 --> 00:17:28,213 NARRATOR: They focus on engine data, searching for any sign 346 00:17:28,280 --> 00:17:32,718 that the engines flamed out or lost power. 347 00:17:32,785 --> 00:17:35,654 A sudden loss of thrust could explain why the aircraft 348 00:17:35,721 --> 00:17:39,124 stalled, but the data shows the engines 349 00:17:39,191 --> 00:17:41,326 were working perfectly. 350 00:17:41,393 --> 00:17:43,562 The Trident had climbed with enough thrust 351 00:17:43,629 --> 00:17:48,333 to maintain a safe speed. 352 00:17:48,400 --> 00:17:49,701 PETER COOMBS: With regard to the engines, 353 00:17:49,768 --> 00:17:52,137 we were quite satisfied that there was no evidence 354 00:17:52,204 --> 00:17:54,173 of a gross loss of thrust. 355 00:17:54,239 --> 00:17:57,910 NARRATOR: Engine failure did not bring down Flight 548. 356 00:17:57,976 --> 00:17:59,945 DAVID LEARMOUNT: The stall happened very suddenly 357 00:18:00,012 --> 00:18:01,647 during a normal climb. 358 00:18:01,713 --> 00:18:04,450 The speed, although it was a bit lower than it should have 359 00:18:04,516 --> 00:18:06,318 been, it was not dramatically, though, 360 00:18:06,385 --> 00:18:07,419 lower than it should have been. 361 00:18:07,486 --> 00:18:14,493 It should not have led to a stall. 362 00:18:17,696 --> 00:18:20,599 NARRATOR: At AAIB headquarters, engineers piece together 363 00:18:20,666 --> 00:18:25,003 the wreckage of Flight 548. 364 00:18:25,070 --> 00:18:27,673 CHRIS POLLARD: When you do a reconstruction 365 00:18:27,739 --> 00:18:30,375 for investigation, the best technique 366 00:18:30,442 --> 00:18:35,214 is to try to lay the wreckage out in-- in plan form 367 00:18:35,280 --> 00:18:39,718 so that in essence you know automatically if you're 368 00:18:39,785 --> 00:18:41,887 looking for-- for a particular bit, 369 00:18:41,954 --> 00:18:43,655 you know where to go for it. 370 00:18:43,722 --> 00:18:45,858 NARRATOR: By testing the reassembled systems, 371 00:18:45,924 --> 00:18:48,227 investigators should be able to tell if there is 372 00:18:48,293 --> 00:18:50,629 a broken part or faulty mechanism that 373 00:18:50,696 --> 00:18:53,932 could have caused the stall. 374 00:18:53,999 --> 00:18:56,001 PETER COOMBS: By reconstructing the aircraft, 375 00:18:56,068 --> 00:19:00,172 it's possible to untangle flying control 376 00:19:00,239 --> 00:19:03,542 cables and hydraulic pipes and identify 377 00:19:03,609 --> 00:19:07,746 whether there are any failures that preceded the impact. 378 00:19:07,813 --> 00:19:10,716 NARRATOR: They soon notice a problem. 379 00:19:10,782 --> 00:19:12,684 That can't be right. 380 00:19:12,751 --> 00:19:15,888 NARRATOR: A lever is set to an unexpected position. 381 00:19:15,954 --> 00:19:18,390 It's used to operate crucial lift devices 382 00:19:18,457 --> 00:19:21,627 on the wing known as droops. 383 00:19:21,693 --> 00:19:23,328 It could be seen that the droop lever 384 00:19:23,395 --> 00:19:27,065 was in the retracted position. 385 00:19:27,132 --> 00:19:29,234 NARRATOR: Droops are aerodynamic surfaces 386 00:19:29,301 --> 00:19:31,770 that can be extended from the front of the wing. 387 00:19:31,837 --> 00:19:33,639 They increase lift during takeoff 388 00:19:33,705 --> 00:19:36,174 to help the plane climb. 389 00:19:36,241 --> 00:19:39,344 The front section of the wing was hydraulically powered 390 00:19:39,411 --> 00:19:41,346 and would lean and droop forward 391 00:19:41,413 --> 00:19:43,248 to give an extra curvature of the wing. 392 00:19:43,315 --> 00:19:46,718 And at lower speed, that would give you extra lift. 393 00:19:46,785 --> 00:19:48,453 NARRATOR: Droops should only be retracted 394 00:19:48,520 --> 00:19:52,157 once the plane has enough speed to maintain lift without them. 395 00:19:52,224 --> 00:19:55,027 If one of the pilots pulled in the droops too early, 396 00:19:55,093 --> 00:20:01,033 it would have instantly put the plane into a dangerous stall. 397 00:20:05,537 --> 00:20:10,208 The discovery baffles investigators. 398 00:20:10,275 --> 00:20:11,977 PETER COOMBS: How on Earth did somebody 399 00:20:12,044 --> 00:20:15,480 manage to retract the droop lever and nobody noticed 400 00:20:15,547 --> 00:20:17,816 that that had happened? 401 00:20:17,883 --> 00:20:22,020 And it didn't make a lot of sense. 402 00:20:22,087 --> 00:20:23,388 NARRATOR: There's no way to tell just 403 00:20:23,455 --> 00:20:26,124 by looking at the droop lever whether the crew moved it 404 00:20:26,191 --> 00:20:28,961 before the crash or if it was jostled out 405 00:20:29,027 --> 00:20:36,034 of place by the crash itself. 406 00:20:37,436 --> 00:20:42,207 It might even have been moved during recovery operations. 407 00:20:42,274 --> 00:20:47,212 Hang on, will you? 408 00:20:47,279 --> 00:20:50,882 We had the whole-- the droop system laid out on tables 409 00:20:50,949 --> 00:20:52,784 in front of the wing. 410 00:20:52,851 --> 00:20:55,754 NARRATOR: To determine how the all-important lever was last 411 00:20:55,821 --> 00:20:58,256 moved, Pollard must carefully examine 412 00:20:58,323 --> 00:21:01,760 the cables connected to it. 413 00:21:01,827 --> 00:21:07,232 The droop lever operated a cable system which went down 414 00:21:07,299 --> 00:21:11,536 to the drive motor and selected a position, which the drive 415 00:21:11,603 --> 00:21:18,610 motor would drive to. 416 00:21:22,080 --> 00:21:23,415 Retracted. 417 00:21:23,482 --> 00:21:25,450 DAVID LEARMOUNT: They determined by an examination 418 00:21:25,517 --> 00:21:29,988 of the wreckage that the droops had been retracted at impact. 419 00:21:30,055 --> 00:21:33,225 NARRATOR: There's no longer any doubt, someone in the cockpit 420 00:21:33,291 --> 00:21:34,726 moved the droop lever. 421 00:21:34,793 --> 00:21:36,495 It's a troubling discovery. 422 00:21:36,561 --> 00:21:40,832 PETER COOMBS: As the awareness develops that there had been 423 00:21:40,899 --> 00:21:43,669 incorrect operation of the droop lever, 424 00:21:43,735 --> 00:21:48,306 the inevitable question arose, well, who had operated it? 425 00:21:48,373 --> 00:21:49,608 NARRATOR: The deadliest aviation 426 00:21:49,675 --> 00:21:51,910 accident ever to occur on British soil 427 00:21:51,977 --> 00:21:55,947 was caused by pilot error. 428 00:21:56,014 --> 00:21:59,117 This prompts urgent questions about the mental and physical 429 00:21:59,184 --> 00:22:01,953 state of the crew. 430 00:22:02,020 --> 00:22:04,389 DAVID LEARMOUNT: Autopsies are always done on flight crews 431 00:22:04,456 --> 00:22:06,858 if they don't survive an accident. 432 00:22:06,925 --> 00:22:09,227 A very simple thing is they want to find out 433 00:22:09,294 --> 00:22:12,130 whether there was any alcohol or drugs 434 00:22:12,197 --> 00:22:16,268 in the blood of the pilots. 435 00:22:16,334 --> 00:22:19,838 NARRATOR: While pathologists search for a physical cause-- 436 00:22:19,905 --> 00:22:21,239 Put up the personnel records, will you? 437 00:22:21,306 --> 00:22:23,208 NARRATOR: --investigators focus their attention 438 00:22:23,275 --> 00:22:25,343 on the pilot's history. 439 00:22:25,410 --> 00:22:26,912 GRAHAM BRAITHWAITE: The technical investigation 440 00:22:26,978 --> 00:22:29,147 at Staines had to rule out technical causes 441 00:22:29,214 --> 00:22:30,215 of the accident. 442 00:22:30,282 --> 00:22:31,750 And when it had done that, it really 443 00:22:31,817 --> 00:22:34,119 needed to look at the performance of the crew, 444 00:22:34,186 --> 00:22:37,255 why did they do what they did or why did they not do what 445 00:22:37,322 --> 00:22:38,724 they may have done on the day? 446 00:22:38,790 --> 00:22:39,991 So-- 447 00:22:40,058 --> 00:22:41,693 NARRATOR: They study the captain's previous flights. 448 00:22:41,760 --> 00:22:45,330 He has an impeccable reputation. 449 00:22:45,397 --> 00:22:46,732 GRAHAM BRAITHWAITE: Captain Key was a very 450 00:22:46,798 --> 00:22:48,300 experienced Trident pilot. 451 00:22:48,366 --> 00:22:51,436 He had over 4,000 hours, and he was an experienced captain 452 00:22:51,503 --> 00:22:52,471 as well. 453 00:22:52,537 --> 00:22:53,839 NARRATOR: His takeoffs from Heathrow 454 00:22:53,905 --> 00:22:57,008 are almost always flawless. 455 00:22:57,075 --> 00:22:59,077 Undercarriage up. 456 00:22:59,144 --> 00:23:00,946 NARRATOR: But on the day of the crash, 457 00:23:01,012 --> 00:23:05,217 he does things differently. 458 00:23:05,283 --> 00:23:09,521 Let me see those air speeds from the day of the crash. 459 00:23:09,588 --> 00:23:13,458 Thanks. 460 00:23:13,525 --> 00:23:16,294 Beeline 548 climbing is cleared. 461 00:23:16,361 --> 00:23:18,463 TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: 548 airborne at 09. 462 00:23:18,530 --> 00:23:19,664 Good day. 463 00:23:19,731 --> 00:23:20,665 Roger. 464 00:23:20,732 --> 00:23:22,367 NARRATOR: As he flew out of Heathrow, 465 00:23:22,434 --> 00:23:26,471 Key was flying the Trident a bit slower than usual. 466 00:23:26,538 --> 00:23:28,173 DAVID LEARMOUNT: On this occasion, 467 00:23:28,240 --> 00:23:30,909 from almost immediately after takeoff 468 00:23:30,976 --> 00:23:33,545 until the accident had occurred itself, 469 00:23:33,612 --> 00:23:36,948 there was a noted disparity between the speed that he 470 00:23:37,015 --> 00:23:39,451 should have been aiming at and the speeds that he 471 00:23:39,518 --> 00:23:40,986 was actually achieving. 472 00:23:41,052 --> 00:23:42,888 NARRATOR: It's an intriguing clue. 473 00:23:42,954 --> 00:23:48,426 This is not the way Captain Key usually ascends after takeoff. 474 00:23:48,493 --> 00:23:50,262 COLIN WRIGHT: The performance at low speed 475 00:23:50,328 --> 00:23:52,030 was quite critical. 476 00:23:52,097 --> 00:23:55,400 The aircraft relies on its speed to provide lift. 477 00:23:55,467 --> 00:23:57,269 That means, particularly close to the ground, 478 00:23:57,335 --> 00:23:59,271 it has to be flown very accurately. 479 00:23:59,337 --> 00:24:01,807 Put up the photo of Key. 480 00:24:01,873 --> 00:24:04,276 DAVID LEARMOUNT: Key's normal performance came up 481 00:24:04,342 --> 00:24:08,246 to normal standards, but this on the day 482 00:24:08,313 --> 00:24:11,917 was well below standard. 483 00:24:11,983 --> 00:24:14,686 So they looked for reasons why this might be so. 484 00:24:14,753 --> 00:24:16,488 Now the tray table from the wreckage. 485 00:24:16,555 --> 00:24:17,756 NARRATOR: A piece of wreckage points 486 00:24:17,823 --> 00:24:19,891 to a possible explanation. 487 00:24:19,958 --> 00:24:25,564 In the sort of engineer's area, 488 00:24:25,630 --> 00:24:26,865 there was a little table. 489 00:24:26,932 --> 00:24:30,569 And on that table, there was some graffiti scribbled 490 00:24:30,635 --> 00:24:34,239 which gave a few rather facetious comments, 491 00:24:34,306 --> 00:24:38,109 obviously, from a pilot who'd been sitting in that position. 492 00:24:39,578 --> 00:24:40,779 Bloody fools. 493 00:24:40,846 --> 00:24:42,848 COLIN WRIGHT: It said, key must go, 494 00:24:42,914 --> 00:24:45,851 and then a few other derogatory comments added as well. 495 00:24:45,917 --> 00:24:47,219 Could you hand me the photograph? 496 00:24:47,285 --> 00:24:48,353 Thank you. 497 00:24:48,420 --> 00:24:49,855 NARRATOR: A note I found in the cockpit hints 498 00:24:49,921 --> 00:24:52,858 that the crew wasn't getting along. 499 00:24:52,924 --> 00:24:55,894 Perhaps a poisonous atmosphere inside the cockpit 500 00:24:55,961 --> 00:25:01,433 made it difficult for the pilots to do their job. 501 00:25:01,499 --> 00:25:02,601 Lights up. 502 00:25:02,667 --> 00:25:03,969 GRAHAM BRAITHWAITE: Investigators looking 503 00:25:04,035 --> 00:25:05,604 for any kind of clue that tells you 504 00:25:05,670 --> 00:25:07,939 about perhaps the atmosphere within the airline 505 00:25:08,006 --> 00:25:09,374 or within the crew on the day. 506 00:25:09,441 --> 00:25:11,009 Could you get this over to handwriting analysis for 507 00:25:11,076 --> 00:25:12,177 me, please? 508 00:25:12,244 --> 00:25:13,345 GRAHAM BRAITHWAITE: Was it particularly tense? 509 00:25:13,411 --> 00:25:14,679 Was it particularly aggressive? 510 00:25:14,746 --> 00:25:16,214 And these are small factors that 511 00:25:16,281 --> 00:25:19,217 might give a clue to that. 512 00:25:19,284 --> 00:25:21,820 NARRATOR: If handwriting analysis can identify who 513 00:25:21,887 --> 00:25:25,457 wrote the note, investigators may be one step closer 514 00:25:25,523 --> 00:25:28,526 to understanding what really happened in the cockpit of BEA 515 00:25:28,593 --> 00:25:29,527 Flight 548. 516 00:25:37,969 --> 00:25:41,339 Investigators interview other BEA pilots to find out all 517 00:25:41,406 --> 00:25:44,542 they can about Captain Stanley Key and his crew. 518 00:25:44,609 --> 00:25:47,879 I hear you're someone we should talk to. 519 00:25:47,946 --> 00:25:53,285 Yeah, I need to tell you what happened. 520 00:25:53,351 --> 00:25:55,320 NARRATOR: Pilots at British European Airways 521 00:25:55,387 --> 00:25:57,322 are on the verge of a strike. 522 00:25:57,389 --> 00:26:02,260 Captain Key is seen by many as a company man. 523 00:26:02,327 --> 00:26:04,062 COLIN WRIGHT: There was a work-to-rule going on. 524 00:26:04,129 --> 00:26:07,232 Most of the co-pilots, which included me, working to rule, 525 00:26:07,299 --> 00:26:09,668 and he thoroughly disapproved of this as not being 526 00:26:09,734 --> 00:26:11,236 a professional way to behave. 527 00:26:11,303 --> 00:26:13,972 I was leading a campaign against it. 528 00:26:14,039 --> 00:26:15,273 NARRATOR: According to witnesses, 529 00:26:15,340 --> 00:26:17,242 things came to a head 90 minutes 530 00:26:17,309 --> 00:26:19,010 before the flight to Brussels. 531 00:26:19,077 --> 00:26:23,615 I'd say it was just a couple of hours before the flight 532 00:26:23,682 --> 00:26:25,317 when it all happened. 533 00:26:28,186 --> 00:26:33,725 Captain Key, may the battle start and go our the way. 534 00:26:33,792 --> 00:26:35,026 What did you say? 535 00:26:35,093 --> 00:26:36,728 I-- I just meant that-- 536 00:26:36,795 --> 00:26:39,364 You know that during the war we flew in real battles? 537 00:26:39,431 --> 00:26:41,333 Captain Key was very, very angry. 538 00:26:41,399 --> 00:26:44,703 He felt very passionate this strike should not go ahead. 539 00:26:44,769 --> 00:26:47,439 Acting like some selfish, pampered, immature crybabies 540 00:26:47,505 --> 00:26:49,207 making a lot of ridiculous demands. 541 00:26:49,274 --> 00:26:51,109 Look here, just because your lot flew in the war-- 542 00:26:51,176 --> 00:26:52,277 And as for your refusal to-- 543 00:26:52,344 --> 00:26:56,781 Witnesses describing captain Key's outburst 544 00:26:56,848 --> 00:27:00,685 at this other pilot described it as being just exactly that. 545 00:27:00,752 --> 00:27:02,921 It was a real outburst, a tirade. 546 00:27:02,988 --> 00:27:06,091 You ungrateful bastard! 547 00:27:06,157 --> 00:27:07,659 If you're flying that plane for money, 548 00:27:07,726 --> 00:27:09,461 then you're in the wrong profession. 549 00:27:09,527 --> 00:27:12,364 I think we better agree to disagree. 550 00:27:12,430 --> 00:27:13,898 Bunch of fools. 551 00:27:13,965 --> 00:27:16,568 NARRATOR: The argument is so severe that investigators 552 00:27:16,634 --> 00:27:20,605 consider an unusual theory, that the captain's 553 00:27:20,672 --> 00:27:26,011 agitation interfered with his ability to fly the plane. 554 00:27:26,077 --> 00:27:28,847 Bloody fools. 555 00:27:28,913 --> 00:27:31,616 TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: 548 climb to flight level 60. 556 00:27:31,683 --> 00:27:35,220 Squawk 6615. 557 00:27:35,286 --> 00:27:38,023 NARRATOR: Distracted and angry-- 558 00:27:38,089 --> 00:27:39,157 Up to 60. 559 00:27:39,224 --> 00:27:40,458 NARRATOR: --he might have pulled the droop 560 00:27:40,525 --> 00:27:44,229 handle without thinking. 561 00:27:44,295 --> 00:27:48,833 The multiple warnings would have added to his confusion. 562 00:27:48,900 --> 00:27:51,770 If you go from what is apparently a normal flight 563 00:27:51,836 --> 00:27:54,272 into something which is seriously dangerous, 564 00:27:54,339 --> 00:27:56,674 it will produce a shock response. 565 00:27:56,741 --> 00:27:59,110 And that means your ability to think clearly 566 00:27:59,177 --> 00:28:04,049 and to act decisively is very difficult. 567 00:28:04,115 --> 00:28:06,117 When we've got that cued up, let me listen to it, 568 00:28:06,184 --> 00:28:07,218 will you, please? 569 00:28:07,285 --> 00:28:08,653 Thanks. 570 00:28:08,720 --> 00:28:10,989 NARRATOR: Although the Trident is not equipped with a cockpit 571 00:28:11,056 --> 00:28:13,758 voice recorder-- 572 00:28:13,825 --> 00:28:16,161 STANLEY KEY (ON SPEAKER): Beeline 548 ready for takeoff. 573 00:28:16,227 --> 00:28:17,962 NARRATOR: --the captain's conversations with air 574 00:28:18,029 --> 00:28:20,331 traffic control are recorded. 575 00:28:20,398 --> 00:28:24,002 TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Beeline 548 clear for takeoff, 28 right. 576 00:28:24,069 --> 00:28:25,837 STANLEY KEY (ON SPEAKER): 548. 577 00:28:25,904 --> 00:28:27,639 GRAHAM BRAITHWAITE: The human performance investigator 578 00:28:27,705 --> 00:28:30,475 is trying to understand a simple thing, what 579 00:28:30,542 --> 00:28:32,243 was going through the mind of the crew 580 00:28:32,310 --> 00:28:33,645 at the time of the accident? 581 00:28:33,711 --> 00:28:37,282 Why did what happen make sense to them at the time? 582 00:28:37,348 --> 00:28:38,516 STANLEY KEY (ON SPEAKER): Beeline 548 583 00:28:38,583 --> 00:28:40,051 climbing as cleared. 584 00:28:40,118 --> 00:28:42,387 TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: 548 airborne at 09. 585 00:28:42,454 --> 00:28:43,922 Good day. 586 00:28:43,988 --> 00:28:45,457 STANLEY KEY (ON SPEAKER): Roger. 587 00:28:45,523 --> 00:28:48,660 NARRATOR: They immediately notice something unusual. 588 00:28:48,726 --> 00:28:52,230 Captain seems awfully quiet. 589 00:28:52,297 --> 00:28:55,033 TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: 548 climb to flight level 60. 590 00:28:55,100 --> 00:28:58,536 Squawk 6615. 591 00:28:58,603 --> 00:28:59,804 STANLEY KEY (ON SPEAKER): Up to 60. 592 00:28:59,871 --> 00:29:01,139 NARRATOR: The captain's infrequent 593 00:29:01,206 --> 00:29:03,608 radio calls are so short they don't 594 00:29:03,675 --> 00:29:05,543 even meet aviation standards. 595 00:29:05,610 --> 00:29:07,812 COLIN WRIGHT: For a proper response, if you are given 596 00:29:07,879 --> 00:29:10,448 a clearance, you have to repeat it back with a course 597 00:29:10,515 --> 00:29:12,117 on of the aircraft. 598 00:29:12,183 --> 00:29:13,518 That was all missing. 599 00:29:13,585 --> 00:29:16,020 NARRATOR: Inadequate responses are out of character 600 00:29:16,087 --> 00:29:17,522 for this strict captain. 601 00:29:17,589 --> 00:29:19,791 DAVID LEARMOUNT: With hindsight, you and I 602 00:29:19,858 --> 00:29:25,296 might make a judgment about the way Captain Key was feeling 603 00:29:25,363 --> 00:29:29,167 at the time, that he felt he was under stress or very busy 604 00:29:29,234 --> 00:29:33,438 or having to concentrate very hard or maybe all of those. 605 00:29:33,505 --> 00:29:35,306 NARRATOR: The conversation with the controller 606 00:29:35,373 --> 00:29:39,110 provides no hint about why the captain is stressed. 607 00:29:39,177 --> 00:29:43,114 Investigators are left with yet another question. 608 00:29:43,181 --> 00:29:45,350 What was going on in that cockpit? 609 00:29:45,416 --> 00:29:46,851 GRAHAM BRAITHWAITE: Stress takes many forms. 610 00:29:46,918 --> 00:29:48,987 It can be physical stress, or it 611 00:29:49,053 --> 00:29:51,289 can be anxiety perhaps caused by, well, 612 00:29:51,356 --> 00:29:52,891 in this case, an argument. 613 00:29:52,957 --> 00:29:55,927 All of those things will add workload to our brains 614 00:29:55,994 --> 00:29:59,964 and reduce our ability to deal with things. 615 00:30:00,031 --> 00:30:02,667 NARRATOR: Results from the handwriting analysis are in. 616 00:30:02,734 --> 00:30:07,071 These are similar C's on the BRAC and on the license. 617 00:30:07,138 --> 00:30:10,074 NARRATOR: Discovering who wrote the note in the cockpit 618 00:30:10,141 --> 00:30:14,913 could be the break investigators need. 619 00:30:14,979 --> 00:30:16,848 Experts find that the handwriting 620 00:30:16,915 --> 00:30:19,617 sample is similar to the co-pilot's, but it's 621 00:30:19,684 --> 00:30:22,053 not a match. 622 00:30:22,120 --> 00:30:24,556 DAVID LEARMOUNT: They never positively identify 623 00:30:24,622 --> 00:30:27,792 the handwriting and the graffiti 624 00:30:27,859 --> 00:30:32,664 as definitely being one of the pilots who was in that crew. 625 00:30:32,730 --> 00:30:34,299 NARRATOR: It's another dead end. 626 00:30:34,365 --> 00:30:37,735 Investigators are no closer to understanding why BEA 627 00:30:37,802 --> 00:30:44,209 Flight 548 ended in tragedy. 628 00:30:44,275 --> 00:30:46,878 All right, could you show me some of the switches 629 00:30:46,945 --> 00:30:48,880 on the Trident here? 630 00:30:48,947 --> 00:30:51,716 NARRATOR: Desperate for leads, they travel to BEA's flight 631 00:30:51,783 --> 00:30:54,052 simulator outside London. 632 00:30:54,118 --> 00:30:56,888 The team hears about a nagging problem for pilots 633 00:30:56,955 --> 00:31:00,792 of the Trident plane. 634 00:31:00,858 --> 00:31:03,161 The handle used to retract the droops 635 00:31:03,228 --> 00:31:08,066 is nearly the same shape as the one used to adjust the flaps. 636 00:31:08,132 --> 00:31:10,902 I can see why you confuse them. 637 00:31:10,969 --> 00:31:12,870 COLIN WRIGHT: One has to bear in mind that it's being moved 638 00:31:12,937 --> 00:31:16,574 by the palm of the hand and it's not easy to identify one 639 00:31:16,641 --> 00:31:19,444 from another. 640 00:31:19,510 --> 00:31:21,613 Beeline 548 climbing as cleared. 641 00:31:21,679 --> 00:31:23,615 NARRATOR: It's the co-pilot who's supposed to raise 642 00:31:23,681 --> 00:31:25,583 the flaps after takeoff. 643 00:31:25,650 --> 00:31:27,819 TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: 548 airborne at 09. 644 00:31:27,885 --> 00:31:28,820 Good day. 645 00:31:28,886 --> 00:31:30,054 Roger. 646 00:31:30,121 --> 00:31:34,425 NARRATOR: But the third pilot sometimes helps out. 647 00:31:34,492 --> 00:31:35,793 85 seconds. 648 00:31:35,860 --> 00:31:37,428 NARRATOR: The noise abatement procedure 649 00:31:37,495 --> 00:31:39,297 added to the pressure. 650 00:31:39,364 --> 00:31:41,532 If the flaps were already up, it 651 00:31:41,599 --> 00:31:45,303 would be all too easy to pull in the droops instead. 652 00:31:45,370 --> 00:31:48,039 DAVID LEARMOUNT: There were circumstances under which it 653 00:31:48,106 --> 00:31:50,575 would be possible, quite easily, 654 00:31:50,642 --> 00:31:53,211 to retract the droops early, and that 655 00:31:53,278 --> 00:31:55,413 could be catastrophic. 656 00:31:55,480 --> 00:31:57,081 NARRATOR: If their theory is right, 657 00:31:57,148 --> 00:32:00,118 investigators should be able to find other cases where 658 00:32:00,184 --> 00:32:02,754 pilots made the same mistake. 659 00:32:02,820 --> 00:32:05,023 The team reviews the flight records from nearly 660 00:32:05,089 --> 00:32:08,559 100 other Trident flights. 661 00:32:08,626 --> 00:32:10,194 It's not just this crew. 662 00:32:10,261 --> 00:32:13,531 NARRATOR: They find two near accidents where pilots pulled 663 00:32:13,598 --> 00:32:19,570 in the droops by mistake. 664 00:32:19,637 --> 00:32:22,407 It's suddenly beginning to look like the captain's argument 665 00:32:22,473 --> 00:32:25,510 in the crew room had nothing to do with the accident. 666 00:32:25,576 --> 00:32:32,583 Poor design may be the real cause. 667 00:32:33,718 --> 00:32:36,020 Then comes news that puts investigators 668 00:32:36,087 --> 00:32:39,457 on an entirely new path. 669 00:32:39,524 --> 00:32:40,792 DAVID LEARMOUNT: In Captain Key's 670 00:32:40,858 --> 00:32:43,928 routine medical examinations before this, 671 00:32:43,995 --> 00:32:47,665 nothing was reckoned to be wrong with his health. 672 00:32:47,732 --> 00:32:53,338 It was only after the accident when an autopsy was carried 673 00:32:53,404 --> 00:32:56,274 out that it was found that he actually had 674 00:32:56,341 --> 00:32:58,743 some severe coronary problems. 675 00:32:58,810 --> 00:33:00,078 PETER COOMBS: There was medical evidence 676 00:33:00,144 --> 00:33:02,747 showing that the captain suffered of a heart condition. 677 00:33:02,814 --> 00:33:06,918 It seemed to be the missing link. 678 00:33:06,984 --> 00:33:08,820 NARRATOR: Although the captain's heart problem did 679 00:33:08,886 --> 00:33:11,255 not show up in his regular medical exams, 680 00:33:11,322 --> 00:33:15,560 he had a deadly heart condition. 681 00:33:15,626 --> 00:33:18,129 Now, as you can see-- 682 00:33:18,196 --> 00:33:20,365 DAVID LEARMOUNT: Key had, without even knowing it, 683 00:33:20,431 --> 00:33:23,201 a clogging of the coronary arteries. 684 00:33:23,267 --> 00:33:25,703 This in turn caused the heart attack. 685 00:33:25,770 --> 00:33:27,105 What did you say? 686 00:33:27,171 --> 00:33:29,707 Do you realize that during the war we flew in real battles? 687 00:33:29,774 --> 00:33:31,376 Acting like some pampered, crybaby-- 688 00:33:31,442 --> 00:33:34,078 NARRATOR: Pathologists believe that Captain Key suffered 689 00:33:34,145 --> 00:33:36,781 heart failure sometime within a 2-hour window 690 00:33:36,848 --> 00:33:37,782 before the crash. 691 00:33:37,849 --> 00:33:39,016 Totally unprofessional. 692 00:33:39,083 --> 00:33:41,119 NARRATOR: It may have been caused by a sudden rise 693 00:33:41,185 --> 00:33:42,553 in blood pressure. 694 00:33:42,620 --> 00:33:44,822 You ungrateful bastard! 695 00:33:44,889 --> 00:33:46,124 GRAHAM BRAITHWAITE: Captain Key may not 696 00:33:46,190 --> 00:33:48,493 have had symptoms of a heart condition prior 697 00:33:48,559 --> 00:33:52,163 to the accident, but following a stressful event, perhaps 698 00:33:52,230 --> 00:33:54,265 after the argument, it seems to have started 699 00:33:54,332 --> 00:33:55,767 to have an effect on him. 700 00:33:55,833 --> 00:33:58,136 Bloody fools! 701 00:33:58,202 --> 00:34:00,171 NARRATOR: The theory could help explain the captain's 702 00:34:00,238 --> 00:34:03,875 unusual radio calls. 703 00:34:03,941 --> 00:34:08,045 TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Beeline 548 clear for takeoff. 704 00:34:08,112 --> 00:34:11,149 STANLEY KEY (ON SPEAKER): 548. 705 00:34:14,619 --> 00:34:17,288 TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: 548 climb to flight level 60. 706 00:34:17,355 --> 00:34:21,893 Squawk 6615. 707 00:34:21,959 --> 00:34:23,828 Up to 60. 708 00:34:23,895 --> 00:34:26,497 NARRATOR: If Captain Key was in enough pain, 709 00:34:26,564 --> 00:34:29,767 he would have kept his replies as short as possible. 710 00:34:29,834 --> 00:34:32,603 His discomfort might even explain why the droop 711 00:34:32,670 --> 00:34:35,173 lever was pulled too soon. 712 00:34:35,239 --> 00:34:38,443 PETER COOMBS: His level of pain would have increased over 713 00:34:38,509 --> 00:34:42,313 the period up to a point where he would have become partly 714 00:34:42,380 --> 00:34:44,649 or totally incapacitated. 715 00:34:44,715 --> 00:34:45,917 GRAHAM BRAITHWAITE: Anything from what 716 00:34:45,983 --> 00:34:47,919 may feel like heartburn or indigestion 717 00:34:47,985 --> 00:34:50,922 through to a violent pain close to death. 718 00:34:50,988 --> 00:34:52,390 If you're flying that plane for the money, 719 00:34:52,457 --> 00:34:54,058 then you're in the wrong profession. 720 00:34:54,125 --> 00:34:55,359 NARRATOR: Finally, investigators 721 00:34:55,426 --> 00:34:57,728 have a possible explanation for what happened 722 00:34:57,795 --> 00:35:01,666 in the cockpit of Flight 548. 723 00:35:01,732 --> 00:35:05,436 Bunch of fools. 724 00:35:05,503 --> 00:35:07,972 DAVID LEARMOUNT: If his blood pressure was particularly high 725 00:35:08,039 --> 00:35:12,477 because he was agitated, it might affect his reasoning, 726 00:35:12,543 --> 00:35:17,215 because if you have the oxygen level in your brain reduced, 727 00:35:17,281 --> 00:35:21,719 even slightly, it affects your alertness and your ability 728 00:35:21,786 --> 00:35:23,120 to reason. 729 00:35:23,187 --> 00:35:27,458 And the accident investigators reckoned that that may well 730 00:35:27,525 --> 00:35:29,560 have been so in this case. 731 00:35:29,627 --> 00:35:31,429 Right, so we have to comb through all the information. 732 00:35:31,496 --> 00:35:33,564 NARRATOR: There's still a nagging question. 733 00:35:33,631 --> 00:35:35,500 There were other qualified pilots 734 00:35:35,566 --> 00:35:37,335 in the cockpit that day. 735 00:35:37,401 --> 00:35:41,439 Why didn't one of them do something to save the plane? 736 00:35:41,506 --> 00:35:43,541 The second captain seated in the back 737 00:35:43,608 --> 00:35:46,644 was too far from the controls to be of any help, 738 00:35:46,711 --> 00:35:50,948 but the two co-pilots could have responded to the crisis. 739 00:35:51,015 --> 00:35:52,350 DAVID LEARMOUNT: Neither Captain Key 740 00:35:52,416 --> 00:35:56,287 nor the other pilots realized that it was the retraction 741 00:35:56,354 --> 00:35:58,289 of the droop which had caused the stall 742 00:35:58,356 --> 00:36:01,025 because nobody attempted to put it back down again. 743 00:36:01,092 --> 00:36:05,162 If they had done, they could have uninstalled the airplane. 744 00:36:05,229 --> 00:36:06,464 Jeremy Keighley. 745 00:36:06,531 --> 00:36:08,266 NARRATOR: Crew records provide a possible explanation. 746 00:36:08,332 --> 00:36:09,567 22. 747 00:36:09,634 --> 00:36:11,369 NARRATOR: Because of the labor dispute at the airline-- 748 00:36:11,435 --> 00:36:12,570 Age 22. 749 00:36:12,637 --> 00:36:15,606 NARRATOR: --pilot training had been disrupted. 750 00:36:15,673 --> 00:36:21,913 Both the co-pilots on Flight 548 were very inexperienced. 751 00:36:22,980 --> 00:36:26,117 What was that? 752 00:36:26,183 --> 00:36:27,552 GRAHAM BRAITHWAITE: In the right hand seat, 753 00:36:27,618 --> 00:36:31,155 his first officer had less than 30 hours of experience 754 00:36:31,222 --> 00:36:32,890 on the Trident. 755 00:36:32,957 --> 00:36:34,358 COLIN WRIGHT: There's obviously some opinion 756 00:36:34,425 --> 00:36:36,227 that these pilots were too young, 757 00:36:36,294 --> 00:36:37,728 they needed more experience. 758 00:36:37,795 --> 00:36:40,531 NARRATOR: The junior pilots may have been distracted by having 759 00:36:40,598 --> 00:36:43,901 a guest in the cockpit or they may have 760 00:36:43,968 --> 00:36:48,172 simply not known what to do. 761 00:36:48,239 --> 00:36:49,974 Investigators believe there's yet 762 00:36:50,041 --> 00:36:53,811 another piece to the puzzle. 763 00:36:53,878 --> 00:36:56,213 It all comes back to that argument. 764 00:36:56,280 --> 00:36:58,516 Pampered crybabies making a lot of ridiculous demands. 765 00:36:58,583 --> 00:37:00,151 Look here, just because your lot flew the war-- 766 00:37:00,217 --> 00:37:02,053 And as for your refusal to fulfill all of your duties-- 767 00:37:02,119 --> 00:37:03,588 NARRATOR: Investigators learn that an hour 768 00:37:03,654 --> 00:37:07,058 and a half before takeoff co-pilot Jeremy Keighley 769 00:37:07,124 --> 00:37:08,326 witnessed Key's outburst. 770 00:37:08,392 --> 00:37:10,227 If you're flying that plane for money, 771 00:37:10,294 --> 00:37:11,862 you're in the wrong profession. 772 00:37:11,929 --> 00:37:13,664 NARRATOR: They suspect it made a big impact 773 00:37:13,731 --> 00:37:14,966 on the young pilot. 774 00:37:15,032 --> 00:37:16,434 COLIN WRIGHT: Having witnessed an outburst like that, 775 00:37:16,500 --> 00:37:19,370 one can only surmise that if you are new to the fleet, 776 00:37:19,437 --> 00:37:21,339 you don't know the captain, you're 777 00:37:21,405 --> 00:37:23,174 slightly unconfident yourself. 778 00:37:23,240 --> 00:37:25,109 You may be nervous of your own performance. 779 00:37:25,176 --> 00:37:26,777 This is not likely to enhance it. 780 00:37:26,844 --> 00:37:29,180 And I would expect it would have been quite intimidating. 781 00:37:29,246 --> 00:37:30,982 NARRATOR: Shaken by his captain's temper-- 782 00:37:31,048 --> 00:37:32,116 Bunch of fools! 783 00:37:32,183 --> 00:37:33,451 NARRATOR: --Keighley may have been 784 00:37:33,517 --> 00:37:36,887 more likely to make mistakes and less likely to correct 785 00:37:36,954 --> 00:37:38,923 his captain's errors. 786 00:37:38,990 --> 00:37:40,391 DAVID LEARMOUNT: It would certainly 787 00:37:40,458 --> 00:37:44,929 reinforce the concept that the captain was authoritarian 788 00:37:44,996 --> 00:37:47,898 and not somebody that you should challenge lightly, 789 00:37:47,965 --> 00:37:50,668 especially on that day. 790 00:37:50,735 --> 00:37:52,970 NARRATOR: There is yet another mystery. 791 00:37:53,037 --> 00:37:54,872 Investigators know that the Trident 792 00:37:54,939 --> 00:37:56,474 is equipped with a safety system 793 00:37:56,540 --> 00:38:00,177 known as a stick shaker. 794 00:38:00,244 --> 00:38:02,680 If the plane's speed drops too low, 795 00:38:02,747 --> 00:38:04,849 the control column begins to shake, 796 00:38:04,915 --> 00:38:07,284 giving the crew a dramatic warning that their plane 797 00:38:07,351 --> 00:38:09,620 is about to stall. 798 00:38:09,687 --> 00:38:12,556 PETER COOMBS: It will shake the column very distinctly 799 00:38:12,623 --> 00:38:14,458 and produce an unmistakable rattling 800 00:38:14,525 --> 00:38:16,227 noise at the same time. 801 00:38:16,293 --> 00:38:18,696 NARRATOR: Pilots are trained to react to the stick shaker 802 00:38:18,763 --> 00:38:21,432 by pushing the nose of the plane down to gain speed 803 00:38:21,499 --> 00:38:24,201 and increase lift. 804 00:38:24,268 --> 00:38:26,103 If that doesn't work, the system has 805 00:38:26,170 --> 00:38:29,140 a failsafe, the stick pusher. 806 00:38:29,206 --> 00:38:31,709 It will move the controls forward to push the nose 807 00:38:31,776 --> 00:38:35,579 down even if the pilots don't. 808 00:38:35,646 --> 00:38:37,148 COLIN WRIGHT: The pusher will make sure 809 00:38:37,214 --> 00:38:39,483 that firmly the aircraft's nose was lowered 810 00:38:39,550 --> 00:38:41,552 into an altitude where the speed would increase 811 00:38:41,619 --> 00:38:43,387 and you would recover. 812 00:38:43,454 --> 00:38:45,222 NARRATOR: Why didn't the system prevent 813 00:38:45,289 --> 00:38:48,726 Flight 548 from stalling and save the lives of everyone 814 00:38:48,793 --> 00:38:49,727 on board? 815 00:38:56,167 --> 00:39:00,137 Investigators study flight data from BEA Flight 548, 816 00:39:00,204 --> 00:39:02,206 searching for any sign that the plane's 817 00:39:02,273 --> 00:39:05,476 anti-stall system failed. 818 00:39:05,543 --> 00:39:10,815 So it looks as though it came on here and here 819 00:39:10,881 --> 00:39:13,884 but didn't stay on. 820 00:39:13,951 --> 00:39:16,987 NARRATOR: The data shows that the stick pusher did engage, 821 00:39:17,054 --> 00:39:22,927 but it didn't stay on long enough to prevent the crash. 822 00:39:22,993 --> 00:39:26,430 The finding can be explained in only one of two ways, 823 00:39:26,497 --> 00:39:29,166 either the stick pusher malfunctioned or the crew 824 00:39:29,233 --> 00:39:32,470 disabled it. 825 00:39:32,536 --> 00:39:33,771 PETER COOMBS: The stall recovery system 826 00:39:33,838 --> 00:39:37,274 was capable of being inhibited if they 827 00:39:37,341 --> 00:39:42,546 concluded that the thing was operating incorrectly. 828 00:39:42,613 --> 00:39:44,582 NARRATOR: To figure out what actually happened, 829 00:39:44,648 --> 00:39:46,617 engineer Peter Coombs has to test 830 00:39:46,684 --> 00:39:50,087 every electrical connection in the system. 831 00:39:50,154 --> 00:39:53,624 PETER COOMBS: Fortunately, the incident sensors had actually 832 00:39:53,691 --> 00:39:57,728 survived the accident in an apparently undamaged state, 833 00:39:57,795 --> 00:39:59,764 and there were a number of other components 834 00:39:59,830 --> 00:40:01,165 to the system. 835 00:40:01,232 --> 00:40:07,204 And they were tested and found to be operating accurately. 836 00:40:07,271 --> 00:40:08,839 NARRATOR: Coombs' test results point 837 00:40:08,906 --> 00:40:10,908 to a stunning conclusion. 838 00:40:10,975 --> 00:40:14,745 The plane's anti-stall system was working perfectly, 839 00:40:14,812 --> 00:40:17,114 but for some reason, perhaps because they didn't think 840 00:40:17,181 --> 00:40:20,151 their plane was actually stalling, one of the pilots 841 00:40:20,217 --> 00:40:21,585 disabled it. 842 00:40:21,652 --> 00:40:25,589 DAVID LEARMOUNT: By pulling out the stick pusher, by disabling 843 00:40:25,656 --> 00:40:31,662 it, they took away the natural stall recovery of the airplane 844 00:40:31,729 --> 00:40:35,332 and took the aircraft back into the stall. 845 00:40:35,399 --> 00:40:37,935 And after that, they were doomed 846 00:40:38,002 --> 00:40:41,205 because the aircraft didn't have enough height left 847 00:40:41,272 --> 00:40:46,811 to recover from the stall. 848 00:40:52,683 --> 00:40:56,353 NARRATOR: It now seems the crash of BEA Flight 548 849 00:40:56,420 --> 00:41:01,592 was the result of a tragic combination of factors. 850 00:41:01,659 --> 00:41:04,128 First, a looming strike that led to an argument. 851 00:41:04,195 --> 00:41:06,263 Bunch of crybabies making a lot of ridiculous demands. 852 00:41:06,330 --> 00:41:07,464 Look here, just because your-- 853 00:41:07,531 --> 00:41:08,732 And as for your refusal to fulfil-- 854 00:41:08,799 --> 00:41:10,568 NARRATOR: A heart failure that was possibly 855 00:41:10,634 --> 00:41:14,438 triggered by the fight, confusion over control levers, 856 00:41:14,505 --> 00:41:18,409 and co-pilots too junior or too intimidated to step in when 857 00:41:18,475 --> 00:41:21,879 things started to go wrong. 858 00:41:21,946 --> 00:41:24,348 For investigators, each piece of the chain 859 00:41:24,415 --> 00:41:31,088 is as important as the other. 860 00:41:32,523 --> 00:41:33,991 GRAHAM BRAITHWAITE: Trying to solve something that-- that's 861 00:41:34,058 --> 00:41:36,260 enormously complex, there's likely to be lots 862 00:41:36,327 --> 00:41:39,029 of small factors that influence any accident, 863 00:41:39,096 --> 00:41:40,631 no one simple thing. 864 00:41:40,698 --> 00:41:42,466 NARRATOR: After the crash, authorities 865 00:41:42,533 --> 00:41:44,435 implemented a number of changes designed 866 00:41:44,501 --> 00:41:48,873 to prevent similar accidents from happening again. 867 00:41:48,939 --> 00:41:51,275 Handles on the Trident and other planes 868 00:41:51,342 --> 00:41:55,546 are redesigned to eliminate the possibility of confusion. 869 00:41:55,613 --> 00:41:58,015 Cockpit voice recorders are now standard equipment 870 00:41:58,082 --> 00:42:01,886 in almost all commercial passenger planes. 871 00:42:01,952 --> 00:42:04,255 Somebody-- and we're never quite sure 872 00:42:04,321 --> 00:42:06,924 who it was among the crew, somebody 873 00:42:06,991 --> 00:42:08,859 retracted the droops early. 874 00:42:08,926 --> 00:42:12,529 And the conclusion of the investigators in this case 875 00:42:12,596 --> 00:42:19,169 is that they could more likely have determined who was doing 876 00:42:20,170 --> 00:42:22,573 what in the cockpit if they had been 877 00:42:22,640 --> 00:42:26,844 able to judge what the pilots were saying to each other. 878 00:42:26,911 --> 00:42:28,078 NARRATOR: Cockpit voice recorders 879 00:42:28,145 --> 00:42:30,414 provide a major source of information for nearly 880 00:42:30,481 --> 00:42:36,854 every crash, but some experts don't think 881 00:42:36,921 --> 00:42:39,757 the recorders are enough. 882 00:42:39,823 --> 00:42:42,259 PETER COOMBS: Listening to a cockpit voice recorder 883 00:42:42,326 --> 00:42:44,929 rather resembles watching a television program 884 00:42:44,995 --> 00:42:46,797 with the picture switched off. 885 00:42:46,864 --> 00:42:49,700 It's quite difficult to work out what's going on. 886 00:42:49,767 --> 00:42:55,606 And on a flight deck, a lot of communication is by gesture. 887 00:42:55,673 --> 00:42:59,009 DAVID LEARMOUNT: One of the recommendations for flight 888 00:42:59,076 --> 00:43:03,714 decks now to help investigators is that there 889 00:43:03,781 --> 00:43:07,618 should be permanent filming of what 890 00:43:07,685 --> 00:43:09,119 happens on the flight deck. 891 00:43:09,186 --> 00:43:12,623 It doesn't have to be widescreen filming which shows 892 00:43:12,690 --> 00:43:14,792 what the pilots are doing and how they're drinking 893 00:43:14,858 --> 00:43:19,430 their coffee, but literally a narrow focus lens which looks 894 00:43:19,496 --> 00:43:21,565 at the controls that they handle 895 00:43:21,632 --> 00:43:24,501 and all the flight instruments. 896 00:43:24,568 --> 00:43:26,937 NARRATOR: So far, there are no legal requirements 897 00:43:27,004 --> 00:43:29,573 for the new technology, but some aviation 898 00:43:29,640 --> 00:43:31,542 authorities promote the voluntary use 899 00:43:31,608 --> 00:43:37,214 of cockpit image recorders. 900 00:43:37,281 --> 00:43:39,350 In the years following the crash, 901 00:43:39,416 --> 00:43:41,652 Hawker Siddeley faced growing competition 902 00:43:41,719 --> 00:43:43,554 from rival manufacturers. 903 00:43:43,620 --> 00:43:48,425 Trident production ended in 1978. 904 00:43:48,492 --> 00:43:51,228 DAVID LEARMOUNT: It was being challenged by the Boeing 727, 905 00:43:51,295 --> 00:43:56,367 which had a similar layout, three engines in the tail, 906 00:43:56,433 --> 00:43:59,970 and in some respects had slightly superior performance. 907 00:44:00,037 --> 00:44:04,174 NARRATOR: But the legacy of the Staines disaster lives on. 908 00:44:04,241 --> 00:44:07,711 PETER COOMBS: The accident drew into perspective 909 00:44:07,778 --> 00:44:14,785 the whole importance of human factors on the flight deck. 910 00:44:15,886 --> 00:44:17,254 Bloody fools. 911 00:44:17,321 --> 00:44:19,423 DAVID LEARMOUNT: Nowadays, the way 912 00:44:19,490 --> 00:44:21,859 that crews interact together is taken 913 00:44:21,925 --> 00:44:24,495 very much more seriously. 914 00:44:24,561 --> 00:44:26,263 COLIN WRIGHT: The modern airline is operated 915 00:44:26,330 --> 00:44:28,399 very, very differently. 916 00:44:28,465 --> 00:44:31,635 The way the crews handle things is improved. 917 00:44:31,702 --> 00:44:34,238 It's a much better and safer world. 918 00:44:34,304 --> 00:44:35,572 The regret is we've had to build 919 00:44:35,639 --> 00:44:38,108 it on the death of 118 people. 72253

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