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NARRATOR: In 1972, the
Hawker Siddeley Trident is
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the pride of British aviation.
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Rotate.
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DAVID LEARMOUNT: The
Trident was a completely
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British-built airplane.
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And the carriage up.
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COLIN WRIGHT: It
was the equivalent
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of having a sports car.
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NARRATOR: When BEA Flight 548--
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Look at the speed.
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Look at the speed.
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NARRATOR: --falls from the
sky moments after takeoff.
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The carnage shocks the nation.
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FRANCES CASTLEDINE: It
was so tragic that there
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wasn't anyone who survived.
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DAVID LEARMOUNT:
It was the worst
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airline accident that
Britain had ever experienced.
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Ladies and gentlemen, we
are starting our approach.
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We lost both engines.
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- Put the mask over your nose.
- Emergency descent.
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Mayday, Mayday.
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Brace for impact!
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I think I lost one.
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Investigation
started on the tragedy.
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He's going to crash!
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NARRATOR: London's
Heathrow Airport,
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Beeline 548 requesting start.
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NARRATOR: The crew of British
European Airways Flight 548
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is completing final
preparations for an afternoon
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flight to Brussels.
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Looks like the
weather is going
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to give us a bumpy ride today.
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Beeline 548 cleared for start.
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NARRATOR: Captain
Stanley Key was
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supposed to have
today off, but was
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called in at the last minute.
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Key is a former Royal Air Force
pilot and one of the airline's
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most qualified captains.
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Starter master.
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On.
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Captain Key had been on the
aircraft for a long time.
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So he's very experienced.
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And if you expected
to fly with him,
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you expected to fly
to the book and to do
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it accurately with no arguing.
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NARRATOR: Many of
the 112 passengers
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are business travelers
taking advantage of BEA's
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rapid service to Brussels.
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The jet-powered
Trident can make
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the trip in just 45 minutes.
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COLIN WRIGHT: The
Trident was really
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competition for the propeller
and the turboprop aircraft,
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which were much slower.
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So you now had an
aircraft which was fast,
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it flew above the weather,
and it was halving the time
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to European
destinations, which is
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an enormous economic
advantage to the airline.
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NARRATOR: It takes three
pilots to fly the plane.
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Droops down.
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NARRATOR: Jeremy
Keighley is the co-pilot.
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Flaps 20.
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Simon Ticehurst will help
monitor the instruments.
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Engine one start.
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Engine one start.
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COLIN WRIGHT: It was
an immensely popular
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airplane because it
was the equivalent
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of having a sports car.
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It had terrific performance.
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It had very powerful controls,
which were all hydraulic.
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It was a delight to fly
once you got used to it.
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NARRATOR: Today's flight is
getting off to a slow start.
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The airline has told
the crew to wait for
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some last minute passengers.
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Another flight crew
needs a ride to Brussels.
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Have a seat, captain.
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COLIN WRIGHT: It
was over 30 years
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difference between
Captain Key and the two
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other members of his crew.
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And this produces the
natural differences
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you have between a generation.
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One regards the other as
old and stuffy, and then
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one who regard the
youngsters as being
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young and irresponsible.
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This produced a
generational gap.
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Beeline 548
ready for takeoff.
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TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Beeline
548 clear for takeoff.
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548.
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NARRATOR: The captain
calls for takeoff power.
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Maximum thrust.
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NARRATOR: The
Trident gets its name
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from its three rear-mounted
Rolls-Royce engines.
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Second officer Ticehurst
monitors the plane's speed.
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100 knots.
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NARRATOR: They can't
lift off until they reach
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rotation speed, 139 knots.
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Stopwatch on.
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NARRATOR: Meanwhile, Keighley
keeps a close eye on the time.
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It's part of a
special procedure
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designed to minimize aircraft
noise over populated areas.
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It's a very noisy
engine with a particularly
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nasty crackle to it.
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So noise abatement would be
an issue wherever it flew.
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Rotate.
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NARRATOR: Once they've
gained enough altitude,
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they'll have to throttle
back slightly to reduce
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the noise of the engines.
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They've got to
adjust the power, i.e.
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reduce it just when it would
be really rather nice to keep
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the full power on, but
they've got to reduce it
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for noise abatement reasons.
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NARRATOR: Officials at the
airport measure the noise
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level after 90 seconds.
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If the pilots get it wrong,
it'll go on their record.
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The pressure on you
is to do it quickly
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and to do it accurately.
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Undercarriage up.
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60 seconds.
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NARRATOR: As the plane
climbs, passengers
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are rocked by turbulence.
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It was a gusty day.
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And gusty days give
you a bumpy ride.
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Left, heading 145.
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Heading 145.
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NARRATOR: The
plane's flight plan
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calls for a left turn
just after takeoff, taking
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it east of the town
of Staines before it
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flies on to Brussels.
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Beeline 548
climbing as cleared.
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TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
548 airborne at 09.
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Good day.
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Roger.
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NARRATOR: Keighley prepares
to throttle back the engines.
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If he does it too
soon, the plane won't
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have enough power to climb.
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JEREMY KEIGHLEY: 75 seconds.
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NARRATOR: He'll have just
5 seconds to get it right.
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There is a lag in the
time that the engines
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take to respond to that.
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00:07:02,121 --> 00:07:04,524
And on occasions, you can
actually reduce the power
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by more than you intended.
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And it would take
a while to actually
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get the engines to settle.
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85 seconds.
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90 seconds.
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NARRATOR: Keighley reduces
power just in time.
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Passing 1,500 feet.
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NARRATOR: The
procedure goes well.
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TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: 548
climbed to flight level 60.
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Squawk 6615.
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NARRATOR: The tower clears
them to a higher altitude.
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Up to 60.
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NARRATOR: Then--
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What was that?
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NARRATOR: --the plane
begins to lose altitude.
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Look at the speed!
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Look at the speed!
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COLIN WRIGHT: The air speed
dropped quite rapidly.
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It was in a very
high rate of descent.
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They were just passengers
in their own aircraft.
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NARRATOR: The plane has crashed
in an empty field just yards
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from the town of Staines.
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I was at home with
my baby of 12 weeks,
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and I heard a very loud thump.
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NARRATOR: Local resident
Frances Castledine
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leaves her infant
son with a neighbor
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and rushes to the crash site.
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If it had gone
another 50 yards,
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it would have hit the center
of Staines with the shops
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and the houses there.
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NARRATOR: Frances is a nurse.
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She immediately
begins searching
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the wreckage for survivors.
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I was very much
afraid there was
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going to be a fire
because the vapor
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was very heavy in the air.
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And I had to decide, basically,
whether I was going to go back
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home to my baby
or whether I was
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going to go forward and help.
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But I had had a lot
of intensive training
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in the accident and
emergency department,
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and I really felt that
I needed to be there.
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NARRATOR: Nearly
everyone is dead,
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but Frances is able
to help one survivor.
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Can you hear me?
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FRANCES CASTLEDINE:
I did my best.
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I did what I could.
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Can you hear me?
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I manipulated his legs and
put them into some wreckage
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splints with some bandages.
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You are going to be OK.
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Hey!
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Hey!
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Help is on the way.
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NARRATOR: The man's
injuries are too severe.
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Despite her quick
response, he dies.
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FRANCES CASTLEDINE: It just
was so tragic that there
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wasn't anyone who survived.
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NARRATOR: All 118 people aboard
BEA Flight 548 are killed
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DAVID LEARMOUNT: This
accident was pretty horrifying
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because it was the worst
airline accident that Britain
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had ever experienced and BEA
was reckoned in those days
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to be the kind of airline
that just didn't have crashes.
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And this time, they did.
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REPORTER: Flight BE 548 en
route to Belgium crashes
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in a field not
far from Heathrow
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and only a few feet from
houses in the main road.
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NARRATOR: News that a
plane crashed and narrowly
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missed the town of Staines
is soon the top story
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across the country.
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00:11:01,160 --> 00:11:03,829
Within an hour, the news
reaches Chris Pollard,
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a new investigator with
Britain's Accidents
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Investigation Branch.
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CHRIS POLLARD: At the time
that I arrived on the site,
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the rescue attempt
had started big time
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and the site was very,
very active with people.
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00:11:20,513 --> 00:11:23,416
NARRATOR: Investigators are
struck by something unusual.
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In most accidents, momentum
carries the wreckage forward
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00:11:26,852 --> 00:11:29,688
after it hits the ground.
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00:11:29,755 --> 00:11:33,259
The crash at Staines
is different.
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CHRIS POLLARD: The
tail had not moved
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very far from where it had
initially struck the ground.
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00:11:39,131 --> 00:11:44,103
And the rest of the aircraft
probably hadn't moved forward
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more than about 50 yards, which
for such a heavy aeroplane
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00:11:48,674 --> 00:11:52,078
is very, very little distance.
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00:11:52,144 --> 00:11:55,981
NARRATOR: Nearby, power
lines tell part of the story.
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00:11:56,048 --> 00:11:58,150
CHRIS POLLARD: The older
investigators, they
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00:11:58,217 --> 00:12:00,119
were pointing out the
power lines, which
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00:12:00,186 --> 00:12:02,788
it had passed over
very, very shortly
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00:12:02,855 --> 00:12:05,124
before the first impact point.
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PETER COOMBS: If you walked
around the back of the remains
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of the tail unit, you could
look backwards and upwards,
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00:12:10,262 --> 00:12:12,598
and there were overhead
high tension cables.
233
00:12:12,665 --> 00:12:15,701
This told you really that the
aircraft must have been coming
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00:12:15,768 --> 00:12:17,236
down at a very
steep angle in order
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00:12:17,303 --> 00:12:19,305
not to interfere
with the cables.
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00:12:19,371 --> 00:12:22,208
NARRATOR: The undamaged
wires and compact crash zone
237
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tell investigators that the
plane fell to the ground
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00:12:24,877 --> 00:12:30,082
suddenly and steeply.
239
00:12:30,149 --> 00:12:34,753
It's a sure sign that
the plane stalled.
240
00:12:34,820 --> 00:12:36,122
DAVID LEARMOUNT:
An aircraft stalls
241
00:12:36,188 --> 00:12:39,024
when it's flying too
slowly to generate
242
00:12:39,091 --> 00:12:42,294
sufficient wind over the
wings to give it lift.
243
00:12:42,361 --> 00:12:44,497
When that aircraft
hit the ground,
244
00:12:44,563 --> 00:12:46,699
it was actually
slightly nose up.
245
00:12:46,765 --> 00:12:52,738
It was falling through
the sky like that.
246
00:12:52,805 --> 00:12:55,307
All the sort of
basic impact signs
247
00:12:55,374 --> 00:12:58,677
were that the
aircraft was stalled.
248
00:12:58,744 --> 00:13:02,381
The first question is, why?
249
00:13:02,448 --> 00:13:05,184
NARRATOR: An airplane can stall
for many different reasons
250
00:13:05,251 --> 00:13:11,123
from engine failure
to pilot error.
251
00:13:11,190 --> 00:13:14,126
Pollard studies the wreckage in
search of the specific reason
252
00:13:14,193 --> 00:13:15,594
for the stall.
253
00:13:15,661 --> 00:13:19,665
Every piece of debris
is a potential clue.
254
00:13:19,732 --> 00:13:21,167
CHRIS POLLARD: You may
come across something
255
00:13:21,233 --> 00:13:23,536
which-- which is unexpected.
256
00:13:23,602 --> 00:13:27,706
At which point, you have
to try to explain it.
257
00:13:27,773 --> 00:13:30,075
It may prove to
be a red herring.
258
00:13:30,142 --> 00:13:33,546
It may prove to be
something crucial.
259
00:13:33,612 --> 00:13:36,315
How you do the salvage
actually very much
260
00:13:36,382 --> 00:13:39,885
influences how easy you
make things for yourself.
261
00:13:39,952 --> 00:13:43,289
Hang on, will you?
262
00:13:43,355 --> 00:13:46,759
You can by careless salvage
make things incredibly
263
00:13:46,825 --> 00:13:50,963
difficult for yourself.
264
00:13:51,030 --> 00:13:52,364
NARRATOR: There's
another challenge.
265
00:13:52,431 --> 00:13:55,401
In 1972, planes in
the United Kingdom
266
00:13:55,467 --> 00:13:59,905
are not required to carry
cockpit voice recorders.
267
00:13:59,972 --> 00:14:01,407
GRAHAM BRAITHWAITE:
The modern investigator
268
00:14:01,473 --> 00:14:04,577
is helped enormously in so
many accident situations
269
00:14:04,643 --> 00:14:07,646
where a cockpit voice recorder
is present because it really
270
00:14:07,713 --> 00:14:09,114
does help you
understand what was
271
00:14:09,181 --> 00:14:10,549
going on in the flight deck.
272
00:14:10,616 --> 00:14:12,251
I think we forget
how difficult this
273
00:14:12,318 --> 00:14:14,954
must have been to investigate.
274
00:14:15,020 --> 00:14:16,355
NARRATOR:
Investigators will only
275
00:14:16,422 --> 00:14:19,358
have the information from the
Trident's flight recorders.
276
00:14:19,425 --> 00:14:26,031
It will take time to recover
and process that data.
277
00:14:26,098 --> 00:14:27,666
The rest of the
debris is carefully
278
00:14:27,733 --> 00:14:32,705
labeled and sent to AAIB
headquarters in Farnborough.
279
00:14:32,771 --> 00:14:34,240
All this has to get
back to the hangar.
280
00:14:34,306 --> 00:14:35,874
NARRATOR: There the
plane will be put back
281
00:14:35,941 --> 00:14:38,744
together like a jigsaw
puzzle, a process
282
00:14:38,811 --> 00:14:41,113
that could take months.
283
00:14:41,180 --> 00:14:42,681
PETER COOMBS: Following
an impact of this sort,
284
00:14:42,748 --> 00:14:46,318
everything is comprehensively
wrecked and jumbled up,
285
00:14:46,385 --> 00:14:49,622
and most of the components
on the aircraft,
286
00:14:49,688 --> 00:14:51,457
particularly the
electronic components, all
287
00:14:51,523 --> 00:14:53,125
look very similar.
288
00:14:53,192 --> 00:14:55,194
NARRATOR: The team
has no time to lose.
289
00:14:55,261 --> 00:14:57,129
If there's a problem
with the Trident,
290
00:14:57,196 --> 00:15:00,466
investigators need to
know as soon as possible.
291
00:15:00,532 --> 00:15:05,137
There is enormous pressure to
find the cause of the crash.
292
00:15:05,204 --> 00:15:06,472
DAVID LEARMOUNT: You
have to recognize
293
00:15:06,538 --> 00:15:10,209
that the Trident was a
completely British-built
294
00:15:10,276 --> 00:15:12,111
and British-engined aeroplane.
295
00:15:12,177 --> 00:15:14,747
Therefore, for
British industry,
296
00:15:14,813 --> 00:15:17,316
it was very important
that if there
297
00:15:17,383 --> 00:15:19,418
was anything wrong
with the Trident,
298
00:15:19,485 --> 00:15:21,487
it should be found
out and corrected.
299
00:15:21,553 --> 00:15:22,621
GRAHAM BRAITHWAITE:
It's usually
300
00:15:22,688 --> 00:15:25,457
a very complex picture
drawn painstakingly
301
00:15:25,524 --> 00:15:27,559
over months, sometimes years.
302
00:15:27,626 --> 00:15:29,461
And so the pressure
to find the answer
303
00:15:29,528 --> 00:15:33,565
can be quite significant.
304
00:15:33,632 --> 00:15:37,102
NARRATOR: The weather could
provide an early lead.
305
00:15:37,169 --> 00:15:40,205
COLIN WRIGHT: There was a cold
front about 30 miles away.
306
00:15:40,272 --> 00:15:42,675
And at the airport at the
time, there was low cloud
307
00:15:42,741 --> 00:15:45,044
at about 1,000 feet--
308
00:15:45,110 --> 00:15:46,979
And the carriage up.
309
00:15:47,046 --> 00:15:48,847
COLIN WRIGHT: --and there
was moderate turbulence,
310
00:15:48,914 --> 00:15:50,382
which would vary
rather like driving
311
00:15:50,449 --> 00:15:56,488
a car over a rough road.
312
00:15:56,555 --> 00:15:59,158
NARRATOR: In bad weather,
storm clouds sometimes create
313
00:15:59,224 --> 00:16:01,226
powerful columns
of air that can
314
00:16:01,293 --> 00:16:03,262
force a plane to the ground.
315
00:16:03,329 --> 00:16:04,863
PETER COOMBS: Extreme
wind shear or something of
316
00:16:04,930 --> 00:16:06,932
that sort can lead to a stall.
317
00:16:06,999 --> 00:16:10,069
NARRATOR: Planes are especially
vulnerable during takeoff.
318
00:16:10,135 --> 00:16:12,571
They're so close to the ground
that pilots have little time
319
00:16:12,638 --> 00:16:13,806
to recover from the problem.
320
00:16:15,174 --> 00:16:17,376
DAVID LEARMOUNT: The aircraft
had only just taken off
321
00:16:17,443 --> 00:16:19,144
and it was still pretty low.
322
00:16:19,211 --> 00:16:23,048
If a stall like this had
happened at multiple thousands
323
00:16:23,115 --> 00:16:25,918
of feet, there would
have been plenty of time
324
00:16:25,984 --> 00:16:28,087
to recognize what
the problem was
325
00:16:28,153 --> 00:16:29,955
and to do something about it.
326
00:16:30,022 --> 00:16:32,791
NARRATOR: Investigators
need to just how severe
327
00:16:32,858 --> 00:16:34,593
the weather conditions
were at Heathrow
328
00:16:34,660 --> 00:16:38,697
when the Trident took off.
329
00:16:38,764 --> 00:16:41,834
The AAIB receives detailed
meteorological reports
330
00:16:41,900 --> 00:16:45,437
from the day of the crash.
331
00:16:45,504 --> 00:16:47,139
They reveal that the
turbulence simply
332
00:16:47,206 --> 00:16:52,578
wasn't strong enough to
knock a plane out of the sky.
333
00:16:52,644 --> 00:16:53,846
PETER COOMBS: There
was no wind shear.
334
00:16:53,912 --> 00:16:55,914
There was nothing
excessive in the weather.
335
00:16:55,981 --> 00:16:58,317
And certainly, it
would have to be
336
00:16:58,384 --> 00:17:01,286
very extreme to
contribute to a stall
337
00:17:01,353 --> 00:17:07,993
at that phase in the flight.
338
00:17:08,060 --> 00:17:09,428
NARRATOR: Meanwhile,
investigators
339
00:17:09,495 --> 00:17:11,864
turn their attention to
the preliminary information
340
00:17:11,930 --> 00:17:15,868
captured on the
Trident's black box.
341
00:17:15,934 --> 00:17:17,669
PETER COOMBS: The amount
of recording on the Trident
342
00:17:17,736 --> 00:17:21,340
was the greatest
amount of any airliner
343
00:17:21,407 --> 00:17:22,941
I was aware of at that time.
344
00:17:23,008 --> 00:17:25,310
It was very much
state of the art.
345
00:17:25,377 --> 00:17:28,213
NARRATOR: They focus on engine
data, searching for any sign
346
00:17:28,280 --> 00:17:32,718
that the engines flamed
out or lost power.
347
00:17:32,785 --> 00:17:35,654
A sudden loss of thrust could
explain why the aircraft
348
00:17:35,721 --> 00:17:39,124
stalled, but the data
shows the engines
349
00:17:39,191 --> 00:17:41,326
were working perfectly.
350
00:17:41,393 --> 00:17:43,562
The Trident had climbed
with enough thrust
351
00:17:43,629 --> 00:17:48,333
to maintain a safe speed.
352
00:17:48,400 --> 00:17:49,701
PETER COOMBS: With
regard to the engines,
353
00:17:49,768 --> 00:17:52,137
we were quite satisfied
that there was no evidence
354
00:17:52,204 --> 00:17:54,173
of a gross loss of thrust.
355
00:17:54,239 --> 00:17:57,910
NARRATOR: Engine failure did
not bring down Flight 548.
356
00:17:57,976 --> 00:17:59,945
DAVID LEARMOUNT: The stall
happened very suddenly
357
00:18:00,012 --> 00:18:01,647
during a normal climb.
358
00:18:01,713 --> 00:18:04,450
The speed, although it was a
bit lower than it should have
359
00:18:04,516 --> 00:18:06,318
been, it was not
dramatically, though,
360
00:18:06,385 --> 00:18:07,419
lower than it should have been.
361
00:18:07,486 --> 00:18:14,493
It should not have
led to a stall.
362
00:18:17,696 --> 00:18:20,599
NARRATOR: At AAIB headquarters,
engineers piece together
363
00:18:20,666 --> 00:18:25,003
the wreckage of Flight 548.
364
00:18:25,070 --> 00:18:27,673
CHRIS POLLARD: When
you do a reconstruction
365
00:18:27,739 --> 00:18:30,375
for investigation,
the best technique
366
00:18:30,442 --> 00:18:35,214
is to try to lay the wreckage
out in-- in plan form
367
00:18:35,280 --> 00:18:39,718
so that in essence you know
automatically if you're
368
00:18:39,785 --> 00:18:41,887
looking for-- for
a particular bit,
369
00:18:41,954 --> 00:18:43,655
you know where to go for it.
370
00:18:43,722 --> 00:18:45,858
NARRATOR: By testing
the reassembled systems,
371
00:18:45,924 --> 00:18:48,227
investigators should be
able to tell if there is
372
00:18:48,293 --> 00:18:50,629
a broken part or
faulty mechanism that
373
00:18:50,696 --> 00:18:53,932
could have caused the stall.
374
00:18:53,999 --> 00:18:56,001
PETER COOMBS: By
reconstructing the aircraft,
375
00:18:56,068 --> 00:19:00,172
it's possible to
untangle flying control
376
00:19:00,239 --> 00:19:03,542
cables and hydraulic
pipes and identify
377
00:19:03,609 --> 00:19:07,746
whether there are any failures
that preceded the impact.
378
00:19:07,813 --> 00:19:10,716
NARRATOR: They soon
notice a problem.
379
00:19:10,782 --> 00:19:12,684
That can't be right.
380
00:19:12,751 --> 00:19:15,888
NARRATOR: A lever is set
to an unexpected position.
381
00:19:15,954 --> 00:19:18,390
It's used to operate
crucial lift devices
382
00:19:18,457 --> 00:19:21,627
on the wing known as droops.
383
00:19:21,693 --> 00:19:23,328
It could be seen
that the droop lever
384
00:19:23,395 --> 00:19:27,065
was in the retracted position.
385
00:19:27,132 --> 00:19:29,234
NARRATOR: Droops are
aerodynamic surfaces
386
00:19:29,301 --> 00:19:31,770
that can be extended from
the front of the wing.
387
00:19:31,837 --> 00:19:33,639
They increase lift
during takeoff
388
00:19:33,705 --> 00:19:36,174
to help the plane climb.
389
00:19:36,241 --> 00:19:39,344
The front section of the
wing was hydraulically powered
390
00:19:39,411 --> 00:19:41,346
and would lean
and droop forward
391
00:19:41,413 --> 00:19:43,248
to give an extra
curvature of the wing.
392
00:19:43,315 --> 00:19:46,718
And at lower speed, that
would give you extra lift.
393
00:19:46,785 --> 00:19:48,453
NARRATOR: Droops should
only be retracted
394
00:19:48,520 --> 00:19:52,157
once the plane has enough speed
to maintain lift without them.
395
00:19:52,224 --> 00:19:55,027
If one of the pilots pulled
in the droops too early,
396
00:19:55,093 --> 00:20:01,033
it would have instantly put the
plane into a dangerous stall.
397
00:20:05,537 --> 00:20:10,208
The discovery baffles
investigators.
398
00:20:10,275 --> 00:20:11,977
PETER COOMBS: How on
Earth did somebody
399
00:20:12,044 --> 00:20:15,480
manage to retract the droop
lever and nobody noticed
400
00:20:15,547 --> 00:20:17,816
that that had happened?
401
00:20:17,883 --> 00:20:22,020
And it didn't make
a lot of sense.
402
00:20:22,087 --> 00:20:23,388
NARRATOR: There's
no way to tell just
403
00:20:23,455 --> 00:20:26,124
by looking at the droop lever
whether the crew moved it
404
00:20:26,191 --> 00:20:28,961
before the crash or
if it was jostled out
405
00:20:29,027 --> 00:20:36,034
of place by the crash itself.
406
00:20:37,436 --> 00:20:42,207
It might even have been moved
during recovery operations.
407
00:20:42,274 --> 00:20:47,212
Hang on, will you?
408
00:20:47,279 --> 00:20:50,882
We had the whole-- the droop
system laid out on tables
409
00:20:50,949 --> 00:20:52,784
in front of the wing.
410
00:20:52,851 --> 00:20:55,754
NARRATOR: To determine how the
all-important lever was last
411
00:20:55,821 --> 00:20:58,256
moved, Pollard must
carefully examine
412
00:20:58,323 --> 00:21:01,760
the cables connected to it.
413
00:21:01,827 --> 00:21:07,232
The droop lever operated a
cable system which went down
414
00:21:07,299 --> 00:21:11,536
to the drive motor and selected
a position, which the drive
415
00:21:11,603 --> 00:21:18,610
motor would drive to.
416
00:21:22,080 --> 00:21:23,415
Retracted.
417
00:21:23,482 --> 00:21:25,450
DAVID LEARMOUNT: They
determined by an examination
418
00:21:25,517 --> 00:21:29,988
of the wreckage that the droops
had been retracted at impact.
419
00:21:30,055 --> 00:21:33,225
NARRATOR: There's no longer any
doubt, someone in the cockpit
420
00:21:33,291 --> 00:21:34,726
moved the droop lever.
421
00:21:34,793 --> 00:21:36,495
It's a troubling discovery.
422
00:21:36,561 --> 00:21:40,832
PETER COOMBS: As the awareness
develops that there had been
423
00:21:40,899 --> 00:21:43,669
incorrect operation
of the droop lever,
424
00:21:43,735 --> 00:21:48,306
the inevitable question arose,
well, who had operated it?
425
00:21:48,373 --> 00:21:49,608
NARRATOR: The
deadliest aviation
426
00:21:49,675 --> 00:21:51,910
accident ever to
occur on British soil
427
00:21:51,977 --> 00:21:55,947
was caused by pilot error.
428
00:21:56,014 --> 00:21:59,117
This prompts urgent questions
about the mental and physical
429
00:21:59,184 --> 00:22:01,953
state of the crew.
430
00:22:02,020 --> 00:22:04,389
DAVID LEARMOUNT: Autopsies are
always done on flight crews
431
00:22:04,456 --> 00:22:06,858
if they don't
survive an accident.
432
00:22:06,925 --> 00:22:09,227
A very simple thing is
they want to find out
433
00:22:09,294 --> 00:22:12,130
whether there was
any alcohol or drugs
434
00:22:12,197 --> 00:22:16,268
in the blood of the pilots.
435
00:22:16,334 --> 00:22:19,838
NARRATOR: While pathologists
search for a physical cause--
436
00:22:19,905 --> 00:22:21,239
Put up the personnel
records, will you?
437
00:22:21,306 --> 00:22:23,208
NARRATOR: --investigators
focus their attention
438
00:22:23,275 --> 00:22:25,343
on the pilot's history.
439
00:22:25,410 --> 00:22:26,912
GRAHAM BRAITHWAITE: The
technical investigation
440
00:22:26,978 --> 00:22:29,147
at Staines had to rule
out technical causes
441
00:22:29,214 --> 00:22:30,215
of the accident.
442
00:22:30,282 --> 00:22:31,750
And when it had
done that, it really
443
00:22:31,817 --> 00:22:34,119
needed to look at the
performance of the crew,
444
00:22:34,186 --> 00:22:37,255
why did they do what they did
or why did they not do what
445
00:22:37,322 --> 00:22:38,724
they may have done on the day?
446
00:22:38,790 --> 00:22:39,991
So--
447
00:22:40,058 --> 00:22:41,693
NARRATOR: They study the
captain's previous flights.
448
00:22:41,760 --> 00:22:45,330
He has an impeccable
reputation.
449
00:22:45,397 --> 00:22:46,732
GRAHAM BRAITHWAITE:
Captain Key was a very
450
00:22:46,798 --> 00:22:48,300
experienced Trident pilot.
451
00:22:48,366 --> 00:22:51,436
He had over 4,000 hours, and
he was an experienced captain
452
00:22:51,503 --> 00:22:52,471
as well.
453
00:22:52,537 --> 00:22:53,839
NARRATOR: His
takeoffs from Heathrow
454
00:22:53,905 --> 00:22:57,008
are almost always flawless.
455
00:22:57,075 --> 00:22:59,077
Undercarriage up.
456
00:22:59,144 --> 00:23:00,946
NARRATOR: But on the
day of the crash,
457
00:23:01,012 --> 00:23:05,217
he does things differently.
458
00:23:05,283 --> 00:23:09,521
Let me see those air speeds
from the day of the crash.
459
00:23:09,588 --> 00:23:13,458
Thanks.
460
00:23:13,525 --> 00:23:16,294
Beeline 548
climbing is cleared.
461
00:23:16,361 --> 00:23:18,463
TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
548 airborne at 09.
462
00:23:18,530 --> 00:23:19,664
Good day.
463
00:23:19,731 --> 00:23:20,665
Roger.
464
00:23:20,732 --> 00:23:22,367
NARRATOR: As he flew
out of Heathrow,
465
00:23:22,434 --> 00:23:26,471
Key was flying the Trident
a bit slower than usual.
466
00:23:26,538 --> 00:23:28,173
DAVID LEARMOUNT:
On this occasion,
467
00:23:28,240 --> 00:23:30,909
from almost immediately
after takeoff
468
00:23:30,976 --> 00:23:33,545
until the accident
had occurred itself,
469
00:23:33,612 --> 00:23:36,948
there was a noted disparity
between the speed that he
470
00:23:37,015 --> 00:23:39,451
should have been aiming
at and the speeds that he
471
00:23:39,518 --> 00:23:40,986
was actually achieving.
472
00:23:41,052 --> 00:23:42,888
NARRATOR: It's an
intriguing clue.
473
00:23:42,954 --> 00:23:48,426
This is not the way Captain Key
usually ascends after takeoff.
474
00:23:48,493 --> 00:23:50,262
COLIN WRIGHT: The
performance at low speed
475
00:23:50,328 --> 00:23:52,030
was quite critical.
476
00:23:52,097 --> 00:23:55,400
The aircraft relies on
its speed to provide lift.
477
00:23:55,467 --> 00:23:57,269
That means, particularly
close to the ground,
478
00:23:57,335 --> 00:23:59,271
it has to be flown
very accurately.
479
00:23:59,337 --> 00:24:01,807
Put up the photo of Key.
480
00:24:01,873 --> 00:24:04,276
DAVID LEARMOUNT: Key's
normal performance came up
481
00:24:04,342 --> 00:24:08,246
to normal standards,
but this on the day
482
00:24:08,313 --> 00:24:11,917
was well below standard.
483
00:24:11,983 --> 00:24:14,686
So they looked for reasons
why this might be so.
484
00:24:14,753 --> 00:24:16,488
Now the tray table
from the wreckage.
485
00:24:16,555 --> 00:24:17,756
NARRATOR: A piece
of wreckage points
486
00:24:17,823 --> 00:24:19,891
to a possible explanation.
487
00:24:19,958 --> 00:24:25,564
In the sort of
engineer's area,
488
00:24:25,630 --> 00:24:26,865
there was a little table.
489
00:24:26,932 --> 00:24:30,569
And on that table, there
was some graffiti scribbled
490
00:24:30,635 --> 00:24:34,239
which gave a few rather
facetious comments,
491
00:24:34,306 --> 00:24:38,109
obviously, from a pilot who'd
been sitting in that position.
492
00:24:39,578 --> 00:24:40,779
Bloody fools.
493
00:24:40,846 --> 00:24:42,848
COLIN WRIGHT: It
said, key must go,
494
00:24:42,914 --> 00:24:45,851
and then a few other derogatory
comments added as well.
495
00:24:45,917 --> 00:24:47,219
Could you hand
me the photograph?
496
00:24:47,285 --> 00:24:48,353
Thank you.
497
00:24:48,420 --> 00:24:49,855
NARRATOR: A note I found
in the cockpit hints
498
00:24:49,921 --> 00:24:52,858
that the crew wasn't
getting along.
499
00:24:52,924 --> 00:24:55,894
Perhaps a poisonous
atmosphere inside the cockpit
500
00:24:55,961 --> 00:25:01,433
made it difficult for the
pilots to do their job.
501
00:25:01,499 --> 00:25:02,601
Lights up.
502
00:25:02,667 --> 00:25:03,969
GRAHAM BRAITHWAITE:
Investigators looking
503
00:25:04,035 --> 00:25:05,604
for any kind of
clue that tells you
504
00:25:05,670 --> 00:25:07,939
about perhaps the atmosphere
within the airline
505
00:25:08,006 --> 00:25:09,374
or within the crew on the day.
506
00:25:09,441 --> 00:25:11,009
Could you get this over to
handwriting analysis for
507
00:25:11,076 --> 00:25:12,177
me, please?
508
00:25:12,244 --> 00:25:13,345
GRAHAM BRAITHWAITE: Was
it particularly tense?
509
00:25:13,411 --> 00:25:14,679
Was it particularly aggressive?
510
00:25:14,746 --> 00:25:16,214
And these are
small factors that
511
00:25:16,281 --> 00:25:19,217
might give a clue to that.
512
00:25:19,284 --> 00:25:21,820
NARRATOR: If handwriting
analysis can identify who
513
00:25:21,887 --> 00:25:25,457
wrote the note, investigators
may be one step closer
514
00:25:25,523 --> 00:25:28,526
to understanding what really
happened in the cockpit of BEA
515
00:25:28,593 --> 00:25:29,527
Flight 548.
516
00:25:37,969 --> 00:25:41,339
Investigators interview other
BEA pilots to find out all
517
00:25:41,406 --> 00:25:44,542
they can about Captain
Stanley Key and his crew.
518
00:25:44,609 --> 00:25:47,879
I hear you're someone
we should talk to.
519
00:25:47,946 --> 00:25:53,285
Yeah, I need to tell
you what happened.
520
00:25:53,351 --> 00:25:55,320
NARRATOR: Pilots at
British European Airways
521
00:25:55,387 --> 00:25:57,322
are on the verge of a strike.
522
00:25:57,389 --> 00:26:02,260
Captain Key is seen by
many as a company man.
523
00:26:02,327 --> 00:26:04,062
COLIN WRIGHT: There was
a work-to-rule going on.
524
00:26:04,129 --> 00:26:07,232
Most of the co-pilots, which
included me, working to rule,
525
00:26:07,299 --> 00:26:09,668
and he thoroughly disapproved
of this as not being
526
00:26:09,734 --> 00:26:11,236
a professional way to behave.
527
00:26:11,303 --> 00:26:13,972
I was leading a
campaign against it.
528
00:26:14,039 --> 00:26:15,273
NARRATOR: According
to witnesses,
529
00:26:15,340 --> 00:26:17,242
things came to a
head 90 minutes
530
00:26:17,309 --> 00:26:19,010
before the flight to Brussels.
531
00:26:19,077 --> 00:26:23,615
I'd say it was just a couple
of hours before the flight
532
00:26:23,682 --> 00:26:25,317
when it all happened.
533
00:26:28,186 --> 00:26:33,725
Captain Key, may the battle
start and go our the way.
534
00:26:33,792 --> 00:26:35,026
What did you say?
535
00:26:35,093 --> 00:26:36,728
I-- I just meant that--
536
00:26:36,795 --> 00:26:39,364
You know that during the
war we flew in real battles?
537
00:26:39,431 --> 00:26:41,333
Captain Key was
very, very angry.
538
00:26:41,399 --> 00:26:44,703
He felt very passionate this
strike should not go ahead.
539
00:26:44,769 --> 00:26:47,439
Acting like some selfish,
pampered, immature crybabies
540
00:26:47,505 --> 00:26:49,207
making a lot of
ridiculous demands.
541
00:26:49,274 --> 00:26:51,109
Look here, just because
your lot flew in the war--
542
00:26:51,176 --> 00:26:52,277
And as for your refusal to--
543
00:26:52,344 --> 00:26:56,781
Witnesses describing
captain Key's outburst
544
00:26:56,848 --> 00:27:00,685
at this other pilot described
it as being just exactly that.
545
00:27:00,752 --> 00:27:02,921
It was a real
outburst, a tirade.
546
00:27:02,988 --> 00:27:06,091
You ungrateful bastard!
547
00:27:06,157 --> 00:27:07,659
If you're flying
that plane for money,
548
00:27:07,726 --> 00:27:09,461
then you're in the
wrong profession.
549
00:27:09,527 --> 00:27:12,364
I think we better
agree to disagree.
550
00:27:12,430 --> 00:27:13,898
Bunch of fools.
551
00:27:13,965 --> 00:27:16,568
NARRATOR: The argument is
so severe that investigators
552
00:27:16,634 --> 00:27:20,605
consider an unusual
theory, that the captain's
553
00:27:20,672 --> 00:27:26,011
agitation interfered with
his ability to fly the plane.
554
00:27:26,077 --> 00:27:28,847
Bloody fools.
555
00:27:28,913 --> 00:27:31,616
TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: 548
climb to flight level 60.
556
00:27:31,683 --> 00:27:35,220
Squawk 6615.
557
00:27:35,286 --> 00:27:38,023
NARRATOR: Distracted
and angry--
558
00:27:38,089 --> 00:27:39,157
Up to 60.
559
00:27:39,224 --> 00:27:40,458
NARRATOR: --he might
have pulled the droop
560
00:27:40,525 --> 00:27:44,229
handle without thinking.
561
00:27:44,295 --> 00:27:48,833
The multiple warnings would
have added to his confusion.
562
00:27:48,900 --> 00:27:51,770
If you go from what is
apparently a normal flight
563
00:27:51,836 --> 00:27:54,272
into something which
is seriously dangerous,
564
00:27:54,339 --> 00:27:56,674
it will produce
a shock response.
565
00:27:56,741 --> 00:27:59,110
And that means your
ability to think clearly
566
00:27:59,177 --> 00:28:04,049
and to act decisively
is very difficult.
567
00:28:04,115 --> 00:28:06,117
When we've got that cued
up, let me listen to it,
568
00:28:06,184 --> 00:28:07,218
will you, please?
569
00:28:07,285 --> 00:28:08,653
Thanks.
570
00:28:08,720 --> 00:28:10,989
NARRATOR: Although the Trident
is not equipped with a cockpit
571
00:28:11,056 --> 00:28:13,758
voice recorder--
572
00:28:13,825 --> 00:28:16,161
STANLEY KEY (ON SPEAKER):
Beeline 548 ready for takeoff.
573
00:28:16,227 --> 00:28:17,962
NARRATOR: --the captain's
conversations with air
574
00:28:18,029 --> 00:28:20,331
traffic control are recorded.
575
00:28:20,398 --> 00:28:24,002
TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Beeline 548
clear for takeoff, 28 right.
576
00:28:24,069 --> 00:28:25,837
STANLEY KEY (ON SPEAKER): 548.
577
00:28:25,904 --> 00:28:27,639
GRAHAM BRAITHWAITE: The human
performance investigator
578
00:28:27,705 --> 00:28:30,475
is trying to understand
a simple thing, what
579
00:28:30,542 --> 00:28:32,243
was going through
the mind of the crew
580
00:28:32,310 --> 00:28:33,645
at the time of the accident?
581
00:28:33,711 --> 00:28:37,282
Why did what happen make
sense to them at the time?
582
00:28:37,348 --> 00:28:38,516
STANLEY KEY (ON
SPEAKER): Beeline 548
583
00:28:38,583 --> 00:28:40,051
climbing as cleared.
584
00:28:40,118 --> 00:28:42,387
TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
548 airborne at 09.
585
00:28:42,454 --> 00:28:43,922
Good day.
586
00:28:43,988 --> 00:28:45,457
STANLEY KEY (ON
SPEAKER): Roger.
587
00:28:45,523 --> 00:28:48,660
NARRATOR: They immediately
notice something unusual.
588
00:28:48,726 --> 00:28:52,230
Captain seems awfully quiet.
589
00:28:52,297 --> 00:28:55,033
TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: 548
climb to flight level 60.
590
00:28:55,100 --> 00:28:58,536
Squawk 6615.
591
00:28:58,603 --> 00:28:59,804
STANLEY KEY (ON
SPEAKER): Up to 60.
592
00:28:59,871 --> 00:29:01,139
NARRATOR: The
captain's infrequent
593
00:29:01,206 --> 00:29:03,608
radio calls are so
short they don't
594
00:29:03,675 --> 00:29:05,543
even meet aviation standards.
595
00:29:05,610 --> 00:29:07,812
COLIN WRIGHT: For a proper
response, if you are given
596
00:29:07,879 --> 00:29:10,448
a clearance, you have to
repeat it back with a course
597
00:29:10,515 --> 00:29:12,117
on of the aircraft.
598
00:29:12,183 --> 00:29:13,518
That was all missing.
599
00:29:13,585 --> 00:29:16,020
NARRATOR: Inadequate
responses are out of character
600
00:29:16,087 --> 00:29:17,522
for this strict captain.
601
00:29:17,589 --> 00:29:19,791
DAVID LEARMOUNT: With
hindsight, you and I
602
00:29:19,858 --> 00:29:25,296
might make a judgment about
the way Captain Key was feeling
603
00:29:25,363 --> 00:29:29,167
at the time, that he felt he
was under stress or very busy
604
00:29:29,234 --> 00:29:33,438
or having to concentrate very
hard or maybe all of those.
605
00:29:33,505 --> 00:29:35,306
NARRATOR: The conversation
with the controller
606
00:29:35,373 --> 00:29:39,110
provides no hint about why
the captain is stressed.
607
00:29:39,177 --> 00:29:43,114
Investigators are left
with yet another question.
608
00:29:43,181 --> 00:29:45,350
What was going
on in that cockpit?
609
00:29:45,416 --> 00:29:46,851
GRAHAM BRAITHWAITE:
Stress takes many forms.
610
00:29:46,918 --> 00:29:48,987
It can be physical
stress, or it
611
00:29:49,053 --> 00:29:51,289
can be anxiety perhaps
caused by, well,
612
00:29:51,356 --> 00:29:52,891
in this case, an argument.
613
00:29:52,957 --> 00:29:55,927
All of those things will
add workload to our brains
614
00:29:55,994 --> 00:29:59,964
and reduce our ability
to deal with things.
615
00:30:00,031 --> 00:30:02,667
NARRATOR: Results from the
handwriting analysis are in.
616
00:30:02,734 --> 00:30:07,071
These are similar C's on
the BRAC and on the license.
617
00:30:07,138 --> 00:30:10,074
NARRATOR: Discovering who
wrote the note in the cockpit
618
00:30:10,141 --> 00:30:14,913
could be the break
investigators need.
619
00:30:14,979 --> 00:30:16,848
Experts find that
the handwriting
620
00:30:16,915 --> 00:30:19,617
sample is similar to
the co-pilot's, but it's
621
00:30:19,684 --> 00:30:22,053
not a match.
622
00:30:22,120 --> 00:30:24,556
DAVID LEARMOUNT: They
never positively identify
623
00:30:24,622 --> 00:30:27,792
the handwriting
and the graffiti
624
00:30:27,859 --> 00:30:32,664
as definitely being one of the
pilots who was in that crew.
625
00:30:32,730 --> 00:30:34,299
NARRATOR: It's
another dead end.
626
00:30:34,365 --> 00:30:37,735
Investigators are no closer
to understanding why BEA
627
00:30:37,802 --> 00:30:44,209
Flight 548 ended in tragedy.
628
00:30:44,275 --> 00:30:46,878
All right, could you show
me some of the switches
629
00:30:46,945 --> 00:30:48,880
on the Trident here?
630
00:30:48,947 --> 00:30:51,716
NARRATOR: Desperate for leads,
they travel to BEA's flight
631
00:30:51,783 --> 00:30:54,052
simulator outside London.
632
00:30:54,118 --> 00:30:56,888
The team hears about a
nagging problem for pilots
633
00:30:56,955 --> 00:31:00,792
of the Trident plane.
634
00:31:00,858 --> 00:31:03,161
The handle used to
retract the droops
635
00:31:03,228 --> 00:31:08,066
is nearly the same shape as the
one used to adjust the flaps.
636
00:31:08,132 --> 00:31:10,902
I can see why
you confuse them.
637
00:31:10,969 --> 00:31:12,870
COLIN WRIGHT: One has to bear
in mind that it's being moved
638
00:31:12,937 --> 00:31:16,574
by the palm of the hand and
it's not easy to identify one
639
00:31:16,641 --> 00:31:19,444
from another.
640
00:31:19,510 --> 00:31:21,613
Beeline 548
climbing as cleared.
641
00:31:21,679 --> 00:31:23,615
NARRATOR: It's the co-pilot
who's supposed to raise
642
00:31:23,681 --> 00:31:25,583
the flaps after takeoff.
643
00:31:25,650 --> 00:31:27,819
TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
548 airborne at 09.
644
00:31:27,885 --> 00:31:28,820
Good day.
645
00:31:28,886 --> 00:31:30,054
Roger.
646
00:31:30,121 --> 00:31:34,425
NARRATOR: But the third
pilot sometimes helps out.
647
00:31:34,492 --> 00:31:35,793
85 seconds.
648
00:31:35,860 --> 00:31:37,428
NARRATOR: The noise
abatement procedure
649
00:31:37,495 --> 00:31:39,297
added to the pressure.
650
00:31:39,364 --> 00:31:41,532
If the flaps were
already up, it
651
00:31:41,599 --> 00:31:45,303
would be all too easy to
pull in the droops instead.
652
00:31:45,370 --> 00:31:48,039
DAVID LEARMOUNT: There were
circumstances under which it
653
00:31:48,106 --> 00:31:50,575
would be possible,
quite easily,
654
00:31:50,642 --> 00:31:53,211
to retract the droops
early, and that
655
00:31:53,278 --> 00:31:55,413
could be catastrophic.
656
00:31:55,480 --> 00:31:57,081
NARRATOR: If their
theory is right,
657
00:31:57,148 --> 00:32:00,118
investigators should be able
to find other cases where
658
00:32:00,184 --> 00:32:02,754
pilots made the same mistake.
659
00:32:02,820 --> 00:32:05,023
The team reviews the
flight records from nearly
660
00:32:05,089 --> 00:32:08,559
100 other Trident flights.
661
00:32:08,626 --> 00:32:10,194
It's not just this crew.
662
00:32:10,261 --> 00:32:13,531
NARRATOR: They find two near
accidents where pilots pulled
663
00:32:13,598 --> 00:32:19,570
in the droops by mistake.
664
00:32:19,637 --> 00:32:22,407
It's suddenly beginning to look
like the captain's argument
665
00:32:22,473 --> 00:32:25,510
in the crew room had nothing
to do with the accident.
666
00:32:25,576 --> 00:32:32,583
Poor design may
be the real cause.
667
00:32:33,718 --> 00:32:36,020
Then comes news that
puts investigators
668
00:32:36,087 --> 00:32:39,457
on an entirely new path.
669
00:32:39,524 --> 00:32:40,792
DAVID LEARMOUNT:
In Captain Key's
670
00:32:40,858 --> 00:32:43,928
routine medical
examinations before this,
671
00:32:43,995 --> 00:32:47,665
nothing was reckoned to
be wrong with his health.
672
00:32:47,732 --> 00:32:53,338
It was only after the accident
when an autopsy was carried
673
00:32:53,404 --> 00:32:56,274
out that it was found
that he actually had
674
00:32:56,341 --> 00:32:58,743
some severe coronary problems.
675
00:32:58,810 --> 00:33:00,078
PETER COOMBS: There
was medical evidence
676
00:33:00,144 --> 00:33:02,747
showing that the captain
suffered of a heart condition.
677
00:33:02,814 --> 00:33:06,918
It seemed to be
the missing link.
678
00:33:06,984 --> 00:33:08,820
NARRATOR: Although the
captain's heart problem did
679
00:33:08,886 --> 00:33:11,255
not show up in his
regular medical exams,
680
00:33:11,322 --> 00:33:15,560
he had a deadly
heart condition.
681
00:33:15,626 --> 00:33:18,129
Now, as you can see--
682
00:33:18,196 --> 00:33:20,365
DAVID LEARMOUNT: Key had,
without even knowing it,
683
00:33:20,431 --> 00:33:23,201
a clogging of the
coronary arteries.
684
00:33:23,267 --> 00:33:25,703
This in turn caused
the heart attack.
685
00:33:25,770 --> 00:33:27,105
What did you say?
686
00:33:27,171 --> 00:33:29,707
Do you realize that during the
war we flew in real battles?
687
00:33:29,774 --> 00:33:31,376
Acting like some
pampered, crybaby--
688
00:33:31,442 --> 00:33:34,078
NARRATOR: Pathologists believe
that Captain Key suffered
689
00:33:34,145 --> 00:33:36,781
heart failure sometime
within a 2-hour window
690
00:33:36,848 --> 00:33:37,782
before the crash.
691
00:33:37,849 --> 00:33:39,016
Totally unprofessional.
692
00:33:39,083 --> 00:33:41,119
NARRATOR: It may have been
caused by a sudden rise
693
00:33:41,185 --> 00:33:42,553
in blood pressure.
694
00:33:42,620 --> 00:33:44,822
You ungrateful bastard!
695
00:33:44,889 --> 00:33:46,124
GRAHAM BRAITHWAITE:
Captain Key may not
696
00:33:46,190 --> 00:33:48,493
have had symptoms of a
heart condition prior
697
00:33:48,559 --> 00:33:52,163
to the accident, but following
a stressful event, perhaps
698
00:33:52,230 --> 00:33:54,265
after the argument, it
seems to have started
699
00:33:54,332 --> 00:33:55,767
to have an effect on him.
700
00:33:55,833 --> 00:33:58,136
Bloody fools!
701
00:33:58,202 --> 00:34:00,171
NARRATOR: The theory could
help explain the captain's
702
00:34:00,238 --> 00:34:03,875
unusual radio calls.
703
00:34:03,941 --> 00:34:08,045
TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Beeline
548 clear for takeoff.
704
00:34:08,112 --> 00:34:11,149
STANLEY KEY (ON SPEAKER): 548.
705
00:34:14,619 --> 00:34:17,288
TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: 548
climb to flight level 60.
706
00:34:17,355 --> 00:34:21,893
Squawk 6615.
707
00:34:21,959 --> 00:34:23,828
Up to 60.
708
00:34:23,895 --> 00:34:26,497
NARRATOR: If Captain
Key was in enough pain,
709
00:34:26,564 --> 00:34:29,767
he would have kept his
replies as short as possible.
710
00:34:29,834 --> 00:34:32,603
His discomfort might even
explain why the droop
711
00:34:32,670 --> 00:34:35,173
lever was pulled too soon.
712
00:34:35,239 --> 00:34:38,443
PETER COOMBS: His level of
pain would have increased over
713
00:34:38,509 --> 00:34:42,313
the period up to a point where
he would have become partly
714
00:34:42,380 --> 00:34:44,649
or totally incapacitated.
715
00:34:44,715 --> 00:34:45,917
GRAHAM BRAITHWAITE:
Anything from what
716
00:34:45,983 --> 00:34:47,919
may feel like heartburn
or indigestion
717
00:34:47,985 --> 00:34:50,922
through to a violent
pain close to death.
718
00:34:50,988 --> 00:34:52,390
If you're flying that
plane for the money,
719
00:34:52,457 --> 00:34:54,058
then you're in the
wrong profession.
720
00:34:54,125 --> 00:34:55,359
NARRATOR: Finally,
investigators
721
00:34:55,426 --> 00:34:57,728
have a possible explanation
for what happened
722
00:34:57,795 --> 00:35:01,666
in the cockpit of Flight 548.
723
00:35:01,732 --> 00:35:05,436
Bunch of fools.
724
00:35:05,503 --> 00:35:07,972
DAVID LEARMOUNT: If his blood
pressure was particularly high
725
00:35:08,039 --> 00:35:12,477
because he was agitated, it
might affect his reasoning,
726
00:35:12,543 --> 00:35:17,215
because if you have the oxygen
level in your brain reduced,
727
00:35:17,281 --> 00:35:21,719
even slightly, it affects your
alertness and your ability
728
00:35:21,786 --> 00:35:23,120
to reason.
729
00:35:23,187 --> 00:35:27,458
And the accident investigators
reckoned that that may well
730
00:35:27,525 --> 00:35:29,560
have been so in this case.
731
00:35:29,627 --> 00:35:31,429
Right, so we have to comb
through all the information.
732
00:35:31,496 --> 00:35:33,564
NARRATOR: There's still
a nagging question.
733
00:35:33,631 --> 00:35:35,500
There were other
qualified pilots
734
00:35:35,566 --> 00:35:37,335
in the cockpit that day.
735
00:35:37,401 --> 00:35:41,439
Why didn't one of them do
something to save the plane?
736
00:35:41,506 --> 00:35:43,541
The second captain
seated in the back
737
00:35:43,608 --> 00:35:46,644
was too far from the
controls to be of any help,
738
00:35:46,711 --> 00:35:50,948
but the two co-pilots could
have responded to the crisis.
739
00:35:51,015 --> 00:35:52,350
DAVID LEARMOUNT:
Neither Captain Key
740
00:35:52,416 --> 00:35:56,287
nor the other pilots realized
that it was the retraction
741
00:35:56,354 --> 00:35:58,289
of the droop which
had caused the stall
742
00:35:58,356 --> 00:36:01,025
because nobody attempted
to put it back down again.
743
00:36:01,092 --> 00:36:05,162
If they had done, they could
have uninstalled the airplane.
744
00:36:05,229 --> 00:36:06,464
Jeremy Keighley.
745
00:36:06,531 --> 00:36:08,266
NARRATOR: Crew records provide
a possible explanation.
746
00:36:08,332 --> 00:36:09,567
22.
747
00:36:09,634 --> 00:36:11,369
NARRATOR: Because of the
labor dispute at the airline--
748
00:36:11,435 --> 00:36:12,570
Age 22.
749
00:36:12,637 --> 00:36:15,606
NARRATOR: --pilot training
had been disrupted.
750
00:36:15,673 --> 00:36:21,913
Both the co-pilots on Flight
548 were very inexperienced.
751
00:36:22,980 --> 00:36:26,117
What was that?
752
00:36:26,183 --> 00:36:27,552
GRAHAM BRAITHWAITE: In
the right hand seat,
753
00:36:27,618 --> 00:36:31,155
his first officer had less
than 30 hours of experience
754
00:36:31,222 --> 00:36:32,890
on the Trident.
755
00:36:32,957 --> 00:36:34,358
COLIN WRIGHT: There's
obviously some opinion
756
00:36:34,425 --> 00:36:36,227
that these pilots
were too young,
757
00:36:36,294 --> 00:36:37,728
they needed more experience.
758
00:36:37,795 --> 00:36:40,531
NARRATOR: The junior pilots may
have been distracted by having
759
00:36:40,598 --> 00:36:43,901
a guest in the cockpit
or they may have
760
00:36:43,968 --> 00:36:48,172
simply not known what to do.
761
00:36:48,239 --> 00:36:49,974
Investigators
believe there's yet
762
00:36:50,041 --> 00:36:53,811
another piece to the puzzle.
763
00:36:53,878 --> 00:36:56,213
It all comes back
to that argument.
764
00:36:56,280 --> 00:36:58,516
Pampered crybabies making
a lot of ridiculous demands.
765
00:36:58,583 --> 00:37:00,151
Look here, just because
your lot flew the war--
766
00:37:00,217 --> 00:37:02,053
And as for your refusal to
fulfill all of your duties--
767
00:37:02,119 --> 00:37:03,588
NARRATOR: Investigators
learn that an hour
768
00:37:03,654 --> 00:37:07,058
and a half before takeoff
co-pilot Jeremy Keighley
769
00:37:07,124 --> 00:37:08,326
witnessed Key's outburst.
770
00:37:08,392 --> 00:37:10,227
If you're flying
that plane for money,
771
00:37:10,294 --> 00:37:11,862
you're in the wrong profession.
772
00:37:11,929 --> 00:37:13,664
NARRATOR: They suspect
it made a big impact
773
00:37:13,731 --> 00:37:14,966
on the young pilot.
774
00:37:15,032 --> 00:37:16,434
COLIN WRIGHT: Having witnessed
an outburst like that,
775
00:37:16,500 --> 00:37:19,370
one can only surmise that
if you are new to the fleet,
776
00:37:19,437 --> 00:37:21,339
you don't know the
captain, you're
777
00:37:21,405 --> 00:37:23,174
slightly unconfident yourself.
778
00:37:23,240 --> 00:37:25,109
You may be nervous of
your own performance.
779
00:37:25,176 --> 00:37:26,777
This is not likely
to enhance it.
780
00:37:26,844 --> 00:37:29,180
And I would expect it would
have been quite intimidating.
781
00:37:29,246 --> 00:37:30,982
NARRATOR: Shaken by
his captain's temper--
782
00:37:31,048 --> 00:37:32,116
Bunch of fools!
783
00:37:32,183 --> 00:37:33,451
NARRATOR: --Keighley
may have been
784
00:37:33,517 --> 00:37:36,887
more likely to make mistakes
and less likely to correct
785
00:37:36,954 --> 00:37:38,923
his captain's errors.
786
00:37:38,990 --> 00:37:40,391
DAVID LEARMOUNT:
It would certainly
787
00:37:40,458 --> 00:37:44,929
reinforce the concept that
the captain was authoritarian
788
00:37:44,996 --> 00:37:47,898
and not somebody that you
should challenge lightly,
789
00:37:47,965 --> 00:37:50,668
especially on that day.
790
00:37:50,735 --> 00:37:52,970
NARRATOR: There is
yet another mystery.
791
00:37:53,037 --> 00:37:54,872
Investigators know
that the Trident
792
00:37:54,939 --> 00:37:56,474
is equipped with
a safety system
793
00:37:56,540 --> 00:38:00,177
known as a stick shaker.
794
00:38:00,244 --> 00:38:02,680
If the plane's
speed drops too low,
795
00:38:02,747 --> 00:38:04,849
the control column
begins to shake,
796
00:38:04,915 --> 00:38:07,284
giving the crew a dramatic
warning that their plane
797
00:38:07,351 --> 00:38:09,620
is about to stall.
798
00:38:09,687 --> 00:38:12,556
PETER COOMBS: It will shake
the column very distinctly
799
00:38:12,623 --> 00:38:14,458
and produce an
unmistakable rattling
800
00:38:14,525 --> 00:38:16,227
noise at the same time.
801
00:38:16,293 --> 00:38:18,696
NARRATOR: Pilots are trained
to react to the stick shaker
802
00:38:18,763 --> 00:38:21,432
by pushing the nose of the
plane down to gain speed
803
00:38:21,499 --> 00:38:24,201
and increase lift.
804
00:38:24,268 --> 00:38:26,103
If that doesn't
work, the system has
805
00:38:26,170 --> 00:38:29,140
a failsafe, the stick pusher.
806
00:38:29,206 --> 00:38:31,709
It will move the controls
forward to push the nose
807
00:38:31,776 --> 00:38:35,579
down even if the pilots don't.
808
00:38:35,646 --> 00:38:37,148
COLIN WRIGHT: The
pusher will make sure
809
00:38:37,214 --> 00:38:39,483
that firmly the aircraft's
nose was lowered
810
00:38:39,550 --> 00:38:41,552
into an altitude where
the speed would increase
811
00:38:41,619 --> 00:38:43,387
and you would recover.
812
00:38:43,454 --> 00:38:45,222
NARRATOR: Why didn't
the system prevent
813
00:38:45,289 --> 00:38:48,726
Flight 548 from stalling and
save the lives of everyone
814
00:38:48,793 --> 00:38:49,727
on board?
815
00:38:56,167 --> 00:39:00,137
Investigators study flight
data from BEA Flight 548,
816
00:39:00,204 --> 00:39:02,206
searching for any
sign that the plane's
817
00:39:02,273 --> 00:39:05,476
anti-stall system failed.
818
00:39:05,543 --> 00:39:10,815
So it looks as though
it came on here and here
819
00:39:10,881 --> 00:39:13,884
but didn't stay on.
820
00:39:13,951 --> 00:39:16,987
NARRATOR: The data shows that
the stick pusher did engage,
821
00:39:17,054 --> 00:39:22,927
but it didn't stay on long
enough to prevent the crash.
822
00:39:22,993 --> 00:39:26,430
The finding can be explained
in only one of two ways,
823
00:39:26,497 --> 00:39:29,166
either the stick pusher
malfunctioned or the crew
824
00:39:29,233 --> 00:39:32,470
disabled it.
825
00:39:32,536 --> 00:39:33,771
PETER COOMBS: The
stall recovery system
826
00:39:33,838 --> 00:39:37,274
was capable of being
inhibited if they
827
00:39:37,341 --> 00:39:42,546
concluded that the thing
was operating incorrectly.
828
00:39:42,613 --> 00:39:44,582
NARRATOR: To figure out
what actually happened,
829
00:39:44,648 --> 00:39:46,617
engineer Peter
Coombs has to test
830
00:39:46,684 --> 00:39:50,087
every electrical
connection in the system.
831
00:39:50,154 --> 00:39:53,624
PETER COOMBS: Fortunately, the
incident sensors had actually
832
00:39:53,691 --> 00:39:57,728
survived the accident in an
apparently undamaged state,
833
00:39:57,795 --> 00:39:59,764
and there were a number
of other components
834
00:39:59,830 --> 00:40:01,165
to the system.
835
00:40:01,232 --> 00:40:07,204
And they were tested and found
to be operating accurately.
836
00:40:07,271 --> 00:40:08,839
NARRATOR: Coombs'
test results point
837
00:40:08,906 --> 00:40:10,908
to a stunning conclusion.
838
00:40:10,975 --> 00:40:14,745
The plane's anti-stall
system was working perfectly,
839
00:40:14,812 --> 00:40:17,114
but for some reason, perhaps
because they didn't think
840
00:40:17,181 --> 00:40:20,151
their plane was actually
stalling, one of the pilots
841
00:40:20,217 --> 00:40:21,585
disabled it.
842
00:40:21,652 --> 00:40:25,589
DAVID LEARMOUNT: By pulling out
the stick pusher, by disabling
843
00:40:25,656 --> 00:40:31,662
it, they took away the natural
stall recovery of the airplane
844
00:40:31,729 --> 00:40:35,332
and took the aircraft
back into the stall.
845
00:40:35,399 --> 00:40:37,935
And after that,
they were doomed
846
00:40:38,002 --> 00:40:41,205
because the aircraft didn't
have enough height left
847
00:40:41,272 --> 00:40:46,811
to recover from the stall.
848
00:40:52,683 --> 00:40:56,353
NARRATOR: It now seems the
crash of BEA Flight 548
849
00:40:56,420 --> 00:41:01,592
was the result of a tragic
combination of factors.
850
00:41:01,659 --> 00:41:04,128
First, a looming strike
that led to an argument.
851
00:41:04,195 --> 00:41:06,263
Bunch of crybabies making
a lot of ridiculous demands.
852
00:41:06,330 --> 00:41:07,464
Look here, just
because your--
853
00:41:07,531 --> 00:41:08,732
And as for your
refusal to fulfil--
854
00:41:08,799 --> 00:41:10,568
NARRATOR: A heart
failure that was possibly
855
00:41:10,634 --> 00:41:14,438
triggered by the fight,
confusion over control levers,
856
00:41:14,505 --> 00:41:18,409
and co-pilots too junior or
too intimidated to step in when
857
00:41:18,475 --> 00:41:21,879
things started to go wrong.
858
00:41:21,946 --> 00:41:24,348
For investigators,
each piece of the chain
859
00:41:24,415 --> 00:41:31,088
is as important as the other.
860
00:41:32,523 --> 00:41:33,991
GRAHAM BRAITHWAITE: Trying to
solve something that-- that's
861
00:41:34,058 --> 00:41:36,260
enormously complex,
there's likely to be lots
862
00:41:36,327 --> 00:41:39,029
of small factors that
influence any accident,
863
00:41:39,096 --> 00:41:40,631
no one simple thing.
864
00:41:40,698 --> 00:41:42,466
NARRATOR: After the
crash, authorities
865
00:41:42,533 --> 00:41:44,435
implemented a number
of changes designed
866
00:41:44,501 --> 00:41:48,873
to prevent similar accidents
from happening again.
867
00:41:48,939 --> 00:41:51,275
Handles on the Trident
and other planes
868
00:41:51,342 --> 00:41:55,546
are redesigned to eliminate
the possibility of confusion.
869
00:41:55,613 --> 00:41:58,015
Cockpit voice recorders
are now standard equipment
870
00:41:58,082 --> 00:42:01,886
in almost all commercial
passenger planes.
871
00:42:01,952 --> 00:42:04,255
Somebody-- and
we're never quite sure
872
00:42:04,321 --> 00:42:06,924
who it was among
the crew, somebody
873
00:42:06,991 --> 00:42:08,859
retracted the droops early.
874
00:42:08,926 --> 00:42:12,529
And the conclusion of the
investigators in this case
875
00:42:12,596 --> 00:42:19,169
is that they could more likely
have determined who was doing
876
00:42:20,170 --> 00:42:22,573
what in the cockpit
if they had been
877
00:42:22,640 --> 00:42:26,844
able to judge what the pilots
were saying to each other.
878
00:42:26,911 --> 00:42:28,078
NARRATOR: Cockpit
voice recorders
879
00:42:28,145 --> 00:42:30,414
provide a major source
of information for nearly
880
00:42:30,481 --> 00:42:36,854
every crash, but some
experts don't think
881
00:42:36,921 --> 00:42:39,757
the recorders are enough.
882
00:42:39,823 --> 00:42:42,259
PETER COOMBS: Listening to
a cockpit voice recorder
883
00:42:42,326 --> 00:42:44,929
rather resembles watching
a television program
884
00:42:44,995 --> 00:42:46,797
with the picture switched off.
885
00:42:46,864 --> 00:42:49,700
It's quite difficult to
work out what's going on.
886
00:42:49,767 --> 00:42:55,606
And on a flight deck, a lot of
communication is by gesture.
887
00:42:55,673 --> 00:42:59,009
DAVID LEARMOUNT: One of the
recommendations for flight
888
00:42:59,076 --> 00:43:03,714
decks now to help
investigators is that there
889
00:43:03,781 --> 00:43:07,618
should be permanent
filming of what
890
00:43:07,685 --> 00:43:09,119
happens on the flight deck.
891
00:43:09,186 --> 00:43:12,623
It doesn't have to be
widescreen filming which shows
892
00:43:12,690 --> 00:43:14,792
what the pilots are doing
and how they're drinking
893
00:43:14,858 --> 00:43:19,430
their coffee, but literally a
narrow focus lens which looks
894
00:43:19,496 --> 00:43:21,565
at the controls
that they handle
895
00:43:21,632 --> 00:43:24,501
and all the flight instruments.
896
00:43:24,568 --> 00:43:26,937
NARRATOR: So far, there
are no legal requirements
897
00:43:27,004 --> 00:43:29,573
for the new technology,
but some aviation
898
00:43:29,640 --> 00:43:31,542
authorities promote
the voluntary use
899
00:43:31,608 --> 00:43:37,214
of cockpit image recorders.
900
00:43:37,281 --> 00:43:39,350
In the years
following the crash,
901
00:43:39,416 --> 00:43:41,652
Hawker Siddeley faced
growing competition
902
00:43:41,719 --> 00:43:43,554
from rival manufacturers.
903
00:43:43,620 --> 00:43:48,425
Trident production
ended in 1978.
904
00:43:48,492 --> 00:43:51,228
DAVID LEARMOUNT: It was being
challenged by the Boeing 727,
905
00:43:51,295 --> 00:43:56,367
which had a similar layout,
three engines in the tail,
906
00:43:56,433 --> 00:43:59,970
and in some respects had
slightly superior performance.
907
00:44:00,037 --> 00:44:04,174
NARRATOR: But the legacy of
the Staines disaster lives on.
908
00:44:04,241 --> 00:44:07,711
PETER COOMBS: The accident
drew into perspective
909
00:44:07,778 --> 00:44:14,785
the whole importance of human
factors on the flight deck.
910
00:44:15,886 --> 00:44:17,254
Bloody fools.
911
00:44:17,321 --> 00:44:19,423
DAVID LEARMOUNT:
Nowadays, the way
912
00:44:19,490 --> 00:44:21,859
that crews interact
together is taken
913
00:44:21,925 --> 00:44:24,495
very much more seriously.
914
00:44:24,561 --> 00:44:26,263
COLIN WRIGHT: The modern
airline is operated
915
00:44:26,330 --> 00:44:28,399
very, very differently.
916
00:44:28,465 --> 00:44:31,635
The way the crews handle
things is improved.
917
00:44:31,702 --> 00:44:34,238
It's a much better
and safer world.
918
00:44:34,304 --> 00:44:35,572
The regret is
we've had to build
919
00:44:35,639 --> 00:44:38,108
it on the death of 118 people.
72253
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