All language subtitles for Air.Disasters.S04E08.Focused.on.Failure.1080p.PMTP.WEB-DL.AAC2.0.H.264-maldini_track3_[eng]

af Afrikaans
ak Akan
sq Albanian
am Amharic
ar Arabic
hy Armenian
az Azerbaijani
eu Basque
be Belarusian
bem Bemba
bn Bengali
bh Bihari
bs Bosnian
br Breton
bg Bulgarian
km Cambodian
ca Catalan
ceb Cebuano
chr Cherokee
ny Chichewa
zh-CN Chinese (Simplified)
zh-TW Chinese (Traditional)
co Corsican
hr Croatian
cs Czech
da Danish
en English
eo Esperanto
et Estonian
ee Ewe
fo Faroese
tl Filipino
fi Finnish
fr French
fy Frisian
gaa Ga
gl Galician
ka Georgian
de German
gn Guarani
gu Gujarati
ht Haitian Creole
ha Hausa
haw Hawaiian
iw Hebrew
hi Hindi
hmn Hmong
hu Hungarian
is Icelandic
ig Igbo
id Indonesian
ia Interlingua
ga Irish
it Italian
ja Japanese
jw Javanese
kn Kannada
kk Kazakh
rw Kinyarwanda
rn Kirundi
kg Kongo
ko Korean
kri Krio (Sierra Leone)
ku Kurdish
ckb Kurdish (Soranî)
ky Kyrgyz
lo Laothian
la Latin
lv Latvian
ln Lingala
lt Lithuanian
loz Lozi
lg Luganda
ach Luo
lb Luxembourgish
mk Macedonian
mg Malagasy
ms Malay
ml Malayalam
mt Maltese
mi Maori
mr Marathi
mfe Mauritian Creole
mo Moldavian
mn Mongolian
my Myanmar (Burmese)
sr-ME Montenegrin
ne Nepali
pcm Nigerian Pidgin
nso Northern Sotho
no Norwegian
nn Norwegian (Nynorsk)
oc Occitan
or Oriya
om Oromo
ps Pashto
fa Persian
pl Polish
pt-BR Portuguese (Brazil)
pt Portuguese (Portugal)
pa Punjabi
qu Quechua
ro Romanian
rm Romansh
nyn Runyakitara
ru Russian
sm Samoan
gd Scots Gaelic
sr Serbian
sh Serbo-Croatian
st Sesotho
tn Setswana
crs Seychellois Creole
sn Shona
sd Sindhi
si Sinhalese
sk Slovak
sl Slovenian
so Somali
es Spanish
es-419 Spanish (Latin American)
su Sundanese
sw Swahili
sv Swedish
tg Tajik
ta Tamil
tt Tatar
te Telugu
th Thai
ti Tigrinya
to Tonga
lua Tshiluba
tum Tumbuka
tr Turkish
tk Turkmen
tw Twi
ug Uighur
uk Ukrainian
ur Urdu
uz Uzbek
vi Vietnamese
cy Welsh
wo Wolof
xh Xhosa
yi Yiddish
yo Yoruba
zu Zulu
Would you like to inspect the original subtitles? These are the user uploaded subtitles that are being translated: 1 00:00:02,235 --> 00:00:03,703 I was afraid. 2 00:00:03,770 --> 00:00:04,971 I didn't know where I was. 3 00:00:05,038 --> 00:00:08,141 NARRATOR: Lost and disoriented, the strange crowd 4 00:00:08,208 --> 00:00:10,910 makes its way through a wooded suburb. 5 00:00:10,977 --> 00:00:13,446 Just minutes ago, they were aboard a flight 6 00:00:13,513 --> 00:00:14,881 bound for Portland, Oregon. 7 00:00:14,948 --> 00:00:16,750 All of a sudden, there was a big crash. 8 00:00:16,816 --> 00:00:18,251 The next thing I knew I was standing outside. 9 00:00:18,318 --> 00:00:19,919 I don't know how the hell I got there. 10 00:00:19,986 --> 00:00:21,221 A man with a flashlight-- 11 00:00:21,287 --> 00:00:22,622 Excuse me. 12 00:00:22,689 --> 00:00:24,090 Came down the aisle. 13 00:00:24,157 --> 00:00:27,260 They continued circling for about an hour. 14 00:00:27,327 --> 00:00:30,730 Was it a crew problem, or was it an aircraft problem? 15 00:00:30,797 --> 00:00:31,931 NARRATOR: The voice recorder-- 16 00:00:31,998 --> 00:00:33,333 OK, let's go. 17 00:00:33,400 --> 00:00:34,901 Could provide the answer. 18 00:00:34,968 --> 00:00:38,071 Reset that circuit breaker momentarily. 19 00:00:38,138 --> 00:00:41,374 I was very interested in how a highly experienced captain 20 00:00:41,441 --> 00:00:44,144 could fly around in sight of the airport in good weather 21 00:00:44,210 --> 00:00:46,780 and not put this airplane on the ground safely. 22 00:00:46,846 --> 00:00:49,449 OK, declare a mayday. 23 00:00:49,516 --> 00:00:52,018 Ladies and gentlemen, we are starting our approach. 24 00:00:52,085 --> 00:00:53,119 We lost both engines. 25 00:00:53,186 --> 00:00:54,287 Put the mask over your nose. 26 00:00:54,354 --> 00:00:55,288 Emergency descent. 27 00:00:55,355 --> 00:00:56,289 Mayday, mayday. 28 00:00:56,356 --> 00:00:57,524 Brace for impact! 29 00:00:57,590 --> 00:00:59,492 Here's the last one. 30 00:00:59,559 --> 00:01:01,961 Investigation starting. 31 00:01:02,028 --> 00:01:08,735 It's gonna crash! 32 00:01:14,874 --> 00:01:18,344 NARRATOR: December 28, 1978-- 33 00:01:18,411 --> 00:01:20,814 We're losing an engine. 34 00:01:20,880 --> 00:01:26,119 United Airlines flight 173 is less than 22 miles 35 00:01:26,186 --> 00:01:28,154 from Portland International Airport. 36 00:01:28,221 --> 00:01:29,355 It's flamed out. 37 00:01:29,422 --> 00:01:30,523 Why? 38 00:01:30,590 --> 00:01:33,893 You can fly a DC 8 or any transport airplane 39 00:01:33,960 --> 00:01:36,196 with one engine inoperative. 40 00:01:36,262 --> 00:01:38,598 NARRATOR: John Cox as a commercial pilot 41 00:01:38,665 --> 00:01:40,567 an aviation expert. 42 00:01:40,633 --> 00:01:42,368 It requires a lot of airmanship. 43 00:01:42,435 --> 00:01:46,239 Pilots train every time they're in a simulator in case 44 00:01:46,306 --> 00:01:48,875 of a loss of an engine. 45 00:01:48,942 --> 00:01:52,812 All right. 46 00:01:52,879 --> 00:01:54,514 The thing to remember is don't worry. 47 00:01:54,581 --> 00:01:58,051 Captain Melbourne McBroom, a veteran of the Second 48 00:01:58,117 --> 00:02:00,320 World War, is one of United Airlines' 49 00:02:00,386 --> 00:02:02,956 most experienced pilots. 50 00:02:03,022 --> 00:02:05,725 His first officer Rod Bibby has more than 5,000 51 00:02:05,792 --> 00:02:08,995 hours flying experience. 52 00:02:09,062 --> 00:02:11,097 The first officer was relatively new 53 00:02:11,164 --> 00:02:12,398 on the airplane. 54 00:02:12,465 --> 00:02:15,635 He had probably been on it six months or maybe less. 55 00:02:15,702 --> 00:02:17,303 He was an experienced pilot, but he'd 56 00:02:17,370 --> 00:02:19,939 been flying other equipment. 57 00:02:20,006 --> 00:02:23,843 NARRATOR: Flight engineer Forrest Mendenhall is 58 00:02:23,910 --> 00:02:24,978 the third member of the crew. 59 00:02:25,044 --> 00:02:26,112 OK. 60 00:02:26,179 --> 00:02:28,581 NARRATOR: It's his job to monitor the DC8's 61 00:02:28,648 --> 00:02:34,988 three remaining engines. 62 00:02:35,054 --> 00:02:36,623 The flight began in New York City 63 00:02:36,689 --> 00:02:39,559 with a stopover in Denver. 64 00:02:39,626 --> 00:02:42,228 It's three days after Christmas. 65 00:02:42,295 --> 00:02:44,797 Many of the 189 people on board are 66 00:02:44,864 --> 00:02:46,900 returning from their holidays. 67 00:02:46,966 --> 00:02:49,936 17-year-old Amy Connor is flying back to boarding 68 00:02:50,003 --> 00:02:52,105 school in Washington State. 69 00:02:52,171 --> 00:02:53,873 I picked up the flight in Denver, 70 00:02:53,940 --> 00:02:56,576 and everything seemed to go normally. 71 00:02:56,643 --> 00:02:57,744 I got to my seat. 72 00:02:57,810 --> 00:03:01,481 I was sitting in between two very nice people. 73 00:03:01,548 --> 00:03:02,482 NARRATOR: In the cockpit-- 74 00:03:02,549 --> 00:03:03,650 All right. 75 00:03:03,716 --> 00:03:05,051 NARRATOR: --the pilots are focused on getting 76 00:03:05,118 --> 00:03:06,452 their plane to the airport. 77 00:03:06,519 --> 00:03:09,589 United 173 would like clearance for an approach 78 00:03:09,656 --> 00:03:12,058 in the 28 Left now. 79 00:03:12,125 --> 00:03:13,960 NARRATOR: Air traffic controller Ed Kingrey 80 00:03:14,027 --> 00:03:17,297 is on duty at Portland Tower. 81 00:03:17,363 --> 00:03:20,733 I was working radar that night down in the radar room. 82 00:03:20,800 --> 00:03:24,337 As I recall, it wasn't all that busy at the time. 83 00:03:24,404 --> 00:03:26,205 United 173, heavy. 84 00:03:26,272 --> 00:03:33,179 OK, roll out heading 010 to runway 28 Left. 85 00:03:33,246 --> 00:03:35,949 NARRATOR: He clears Flight 173 to land on the airport's 86 00:03:36,015 --> 00:03:38,251 longest runway. 87 00:03:38,318 --> 00:03:41,688 He said, we'll-- we'll be heading in for a landing now. 88 00:03:41,754 --> 00:03:44,057 In this case, he was coming from the east, 89 00:03:44,123 --> 00:03:46,159 so he lined him up for a straight in. 90 00:03:47,493 --> 00:03:49,095 You're going to lose number three in a minute, too. 91 00:03:50,396 --> 00:03:51,531 NARRATOR: The plane's engines are 92 00:03:51,598 --> 00:03:54,267 flaming out one after another. 93 00:03:54,334 --> 00:03:58,438 I recall hearing the captain tell the tower 94 00:03:58,504 --> 00:04:01,441 they're losing engines. 95 00:04:01,507 --> 00:04:02,976 NARRATOR: With two engine's gone, 96 00:04:03,042 --> 00:04:05,244 the autopilot can no longer fly the plane. 97 00:04:06,713 --> 00:04:13,319 McBroom must get the crippled DC-8 to the airport himself. 98 00:04:16,189 --> 00:04:17,624 You've got to keep running, Frosty. 99 00:04:17,690 --> 00:04:18,758 Yes, sir. 100 00:04:18,825 --> 00:04:20,193 NARRATOR: The engineer struggles to keep 101 00:04:20,259 --> 00:04:24,664 the last two engines running. 102 00:04:24,731 --> 00:04:27,634 How far do you show us from the field? 103 00:04:27,700 --> 00:04:28,868 I'd call it-- 104 00:04:28,935 --> 00:04:30,737 EDWARD KINGREY: I told him it was 18 flying miles. 105 00:04:30,803 --> 00:04:31,738 --18 flying miles. 106 00:04:31,804 --> 00:04:33,706 Which would include the base leg 107 00:04:33,773 --> 00:04:36,342 to the final and then the turn to final 108 00:04:36,409 --> 00:04:41,080 to the end of the runway. 109 00:04:44,651 --> 00:04:46,719 We just lost one and two. 110 00:04:46,786 --> 00:04:51,090 NARRATOR: Flight 173 has now lost all four engines. 111 00:04:51,157 --> 00:04:53,526 The cabin lights all went out. 112 00:04:53,593 --> 00:04:55,728 That, we all assumed, was an indicator 113 00:04:55,795 --> 00:05:02,568 that something was wrong. 114 00:05:02,635 --> 00:05:04,871 NARRATOR: With no engines running, 115 00:05:04,937 --> 00:05:06,839 back-up batteries now provide power 116 00:05:06,906 --> 00:05:13,579 to only critical instruments. 117 00:05:13,646 --> 00:05:15,481 People started to shout. 118 00:05:15,548 --> 00:05:16,616 MALBURN MCBROOM (OVER PA): Brace! 119 00:05:16,683 --> 00:05:18,151 Brace! - Get your heads down. 120 00:05:18,217 --> 00:05:19,185 Get into your brace positions. 121 00:05:19,252 --> 00:05:20,553 MALBURN MCBROOM (OVER PA): Brace! 122 00:05:20,620 --> 00:05:23,556 NARRATOR: The 100-ton aircraft is losing more than 3,000 123 00:05:23,623 --> 00:05:25,892 feet of altitude a minute. 124 00:05:25,958 --> 00:05:29,962 Total power loss in a DC-8 would be very catastrophic. 125 00:05:30,029 --> 00:05:33,399 NARRATOR: At this rate, they will be lucky to stay airborne 126 00:05:33,466 --> 00:05:39,806 for as long as 90 seconds. 127 00:05:39,872 --> 00:05:44,544 Now Captain McBroom makes a horrifying calculation. 128 00:05:44,610 --> 00:05:45,611 We can't make it. 129 00:05:45,678 --> 00:05:47,947 NARRATOR: The airport is too far away. 130 00:05:48,014 --> 00:05:49,882 We can't make anything. 131 00:05:49,949 --> 00:05:51,818 NARRATOR: The jetliner is dropping fast 132 00:05:51,884 --> 00:05:54,654 over a city of 350,000 people. 133 00:05:54,721 --> 00:05:56,889 McBroom needs to find a safe place 134 00:05:56,956 --> 00:05:59,158 to put the aircraft down and try to save 135 00:05:59,225 --> 00:06:01,561 the lives of all onboard. 136 00:06:01,627 --> 00:06:04,297 To land a transport jet off an airport 137 00:06:04,363 --> 00:06:07,533 is a situation that no pilot wants to face. 138 00:06:07,600 --> 00:06:10,036 Putting it into a populated area 139 00:06:10,103 --> 00:06:12,004 would be an absolute last choice. 140 00:06:12,071 --> 00:06:13,005 OK. 141 00:06:13,072 --> 00:06:15,341 Declare mayday. 142 00:06:15,408 --> 00:06:17,543 Portland Tower, United 173, heavy mayday. 143 00:06:17,610 --> 00:06:19,979 He declared mayday, and then in a very-- 144 00:06:20,046 --> 00:06:21,748 what seemed to me like a-- 145 00:06:21,814 --> 00:06:24,984 a calm, matter-of-fact voice, I could hear the pilot. 146 00:06:25,051 --> 00:06:26,652 Engines are flaming out. We're going down. 147 00:06:26,719 --> 00:06:28,421 We're not going to be able to make it to the airport. 148 00:06:28,488 --> 00:06:29,422 We lost power. 149 00:06:29,489 --> 00:06:30,757 We're going down. 150 00:06:30,823 --> 00:06:33,392 NARRATOR: Emergency services are told what's happening. 151 00:06:33,459 --> 00:06:34,594 Flight 173 is flamed-out. 152 00:06:34,660 --> 00:06:37,396 They're going down. 153 00:06:37,463 --> 00:06:41,801 NARRATOR: Kingrey tries to figure out where they'll hit. 154 00:06:41,868 --> 00:06:44,237 I could see him coming in from the south, his 155 00:06:44,303 --> 00:06:46,072 navigational lights flashing. 156 00:06:46,139 --> 00:06:47,940 I could tell he was quite low. 157 00:06:48,007 --> 00:06:49,308 NARRATOR: The DC-8 is coming down 158 00:06:49,375 --> 00:06:51,677 over a densely-populated suburb. 159 00:06:51,744 --> 00:06:53,412 And I can no longer see him. 160 00:06:53,479 --> 00:06:57,517 I was, of course, expecting the worst. 161 00:06:57,583 --> 00:06:59,519 NARRATOR: Suddenly, Captain McBroom sees 162 00:06:59,585 --> 00:07:03,089 what he's been looking for-- 163 00:07:03,156 --> 00:07:05,158 a dark area up ahead. 164 00:07:05,224 --> 00:07:07,260 It looks like an empty field. 165 00:07:07,326 --> 00:07:09,295 The place that you want to put it is where there-- 166 00:07:09,362 --> 00:07:12,899 there's minimum buildings, the most open area possible 167 00:07:12,965 --> 00:07:19,071 because the 200,000 pounds-plus jet arriving at 140 knots, 168 00:07:19,138 --> 00:07:21,340 which is 160-plus miles an hour-- 169 00:07:21,407 --> 00:07:22,508 it's going to do a lot of damage 170 00:07:22,575 --> 00:07:28,014 to the things on the ground. 171 00:07:28,080 --> 00:07:30,349 NARRATOR: Putting the plane on this narrow strip of land 172 00:07:30,416 --> 00:07:35,555 is McBroom's best bet. 173 00:07:35,621 --> 00:07:38,157 But as he gets closer, he realizes 174 00:07:38,224 --> 00:07:40,927 it isn't an open field. 175 00:07:40,993 --> 00:07:42,161 We can't make it. 176 00:07:42,228 --> 00:07:44,130 NARRATOR: It's a heavily wooded suburb, 177 00:07:44,197 --> 00:07:51,204 and he's headed straight for it. 178 00:07:52,705 --> 00:07:56,209 JOHN COX: If they're woods and that's all you have, 179 00:07:56,275 --> 00:07:57,844 then you're going to have to deal with it. 180 00:07:57,910 --> 00:08:00,079 The tops of trees are pretty soft. 181 00:08:00,146 --> 00:08:01,781 As you settle into the trees, they 182 00:08:01,848 --> 00:08:03,349 get progressively less soft. 183 00:08:03,416 --> 00:08:06,085 They're going to do a lot of damage. 184 00:08:06,152 --> 00:08:07,787 NARRATOR: McBroom doesn't give up. 185 00:08:07,854 --> 00:08:12,992 He actually tries to steer the plane between the trees. 186 00:08:14,427 --> 00:08:16,529 The passengers still assume they're about to touch down 187 00:08:16,596 --> 00:08:17,697 on a runway. 188 00:08:17,763 --> 00:08:19,932 We clipped the top of a few trees, 189 00:08:19,999 --> 00:08:22,401 and that felt like we were making the initial landing 190 00:08:22,468 --> 00:08:23,536 at the airport. 191 00:08:23,603 --> 00:08:27,306 So my first sense was, hooray, we're there. 192 00:08:27,373 --> 00:08:30,376 And then all hell broke loose. 193 00:08:33,679 --> 00:08:35,181 It was this enormous noise. 194 00:08:35,248 --> 00:08:38,184 I can't even begin to describe what kind of noise it is. 195 00:08:38,251 --> 00:08:41,120 It's physical. 196 00:08:41,187 --> 00:08:48,194 You can feel it in your bones. 197 00:08:51,464 --> 00:08:54,734 I saw the bright flash out there and-- 198 00:08:54,800 --> 00:08:56,969 and knew he had gone down. 199 00:09:02,375 --> 00:09:05,144 NARRATOR: The plane carves a 1,600-foot-long 200 00:09:05,211 --> 00:09:11,617 path through the trees. 201 00:09:11,684 --> 00:09:18,357 After the plane stopped moving, it was pretty calm. 202 00:09:18,424 --> 00:09:21,827 There was no fire. 203 00:09:21,894 --> 00:09:26,799 People just wanted to get out and very polite, taking turns. 204 00:09:29,769 --> 00:09:31,370 There was no hurry. 205 00:09:35,308 --> 00:09:37,777 I remember seeing a lot of people 206 00:09:37,843 --> 00:09:42,648 with the same expression of stunned disbelief. 207 00:09:42,715 --> 00:09:43,649 You know, where are we? 208 00:09:43,716 --> 00:09:46,953 And how did we get here? 209 00:09:47,019 --> 00:09:50,456 NARRATOR: Incredibly, the DC-8 has crashed-landed 210 00:09:50,523 --> 00:09:52,959 in the middle of a major American city 211 00:09:53,025 --> 00:09:59,098 without injuring a single person on the ground. 212 00:09:59,165 --> 00:10:01,734 Most of the 189 passengers and crew 213 00:10:01,801 --> 00:10:08,808 are alive, including Captain Malburn McBroom. 214 00:10:10,109 --> 00:10:11,544 The captain flying the airplane-- 215 00:10:11,610 --> 00:10:13,946 he kept it under control, and that's a big, 216 00:10:14,013 --> 00:10:15,915 big, big positive. 217 00:10:15,982 --> 00:10:18,250 NARRATOR: But he can't understand why his plane 218 00:10:18,317 --> 00:10:23,456 lost power and crashed. 219 00:10:23,522 --> 00:10:26,292 I was afraid. 220 00:10:26,359 --> 00:10:27,960 I didn't know where I was. 221 00:10:28,027 --> 00:10:30,730 I was only 17. 222 00:10:30,796 --> 00:10:34,900 I also realized that my parents in Minnesota 223 00:10:34,967 --> 00:10:37,636 needed to hear from me. 224 00:10:37,703 --> 00:10:38,637 I walked into this home. 225 00:10:38,704 --> 00:10:39,739 Hello? 226 00:10:39,805 --> 00:10:41,273 And I said, I need to use your telephone. 227 00:10:41,340 --> 00:10:42,942 I need to use your telephone. 228 00:10:43,009 --> 00:10:46,912 My parents' initial reaction was to listen 229 00:10:46,979 --> 00:10:48,681 and kind of blow me off. 230 00:10:48,748 --> 00:10:52,284 I was a teenage drama queen, and 17-year-olds 231 00:10:52,351 --> 00:10:54,020 do tend to exaggerate. 232 00:10:54,086 --> 00:10:57,757 But a few minutes later, they got the news they broke 233 00:10:57,823 --> 00:11:00,860 into their television program. 234 00:11:00,926 --> 00:11:02,328 REPORTER: The plane crashed 5 miles 235 00:11:02,395 --> 00:11:04,730 southeast of the airport in a residential area. 236 00:11:04,797 --> 00:11:07,767 Two homes were hit, one disintegrated. 237 00:11:07,833 --> 00:11:09,602 Rescue workers worked through the night. 238 00:11:09,668 --> 00:11:11,303 They carefully picked through the wreckage, 239 00:11:11,370 --> 00:11:12,671 looking for bodies. 240 00:11:12,738 --> 00:11:15,107 They won't know the exact number of dead until 241 00:11:15,174 --> 00:11:16,509 sometime today. 242 00:11:16,575 --> 00:11:19,412 The news teams found us before the emergency 243 00:11:19,478 --> 00:11:22,048 crews did, and so there were cameras, there was lights. 244 00:11:22,114 --> 00:11:23,949 The next thing I know it was boom, boom real hard, 245 00:11:24,016 --> 00:11:24,950 and we were shaking. 246 00:11:25,017 --> 00:11:26,519 And we were down in the position. 247 00:11:26,585 --> 00:11:29,121 All of a sudden, there was a big-- you know, a big crash. 248 00:11:29,188 --> 00:11:31,123 One thump I remember, and then the next thing 249 00:11:31,190 --> 00:11:32,258 I knew I was standing outside. 250 00:11:32,324 --> 00:11:33,526 I don't know how the hell I got there. 251 00:11:35,261 --> 00:11:38,130 NARRATOR: Confronted by such an unprecedented disaster, 252 00:11:38,197 --> 00:11:41,867 the entire airline industry needs an answer. 253 00:11:41,934 --> 00:11:45,905 How could a DC-8 crash 6 miles short of the airport 254 00:11:45,971 --> 00:11:54,513 on a calm, clear night? 255 00:11:57,583 --> 00:12:01,387 The morning after the crash of United Airlines Flight 173. 256 00:12:01,454 --> 00:12:05,357 NTSB investigators are on the scene. 257 00:12:05,424 --> 00:12:07,560 One of the members of the team is human factor 258 00:12:07,626 --> 00:12:11,097 specialist Alan Diehl. 259 00:12:11,163 --> 00:12:13,566 We needed to get out and document the wreckage, 260 00:12:13,632 --> 00:12:16,102 take photographs, take measurements, and so on, very 261 00:12:16,168 --> 00:12:21,006 critical that you do that. 262 00:12:21,073 --> 00:12:23,542 NARRATOR: It's apparent to Diehl 263 00:12:23,609 --> 00:12:26,645 that this disaster could have been much worse. 264 00:12:26,712 --> 00:12:28,848 How the hell did they miss those? 265 00:12:28,914 --> 00:12:30,316 NARRATOR: Captain McBroom somehow 266 00:12:30,382 --> 00:12:33,686 managed to shoehorn the plane into a narrow strip of woods 267 00:12:33,752 --> 00:12:36,055 in the middle of Portland. 268 00:12:36,122 --> 00:12:38,958 When I saw how close he'd come to apartment complexes, 269 00:12:39,024 --> 00:12:41,393 I realized this could have been one of the worst 270 00:12:41,460 --> 00:12:44,697 accidents in history. 271 00:12:44,763 --> 00:12:46,866 NARRATOR: The main cabin of Flight 173 272 00:12:46,932 --> 00:12:50,870 has survived the crash largely intact, 273 00:12:50,936 --> 00:12:55,307 but the nose of the plane is completely destroyed. 274 00:12:55,374 --> 00:12:56,942 It looked to me like the front of the airplane 275 00:12:57,009 --> 00:12:59,712 almost opened up like a banana when it plowed 276 00:12:59,778 --> 00:13:04,650 through the woods and couldn't believe that anybody 277 00:13:04,717 --> 00:13:10,689 had survived this. 278 00:13:10,756 --> 00:13:12,992 NARRATOR: Eight passengers and two members of the crew 279 00:13:13,058 --> 00:13:15,528 are dead. 280 00:13:15,594 --> 00:13:18,164 ALAN DIEHL: A flight engineer had died in the crash, as had 281 00:13:18,230 --> 00:13:23,636 the lead flight attendant. 282 00:13:28,073 --> 00:13:29,642 NARRATOR: Investigators hope survivors 283 00:13:29,708 --> 00:13:35,447 can provide some insight into what brought this jet down. 284 00:13:35,514 --> 00:13:37,516 When did you first notice something out of the ordinary? 285 00:13:41,086 --> 00:13:43,923 NARRATOR: They learn that just over an hour before the crash 286 00:13:43,989 --> 00:13:46,559 the passengers heard a terrifying sound. 287 00:13:48,027 --> 00:13:54,033 We heard a loud thud and felt the plane jolt. 288 00:13:54,099 --> 00:13:55,568 The whole plane just shook. 289 00:13:55,634 --> 00:13:58,470 It was-- it was a jarring sensation. 290 00:13:58,537 --> 00:13:59,738 What was that? 291 00:13:59,805 --> 00:14:01,006 AIMEE CONNER: And of course, everybody 292 00:14:01,073 --> 00:14:02,107 wanted to know what it was. 293 00:14:02,174 --> 00:14:03,108 What was that? 294 00:14:03,175 --> 00:14:05,878 Lots of conversation-starters. 295 00:14:05,945 --> 00:14:06,879 What do you think that was? 296 00:14:06,946 --> 00:14:11,550 Lots of guessing. 297 00:14:11,617 --> 00:14:15,821 A man with a flashlight came down the aisle. 298 00:14:15,888 --> 00:14:16,922 NARRATOR: One of the pilots comes 299 00:14:16,989 --> 00:14:20,025 back to the passenger cabin. 300 00:14:20,092 --> 00:14:22,728 At this point, I started realizing something 301 00:14:22,795 --> 00:14:25,030 really was wrong. 302 00:14:25,097 --> 00:14:26,031 Excuse me. 303 00:14:26,098 --> 00:14:28,701 Can I look out the window here? 304 00:14:28,767 --> 00:14:30,836 AIMEE CONNER: That something wasn't working 305 00:14:30,903 --> 00:14:32,271 the way it should be and they weren't 306 00:14:32,338 --> 00:14:34,306 telling us about it yet. 307 00:14:34,373 --> 00:14:35,374 NARRATOR: The pilot is searching 308 00:14:35,441 --> 00:14:37,243 for something in the darkness. 309 00:14:37,309 --> 00:14:42,181 We're all wanting to know what was going on. 310 00:14:42,248 --> 00:14:44,783 Then the captain came on the PA. 311 00:14:44,850 --> 00:14:46,318 MALBURN MCBROOM (ON PA): Ladies and gentlemen, 312 00:14:46,385 --> 00:14:47,853 this is your captain speaking. 313 00:14:47,920 --> 00:14:49,788 The pilot finally got on and said, 314 00:14:49,855 --> 00:14:51,991 we're having trouble with the landing gear. 315 00:14:52,057 --> 00:14:54,860 We're not sure whether or not it's working correctly. 316 00:14:54,927 --> 00:14:57,196 We'll be running a few routine checks. 317 00:14:57,263 --> 00:14:58,931 Captains are always focused on the safety 318 00:14:58,998 --> 00:14:59,932 of the passengers. 319 00:14:59,999 --> 00:15:00,933 It comes with the job. 320 00:15:03,402 --> 00:15:06,505 That is, if the airplane is experiencing an abnormality, 321 00:15:06,572 --> 00:15:09,241 what's the effect on the passengers and crew? 322 00:15:09,308 --> 00:15:10,643 Do we need to descend? 323 00:15:10,709 --> 00:15:12,878 What do we need to do to make sure that everybody 324 00:15:12,945 --> 00:15:15,180 gets through this abnormality with 325 00:15:15,247 --> 00:15:17,650 the minimum negative effects? 326 00:15:17,716 --> 00:15:21,420 How did the cabin crew react? 327 00:15:21,487 --> 00:15:25,557 They told us to prepare for an emergency landing. 328 00:15:25,624 --> 00:15:27,760 NARRATOR: Passengers are told to remove their jewelry 329 00:15:27,826 --> 00:15:30,963 and securely stow any loose items. 330 00:15:31,030 --> 00:15:32,765 It's clear that the captain is concerned 331 00:15:32,831 --> 00:15:36,902 that his landing gear might collapse on touchdown. 332 00:15:36,969 --> 00:15:39,705 But something isn't making sense to Diehl. 333 00:15:39,772 --> 00:15:41,206 ALAN DIEHL: Crash landings on-airport 334 00:15:41,273 --> 00:15:42,908 are eminently survivable. 335 00:15:42,975 --> 00:15:44,376 First of all, you've got all the equipment 336 00:15:44,443 --> 00:15:47,713 to handle the fire, the fire engines and the rescue people. 337 00:15:47,780 --> 00:15:49,214 But if you have to go off-airport, 338 00:15:49,281 --> 00:15:52,017 it's a whole different situation. 339 00:15:52,084 --> 00:15:54,219 How does a landing gear problem bring down a plane? 340 00:15:57,423 --> 00:16:01,427 NARRATOR: At the crash site of United Airlines Flight 173, 341 00:16:01,493 --> 00:16:05,597 investigators retrieve the plane's flight recorders. 342 00:16:05,664 --> 00:16:07,800 One contains flight data. 343 00:16:07,866 --> 00:16:11,070 The other records voices in the cockpit. 344 00:16:11,136 --> 00:16:14,540 ALAN DIEHL: I've always said that the flight data recorder 345 00:16:14,606 --> 00:16:16,542 tells you what happened, but you 346 00:16:16,608 --> 00:16:20,479 have to listen very carefully to the cockpit voice recorder 347 00:16:20,546 --> 00:16:26,285 to understand why things happen the way they did. 348 00:16:26,352 --> 00:16:27,820 NARRATOR: The recorders will be analyzed 349 00:16:27,886 --> 00:16:30,356 at National Transportation Safety Board headquarters 350 00:16:30,422 --> 00:16:37,396 in Washington. 351 00:16:39,264 --> 00:16:41,033 One of the most important witnesses 352 00:16:41,100 --> 00:16:43,569 is Ed Kingrey, the controller who 353 00:16:43,635 --> 00:16:47,072 handled Flight 173's approach. 354 00:16:47,139 --> 00:16:49,875 I cleared him for an approach to runway 28. 355 00:16:49,942 --> 00:16:52,144 I was about to hand him off to the tower controller. 356 00:16:52,211 --> 00:16:55,781 He basically said he'd stay with me, that he was having 357 00:16:55,848 --> 00:16:59,318 some kind of unsafe gear indication 358 00:16:59,385 --> 00:17:03,555 and he didn't know if one of the landing gear were down. 359 00:17:03,622 --> 00:17:04,556 Negative. 360 00:17:04,623 --> 00:17:05,824 We'll stay with you. 361 00:17:05,891 --> 00:17:08,827 When we've got a gear problem we'll let you know. 362 00:17:08,894 --> 00:17:13,432 NARRATOR: Flight 173 did not want to come in to land. 363 00:17:13,499 --> 00:17:17,836 United 173 heavy, turn left, heading 100. 364 00:17:17,903 --> 00:17:23,742 I'll just orbit you out there. 365 00:17:23,809 --> 00:17:25,744 NARRATOR: Kingrey cleared Flight 173 366 00:17:25,811 --> 00:17:28,113 to fly a holding pattern south of the airport 367 00:17:28,180 --> 00:17:31,250 over the Portland suburbs. 368 00:17:31,316 --> 00:17:34,486 Captain McBroom wanted time to troubleshoot the gear problem 369 00:17:34,553 --> 00:17:37,089 and give his flight attendants time to prepare the cabin 370 00:17:37,156 --> 00:17:39,057 for an emergency landing. 371 00:17:39,124 --> 00:17:42,928 If they have opportunity to plan and prepare 372 00:17:42,995 --> 00:17:46,131 people, things such as where the exits are, 373 00:17:46,198 --> 00:17:49,735 the quality and success of the evacuation 374 00:17:49,802 --> 00:17:55,174 goes up dramatically. 375 00:17:55,240 --> 00:17:57,209 A holding pattern would basically 376 00:17:57,276 --> 00:18:00,612 give him his own air space there 377 00:18:00,679 --> 00:18:03,015 to do whatever he had to do. 378 00:18:06,652 --> 00:18:10,155 I didn't hear much from him after that. 379 00:18:10,222 --> 00:18:13,292 NARRATOR: Investigators learn that after they begin circling 380 00:18:13,358 --> 00:18:16,295 Kingrey only speaks to Flight 173 381 00:18:16,361 --> 00:18:20,699 to warn them of other nearby aircraft. 382 00:18:20,766 --> 00:18:24,303 I would give him traffic, and he would acknowledge it. 383 00:18:24,369 --> 00:18:27,339 There's traffic out there about 9:30. 384 00:18:27,406 --> 00:18:29,741 I see somebody out there with a light on. 385 00:18:29,808 --> 00:18:32,411 EDWARD KINGREY: But no indication to me what was 386 00:18:32,478 --> 00:18:33,946 going on inside the cockpit. 387 00:18:36,181 --> 00:18:39,017 NARRATOR: The crew of Flight 173 is given as much time 388 00:18:39,084 --> 00:18:42,120 as it needs in the holding pattern. 389 00:18:42,187 --> 00:18:43,455 EDWARD KINGREY: It's up to the captain 390 00:18:43,522 --> 00:18:47,292 to decide when it's time for them to come in and land. 391 00:18:47,359 --> 00:18:49,895 They continued circling for about an hour. 392 00:18:49,962 --> 00:18:53,398 NARRATOR: Investigators learned Flight 173 circled Portland 393 00:18:53,465 --> 00:18:56,235 for an unusually long time. 394 00:18:58,136 --> 00:19:01,173 There was no indication to me the-- 395 00:19:01,240 --> 00:19:03,976 the gravity of the situation. 396 00:19:04,042 --> 00:19:05,310 NARRATOR: They now wonder what happened 397 00:19:05,377 --> 00:19:07,579 during that hour of circling to turn 398 00:19:07,646 --> 00:19:08,780 a landing gear malfunction-- 399 00:19:09,915 --> 00:19:11,717 We've got a gear problem. 400 00:19:11,783 --> 00:19:13,385 We'll let you know. 401 00:19:13,452 --> 00:19:15,454 NARRATOR: --into catastrophic engine failure. 402 00:19:16,522 --> 00:19:17,456 The engines are flaming out. 403 00:19:17,523 --> 00:19:18,757 We're going down. 404 00:19:18,824 --> 00:19:20,759 We're not going to be able to make it to the airport. 405 00:19:20,826 --> 00:19:24,563 I was clearly very interested in how a highly experienced 406 00:19:24,630 --> 00:19:27,499 captain could fly around for over an hour 407 00:19:27,566 --> 00:19:29,401 inside of the airport in good weather 408 00:19:29,468 --> 00:19:31,737 and not put this airplane on the ground safely. 409 00:19:37,943 --> 00:19:39,545 NARRATOR: Investigators find the plane's 410 00:19:39,611 --> 00:19:46,618 right side landing gear. 411 00:19:48,387 --> 00:19:51,123 A rusted bolt has pulled free of the mechanism that 412 00:19:51,189 --> 00:19:54,059 raises and lowers the gear. 413 00:19:54,126 --> 00:19:55,961 This could explain it. 414 00:19:56,028 --> 00:19:57,229 NARRATOR: The landing gear would have 415 00:19:57,296 --> 00:20:00,999 dropped suddenly into place. 416 00:20:01,066 --> 00:20:02,467 JOHN COX: The free fall of the gear 417 00:20:02,534 --> 00:20:05,971 would be very apparent to everyone on the airplane. 418 00:20:06,038 --> 00:20:07,573 What was that? 419 00:20:07,639 --> 00:20:11,243 JOHN COX: You would get a very large thump or clunking sound. 420 00:20:11,310 --> 00:20:14,079 You'd feel the gear slam up against the lock, 421 00:20:14,146 --> 00:20:16,081 and so you'd get this reverberation 422 00:20:16,148 --> 00:20:18,584 through the airplane. 423 00:20:18,650 --> 00:20:20,485 ALAN DIEHL: And we learn that, due to corrosion, 424 00:20:20,552 --> 00:20:22,688 the extension mechanism had failed, 425 00:20:22,754 --> 00:20:26,158 and that's what caused the gear to slam down. 426 00:20:26,224 --> 00:20:28,460 NARRATOR: The discovery explains the troubling sound-- 427 00:20:30,095 --> 00:20:32,097 --heard in the cabin an hour before the crash. 428 00:20:35,033 --> 00:20:40,138 But it still doesn't explain the massive engine failure. 429 00:20:44,509 --> 00:20:47,512 The NTSB brings another investigator into the Portland 430 00:20:47,579 --> 00:20:50,449 crash, Dennis Grossi. 431 00:20:50,515 --> 00:20:53,952 DENNIS GROSSI: I was assigned to be the aircraft performance 432 00:20:54,019 --> 00:20:56,688 engineer for this accident. 433 00:20:56,755 --> 00:20:58,890 Basically, it's pulling together 434 00:20:58,957 --> 00:21:02,861 all the information that's available to determine 435 00:21:02,928 --> 00:21:05,330 the aircraft's performance. 436 00:21:05,397 --> 00:21:06,765 NARRATOR: If there was a malfunction, 437 00:21:06,832 --> 00:21:10,302 Grossi hopes the Cockpit Voice Recorder or CVR picked 438 00:21:10,369 --> 00:21:12,871 up the pilots discussing it. 439 00:21:12,938 --> 00:21:14,539 OK. Let's go. 440 00:21:14,606 --> 00:21:15,941 NARRATOR: The recording begins 30 441 00:21:16,008 --> 00:21:18,543 minutes before the crash as the pilots circle over Portland. 442 00:21:18,610 --> 00:21:20,312 MALBURN MCBROOM (ON RECORDING): Ladies and gentlemen, 443 00:21:20,379 --> 00:21:23,682 this is your captain speaking. 444 00:21:23,749 --> 00:21:26,151 NARRATOR: In the era of analog recording, 445 00:21:26,218 --> 00:21:29,855 the CVR uses a 30-minute-long loop of magnetic tape 446 00:21:29,921 --> 00:21:35,227 that keeps recording over itself throughout the flight. 447 00:21:35,293 --> 00:21:37,663 Most air disasters unfold in a matter 448 00:21:37,729 --> 00:21:44,736 of minutes or even seconds. 449 00:21:46,538 --> 00:21:49,174 So having the last half hour of cockpit sounds 450 00:21:49,241 --> 00:21:51,510 and conversation should give investigators 451 00:21:51,576 --> 00:21:53,845 enough material to work with. 452 00:21:53,912 --> 00:21:55,881 DENNIS GROSSI: There's four channels, one cockpit area 453 00:21:55,947 --> 00:21:57,983 microphone and then a channel for each 454 00:21:58,050 --> 00:21:59,818 of the three crew members. 455 00:21:59,885 --> 00:22:01,119 FORREST MENDENHALL (ON RECORDING): 456 00:22:01,186 --> 00:22:03,188 --because I only got this thing to shine down there. 457 00:22:03,255 --> 00:22:04,589 NARRATOR: They hear the flight engineer 458 00:22:04,656 --> 00:22:06,258 leave the cockpit to troubleshoot 459 00:22:06,324 --> 00:22:10,562 the landing gear problem. 460 00:22:10,629 --> 00:22:12,464 In the early generation jets, it 461 00:22:12,531 --> 00:22:16,968 was very common to have mechanical indications 462 00:22:17,035 --> 00:22:23,108 that the landing gear was, in fact, down and locked. 463 00:22:23,175 --> 00:22:24,876 NARRATOR: When the landing gear is lowered, 464 00:22:24,943 --> 00:22:27,813 a small rod pops up on the wing, 465 00:22:27,879 --> 00:22:32,784 providing visual confirmation that the gear is in place. 466 00:22:32,851 --> 00:22:34,653 The flight engineer would be asked by the captain 467 00:22:34,720 --> 00:22:37,022 to go back and check the mechanical indicators 468 00:22:37,089 --> 00:22:40,092 for the position of the landing gear, walk down the aisle 469 00:22:40,158 --> 00:22:41,827 to about the center of the wing. 470 00:22:41,893 --> 00:22:42,828 Excuse me. 471 00:22:42,894 --> 00:22:44,062 Can I look out the window here? 472 00:22:44,129 --> 00:22:45,363 JOHN COX: And he could look over, 473 00:22:45,430 --> 00:22:47,999 and there are tabs that actually come up and go down. 474 00:22:48,066 --> 00:22:52,804 And he could see if the gear was extended and locked. 475 00:22:52,871 --> 00:22:54,639 NARRATOR: It's exactly what Aimee Connor 476 00:22:54,706 --> 00:22:56,341 described to investigators-- 477 00:22:56,408 --> 00:22:58,810 A man with a flashlight came through the aisle. 478 00:22:58,877 --> 00:23:03,849 --in her post-crash interview. 479 00:23:03,915 --> 00:23:05,851 How's that main gear back there? 480 00:23:05,917 --> 00:23:07,753 Both appear to be down and locked. 481 00:23:07,819 --> 00:23:09,988 NARRATOR: Despite his engineer's report, 482 00:23:10,055 --> 00:23:13,091 Captain McBroom is still concerned. 483 00:23:13,158 --> 00:23:19,531 If the gear is locked, none of the lights should be flashing. 484 00:23:19,598 --> 00:23:24,102 And the touchdown if that gear folds or something. 485 00:23:24,169 --> 00:23:27,806 Obviously the lights were affected, the electronics that 486 00:23:27,873 --> 00:23:29,941 tell the crew members whether or not the gear is down 487 00:23:30,008 --> 00:23:31,443 and locked. 488 00:23:31,510 --> 00:23:32,878 NARRATOR: Landing gear failure is 489 00:23:32,944 --> 00:23:35,547 rare in commercial aviation. 490 00:23:35,614 --> 00:23:37,916 When it does happen, statistics show that most 491 00:23:37,983 --> 00:23:39,317 passengers survive unscathed. 492 00:23:41,386 --> 00:23:45,323 In 2008, engine failure forced British Airways Flight 493 00:23:45,390 --> 00:23:51,163 38 to make a crash-landing. 494 00:23:51,229 --> 00:23:54,065 The impact ripped the Boeing 777 landing 495 00:23:54,132 --> 00:23:57,302 gear from the fuselage. 496 00:23:57,369 --> 00:24:04,176 The plane was totaled, but no one was killed. 497 00:24:08,246 --> 00:24:11,249 There's one check we missed, checking 498 00:24:11,316 --> 00:24:15,487 the gear warning horn. 499 00:24:15,554 --> 00:24:17,255 - Right. - Correct. 500 00:24:17,322 --> 00:24:18,490 Right. 501 00:24:18,557 --> 00:24:20,959 Normally when we see these problems of a gear light 502 00:24:21,026 --> 00:24:23,695 not coming on, it's a light bulb or some minor piece 503 00:24:23,762 --> 00:24:25,297 of circuitry. 504 00:24:25,363 --> 00:24:27,933 NARRATOR: It appears that a minor electrical problem 505 00:24:27,999 --> 00:24:33,538 had become a major distraction for Captain McBroom. 506 00:24:33,605 --> 00:24:35,240 So how do we do that? 507 00:24:35,307 --> 00:24:36,775 NARRATOR: That still doesn't explain 508 00:24:36,842 --> 00:24:38,844 why the plane lost power. 509 00:24:38,910 --> 00:24:43,882 But what investigators hear next could explain everything. 510 00:24:43,949 --> 00:24:45,450 RODERICK BEEBE (ON RECORDING): Losing an engine. 511 00:24:45,517 --> 00:24:46,651 It's flamed out. 512 00:24:46,718 --> 00:24:48,887 Why? 513 00:24:48,954 --> 00:24:49,888 Fuel. 514 00:24:51,223 --> 00:24:54,125 NARRATOR: First officer Beebe's answer is chilling. 515 00:24:54,192 --> 00:24:56,595 After nearly an hour in a holding pattern, 516 00:24:56,661 --> 00:25:00,432 Flight 173 is simply running out of gas. 517 00:25:00,498 --> 00:25:02,200 RODERICK BEEBE (ON RECORDING): We're losing an engine. 518 00:25:02,267 --> 00:25:05,036 NARRATOR: NTSB investigator Alan Diehl has discovered 519 00:25:05,103 --> 00:25:06,771 something crucial on the CVR. 520 00:25:06,838 --> 00:25:07,772 It's flamed out. 521 00:25:07,839 --> 00:25:09,007 What? 522 00:25:09,074 --> 00:25:11,009 NARRATOR: Less than eight minutes before the DC-8 523 00:25:11,076 --> 00:25:13,678 crashes into a Portland suburb, the captain 524 00:25:13,745 --> 00:25:19,985 seems unconvinced that low fuel is behind his engine failure. 525 00:25:20,051 --> 00:25:22,320 He was asking what was causing that, 526 00:25:22,387 --> 00:25:26,057 and he got a very adamant answer saying "fuel." 527 00:25:26,124 --> 00:25:27,359 Fuel. 528 00:25:27,425 --> 00:25:29,060 As if to say, we've been trying to tell 529 00:25:29,127 --> 00:25:30,295 you about this all along. 530 00:25:31,563 --> 00:25:35,033 Open those crossfeeds there or something. 531 00:25:35,100 --> 00:25:37,535 JOHN COX: There are cross feed valves that are opened 532 00:25:37,602 --> 00:25:40,939 in a specific sequence to let one tank feed 533 00:25:41,006 --> 00:25:44,075 one or more engines, and it's the job of the flight 534 00:25:44,142 --> 00:25:45,877 engineer, in the case of a DC-8, 535 00:25:45,944 --> 00:25:50,048 to know exactly how to do that. 536 00:25:50,115 --> 00:25:51,650 Showing fumes. 537 00:25:51,716 --> 00:25:53,251 NARRATOR: Though the crew couldn't agree on 538 00:25:53,318 --> 00:25:55,320 exactly how much was left-- 539 00:25:55,387 --> 00:25:57,088 No, it's showing 1,000 or better. 540 00:25:57,155 --> 00:25:58,790 I don't think it's in there. 541 00:25:58,857 --> 00:26:00,125 NARRATOR: --one thing is certain-- 542 00:26:00,191 --> 00:26:04,029 there isn't enough to keep the engine's running. 543 00:26:04,095 --> 00:26:07,132 Losing an engine. 544 00:26:07,198 --> 00:26:08,333 It's flamed out. 545 00:26:08,400 --> 00:26:10,802 It takes a few things to make an engine run. 546 00:26:10,869 --> 00:26:13,305 One of them is fuel. 547 00:26:13,371 --> 00:26:15,307 MALBURN MCBROOM (ON RECORDING): You got that crossfeed open? 548 00:26:15,373 --> 00:26:17,008 NARRATOR: Captain McBroom is desperate. 549 00:26:17,075 --> 00:26:19,010 He needs to get more fuel to the remaining engines. 550 00:26:20,078 --> 00:26:21,313 No, I haven't got it open. 551 00:26:21,379 --> 00:26:23,081 Which one? 552 00:26:23,148 --> 00:26:24,082 Open them both. 553 00:26:24,149 --> 00:26:26,251 Damn it, get some fuel in there. 554 00:26:26,318 --> 00:26:28,053 NARRATOR: Each of the plane's four engines 555 00:26:28,119 --> 00:26:29,821 has its own fuel tank. 556 00:26:29,888 --> 00:26:32,490 Opening the crossfeeds should allow fuel to flow 557 00:26:32,557 --> 00:26:36,061 between the four main tanks. 558 00:26:36,127 --> 00:26:37,395 Number two is empty. 559 00:26:37,462 --> 00:26:39,764 NARRATOR: But it's not working. 560 00:26:39,831 --> 00:26:43,268 You're going to lose number three in a minute, too. 561 00:26:43,335 --> 00:26:46,638 NARRATOR: One by one, fuel starvation shuts down all the, 562 00:26:46,705 --> 00:26:52,444 engines leaving the DC-8 without any power. 563 00:26:52,510 --> 00:26:53,611 MALBURN MCBROOM (ON RECORDING): OK. 564 00:26:53,678 --> 00:26:59,651 Declare mayday. 565 00:26:59,718 --> 00:27:05,156 The engines didn't have any fuel. 566 00:27:05,223 --> 00:27:08,326 We knew that the aircraft ran out of fuel. 567 00:27:08,393 --> 00:27:12,197 So then became the question, why? 568 00:27:12,263 --> 00:27:15,033 Why would a modern transport aircraft 569 00:27:15,100 --> 00:27:17,535 like this run out of fuel? 570 00:27:17,602 --> 00:27:20,638 NARRATOR: Investigators focus on two possibilities-- 571 00:27:20,705 --> 00:27:25,143 mechanical failure or human error. 572 00:27:25,210 --> 00:27:28,880 Was it a crew problem, or was it an aircraft problem? 573 00:27:31,216 --> 00:27:32,717 NARRATOR: McBroom may be the only one 574 00:27:32,784 --> 00:27:36,654 who can give the answer. 575 00:27:36,721 --> 00:27:41,192 I wanted to be on final with as much fuel as I could have. 576 00:27:41,259 --> 00:27:43,328 You've got to keep them running, Frosty. 577 00:27:43,395 --> 00:27:44,763 NARRATOR: Recovering from his injuries 578 00:27:44,829 --> 00:27:47,399 in an Oregon hospital, he's now well enough 579 00:27:47,465 --> 00:27:49,567 to tell his side of the story. 580 00:27:49,634 --> 00:27:51,770 We finally sat down with Captain McBroom 581 00:27:51,836 --> 00:27:54,539 and asked the tough questions. 582 00:27:54,606 --> 00:27:57,442 JOHN COX: A pilot takes the responsibility 583 00:27:57,509 --> 00:27:59,444 for the passengers and his fellow crew members 584 00:27:59,511 --> 00:28:03,782 extremely seriously, and to be involved in an accident 585 00:28:03,848 --> 00:28:05,850 where there are fatalities is something 586 00:28:05,917 --> 00:28:09,087 that never leaves you. 587 00:28:09,154 --> 00:28:13,691 It would be with a pilot the remainder of their lives. 588 00:28:13,758 --> 00:28:17,429 I recall seeing the number one 589 00:28:17,495 --> 00:28:19,697 and number two warning lights come on, 590 00:28:19,764 --> 00:28:24,436 but I knew we had fuel. 591 00:28:24,502 --> 00:28:27,038 ALAN DIEHL: He was still convinced that somehow 592 00:28:27,105 --> 00:28:29,274 the fuel had either leaked out of the tanks, 593 00:28:29,340 --> 00:28:32,577 or the fuel burn was too high, or the gauges were wrong. 594 00:28:32,644 --> 00:28:34,379 No, it's showing 1,000 or better. 595 00:28:34,446 --> 00:28:38,550 I don't think it's in there. 596 00:28:38,616 --> 00:28:40,385 NARRATOR: Meanwhile, in Washington, 597 00:28:40,452 --> 00:28:46,224 Dennis Grossi digs deeper in search of a mechanical cause. 598 00:28:46,291 --> 00:28:49,861 He studies Flight 173's flight plan. 599 00:28:49,928 --> 00:28:52,163 He uses it to calculate the amount of fuel 600 00:28:52,230 --> 00:28:54,265 the DC-8 should have burned. 601 00:29:01,906 --> 00:29:03,141 JOHN COX: A DC-8 burns somewhere 602 00:29:03,208 --> 00:29:08,012 in the neighborhood of 13,000 pounds of fuel an hour. 603 00:29:08,079 --> 00:29:09,647 The question is, did this aircraft 604 00:29:09,714 --> 00:29:13,618 burn fuel faster than normal? 605 00:29:13,685 --> 00:29:16,354 NARRATOR: If the data shows any discrepancy, 606 00:29:16,421 --> 00:29:18,790 it could mean the captain was right. 607 00:29:21,426 --> 00:29:22,861 DENNIS GROSSI: There must have been a problem 608 00:29:22,927 --> 00:29:27,265 that the engines were burning a lot more fuel than normal 609 00:29:27,332 --> 00:29:32,537 or there was some anomaly in the aircraft. 610 00:29:32,604 --> 00:29:35,240 NARRATOR: His analysis finds no problem. 611 00:29:35,306 --> 00:29:38,309 Flight 173 took off with more than enough fuel 612 00:29:38,376 --> 00:29:40,478 to reach Portland and was consuming 613 00:29:40,545 --> 00:29:44,048 it at the standard rate. 614 00:29:44,115 --> 00:29:46,518 The fuel burn is completely normal. 615 00:29:46,584 --> 00:29:50,388 The conclusion was that the aircraft performance was 616 00:29:50,455 --> 00:29:53,892 normal and that there was no anomalies in the amount 617 00:29:53,958 --> 00:29:54,893 of fuel consumed. 618 00:29:56,961 --> 00:29:57,896 Showing films. 619 00:30:00,632 --> 00:30:01,633 NARRATOR: Investigators are left 620 00:30:01,699 --> 00:30:05,203 with a troubling question. 621 00:30:05,270 --> 00:30:09,908 How could an experienced crew lose track of how much fuel 622 00:30:09,974 --> 00:30:13,711 they had onboard and, in fact, run out of fuel when they 623 00:30:13,778 --> 00:30:17,849 were in view of the airport? 624 00:30:17,916 --> 00:30:20,418 NARRATOR: Grossi considers the possibility that the plane's 625 00:30:20,485 --> 00:30:23,021 fuel gauges malfunctioned. 626 00:30:23,087 --> 00:30:26,858 He studies the CVR transcript, focusing in on the crew's 627 00:30:26,925 --> 00:30:30,862 discussion of fuel levels. 628 00:30:30,929 --> 00:30:32,564 DENNIS GROSSI: Fuel gauges are not known 629 00:30:32,630 --> 00:30:35,366 for being all that precise. 630 00:30:35,433 --> 00:30:38,303 That's why it was so important for the performance study 631 00:30:38,369 --> 00:30:41,973 to correlate the amount of fuel that was actually 632 00:30:42,040 --> 00:30:44,976 on the aircraft with what was actually 633 00:30:45,043 --> 00:30:47,812 being indicated to the crew. 634 00:30:47,879 --> 00:30:49,781 How not sure we got, Frosty? 635 00:30:49,847 --> 00:30:52,951 NARRATOR: If the gauges weren't working properly-- 636 00:30:53,017 --> 00:30:54,085 5,000. 637 00:30:54,152 --> 00:30:55,620 NARRATOR: --it could explain why the crew let 638 00:30:55,687 --> 00:30:59,791 the fuel levels fall so low. 639 00:30:59,857 --> 00:31:01,526 The crew discuss, how much fuel do you have? 640 00:31:01,593 --> 00:31:04,295 We got 5,000 pounds. 641 00:31:04,362 --> 00:31:06,264 NARRATOR: By matching the time and the transcript 642 00:31:06,331 --> 00:31:09,500 with the fuel burn chart, Grossi 643 00:31:09,567 --> 00:31:13,338 can determine if the gauges were working accurately. 644 00:31:13,404 --> 00:31:16,241 You take the data and apply the time factor to it, 645 00:31:16,307 --> 00:31:18,710 and you can figure out how much fuel they 646 00:31:18,776 --> 00:31:21,112 should have had remaining. 647 00:31:21,179 --> 00:31:23,681 NARRATOR: He discovers the flight engineer-- 648 00:31:23,748 --> 00:31:24,682 FORREST MENDENHALL: 5,000. 649 00:31:24,749 --> 00:31:27,318 NARRATOR: --had the correct reading 650 00:31:27,385 --> 00:31:28,720 5,000. 651 00:31:28,786 --> 00:31:30,321 That's exactly right. 652 00:31:30,388 --> 00:31:33,324 There was nothing wrong with the gauges either. 653 00:31:33,391 --> 00:31:36,060 He said that they saw 5,000 pounds. 654 00:31:36,127 --> 00:31:40,965 That was consistent with what the fuel burn study showed. 655 00:31:41,032 --> 00:31:42,700 NARRATOR: Investigators are convinced 656 00:31:42,767 --> 00:31:45,236 that Flight 173's fuel system was 657 00:31:45,303 --> 00:31:49,774 working exactly as it should. 658 00:31:49,841 --> 00:31:53,778 Lights in the fuel pump. 659 00:31:53,845 --> 00:31:56,281 NARRATOR: 35 minutes after the captain put his plane 660 00:31:56,347 --> 00:31:58,449 into a holding pattern, a warning 661 00:31:58,516 --> 00:32:02,620 light tells the flight engineer that fuel is dangerously low. 662 00:32:02,687 --> 00:32:03,755 That's about right. 663 00:32:03,821 --> 00:32:06,391 The feed pumps are starting to blink. 664 00:32:06,457 --> 00:32:07,692 ALAN DIEHL: Fuel pump lights come on. 665 00:32:07,759 --> 00:32:10,161 This means that the-- they're literally sucking air. 666 00:32:10,228 --> 00:32:12,397 As the fuel sloshes around in tanks, 667 00:32:12,463 --> 00:32:15,600 this plane should have been headed for the airport soon. 668 00:32:15,667 --> 00:32:19,370 NARRATOR: But captain McBroom still isn't ready to land. 669 00:32:19,437 --> 00:32:22,140 JOHN COX: To be in an airplane with that little fuel, it's 670 00:32:22,206 --> 00:32:24,075 something that, as a pilot-- 671 00:32:24,142 --> 00:32:25,810 I've never been in that position, 672 00:32:25,877 --> 00:32:28,813 and I would be extraordinarily uncomfortable. 673 00:32:28,880 --> 00:32:31,716 NARRATOR: His reaction is puzzling. 674 00:32:31,783 --> 00:32:34,485 I figure about another 15 minutes. 675 00:32:34,552 --> 00:32:36,988 ALAN DIEHL: The flight engineer said, Captain, 15 minutes? 676 00:32:37,055 --> 00:32:39,724 That's going to run us kind of close on fuel out here. 677 00:32:39,791 --> 00:32:41,726 Not enough. 678 00:32:41,793 --> 00:32:44,195 15 minutes is really going to run us low on fuel here. 679 00:32:44,262 --> 00:32:47,332 That was his one definitive statement to the captain 680 00:32:47,398 --> 00:32:49,367 that things were not right. 681 00:32:49,434 --> 00:32:51,336 NARRATOR: The captain wants more time to prepare 682 00:32:51,402 --> 00:32:53,137 for the emergency landing. 683 00:32:53,204 --> 00:32:54,839 Call around. 684 00:32:54,906 --> 00:32:57,408 Give them our passenger count and them him to give 685 00:32:57,475 --> 00:33:01,713 that to the fire department. 686 00:33:01,779 --> 00:33:07,018 NARRATOR: Instead of heading straight for the runway, 687 00:33:07,085 --> 00:33:11,823 he turns the plane into one last circle over Portland. 688 00:33:11,889 --> 00:33:14,258 I kept thinking, why isn't this guy 689 00:33:14,325 --> 00:33:17,495 turning in to the airport at this time? 690 00:33:17,562 --> 00:33:19,464 NARRATOR: The plane has been in a holding pattern 691 00:33:19,530 --> 00:33:21,532 for more than 40 minutes. 692 00:33:21,599 --> 00:33:24,769 It will take at least 15 more to land, 693 00:33:24,836 --> 00:33:31,676 but the aircraft has only 14 minutes worth of fuel. 694 00:33:32,677 --> 00:33:36,280 A crash landing is now inevitable. 695 00:33:36,347 --> 00:33:37,281 Engines are flaming out. 696 00:33:37,348 --> 00:33:38,583 We're going down. 697 00:33:38,649 --> 00:33:41,753 We're not going to be able to make it to the airport. 698 00:33:41,819 --> 00:33:43,254 NARRATOR: Investigators now know 699 00:33:43,321 --> 00:33:45,656 that Captain McBroom received clear warnings 700 00:33:45,723 --> 00:33:49,527 about low fuel levels. 701 00:33:49,594 --> 00:33:51,662 This didn't have to happen. 702 00:33:51,729 --> 00:33:53,631 NARRATOR: What they don't understand 703 00:33:53,698 --> 00:33:56,901 Is why he ignored them. 704 00:33:56,968 --> 00:33:58,503 ALAN DIEHL: And this was not an act of God. 705 00:33:58,569 --> 00:34:00,972 This was not a massive mechanical failure. 706 00:34:01,038 --> 00:34:04,442 This was an airplane that was perfectly flyable, good night, 707 00:34:04,509 --> 00:34:07,078 within sight of the airport. 708 00:34:07,145 --> 00:34:10,214 This accident should never have happened. 709 00:34:10,281 --> 00:34:12,083 RODERICK BEEBE (ON RECORDING): How much fuel we got now? 710 00:34:12,150 --> 00:34:15,720 NARRATOR: The NTSB's Al Diehl returns to the CVR looking 711 00:34:15,787 --> 00:34:18,189 for anything that might shed some light on the captain's 712 00:34:18,256 --> 00:34:19,424 state of mind. 713 00:34:19,490 --> 00:34:23,594 When you listen to the tapes over and over again, 714 00:34:23,661 --> 00:34:25,997 you can detect things like voice inflections, 715 00:34:26,063 --> 00:34:29,967 subtle voice mannerisms that are trying to communicate 716 00:34:30,034 --> 00:34:32,437 to other members of the crew. 717 00:34:32,503 --> 00:34:35,339 NARRATOR: Diehl is struck by an unusual aspect of McBroom's 718 00:34:35,406 --> 00:34:37,575 behavior in the cockpit. 719 00:34:37,642 --> 00:34:39,076 RODERICK BEEBE (ON RECORDING): How much fuel we got now? 720 00:34:40,445 --> 00:34:42,013 NARRATOR: His crewmates tried more than once to alert 721 00:34:42,079 --> 00:34:46,584 him to the fuel situation. 722 00:34:46,651 --> 00:34:48,085 How much fuel we've got now? 723 00:34:48,152 --> 00:34:54,125 4-- 4,000, in each, pounds. 724 00:34:54,192 --> 00:34:57,261 Both the first officer and the second officer 725 00:34:57,328 --> 00:35:00,431 were acutely aware of the fuel status. 726 00:35:00,498 --> 00:35:01,933 NARRATOR: But McBroom is focusing 727 00:35:01,999 --> 00:35:05,269 on the broken landing gear. 728 00:35:05,336 --> 00:35:10,107 There's-- there's one check we missed, checking 729 00:35:10,174 --> 00:35:14,378 the gear whirring horn. 730 00:35:14,445 --> 00:35:15,379 Right. 731 00:35:15,446 --> 00:35:16,380 Correct. 732 00:35:16,447 --> 00:35:17,582 Right. 733 00:35:17,648 --> 00:35:20,084 So how do we do that? 734 00:35:20,151 --> 00:35:22,320 JOHN COX: Flying with a very senior captain, it 735 00:35:22,386 --> 00:35:24,021 would be very difficult to-- 736 00:35:24,088 --> 00:35:27,492 to challenge that Captain in those days about something 737 00:35:27,558 --> 00:35:28,493 like fuel. 738 00:35:28,559 --> 00:35:29,627 ALAN DIEHL: The other crew members 739 00:35:29,694 --> 00:35:31,062 are trying to get this captain's attention, 740 00:35:31,128 --> 00:35:34,332 but he was apparently totally focused on the gear problem 741 00:35:34,398 --> 00:35:37,201 to the exclusion of all else. 742 00:35:37,268 --> 00:35:40,238 NARRATOR: Even after the engines begin to flame out, 743 00:35:40,304 --> 00:35:42,473 McBroom is still trying to fix the malfunctioning 744 00:35:42,540 --> 00:35:43,474 landing gear. 745 00:35:46,511 --> 00:35:47,945 McBroom was not going to give up. 746 00:35:51,349 --> 00:35:54,452 He was going to find a-- what we sometimes called 747 00:35:54,519 --> 00:35:56,721 the golden BB, the one thing that would answer 748 00:35:56,787 --> 00:35:59,257 the riddle as to why this light is not on, 749 00:35:59,323 --> 00:36:02,593 and of course that never happened. 750 00:36:02,660 --> 00:36:04,295 NARRATOR: McBroom is determined to fix 751 00:36:04,362 --> 00:36:08,299 a mechanical problem that could threaten the plane's safety. 752 00:36:08,366 --> 00:36:11,035 On the touchdown, if that gear folds or something-- 753 00:36:11,102 --> 00:36:12,937 NARRATOR: As a result, he misses a far 754 00:36:13,004 --> 00:36:14,972 bigger and deadlier threat. 755 00:36:15,039 --> 00:36:19,076 The gear problem is really a distraction for the crew. 756 00:36:19,143 --> 00:36:23,748 You had a small problem with a small potential consequence, 757 00:36:23,814 --> 00:36:26,417 the gear collapsing on landing. 758 00:36:26,484 --> 00:36:27,952 But the captain was so focused on 759 00:36:28,019 --> 00:36:30,054 that he lost the big picture. 760 00:36:30,121 --> 00:36:32,423 Reset that circuit breaker momentarily. 761 00:36:32,490 --> 00:36:33,925 See if we get gear lights. 762 00:36:33,991 --> 00:36:36,527 DENNIS GROSSI: They lost sight of the real emergency, 763 00:36:36,594 --> 00:36:39,297 which was the lack of fuel. 764 00:36:39,363 --> 00:36:41,098 NARRATOR: Al Diehl now understands 765 00:36:41,165 --> 00:36:44,101 how Captain McBroom's obsession with the malfunctioning 766 00:36:44,168 --> 00:36:47,104 landing gear led to disaster. 767 00:36:47,171 --> 00:36:50,374 JOHN COX: After this accident, the National Transportation 768 00:36:50,441 --> 00:36:52,410 Safety Board said flight crew members need 769 00:36:52,476 --> 00:36:55,846 to be better trained to communicate when they 770 00:36:55,913 --> 00:36:59,016 have safety of flight issues. 771 00:36:59,083 --> 00:37:01,586 NARRATOR: What happened aboard Flight 173 772 00:37:01,652 --> 00:37:06,691 is, alarmingly, not an isolated case. 773 00:37:09,727 --> 00:37:15,232 Just a year earlier, another DC-8 crashed in almost 774 00:37:15,299 --> 00:37:18,803 identical circumstances. 775 00:37:18,869 --> 00:37:21,906 ALAN DIEHL: It was a United crew, same kind of aircraft, 776 00:37:21,973 --> 00:37:24,442 gear unsafe light, entered a holding pattern at night, 777 00:37:24,508 --> 00:37:27,678 flew around, troubleshooting the gear problem. 778 00:37:27,745 --> 00:37:30,681 They flew into a mountain and killed everybody aboard. 779 00:37:33,050 --> 00:37:35,186 NARRATOR: It was one of a string of deadly crashes 780 00:37:35,252 --> 00:37:39,957 during the 1970s involving a lack of communication. 781 00:37:40,024 --> 00:37:41,993 The list includes Eastern Airlines 782 00:37:42,059 --> 00:37:47,698 Flight 401, a Lockheed L-1011 bound for Miami. 783 00:37:47,765 --> 00:37:50,534 Here, too, they had a gear unsafe light. 784 00:37:53,938 --> 00:37:56,474 They ended up descending into the Everglades, crashing, 785 00:37:56,540 --> 00:37:58,709 and killed over 100 people. 786 00:38:05,116 --> 00:38:06,550 NARRATOR: The deadliest air disaster 787 00:38:06,617 --> 00:38:10,321 in history at Tenerife in the Canary Islands. 788 00:38:10,388 --> 00:38:17,061 It was caused by poor communication. 789 00:38:17,128 --> 00:38:20,498 The collision claimed 583 lives. 790 00:38:20,564 --> 00:38:21,799 ALAN DIEHL: There was a pattern here 791 00:38:21,866 --> 00:38:24,368 where we're having the same types of accidents where 792 00:38:24,435 --> 00:38:28,105 other flight deck crewmembers were having a difficult time 793 00:38:28,172 --> 00:38:30,474 getting the captain's attention and making 794 00:38:30,541 --> 00:38:31,509 him do the right thing. 795 00:38:36,047 --> 00:38:38,516 NARRATOR: Al Diehl is convinced that the way pilots 796 00:38:38,582 --> 00:38:41,052 communicate with each other is now a growing 797 00:38:41,118 --> 00:38:43,454 threat to commercial aviation. 798 00:38:43,521 --> 00:38:45,489 A lot of people at NTSB elsewhere 799 00:38:45,556 --> 00:38:47,692 thought we were going to be headed for a bloodbath 800 00:38:47,758 --> 00:38:51,262 if we didn't get a handle on the causes of human error. 801 00:38:59,470 --> 00:39:02,206 Diehl learns about an experimental pilot training 802 00:39:02,273 --> 00:39:05,443 program developed by NASA that could help 803 00:39:05,509 --> 00:39:10,214 solve the growing problem. 804 00:39:10,281 --> 00:39:13,851 Known as Cockpit Resource Management or CRM, 805 00:39:13,918 --> 00:39:16,187 it's a system of training designed to improve 806 00:39:16,253 --> 00:39:19,256 the way pilots communicate. 807 00:39:19,323 --> 00:39:22,226 It helps to improve crew coordination 808 00:39:22,293 --> 00:39:24,562 and improve collective decision-making 809 00:39:24,628 --> 00:39:25,963 on the cockpit. 810 00:39:26,030 --> 00:39:28,733 And the way it does that is it teaches captains to listen 811 00:39:28,799 --> 00:39:30,801 better, and it teaches the other members 812 00:39:30,868 --> 00:39:34,605 of the flight deck to be respectfully assertive. 813 00:39:34,672 --> 00:39:35,740 NARRATOR: In a move that will have 814 00:39:35,806 --> 00:39:38,642 a lasting impact on airline safety, 815 00:39:38,709 --> 00:39:43,013 the FAA adopts deals CRM recommendation. 816 00:39:44,348 --> 00:39:47,952 From here on, the job of flying a commercial airliner 817 00:39:48,018 --> 00:39:52,523 will never be the same. 818 00:39:56,427 --> 00:39:58,229 United Airlines is one of the first 819 00:39:58,295 --> 00:40:02,266 to implement a CRM training program for its pilots. 820 00:40:02,333 --> 00:40:06,771 It's still in use today. 821 00:40:06,837 --> 00:40:09,240 United's director of flight training operations 822 00:40:09,306 --> 00:40:11,442 is Marc Champion. 823 00:40:11,509 --> 00:40:13,911 The principles of Crew Resource Management 824 00:40:13,978 --> 00:40:17,148 are that no one individual in the cockpit 825 00:40:17,214 --> 00:40:21,018 can possibly understand or see all of the threats 826 00:40:21,085 --> 00:40:22,386 that are out there. 827 00:40:22,453 --> 00:40:26,056 It requires the entire crew to really foresee and manage 828 00:40:26,123 --> 00:40:29,160 the various threats that happen to be in play 829 00:40:29,226 --> 00:40:31,128 when an airplane is in flight. 830 00:40:31,195 --> 00:40:33,430 NARRATOR: Today, United pilot Sheri Rutledge-- 831 00:40:33,497 --> 00:40:36,433 Also I'm having a hard time maintaining my speed here. 832 00:40:36,500 --> 00:40:37,535 --is undergoing CRM training. 833 00:40:37,601 --> 00:40:38,803 Let me talk to the flight attendant. 834 00:40:38,869 --> 00:40:40,204 You continue to steer the airplane. 835 00:40:40,271 --> 00:40:41,338 DENNIS GROSSI: I got the airplane. 836 00:40:42,673 --> 00:40:44,108 NARRATOR: In this simulation, she and her captain 837 00:40:44,175 --> 00:40:45,209 are dealing with an emergency. 838 00:40:46,310 --> 00:40:47,745 Engine oil low pressure. 839 00:40:47,812 --> 00:40:51,115 If oil is less than 60 PSI-- 840 00:40:51,182 --> 00:40:53,284 NARRATOR: A mechanical problem has forced a shutdown 841 00:40:53,350 --> 00:40:55,085 of one of their two engines. - --level one to idle. 842 00:40:55,152 --> 00:40:56,420 Confirm to us. 843 00:40:56,487 --> 00:40:59,056 Engine one shut down, engine mode selector to ignition. 844 00:40:59,123 --> 00:41:04,528 It's designed to mimic the situations that I will 845 00:41:04,595 --> 00:41:06,664 see in actual airplane flying. 846 00:41:06,730 --> 00:41:08,899 Yes. 847 00:41:08,966 --> 00:41:13,337 Oakland Center, United 1916, we're declaring an emergency. 848 00:41:13,404 --> 00:41:15,606 We've had an engine failure at altitude. 849 00:41:15,673 --> 00:41:17,875 There are specific threats that we 850 00:41:17,942 --> 00:41:21,111 have to deal with as a crew, be able to communicate, 851 00:41:21,178 --> 00:41:24,882 plan, decision-make through to a safe outcome. 852 00:41:24,949 --> 00:41:27,952 So it's a problem-solving type of scenario, 853 00:41:28,018 --> 00:41:29,119 and you're very focused. 854 00:41:29,186 --> 00:41:30,821 It doesn't look to me as though we've got a fire 855 00:41:30,888 --> 00:41:32,022 issue, though. 856 00:41:32,089 --> 00:41:33,457 We've shut it down quickly enough. 857 00:41:33,524 --> 00:41:35,893 All the flight crew comes together, agrees on, 858 00:41:35,960 --> 00:41:37,328 yes, this is the way-- 859 00:41:37,394 --> 00:41:40,164 everything's appropriate, and then you go to the next step. 860 00:41:40,231 --> 00:41:41,198 Yeah, pull the book out. 861 00:41:41,265 --> 00:41:42,199 Let's take a look at that. 862 00:41:42,266 --> 00:41:44,635 OK. 863 00:41:44,702 --> 00:41:49,006 It's very easy sometimes to know what your intention is 864 00:41:49,073 --> 00:41:52,443 and think that the people around you 865 00:41:52,509 --> 00:41:55,713 will also know what that intention is. 866 00:41:55,779 --> 00:41:57,848 But that's not usually the case. 867 00:41:57,915 --> 00:41:59,917 I'm going to go off and talk to dispatch to maintain 868 00:41:59,984 --> 00:42:00,918 flying the airplane. 869 00:42:00,985 --> 00:42:02,519 How are we doing on altitude? 870 00:42:02,586 --> 00:42:04,521 NARRATOR: They keep each other informed every 871 00:42:04,588 --> 00:42:07,324 step of the way, exactly as the exercise intends. 872 00:42:07,391 --> 00:42:08,325 --San Jose as well. 873 00:42:08,392 --> 00:42:09,493 I wanted to-- 874 00:42:09,560 --> 00:42:10,961 Ladies and gentlemen, your captain speaking. 875 00:42:11,028 --> 00:42:13,631 We're now in our descent into San Francisco 876 00:42:13,697 --> 00:42:20,204 this ERM training makes every difference in every flight. 877 00:42:20,271 --> 00:42:23,107 It has empowered me as a crew member 878 00:42:23,173 --> 00:42:25,976 and reminded me to speak up. 879 00:42:26,043 --> 00:42:28,379 We're getting a little close in here. 880 00:42:28,445 --> 00:42:31,148 To help with decisions, to maintain 881 00:42:31,215 --> 00:42:33,317 my situational awareness, and that, I think, 882 00:42:33,384 --> 00:42:36,820 is the most important part of it. 883 00:42:36,887 --> 00:42:39,256 ALAN DIEHL: In the States, we've literally gone a decade 884 00:42:39,323 --> 00:42:41,926 without losing a single passenger 885 00:42:41,992 --> 00:42:44,628 at a major carrier accident. 886 00:42:47,898 --> 00:42:50,601 Many of the experts have concluded that that was 887 00:42:50,668 --> 00:42:52,870 at least partly due to CRM. 888 00:42:54,071 --> 00:42:55,940 NARRATOR: Had the crew of Flight 173 889 00:42:56,006 --> 00:42:58,042 received such training-- 890 00:42:58,108 --> 00:43:00,277 I figure about another 15 minutes. 891 00:43:00,344 --> 00:43:02,012 NARRATOR: --they might have expressed their concerns 892 00:43:02,079 --> 00:43:04,014 more forcefully, insisting Captain 893 00:43:04,081 --> 00:43:05,549 McBroom land immediately. 894 00:43:05,616 --> 00:43:07,484 Not enough. 895 00:43:07,551 --> 00:43:10,154 15 minutes is really going to run us low on fuel here. 896 00:43:10,220 --> 00:43:12,323 Instead, they expected their captain 897 00:43:12,389 --> 00:43:17,261 to make the right decision. 898 00:43:17,328 --> 00:43:19,530 OK, declare mayday. 899 00:43:20,597 --> 00:43:21,899 NARRATOR: Melburn McBroom was held 900 00:43:21,966 --> 00:43:24,668 responsible for the crash. 901 00:43:24,735 --> 00:43:31,141 He retired shortly afterwards. 902 00:43:31,208 --> 00:43:33,510 Flight 173 passenger Aimee Connor 903 00:43:33,577 --> 00:43:40,217 met Captain McBroom in 1998, six years before his death. 904 00:43:41,218 --> 00:43:42,553 The man that I saw at the reunion 905 00:43:42,619 --> 00:43:47,791 was very broken, very broken, and yet so willing 906 00:43:47,858 --> 00:43:52,096 to be there for us under whatever 907 00:43:52,162 --> 00:43:55,799 circumstances there were. 908 00:43:55,866 --> 00:43:56,800 MALBURN MCBROOM: Call around. 909 00:43:56,867 --> 00:43:58,502 Give them a passenger count. 910 00:43:58,569 --> 00:44:00,571 AIMEE CONNER: If I had had any anger toward him 911 00:44:00,637 --> 00:44:04,842 before the reunion, I sure didn't after I met him, 912 00:44:04,908 --> 00:44:07,077 I know that he truly believed he had more 913 00:44:07,144 --> 00:44:08,912 fuel onboard than he did have. 914 00:44:08,979 --> 00:44:10,180 MALBURN MCBROOM: Tell him to pass that 915 00:44:10,247 --> 00:44:12,816 on to the fire department. 916 00:44:12,883 --> 00:44:16,754 I always said that pilot air is not an answer. 917 00:44:16,820 --> 00:44:19,223 It's only a symptom of some underlying problems. 918 00:44:19,289 --> 00:44:21,725 MALBURN MCBROOM: The thing to remember is, don't worry. 919 00:44:21,792 --> 00:44:24,795 ALAN DIEHL: McBroom was flying under the cockpit 920 00:44:24,862 --> 00:44:26,096 culture of the time. 921 00:44:26,163 --> 00:44:28,799 This was an accident waiting to happen. 922 00:44:28,866 --> 00:44:30,501 They were a product of their times, 923 00:44:30,567 --> 00:44:34,004 and we have to judge those men by the environment 924 00:44:34,071 --> 00:44:37,041 they operated in. 925 00:44:37,107 --> 00:44:40,077 You don't do that sort of thing on purpose. 926 00:44:40,144 --> 00:44:41,712 We can't make it. 927 00:44:41,779 --> 00:44:44,915 He was devastated. 928 00:44:44,982 --> 00:44:46,650 He lost his license. 929 00:44:46,717 --> 00:44:49,153 He lost his family. 930 00:44:49,219 --> 00:44:52,423 The rest of his life was just shattered. 71891

Can't find what you're looking for?
Get subtitles in any language from opensubtitles.com, and translate them here.