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I was afraid.
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I didn't know where I was.
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NARRATOR: Lost and
disoriented, the strange crowd
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makes its way through
a wooded suburb.
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Just minutes ago, they
were aboard a flight
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00:00:13,513 --> 00:00:14,881
bound for Portland, Oregon.
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All of a sudden,
there was a big crash.
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The next thing I knew
I was standing outside.
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I don't know how the
hell I got there.
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A man with a flashlight--
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Excuse me.
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Came down the aisle.
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They continued circling
for about an hour.
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00:00:27,327 --> 00:00:30,730
Was it a crew problem, or
was it an aircraft problem?
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NARRATOR: The voice recorder--
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OK, let's go.
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Could provide the answer.
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Reset that circuit
breaker momentarily.
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I was very interested in how
a highly experienced captain
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could fly around in sight of
the airport in good weather
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and not put this airplane
on the ground safely.
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OK, declare a mayday.
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Ladies and gentlemen, we
are starting our approach.
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We lost both engines.
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Put the mask over your nose.
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Emergency descent.
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Mayday, mayday.
28
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Brace for impact!
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Here's the last one.
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Investigation starting.
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It's gonna crash!
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NARRATOR: December 28, 1978--
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We're losing an engine.
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United Airlines flight
173 is less than 22 miles
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from Portland
International Airport.
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It's flamed out.
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Why?
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You can fly a DC 8 or
any transport airplane
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with one engine inoperative.
40
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NARRATOR: John Cox
as a commercial pilot
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an aviation expert.
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It requires a lot
of airmanship.
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Pilots train every time
they're in a simulator in case
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of a loss of an engine.
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All right.
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The thing to remember
is don't worry.
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Captain Melbourne McBroom,
a veteran of the Second
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World War, is one
of United Airlines'
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most experienced pilots.
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00:02:03,022 --> 00:02:05,725
His first officer Rod
Bibby has more than 5,000
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hours flying experience.
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The first officer
was relatively new
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on the airplane.
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He had probably been on it
six months or maybe less.
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He was an experienced
pilot, but he'd
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been flying other equipment.
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NARRATOR: Flight engineer
Forrest Mendenhall is
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the third member of the crew.
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OK.
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NARRATOR: It's his job
to monitor the DC8's
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three remaining engines.
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The flight began
in New York City
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with a stopover in Denver.
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It's three days
after Christmas.
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Many of the 189
people on board are
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returning from their holidays.
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00:02:46,966 --> 00:02:49,936
17-year-old Amy Connor is
flying back to boarding
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school in Washington State.
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00:02:52,171 --> 00:02:53,873
I picked up the
flight in Denver,
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and everything seemed
to go normally.
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I got to my seat.
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I was sitting in between
two very nice people.
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00:03:01,548 --> 00:03:02,482
NARRATOR: In the cockpit--
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00:03:02,549 --> 00:03:03,650
All right.
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00:03:03,716 --> 00:03:05,051
NARRATOR: --the pilots
are focused on getting
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their plane to the airport.
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00:03:06,519 --> 00:03:09,589
United 173 would like
clearance for an approach
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00:03:09,656 --> 00:03:12,058
in the 28 Left now.
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00:03:12,125 --> 00:03:13,960
NARRATOR: Air traffic
controller Ed Kingrey
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00:03:14,027 --> 00:03:17,297
is on duty at Portland Tower.
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00:03:17,363 --> 00:03:20,733
I was working radar that
night down in the radar room.
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00:03:20,800 --> 00:03:24,337
As I recall, it wasn't
all that busy at the time.
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United 173, heavy.
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OK, roll out heading
010 to runway 28 Left.
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00:03:33,246 --> 00:03:35,949
NARRATOR: He clears Flight
173 to land on the airport's
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longest runway.
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He said, we'll-- we'll be
heading in for a landing now.
88
00:03:41,754 --> 00:03:44,057
In this case, he was
coming from the east,
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00:03:44,123 --> 00:03:46,159
so he lined him up
for a straight in.
90
00:03:47,493 --> 00:03:49,095
You're going to lose number
three in a minute, too.
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00:03:50,396 --> 00:03:51,531
NARRATOR: The
plane's engines are
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00:03:51,598 --> 00:03:54,267
flaming out one after another.
93
00:03:54,334 --> 00:03:58,438
I recall hearing the
captain tell the tower
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00:03:58,504 --> 00:04:01,441
they're losing engines.
95
00:04:01,507 --> 00:04:02,976
NARRATOR: With
two engine's gone,
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00:04:03,042 --> 00:04:05,244
the autopilot can no
longer fly the plane.
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00:04:06,713 --> 00:04:13,319
McBroom must get the crippled
DC-8 to the airport himself.
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00:04:16,189 --> 00:04:17,624
You've got to keep
running, Frosty.
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00:04:17,690 --> 00:04:18,758
Yes, sir.
100
00:04:18,825 --> 00:04:20,193
NARRATOR: The engineer
struggles to keep
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00:04:20,259 --> 00:04:24,664
the last two engines running.
102
00:04:24,731 --> 00:04:27,634
How far do you show
us from the field?
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00:04:27,700 --> 00:04:28,868
I'd call it--
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00:04:28,935 --> 00:04:30,737
EDWARD KINGREY: I told him
it was 18 flying miles.
105
00:04:30,803 --> 00:04:31,738
--18 flying miles.
106
00:04:31,804 --> 00:04:33,706
Which would
include the base leg
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00:04:33,773 --> 00:04:36,342
to the final and then
the turn to final
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00:04:36,409 --> 00:04:41,080
to the end of the runway.
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00:04:44,651 --> 00:04:46,719
We just lost one and two.
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00:04:46,786 --> 00:04:51,090
NARRATOR: Flight 173 has
now lost all four engines.
111
00:04:51,157 --> 00:04:53,526
The cabin lights
all went out.
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00:04:53,593 --> 00:04:55,728
That, we all assumed,
was an indicator
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00:04:55,795 --> 00:05:02,568
that something was wrong.
114
00:05:02,635 --> 00:05:04,871
NARRATOR: With no
engines running,
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00:05:04,937 --> 00:05:06,839
back-up batteries
now provide power
116
00:05:06,906 --> 00:05:13,579
to only critical instruments.
117
00:05:13,646 --> 00:05:15,481
People started to shout.
118
00:05:15,548 --> 00:05:16,616
MALBURN MCBROOM
(OVER PA): Brace!
119
00:05:16,683 --> 00:05:18,151
Brace!
- Get your heads down.
120
00:05:18,217 --> 00:05:19,185
Get into your brace positions.
121
00:05:19,252 --> 00:05:20,553
MALBURN MCBROOM
(OVER PA): Brace!
122
00:05:20,620 --> 00:05:23,556
NARRATOR: The 100-ton aircraft
is losing more than 3,000
123
00:05:23,623 --> 00:05:25,892
feet of altitude a minute.
124
00:05:25,958 --> 00:05:29,962
Total power loss in a DC-8
would be very catastrophic.
125
00:05:30,029 --> 00:05:33,399
NARRATOR: At this rate, they
will be lucky to stay airborne
126
00:05:33,466 --> 00:05:39,806
for as long as 90 seconds.
127
00:05:39,872 --> 00:05:44,544
Now Captain McBroom makes
a horrifying calculation.
128
00:05:44,610 --> 00:05:45,611
We can't make it.
129
00:05:45,678 --> 00:05:47,947
NARRATOR: The airport
is too far away.
130
00:05:48,014 --> 00:05:49,882
We can't make anything.
131
00:05:49,949 --> 00:05:51,818
NARRATOR: The jetliner
is dropping fast
132
00:05:51,884 --> 00:05:54,654
over a city of 350,000 people.
133
00:05:54,721 --> 00:05:56,889
McBroom needs to
find a safe place
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00:05:56,956 --> 00:05:59,158
to put the aircraft
down and try to save
135
00:05:59,225 --> 00:06:01,561
the lives of all onboard.
136
00:06:01,627 --> 00:06:04,297
To land a transport
jet off an airport
137
00:06:04,363 --> 00:06:07,533
is a situation that no
pilot wants to face.
138
00:06:07,600 --> 00:06:10,036
Putting it into
a populated area
139
00:06:10,103 --> 00:06:12,004
would be an absolute
last choice.
140
00:06:12,071 --> 00:06:13,005
OK.
141
00:06:13,072 --> 00:06:15,341
Declare mayday.
142
00:06:15,408 --> 00:06:17,543
Portland Tower, United
173, heavy mayday.
143
00:06:17,610 --> 00:06:19,979
He declared mayday,
and then in a very--
144
00:06:20,046 --> 00:06:21,748
what seemed to me like a--
145
00:06:21,814 --> 00:06:24,984
a calm, matter-of-fact voice,
I could hear the pilot.
146
00:06:25,051 --> 00:06:26,652
Engines are flaming out.
We're going down.
147
00:06:26,719 --> 00:06:28,421
We're not going to be able
to make it to the airport.
148
00:06:28,488 --> 00:06:29,422
We lost power.
149
00:06:29,489 --> 00:06:30,757
We're going down.
150
00:06:30,823 --> 00:06:33,392
NARRATOR: Emergency services
are told what's happening.
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00:06:33,459 --> 00:06:34,594
Flight 173 is flamed-out.
152
00:06:34,660 --> 00:06:37,396
They're going down.
153
00:06:37,463 --> 00:06:41,801
NARRATOR: Kingrey tries to
figure out where they'll hit.
154
00:06:41,868 --> 00:06:44,237
I could see him coming
in from the south, his
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00:06:44,303 --> 00:06:46,072
navigational lights flashing.
156
00:06:46,139 --> 00:06:47,940
I could tell he was quite low.
157
00:06:48,007 --> 00:06:49,308
NARRATOR: The DC-8
is coming down
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00:06:49,375 --> 00:06:51,677
over a densely-populated
suburb.
159
00:06:51,744 --> 00:06:53,412
And I can no longer see him.
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00:06:53,479 --> 00:06:57,517
I was, of course,
expecting the worst.
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00:06:57,583 --> 00:06:59,519
NARRATOR: Suddenly,
Captain McBroom sees
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00:06:59,585 --> 00:07:03,089
what he's been looking for--
163
00:07:03,156 --> 00:07:05,158
a dark area up ahead.
164
00:07:05,224 --> 00:07:07,260
It looks like an empty field.
165
00:07:07,326 --> 00:07:09,295
The place that you want
to put it is where there--
166
00:07:09,362 --> 00:07:12,899
there's minimum buildings,
the most open area possible
167
00:07:12,965 --> 00:07:19,071
because the 200,000 pounds-plus
jet arriving at 140 knots,
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00:07:19,138 --> 00:07:21,340
which is 160-plus
miles an hour--
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00:07:21,407 --> 00:07:22,508
it's going to do
a lot of damage
170
00:07:22,575 --> 00:07:28,014
to the things on the ground.
171
00:07:28,080 --> 00:07:30,349
NARRATOR: Putting the plane
on this narrow strip of land
172
00:07:30,416 --> 00:07:35,555
is McBroom's best bet.
173
00:07:35,621 --> 00:07:38,157
But as he gets
closer, he realizes
174
00:07:38,224 --> 00:07:40,927
it isn't an open field.
175
00:07:40,993 --> 00:07:42,161
We can't make it.
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00:07:42,228 --> 00:07:44,130
NARRATOR: It's a
heavily wooded suburb,
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00:07:44,197 --> 00:07:51,204
and he's headed
straight for it.
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00:07:52,705 --> 00:07:56,209
JOHN COX: If they're woods
and that's all you have,
179
00:07:56,275 --> 00:07:57,844
then you're going to
have to deal with it.
180
00:07:57,910 --> 00:08:00,079
The tops of trees
are pretty soft.
181
00:08:00,146 --> 00:08:01,781
As you settle into
the trees, they
182
00:08:01,848 --> 00:08:03,349
get progressively less soft.
183
00:08:03,416 --> 00:08:06,085
They're going to
do a lot of damage.
184
00:08:06,152 --> 00:08:07,787
NARRATOR: McBroom
doesn't give up.
185
00:08:07,854 --> 00:08:12,992
He actually tries to steer
the plane between the trees.
186
00:08:14,427 --> 00:08:16,529
The passengers still assume
they're about to touch down
187
00:08:16,596 --> 00:08:17,697
on a runway.
188
00:08:17,763 --> 00:08:19,932
We clipped the
top of a few trees,
189
00:08:19,999 --> 00:08:22,401
and that felt like we were
making the initial landing
190
00:08:22,468 --> 00:08:23,536
at the airport.
191
00:08:23,603 --> 00:08:27,306
So my first sense was,
hooray, we're there.
192
00:08:27,373 --> 00:08:30,376
And then all hell broke loose.
193
00:08:33,679 --> 00:08:35,181
It was this enormous noise.
194
00:08:35,248 --> 00:08:38,184
I can't even begin to describe
what kind of noise it is.
195
00:08:38,251 --> 00:08:41,120
It's physical.
196
00:08:41,187 --> 00:08:48,194
You can feel it in your bones.
197
00:08:51,464 --> 00:08:54,734
I saw the bright
flash out there and--
198
00:08:54,800 --> 00:08:56,969
and knew he had gone down.
199
00:09:02,375 --> 00:09:05,144
NARRATOR: The plane
carves a 1,600-foot-long
200
00:09:05,211 --> 00:09:11,617
path through the trees.
201
00:09:11,684 --> 00:09:18,357
After the plane stopped
moving, it was pretty calm.
202
00:09:18,424 --> 00:09:21,827
There was no fire.
203
00:09:21,894 --> 00:09:26,799
People just wanted to get out
and very polite, taking turns.
204
00:09:29,769 --> 00:09:31,370
There was no hurry.
205
00:09:35,308 --> 00:09:37,777
I remember seeing
a lot of people
206
00:09:37,843 --> 00:09:42,648
with the same expression
of stunned disbelief.
207
00:09:42,715 --> 00:09:43,649
You know, where are we?
208
00:09:43,716 --> 00:09:46,953
And how did we get here?
209
00:09:47,019 --> 00:09:50,456
NARRATOR: Incredibly, the
DC-8 has crashed-landed
210
00:09:50,523 --> 00:09:52,959
in the middle of a
major American city
211
00:09:53,025 --> 00:09:59,098
without injuring a single
person on the ground.
212
00:09:59,165 --> 00:10:01,734
Most of the 189
passengers and crew
213
00:10:01,801 --> 00:10:08,808
are alive, including
Captain Malburn McBroom.
214
00:10:10,109 --> 00:10:11,544
The captain flying
the airplane--
215
00:10:11,610 --> 00:10:13,946
he kept it under control,
and that's a big,
216
00:10:14,013 --> 00:10:15,915
big, big positive.
217
00:10:15,982 --> 00:10:18,250
NARRATOR: But he can't
understand why his plane
218
00:10:18,317 --> 00:10:23,456
lost power and crashed.
219
00:10:23,522 --> 00:10:26,292
I was afraid.
220
00:10:26,359 --> 00:10:27,960
I didn't know where I was.
221
00:10:28,027 --> 00:10:30,730
I was only 17.
222
00:10:30,796 --> 00:10:34,900
I also realized that
my parents in Minnesota
223
00:10:34,967 --> 00:10:37,636
needed to hear from me.
224
00:10:37,703 --> 00:10:38,637
I walked into this home.
225
00:10:38,704 --> 00:10:39,739
Hello?
226
00:10:39,805 --> 00:10:41,273
And I said, I need
to use your telephone.
227
00:10:41,340 --> 00:10:42,942
I need to use your telephone.
228
00:10:43,009 --> 00:10:46,912
My parents' initial
reaction was to listen
229
00:10:46,979 --> 00:10:48,681
and kind of blow me off.
230
00:10:48,748 --> 00:10:52,284
I was a teenage drama
queen, and 17-year-olds
231
00:10:52,351 --> 00:10:54,020
do tend to exaggerate.
232
00:10:54,086 --> 00:10:57,757
But a few minutes later,
they got the news they broke
233
00:10:57,823 --> 00:11:00,860
into their television program.
234
00:11:00,926 --> 00:11:02,328
REPORTER: The plane
crashed 5 miles
235
00:11:02,395 --> 00:11:04,730
southeast of the airport
in a residential area.
236
00:11:04,797 --> 00:11:07,767
Two homes were hit,
one disintegrated.
237
00:11:07,833 --> 00:11:09,602
Rescue workers worked
through the night.
238
00:11:09,668 --> 00:11:11,303
They carefully picked
through the wreckage,
239
00:11:11,370 --> 00:11:12,671
looking for bodies.
240
00:11:12,738 --> 00:11:15,107
They won't know the exact
number of dead until
241
00:11:15,174 --> 00:11:16,509
sometime today.
242
00:11:16,575 --> 00:11:19,412
The news teams found
us before the emergency
243
00:11:19,478 --> 00:11:22,048
crews did, and so there were
cameras, there was lights.
244
00:11:22,114 --> 00:11:23,949
The next thing I know it
was boom, boom real hard,
245
00:11:24,016 --> 00:11:24,950
and we were shaking.
246
00:11:25,017 --> 00:11:26,519
And we were down
in the position.
247
00:11:26,585 --> 00:11:29,121
All of a sudden, there was
a big-- you know, a big crash.
248
00:11:29,188 --> 00:11:31,123
One thump I remember,
and then the next thing
249
00:11:31,190 --> 00:11:32,258
I knew I was standing outside.
250
00:11:32,324 --> 00:11:33,526
I don't know how the
hell I got there.
251
00:11:35,261 --> 00:11:38,130
NARRATOR: Confronted by such
an unprecedented disaster,
252
00:11:38,197 --> 00:11:41,867
the entire airline
industry needs an answer.
253
00:11:41,934 --> 00:11:45,905
How could a DC-8 crash 6
miles short of the airport
254
00:11:45,971 --> 00:11:54,513
on a calm, clear night?
255
00:11:57,583 --> 00:12:01,387
The morning after the crash
of United Airlines Flight 173.
256
00:12:01,454 --> 00:12:05,357
NTSB investigators
are on the scene.
257
00:12:05,424 --> 00:12:07,560
One of the members of
the team is human factor
258
00:12:07,626 --> 00:12:11,097
specialist Alan Diehl.
259
00:12:11,163 --> 00:12:13,566
We needed to get out
and document the wreckage,
260
00:12:13,632 --> 00:12:16,102
take photographs, take
measurements, and so on, very
261
00:12:16,168 --> 00:12:21,006
critical that you do that.
262
00:12:21,073 --> 00:12:23,542
NARRATOR: It's
apparent to Diehl
263
00:12:23,609 --> 00:12:26,645
that this disaster could
have been much worse.
264
00:12:26,712 --> 00:12:28,848
How the hell did
they miss those?
265
00:12:28,914 --> 00:12:30,316
NARRATOR: Captain
McBroom somehow
266
00:12:30,382 --> 00:12:33,686
managed to shoehorn the plane
into a narrow strip of woods
267
00:12:33,752 --> 00:12:36,055
in the middle of Portland.
268
00:12:36,122 --> 00:12:38,958
When I saw how close he'd
come to apartment complexes,
269
00:12:39,024 --> 00:12:41,393
I realized this could
have been one of the worst
270
00:12:41,460 --> 00:12:44,697
accidents in history.
271
00:12:44,763 --> 00:12:46,866
NARRATOR: The main
cabin of Flight 173
272
00:12:46,932 --> 00:12:50,870
has survived the
crash largely intact,
273
00:12:50,936 --> 00:12:55,307
but the nose of the plane
is completely destroyed.
274
00:12:55,374 --> 00:12:56,942
It looked to me like
the front of the airplane
275
00:12:57,009 --> 00:12:59,712
almost opened up like
a banana when it plowed
276
00:12:59,778 --> 00:13:04,650
through the woods and
couldn't believe that anybody
277
00:13:04,717 --> 00:13:10,689
had survived this.
278
00:13:10,756 --> 00:13:12,992
NARRATOR: Eight passengers
and two members of the crew
279
00:13:13,058 --> 00:13:15,528
are dead.
280
00:13:15,594 --> 00:13:18,164
ALAN DIEHL: A flight engineer
had died in the crash, as had
281
00:13:18,230 --> 00:13:23,636
the lead flight attendant.
282
00:13:28,073 --> 00:13:29,642
NARRATOR: Investigators
hope survivors
283
00:13:29,708 --> 00:13:35,447
can provide some insight into
what brought this jet down.
284
00:13:35,514 --> 00:13:37,516
When did you first notice
something out of the ordinary?
285
00:13:41,086 --> 00:13:43,923
NARRATOR: They learn that just
over an hour before the crash
286
00:13:43,989 --> 00:13:46,559
the passengers heard
a terrifying sound.
287
00:13:48,027 --> 00:13:54,033
We heard a loud thud
and felt the plane jolt.
288
00:13:54,099 --> 00:13:55,568
The whole plane just shook.
289
00:13:55,634 --> 00:13:58,470
It was-- it was a
jarring sensation.
290
00:13:58,537 --> 00:13:59,738
What was that?
291
00:13:59,805 --> 00:14:01,006
AIMEE CONNER: And
of course, everybody
292
00:14:01,073 --> 00:14:02,107
wanted to know what it was.
293
00:14:02,174 --> 00:14:03,108
What was that?
294
00:14:03,175 --> 00:14:05,878
Lots of conversation-starters.
295
00:14:05,945 --> 00:14:06,879
What do you think that was?
296
00:14:06,946 --> 00:14:11,550
Lots of guessing.
297
00:14:11,617 --> 00:14:15,821
A man with a flashlight
came down the aisle.
298
00:14:15,888 --> 00:14:16,922
NARRATOR: One of
the pilots comes
299
00:14:16,989 --> 00:14:20,025
back to the passenger cabin.
300
00:14:20,092 --> 00:14:22,728
At this point, I started
realizing something
301
00:14:22,795 --> 00:14:25,030
really was wrong.
302
00:14:25,097 --> 00:14:26,031
Excuse me.
303
00:14:26,098 --> 00:14:28,701
Can I look out the window here?
304
00:14:28,767 --> 00:14:30,836
AIMEE CONNER: That
something wasn't working
305
00:14:30,903 --> 00:14:32,271
the way it should
be and they weren't
306
00:14:32,338 --> 00:14:34,306
telling us about it yet.
307
00:14:34,373 --> 00:14:35,374
NARRATOR: The
pilot is searching
308
00:14:35,441 --> 00:14:37,243
for something in the darkness.
309
00:14:37,309 --> 00:14:42,181
We're all wanting to
know what was going on.
310
00:14:42,248 --> 00:14:44,783
Then the captain
came on the PA.
311
00:14:44,850 --> 00:14:46,318
MALBURN MCBROOM (ON PA):
Ladies and gentlemen,
312
00:14:46,385 --> 00:14:47,853
this is your captain speaking.
313
00:14:47,920 --> 00:14:49,788
The pilot finally
got on and said,
314
00:14:49,855 --> 00:14:51,991
we're having trouble
with the landing gear.
315
00:14:52,057 --> 00:14:54,860
We're not sure whether or
not it's working correctly.
316
00:14:54,927 --> 00:14:57,196
We'll be running a
few routine checks.
317
00:14:57,263 --> 00:14:58,931
Captains are always
focused on the safety
318
00:14:58,998 --> 00:14:59,932
of the passengers.
319
00:14:59,999 --> 00:15:00,933
It comes with the job.
320
00:15:03,402 --> 00:15:06,505
That is, if the airplane is
experiencing an abnormality,
321
00:15:06,572 --> 00:15:09,241
what's the effect on
the passengers and crew?
322
00:15:09,308 --> 00:15:10,643
Do we need to descend?
323
00:15:10,709 --> 00:15:12,878
What do we need to do to
make sure that everybody
324
00:15:12,945 --> 00:15:15,180
gets through this
abnormality with
325
00:15:15,247 --> 00:15:17,650
the minimum negative effects?
326
00:15:17,716 --> 00:15:21,420
How did the cabin crew react?
327
00:15:21,487 --> 00:15:25,557
They told us to prepare
for an emergency landing.
328
00:15:25,624 --> 00:15:27,760
NARRATOR: Passengers are
told to remove their jewelry
329
00:15:27,826 --> 00:15:30,963
and securely stow
any loose items.
330
00:15:31,030 --> 00:15:32,765
It's clear that the
captain is concerned
331
00:15:32,831 --> 00:15:36,902
that his landing gear might
collapse on touchdown.
332
00:15:36,969 --> 00:15:39,705
But something isn't
making sense to Diehl.
333
00:15:39,772 --> 00:15:41,206
ALAN DIEHL: Crash
landings on-airport
334
00:15:41,273 --> 00:15:42,908
are eminently survivable.
335
00:15:42,975 --> 00:15:44,376
First of all, you've
got all the equipment
336
00:15:44,443 --> 00:15:47,713
to handle the fire, the fire
engines and the rescue people.
337
00:15:47,780 --> 00:15:49,214
But if you have
to go off-airport,
338
00:15:49,281 --> 00:15:52,017
it's a whole
different situation.
339
00:15:52,084 --> 00:15:54,219
How does a landing gear
problem bring down a plane?
340
00:15:57,423 --> 00:16:01,427
NARRATOR: At the crash site
of United Airlines Flight 173,
341
00:16:01,493 --> 00:16:05,597
investigators retrieve the
plane's flight recorders.
342
00:16:05,664 --> 00:16:07,800
One contains flight data.
343
00:16:07,866 --> 00:16:11,070
The other records
voices in the cockpit.
344
00:16:11,136 --> 00:16:14,540
ALAN DIEHL: I've always said
that the flight data recorder
345
00:16:14,606 --> 00:16:16,542
tells you what
happened, but you
346
00:16:16,608 --> 00:16:20,479
have to listen very carefully
to the cockpit voice recorder
347
00:16:20,546 --> 00:16:26,285
to understand why things
happen the way they did.
348
00:16:26,352 --> 00:16:27,820
NARRATOR: The recorders
will be analyzed
349
00:16:27,886 --> 00:16:30,356
at National Transportation
Safety Board headquarters
350
00:16:30,422 --> 00:16:37,396
in Washington.
351
00:16:39,264 --> 00:16:41,033
One of the most
important witnesses
352
00:16:41,100 --> 00:16:43,569
is Ed Kingrey,
the controller who
353
00:16:43,635 --> 00:16:47,072
handled Flight 173's approach.
354
00:16:47,139 --> 00:16:49,875
I cleared him for an
approach to runway 28.
355
00:16:49,942 --> 00:16:52,144
I was about to hand him off
to the tower controller.
356
00:16:52,211 --> 00:16:55,781
He basically said he'd stay
with me, that he was having
357
00:16:55,848 --> 00:16:59,318
some kind of unsafe
gear indication
358
00:16:59,385 --> 00:17:03,555
and he didn't know if one of
the landing gear were down.
359
00:17:03,622 --> 00:17:04,556
Negative.
360
00:17:04,623 --> 00:17:05,824
We'll stay with you.
361
00:17:05,891 --> 00:17:08,827
When we've got a gear
problem we'll let you know.
362
00:17:08,894 --> 00:17:13,432
NARRATOR: Flight 173 did
not want to come in to land.
363
00:17:13,499 --> 00:17:17,836
United 173 heavy,
turn left, heading 100.
364
00:17:17,903 --> 00:17:23,742
I'll just orbit you out there.
365
00:17:23,809 --> 00:17:25,744
NARRATOR: Kingrey
cleared Flight 173
366
00:17:25,811 --> 00:17:28,113
to fly a holding pattern
south of the airport
367
00:17:28,180 --> 00:17:31,250
over the Portland suburbs.
368
00:17:31,316 --> 00:17:34,486
Captain McBroom wanted time to
troubleshoot the gear problem
369
00:17:34,553 --> 00:17:37,089
and give his flight attendants
time to prepare the cabin
370
00:17:37,156 --> 00:17:39,057
for an emergency landing.
371
00:17:39,124 --> 00:17:42,928
If they have opportunity
to plan and prepare
372
00:17:42,995 --> 00:17:46,131
people, things such as
where the exits are,
373
00:17:46,198 --> 00:17:49,735
the quality and success
of the evacuation
374
00:17:49,802 --> 00:17:55,174
goes up dramatically.
375
00:17:55,240 --> 00:17:57,209
A holding pattern
would basically
376
00:17:57,276 --> 00:18:00,612
give him his own
air space there
377
00:18:00,679 --> 00:18:03,015
to do whatever he had to do.
378
00:18:06,652 --> 00:18:10,155
I didn't hear much
from him after that.
379
00:18:10,222 --> 00:18:13,292
NARRATOR: Investigators learn
that after they begin circling
380
00:18:13,358 --> 00:18:16,295
Kingrey only speaks
to Flight 173
381
00:18:16,361 --> 00:18:20,699
to warn them of other
nearby aircraft.
382
00:18:20,766 --> 00:18:24,303
I would give him traffic,
and he would acknowledge it.
383
00:18:24,369 --> 00:18:27,339
There's traffic
out there about 9:30.
384
00:18:27,406 --> 00:18:29,741
I see somebody out
there with a light on.
385
00:18:29,808 --> 00:18:32,411
EDWARD KINGREY: But no
indication to me what was
386
00:18:32,478 --> 00:18:33,946
going on inside the cockpit.
387
00:18:36,181 --> 00:18:39,017
NARRATOR: The crew of Flight
173 is given as much time
388
00:18:39,084 --> 00:18:42,120
as it needs in the
holding pattern.
389
00:18:42,187 --> 00:18:43,455
EDWARD KINGREY: It's
up to the captain
390
00:18:43,522 --> 00:18:47,292
to decide when it's time for
them to come in and land.
391
00:18:47,359 --> 00:18:49,895
They continued circling
for about an hour.
392
00:18:49,962 --> 00:18:53,398
NARRATOR: Investigators learned
Flight 173 circled Portland
393
00:18:53,465 --> 00:18:56,235
for an unusually long time.
394
00:18:58,136 --> 00:19:01,173
There was no
indication to me the--
395
00:19:01,240 --> 00:19:03,976
the gravity of the situation.
396
00:19:04,042 --> 00:19:05,310
NARRATOR: They now
wonder what happened
397
00:19:05,377 --> 00:19:07,579
during that hour
of circling to turn
398
00:19:07,646 --> 00:19:08,780
a landing gear malfunction--
399
00:19:09,915 --> 00:19:11,717
We've got a gear problem.
400
00:19:11,783 --> 00:19:13,385
We'll let you know.
401
00:19:13,452 --> 00:19:15,454
NARRATOR: --into
catastrophic engine failure.
402
00:19:16,522 --> 00:19:17,456
The engines are flaming out.
403
00:19:17,523 --> 00:19:18,757
We're going down.
404
00:19:18,824 --> 00:19:20,759
We're not going to be able
to make it to the airport.
405
00:19:20,826 --> 00:19:24,563
I was clearly very interested
in how a highly experienced
406
00:19:24,630 --> 00:19:27,499
captain could fly
around for over an hour
407
00:19:27,566 --> 00:19:29,401
inside of the airport
in good weather
408
00:19:29,468 --> 00:19:31,737
and not put this airplane
on the ground safely.
409
00:19:37,943 --> 00:19:39,545
NARRATOR: Investigators
find the plane's
410
00:19:39,611 --> 00:19:46,618
right side landing gear.
411
00:19:48,387 --> 00:19:51,123
A rusted bolt has pulled
free of the mechanism that
412
00:19:51,189 --> 00:19:54,059
raises and lowers the gear.
413
00:19:54,126 --> 00:19:55,961
This could explain it.
414
00:19:56,028 --> 00:19:57,229
NARRATOR: The landing
gear would have
415
00:19:57,296 --> 00:20:00,999
dropped suddenly into place.
416
00:20:01,066 --> 00:20:02,467
JOHN COX: The free
fall of the gear
417
00:20:02,534 --> 00:20:05,971
would be very apparent to
everyone on the airplane.
418
00:20:06,038 --> 00:20:07,573
What was that?
419
00:20:07,639 --> 00:20:11,243
JOHN COX: You would get a very
large thump or clunking sound.
420
00:20:11,310 --> 00:20:14,079
You'd feel the gear slam
up against the lock,
421
00:20:14,146 --> 00:20:16,081
and so you'd get
this reverberation
422
00:20:16,148 --> 00:20:18,584
through the airplane.
423
00:20:18,650 --> 00:20:20,485
ALAN DIEHL: And we learn
that, due to corrosion,
424
00:20:20,552 --> 00:20:22,688
the extension
mechanism had failed,
425
00:20:22,754 --> 00:20:26,158
and that's what caused
the gear to slam down.
426
00:20:26,224 --> 00:20:28,460
NARRATOR: The discovery
explains the troubling sound--
427
00:20:30,095 --> 00:20:32,097
--heard in the cabin an
hour before the crash.
428
00:20:35,033 --> 00:20:40,138
But it still doesn't explain
the massive engine failure.
429
00:20:44,509 --> 00:20:47,512
The NTSB brings another
investigator into the Portland
430
00:20:47,579 --> 00:20:50,449
crash, Dennis Grossi.
431
00:20:50,515 --> 00:20:53,952
DENNIS GROSSI: I was assigned
to be the aircraft performance
432
00:20:54,019 --> 00:20:56,688
engineer for this accident.
433
00:20:56,755 --> 00:20:58,890
Basically, it's
pulling together
434
00:20:58,957 --> 00:21:02,861
all the information that's
available to determine
435
00:21:02,928 --> 00:21:05,330
the aircraft's performance.
436
00:21:05,397 --> 00:21:06,765
NARRATOR: If there
was a malfunction,
437
00:21:06,832 --> 00:21:10,302
Grossi hopes the Cockpit
Voice Recorder or CVR picked
438
00:21:10,369 --> 00:21:12,871
up the pilots discussing it.
439
00:21:12,938 --> 00:21:14,539
OK.
Let's go.
440
00:21:14,606 --> 00:21:15,941
NARRATOR: The
recording begins 30
441
00:21:16,008 --> 00:21:18,543
minutes before the crash as the
pilots circle over Portland.
442
00:21:18,610 --> 00:21:20,312
MALBURN MCBROOM (ON RECORDING):
Ladies and gentlemen,
443
00:21:20,379 --> 00:21:23,682
this is your captain speaking.
444
00:21:23,749 --> 00:21:26,151
NARRATOR: In the era
of analog recording,
445
00:21:26,218 --> 00:21:29,855
the CVR uses a 30-minute-long
loop of magnetic tape
446
00:21:29,921 --> 00:21:35,227
that keeps recording over
itself throughout the flight.
447
00:21:35,293 --> 00:21:37,663
Most air disasters
unfold in a matter
448
00:21:37,729 --> 00:21:44,736
of minutes or even seconds.
449
00:21:46,538 --> 00:21:49,174
So having the last half
hour of cockpit sounds
450
00:21:49,241 --> 00:21:51,510
and conversation should
give investigators
451
00:21:51,576 --> 00:21:53,845
enough material to work with.
452
00:21:53,912 --> 00:21:55,881
DENNIS GROSSI: There's four
channels, one cockpit area
453
00:21:55,947 --> 00:21:57,983
microphone and then
a channel for each
454
00:21:58,050 --> 00:21:59,818
of the three crew members.
455
00:21:59,885 --> 00:22:01,119
FORREST MENDENHALL
(ON RECORDING):
456
00:22:01,186 --> 00:22:03,188
--because I only got this
thing to shine down there.
457
00:22:03,255 --> 00:22:04,589
NARRATOR: They hear
the flight engineer
458
00:22:04,656 --> 00:22:06,258
leave the cockpit
to troubleshoot
459
00:22:06,324 --> 00:22:10,562
the landing gear problem.
460
00:22:10,629 --> 00:22:12,464
In the early
generation jets, it
461
00:22:12,531 --> 00:22:16,968
was very common to have
mechanical indications
462
00:22:17,035 --> 00:22:23,108
that the landing gear was,
in fact, down and locked.
463
00:22:23,175 --> 00:22:24,876
NARRATOR: When the
landing gear is lowered,
464
00:22:24,943 --> 00:22:27,813
a small rod pops
up on the wing,
465
00:22:27,879 --> 00:22:32,784
providing visual confirmation
that the gear is in place.
466
00:22:32,851 --> 00:22:34,653
The flight engineer would
be asked by the captain
467
00:22:34,720 --> 00:22:37,022
to go back and check the
mechanical indicators
468
00:22:37,089 --> 00:22:40,092
for the position of the landing
gear, walk down the aisle
469
00:22:40,158 --> 00:22:41,827
to about the
center of the wing.
470
00:22:41,893 --> 00:22:42,828
Excuse me.
471
00:22:42,894 --> 00:22:44,062
Can I look out the window here?
472
00:22:44,129 --> 00:22:45,363
JOHN COX: And he
could look over,
473
00:22:45,430 --> 00:22:47,999
and there are tabs that
actually come up and go down.
474
00:22:48,066 --> 00:22:52,804
And he could see if the gear
was extended and locked.
475
00:22:52,871 --> 00:22:54,639
NARRATOR: It's exactly
what Aimee Connor
476
00:22:54,706 --> 00:22:56,341
described to investigators--
477
00:22:56,408 --> 00:22:58,810
A man with a flashlight
came through the aisle.
478
00:22:58,877 --> 00:23:03,849
--in her
post-crash interview.
479
00:23:03,915 --> 00:23:05,851
How's that main
gear back there?
480
00:23:05,917 --> 00:23:07,753
Both appear to
be down and locked.
481
00:23:07,819 --> 00:23:09,988
NARRATOR: Despite his
engineer's report,
482
00:23:10,055 --> 00:23:13,091
Captain McBroom is
still concerned.
483
00:23:13,158 --> 00:23:19,531
If the gear is locked, none of
the lights should be flashing.
484
00:23:19,598 --> 00:23:24,102
And the touchdown if that
gear folds or something.
485
00:23:24,169 --> 00:23:27,806
Obviously the lights were
affected, the electronics that
486
00:23:27,873 --> 00:23:29,941
tell the crew members whether
or not the gear is down
487
00:23:30,008 --> 00:23:31,443
and locked.
488
00:23:31,510 --> 00:23:32,878
NARRATOR: Landing
gear failure is
489
00:23:32,944 --> 00:23:35,547
rare in commercial aviation.
490
00:23:35,614 --> 00:23:37,916
When it does happen,
statistics show that most
491
00:23:37,983 --> 00:23:39,317
passengers survive unscathed.
492
00:23:41,386 --> 00:23:45,323
In 2008, engine failure
forced British Airways Flight
493
00:23:45,390 --> 00:23:51,163
38 to make a crash-landing.
494
00:23:51,229 --> 00:23:54,065
The impact ripped the
Boeing 777 landing
495
00:23:54,132 --> 00:23:57,302
gear from the fuselage.
496
00:23:57,369 --> 00:24:04,176
The plane was totaled,
but no one was killed.
497
00:24:08,246 --> 00:24:11,249
There's one check
we missed, checking
498
00:24:11,316 --> 00:24:15,487
the gear warning horn.
499
00:24:15,554 --> 00:24:17,255
- Right.
- Correct.
500
00:24:17,322 --> 00:24:18,490
Right.
501
00:24:18,557 --> 00:24:20,959
Normally when we see these
problems of a gear light
502
00:24:21,026 --> 00:24:23,695
not coming on, it's a light
bulb or some minor piece
503
00:24:23,762 --> 00:24:25,297
of circuitry.
504
00:24:25,363 --> 00:24:27,933
NARRATOR: It appears that
a minor electrical problem
505
00:24:27,999 --> 00:24:33,538
had become a major distraction
for Captain McBroom.
506
00:24:33,605 --> 00:24:35,240
So how do we do that?
507
00:24:35,307 --> 00:24:36,775
NARRATOR: That still
doesn't explain
508
00:24:36,842 --> 00:24:38,844
why the plane lost power.
509
00:24:38,910 --> 00:24:43,882
But what investigators hear
next could explain everything.
510
00:24:43,949 --> 00:24:45,450
RODERICK BEEBE (ON
RECORDING): Losing an engine.
511
00:24:45,517 --> 00:24:46,651
It's flamed out.
512
00:24:46,718 --> 00:24:48,887
Why?
513
00:24:48,954 --> 00:24:49,888
Fuel.
514
00:24:51,223 --> 00:24:54,125
NARRATOR: First officer
Beebe's answer is chilling.
515
00:24:54,192 --> 00:24:56,595
After nearly an hour
in a holding pattern,
516
00:24:56,661 --> 00:25:00,432
Flight 173 is simply
running out of gas.
517
00:25:00,498 --> 00:25:02,200
RODERICK BEEBE (ON RECORDING):
We're losing an engine.
518
00:25:02,267 --> 00:25:05,036
NARRATOR: NTSB investigator
Alan Diehl has discovered
519
00:25:05,103 --> 00:25:06,771
something crucial on the CVR.
520
00:25:06,838 --> 00:25:07,772
It's flamed out.
521
00:25:07,839 --> 00:25:09,007
What?
522
00:25:09,074 --> 00:25:11,009
NARRATOR: Less than eight
minutes before the DC-8
523
00:25:11,076 --> 00:25:13,678
crashes into a Portland
suburb, the captain
524
00:25:13,745 --> 00:25:19,985
seems unconvinced that low fuel
is behind his engine failure.
525
00:25:20,051 --> 00:25:22,320
He was asking what
was causing that,
526
00:25:22,387 --> 00:25:26,057
and he got a very adamant
answer saying "fuel."
527
00:25:26,124 --> 00:25:27,359
Fuel.
528
00:25:27,425 --> 00:25:29,060
As if to say, we've
been trying to tell
529
00:25:29,127 --> 00:25:30,295
you about this all along.
530
00:25:31,563 --> 00:25:35,033
Open those crossfeeds
there or something.
531
00:25:35,100 --> 00:25:37,535
JOHN COX: There are cross
feed valves that are opened
532
00:25:37,602 --> 00:25:40,939
in a specific sequence
to let one tank feed
533
00:25:41,006 --> 00:25:44,075
one or more engines, and
it's the job of the flight
534
00:25:44,142 --> 00:25:45,877
engineer, in the
case of a DC-8,
535
00:25:45,944 --> 00:25:50,048
to know exactly how to do that.
536
00:25:50,115 --> 00:25:51,650
Showing fumes.
537
00:25:51,716 --> 00:25:53,251
NARRATOR: Though the
crew couldn't agree on
538
00:25:53,318 --> 00:25:55,320
exactly how much was left--
539
00:25:55,387 --> 00:25:57,088
No, it's showing
1,000 or better.
540
00:25:57,155 --> 00:25:58,790
I don't think it's in there.
541
00:25:58,857 --> 00:26:00,125
NARRATOR: --one
thing is certain--
542
00:26:00,191 --> 00:26:04,029
there isn't enough to
keep the engine's running.
543
00:26:04,095 --> 00:26:07,132
Losing an engine.
544
00:26:07,198 --> 00:26:08,333
It's flamed out.
545
00:26:08,400 --> 00:26:10,802
It takes a few things
to make an engine run.
546
00:26:10,869 --> 00:26:13,305
One of them is fuel.
547
00:26:13,371 --> 00:26:15,307
MALBURN MCBROOM (ON RECORDING):
You got that crossfeed open?
548
00:26:15,373 --> 00:26:17,008
NARRATOR: Captain
McBroom is desperate.
549
00:26:17,075 --> 00:26:19,010
He needs to get more fuel
to the remaining engines.
550
00:26:20,078 --> 00:26:21,313
No, I haven't got it open.
551
00:26:21,379 --> 00:26:23,081
Which one?
552
00:26:23,148 --> 00:26:24,082
Open them both.
553
00:26:24,149 --> 00:26:26,251
Damn it, get some
fuel in there.
554
00:26:26,318 --> 00:26:28,053
NARRATOR: Each of the
plane's four engines
555
00:26:28,119 --> 00:26:29,821
has its own fuel tank.
556
00:26:29,888 --> 00:26:32,490
Opening the crossfeeds
should allow fuel to flow
557
00:26:32,557 --> 00:26:36,061
between the four main tanks.
558
00:26:36,127 --> 00:26:37,395
Number two is empty.
559
00:26:37,462 --> 00:26:39,764
NARRATOR: But it's not working.
560
00:26:39,831 --> 00:26:43,268
You're going to lose number
three in a minute, too.
561
00:26:43,335 --> 00:26:46,638
NARRATOR: One by one, fuel
starvation shuts down all the,
562
00:26:46,705 --> 00:26:52,444
engines leaving the
DC-8 without any power.
563
00:26:52,510 --> 00:26:53,611
MALBURN MCBROOM
(ON RECORDING): OK.
564
00:26:53,678 --> 00:26:59,651
Declare mayday.
565
00:26:59,718 --> 00:27:05,156
The engines didn't
have any fuel.
566
00:27:05,223 --> 00:27:08,326
We knew that the
aircraft ran out of fuel.
567
00:27:08,393 --> 00:27:12,197
So then became
the question, why?
568
00:27:12,263 --> 00:27:15,033
Why would a modern
transport aircraft
569
00:27:15,100 --> 00:27:17,535
like this run out of fuel?
570
00:27:17,602 --> 00:27:20,638
NARRATOR: Investigators
focus on two possibilities--
571
00:27:20,705 --> 00:27:25,143
mechanical failure
or human error.
572
00:27:25,210 --> 00:27:28,880
Was it a crew problem, or
was it an aircraft problem?
573
00:27:31,216 --> 00:27:32,717
NARRATOR: McBroom
may be the only one
574
00:27:32,784 --> 00:27:36,654
who can give the answer.
575
00:27:36,721 --> 00:27:41,192
I wanted to be on final with
as much fuel as I could have.
576
00:27:41,259 --> 00:27:43,328
You've got to keep
them running, Frosty.
577
00:27:43,395 --> 00:27:44,763
NARRATOR: Recovering
from his injuries
578
00:27:44,829 --> 00:27:47,399
in an Oregon hospital,
he's now well enough
579
00:27:47,465 --> 00:27:49,567
to tell his side of the story.
580
00:27:49,634 --> 00:27:51,770
We finally sat down
with Captain McBroom
581
00:27:51,836 --> 00:27:54,539
and asked the tough questions.
582
00:27:54,606 --> 00:27:57,442
JOHN COX: A pilot takes
the responsibility
583
00:27:57,509 --> 00:27:59,444
for the passengers and
his fellow crew members
584
00:27:59,511 --> 00:28:03,782
extremely seriously, and to
be involved in an accident
585
00:28:03,848 --> 00:28:05,850
where there are
fatalities is something
586
00:28:05,917 --> 00:28:09,087
that never leaves you.
587
00:28:09,154 --> 00:28:13,691
It would be with a pilot the
remainder of their lives.
588
00:28:13,758 --> 00:28:17,429
I recall seeing
the number one
589
00:28:17,495 --> 00:28:19,697
and number two warning
lights come on,
590
00:28:19,764 --> 00:28:24,436
but I knew we had fuel.
591
00:28:24,502 --> 00:28:27,038
ALAN DIEHL: He was still
convinced that somehow
592
00:28:27,105 --> 00:28:29,274
the fuel had either
leaked out of the tanks,
593
00:28:29,340 --> 00:28:32,577
or the fuel burn was too high,
or the gauges were wrong.
594
00:28:32,644 --> 00:28:34,379
No, it's showing
1,000 or better.
595
00:28:34,446 --> 00:28:38,550
I don't think it's in there.
596
00:28:38,616 --> 00:28:40,385
NARRATOR: Meanwhile,
in Washington,
597
00:28:40,452 --> 00:28:46,224
Dennis Grossi digs deeper in
search of a mechanical cause.
598
00:28:46,291 --> 00:28:49,861
He studies Flight
173's flight plan.
599
00:28:49,928 --> 00:28:52,163
He uses it to calculate
the amount of fuel
600
00:28:52,230 --> 00:28:54,265
the DC-8 should have burned.
601
00:29:01,906 --> 00:29:03,141
JOHN COX: A DC-8
burns somewhere
602
00:29:03,208 --> 00:29:08,012
in the neighborhood of 13,000
pounds of fuel an hour.
603
00:29:08,079 --> 00:29:09,647
The question is,
did this aircraft
604
00:29:09,714 --> 00:29:13,618
burn fuel faster than normal?
605
00:29:13,685 --> 00:29:16,354
NARRATOR: If the data
shows any discrepancy,
606
00:29:16,421 --> 00:29:18,790
it could mean the
captain was right.
607
00:29:21,426 --> 00:29:22,861
DENNIS GROSSI: There
must have been a problem
608
00:29:22,927 --> 00:29:27,265
that the engines were burning
a lot more fuel than normal
609
00:29:27,332 --> 00:29:32,537
or there was some
anomaly in the aircraft.
610
00:29:32,604 --> 00:29:35,240
NARRATOR: His analysis
finds no problem.
611
00:29:35,306 --> 00:29:38,309
Flight 173 took off with
more than enough fuel
612
00:29:38,376 --> 00:29:40,478
to reach Portland
and was consuming
613
00:29:40,545 --> 00:29:44,048
it at the standard rate.
614
00:29:44,115 --> 00:29:46,518
The fuel burn is
completely normal.
615
00:29:46,584 --> 00:29:50,388
The conclusion was that
the aircraft performance was
616
00:29:50,455 --> 00:29:53,892
normal and that there was
no anomalies in the amount
617
00:29:53,958 --> 00:29:54,893
of fuel consumed.
618
00:29:56,961 --> 00:29:57,896
Showing films.
619
00:30:00,632 --> 00:30:01,633
NARRATOR:
Investigators are left
620
00:30:01,699 --> 00:30:05,203
with a troubling question.
621
00:30:05,270 --> 00:30:09,908
How could an experienced crew
lose track of how much fuel
622
00:30:09,974 --> 00:30:13,711
they had onboard and, in fact,
run out of fuel when they
623
00:30:13,778 --> 00:30:17,849
were in view of the airport?
624
00:30:17,916 --> 00:30:20,418
NARRATOR: Grossi considers the
possibility that the plane's
625
00:30:20,485 --> 00:30:23,021
fuel gauges malfunctioned.
626
00:30:23,087 --> 00:30:26,858
He studies the CVR transcript,
focusing in on the crew's
627
00:30:26,925 --> 00:30:30,862
discussion of fuel levels.
628
00:30:30,929 --> 00:30:32,564
DENNIS GROSSI: Fuel
gauges are not known
629
00:30:32,630 --> 00:30:35,366
for being all that precise.
630
00:30:35,433 --> 00:30:38,303
That's why it was so important
for the performance study
631
00:30:38,369 --> 00:30:41,973
to correlate the amount
of fuel that was actually
632
00:30:42,040 --> 00:30:44,976
on the aircraft with
what was actually
633
00:30:45,043 --> 00:30:47,812
being indicated to the crew.
634
00:30:47,879 --> 00:30:49,781
How not sure we got, Frosty?
635
00:30:49,847 --> 00:30:52,951
NARRATOR: If the gauges
weren't working properly--
636
00:30:53,017 --> 00:30:54,085
5,000.
637
00:30:54,152 --> 00:30:55,620
NARRATOR: --it could
explain why the crew let
638
00:30:55,687 --> 00:30:59,791
the fuel levels fall so low.
639
00:30:59,857 --> 00:31:01,526
The crew discuss, how
much fuel do you have?
640
00:31:01,593 --> 00:31:04,295
We got 5,000 pounds.
641
00:31:04,362 --> 00:31:06,264
NARRATOR: By matching the
time and the transcript
642
00:31:06,331 --> 00:31:09,500
with the fuel
burn chart, Grossi
643
00:31:09,567 --> 00:31:13,338
can determine if the gauges
were working accurately.
644
00:31:13,404 --> 00:31:16,241
You take the data and
apply the time factor to it,
645
00:31:16,307 --> 00:31:18,710
and you can figure
out how much fuel they
646
00:31:18,776 --> 00:31:21,112
should have had remaining.
647
00:31:21,179 --> 00:31:23,681
NARRATOR: He discovers
the flight engineer--
648
00:31:23,748 --> 00:31:24,682
FORREST MENDENHALL: 5,000.
649
00:31:24,749 --> 00:31:27,318
NARRATOR: --had
the correct reading
650
00:31:27,385 --> 00:31:28,720
5,000.
651
00:31:28,786 --> 00:31:30,321
That's exactly right.
652
00:31:30,388 --> 00:31:33,324
There was nothing wrong
with the gauges either.
653
00:31:33,391 --> 00:31:36,060
He said that they
saw 5,000 pounds.
654
00:31:36,127 --> 00:31:40,965
That was consistent with what
the fuel burn study showed.
655
00:31:41,032 --> 00:31:42,700
NARRATOR: Investigators
are convinced
656
00:31:42,767 --> 00:31:45,236
that Flight 173's
fuel system was
657
00:31:45,303 --> 00:31:49,774
working exactly as it should.
658
00:31:49,841 --> 00:31:53,778
Lights in the fuel pump.
659
00:31:53,845 --> 00:31:56,281
NARRATOR: 35 minutes after
the captain put his plane
660
00:31:56,347 --> 00:31:58,449
into a holding
pattern, a warning
661
00:31:58,516 --> 00:32:02,620
light tells the flight engineer
that fuel is dangerously low.
662
00:32:02,687 --> 00:32:03,755
That's about right.
663
00:32:03,821 --> 00:32:06,391
The feed pumps are
starting to blink.
664
00:32:06,457 --> 00:32:07,692
ALAN DIEHL: Fuel
pump lights come on.
665
00:32:07,759 --> 00:32:10,161
This means that the-- they're
literally sucking air.
666
00:32:10,228 --> 00:32:12,397
As the fuel sloshes
around in tanks,
667
00:32:12,463 --> 00:32:15,600
this plane should have been
headed for the airport soon.
668
00:32:15,667 --> 00:32:19,370
NARRATOR: But captain McBroom
still isn't ready to land.
669
00:32:19,437 --> 00:32:22,140
JOHN COX: To be in an airplane
with that little fuel, it's
670
00:32:22,206 --> 00:32:24,075
something that, as a pilot--
671
00:32:24,142 --> 00:32:25,810
I've never been
in that position,
672
00:32:25,877 --> 00:32:28,813
and I would be
extraordinarily uncomfortable.
673
00:32:28,880 --> 00:32:31,716
NARRATOR: His
reaction is puzzling.
674
00:32:31,783 --> 00:32:34,485
I figure about
another 15 minutes.
675
00:32:34,552 --> 00:32:36,988
ALAN DIEHL: The flight engineer
said, Captain, 15 minutes?
676
00:32:37,055 --> 00:32:39,724
That's going to run us kind
of close on fuel out here.
677
00:32:39,791 --> 00:32:41,726
Not enough.
678
00:32:41,793 --> 00:32:44,195
15 minutes is really going
to run us low on fuel here.
679
00:32:44,262 --> 00:32:47,332
That was his one definitive
statement to the captain
680
00:32:47,398 --> 00:32:49,367
that things were not right.
681
00:32:49,434 --> 00:32:51,336
NARRATOR: The captain
wants more time to prepare
682
00:32:51,402 --> 00:32:53,137
for the emergency landing.
683
00:32:53,204 --> 00:32:54,839
Call around.
684
00:32:54,906 --> 00:32:57,408
Give them our passenger
count and them him to give
685
00:32:57,475 --> 00:33:01,713
that to the fire department.
686
00:33:01,779 --> 00:33:07,018
NARRATOR: Instead of heading
straight for the runway,
687
00:33:07,085 --> 00:33:11,823
he turns the plane into one
last circle over Portland.
688
00:33:11,889 --> 00:33:14,258
I kept thinking,
why isn't this guy
689
00:33:14,325 --> 00:33:17,495
turning in to the
airport at this time?
690
00:33:17,562 --> 00:33:19,464
NARRATOR: The plane has
been in a holding pattern
691
00:33:19,530 --> 00:33:21,532
for more than 40 minutes.
692
00:33:21,599 --> 00:33:24,769
It will take at least
15 more to land,
693
00:33:24,836 --> 00:33:31,676
but the aircraft has only
14 minutes worth of fuel.
694
00:33:32,677 --> 00:33:36,280
A crash landing
is now inevitable.
695
00:33:36,347 --> 00:33:37,281
Engines are flaming out.
696
00:33:37,348 --> 00:33:38,583
We're going down.
697
00:33:38,649 --> 00:33:41,753
We're not going to be able
to make it to the airport.
698
00:33:41,819 --> 00:33:43,254
NARRATOR:
Investigators now know
699
00:33:43,321 --> 00:33:45,656
that Captain McBroom
received clear warnings
700
00:33:45,723 --> 00:33:49,527
about low fuel levels.
701
00:33:49,594 --> 00:33:51,662
This didn't have to happen.
702
00:33:51,729 --> 00:33:53,631
NARRATOR: What they
don't understand
703
00:33:53,698 --> 00:33:56,901
Is why he ignored them.
704
00:33:56,968 --> 00:33:58,503
ALAN DIEHL: And this
was not an act of God.
705
00:33:58,569 --> 00:34:00,972
This was not a massive
mechanical failure.
706
00:34:01,038 --> 00:34:04,442
This was an airplane that was
perfectly flyable, good night,
707
00:34:04,509 --> 00:34:07,078
within sight of the airport.
708
00:34:07,145 --> 00:34:10,214
This accident should
never have happened.
709
00:34:10,281 --> 00:34:12,083
RODERICK BEEBE (ON RECORDING):
How much fuel we got now?
710
00:34:12,150 --> 00:34:15,720
NARRATOR: The NTSB's Al Diehl
returns to the CVR looking
711
00:34:15,787 --> 00:34:18,189
for anything that might shed
some light on the captain's
712
00:34:18,256 --> 00:34:19,424
state of mind.
713
00:34:19,490 --> 00:34:23,594
When you listen to the
tapes over and over again,
714
00:34:23,661 --> 00:34:25,997
you can detect things
like voice inflections,
715
00:34:26,063 --> 00:34:29,967
subtle voice mannerisms that
are trying to communicate
716
00:34:30,034 --> 00:34:32,437
to other members of the crew.
717
00:34:32,503 --> 00:34:35,339
NARRATOR: Diehl is struck by
an unusual aspect of McBroom's
718
00:34:35,406 --> 00:34:37,575
behavior in the cockpit.
719
00:34:37,642 --> 00:34:39,076
RODERICK BEEBE (ON RECORDING):
How much fuel we got now?
720
00:34:40,445 --> 00:34:42,013
NARRATOR: His crewmates
tried more than once to alert
721
00:34:42,079 --> 00:34:46,584
him to the fuel situation.
722
00:34:46,651 --> 00:34:48,085
How much fuel we've got now?
723
00:34:48,152 --> 00:34:54,125
4-- 4,000, in each, pounds.
724
00:34:54,192 --> 00:34:57,261
Both the first officer
and the second officer
725
00:34:57,328 --> 00:35:00,431
were acutely aware
of the fuel status.
726
00:35:00,498 --> 00:35:01,933
NARRATOR: But
McBroom is focusing
727
00:35:01,999 --> 00:35:05,269
on the broken landing gear.
728
00:35:05,336 --> 00:35:10,107
There's-- there's one
check we missed, checking
729
00:35:10,174 --> 00:35:14,378
the gear whirring horn.
730
00:35:14,445 --> 00:35:15,379
Right.
731
00:35:15,446 --> 00:35:16,380
Correct.
732
00:35:16,447 --> 00:35:17,582
Right.
733
00:35:17,648 --> 00:35:20,084
So how do we do that?
734
00:35:20,151 --> 00:35:22,320
JOHN COX: Flying with a
very senior captain, it
735
00:35:22,386 --> 00:35:24,021
would be very difficult to--
736
00:35:24,088 --> 00:35:27,492
to challenge that Captain in
those days about something
737
00:35:27,558 --> 00:35:28,493
like fuel.
738
00:35:28,559 --> 00:35:29,627
ALAN DIEHL: The
other crew members
739
00:35:29,694 --> 00:35:31,062
are trying to get this
captain's attention,
740
00:35:31,128 --> 00:35:34,332
but he was apparently totally
focused on the gear problem
741
00:35:34,398 --> 00:35:37,201
to the exclusion of all else.
742
00:35:37,268 --> 00:35:40,238
NARRATOR: Even after the
engines begin to flame out,
743
00:35:40,304 --> 00:35:42,473
McBroom is still trying
to fix the malfunctioning
744
00:35:42,540 --> 00:35:43,474
landing gear.
745
00:35:46,511 --> 00:35:47,945
McBroom was not
going to give up.
746
00:35:51,349 --> 00:35:54,452
He was going to find a--
what we sometimes called
747
00:35:54,519 --> 00:35:56,721
the golden BB, the one
thing that would answer
748
00:35:56,787 --> 00:35:59,257
the riddle as to why
this light is not on,
749
00:35:59,323 --> 00:36:02,593
and of course that
never happened.
750
00:36:02,660 --> 00:36:04,295
NARRATOR: McBroom
is determined to fix
751
00:36:04,362 --> 00:36:08,299
a mechanical problem that could
threaten the plane's safety.
752
00:36:08,366 --> 00:36:11,035
On the touchdown, if that
gear folds or something--
753
00:36:11,102 --> 00:36:12,937
NARRATOR: As a result,
he misses a far
754
00:36:13,004 --> 00:36:14,972
bigger and deadlier threat.
755
00:36:15,039 --> 00:36:19,076
The gear problem is really
a distraction for the crew.
756
00:36:19,143 --> 00:36:23,748
You had a small problem with
a small potential consequence,
757
00:36:23,814 --> 00:36:26,417
the gear collapsing on landing.
758
00:36:26,484 --> 00:36:27,952
But the captain
was so focused on
759
00:36:28,019 --> 00:36:30,054
that he lost the big picture.
760
00:36:30,121 --> 00:36:32,423
Reset that circuit
breaker momentarily.
761
00:36:32,490 --> 00:36:33,925
See if we get gear lights.
762
00:36:33,991 --> 00:36:36,527
DENNIS GROSSI: They lost
sight of the real emergency,
763
00:36:36,594 --> 00:36:39,297
which was the lack of fuel.
764
00:36:39,363 --> 00:36:41,098
NARRATOR: Al Diehl
now understands
765
00:36:41,165 --> 00:36:44,101
how Captain McBroom's obsession
with the malfunctioning
766
00:36:44,168 --> 00:36:47,104
landing gear led to disaster.
767
00:36:47,171 --> 00:36:50,374
JOHN COX: After this accident,
the National Transportation
768
00:36:50,441 --> 00:36:52,410
Safety Board said
flight crew members need
769
00:36:52,476 --> 00:36:55,846
to be better trained to
communicate when they
770
00:36:55,913 --> 00:36:59,016
have safety of flight issues.
771
00:36:59,083 --> 00:37:01,586
NARRATOR: What happened
aboard Flight 173
772
00:37:01,652 --> 00:37:06,691
is, alarmingly, not
an isolated case.
773
00:37:09,727 --> 00:37:15,232
Just a year earlier, another
DC-8 crashed in almost
774
00:37:15,299 --> 00:37:18,803
identical circumstances.
775
00:37:18,869 --> 00:37:21,906
ALAN DIEHL: It was a United
crew, same kind of aircraft,
776
00:37:21,973 --> 00:37:24,442
gear unsafe light, entered
a holding pattern at night,
777
00:37:24,508 --> 00:37:27,678
flew around, troubleshooting
the gear problem.
778
00:37:27,745 --> 00:37:30,681
They flew into a mountain
and killed everybody aboard.
779
00:37:33,050 --> 00:37:35,186
NARRATOR: It was one of a
string of deadly crashes
780
00:37:35,252 --> 00:37:39,957
during the 1970s involving
a lack of communication.
781
00:37:40,024 --> 00:37:41,993
The list includes
Eastern Airlines
782
00:37:42,059 --> 00:37:47,698
Flight 401, a Lockheed
L-1011 bound for Miami.
783
00:37:47,765 --> 00:37:50,534
Here, too, they had
a gear unsafe light.
784
00:37:53,938 --> 00:37:56,474
They ended up descending into
the Everglades, crashing,
785
00:37:56,540 --> 00:37:58,709
and killed over 100 people.
786
00:38:05,116 --> 00:38:06,550
NARRATOR: The
deadliest air disaster
787
00:38:06,617 --> 00:38:10,321
in history at Tenerife
in the Canary Islands.
788
00:38:10,388 --> 00:38:17,061
It was caused by
poor communication.
789
00:38:17,128 --> 00:38:20,498
The collision
claimed 583 lives.
790
00:38:20,564 --> 00:38:21,799
ALAN DIEHL: There
was a pattern here
791
00:38:21,866 --> 00:38:24,368
where we're having the same
types of accidents where
792
00:38:24,435 --> 00:38:28,105
other flight deck crewmembers
were having a difficult time
793
00:38:28,172 --> 00:38:30,474
getting the captain's
attention and making
794
00:38:30,541 --> 00:38:31,509
him do the right thing.
795
00:38:36,047 --> 00:38:38,516
NARRATOR: Al Diehl is
convinced that the way pilots
796
00:38:38,582 --> 00:38:41,052
communicate with each
other is now a growing
797
00:38:41,118 --> 00:38:43,454
threat to commercial aviation.
798
00:38:43,521 --> 00:38:45,489
A lot of people
at NTSB elsewhere
799
00:38:45,556 --> 00:38:47,692
thought we were going to
be headed for a bloodbath
800
00:38:47,758 --> 00:38:51,262
if we didn't get a handle on
the causes of human error.
801
00:38:59,470 --> 00:39:02,206
Diehl learns about an
experimental pilot training
802
00:39:02,273 --> 00:39:05,443
program developed by
NASA that could help
803
00:39:05,509 --> 00:39:10,214
solve the growing problem.
804
00:39:10,281 --> 00:39:13,851
Known as Cockpit Resource
Management or CRM,
805
00:39:13,918 --> 00:39:16,187
it's a system of training
designed to improve
806
00:39:16,253 --> 00:39:19,256
the way pilots communicate.
807
00:39:19,323 --> 00:39:22,226
It helps to improve
crew coordination
808
00:39:22,293 --> 00:39:24,562
and improve collective
decision-making
809
00:39:24,628 --> 00:39:25,963
on the cockpit.
810
00:39:26,030 --> 00:39:28,733
And the way it does that is
it teaches captains to listen
811
00:39:28,799 --> 00:39:30,801
better, and it teaches
the other members
812
00:39:30,868 --> 00:39:34,605
of the flight deck to be
respectfully assertive.
813
00:39:34,672 --> 00:39:35,740
NARRATOR: In a
move that will have
814
00:39:35,806 --> 00:39:38,642
a lasting impact
on airline safety,
815
00:39:38,709 --> 00:39:43,013
the FAA adopts deals
CRM recommendation.
816
00:39:44,348 --> 00:39:47,952
From here on, the job of
flying a commercial airliner
817
00:39:48,018 --> 00:39:52,523
will never be the same.
818
00:39:56,427 --> 00:39:58,229
United Airlines is
one of the first
819
00:39:58,295 --> 00:40:02,266
to implement a CRM training
program for its pilots.
820
00:40:02,333 --> 00:40:06,771
It's still in use today.
821
00:40:06,837 --> 00:40:09,240
United's director of
flight training operations
822
00:40:09,306 --> 00:40:11,442
is Marc Champion.
823
00:40:11,509 --> 00:40:13,911
The principles of
Crew Resource Management
824
00:40:13,978 --> 00:40:17,148
are that no one
individual in the cockpit
825
00:40:17,214 --> 00:40:21,018
can possibly understand
or see all of the threats
826
00:40:21,085 --> 00:40:22,386
that are out there.
827
00:40:22,453 --> 00:40:26,056
It requires the entire crew
to really foresee and manage
828
00:40:26,123 --> 00:40:29,160
the various threats that
happen to be in play
829
00:40:29,226 --> 00:40:31,128
when an airplane is in flight.
830
00:40:31,195 --> 00:40:33,430
NARRATOR: Today, United
pilot Sheri Rutledge--
831
00:40:33,497 --> 00:40:36,433
Also I'm having a hard time
maintaining my speed here.
832
00:40:36,500 --> 00:40:37,535
--is undergoing CRM training.
833
00:40:37,601 --> 00:40:38,803
Let me talk to the
flight attendant.
834
00:40:38,869 --> 00:40:40,204
You continue to
steer the airplane.
835
00:40:40,271 --> 00:40:41,338
DENNIS GROSSI: I
got the airplane.
836
00:40:42,673 --> 00:40:44,108
NARRATOR: In this simulation,
she and her captain
837
00:40:44,175 --> 00:40:45,209
are dealing with an emergency.
838
00:40:46,310 --> 00:40:47,745
Engine oil low pressure.
839
00:40:47,812 --> 00:40:51,115
If oil is less than 60 PSI--
840
00:40:51,182 --> 00:40:53,284
NARRATOR: A mechanical
problem has forced a shutdown
841
00:40:53,350 --> 00:40:55,085
of one of their two engines.
- --level one to idle.
842
00:40:55,152 --> 00:40:56,420
Confirm to us.
843
00:40:56,487 --> 00:40:59,056
Engine one shut down, engine
mode selector to ignition.
844
00:40:59,123 --> 00:41:04,528
It's designed to mimic
the situations that I will
845
00:41:04,595 --> 00:41:06,664
see in actual airplane flying.
846
00:41:06,730 --> 00:41:08,899
Yes.
847
00:41:08,966 --> 00:41:13,337
Oakland Center, United 1916,
we're declaring an emergency.
848
00:41:13,404 --> 00:41:15,606
We've had an engine
failure at altitude.
849
00:41:15,673 --> 00:41:17,875
There are specific
threats that we
850
00:41:17,942 --> 00:41:21,111
have to deal with as a crew,
be able to communicate,
851
00:41:21,178 --> 00:41:24,882
plan, decision-make
through to a safe outcome.
852
00:41:24,949 --> 00:41:27,952
So it's a problem-solving
type of scenario,
853
00:41:28,018 --> 00:41:29,119
and you're very focused.
854
00:41:29,186 --> 00:41:30,821
It doesn't look to me as
though we've got a fire
855
00:41:30,888 --> 00:41:32,022
issue, though.
856
00:41:32,089 --> 00:41:33,457
We've shut it down
quickly enough.
857
00:41:33,524 --> 00:41:35,893
All the flight crew
comes together, agrees on,
858
00:41:35,960 --> 00:41:37,328
yes, this is the way--
859
00:41:37,394 --> 00:41:40,164
everything's appropriate, and
then you go to the next step.
860
00:41:40,231 --> 00:41:41,198
Yeah, pull the book out.
861
00:41:41,265 --> 00:41:42,199
Let's take a look at that.
862
00:41:42,266 --> 00:41:44,635
OK.
863
00:41:44,702 --> 00:41:49,006
It's very easy sometimes to
know what your intention is
864
00:41:49,073 --> 00:41:52,443
and think that the
people around you
865
00:41:52,509 --> 00:41:55,713
will also know what
that intention is.
866
00:41:55,779 --> 00:41:57,848
But that's not
usually the case.
867
00:41:57,915 --> 00:41:59,917
I'm going to go off and
talk to dispatch to maintain
868
00:41:59,984 --> 00:42:00,918
flying the airplane.
869
00:42:00,985 --> 00:42:02,519
How are we doing on altitude?
870
00:42:02,586 --> 00:42:04,521
NARRATOR: They keep each
other informed every
871
00:42:04,588 --> 00:42:07,324
step of the way, exactly
as the exercise intends.
872
00:42:07,391 --> 00:42:08,325
--San Jose as well.
873
00:42:08,392 --> 00:42:09,493
I wanted to--
874
00:42:09,560 --> 00:42:10,961
Ladies and gentlemen,
your captain speaking.
875
00:42:11,028 --> 00:42:13,631
We're now in our descent
into San Francisco
876
00:42:13,697 --> 00:42:20,204
this ERM training makes every
difference in every flight.
877
00:42:20,271 --> 00:42:23,107
It has empowered
me as a crew member
878
00:42:23,173 --> 00:42:25,976
and reminded me to speak up.
879
00:42:26,043 --> 00:42:28,379
We're getting a
little close in here.
880
00:42:28,445 --> 00:42:31,148
To help with
decisions, to maintain
881
00:42:31,215 --> 00:42:33,317
my situational awareness,
and that, I think,
882
00:42:33,384 --> 00:42:36,820
is the most
important part of it.
883
00:42:36,887 --> 00:42:39,256
ALAN DIEHL: In the States,
we've literally gone a decade
884
00:42:39,323 --> 00:42:41,926
without losing a
single passenger
885
00:42:41,992 --> 00:42:44,628
at a major carrier accident.
886
00:42:47,898 --> 00:42:50,601
Many of the experts have
concluded that that was
887
00:42:50,668 --> 00:42:52,870
at least partly due to CRM.
888
00:42:54,071 --> 00:42:55,940
NARRATOR: Had the
crew of Flight 173
889
00:42:56,006 --> 00:42:58,042
received such training--
890
00:42:58,108 --> 00:43:00,277
I figure about
another 15 minutes.
891
00:43:00,344 --> 00:43:02,012
NARRATOR: --they might have
expressed their concerns
892
00:43:02,079 --> 00:43:04,014
more forcefully,
insisting Captain
893
00:43:04,081 --> 00:43:05,549
McBroom land immediately.
894
00:43:05,616 --> 00:43:07,484
Not enough.
895
00:43:07,551 --> 00:43:10,154
15 minutes is really going
to run us low on fuel here.
896
00:43:10,220 --> 00:43:12,323
Instead, they
expected their captain
897
00:43:12,389 --> 00:43:17,261
to make the right decision.
898
00:43:17,328 --> 00:43:19,530
OK, declare mayday.
899
00:43:20,597 --> 00:43:21,899
NARRATOR: Melburn
McBroom was held
900
00:43:21,966 --> 00:43:24,668
responsible for the crash.
901
00:43:24,735 --> 00:43:31,141
He retired shortly afterwards.
902
00:43:31,208 --> 00:43:33,510
Flight 173 passenger
Aimee Connor
903
00:43:33,577 --> 00:43:40,217
met Captain McBroom in 1998,
six years before his death.
904
00:43:41,218 --> 00:43:42,553
The man that I
saw at the reunion
905
00:43:42,619 --> 00:43:47,791
was very broken, very
broken, and yet so willing
906
00:43:47,858 --> 00:43:52,096
to be there for
us under whatever
907
00:43:52,162 --> 00:43:55,799
circumstances there were.
908
00:43:55,866 --> 00:43:56,800
MALBURN MCBROOM: Call around.
909
00:43:56,867 --> 00:43:58,502
Give them a passenger count.
910
00:43:58,569 --> 00:44:00,571
AIMEE CONNER: If I had
had any anger toward him
911
00:44:00,637 --> 00:44:04,842
before the reunion, I sure
didn't after I met him,
912
00:44:04,908 --> 00:44:07,077
I know that he truly
believed he had more
913
00:44:07,144 --> 00:44:08,912
fuel onboard than he did have.
914
00:44:08,979 --> 00:44:10,180
MALBURN MCBROOM:
Tell him to pass that
915
00:44:10,247 --> 00:44:12,816
on to the fire department.
916
00:44:12,883 --> 00:44:16,754
I always said that pilot
air is not an answer.
917
00:44:16,820 --> 00:44:19,223
It's only a symptom of
some underlying problems.
918
00:44:19,289 --> 00:44:21,725
MALBURN MCBROOM: The thing
to remember is, don't worry.
919
00:44:21,792 --> 00:44:24,795
ALAN DIEHL: McBroom was
flying under the cockpit
920
00:44:24,862 --> 00:44:26,096
culture of the time.
921
00:44:26,163 --> 00:44:28,799
This was an accident
waiting to happen.
922
00:44:28,866 --> 00:44:30,501
They were a product
of their times,
923
00:44:30,567 --> 00:44:34,004
and we have to judge those
men by the environment
924
00:44:34,071 --> 00:44:37,041
they operated in.
925
00:44:37,107 --> 00:44:40,077
You don't do that sort
of thing on purpose.
926
00:44:40,144 --> 00:44:41,712
We can't make it.
927
00:44:41,779 --> 00:44:44,915
He was devastated.
928
00:44:44,982 --> 00:44:46,650
He lost his license.
929
00:44:46,717 --> 00:44:49,153
He lost his family.
930
00:44:49,219 --> 00:44:52,423
The rest of his life
was just shattered.
71891
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