All language subtitles for Air.Disasters.S03E05.Turning.Point.1080p.PMTP.WEB-DL.AAC2.0.H.264-maldini_track3_[eng]

35,000 thousand feet
above the Bering sea...

Anchorage, Northwest 85.

Confirm that you are aware that
we have declared an emergency.

A Boeing 747
is in serious trouble.

Can't do that.
There's too much traffic.

We're calling this one a red
emergency.

Red emergency is
preparing for the worst.

The crew can
barely control the plane.

It was a very
confusing situation.

It was something that
they had never done in training.

They need
all the help they can get

to have any hope of bringing
the plane and its 386 passengers

safely to the ground.

If there's ever
gonna be a time

that you fly a perfect approach,
it's got to be this one.

Ladies and gentlemen,

we are starting our approach.

We lost both engines!

Put the mask over your nose.

Emergency descent.

Mayday, mayday.

Brace for impact!

I think I lost one.

Investigation starting.

He's gonna crash!

Northwest Airlines
flight 85 is making its way

over the Bering sea.

It's after 5:00 p.m.

Dinner service has ended,

and passengers are settling in
for a long flight.

The massive Boeing 747-400
has just flown over Alaska

and is now almost halfway
through a 13 1/2 hour journey

from Detroit to
Japan's Narita Airport.

Hello, gentlemen.

Frank?

How are things?

35,000 feet, smooth air.

Captain John Hanson
is a career pilot.

He is also a flight instructor
for the Boeing 747.

Six and a half hours
into the flight,

he's about to hand over
the controls.

On long journeys, it's common
to have two flight crews.

The trip was long enough

that we put on
a full augmented crew.

We had two captains
and two co-pilots.

They fly in shifts
to prevent fatigue.

Why don't you guys
give me a ding

about 20 minutes before
you want me back up here, okay?

Mike Fagan, a Vietnam vet

with 25 years flying experience,
is the fresh first officer.

Everything was normal,

and we didn't expect
to have any problems.

We'd flown this flight
many, many times.

Frank, I'm taking the lasagna.
You get option B.

Does option B include starving?

He is joined by
captain Frank Geib,

who has over 11,000 hours
of flying under his belt.

Pilots refer to this aircraft as
"the queen of the skies."

it's equipped with a private
cabin for the flight crew.

Here, captain Hanson and
his first officer David Smith

will have a five-hour rest break

before returning
to the flight deck.

Dave Smith had worked with me.

And we were going to
read for a while,

perhaps nap in the bunk and
wake up for descent to Tokyo.

-You sure you're not hungry?
-Trust me, I'm good.

Flight 85 is
more than six hours

from landing at Narita.

The aircraft took
a dramatic roll to the left,

and it went from 35 through
40 degrees of bank.

For no apparent reason,

the pilots have lost control
of their plane.

The airplane took a lurch

like nothing
I had ever felt before.

And I kind of had
to catch myself.

It was a very,
a very sudden yawing movement.

It's the type of thing
you only feel in a simulator

when they're doing
extreme things.

Captain Geib has
only moments to react.

Did we lose an engine?

Do we still have engines?

We still have
all engines, that's not it.

The lives of 386
passengers hang in the balance.

The airplane
was kind of shaking,

and I knew the autopilot
had been disconnected.

It was quite obvious that
something was abnormal.

In a matter of seconds,

captain Geib has disconnected
the autopilot,

pulled back on
the control column

and leveled the wings.

But something is still
seriously wrong.

-Frank, have you got it?
-Yeah, I think I've got it.

If it's not the engines, then we
have a problem with the rudder.

The pilots have
leveled the plane,

but they are still having
difficulty controlling it.

The warning system
confirms Geib's suspicion.

Yaw damper lower.

A malfunction
of the rudder system.

The rudder controls
the plane's yaw,

its movements from left
to right, as it flies.

It directs airflow to
keep it flying straight.

Less than a year earlier,
American Airlines flight 587

lost control of
its rudder system

and crashed into a neighborhood
in Queens, New York,

killing everyone on board.

We were very well aware of that,

and there had been
quite a study done on that,

so we had actually just reviewed
that event in flight planning.

This plane is in danger

of suffering the same fate.

Because of its size, the 747 has
both an upper and lower rudder.

They normally move in unison.

For some unknown reason,

the lower rudder has deflected
17 degrees to the left.

And it's stuck there.

The captain tries to keep the
plane flying level and straight.

He uses foot pedals to
control the upper rudder,

and the control column
to move the ailerons.

But he knows
it's a stopgap measure

that may not work for long.

I've got the airplane
and the radios.

You get the COM and see if
there's a procedure for this.

The COM,
or cockpit operating manual,

provides a list of procedures
for emergency situations.

It says not to remove any
pressure from the hydraulics,

that's all.

That's not very helpful.
Is there anything else?

Are any other systems failing?

Not so far.

Hydraulics control
several vital components,

including the failed rudder.

More failures could
spell disaster.

How far to Narita?

About six hours.

Flying that far

without full control
of the plane

is a huge risk.

P3. Get them back.

When you're in the bunk,
you're used to hearing the P3

only at times when
it's time for a shift change.

When you hear it at an odd time,
it means come back,

because something out of
the ordinary has happened.

Anchorage is
two hours behind us.

Call them and
declare an emergency.

We're turning around.

Anchorage,
this is Northwest 85.

But even contacting
anchorage is a problem.

Anchorage,
this is Northwest 85.

Air traffic control
centers have a limited range.

In the middle of the sea
between two continents,

the plane is in a dead zone.

No one in anchorage knows
they're in trouble.

In the cabin, passengers don't
know the scale of the problem.

Many passengers assume
it was only turbulence

that caused the sudden jolt.

See if you can reach 19.

The pilots attempt
to contact another flight

that's closer to Alaska.

Northwest 19,
this is Northwest 85.

But the signal is weak.

Northwest 19,
this is Northwest 85.

This is Northwest 19, go ahead.

We have
an emergency on board.

Can you relay to Anchorage?

Roger, stand by.

Okay, let's turn this around.

The plane goes into
a very wide right turn.

Anchorage control,
this is Northwest 19.

Northwest 19, go ahead.

Northwest 85 is
requesting an emergency landing.

What is the nature
of the emergency?

Hardover left rudder.

The rudder is crucial
for turning the plane around.

Without it, the captain
is forced to improvise.

We had no idea
what the problem was.

So Frank was very cautious
on using the rudder,

which means that he had
to use full aileron

to control the aircraft.

But in the meantime,
the aircraft is in a slip,

and a slip is when the aircraft
is not in a coordinated turn.

The tail is off
in one direction,

the nose pointed
in the other direction.

In other words, it's a slip
that goes like this.

Like a racecar driver
skidding through a turn,

captain Geib is close
to losing control.

Let's move it.

What's happening?

We've declared
an emergency,

and we're headed
back to anchorage.

Indications?

The lower rudder is
hardover 17 degrees to the left.

We don't know why,
and it's not responding.

We don't know
what else is wrong yet.

It took both hands
to fly the airplane.

We didn't know at that point

whether the rudder
was coming apart.

All we knew was it was
definitely a rudder problem.

This has never
happened before.

The pilots haven't been trained
for this malfunction.

There's no procedure
in the COM.

And the manual is of no use.

Well, we're gonna
have to make one up.

35,000 feet
over the Bering sea

and an hour and 40 minutes away
from the nearest airport,

the pilots of this massive 747
are in uncharted territory.

For the 386
passengers on flight 85,

the anxiety over the sudden dive
has subsided.

No one in the cabin is aware of
the potentially fatal drama

still unfolding in the cockpit.

Without full control
of the plane's rudder,

the crew needs to fly another
800 miles to Anchorage.

Frank was the junior captain,

I was the senior captain.

And when I saw him
battling the controls,

I decided that
I was gonna take over.

Frank, you've done
a hell of a job,

but I think
I'd better take over now.

If anybody's gonna ding
this thing up, it's gonna be me.

-I have no problem with that.
-Okay.

Okay, mike, you're gonna
have to take control

while we switch over.

Are you ready?

I'm ready.

First officer Fagan
must now hold the yoke steady

as captain Geib relinquishes
control of the plane.

I have control.

Any mishandling
of the controls

could send the plane
into a fatal spin.

The same delicate balancing act
transfers control of the plane

to captain Hanson.

I was pretty appalled
at how much force it took

to fly this big,
beautiful airplane.

If the airplane is flying,
even lousy, it's flying,

and that's the bottom line.

And it's headed
towards Anchorage,

so we're good to go for a while.

Now we could begin
to devote some thought

to other things
that had to be done.

The crew has no idea
how badly the rudder is damaged.

It could be seconds from
tearing off altogether.

I can't tell
whether the damn rudder

is trying to leave the airplane.

What do we tell the cabin?

We decided the
passengers really should know.

So we wanted to liaison
with the cabin,

and Frank offered to do that.

I'll go back and tell them.

The more they know, the better.

I agree.

I think we should tell them
exactly what's going on.

Kathy?

We don't know if things are
gonna get better or worse.

Every single crewmember knew

that something major had
happened to that aircraft.

We've turned
back to Anchorage,

and we're gonna make
an emergency landing.

The captain didn't
try to hide anything,

didn't try to pull any punches.

He just flat out said
how things were

and that it could possibly
be a very rough landing.

Kathy, we're calling
this one a red emergency.

Red emergency is, of
course, preparing for the worst.

There may be a crash landing.

There may be damage
to the aircraft.

There may be injury and/or death
to the passengers

and/or yourself.

Hello,
ladies and gentlemen.

I'm captain Frank Geib.

We are dealing with
a malfunction at the moment,

and our crew is dealing with
the situation as best we can.

We need everybody
to remain calm,

and please give
your flight attendants

your complete attention.

I cannot stress how important

your complete cooperation
will be

in order for us to make it
to the ground safely.

The passengers for
the most part were fairly calm.

I promise I'll update you
with any new information

as it becomes available.

Thank you very much
for your attention,

and I'll talk to you later.

After a few minutes,

you could hear some people
crying a little bit.

You could see people
looking around.

You could see fear.

We need to talk to
S.O.C. We need suggestions.

We can reach them on HF.

The Systems
Operations Center in Minnesota

may be able to help.

But to reach that far,

the pilots must use
high frequency radio,

which has a weak,
intermittent signal.

HF radio is like
when you were a kid

and your best friend
lived next door,

and you talked to him
between your bedrooms

with two Campbell's soup cans
with a string between them.

About that level
of sound quality.

It's just awful.

And ask them to wake up
John Doherty for us.

I was at home
the night of the call,

just relaxing after a day in
the office, enjoying a movie.

But I was on call...

and those pagers would go off,
and sure enough, it did.

John Doherty has
worked with captain Hanson

for several years.

I knew John very well,
so I had a face, a person,

a pilot I knew very well
in my mind's eye.

I knew John Doherty
had a better knowledge

of the 747-400
than anybody at Northwest.

But captain Hanson has no idea

when his friend's help
might arrive,

and keeping the huge aircraft
flying level at 35,000 feet

is becoming
increasingly difficult.

The control wheel was shaking,

'cause the whole airplane
was shaking.

He decides to descend
to a lower altitude,

where denser air
will provide more lift.

-You ready to do this?
-All set.

But with
a crippled plane,

this normally routine procedure
will be another risky maneuver.

Okay.

Let's go.

You want to do it
very carefully.

So they're handling the controls

under this really
unusual circumstance

as carefully and gently
and as delicately as they can.

How's it feel?

About the same, not great.

We had to be very careful
how we flew this airplane.

The tail might be coming apart.

The rudder might be
just barely hanging on

or it could be
a hydraulic problem.

28,000.

They make it
down to 28,000 feet

without further incident.

I think I got this here.
Okay.

But the force required

to fly the damaged aircraft

has taken its toll
on the captain.

John.

Yeah, my leg's starting
to cramp up.

I'm having a tough time
holding this together.

The physical effort that was
required was considerable.

We were pushing so hard with
our leg on that rudder pedal

that we could only do it
for about 10 minutes.

You're gonna have to take it.

Are you ready?

-I'm ready.
-All right.

Nice and easy.

And then mike would come in
as I released.

It wanted to go back
the other way.

In other words, you had to make
it go where you wanted it to go.

And you have to use
the cross controls,

so you're using the muscles in
your shoulder and in your back,

and we would lock our legs.

And then when I would release,

I'd kind of get
limbered up again.

Still more than
an hour away from Anchorage,

the flight attendants prepare
the cabin for a red emergency.

We did what
we were trained to do.

It just kicked in.

And you would make sure that

everything on the counter
is put away,

make sure all the crew bags are
stowed and where they should be.

Everyone to a person cooperated
with what we asked them to do.

I remember coming to
a family of three,

and they asked me
if I was afraid,

and I hate to admit it, but
I did briefly consider lying,

but then I decided that
wasn't what I should do.

Yeah, I'm afraid, too,
but we have the best pilots.

Flight 85, we have
John Doherty on the line.

Operations has
finally been able to connect

the pilots with John Doherty.

John, have you been
briefed on this?

You know
what's happening up here?

Yes, I understand
you have a control problem.

EICAS is showing we have
a hardover lower rudder.

They were facing really
a very confusing situation.

They knew they were confronted
with something unique.

It was something that they
had never done in training,

something they'd never
seen in training,

nothing we'd ever talked about
in ground schools.

The COM is
not telling us much.

We're about over an hour
out of Anchorage.

What do you think?

Well, don't remove
any power from the hydraulics,

but other than that...

And I knew from
listening to John

that what we had in the books

wasn't going to be
a help to him.

There are going to be some
circumstances where a pilot is,

is going to have to figure out
what to do on his or her own.

30 minutes pass
before Northwest 85 is in range

to talk to the Anchorage
Control Center directly.

Northwest 85,
we have you on the radar.

Anchorage, Northwest 85.

Confirm that you are aware that
we have declared an emergency

and that you have emergency
equipment standing by.

We will request runway.

The plane must fly
over the Aleutian Mountain range

to reach Anchorage
international airport.

The airport itself is also
surrounded by mountains.

We said, okay, six right
is the runway we want,

'cause it'll give us
a 20-mile final,

and it's a great runway with
an ILS approach, and it's long.

Okay, six right it is.

Let's make sure we get it right
the first time.

And as far as the missed
approach is concerned,

we're not gonna do one.

We're just gonna do it right
the first time

and put it right on the spot.

There is no margin for error.

The pilots know
they have only one shot.

What do you think, Mike?

Maybe we should start
configuring for landing early.

Lower our altitude.

They're still
40 minutes away from Anchorage,

but the pilots decide to
configure for a landing.

They want to see how it will
affect their crippled plane.

If something goes wrong,

this may give them
more room to recover.

Okay, we can take it
over Cook Inlet,

lower to 14,000,
and then see what happens.

14,000 feet is a real nice
intermediate altitude.

It's good, thick air,
and it's high enough yet

that if something got worse
and control deteriorated,

you'd have room for a recovery.

This is Northwest 85.

We would like to descend to
14,000 over Cook Inlet.

We can't do that.

Lots of air traffic
in that airspace.

The airspace
over Cook Inlet

is the busiest corridor in
this part of the continent.

If they lose control
of the plane again,

they could collide
with another aircraft.

This is an emergency aircraft.

This is the safest
course of action.

Okay, we'll clear
everyone out of your way.

The jumbo jet slowly
descends to 14,000 feet.

Okay, flap five.

Flap five.

As he adds flaps,

captain Hanson can only hope the
plane maintains stable flight.

Next comes an even bigger test.

Gear down.

Gear down.

Lowering the massive
landing gear will increase drag

and reduce airspeed.

The plane handles
the new configuration

without any problems,

but there are new worries
about the damaged rudder.

-You feeling that?
-Oh, yeah.

The rudder is tied
to airspeed and altitude.

The lower you get,
the further the rudder goes out.

So then it required more rudder,
more aileron,

and that was
physically exhausting.

Mike, my leg's
starting to cramp up.

Are you ready?

I'm ready.

John Doherty is still
on the line to the crew.

He offers a suggestion.

Have you considered
adding 20 knots

to your approach speed?

No, we hadn't
thought about that.

We'll do it.

The extra speed may help

make the plane
more controllable.

Hello,
ladies and gentlemen,

we're in for a bit
of a rough landing.

When we touch down,
there's gonna be quite a jolt.

We'll tell you when
to brace for impact.

As Northwest Airlines
flight 85 approaches Anchorage,

the pilots and Doherty
continue planning

for an uncertain landing ahead.

We discussed
how are things gonna be

as we fly the approach,
what flight control,

what management issues
in terms of flight path

are we gonna encounter there,

and then how are we gonna manage
directional control

during the landing rollout,

what stopping issues
we're gonna have, and so on.

The decisions they
face in the next few moments

will make the difference
between life and death.

Okay, we can't do this anymore.

Let's use the engines.

Dave, get on the levers.

One and two up,
three and four down.

Just minutes
from touchdown,

the pilots increase power
to the left engines

while reducing power
to the right.

This uneven thrust should help
keep it straight.

But there is a danger.

No one knows how badly damaged
the rudder is.

If it tears off while
the engine thrust is uneven,

the pilots will
lose all control.

On the ground, they
are preparing for the worst.

I'd give $1,000 for
a rearview mirror right now.

John.

What do you think?

Doherty has been
scouring charts and manuals.

He reminds the crew of
another problem to consider.

On landing,

don't forget the rudder's
attached to the nose steering.

And when that happens, Mike,

I'll take the tiller
and the brakes.

You take the yoke.

Once the nose touches down,

the damaged rudder
may cause them

to lose control of the plane
at more than 185 miles an hour.

I flew the approach
all the way down.

And I thought, if there's
ever gonna be a time

that you fly a perfect approach,
it's got to be this one.

I became extraneous
at that time.

So somewhere along around 7,000,
8,000 feet on the way down,

I signed off with the crew.

I'll talk to you
when you're on the ground.

We'll talk soon.

You know, I gave John

whatever blessing I could give
at the moment,

probably understated in
typical pilot fashion,

and I was off the line and just
waiting to hear what happened.

Between the frigid
waters of Cook Inlet

and the towering
Alaskan mountains,

Anchorage International Airport
awaits the arrival

of a stricken 747.

Northwest 85,
we have you on our radar.

The passengers
and crew of Northwest 85

are now moments away from
an emergency landing.

As I was putting
my own seatbelt on,

I remember thinking to myself,
is this all there is?

As in, am I done here?

Am I gonna be alive
when this is over?

And I thought about my kids
and my husband and my home.

Northwest 85, cleared to land.

Emergency equipment standing by.

Roger, cleared to land.

The crew still has
no idea what will happen

when the plane
touches the ground.

There were close to
400 passengers on the airplane

and a crew of 18.

And some of them people
that I knew personally

like John and the other pilots
in the crew,

so waiting was hard.

Okay, everyone,
here we go.

Touchdown in five.
Prepare for impact.

Brace! Brace! Brace!

- You got it?
- I got it!

As planned, on touchdown

first officer Fagan
takes the control column.

Captain Hanson guides the
front wheels with the tiller.

The timing is critical.

One false step, and the plane
could shoot off the runway.

We got it.

Good job, Mike.

Good job, guys.

So what do we do for an encore?

Not that.

Everyone in the cockpit
was finally able to exhale.

And we just went...

Once we were given
the signal that it was okay...

Please remain seated until
the seatbelt light is off.

I knew that I had to get up
and go to that entry door

and get these people
out of this airplane.

We did what we were
trained to do.

We did a great job.

Controllers can see
what the pilots can't.

That's quite
the rudder you got there.

Must have been a hell of a ride.

Oh, yeah.
It was a real joyride.

Almost two hours
after the emergency began

at 35,000 feet,

all 404 people on board
are safely on the ground.

Well, when I heard
the crew was safe,

of course, it was an incredible
sense of relief.

These guys had been tested,
and they'd done a fabulous job.

So it was,
it was really joyful.

I mean, the sense of grace,
accomplishment,

joy, satisfaction.

It was all good.

The pilots have
narrowly avoided a fatal crash,

but what caused them to
lose control in the first place

is a question that desperately
needs to be answered.

Northwest is just one
of many airlines

flying the 747-400 every day.

Thousands of passengers
around the world

now face a potential risk.

Carolyn Deforge of the NTSB
will oversee the investigation.

It appeared
to be a very dramatic event.

And it definitely
seemed like something

we needed to follow up on

and try and understand
what had happened.

Investigators
immediately discover

a trail of hydraulic fluid

leaking from the back
of the plane.

It was very surprising to us

when we found out what type
of failure had occurred

and that the effects it had

on the aircraft's
controllability.

The pilot's foot
pedals are linked to the rudder

through a hydraulic power
control module, or PCM.

When the pilot presses
on the pedals,

the PCM changes
the hydraulic pressure,

and that's what
moves the rudder.

They opened up
the access panels in the tail,

and they noticed that the
end cap on the control module

had separated.

The end cap is a circular piece

about two and a half inches
in diameter,

and it had completely fractured

all of the way around
its diameter

and had then fallen off.

With the PCM broken,

the pilots had no way
to control the lower rudder.

The failure of this
one piece of engineering

nearly brought down
the entire plane.

The power control module is
shipped to the NTSB headquarters

in Washington.

Close examination reveals
exactly how the failed part

caused the rudder to jam.

When the end cap came off,

it allowed a piston
inside the module

to move further than
its design limit was intended,

and that is what resulted
in the rudder hardover.

But why the module's end cap

failed in the first place

is still a mystery.

It was certainly something

that was not anticipated
by the designers.

And when we examined
the hardware,

it was definitely
beyond the scope

of what you normally encounter
as an engineer

when you're doing
a failure investigation.

Normally, you see something
that's an internal failure,

not an actual mechanical failure
of the housing itself.

Sylvie Dionne
is a metallurgist

specializing in
airplane components.

The manifold
material was an aluminum alloy,

which means that
it's actually aluminum metal

that's mixed in
with a bit of copper,

with magnesium, with zinc.

And the purpose of adding
these other elements

is to make it stronger.

The aluminum alloy
used to make this part

is extremely resilient.

It should never
break apart like this.

Doing failure analyses
like this on failed parts

is a bit like being a detective,

because you're looking for clues

as to what caused
the occurrence,

what caused
the material to fail.

The size and shape
of the crack

tells investigators that
the module wore out over time--

what's called metal fatigue.

However, this is almost
impossible for them to believe.

A Boeing 747-400 is
built for long hauls,

12- to 15-hour flights,

and its parts are built
to last decades.

My understanding was
the mean time before failure

for this item was something
like 30,000 years,

which is basically saying,

well, we don't think
this part is ever going to fail.

The 747-400
is in high demand.

More of these massive planes are
being manufactured every year,

with the same control module
that failed on flight 85.

If this crucial system is
wearing out prematurely,

investigators need
to figure out why

before it leads to
a fatal disaster.

What happened?

The fact that this had
a purely fatigue failure

with no apparent origin to it

such as a deficiency or a defect

made us question
the material properties

of the housing itself.

Investigators send the unit

back to the manufacturer

for extensive
metallurgical testing.

Metals are made up
of little crystals

which metallurgists call grains.

And if the grains are
too small or too large

or not the correct shape,

the material may have
a different strength,

different ductility,

different resistance to
propagation of a crack.

A visual examination
of the metal

provides no insight
into why it failed.

One of the best
techniques for revealing

if a part contains
cracks or surface defects

is to use fluorescent DYE
inspection.

The part is examined
under UV light

and the defects will appear as
bright lines or bright dots

that are very visible.

But the exhaustive
tests reveal

that the material itself
was not to blame.

Investigators still can't
explain the failure.

It was driving
all of the group crazy.

We were very frustrated
when we realized

that all of the paths
we chased down

didn't give you that
ah-ha, eureka moment.

Investigators wonder

if something in
this plane's history

could have caused the module
to break down prematurely.

What the records reveal
is surprising.

Northwest was the launch
customer for the 747-400.

And this one was the first
in the line of 400's

that Northwest flew.

It was the oldest production
747-400 in the world.

And that's not all.

Records also show that this very
747-400 was used as a test plane

before it was even
sold to the airline.

Could rigorous testing have
somehow led to the failure

of the power control module?

The plane had flown
for 55,000 hours

and taken off more than
7,000 times.

That's more takeoffs
and landings

than most 747's with that
number of hours in the air.

This discovery leads
the investigation

in an entirely new direction.

We were concerned
that it had been exposed

to more stress
than we had expected

and that may have
caused it to fail.

Each time a plane
takes off and lands,

its systems are
put through more stress

than when it's simply
flying through the air.

We were very concerned
about those operators in Asia

that use the 747-400
on short haul flights.

This module, however,
is already broken.

There is no way to test it.

Checking all the units
on the rest of the fleet

is not a practical option.

You would have essentially

had to have grounded the fleet
to remove all of the units.

As a preemptive
strike against future failure,

the NTSB recommends that

airlines test
the power control module

more vigorously
and more regularly.

We instituted a repetitive

inspection cycle requirement.

But the root cause
of the failure is never found.

Four years later,
an Air France cargo plane

is forced to make
an emergency landing.

Once again, the lower rudder
has failed on the 747-400.

The circumstances are strikingly
similar to Northwest flight 85.

The unit was sent to
Parker Hannifin in California

for repair.

And when they opened the box
and looked at it,

their eyes got really big.

They immediately quarantined it,
and called everyone,

and said, "oh, my gosh,
you're not gonna believe

what just showed up
on our doorstep."

If the Air France
module shows signs

of metal fatigue
like the one on flight 85,

then investigators
may be a step closer

to explaining
the mysterious failures.

We immediately focused
in on the fracture surface again

in the same area,
and did many of the checks

that we had done
the first time around.

But this case
seems to be different.

There is no sign of fatigue.

Instead, they find
a manufacturing defect.

We actually found a deficiency

in the bottom of
the threaded bore section.

We found a very sharp radius
at the bottom of the threads,

which is where the crack
had propagated from.

While finding
the cause of this latest failure

is significant,

it has done nothing to help
explain the failure

on the Northwest flight
four years earlier.

Was it overloading?

Was it a progressive failure?

Was it exposed to something
in the environment

that caused it to fail?

Without knowing the why

you can't really take the
appropriate corrective action.

And as an investigator,
that's frustrating.

For the second time,

a part that was never
meant to wear out

has nearly brought down a 747.

With one of the two near
tragedies still unexplained,

investigators desperately need
to find a fail-safe measure

that will protect passengers
in the future.

Okay, everyone,
here we go.

Four years after

flight 85's heart-stopping
emergency landing in Anchorage,

the cause of the 747's
rudder failure is still unknown.

Now the same part has failed
on another flight.

The next failure
could be deadly.

We still don't know
actually the root cause

of the Northwest failure.

But because of what we found

with the second
Air France failure,

we needed to take
corrective action

to prevent similar failures
from occurring.

Investigators recommend

attaching special plugs
to the control module.

In the event of another failure,

these new pieces will prevent
the rudder from moving

too far in either direction.

The changes that we've
made to the control modules

in the 747-400 fleet

will prevent any future events
of a rudder hardover.

An airworthiness
directive from the FAA

makes it mandatory
for every 747-400

to be fitted with
this new technology,

eliminating the risk
of another failure.

But still, there is another
question to consider--

one investigators seldom have
the luxury to contemplate.

With a catastrophic failure
of the rudder system,

why didn't flight 85 crash?

One reason--
the very design of this 747.

Having a split rudder

is definitely an unusual feature
of this airplane.

And in this case,
it worked in their favor,

in the sense that if
there had only been one rudder

and the actuator of that rudder
had failed,

then 100% of the yaw control
would have been deflected,

which would have
magnified the problem.

But technology alone
didn't save 404 lives.

In 1985,

China Airlines flight 006
also went into a sudden roll.

But that flight plummeted
nearly 30,000 feet

before the pilots were
able to regain control.

How had flight 85
escaped the same fate?

If Frank hadn't
reacted the way he had,

we probably would not be here
to tell the story.

-Frank, have you got it?
-Yes, I think I've got it.

Captain Geib's
actions in the first few seconds

were critical to
saving the plane,

but what got it safely to
the ground is another story.

Every pilot in that
cockpit knew what was going on.

The risks were being
assessed and so on.

On landing, don't forget
the rudder's attached

to the nose steering.

And when that happens, Mike,

I'll take the tiller
and the brakes

and you take the yoke.

Cockpit resource management
is really what enabled us

to think this thing through and
get the airplane on the ground.

I am proud to say we
were like a well-oiled machine.

We all did what
we were trained to do.

Touchdown in five.
Prepare for impact.

And not one single
person fell apart.

What do we tell the cabin?

The guys that we had in the
cockpit were just tremendous.

Everybody communicated.

I'll go back and tell them.

The more they know, the better.

I agree.

I think we should tell them
exactly what's going on.

I think this crew
did a phenomenal job

in getting this aircraft
back on the ground safely.

In 2003,
the airline pilots' association

awarded the crew of
Northwest Airlines flight 85

with the superior
airmanship award.

More important than the award

was the fact that we got
the people on the ground safely.

We got it.

In this day and age
of automated cockpits,

hand flying is in danger
of becoming a lost art.

We have to remember as pilots

that we are there
because of our flying skills.

We had prepared
so well for this thing

that failure was not an option.