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These are the user uploaded subtitles that are being translated: 1 00:00:06,306 --> 00:00:09,175 Damn it! 2 00:00:09,175 --> 00:00:11,711 NARRATOR: When a passenger jet owned by Formula One 3 00:00:11,711 --> 00:00:15,548 superstar Niki Lauda plummets to earth, 4 00:00:15,548 --> 00:00:18,685 he's driven to find out why. 5 00:00:18,685 --> 00:00:20,653 Where was the tail found? 6 00:00:20,653 --> 00:00:23,223 I was upset that the airplane did 7 00:00:23,223 --> 00:00:26,459 something where a human being couldn't react anymore. 8 00:00:26,459 --> 00:00:29,396 NARRATOR: When two DC-10s are brought down within two years-- 9 00:00:29,396 --> 00:00:31,698 What's happened? 10 00:00:31,698 --> 00:00:34,067 The captain flew out! 11 00:00:34,067 --> 00:00:37,804 NARRATOR: --investigators unlock shocking discoveries. 12 00:00:37,804 --> 00:00:40,407 Design flaw issues can typically 13 00:00:40,407 --> 00:00:42,175 affect the entire fleet. 14 00:00:42,175 --> 00:00:46,112 Are there other ones that are about to happen? 15 00:00:46,112 --> 00:00:46,813 Get out of it! 16 00:00:46,813 --> 00:00:47,414 I can't. 17 00:00:47,414 --> 00:00:49,249 Come on. 18 00:00:49,249 --> 00:00:50,750 NARRATOR: And a doomed commuter flight in Georgia 19 00:00:50,750 --> 00:00:53,420 comes down to a faulty design. 20 00:00:53,420 --> 00:00:55,688 My god. 21 00:00:55,688 --> 00:00:57,624 NARRATOR: Are three horrific accidents 22 00:00:57,624 --> 00:01:01,127 all because of deadly defects? 23 00:01:01,127 --> 00:01:05,231 A design flaw that leads to a loss of an aircraft, 24 00:01:05,231 --> 00:01:07,801 it draws the attention of the entire world. 25 00:01:07,801 --> 00:01:10,303 Ladies and gentlemen, we are starting our approach. 26 00:01:10,303 --> 00:01:11,304 We lost both engines. 27 00:01:11,304 --> 00:01:12,439 Keep the mask over your. 28 00:01:12,439 --> 00:01:14,107 Emergency. 29 00:01:14,107 --> 00:01:14,741 Mayday, mayday. 30 00:01:14,741 --> 00:01:16,476 Brace for impact! 31 00:01:20,413 --> 00:01:21,247 He's gonna crash! 32 00:01:37,197 --> 00:01:40,333 You need a little bit of outer trim to the left, huh? 33 00:01:40,333 --> 00:01:41,734 What was that? 34 00:01:41,734 --> 00:01:43,336 You need a little bit of outer trim to the left. 35 00:01:43,336 --> 00:01:45,338 NARRATOR: Ascending to cruise altitude-- 36 00:01:45,338 --> 00:01:47,173 OK. 37 00:01:47,173 --> 00:01:50,276 NARRATOR: --Captain Thomas Welch and first officer Josef Thurner 38 00:01:50,276 --> 00:01:54,180 are flying a Boeing 767 from Bangkok, Thailand 39 00:01:54,180 --> 00:01:54,814 to Vienna, Austria. 40 00:01:58,184 --> 00:02:03,356 The flight is operated by Lauda Air, 41 00:02:03,356 --> 00:02:08,361 the brainchild of famed Austrian Formula One driver Niki Lauda. 42 00:02:08,361 --> 00:02:11,831 For me it was a logical step after retiring 43 00:02:11,831 --> 00:02:15,301 from racing to start in this kind of business. 44 00:02:15,301 --> 00:02:19,339 And that's what I did with Lauda Air. 45 00:02:19,339 --> 00:02:21,441 NARRATOR: His new airline is a small fleet 46 00:02:21,441 --> 00:02:24,310 of just four planes. 47 00:02:24,310 --> 00:02:26,846 One of the main reasons was to give the passengers 48 00:02:26,846 --> 00:02:28,815 a different way of flying-- 49 00:02:28,815 --> 00:02:30,850 better service, better food. 50 00:02:30,850 --> 00:02:34,554 The airplane had to look in a certain way. 51 00:02:34,554 --> 00:02:37,657 NARRATOR: Lauda Air Flight 4 is less than 15 minutes into 52 00:02:37,657 --> 00:02:38,858 its 11-hour flight to Vienna. 53 00:02:42,362 --> 00:02:43,930 [non-english speech] 54 00:02:48,968 --> 00:02:52,338 NARRATOR: In the cockpit, Captain Welch and First Officer 55 00:02:52,338 --> 00:02:54,707 Thurner monitor their instruments while the autopilot 56 00:02:54,707 --> 00:02:55,875 controls the climb. 57 00:03:04,250 --> 00:03:06,286 [groaning] 58 00:03:06,286 --> 00:03:09,389 NARRATOR: Suddenly, the plane begins dropping from the sky. 59 00:03:09,389 --> 00:03:11,257 [screaming] 60 00:03:11,891 --> 00:03:14,527 Yeah, wait a minute. 61 00:03:14,527 --> 00:03:19,399 NARRATOR: In an instant, the pilots lose all control. 62 00:03:19,399 --> 00:03:20,266 Damn it! 63 00:03:24,537 --> 00:03:26,706 NARRATOR: And their jet plunges toward the ground. 64 00:03:29,542 --> 00:03:33,646 In a matter of seconds, the jet falls more than 20,000 feet. 65 00:03:33,646 --> 00:03:35,281 [screaming] 66 00:03:44,791 --> 00:03:48,361 The plane slams into a remote jungle, 110 miles 67 00:03:48,361 --> 00:03:49,262 Northwest of Bangkok. 68 00:03:51,965 --> 00:03:55,335 I was at home, and I had a phone call from the news. 69 00:03:55,335 --> 00:03:59,305 They said one of our airplanes crashed. 70 00:03:59,305 --> 00:04:00,974 NARRATOR: When rescuers arrive, it's 71 00:04:00,974 --> 00:04:05,511 immediately obvious that there's no one to be rescued. 72 00:04:05,511 --> 00:04:08,948 All 213 passengers and 10 crew members are dead. 73 00:04:17,056 --> 00:04:21,461 It's the first time a Boeing 767 has ever crashed. 74 00:04:21,461 --> 00:04:23,830 The loss of a US-made aircraft prompts 75 00:04:23,830 --> 00:04:27,033 quick action from the National Transportation Safety Board, 76 00:04:27,033 --> 00:04:28,968 or NTSB. 77 00:04:28,968 --> 00:04:33,039 Bob Macintosh is assigned to the investigation. 78 00:04:33,039 --> 00:04:36,542 A first crash of an aircraft that 79 00:04:36,542 --> 00:04:40,980 was in service intercontinental for almost a decade 80 00:04:40,980 --> 00:04:43,650 with a perfect service record-- 81 00:04:43,650 --> 00:04:48,021 it was extremely important for us to learn what had happened. 82 00:04:51,524 --> 00:04:53,826 NARRATOR: He finds the badly burned wreckage strewn over 83 00:04:53,826 --> 00:04:58,331 a square mile of rough terrain. 84 00:04:58,331 --> 00:05:01,000 The major components, the cockpit, the tail, 85 00:05:01,000 --> 00:05:03,369 the main body, they were scattered 86 00:05:03,369 --> 00:05:05,104 far enough apart that certainly they 87 00:05:05,104 --> 00:05:09,008 had not come down together. 88 00:05:09,008 --> 00:05:11,010 NARRATOR: Macintosh immediately knows the plane 89 00:05:11,010 --> 00:05:12,378 broke up during the flight. 90 00:05:17,850 --> 00:05:20,386 What he needs to uncover is why. 91 00:05:26,726 --> 00:05:28,594 Where was the tail found? 92 00:05:28,594 --> 00:05:30,963 NARRATOR: Airline owner Niki Lauda arrives in Thailand 93 00:05:30,963 --> 00:05:32,098 to help find the answer. 94 00:05:34,033 --> 00:05:35,568 NIKI LAUDA (VOICEOVER): The scene 95 00:05:35,568 --> 00:05:38,504 for me, this was the most horrific pictures 96 00:05:38,504 --> 00:05:41,074 I've ever seen. 97 00:05:41,074 --> 00:05:42,875 NARRATOR: Surrounded by the scattered remains 98 00:05:42,875 --> 00:05:45,645 of an airliner that carries his name, 99 00:05:45,645 --> 00:05:50,583 Lauda is overwhelmed by the magnitude of the disaster. 100 00:05:50,583 --> 00:05:53,019 NIKI LAUDA (VOICEOVER): When you have 223 people killed, 101 00:05:53,019 --> 00:05:55,088 the families all want to know why. 102 00:05:58,157 --> 00:05:59,358 And I think this is the worst for people, 103 00:05:59,358 --> 00:06:03,129 if they do not know why they lost their husband, children 104 00:06:03,129 --> 00:06:04,897 whatsoever. 105 00:06:04,897 --> 00:06:07,600 NARRATOR: The black boxes may have captured important clues 106 00:06:07,600 --> 00:06:10,870 about the cause of the in-flight breakup, 107 00:06:10,870 --> 00:06:11,938 but they're badly burned. 108 00:06:15,441 --> 00:06:18,444 They're sent to NTSB technicians in Washington. 109 00:06:24,917 --> 00:06:28,755 Then, days after the crash-- 110 00:06:28,755 --> 00:06:30,056 Well, would you look at that. 111 00:06:30,056 --> 00:06:32,091 NARRATOR: --more pieces of the plane 112 00:06:32,091 --> 00:06:34,460 are found, including one of the engines. 113 00:06:38,197 --> 00:06:41,067 And investigators are amazed by what they see. 114 00:06:44,704 --> 00:06:47,940 The thrust reverser on Flight 4's left engine 115 00:06:47,940 --> 00:06:50,810 is fully deployed. 116 00:06:50,810 --> 00:06:55,715 Once we actually saw that the thrust reverser had deployed, 117 00:06:55,715 --> 00:06:58,751 for me, it was shocking. 118 00:06:58,751 --> 00:07:02,488 NARRATOR: Thrust reversers are only used on landing. 119 00:07:02,488 --> 00:07:05,191 Once activated, they direct air flow forward, 120 00:07:05,191 --> 00:07:08,928 helping the 767 come to a stop. 121 00:07:08,928 --> 00:07:10,463 They should never be deployed in the air. 122 00:07:13,633 --> 00:07:16,736 And even if it does happen, a deployed reverser 123 00:07:16,736 --> 00:07:17,937 shouldn't cause a crash. 124 00:07:21,507 --> 00:07:24,610 This discovery is the biggest break so far, 125 00:07:24,610 --> 00:07:28,648 and investigators need to know was a deployed thrust reverser 126 00:07:28,648 --> 00:07:29,916 responsible for the crash? 127 00:07:37,757 --> 00:07:40,693 But the team will have to solve the mystery without their most 128 00:07:40,693 --> 00:07:43,196 valuable tool. 129 00:07:43,196 --> 00:07:45,498 The flight data recorder is so badly 130 00:07:45,498 --> 00:07:48,935 burned that technicians at the NTSB can't recover any data. 131 00:07:52,738 --> 00:07:56,742 Thankfully, the cockpit voice recorder has survived. 132 00:07:56,742 --> 00:07:58,177 Ready to go? 133 00:07:58,177 --> 00:08:00,813 NARRATOR: Investigators and Niki Lauda 134 00:08:00,813 --> 00:08:04,884 listen to the last moments of Lauda Air Flight 4. 135 00:08:04,884 --> 00:08:06,552 [radio chatter] 136 00:08:06,552 --> 00:08:08,588 Check. 137 00:08:08,588 --> 00:08:11,791 NARRATOR: 5 and 1/2 minutes into the 15-minute long flight, 138 00:08:11,791 --> 00:08:14,126 everything is normal. 139 00:08:14,126 --> 00:08:17,797 Then the first sign of trouble. 140 00:08:17,797 --> 00:08:21,734 [non-english] That keeps-- 141 00:08:21,734 --> 00:08:22,869 it's come on. 142 00:08:22,869 --> 00:08:26,072 What's come on? 143 00:08:26,072 --> 00:08:27,907 Some kind of warning. 144 00:08:27,907 --> 00:08:29,542 NARRATOR: They discover Lauda pilots 145 00:08:29,542 --> 00:08:31,744 discuss a mysterious cockpit warning 146 00:08:31,744 --> 00:08:35,014 moments before the crash. 147 00:08:35,014 --> 00:08:37,750 It's a warning that relates to a hydraulic valve in the 148 00:08:37,750 --> 00:08:41,053 left engine's thrust reverser. 149 00:08:41,053 --> 00:08:43,155 The hydraulic isolation valve controls 150 00:08:43,155 --> 00:08:47,026 the flow of hydraulic fluid to the reversers. 151 00:08:47,026 --> 00:08:48,861 Opening the valve allows the reverser 152 00:08:48,861 --> 00:08:51,197 to be stowed or deployed. 153 00:08:51,197 --> 00:08:54,901 When it's closed, the reversers won't budge. 154 00:08:54,901 --> 00:08:55,902 OK. 155 00:08:55,902 --> 00:08:57,803 Yeah. 156 00:08:57,803 --> 00:09:01,641 NARRATOR: The crew doesn't sound worried about the warning. 157 00:09:01,641 --> 00:09:04,277 No, it's probably moisture or something. 158 00:09:07,179 --> 00:09:10,950 NARRATOR: For five minutes, nothing happens. 159 00:09:10,950 --> 00:09:12,151 Then-- - What? 160 00:09:12,151 --> 00:09:13,252 Reversers deployed! 161 00:09:19,625 --> 00:09:20,760 Wait a minute. 162 00:09:20,760 --> 00:09:25,331 NARRATOR: --just 22 seconds later, there's the sound 163 00:09:25,331 --> 00:09:27,300 of the plane ripping to pieces. 164 00:09:31,804 --> 00:09:36,275 The whole thing was so difficult. You never forget. 165 00:09:40,212 --> 00:09:42,782 NARRATOR: More motivated than ever, Lauda sets out 166 00:09:42,782 --> 00:09:45,284 to prove a controversial theory explaining 167 00:09:45,284 --> 00:09:48,688 why his plane went down. 168 00:09:48,688 --> 00:09:51,824 NIKI LAUDA (VOICEOVER): I was after Boeing day and night 169 00:09:51,824 --> 00:09:54,961 so that the people understand that we're working on it, 170 00:09:54,961 --> 00:09:57,396 that we hopefully find the cause and make sure it 171 00:09:57,396 --> 00:09:58,998 will never ever happen again. 172 00:09:58,998 --> 00:10:01,634 Because this is the answers these families needed. 173 00:10:06,406 --> 00:10:08,908 headquarters in Seattle to investigate 174 00:10:08,908 --> 00:10:12,846 the 767's thrust reversers. 175 00:10:12,846 --> 00:10:15,915 NIKI LAUDA: It's my name, my airplane, my crash. 176 00:10:15,915 --> 00:10:19,319 And Boeing understood my problem, or their problem. 177 00:10:19,319 --> 00:10:22,188 And we kept on working together. 178 00:10:22,188 --> 00:10:25,125 NARRATOR: Before the 767 first went into service, 179 00:10:25,125 --> 00:10:28,962 Boeing ran certification tests to prove that pilots could 180 00:10:28,962 --> 00:10:31,431 keep flying safely in the event of a mid-air reverser 181 00:10:31,431 --> 00:10:32,332 deployment. 182 00:10:38,438 --> 00:10:41,708 The tests proved that the 767 was capable 183 00:10:41,708 --> 00:10:44,844 of continued safe flight and landing, 184 00:10:44,844 --> 00:10:47,147 regardless of the position of the thrust reverser. 185 00:10:50,717 --> 00:10:55,689 The widespread feeling of what would happen 186 00:10:55,689 --> 00:11:00,126 if a reverser deployed in flight was that the airplane 187 00:11:00,126 --> 00:11:02,696 would be controllable. 188 00:11:02,696 --> 00:11:05,165 NARRATOR: But despite Boeing's certification tests, 189 00:11:05,165 --> 00:11:07,333 Lauda believes the reverser is to blame. 190 00:11:07,333 --> 00:11:09,169 I think we need to use a simulator. 191 00:11:09,169 --> 00:11:12,772 I know what it says, but that's not what happened in Thailand. 192 00:11:12,772 --> 00:11:15,709 NARRATOR: And he's determined to figure out why a failure that's 193 00:11:15,709 --> 00:11:18,978 not supposed to be dangerous killed 223 people flying 194 00:11:18,978 --> 00:11:20,046 on his airline. 195 00:11:20,046 --> 00:11:21,081 It's my airplane. 196 00:11:21,081 --> 00:11:23,750 It's my crash. 197 00:11:23,750 --> 00:11:24,417 OK. 198 00:11:24,417 --> 00:11:26,419 Let's try it in a simulator. 199 00:11:26,419 --> 00:11:28,922 NARRATOR: Niki Lauda works with Boeing investigators 200 00:11:28,922 --> 00:11:31,758 to recreate the flight. 201 00:11:31,758 --> 00:11:34,027 OK, let's begin. 202 00:11:34,027 --> 00:11:38,164 NARRATOR: He sets the flight's altitude to 24,000 feet, more 203 00:11:38,164 --> 00:11:41,301 than double the 10,000 feet that Boeing used for their thrust 204 00:11:41,301 --> 00:11:43,937 reverser certification. 205 00:11:43,937 --> 00:11:47,207 Could the altitude difference explain what happened? 206 00:11:49,943 --> 00:11:53,246 It was incredible because the airplane just turned around, 207 00:11:53,246 --> 00:11:54,447 and you couldn't do anything. 208 00:11:57,917 --> 00:12:00,420 NARRATOR: Lauda now knows definitively why his plane 209 00:12:00,420 --> 00:12:04,424 dropped so unexpectedly. 210 00:12:04,424 --> 00:12:06,526 When the thrust reverser deployed, 211 00:12:06,526 --> 00:12:08,895 the smooth flow of air over the wing 212 00:12:08,895 --> 00:12:11,731 was disrupted, dramatically decreasing lift. 213 00:12:15,068 --> 00:12:16,503 Reversers deployed! 214 00:12:16,503 --> 00:12:18,138 NARRATOR: This forced the jet into 215 00:12:18,138 --> 00:12:21,141 a sudden, terrifying nosedive. 216 00:12:21,141 --> 00:12:22,375 It was just too late. 217 00:12:22,375 --> 00:12:24,444 The aircraft was going to assume a very 218 00:12:24,444 --> 00:12:28,481 nose-low, high-speed attitude. 219 00:12:28,481 --> 00:12:31,451 NARRATOR: Incredibly, Niki Lauda has proven Boeing's 220 00:12:31,451 --> 00:12:35,789 certification test was lacking. 221 00:12:35,789 --> 00:12:40,126 He's shown that above 20,000 feet, where planes fly faster, 222 00:12:40,126 --> 00:12:45,565 the accidental deployment of a thrust reversers can be fatal. 223 00:12:45,565 --> 00:12:47,967 It was evident to the Boeing Company 224 00:12:47,967 --> 00:12:51,938 and to the FAA certification authorities 225 00:12:51,938 --> 00:12:55,875 and to the operators of Boeing 767s around the world 226 00:12:55,875 --> 00:12:59,045 that this was going to be a major, major issue. 227 00:12:59,045 --> 00:13:02,282 The reverser deployed, and those guys couldn't recover. 228 00:13:06,920 --> 00:13:08,488 Let's figure out why that happened. 229 00:13:12,458 --> 00:13:15,495 NARRATOR: Now the 767's thrust reversers undergo 230 00:13:15,495 --> 00:13:18,932 intensive study at Boeing. 231 00:13:18,932 --> 00:13:21,601 Engineers can imagine only one scenario 232 00:13:21,601 --> 00:13:26,940 that might make a reverse or deploy unexpectedly in mid-air. 233 00:13:26,940 --> 00:13:29,075 The theory calls for the activation 234 00:13:29,075 --> 00:13:32,212 of the two valves in the reverser's failsafe system 235 00:13:32,212 --> 00:13:35,081 at the same time. 236 00:13:35,081 --> 00:13:38,051 The first valve is the isolation valve that controls 237 00:13:38,051 --> 00:13:40,253 the flow of hydraulic fluid. 238 00:13:40,253 --> 00:13:43,556 When the second valve, called the directional control valve, 239 00:13:43,556 --> 00:13:46,359 is activated, fluid freely moves the reverser 240 00:13:46,359 --> 00:13:49,529 from stowed to deployed. 241 00:13:49,529 --> 00:13:53,099 You have to have both the isolation valve open 242 00:13:53,099 --> 00:13:57,136 and the directional control valve at the engine open 243 00:13:57,136 --> 00:13:58,905 to the deployed position. 244 00:14:09,649 --> 00:14:11,885 NARRATOR: After extensive testing, 245 00:14:11,885 --> 00:14:15,989 engineers finally make a major breakthrough. 246 00:14:15,989 --> 00:14:18,558 They're able to trigger the double failure needed to 247 00:14:18,558 --> 00:14:20,894 accidentally deploy a reverser. 248 00:14:24,564 --> 00:14:28,201 We could get that system to activate 249 00:14:28,201 --> 00:14:34,040 by introducing a short, a direct short in a system. 250 00:14:34,040 --> 00:14:36,376 NARRATOR: Investigators consult with Boeing engineers 251 00:14:36,376 --> 00:14:40,113 on the 767's infrastructure. 252 00:14:40,113 --> 00:14:42,582 They discover that the wires for both valves 253 00:14:42,582 --> 00:14:45,919 were bundled in the same harness. 254 00:14:45,919 --> 00:14:48,621 A fault across several wires in the same harness 255 00:14:48,621 --> 00:14:53,259 could have triggered simultaneous short circuits. 256 00:14:53,259 --> 00:15:00,300 Two shorts in two valves at exactly the same time? 257 00:15:00,300 --> 00:15:02,368 What are the odds? 258 00:15:02,368 --> 00:15:06,239 I was upset that the airplane did 259 00:15:06,239 --> 00:15:10,944 something where a human being couldn't react anymore. 260 00:15:10,944 --> 00:15:12,545 NARRATOR: Investigators have revealed 261 00:15:12,545 --> 00:15:16,082 a serious design flaw that allows thrust reversers 262 00:15:16,082 --> 00:15:17,917 to deploy accidentally. 263 00:15:21,154 --> 00:15:23,456 Pressure builds for a full review of the thrust 264 00:15:23,456 --> 00:15:27,427 reverser system on all 767s. 265 00:15:27,427 --> 00:15:30,663 There were other airlines that joined in the questioning 266 00:15:30,663 --> 00:15:33,733 of how could this possibly affect 267 00:15:33,733 --> 00:15:35,702 the flight path to the point where you lose control? 268 00:15:38,604 --> 00:15:42,442 NARRATOR: As a result of the Lauda investigation, 269 00:15:42,442 --> 00:15:45,044 a series of mechanical locks now ensure 270 00:15:45,044 --> 00:15:48,448 that even if both valves get energized in flight, 271 00:15:48,448 --> 00:15:50,350 the reversers can't deploy. 272 00:15:54,287 --> 00:15:57,490 For Niki Lauda, the outcome of this investigation 273 00:15:57,490 --> 00:16:00,126 is total vindication. 274 00:16:00,126 --> 00:16:02,462 For me, the worst thing in life is gray areas. 275 00:16:02,462 --> 00:16:03,997 I hate gray areas. 276 00:16:03,997 --> 00:16:06,766 And a lot of airplane crashes been in the past 277 00:16:06,766 --> 00:16:10,670 where you really do not know exactly what happened. 278 00:16:10,670 --> 00:16:13,373 And in this crash here, thank God, 279 00:16:13,373 --> 00:16:15,041 it was clear what was the cause. 280 00:16:18,511 --> 00:16:22,015 And it was fixed for all airplanes worldwide. 281 00:16:24,384 --> 00:16:26,219 NARRATOR: Even when new airliners 282 00:16:26,219 --> 00:16:29,188 go through exhaustive testing before they're put in service, 283 00:16:29,188 --> 00:16:34,193 a design flaw can occasionally slip through the cracks. 284 00:16:34,193 --> 00:16:37,697 I think due to the complexity of these aircraft, 285 00:16:37,697 --> 00:16:39,665 there are any number of things can 286 00:16:39,665 --> 00:16:43,403 go wrong even under the best set of circumstances. 287 00:16:46,239 --> 00:16:51,177 NARRATOR: 17 years earlier, is a deadly design flaw-- 288 00:16:51,177 --> 00:16:52,378 The captain blew out. 289 00:16:52,378 --> 00:16:55,548 NARRATOR: --responsible for the worst air crash to date? 290 00:17:03,406 --> 00:17:07,177 Turkish Airlines Flight 981 is boarding at Orly airport 291 00:17:07,177 --> 00:17:08,044 in Paris. 292 00:17:11,114 --> 00:17:14,217 Normally, the last leg of this trip from Turkey to England 293 00:17:14,217 --> 00:17:17,087 isn't very crowded. 294 00:17:17,087 --> 00:17:19,723 But today, the DC-10 is filling up fast. 295 00:17:23,593 --> 00:17:25,762 With all the new passengers boarding, 296 00:17:25,762 --> 00:17:30,066 Captain Nejat Berkoz and co-pilot Oral Ulusman 297 00:17:30,066 --> 00:17:31,501 are running a little behind schedule. 298 00:17:35,138 --> 00:17:39,309 So is baggage Handler Mohammed Mahmoudi, 299 00:17:39,309 --> 00:17:42,746 who's loading the luggage of all 335 passengers. 300 00:17:49,586 --> 00:17:51,588 NARRATOR: Not expecting anymore bags, 301 00:17:51,588 --> 00:17:53,590 Mahmoudi locks the rear cargo door. 302 00:18:02,299 --> 00:18:03,833 The DC-10 is set to go. 303 00:18:11,708 --> 00:18:14,778 Just after 12:30 in the afternoon, 304 00:18:14,778 --> 00:18:17,814 Flight 981 lifts off into the skies above Paris. 305 00:18:21,685 --> 00:18:23,153 TOWER: Tango Hotel Yankee. 306 00:18:23,153 --> 00:18:26,389 91, you are cleared to flight level 230. 307 00:18:26,389 --> 00:18:29,226 91, roger. 308 00:18:29,226 --> 00:18:31,294 NARRATOR: As it flies away from the airport, 309 00:18:31,294 --> 00:18:34,164 the DC-10 continues to gain altitude. 310 00:18:40,604 --> 00:18:46,443 They're still climbing at 10,000 feet when disaster strikes. 311 00:18:46,443 --> 00:18:48,812 [screaming] 312 00:18:54,284 --> 00:18:57,587 The huge jet shudders and begins to drop. 313 00:19:04,427 --> 00:19:06,463 What happened? 314 00:19:06,463 --> 00:19:09,499 The captain flew out. 315 00:19:09,499 --> 00:19:13,303 NARRATOR: As the nose pitches down, the plane picks up speed, 316 00:19:13,303 --> 00:19:16,439 and the crew struggles to save their plummeting jet. 317 00:19:16,439 --> 00:19:18,275 Bring it up! 318 00:19:18,275 --> 00:19:19,509 Up, up, up! 319 00:19:19,509 --> 00:19:20,577 I can't bring it up. 320 00:19:20,577 --> 00:19:21,711 She doesn't respond! 321 00:19:25,248 --> 00:19:27,517 NARRATOR: In the cabin, two rows of seats 322 00:19:27,517 --> 00:19:28,785 have simply disappeared. 323 00:19:31,288 --> 00:19:34,257 Anything not bolted down flies out of the plane 324 00:19:34,257 --> 00:19:36,293 through a gaping hole in the cabin floor. 325 00:19:40,397 --> 00:19:42,666 It looks like we're going to hit the ground! 326 00:19:42,666 --> 00:19:51,474 [non-english] 327 00:19:51,474 --> 00:19:52,876 [crash] 328 00:20:00,684 --> 00:20:04,187 NARRATOR: Turkish Airways Flight 981 disintegrates at impact. 329 00:20:06,823 --> 00:20:11,928 None of the 346 people onboard survive. 330 00:20:11,928 --> 00:20:14,230 It becomes the worst plane crash to date. 331 00:20:19,769 --> 00:20:21,604 Paul Eddy is a journalist who covered 332 00:20:21,604 --> 00:20:22,939 the story as it unfolded. 333 00:20:26,443 --> 00:20:31,681 It was just a scene of absolute, utter devastation. 334 00:20:31,681 --> 00:20:34,784 I still have nightmares about this. 335 00:20:34,784 --> 00:20:37,787 NARRATOR: Investigators for the French Accident Investigation 336 00:20:37,787 --> 00:20:40,457 Bureau are on the scene. 337 00:20:40,457 --> 00:20:47,964 My first job was to evaluate the scope of the wreckage 338 00:20:47,964 --> 00:20:51,301 and begin the first investigation on the spot. 339 00:20:54,504 --> 00:20:56,673 NARRATOR: Despite the enormous force of the crash, 340 00:20:56,673 --> 00:21:00,276 the black boxes survive. 341 00:21:00,276 --> 00:21:02,812 Their contents could provide valuable clues. 342 00:21:09,052 --> 00:21:11,321 The inquiry takes a bizarre turn when 343 00:21:11,321 --> 00:21:13,022 investigators are called to a field 344 00:21:13,022 --> 00:21:15,658 nine miles from the main crash site. 345 00:21:19,462 --> 00:21:23,666 They find the rear cargo door and two rows of seats that 346 00:21:23,666 --> 00:21:25,335 somehow fell from the DC-10. 347 00:21:28,838 --> 00:21:31,674 Since the accident involves an American plane, 348 00:21:31,674 --> 00:21:34,644 Chuck Miller from the National Transportation Safety Board 349 00:21:34,644 --> 00:21:38,381 joins the investigation. 350 00:21:38,381 --> 00:21:41,050 He was a very, very professional man. 351 00:21:41,050 --> 00:21:43,753 Chuck didn't sit back in the office. 352 00:21:43,753 --> 00:21:45,321 Chuck was always on the scene. 353 00:21:47,924 --> 00:21:51,961 NARRATOR: For him, the scene is eerily familiar. 354 00:21:51,961 --> 00:21:53,830 For the second time in two years, 355 00:21:53,830 --> 00:21:55,365 he's dealing with a DC-10. 356 00:22:02,105 --> 00:22:06,810 In June 1972, a plane's cargo door and some cargo 357 00:22:06,810 --> 00:22:13,416 were found in a field 18 miles from Windsor, Ontario, Canada. 358 00:22:13,416 --> 00:22:15,885 They had been ripped from a brand new DC-10 359 00:22:15,885 --> 00:22:16,953 as it flew to Buffalo. 360 00:22:22,992 --> 00:22:25,462 But the Windsor incident ended differently, 361 00:22:25,462 --> 00:22:28,398 as the pilots of American Airlines Flight 96 362 00:22:28,398 --> 00:22:32,068 were able to land their planes safely. 363 00:22:32,068 --> 00:22:34,404 When the flight crew finally saw the damage, 364 00:22:34,404 --> 00:22:36,806 they were stunned by a hole where the cargo 365 00:22:36,806 --> 00:22:38,875 door would normally be. 366 00:22:38,875 --> 00:22:42,111 The captain and I walked back to the back, 367 00:22:42,111 --> 00:22:46,749 and we just looked up and saw this hole. 368 00:22:46,749 --> 00:22:49,986 And it was just so weird. 369 00:22:49,986 --> 00:22:51,921 NARRATOR: It didn't take investigators long 370 00:22:51,921 --> 00:22:54,891 to realize the very design of the cargo door 371 00:22:54,891 --> 00:22:57,026 carried a latent fatal flaw. 372 00:22:57,026 --> 00:22:58,795 Take a picture of this here. 373 00:22:58,795 --> 00:23:00,797 These don't look like-- 374 00:23:00,797 --> 00:23:04,434 NARRATOR: When it closes, hooks in the DC-10's cargo door grab 375 00:23:04,434 --> 00:23:07,537 hold of a bar on the plane's door frame. 376 00:23:07,537 --> 00:23:10,039 To make sure it's locked, baggage handlers 377 00:23:10,039 --> 00:23:12,475 push down on a lever which drives 378 00:23:12,475 --> 00:23:17,413 locking pins through the hooks that hold them in place. 379 00:23:17,413 --> 00:23:19,482 Without this heavy-duty mechanism, 380 00:23:19,482 --> 00:23:22,118 the extreme air pressure thousands of feet in the air 381 00:23:22,118 --> 00:23:23,920 would rip the door right off the plane. 382 00:23:27,991 --> 00:23:33,663 A 1972 discovery was terrifying. 383 00:23:33,663 --> 00:23:36,799 The NTSB realized it was possible to close the lever 384 00:23:36,799 --> 00:23:40,069 on the outside of the door, even if the hooks and locking 385 00:23:40,069 --> 00:23:43,907 pins were not in the closed position. 386 00:23:43,907 --> 00:23:45,842 Engage the lever. 387 00:23:45,842 --> 00:23:48,611 NARRATOR: This meant baggage handlers could believe the door 388 00:23:48,611 --> 00:23:50,413 was locked when it wasn't. 389 00:23:55,652 --> 00:24:00,156 In the Windsor incident, there was an obvious flaw. 390 00:24:00,156 --> 00:24:03,026 And that's where the NTSB said, let's make sure we 391 00:24:03,026 --> 00:24:04,627 change this system right now. 392 00:24:04,627 --> 00:24:07,697 Every DC-10 operator needs to know this. 393 00:24:07,697 --> 00:24:10,533 I want everything checked, all the bolts checked. 394 00:24:10,533 --> 00:24:13,670 NARRATOR: In 1972, Chuck Miller's report strongly 395 00:24:13,670 --> 00:24:16,506 recommended changes to the DC-10's cargo door 396 00:24:16,506 --> 00:24:19,008 locking mechanism be made as soon as possible. 397 00:24:25,114 --> 00:24:27,784 Two years later, as Miller inspects 398 00:24:27,784 --> 00:24:33,756 the Turkish Airlines crash site, he's immediately troubled. 399 00:24:33,756 --> 00:24:37,093 If Miller's recommendations were implemented after the Windsor 400 00:24:37,093 --> 00:24:40,830 incident, why has another DC-10 cargo door 401 00:24:40,830 --> 00:24:42,932 been ripped from its plane? 402 00:24:42,932 --> 00:24:47,136 When he saw the door, saw that the fix hadn't been made, 403 00:24:47,136 --> 00:24:51,841 and that's when I think his anger became 404 00:24:51,841 --> 00:24:52,642 very, very strong indeed. 405 00:24:55,278 --> 00:24:58,615 NARRATOR: Miller takes an unusual step. 406 00:24:58,615 --> 00:25:00,583 Although the official investigation 407 00:25:00,583 --> 00:25:03,553 is just beginning, he gives journalist Paul Eddy 408 00:25:03,553 --> 00:25:04,787 an important tip. 409 00:25:04,787 --> 00:25:07,724 I said have you got any ideas what made the door come off? 410 00:25:07,724 --> 00:25:09,559 And he said, yeah. 411 00:25:09,559 --> 00:25:11,060 If I were you, I'd go and look at a place 412 00:25:11,060 --> 00:25:12,161 called Windsor, Ontario. 413 00:25:20,612 --> 00:25:24,749 incidents within two years with a DC-10 are connected-- 414 00:25:24,749 --> 00:25:26,584 I'm Chuck Miller. 415 00:25:26,584 --> 00:25:29,721 NARRATOR: --NTSB investigator Chuck Miller shares his theory 416 00:25:29,721 --> 00:25:32,924 with French investigators. 417 00:25:32,924 --> 00:25:43,101 These were taken on June 12, 1972, right after the incident. 418 00:25:43,101 --> 00:25:46,871 We asked for the report on the Windsor accident. 419 00:25:46,871 --> 00:25:53,011 And our American colleagues were also volunteers 420 00:25:53,011 --> 00:25:57,048 to give us a lot of details. 421 00:25:57,048 --> 00:25:58,783 NARRATOR: The French team is astonished 422 00:25:58,783 --> 00:26:00,885 by what Miller shows them. 423 00:26:00,885 --> 00:26:04,656 Now we had an American Airlines flight from Detroit 424 00:26:04,656 --> 00:26:07,625 to Buffalo have its cargo door blow off. 425 00:26:12,097 --> 00:26:13,631 And he has been very frank. 426 00:26:13,631 --> 00:26:16,101 And I'll explain what he was thinking 427 00:26:16,101 --> 00:26:17,569 of the Windsor accident. 428 00:26:19,904 --> 00:26:22,373 NARRATOR: With the information from Chuck Miller, 429 00:26:22,373 --> 00:26:24,109 French investigators take a closer 430 00:26:24,109 --> 00:26:25,710 look at the plane's cargo door. 431 00:26:28,813 --> 00:26:30,849 There is no new problem. 432 00:26:30,849 --> 00:26:37,088 It's just like the 1972 American Airlines case all over again. 433 00:26:37,088 --> 00:26:40,892 The latches that are supposed to hold the cargo door closed 434 00:26:40,892 --> 00:26:44,162 aren't locked. 435 00:26:44,162 --> 00:26:46,898 What you're going to now discover 436 00:26:46,898 --> 00:26:49,300 is why wasn't that door fixed? 437 00:26:49,300 --> 00:26:52,337 So I don't think it's connected-- 438 00:26:52,337 --> 00:26:55,640 NARRATOR: In the wake of the 1972 Windsor incident, 439 00:26:55,640 --> 00:26:59,144 the NTSB had made very specific recommendations to the Federal 440 00:26:59,144 --> 00:27:02,781 Aviation Administration. 441 00:27:02,781 --> 00:27:04,015 Engage the lever. 442 00:27:04,015 --> 00:27:07,285 NARRATOR: Most importantly, they suggested that a change be 443 00:27:07,285 --> 00:27:09,020 made to the locking mechanism. 444 00:27:14,759 --> 00:27:19,197 But in the two years since that accident, 445 00:27:19,197 --> 00:27:20,832 none of those recommendations had 446 00:27:20,832 --> 00:27:23,868 been implemented by McDonnell Douglas, the company 447 00:27:23,868 --> 00:27:25,170 who manufactures the DC-10. 448 00:27:29,874 --> 00:27:34,045 In fact, the FAA never issued an airworthiness directive, 449 00:27:34,045 --> 00:27:38,016 a legal requirement that would ensure fixes were made. 450 00:27:38,016 --> 00:27:44,455 It's the job of the NTSB to discover what's happened, 451 00:27:44,455 --> 00:27:47,125 and to come up with recommendations as how 452 00:27:47,125 --> 00:27:48,760 to prevent it happening again. 453 00:27:48,760 --> 00:27:53,998 But it has absolutely no authority to implement them. 454 00:27:53,998 --> 00:27:56,034 NARRATOR: Investigators learned that McDonnell 455 00:27:56,034 --> 00:27:59,170 Douglas had made some minor changes to the cargo doors. 456 00:28:01,973 --> 00:28:04,709 A peephole was cut in the bottom of the door, 457 00:28:04,709 --> 00:28:09,080 so baggage handlers could see if the locking pins had engaged. 458 00:28:09,080 --> 00:28:14,018 Several warning signs were also attached to the plane's door. 459 00:28:14,018 --> 00:28:17,388 But sadly, those fixes just created their own problems. 460 00:28:21,793 --> 00:28:24,195 NARRATOR: Many baggage handlers didn't know what the small hole 461 00:28:24,195 --> 00:28:27,131 in the door was for. 462 00:28:27,131 --> 00:28:30,435 The baggage handler in Paris read and spoke three languages 463 00:28:30,435 --> 00:28:33,938 but not English, the only language in which 464 00:28:33,938 --> 00:28:35,273 the warning signs were written. 465 00:28:38,076 --> 00:28:42,413 But in the eyes of Chuck Miller, these were band-aid solutions. 466 00:28:42,413 --> 00:28:45,283 The fundamental flawed design of the locks 467 00:28:45,283 --> 00:28:48,186 remained the same, allowing history to repeat 468 00:28:48,186 --> 00:28:50,121 itself just two years later. 469 00:28:50,121 --> 00:28:53,925 There is no question that if an airworthiness directive had 470 00:28:53,925 --> 00:28:56,527 been issued, as it should have been after Windsor, 471 00:28:56,527 --> 00:28:58,863 Paris would not have happened. 472 00:28:58,863 --> 00:29:01,366 It was an entirely avoidable accident. 473 00:29:05,970 --> 00:29:09,374 NARRATOR: After the Paris crash, foolproof changes were finally 474 00:29:09,374 --> 00:29:12,810 made to the DC-10's cargo door. 475 00:29:12,810 --> 00:29:15,146 Well, in aviation, it's called tombstone technology. 476 00:29:15,146 --> 00:29:19,017 In other words, we always have the balance of money. 477 00:29:19,017 --> 00:29:21,786 And unfortunately, we have had to wait until we had 478 00:29:21,786 --> 00:29:24,022 enough people die in an accident to say, you know, 479 00:29:24,022 --> 00:29:26,391 we really are going to have to spend the money over here. 480 00:29:34,866 --> 00:29:36,534 NARRATOR: Atlantic Southeast Airlines Flight 481 00:29:36,534 --> 00:29:41,506 2311 cruises at 15,000 feet. 482 00:29:41,506 --> 00:29:43,908 This is Captain Friedline on the flight deck. 483 00:29:43,908 --> 00:29:45,343 We've got a bit of weather ahead of us, 484 00:29:45,343 --> 00:29:46,411 but we're going to go around it and give 485 00:29:46,411 --> 00:29:47,779 you a pretty smooth ride. 486 00:29:50,949 --> 00:29:52,383 NARRATOR: At the controls of the Embraer 487 00:29:52,383 --> 00:29:55,186 120 is Captain Mark Friedline. 488 00:29:55,186 --> 00:30:01,492 He's an experienced pilot with almost 12,000 flight hours. 489 00:30:01,492 --> 00:30:03,561 First Officer Hank Johnston has been 490 00:30:03,561 --> 00:30:05,496 flying with Atlantic Southeast Airlines 491 00:30:05,496 --> 00:30:06,564 for nearly three years. 492 00:30:10,868 --> 00:30:13,037 This was a normal day in the life of the crew. 493 00:30:16,007 --> 00:30:18,576 doubt they were expecting any difficulties with the flight. 494 00:30:18,576 --> 00:30:21,546 Let's go 20 degrees to the right. 495 00:30:25,450 --> 00:30:27,552 NARRATOR: Today's flight is a short commuter route 496 00:30:27,552 --> 00:30:30,054 from Atlanta, Georgia to the city of Brunswick 497 00:30:30,054 --> 00:30:30,888 on the Atlantic coast. 498 00:30:33,591 --> 00:30:35,893 There are 20 passengers on today's flight. 499 00:30:40,198 --> 00:30:43,267 The runway's in sight. 500 00:30:43,267 --> 00:30:47,071 NARRATOR: The crew is just five minutes from touching down. 501 00:30:47,071 --> 00:30:49,240 TOWER: ASA 2311. 502 00:30:49,240 --> 00:30:51,142 Cleared direct to Jeff one. 503 00:30:51,142 --> 00:30:53,177 Winco, report the airport sight. 504 00:30:53,177 --> 00:30:55,213 Expect a visual. 505 00:30:55,213 --> 00:30:56,180 We do have it in sight. 506 00:30:56,180 --> 00:30:58,249 2311. 507 00:30:58,249 --> 00:31:02,053 Slowing for approach speed. 508 00:31:02,053 --> 00:31:03,554 The aircraft was normal. 509 00:31:03,554 --> 00:31:05,390 There was nothing unexpected. 510 00:31:09,093 --> 00:31:13,131 NARRATOR: Then the captain notices an unusual sound. 511 00:31:13,131 --> 00:31:14,599 It's weird. 512 00:31:14,599 --> 00:31:18,069 Number one seems to be spinning faster. 513 00:31:18,069 --> 00:31:22,440 The left is-- the left is pulling a bit more. 514 00:31:22,440 --> 00:31:25,376 Bringing power down to the left. 515 00:31:25,376 --> 00:31:27,145 NARRATOR: Captain Friedline tries 516 00:31:27,145 --> 00:31:29,914 to compensate for the plane's unexplained pull to the left. 517 00:31:34,118 --> 00:31:38,089 Flight 2311 is less than 1,000 feet from the ground, 518 00:31:38,089 --> 00:31:41,292 and the plane is getting more and more difficult to control. 519 00:31:41,292 --> 00:31:43,061 What's going on? 520 00:31:43,061 --> 00:31:45,363 Do you see anything? 521 00:31:45,363 --> 00:31:46,998 There's nothing. 522 00:31:46,998 --> 00:31:48,132 The crew were apparently caught completely 523 00:31:48,132 --> 00:31:49,934 by surprise by something. 524 00:31:49,934 --> 00:31:51,202 What's going on with this thing? 525 00:31:51,202 --> 00:31:52,270 I can't hold it. 526 00:31:52,270 --> 00:31:53,171 Get out of it! 527 00:31:53,171 --> 00:31:54,105 I can't. 528 00:31:54,105 --> 00:31:54,972 Come on! 529 00:31:58,709 --> 00:32:01,212 NARRATOR: The plane is dropping out of the sky, 530 00:32:01,212 --> 00:32:02,914 and the crew doesn't know why. 531 00:32:14,025 --> 00:32:14,859 Come on. 532 00:32:14,859 --> 00:32:16,461 No, no! 533 00:32:16,461 --> 00:32:20,031 NARRATOR: --fights desperately to save his plane. 534 00:32:20,031 --> 00:32:22,433 It's no use. 535 00:32:22,433 --> 00:32:23,801 [crash] 536 00:32:29,907 --> 00:32:32,443 All 20 passengers and three crew members 537 00:32:32,443 --> 00:32:34,145 are killed at the moment of impact. 538 00:32:42,220 --> 00:32:44,088 Wreckage is still smoldering when 539 00:32:44,088 --> 00:32:48,960 NTSB investigator Jim Ritter arrives at the crash site. 540 00:32:48,960 --> 00:32:52,163 OK, let's start here and work backwards to first impact. 541 00:32:52,163 --> 00:32:54,899 I want a record of everything. 542 00:32:54,899 --> 00:32:56,467 You need to look at the crash site 543 00:32:56,467 --> 00:32:58,136 to collect the physical evidence. 544 00:32:58,136 --> 00:33:03,407 That's the most important aspect of any aircraft investigation. 545 00:33:06,277 --> 00:33:09,514 NARRATOR: At the same time, witnesses tell investigators 546 00:33:09,514 --> 00:33:11,449 they saw the plane roll hard to the left 547 00:33:11,449 --> 00:33:14,819 before it hit the ground. 548 00:33:14,819 --> 00:33:16,154 And it come right over top of the house, 549 00:33:16,154 --> 00:33:18,089 and it got real loud. 550 00:33:18,089 --> 00:33:20,191 It was coming right over these trees here, 551 00:33:20,191 --> 00:33:24,529 and then it got extra loud. 552 00:33:24,529 --> 00:33:27,899 We knew that it was some kind of very abrupt failure 553 00:33:27,899 --> 00:33:30,301 that would have been difficult for the flight crew 554 00:33:30,301 --> 00:33:31,536 to overcome. 555 00:33:37,875 --> 00:33:42,113 What could make it roll so far over? 556 00:33:42,113 --> 00:33:44,448 NARRATOR: As investigators scour the wreckage, searching 557 00:33:44,448 --> 00:33:48,886 for clues, Ritter knows they'll be 558 00:33:48,886 --> 00:33:52,990 working without any onboard flight recorders. 559 00:33:52,990 --> 00:33:56,627 In 1991, commuter planes aren't required to carry them. 560 00:33:56,627 --> 00:33:59,463 Without the black boxes, it's basically 561 00:33:59,463 --> 00:34:00,965 a process of elimination. 562 00:34:00,965 --> 00:34:03,501 We analyze all of the physical evidence 563 00:34:03,501 --> 00:34:06,070 and come up with the most compelling scenario 564 00:34:06,070 --> 00:34:09,006 that matches that evidence. 565 00:34:09,006 --> 00:34:11,008 NARRATOR: So far, the investigators' best 566 00:34:11,008 --> 00:34:13,578 clue is the steep left roll before impact. 567 00:34:16,414 --> 00:34:17,949 When the airplane rolled to the left, 568 00:34:17,949 --> 00:34:21,419 it could really only be due to two things. 569 00:34:21,419 --> 00:34:23,421 Perhaps the pilot wanted to roll to the left, 570 00:34:23,421 --> 00:34:27,858 or there was a malfunction that the pilots couldn't counteract. 571 00:34:30,995 --> 00:34:33,497 NARRATOR: But when investigators study the engines, 572 00:34:33,497 --> 00:34:35,433 they find that they were operating normally 573 00:34:35,433 --> 00:34:36,534 at the moment of impact. 574 00:34:45,109 --> 00:34:47,678 Ritter turns his attention to the other main part of 575 00:34:47,678 --> 00:34:50,615 the plane's propulsion system. 576 00:34:50,615 --> 00:34:51,782 Let's take a look at these propellers. 577 00:34:51,782 --> 00:34:54,118 When we started doing testing to the propeller system, 578 00:34:54,118 --> 00:34:56,120 we didn't knew where it was going to lead us, 579 00:34:56,120 --> 00:35:01,025 but it was something we had to eliminate if nothing else. 580 00:35:01,025 --> 00:35:03,461 NARRATOR: Deep inside the propeller unit, 581 00:35:03,461 --> 00:35:07,064 investigators uncover an important clue. 582 00:35:07,064 --> 00:35:09,133 Ah-hah. 583 00:35:09,133 --> 00:35:11,402 There you are. 584 00:35:11,402 --> 00:35:12,203 We have a witness mark. 585 00:35:12,203 --> 00:35:14,171 Take a look. 586 00:35:14,171 --> 00:35:16,107 NARRATOR: There's a small mark where the base of the propeller 587 00:35:16,107 --> 00:35:18,442 slammed into its housing during the crash. 588 00:35:22,647 --> 00:35:24,615 It might be enough to tell investigators 589 00:35:24,615 --> 00:35:26,417 how the propellers were operating 590 00:35:26,417 --> 00:35:29,053 at the moment of impact. 591 00:35:29,053 --> 00:35:32,456 You can literally match up the scratch marks 592 00:35:32,456 --> 00:35:34,959 between both pieces, and you'll know 593 00:35:34,959 --> 00:35:36,627 what the angle of the propeller blade 594 00:35:36,627 --> 00:35:39,330 was from that measurement. 595 00:35:39,330 --> 00:35:44,335 It marked this one 22 degrees. 596 00:35:47,071 --> 00:35:49,273 NARRATOR: The Embraer 120 is what's called 597 00:35:49,273 --> 00:35:52,643 a constant speed propeller. 598 00:35:52,643 --> 00:35:56,580 The blades spin at a steady rate in flight. 599 00:35:56,580 --> 00:35:59,350 When the pilots need more power, the blades 600 00:35:59,350 --> 00:36:01,352 twist, changing their angle to take 601 00:36:01,352 --> 00:36:03,988 a bigger bite out of the air and provide more thrust. 602 00:36:06,624 --> 00:36:10,194 Slow in for approach speed. 603 00:36:10,194 --> 00:36:13,431 And in flight, it acts like the automatic transmission 604 00:36:13,431 --> 00:36:15,366 in a car. 605 00:36:15,366 --> 00:36:19,303 It's as if it's changing gears to match the engine load. 606 00:36:19,303 --> 00:36:22,173 NARRATOR: The marks tell Ritter the exact angle of the blades 607 00:36:22,173 --> 00:36:24,542 when the plane slammed into the ground. 608 00:36:24,542 --> 00:36:26,210 We immediately noticed a difference 609 00:36:26,210 --> 00:36:29,213 between some of the blade angle measurements 610 00:36:29,213 --> 00:36:33,217 for the left engine versus the right engine. 611 00:36:33,217 --> 00:36:37,455 The blades were almost flat. 612 00:36:37,455 --> 00:36:39,056 NARRATOR: At 3 degrees, the blades 613 00:36:39,056 --> 00:36:41,292 are so flat they would act like a wall, 614 00:36:41,292 --> 00:36:44,562 blocking the flow of air the plane needs to maintain lift. 615 00:36:47,698 --> 00:36:50,034 It might have caused the pilots to lose control. 616 00:36:56,040 --> 00:36:57,775 Investigators study the mechanism used 617 00:36:57,775 --> 00:37:01,212 to control the left propeller. 618 00:37:01,212 --> 00:37:04,248 Will you look at this? 619 00:37:04,248 --> 00:37:07,084 It's completely worn down. 620 00:37:07,084 --> 00:37:09,153 NARRATOR: The teeth on a key gear mechanism, 621 00:37:09,153 --> 00:37:12,423 known as the quill, are almost entirely worn away. 622 00:37:17,094 --> 00:37:18,662 This is what it's supposed to look like. 623 00:37:22,767 --> 00:37:24,368 NARRATOR: With its teeth worn away, 624 00:37:24,368 --> 00:37:27,204 the quill can't effectively lock onto the gear 625 00:37:27,204 --> 00:37:29,807 system that controls the angle of the propeller blades. 626 00:37:34,779 --> 00:37:37,081 That really was a eureka moment for us, 627 00:37:37,081 --> 00:37:40,284 because now we had a serious malfunction 628 00:37:40,284 --> 00:37:42,720 that we could examine. 629 00:37:46,624 --> 00:37:48,426 NARRATOR: Investigators study the design 630 00:37:48,426 --> 00:37:49,794 of the propeller mechanism. 631 00:37:55,166 --> 00:37:57,468 They learn that shortly before the accident, 632 00:37:57,468 --> 00:38:00,771 the propeller manufacturer started using a harder, more 633 00:38:00,771 --> 00:38:04,141 abrasive coating on a key part known 634 00:38:04,141 --> 00:38:09,713 as the transfer tube, which meshes with the quill teeth. 635 00:38:09,713 --> 00:38:12,716 It turned into a giant file. 636 00:38:12,716 --> 00:38:15,286 So the spines on the transfer tube 637 00:38:15,286 --> 00:38:17,788 were much harder and rougher than the quill teeth. 638 00:38:17,788 --> 00:38:19,557 And it was almost like sandpaper, 639 00:38:19,557 --> 00:38:23,160 so the tube was actually wearing down the teeth on the quill. 640 00:38:27,832 --> 00:38:29,767 NARRATOR: Investigators now understand why 641 00:38:29,767 --> 00:38:31,635 the quill teeth were worn down. 642 00:38:34,305 --> 00:38:37,241 Without functional quill teeth, the propeller blades 643 00:38:37,241 --> 00:38:40,678 could slip into a dangerously flat position. 644 00:38:40,678 --> 00:38:42,813 To prove their new theory, investigators 645 00:38:42,813 --> 00:38:45,182 need to take a huge risk-- 646 00:38:45,182 --> 00:38:47,785 We've got to see what happens in the air. 647 00:38:47,785 --> 00:38:49,653 NARRATOR: --and test the damaged propeller system 648 00:38:49,653 --> 00:38:52,857 under full flight conditions. 649 00:38:52,857 --> 00:38:54,892 I said, well, the only way to really know 650 00:38:54,892 --> 00:38:57,194 is let's do a flight test and find out. 651 00:38:57,194 --> 00:38:59,763 Because we are at a point in the investigation, 652 00:38:59,763 --> 00:39:03,567 we need to start eliminating things. 653 00:39:03,567 --> 00:39:06,704 NARRATOR: The investigation into the crash of Flight 2311 654 00:39:06,704 --> 00:39:09,206 moves to Embraer headquarters in Brazil. 655 00:39:12,243 --> 00:39:15,212 Investigator Tom Haueter meets with the representatives 656 00:39:15,212 --> 00:39:18,616 from Embraer and the propeller manufacturer. 657 00:39:18,616 --> 00:39:20,584 Thank you for doing this. 658 00:39:20,584 --> 00:39:24,188 NARRATOR: Embraer's chief test pilot, Gilberto Schittini will 659 00:39:24,188 --> 00:39:27,725 fly an Embraer 120 that has been modified to recreate 660 00:39:27,725 --> 00:39:30,794 the failure of Flight 2311. 661 00:39:30,794 --> 00:39:32,963 So we've modified the quill. 662 00:39:32,963 --> 00:39:37,268 The teeth have been worn down just like Flight 2311. 663 00:39:37,268 --> 00:39:41,972 NARRATOR: A worn quill is placed inside the propeller unit. 664 00:39:41,972 --> 00:39:44,575 This was potentially very high risk. 665 00:39:44,575 --> 00:39:47,678 Because once we disconnected the transfer tube in flight, 666 00:39:47,678 --> 00:39:51,382 the pilots would have no way to control the propeller. 667 00:39:51,382 --> 00:39:53,784 We put a pitch lock here. 668 00:39:53,784 --> 00:39:55,986 It won't go past 22 degrees. 669 00:39:55,986 --> 00:39:57,922 NARRATOR: A mechanical lock has also 670 00:39:57,922 --> 00:40:00,291 been added to stop the propeller from going 671 00:40:00,291 --> 00:40:05,362 flatter than 22 degrees, not 3 degrees as happened 672 00:40:05,362 --> 00:40:06,964 on Flight 2311. 673 00:40:06,964 --> 00:40:09,567 It would be too dangerous in a flight test 674 00:40:09,567 --> 00:40:12,770 to have the propeller blade go all the way to flat pitch. 675 00:40:12,770 --> 00:40:13,904 You'd lose control of the airplane. 676 00:40:13,904 --> 00:40:15,339 That was almost guaranteed. 677 00:40:23,447 --> 00:40:25,549 EMC 120, do you copy? 678 00:40:25,549 --> 00:40:27,918 What if this airplane crashes? 679 00:40:27,918 --> 00:40:30,454 What if we lose the airplane? 680 00:40:30,454 --> 00:40:33,357 I'm the one who's basically running this test. 681 00:40:33,357 --> 00:40:35,659 This could be all my responsibility. 682 00:40:35,659 --> 00:40:37,027 Copy. 683 00:40:37,027 --> 00:40:38,896 We are ready to disengage the prop. 684 00:40:46,437 --> 00:40:49,707 Propeller blade angle's causing no problems. 685 00:40:49,707 --> 00:40:50,941 No control issues. 686 00:41:06,890 --> 00:41:08,292 NARRATOR: Then the Brazilian test 687 00:41:08,292 --> 00:41:09,893 flight takes a dramatic turn. 688 00:41:12,796 --> 00:41:14,999 As the flight continues, the blades 689 00:41:14,999 --> 00:41:17,301 begin drifting toward the deadly flat position. 690 00:41:20,638 --> 00:41:23,674 Reducing speed. 691 00:41:23,674 --> 00:41:25,909 Easy does it. 692 00:41:29,079 --> 00:41:33,817 We started feeling a rolling moment to the left and even 693 00:41:33,817 --> 00:41:36,754 more movement to the left. 694 00:41:36,754 --> 00:41:39,356 NARRATOR: The blades go as flat as this test will allow. 695 00:41:42,960 --> 00:41:45,829 For Haueter, the risky test flight has paid off. 696 00:41:48,065 --> 00:41:50,701 The investigator's theory about the crash 697 00:41:50,701 --> 00:41:53,037 is back on solid ground. 698 00:41:53,037 --> 00:41:54,738 Seeing the data right then, it took a load off. 699 00:41:54,738 --> 00:41:56,106 Said, wow. 700 00:41:56,106 --> 00:41:58,642 I mean, we now know what happened. 701 00:41:58,642 --> 00:41:59,309 It was obvious. 702 00:42:02,513 --> 00:42:04,948 NARRATOR: Investigators finally understand the full story 703 00:42:04,948 --> 00:42:08,419 behind the crash of Flight 2311. 704 00:42:08,419 --> 00:42:11,422 When the flight crew began preparations for landing, 705 00:42:11,422 --> 00:42:15,559 the teeth on the quill were worn down but still operational. 706 00:42:15,559 --> 00:42:18,729 Slowing for approach speed. 707 00:42:18,729 --> 00:42:20,397 NARRATOR: Preparing for landing put 708 00:42:20,397 --> 00:42:23,100 renewed pressure on the already worn teeth in the quill. 709 00:42:27,571 --> 00:42:30,407 The teeth could no longer stay locked on the left propeller 710 00:42:30,407 --> 00:42:31,075 mechanism. 711 00:42:36,580 --> 00:42:39,683 And once the teeth gave way, the propeller blades 712 00:42:39,683 --> 00:42:44,054 were free to drift into a fatally flat position. 713 00:42:44,054 --> 00:42:45,155 What's going on with this thing? 714 00:42:45,155 --> 00:42:48,559 I can't hold it. 715 00:42:48,559 --> 00:42:50,494 The propeller's design couldn't hold the blades 716 00:42:50,494 --> 00:42:52,730 at a safe angle, and the plane became 717 00:42:52,730 --> 00:42:54,498 less and less controllable. 718 00:42:57,601 --> 00:43:00,738 Human error is almost always underneath the causes 719 00:43:00,738 --> 00:43:04,708 of an accident, even if it wasn't the pilot or a mechanic. 720 00:43:04,708 --> 00:43:07,611 In this particular case, an engineering change was made, 721 00:43:07,611 --> 00:43:11,749 which well-intentioned actually, did not work out. 722 00:43:11,749 --> 00:43:12,583 That's it. 723 00:43:12,583 --> 00:43:13,450 Oh, God. 724 00:43:15,052 --> 00:43:15,919 No! 725 00:43:20,724 --> 00:43:24,795 The worn quill teeth was a time bomb waiting to go off. 726 00:43:24,795 --> 00:43:27,631 NARRATOR: After the accident, additional safeguards 727 00:43:27,631 --> 00:43:32,569 are added to prevent this type of failure, a change that 728 00:43:32,569 --> 00:43:35,472 affects not only Embraer but several other turboprop 729 00:43:35,472 --> 00:43:36,406 aircraft. 730 00:43:40,043 --> 00:43:42,446 Airline manufacturers are constantly 731 00:43:42,446 --> 00:43:47,217 trying to stay ahead of potentially fatal design flaws. 732 00:43:47,217 --> 00:43:49,987 Air crash investigators are determined 733 00:43:49,987 --> 00:43:52,623 to make sure they do. 734 00:43:52,623 --> 00:43:55,159 What's important is getting to the truth. 735 00:43:55,159 --> 00:43:59,830 So if the truth is something that may hurt the company, 736 00:43:59,830 --> 00:44:01,165 let the chips fall where they may. 57812

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