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Damn it!
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NARRATOR: When a passenger
jet owned by Formula One
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superstar Niki Lauda
plummets to earth,
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he's driven to find out why.
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Where was the tail found?
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I was upset that
the airplane did
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something where a human
being couldn't react anymore.
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NARRATOR: When two DC-10s are
brought down within two years--
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What's happened?
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The captain flew out!
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NARRATOR: --investigators
unlock shocking discoveries.
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Design flaw
issues can typically
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affect the entire fleet.
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Are there other ones
that are about to happen?
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Get out of it!
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I can't.
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Come on.
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NARRATOR: And a doomed
commuter flight in Georgia
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comes down to a faulty design.
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My god.
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NARRATOR: Are three
horrific accidents
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all because of deadly defects?
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A design flaw that leads
to a loss of an aircraft,
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it draws the attention
of the entire world.
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Ladies and gentlemen, we
are starting our approach.
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We lost both engines.
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Keep the mask over your.
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Emergency.
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Mayday, mayday.
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Brace for impact!
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He's gonna crash!
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You need a little bit of
outer trim to the left, huh?
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What was that?
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You need a little bit
of outer trim to the left.
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NARRATOR: Ascending
to cruise altitude--
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OK.
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NARRATOR: --Captain Thomas Welch
and first officer Josef Thurner
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are flying a Boeing 767
from Bangkok, Thailand
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to Vienna, Austria.
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The flight is
operated by Lauda Air,
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the brainchild of famed Austrian
Formula One driver Niki Lauda.
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For me it was a logical
step after retiring
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from racing to start in
this kind of business.
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And that's what I
did with Lauda Air.
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NARRATOR: His new
airline is a small fleet
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of just four planes.
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One of the main reasons
was to give the passengers
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a different way of flying--
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better service, better food.
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The airplane had to
look in a certain way.
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NARRATOR: Lauda Air Flight 4
is less than 15 minutes into
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its 11-hour flight to Vienna.
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[non-english speech]
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NARRATOR: In the cockpit,
Captain Welch and First Officer
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Thurner monitor their
instruments while the autopilot
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controls the climb.
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[groaning]
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NARRATOR: Suddenly, the plane
begins dropping from the sky.
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[screaming]
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Yeah, wait a minute.
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NARRATOR: In an instant,
the pilots lose all control.
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Damn it!
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NARRATOR: And their jet
plunges toward the ground.
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In a matter of seconds, the jet
falls more than 20,000 feet.
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[screaming]
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The plane slams into a
remote jungle, 110 miles
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Northwest of Bangkok.
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I was at home, and I had
a phone call from the news.
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They said one of our
airplanes crashed.
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NARRATOR: When
rescuers arrive, it's
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00:04:00,974 --> 00:04:05,511
immediately obvious that
there's no one to be rescued.
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All 213 passengers and
10 crew members are dead.
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It's the first time a
Boeing 767 has ever crashed.
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The loss of a US-made
aircraft prompts
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quick action from the National
Transportation Safety Board,
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or NTSB.
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Bob Macintosh is assigned
to the investigation.
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A first crash of
an aircraft that
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was in service intercontinental
for almost a decade
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with a perfect service record--
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it was extremely important for
us to learn what had happened.
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NARRATOR: He finds the badly
burned wreckage strewn over
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a square mile of rough terrain.
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The major components,
the cockpit, the tail,
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00:05:01,000 --> 00:05:03,369
the main body,
they were scattered
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far enough apart
that certainly they
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had not come down together.
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NARRATOR: Macintosh
immediately knows the plane
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broke up during the flight.
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What he needs to uncover is why.
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Where was the tail found?
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NARRATOR: Airline owner Niki
Lauda arrives in Thailand
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to help find the answer.
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NIKI LAUDA
(VOICEOVER): The scene
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for me, this was the
most horrific pictures
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I've ever seen.
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00:05:41,074 --> 00:05:42,875
NARRATOR: Surrounded by
the scattered remains
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of an airliner that
carries his name,
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Lauda is overwhelmed by the
magnitude of the disaster.
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00:05:50,583 --> 00:05:53,019
NIKI LAUDA (VOICEOVER): When
you have 223 people killed,
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the families all
want to know why.
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And I think this is
the worst for people,
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if they do not know why they
lost their husband, children
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whatsoever.
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00:06:04,897 --> 00:06:07,600
NARRATOR: The black boxes may
have captured important clues
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about the cause of
the in-flight breakup,
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but they're badly burned.
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They're sent to NTSB
technicians in Washington.
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Then, days after the crash--
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Well, would you look at that.
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NARRATOR: --more
pieces of the plane
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are found, including
one of the engines.
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And investigators are
amazed by what they see.
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The thrust reverser on
Flight 4's left engine
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is fully deployed.
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Once we actually saw that the
thrust reverser had deployed,
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for me, it was shocking.
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NARRATOR: Thrust reversers
are only used on landing.
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Once activated, they
direct air flow forward,
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00:07:05,191 --> 00:07:08,928
helping the 767 come to a stop.
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00:07:08,928 --> 00:07:10,463
They should never be
deployed in the air.
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00:07:13,633 --> 00:07:16,736
And even if it does
happen, a deployed reverser
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00:07:16,736 --> 00:07:17,937
shouldn't cause a crash.
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00:07:21,507 --> 00:07:24,610
This discovery is the
biggest break so far,
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00:07:24,610 --> 00:07:28,648
and investigators need to know
was a deployed thrust reverser
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00:07:28,648 --> 00:07:29,916
responsible for the crash?
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00:07:37,757 --> 00:07:40,693
But the team will have to solve
the mystery without their most
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valuable tool.
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The flight data
recorder is so badly
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burned that technicians at the
NTSB can't recover any data.
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Thankfully, the cockpit
voice recorder has survived.
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Ready to go?
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NARRATOR: Investigators
and Niki Lauda
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listen to the last moments
of Lauda Air Flight 4.
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00:08:04,884 --> 00:08:06,552
[radio chatter]
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00:08:06,552 --> 00:08:08,588
Check.
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00:08:08,588 --> 00:08:11,791
NARRATOR: 5 and 1/2 minutes
into the 15-minute long flight,
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00:08:11,791 --> 00:08:14,126
everything is normal.
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00:08:14,126 --> 00:08:17,797
Then the first sign of trouble.
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00:08:17,797 --> 00:08:21,734
[non-english] That keeps--
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it's come on.
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What's come on?
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00:08:26,072 --> 00:08:27,907
Some kind of warning.
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00:08:27,907 --> 00:08:29,542
NARRATOR: They
discover Lauda pilots
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discuss a mysterious
cockpit warning
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moments before the crash.
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It's a warning that relates
to a hydraulic valve in the
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00:08:37,750 --> 00:08:41,053
left engine's thrust reverser.
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00:08:41,053 --> 00:08:43,155
The hydraulic isolation
valve controls
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00:08:43,155 --> 00:08:47,026
the flow of hydraulic
fluid to the reversers.
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00:08:47,026 --> 00:08:48,861
Opening the valve
allows the reverser
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to be stowed or deployed.
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00:08:51,197 --> 00:08:54,901
When it's closed, the
reversers won't budge.
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00:08:54,901 --> 00:08:55,902
OK.
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00:08:55,902 --> 00:08:57,803
Yeah.
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00:08:57,803 --> 00:09:01,641
NARRATOR: The crew doesn't
sound worried about the warning.
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00:09:01,641 --> 00:09:04,277
No, it's probably
moisture or something.
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00:09:07,179 --> 00:09:10,950
NARRATOR: For five
minutes, nothing happens.
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00:09:10,950 --> 00:09:12,151
Then--
- What?
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00:09:12,151 --> 00:09:13,252
Reversers deployed!
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00:09:19,625 --> 00:09:20,760
Wait a minute.
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NARRATOR: --just 22 seconds
later, there's the sound
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of the plane ripping to pieces.
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The whole thing was so
difficult. You never forget.
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NARRATOR: More motivated
than ever, Lauda sets out
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00:09:42,782 --> 00:09:45,284
to prove a controversial
theory explaining
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why his plane went down.
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NIKI LAUDA (VOICEOVER): I was
after Boeing day and night
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so that the people understand
that we're working on it,
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that we hopefully find
the cause and make sure it
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00:09:57,396 --> 00:09:58,998
will never ever happen again.
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00:09:58,998 --> 00:10:01,634
Because this is the answers
these families needed.
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headquarters in
Seattle to investigate
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the 767's thrust reversers.
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NIKI LAUDA: It's my name,
my airplane, my crash.
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And Boeing understood my
problem, or their problem.
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And we kept on working together.
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NARRATOR: Before the 767
first went into service,
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Boeing ran certification tests
to prove that pilots could
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00:10:28,962 --> 00:10:31,431
keep flying safely in the
event of a mid-air reverser
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00:10:31,431 --> 00:10:32,332
deployment.
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The tests proved that
the 767 was capable
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00:10:41,708 --> 00:10:44,844
of continued safe
flight and landing,
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regardless of the position
of the thrust reverser.
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The widespread feeling
of what would happen
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if a reverser deployed in
flight was that the airplane
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would be controllable.
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00:11:02,696 --> 00:11:05,165
NARRATOR: But despite
Boeing's certification tests,
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Lauda believes the
reverser is to blame.
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00:11:07,333 --> 00:11:09,169
I think we need
to use a simulator.
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I know what it says, but that's
not what happened in Thailand.
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NARRATOR: And he's determined to
figure out why a failure that's
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not supposed to be dangerous
killed 223 people flying
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00:11:18,978 --> 00:11:20,046
on his airline.
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00:11:20,046 --> 00:11:21,081
It's my airplane.
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It's my crash.
197
00:11:23,750 --> 00:11:24,417
OK.
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00:11:24,417 --> 00:11:26,419
Let's try it in a simulator.
199
00:11:26,419 --> 00:11:28,922
NARRATOR: Niki Lauda works
with Boeing investigators
200
00:11:28,922 --> 00:11:31,758
to recreate the flight.
201
00:11:31,758 --> 00:11:34,027
OK, let's begin.
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NARRATOR: He sets the flight's
altitude to 24,000 feet, more
203
00:11:38,164 --> 00:11:41,301
than double the 10,000 feet that
Boeing used for their thrust
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00:11:41,301 --> 00:11:43,937
reverser certification.
205
00:11:43,937 --> 00:11:47,207
Could the altitude difference
explain what happened?
206
00:11:49,943 --> 00:11:53,246
It was incredible because the
airplane just turned around,
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00:11:53,246 --> 00:11:54,447
and you couldn't do anything.
208
00:11:57,917 --> 00:12:00,420
NARRATOR: Lauda now knows
definitively why his plane
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00:12:00,420 --> 00:12:04,424
dropped so unexpectedly.
210
00:12:04,424 --> 00:12:06,526
When the thrust
reverser deployed,
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00:12:06,526 --> 00:12:08,895
the smooth flow of
air over the wing
212
00:12:08,895 --> 00:12:11,731
was disrupted, dramatically
decreasing lift.
213
00:12:15,068 --> 00:12:16,503
Reversers deployed!
214
00:12:16,503 --> 00:12:18,138
NARRATOR: This
forced the jet into
215
00:12:18,138 --> 00:12:21,141
a sudden, terrifying nosedive.
216
00:12:21,141 --> 00:12:22,375
It was just too late.
217
00:12:22,375 --> 00:12:24,444
The aircraft was
going to assume a very
218
00:12:24,444 --> 00:12:28,481
nose-low, high-speed attitude.
219
00:12:28,481 --> 00:12:31,451
NARRATOR: Incredibly, Niki
Lauda has proven Boeing's
220
00:12:31,451 --> 00:12:35,789
certification test was lacking.
221
00:12:35,789 --> 00:12:40,126
He's shown that above 20,000
feet, where planes fly faster,
222
00:12:40,126 --> 00:12:45,565
the accidental deployment of a
thrust reversers can be fatal.
223
00:12:45,565 --> 00:12:47,967
It was evident to
the Boeing Company
224
00:12:47,967 --> 00:12:51,938
and to the FAA
certification authorities
225
00:12:51,938 --> 00:12:55,875
and to the operators of
Boeing 767s around the world
226
00:12:55,875 --> 00:12:59,045
that this was going to
be a major, major issue.
227
00:12:59,045 --> 00:13:02,282
The reverser deployed, and
those guys couldn't recover.
228
00:13:06,920 --> 00:13:08,488
Let's figure out
why that happened.
229
00:13:12,458 --> 00:13:15,495
NARRATOR: Now the 767's
thrust reversers undergo
230
00:13:15,495 --> 00:13:18,932
intensive study at Boeing.
231
00:13:18,932 --> 00:13:21,601
Engineers can imagine
only one scenario
232
00:13:21,601 --> 00:13:26,940
that might make a reverse or
deploy unexpectedly in mid-air.
233
00:13:26,940 --> 00:13:29,075
The theory calls
for the activation
234
00:13:29,075 --> 00:13:32,212
of the two valves in the
reverser's failsafe system
235
00:13:32,212 --> 00:13:35,081
at the same time.
236
00:13:35,081 --> 00:13:38,051
The first valve is the
isolation valve that controls
237
00:13:38,051 --> 00:13:40,253
the flow of hydraulic fluid.
238
00:13:40,253 --> 00:13:43,556
When the second valve, called
the directional control valve,
239
00:13:43,556 --> 00:13:46,359
is activated, fluid
freely moves the reverser
240
00:13:46,359 --> 00:13:49,529
from stowed to deployed.
241
00:13:49,529 --> 00:13:53,099
You have to have both
the isolation valve open
242
00:13:53,099 --> 00:13:57,136
and the directional control
valve at the engine open
243
00:13:57,136 --> 00:13:58,905
to the deployed position.
244
00:14:09,649 --> 00:14:11,885
NARRATOR: After
extensive testing,
245
00:14:11,885 --> 00:14:15,989
engineers finally make
a major breakthrough.
246
00:14:15,989 --> 00:14:18,558
They're able to trigger the
double failure needed to
247
00:14:18,558 --> 00:14:20,894
accidentally deploy a reverser.
248
00:14:24,564 --> 00:14:28,201
We could get that
system to activate
249
00:14:28,201 --> 00:14:34,040
by introducing a short, a
direct short in a system.
250
00:14:34,040 --> 00:14:36,376
NARRATOR: Investigators
consult with Boeing engineers
251
00:14:36,376 --> 00:14:40,113
on the 767's infrastructure.
252
00:14:40,113 --> 00:14:42,582
They discover that the
wires for both valves
253
00:14:42,582 --> 00:14:45,919
were bundled in
the same harness.
254
00:14:45,919 --> 00:14:48,621
A fault across several
wires in the same harness
255
00:14:48,621 --> 00:14:53,259
could have triggered
simultaneous short circuits.
256
00:14:53,259 --> 00:15:00,300
Two shorts in two valves
at exactly the same time?
257
00:15:00,300 --> 00:15:02,368
What are the odds?
258
00:15:02,368 --> 00:15:06,239
I was upset that
the airplane did
259
00:15:06,239 --> 00:15:10,944
something where a human
being couldn't react anymore.
260
00:15:10,944 --> 00:15:12,545
NARRATOR: Investigators
have revealed
261
00:15:12,545 --> 00:15:16,082
a serious design flaw that
allows thrust reversers
262
00:15:16,082 --> 00:15:17,917
to deploy accidentally.
263
00:15:21,154 --> 00:15:23,456
Pressure builds for a
full review of the thrust
264
00:15:23,456 --> 00:15:27,427
reverser system on all 767s.
265
00:15:27,427 --> 00:15:30,663
There were other airlines
that joined in the questioning
266
00:15:30,663 --> 00:15:33,733
of how could this
possibly affect
267
00:15:33,733 --> 00:15:35,702
the flight path to the point
where you lose control?
268
00:15:38,604 --> 00:15:42,442
NARRATOR: As a result of
the Lauda investigation,
269
00:15:42,442 --> 00:15:45,044
a series of mechanical
locks now ensure
270
00:15:45,044 --> 00:15:48,448
that even if both valves
get energized in flight,
271
00:15:48,448 --> 00:15:50,350
the reversers can't deploy.
272
00:15:54,287 --> 00:15:57,490
For Niki Lauda, the outcome
of this investigation
273
00:15:57,490 --> 00:16:00,126
is total vindication.
274
00:16:00,126 --> 00:16:02,462
For me, the worst thing
in life is gray areas.
275
00:16:02,462 --> 00:16:03,997
I hate gray areas.
276
00:16:03,997 --> 00:16:06,766
And a lot of airplane
crashes been in the past
277
00:16:06,766 --> 00:16:10,670
where you really do not
know exactly what happened.
278
00:16:10,670 --> 00:16:13,373
And in this crash
here, thank God,
279
00:16:13,373 --> 00:16:15,041
it was clear what was the cause.
280
00:16:18,511 --> 00:16:22,015
And it was fixed for
all airplanes worldwide.
281
00:16:24,384 --> 00:16:26,219
NARRATOR: Even
when new airliners
282
00:16:26,219 --> 00:16:29,188
go through exhaustive testing
before they're put in service,
283
00:16:29,188 --> 00:16:34,193
a design flaw can occasionally
slip through the cracks.
284
00:16:34,193 --> 00:16:37,697
I think due to the
complexity of these aircraft,
285
00:16:37,697 --> 00:16:39,665
there are any
number of things can
286
00:16:39,665 --> 00:16:43,403
go wrong even under the
best set of circumstances.
287
00:16:46,239 --> 00:16:51,177
NARRATOR: 17 years earlier,
is a deadly design flaw--
288
00:16:51,177 --> 00:16:52,378
The captain blew out.
289
00:16:52,378 --> 00:16:55,548
NARRATOR: --responsible for
the worst air crash to date?
290
00:17:03,406 --> 00:17:07,177
Turkish Airlines Flight 981
is boarding at Orly airport
291
00:17:07,177 --> 00:17:08,044
in Paris.
292
00:17:11,114 --> 00:17:14,217
Normally, the last leg of this
trip from Turkey to England
293
00:17:14,217 --> 00:17:17,087
isn't very crowded.
294
00:17:17,087 --> 00:17:19,723
But today, the DC-10
is filling up fast.
295
00:17:23,593 --> 00:17:25,762
With all the new
passengers boarding,
296
00:17:25,762 --> 00:17:30,066
Captain Nejat Berkoz and
co-pilot Oral Ulusman
297
00:17:30,066 --> 00:17:31,501
are running a little
behind schedule.
298
00:17:35,138 --> 00:17:39,309
So is baggage Handler
Mohammed Mahmoudi,
299
00:17:39,309 --> 00:17:42,746
who's loading the luggage
of all 335 passengers.
300
00:17:49,586 --> 00:17:51,588
NARRATOR: Not
expecting anymore bags,
301
00:17:51,588 --> 00:17:53,590
Mahmoudi locks the
rear cargo door.
302
00:18:02,299 --> 00:18:03,833
The DC-10 is set to go.
303
00:18:11,708 --> 00:18:14,778
Just after 12:30
in the afternoon,
304
00:18:14,778 --> 00:18:17,814
Flight 981 lifts off into
the skies above Paris.
305
00:18:21,685 --> 00:18:23,153
TOWER: Tango Hotel Yankee.
306
00:18:23,153 --> 00:18:26,389
91, you are cleared
to flight level 230.
307
00:18:26,389 --> 00:18:29,226
91, roger.
308
00:18:29,226 --> 00:18:31,294
NARRATOR: As it flies
away from the airport,
309
00:18:31,294 --> 00:18:34,164
the DC-10 continues
to gain altitude.
310
00:18:40,604 --> 00:18:46,443
They're still climbing at 10,000
feet when disaster strikes.
311
00:18:46,443 --> 00:18:48,812
[screaming]
312
00:18:54,284 --> 00:18:57,587
The huge jet shudders
and begins to drop.
313
00:19:04,427 --> 00:19:06,463
What happened?
314
00:19:06,463 --> 00:19:09,499
The captain flew out.
315
00:19:09,499 --> 00:19:13,303
NARRATOR: As the nose pitches
down, the plane picks up speed,
316
00:19:13,303 --> 00:19:16,439
and the crew struggles to
save their plummeting jet.
317
00:19:16,439 --> 00:19:18,275
Bring it up!
318
00:19:18,275 --> 00:19:19,509
Up, up, up!
319
00:19:19,509 --> 00:19:20,577
I can't bring it up.
320
00:19:20,577 --> 00:19:21,711
She doesn't respond!
321
00:19:25,248 --> 00:19:27,517
NARRATOR: In the cabin,
two rows of seats
322
00:19:27,517 --> 00:19:28,785
have simply disappeared.
323
00:19:31,288 --> 00:19:34,257
Anything not bolted down
flies out of the plane
324
00:19:34,257 --> 00:19:36,293
through a gaping hole
in the cabin floor.
325
00:19:40,397 --> 00:19:42,666
It looks like we're
going to hit the ground!
326
00:19:42,666 --> 00:19:51,474
[non-english]
327
00:19:51,474 --> 00:19:52,876
[crash]
328
00:20:00,684 --> 00:20:04,187
NARRATOR: Turkish Airways Flight
981 disintegrates at impact.
329
00:20:06,823 --> 00:20:11,928
None of the 346 people
onboard survive.
330
00:20:11,928 --> 00:20:14,230
It becomes the worst
plane crash to date.
331
00:20:19,769 --> 00:20:21,604
Paul Eddy is a
journalist who covered
332
00:20:21,604 --> 00:20:22,939
the story as it unfolded.
333
00:20:26,443 --> 00:20:31,681
It was just a scene of
absolute, utter devastation.
334
00:20:31,681 --> 00:20:34,784
I still have
nightmares about this.
335
00:20:34,784 --> 00:20:37,787
NARRATOR: Investigators for the
French Accident Investigation
336
00:20:37,787 --> 00:20:40,457
Bureau are on the scene.
337
00:20:40,457 --> 00:20:47,964
My first job was to evaluate
the scope of the wreckage
338
00:20:47,964 --> 00:20:51,301
and begin the first
investigation on the spot.
339
00:20:54,504 --> 00:20:56,673
NARRATOR: Despite the
enormous force of the crash,
340
00:20:56,673 --> 00:21:00,276
the black boxes survive.
341
00:21:00,276 --> 00:21:02,812
Their contents could
provide valuable clues.
342
00:21:09,052 --> 00:21:11,321
The inquiry takes
a bizarre turn when
343
00:21:11,321 --> 00:21:13,022
investigators are
called to a field
344
00:21:13,022 --> 00:21:15,658
nine miles from the
main crash site.
345
00:21:19,462 --> 00:21:23,666
They find the rear cargo door
and two rows of seats that
346
00:21:23,666 --> 00:21:25,335
somehow fell from the DC-10.
347
00:21:28,838 --> 00:21:31,674
Since the accident
involves an American plane,
348
00:21:31,674 --> 00:21:34,644
Chuck Miller from the National
Transportation Safety Board
349
00:21:34,644 --> 00:21:38,381
joins the investigation.
350
00:21:38,381 --> 00:21:41,050
He was a very, very
professional man.
351
00:21:41,050 --> 00:21:43,753
Chuck didn't sit
back in the office.
352
00:21:43,753 --> 00:21:45,321
Chuck was always on the scene.
353
00:21:47,924 --> 00:21:51,961
NARRATOR: For him, the
scene is eerily familiar.
354
00:21:51,961 --> 00:21:53,830
For the second
time in two years,
355
00:21:53,830 --> 00:21:55,365
he's dealing with a DC-10.
356
00:22:02,105 --> 00:22:06,810
In June 1972, a plane's
cargo door and some cargo
357
00:22:06,810 --> 00:22:13,416
were found in a field 18 miles
from Windsor, Ontario, Canada.
358
00:22:13,416 --> 00:22:15,885
They had been ripped
from a brand new DC-10
359
00:22:15,885 --> 00:22:16,953
as it flew to Buffalo.
360
00:22:22,992 --> 00:22:25,462
But the Windsor incident
ended differently,
361
00:22:25,462 --> 00:22:28,398
as the pilots of American
Airlines Flight 96
362
00:22:28,398 --> 00:22:32,068
were able to land
their planes safely.
363
00:22:32,068 --> 00:22:34,404
When the flight crew
finally saw the damage,
364
00:22:34,404 --> 00:22:36,806
they were stunned by
a hole where the cargo
365
00:22:36,806 --> 00:22:38,875
door would normally be.
366
00:22:38,875 --> 00:22:42,111
The captain and I
walked back to the back,
367
00:22:42,111 --> 00:22:46,749
and we just looked
up and saw this hole.
368
00:22:46,749 --> 00:22:49,986
And it was just so weird.
369
00:22:49,986 --> 00:22:51,921
NARRATOR: It didn't
take investigators long
370
00:22:51,921 --> 00:22:54,891
to realize the very
design of the cargo door
371
00:22:54,891 --> 00:22:57,026
carried a latent fatal flaw.
372
00:22:57,026 --> 00:22:58,795
Take a picture of this here.
373
00:22:58,795 --> 00:23:00,797
These don't look like--
374
00:23:00,797 --> 00:23:04,434
NARRATOR: When it closes, hooks
in the DC-10's cargo door grab
375
00:23:04,434 --> 00:23:07,537
hold of a bar on the
plane's door frame.
376
00:23:07,537 --> 00:23:10,039
To make sure it's
locked, baggage handlers
377
00:23:10,039 --> 00:23:12,475
push down on a
lever which drives
378
00:23:12,475 --> 00:23:17,413
locking pins through the
hooks that hold them in place.
379
00:23:17,413 --> 00:23:19,482
Without this
heavy-duty mechanism,
380
00:23:19,482 --> 00:23:22,118
the extreme air pressure
thousands of feet in the air
381
00:23:22,118 --> 00:23:23,920
would rip the door
right off the plane.
382
00:23:27,991 --> 00:23:33,663
A 1972 discovery was terrifying.
383
00:23:33,663 --> 00:23:36,799
The NTSB realized it was
possible to close the lever
384
00:23:36,799 --> 00:23:40,069
on the outside of the door,
even if the hooks and locking
385
00:23:40,069 --> 00:23:43,907
pins were not in
the closed position.
386
00:23:43,907 --> 00:23:45,842
Engage the lever.
387
00:23:45,842 --> 00:23:48,611
NARRATOR: This meant baggage
handlers could believe the door
388
00:23:48,611 --> 00:23:50,413
was locked when it wasn't.
389
00:23:55,652 --> 00:24:00,156
In the Windsor incident,
there was an obvious flaw.
390
00:24:00,156 --> 00:24:03,026
And that's where the NTSB
said, let's make sure we
391
00:24:03,026 --> 00:24:04,627
change this system right now.
392
00:24:04,627 --> 00:24:07,697
Every DC-10 operator
needs to know this.
393
00:24:07,697 --> 00:24:10,533
I want everything checked,
all the bolts checked.
394
00:24:10,533 --> 00:24:13,670
NARRATOR: In 1972, Chuck
Miller's report strongly
395
00:24:13,670 --> 00:24:16,506
recommended changes to
the DC-10's cargo door
396
00:24:16,506 --> 00:24:19,008
locking mechanism be
made as soon as possible.
397
00:24:25,114 --> 00:24:27,784
Two years later,
as Miller inspects
398
00:24:27,784 --> 00:24:33,756
the Turkish Airlines crash
site, he's immediately troubled.
399
00:24:33,756 --> 00:24:37,093
If Miller's recommendations were
implemented after the Windsor
400
00:24:37,093 --> 00:24:40,830
incident, why has
another DC-10 cargo door
401
00:24:40,830 --> 00:24:42,932
been ripped from its plane?
402
00:24:42,932 --> 00:24:47,136
When he saw the door, saw
that the fix hadn't been made,
403
00:24:47,136 --> 00:24:51,841
and that's when I
think his anger became
404
00:24:51,841 --> 00:24:52,642
very, very strong indeed.
405
00:24:55,278 --> 00:24:58,615
NARRATOR: Miller
takes an unusual step.
406
00:24:58,615 --> 00:25:00,583
Although the official
investigation
407
00:25:00,583 --> 00:25:03,553
is just beginning, he
gives journalist Paul Eddy
408
00:25:03,553 --> 00:25:04,787
an important tip.
409
00:25:04,787 --> 00:25:07,724
I said have you got any ideas
what made the door come off?
410
00:25:07,724 --> 00:25:09,559
And he said, yeah.
411
00:25:09,559 --> 00:25:11,060
If I were you, I'd go
and look at a place
412
00:25:11,060 --> 00:25:12,161
called Windsor, Ontario.
413
00:25:20,612 --> 00:25:24,749
incidents within two years
with a DC-10 are connected--
414
00:25:24,749 --> 00:25:26,584
I'm Chuck Miller.
415
00:25:26,584 --> 00:25:29,721
NARRATOR: --NTSB investigator
Chuck Miller shares his theory
416
00:25:29,721 --> 00:25:32,924
with French investigators.
417
00:25:32,924 --> 00:25:43,101
These were taken on June 12,
1972, right after the incident.
418
00:25:43,101 --> 00:25:46,871
We asked for the report
on the Windsor accident.
419
00:25:46,871 --> 00:25:53,011
And our American colleagues
were also volunteers
420
00:25:53,011 --> 00:25:57,048
to give us a lot of details.
421
00:25:57,048 --> 00:25:58,783
NARRATOR: The French
team is astonished
422
00:25:58,783 --> 00:26:00,885
by what Miller shows them.
423
00:26:00,885 --> 00:26:04,656
Now we had an American
Airlines flight from Detroit
424
00:26:04,656 --> 00:26:07,625
to Buffalo have its
cargo door blow off.
425
00:26:12,097 --> 00:26:13,631
And he has been very frank.
426
00:26:13,631 --> 00:26:16,101
And I'll explain
what he was thinking
427
00:26:16,101 --> 00:26:17,569
of the Windsor accident.
428
00:26:19,904 --> 00:26:22,373
NARRATOR: With the
information from Chuck Miller,
429
00:26:22,373 --> 00:26:24,109
French investigators
take a closer
430
00:26:24,109 --> 00:26:25,710
look at the plane's cargo door.
431
00:26:28,813 --> 00:26:30,849
There is no new problem.
432
00:26:30,849 --> 00:26:37,088
It's just like the 1972 American
Airlines case all over again.
433
00:26:37,088 --> 00:26:40,892
The latches that are supposed
to hold the cargo door closed
434
00:26:40,892 --> 00:26:44,162
aren't locked.
435
00:26:44,162 --> 00:26:46,898
What you're going
to now discover
436
00:26:46,898 --> 00:26:49,300
is why wasn't that door fixed?
437
00:26:49,300 --> 00:26:52,337
So I don't think
it's connected--
438
00:26:52,337 --> 00:26:55,640
NARRATOR: In the wake of
the 1972 Windsor incident,
439
00:26:55,640 --> 00:26:59,144
the NTSB had made very specific
recommendations to the Federal
440
00:26:59,144 --> 00:27:02,781
Aviation Administration.
441
00:27:02,781 --> 00:27:04,015
Engage the lever.
442
00:27:04,015 --> 00:27:07,285
NARRATOR: Most importantly,
they suggested that a change be
443
00:27:07,285 --> 00:27:09,020
made to the locking mechanism.
444
00:27:14,759 --> 00:27:19,197
But in the two years
since that accident,
445
00:27:19,197 --> 00:27:20,832
none of those
recommendations had
446
00:27:20,832 --> 00:27:23,868
been implemented by McDonnell
Douglas, the company
447
00:27:23,868 --> 00:27:25,170
who manufactures the DC-10.
448
00:27:29,874 --> 00:27:34,045
In fact, the FAA never issued
an airworthiness directive,
449
00:27:34,045 --> 00:27:38,016
a legal requirement that
would ensure fixes were made.
450
00:27:38,016 --> 00:27:44,455
It's the job of the NTSB
to discover what's happened,
451
00:27:44,455 --> 00:27:47,125
and to come up with
recommendations as how
452
00:27:47,125 --> 00:27:48,760
to prevent it happening again.
453
00:27:48,760 --> 00:27:53,998
But it has absolutely no
authority to implement them.
454
00:27:53,998 --> 00:27:56,034
NARRATOR: Investigators
learned that McDonnell
455
00:27:56,034 --> 00:27:59,170
Douglas had made some minor
changes to the cargo doors.
456
00:28:01,973 --> 00:28:04,709
A peephole was cut in
the bottom of the door,
457
00:28:04,709 --> 00:28:09,080
so baggage handlers could see
if the locking pins had engaged.
458
00:28:09,080 --> 00:28:14,018
Several warning signs were also
attached to the plane's door.
459
00:28:14,018 --> 00:28:17,388
But sadly, those fixes just
created their own problems.
460
00:28:21,793 --> 00:28:24,195
NARRATOR: Many baggage handlers
didn't know what the small hole
461
00:28:24,195 --> 00:28:27,131
in the door was for.
462
00:28:27,131 --> 00:28:30,435
The baggage handler in Paris
read and spoke three languages
463
00:28:30,435 --> 00:28:33,938
but not English, the
only language in which
464
00:28:33,938 --> 00:28:35,273
the warning signs were written.
465
00:28:38,076 --> 00:28:42,413
But in the eyes of Chuck Miller,
these were band-aid solutions.
466
00:28:42,413 --> 00:28:45,283
The fundamental flawed
design of the locks
467
00:28:45,283 --> 00:28:48,186
remained the same,
allowing history to repeat
468
00:28:48,186 --> 00:28:50,121
itself just two years later.
469
00:28:50,121 --> 00:28:53,925
There is no question that if
an airworthiness directive had
470
00:28:53,925 --> 00:28:56,527
been issued, as it should
have been after Windsor,
471
00:28:56,527 --> 00:28:58,863
Paris would not have happened.
472
00:28:58,863 --> 00:29:01,366
It was an entirely
avoidable accident.
473
00:29:05,970 --> 00:29:09,374
NARRATOR: After the Paris crash,
foolproof changes were finally
474
00:29:09,374 --> 00:29:12,810
made to the DC-10's cargo door.
475
00:29:12,810 --> 00:29:15,146
Well, in aviation, it's
called tombstone technology.
476
00:29:15,146 --> 00:29:19,017
In other words, we always
have the balance of money.
477
00:29:19,017 --> 00:29:21,786
And unfortunately, we have
had to wait until we had
478
00:29:21,786 --> 00:29:24,022
enough people die in an
accident to say, you know,
479
00:29:24,022 --> 00:29:26,391
we really are going to have
to spend the money over here.
480
00:29:34,866 --> 00:29:36,534
NARRATOR: Atlantic
Southeast Airlines Flight
481
00:29:36,534 --> 00:29:41,506
2311 cruises at 15,000 feet.
482
00:29:41,506 --> 00:29:43,908
This is Captain Friedline
on the flight deck.
483
00:29:43,908 --> 00:29:45,343
We've got a bit of
weather ahead of us,
484
00:29:45,343 --> 00:29:46,411
but we're going to
go around it and give
485
00:29:46,411 --> 00:29:47,779
you a pretty smooth ride.
486
00:29:50,949 --> 00:29:52,383
NARRATOR: At the
controls of the Embraer
487
00:29:52,383 --> 00:29:55,186
120 is Captain Mark Friedline.
488
00:29:55,186 --> 00:30:01,492
He's an experienced pilot with
almost 12,000 flight hours.
489
00:30:01,492 --> 00:30:03,561
First Officer Hank
Johnston has been
490
00:30:03,561 --> 00:30:05,496
flying with Atlantic
Southeast Airlines
491
00:30:05,496 --> 00:30:06,564
for nearly three years.
492
00:30:10,868 --> 00:30:13,037
This was a normal day
in the life of the crew.
493
00:30:16,007 --> 00:30:18,576
doubt they were expecting any
difficulties with the flight.
494
00:30:18,576 --> 00:30:21,546
Let's go 20
degrees to the right.
495
00:30:25,450 --> 00:30:27,552
NARRATOR: Today's flight
is a short commuter route
496
00:30:27,552 --> 00:30:30,054
from Atlanta, Georgia
to the city of Brunswick
497
00:30:30,054 --> 00:30:30,888
on the Atlantic coast.
498
00:30:33,591 --> 00:30:35,893
There are 20 passengers
on today's flight.
499
00:30:40,198 --> 00:30:43,267
The runway's in sight.
500
00:30:43,267 --> 00:30:47,071
NARRATOR: The crew is just five
minutes from touching down.
501
00:30:47,071 --> 00:30:49,240
TOWER: ASA 2311.
502
00:30:49,240 --> 00:30:51,142
Cleared direct to Jeff one.
503
00:30:51,142 --> 00:30:53,177
Winco, report the airport sight.
504
00:30:53,177 --> 00:30:55,213
Expect a visual.
505
00:30:55,213 --> 00:30:56,180
We do have it in sight.
506
00:30:56,180 --> 00:30:58,249
2311.
507
00:30:58,249 --> 00:31:02,053
Slowing for approach speed.
508
00:31:02,053 --> 00:31:03,554
The aircraft was normal.
509
00:31:03,554 --> 00:31:05,390
There was nothing unexpected.
510
00:31:09,093 --> 00:31:13,131
NARRATOR: Then the captain
notices an unusual sound.
511
00:31:13,131 --> 00:31:14,599
It's weird.
512
00:31:14,599 --> 00:31:18,069
Number one seems to
be spinning faster.
513
00:31:18,069 --> 00:31:22,440
The left is-- the left
is pulling a bit more.
514
00:31:22,440 --> 00:31:25,376
Bringing power down to the left.
515
00:31:25,376 --> 00:31:27,145
NARRATOR: Captain
Friedline tries
516
00:31:27,145 --> 00:31:29,914
to compensate for the plane's
unexplained pull to the left.
517
00:31:34,118 --> 00:31:38,089
Flight 2311 is less than
1,000 feet from the ground,
518
00:31:38,089 --> 00:31:41,292
and the plane is getting more
and more difficult to control.
519
00:31:41,292 --> 00:31:43,061
What's going on?
520
00:31:43,061 --> 00:31:45,363
Do you see anything?
521
00:31:45,363 --> 00:31:46,998
There's nothing.
522
00:31:46,998 --> 00:31:48,132
The crew were apparently
caught completely
523
00:31:48,132 --> 00:31:49,934
by surprise by something.
524
00:31:49,934 --> 00:31:51,202
What's going on
with this thing?
525
00:31:51,202 --> 00:31:52,270
I can't hold it.
526
00:31:52,270 --> 00:31:53,171
Get out of it!
527
00:31:53,171 --> 00:31:54,105
I can't.
528
00:31:54,105 --> 00:31:54,972
Come on!
529
00:31:58,709 --> 00:32:01,212
NARRATOR: The plane is
dropping out of the sky,
530
00:32:01,212 --> 00:32:02,914
and the crew doesn't know why.
531
00:32:14,025 --> 00:32:14,859
Come on.
532
00:32:14,859 --> 00:32:16,461
No, no!
533
00:32:16,461 --> 00:32:20,031
NARRATOR: --fights
desperately to save his plane.
534
00:32:20,031 --> 00:32:22,433
It's no use.
535
00:32:22,433 --> 00:32:23,801
[crash]
536
00:32:29,907 --> 00:32:32,443
All 20 passengers and
three crew members
537
00:32:32,443 --> 00:32:34,145
are killed at the
moment of impact.
538
00:32:42,220 --> 00:32:44,088
Wreckage is still
smoldering when
539
00:32:44,088 --> 00:32:48,960
NTSB investigator Jim Ritter
arrives at the crash site.
540
00:32:48,960 --> 00:32:52,163
OK, let's start here and
work backwards to first impact.
541
00:32:52,163 --> 00:32:54,899
I want a record of everything.
542
00:32:54,899 --> 00:32:56,467
You need to look
at the crash site
543
00:32:56,467 --> 00:32:58,136
to collect the
physical evidence.
544
00:32:58,136 --> 00:33:03,407
That's the most important aspect
of any aircraft investigation.
545
00:33:06,277 --> 00:33:09,514
NARRATOR: At the same time,
witnesses tell investigators
546
00:33:09,514 --> 00:33:11,449
they saw the plane
roll hard to the left
547
00:33:11,449 --> 00:33:14,819
before it hit the ground.
548
00:33:14,819 --> 00:33:16,154
And it come right
over top of the house,
549
00:33:16,154 --> 00:33:18,089
and it got real loud.
550
00:33:18,089 --> 00:33:20,191
It was coming right
over these trees here,
551
00:33:20,191 --> 00:33:24,529
and then it got extra loud.
552
00:33:24,529 --> 00:33:27,899
We knew that it was some
kind of very abrupt failure
553
00:33:27,899 --> 00:33:30,301
that would have been
difficult for the flight crew
554
00:33:30,301 --> 00:33:31,536
to overcome.
555
00:33:37,875 --> 00:33:42,113
What could make
it roll so far over?
556
00:33:42,113 --> 00:33:44,448
NARRATOR: As investigators
scour the wreckage, searching
557
00:33:44,448 --> 00:33:48,886
for clues, Ritter
knows they'll be
558
00:33:48,886 --> 00:33:52,990
working without any
onboard flight recorders.
559
00:33:52,990 --> 00:33:56,627
In 1991, commuter planes
aren't required to carry them.
560
00:33:56,627 --> 00:33:59,463
Without the black
boxes, it's basically
561
00:33:59,463 --> 00:34:00,965
a process of elimination.
562
00:34:00,965 --> 00:34:03,501
We analyze all of
the physical evidence
563
00:34:03,501 --> 00:34:06,070
and come up with the
most compelling scenario
564
00:34:06,070 --> 00:34:09,006
that matches that evidence.
565
00:34:09,006 --> 00:34:11,008
NARRATOR: So far, the
investigators' best
566
00:34:11,008 --> 00:34:13,578
clue is the steep left
roll before impact.
567
00:34:16,414 --> 00:34:17,949
When the airplane
rolled to the left,
568
00:34:17,949 --> 00:34:21,419
it could really only
be due to two things.
569
00:34:21,419 --> 00:34:23,421
Perhaps the pilot wanted
to roll to the left,
570
00:34:23,421 --> 00:34:27,858
or there was a malfunction that
the pilots couldn't counteract.
571
00:34:30,995 --> 00:34:33,497
NARRATOR: But when
investigators study the engines,
572
00:34:33,497 --> 00:34:35,433
they find that they
were operating normally
573
00:34:35,433 --> 00:34:36,534
at the moment of impact.
574
00:34:45,109 --> 00:34:47,678
Ritter turns his attention
to the other main part of
575
00:34:47,678 --> 00:34:50,615
the plane's propulsion system.
576
00:34:50,615 --> 00:34:51,782
Let's take a look
at these propellers.
577
00:34:51,782 --> 00:34:54,118
When we started doing testing
to the propeller system,
578
00:34:54,118 --> 00:34:56,120
we didn't knew where it
was going to lead us,
579
00:34:56,120 --> 00:35:01,025
but it was something we had
to eliminate if nothing else.
580
00:35:01,025 --> 00:35:03,461
NARRATOR: Deep inside
the propeller unit,
581
00:35:03,461 --> 00:35:07,064
investigators uncover
an important clue.
582
00:35:07,064 --> 00:35:09,133
Ah-hah.
583
00:35:09,133 --> 00:35:11,402
There you are.
584
00:35:11,402 --> 00:35:12,203
We have a witness mark.
585
00:35:12,203 --> 00:35:14,171
Take a look.
586
00:35:14,171 --> 00:35:16,107
NARRATOR: There's a small mark
where the base of the propeller
587
00:35:16,107 --> 00:35:18,442
slammed into its housing
during the crash.
588
00:35:22,647 --> 00:35:24,615
It might be enough
to tell investigators
589
00:35:24,615 --> 00:35:26,417
how the propellers
were operating
590
00:35:26,417 --> 00:35:29,053
at the moment of impact.
591
00:35:29,053 --> 00:35:32,456
You can literally match
up the scratch marks
592
00:35:32,456 --> 00:35:34,959
between both pieces,
and you'll know
593
00:35:34,959 --> 00:35:36,627
what the angle of
the propeller blade
594
00:35:36,627 --> 00:35:39,330
was from that measurement.
595
00:35:39,330 --> 00:35:44,335
It marked this one 22 degrees.
596
00:35:47,071 --> 00:35:49,273
NARRATOR: The Embraer
120 is what's called
597
00:35:49,273 --> 00:35:52,643
a constant speed propeller.
598
00:35:52,643 --> 00:35:56,580
The blades spin at a
steady rate in flight.
599
00:35:56,580 --> 00:35:59,350
When the pilots need
more power, the blades
600
00:35:59,350 --> 00:36:01,352
twist, changing
their angle to take
601
00:36:01,352 --> 00:36:03,988
a bigger bite out of the
air and provide more thrust.
602
00:36:06,624 --> 00:36:10,194
Slow in for approach speed.
603
00:36:10,194 --> 00:36:13,431
And in flight, it acts like
the automatic transmission
604
00:36:13,431 --> 00:36:15,366
in a car.
605
00:36:15,366 --> 00:36:19,303
It's as if it's changing gears
to match the engine load.
606
00:36:19,303 --> 00:36:22,173
NARRATOR: The marks tell Ritter
the exact angle of the blades
607
00:36:22,173 --> 00:36:24,542
when the plane slammed
into the ground.
608
00:36:24,542 --> 00:36:26,210
We immediately
noticed a difference
609
00:36:26,210 --> 00:36:29,213
between some of the
blade angle measurements
610
00:36:29,213 --> 00:36:33,217
for the left engine
versus the right engine.
611
00:36:33,217 --> 00:36:37,455
The blades were almost flat.
612
00:36:37,455 --> 00:36:39,056
NARRATOR: At 3
degrees, the blades
613
00:36:39,056 --> 00:36:41,292
are so flat they
would act like a wall,
614
00:36:41,292 --> 00:36:44,562
blocking the flow of air the
plane needs to maintain lift.
615
00:36:47,698 --> 00:36:50,034
It might have caused the
pilots to lose control.
616
00:36:56,040 --> 00:36:57,775
Investigators study
the mechanism used
617
00:36:57,775 --> 00:37:01,212
to control the left propeller.
618
00:37:01,212 --> 00:37:04,248
Will you look at this?
619
00:37:04,248 --> 00:37:07,084
It's completely worn down.
620
00:37:07,084 --> 00:37:09,153
NARRATOR: The teeth on
a key gear mechanism,
621
00:37:09,153 --> 00:37:12,423
known as the quill, are
almost entirely worn away.
622
00:37:17,094 --> 00:37:18,662
This is what it's
supposed to look like.
623
00:37:22,767 --> 00:37:24,368
NARRATOR: With its
teeth worn away,
624
00:37:24,368 --> 00:37:27,204
the quill can't effectively
lock onto the gear
625
00:37:27,204 --> 00:37:29,807
system that controls the
angle of the propeller blades.
626
00:37:34,779 --> 00:37:37,081
That really was a
eureka moment for us,
627
00:37:37,081 --> 00:37:40,284
because now we had a
serious malfunction
628
00:37:40,284 --> 00:37:42,720
that we could examine.
629
00:37:46,624 --> 00:37:48,426
NARRATOR: Investigators
study the design
630
00:37:48,426 --> 00:37:49,794
of the propeller mechanism.
631
00:37:55,166 --> 00:37:57,468
They learn that shortly
before the accident,
632
00:37:57,468 --> 00:38:00,771
the propeller manufacturer
started using a harder, more
633
00:38:00,771 --> 00:38:04,141
abrasive coating
on a key part known
634
00:38:04,141 --> 00:38:09,713
as the transfer tube, which
meshes with the quill teeth.
635
00:38:09,713 --> 00:38:12,716
It turned into a giant file.
636
00:38:12,716 --> 00:38:15,286
So the spines on
the transfer tube
637
00:38:15,286 --> 00:38:17,788
were much harder and rougher
than the quill teeth.
638
00:38:17,788 --> 00:38:19,557
And it was almost
like sandpaper,
639
00:38:19,557 --> 00:38:23,160
so the tube was actually wearing
down the teeth on the quill.
640
00:38:27,832 --> 00:38:29,767
NARRATOR: Investigators
now understand why
641
00:38:29,767 --> 00:38:31,635
the quill teeth were worn down.
642
00:38:34,305 --> 00:38:37,241
Without functional quill
teeth, the propeller blades
643
00:38:37,241 --> 00:38:40,678
could slip into a
dangerously flat position.
644
00:38:40,678 --> 00:38:42,813
To prove their new
theory, investigators
645
00:38:42,813 --> 00:38:45,182
need to take a huge risk--
646
00:38:45,182 --> 00:38:47,785
We've got to see what
happens in the air.
647
00:38:47,785 --> 00:38:49,653
NARRATOR: --and test the
damaged propeller system
648
00:38:49,653 --> 00:38:52,857
under full flight conditions.
649
00:38:52,857 --> 00:38:54,892
I said, well, the
only way to really know
650
00:38:54,892 --> 00:38:57,194
is let's do a flight
test and find out.
651
00:38:57,194 --> 00:38:59,763
Because we are at a point
in the investigation,
652
00:38:59,763 --> 00:39:03,567
we need to start
eliminating things.
653
00:39:03,567 --> 00:39:06,704
NARRATOR: The investigation
into the crash of Flight 2311
654
00:39:06,704 --> 00:39:09,206
moves to Embraer
headquarters in Brazil.
655
00:39:12,243 --> 00:39:15,212
Investigator Tom Haueter
meets with the representatives
656
00:39:15,212 --> 00:39:18,616
from Embraer and the
propeller manufacturer.
657
00:39:18,616 --> 00:39:20,584
Thank you for doing this.
658
00:39:20,584 --> 00:39:24,188
NARRATOR: Embraer's chief test
pilot, Gilberto Schittini will
659
00:39:24,188 --> 00:39:27,725
fly an Embraer 120 that has
been modified to recreate
660
00:39:27,725 --> 00:39:30,794
the failure of Flight 2311.
661
00:39:30,794 --> 00:39:32,963
So we've modified the quill.
662
00:39:32,963 --> 00:39:37,268
The teeth have been worn
down just like Flight 2311.
663
00:39:37,268 --> 00:39:41,972
NARRATOR: A worn quill is placed
inside the propeller unit.
664
00:39:41,972 --> 00:39:44,575
This was potentially
very high risk.
665
00:39:44,575 --> 00:39:47,678
Because once we disconnected
the transfer tube in flight,
666
00:39:47,678 --> 00:39:51,382
the pilots would have no way
to control the propeller.
667
00:39:51,382 --> 00:39:53,784
We put a pitch lock here.
668
00:39:53,784 --> 00:39:55,986
It won't go past 22 degrees.
669
00:39:55,986 --> 00:39:57,922
NARRATOR: A mechanical
lock has also
670
00:39:57,922 --> 00:40:00,291
been added to stop the
propeller from going
671
00:40:00,291 --> 00:40:05,362
flatter than 22 degrees,
not 3 degrees as happened
672
00:40:05,362 --> 00:40:06,964
on Flight 2311.
673
00:40:06,964 --> 00:40:09,567
It would be too
dangerous in a flight test
674
00:40:09,567 --> 00:40:12,770
to have the propeller blade
go all the way to flat pitch.
675
00:40:12,770 --> 00:40:13,904
You'd lose control
of the airplane.
676
00:40:13,904 --> 00:40:15,339
That was almost guaranteed.
677
00:40:23,447 --> 00:40:25,549
EMC 120, do you copy?
678
00:40:25,549 --> 00:40:27,918
What if this airplane crashes?
679
00:40:27,918 --> 00:40:30,454
What if we lose the airplane?
680
00:40:30,454 --> 00:40:33,357
I'm the one who's basically
running this test.
681
00:40:33,357 --> 00:40:35,659
This could be all
my responsibility.
682
00:40:35,659 --> 00:40:37,027
Copy.
683
00:40:37,027 --> 00:40:38,896
We are ready to
disengage the prop.
684
00:40:46,437 --> 00:40:49,707
Propeller blade angle's
causing no problems.
685
00:40:49,707 --> 00:40:50,941
No control issues.
686
00:41:06,890 --> 00:41:08,292
NARRATOR: Then
the Brazilian test
687
00:41:08,292 --> 00:41:09,893
flight takes a dramatic turn.
688
00:41:12,796 --> 00:41:14,999
As the flight
continues, the blades
689
00:41:14,999 --> 00:41:17,301
begin drifting toward
the deadly flat position.
690
00:41:20,638 --> 00:41:23,674
Reducing speed.
691
00:41:23,674 --> 00:41:25,909
Easy does it.
692
00:41:29,079 --> 00:41:33,817
We started feeling a rolling
moment to the left and even
693
00:41:33,817 --> 00:41:36,754
more movement to the left.
694
00:41:36,754 --> 00:41:39,356
NARRATOR: The blades go as
flat as this test will allow.
695
00:41:42,960 --> 00:41:45,829
For Haueter, the risky
test flight has paid off.
696
00:41:48,065 --> 00:41:50,701
The investigator's
theory about the crash
697
00:41:50,701 --> 00:41:53,037
is back on solid ground.
698
00:41:53,037 --> 00:41:54,738
Seeing the data right
then, it took a load off.
699
00:41:54,738 --> 00:41:56,106
Said, wow.
700
00:41:56,106 --> 00:41:58,642
I mean, we now
know what happened.
701
00:41:58,642 --> 00:41:59,309
It was obvious.
702
00:42:02,513 --> 00:42:04,948
NARRATOR: Investigators finally
understand the full story
703
00:42:04,948 --> 00:42:08,419
behind the crash of Flight 2311.
704
00:42:08,419 --> 00:42:11,422
When the flight crew began
preparations for landing,
705
00:42:11,422 --> 00:42:15,559
the teeth on the quill were
worn down but still operational.
706
00:42:15,559 --> 00:42:18,729
Slowing for approach speed.
707
00:42:18,729 --> 00:42:20,397
NARRATOR: Preparing
for landing put
708
00:42:20,397 --> 00:42:23,100
renewed pressure on the already
worn teeth in the quill.
709
00:42:27,571 --> 00:42:30,407
The teeth could no longer stay
locked on the left propeller
710
00:42:30,407 --> 00:42:31,075
mechanism.
711
00:42:36,580 --> 00:42:39,683
And once the teeth gave
way, the propeller blades
712
00:42:39,683 --> 00:42:44,054
were free to drift into
a fatally flat position.
713
00:42:44,054 --> 00:42:45,155
What's going on
with this thing?
714
00:42:45,155 --> 00:42:48,559
I can't hold it.
715
00:42:48,559 --> 00:42:50,494
The propeller's design
couldn't hold the blades
716
00:42:50,494 --> 00:42:52,730
at a safe angle,
and the plane became
717
00:42:52,730 --> 00:42:54,498
less and less controllable.
718
00:42:57,601 --> 00:43:00,738
Human error is almost
always underneath the causes
719
00:43:00,738 --> 00:43:04,708
of an accident, even if it
wasn't the pilot or a mechanic.
720
00:43:04,708 --> 00:43:07,611
In this particular case, an
engineering change was made,
721
00:43:07,611 --> 00:43:11,749
which well-intentioned
actually, did not work out.
722
00:43:11,749 --> 00:43:12,583
That's it.
723
00:43:12,583 --> 00:43:13,450
Oh, God.
724
00:43:15,052 --> 00:43:15,919
No!
725
00:43:20,724 --> 00:43:24,795
The worn quill teeth was a
time bomb waiting to go off.
726
00:43:24,795 --> 00:43:27,631
NARRATOR: After the accident,
additional safeguards
727
00:43:27,631 --> 00:43:32,569
are added to prevent this
type of failure, a change that
728
00:43:32,569 --> 00:43:35,472
affects not only Embraer
but several other turboprop
729
00:43:35,472 --> 00:43:36,406
aircraft.
730
00:43:40,043 --> 00:43:42,446
Airline manufacturers
are constantly
731
00:43:42,446 --> 00:43:47,217
trying to stay ahead of
potentially fatal design flaws.
732
00:43:47,217 --> 00:43:49,987
Air crash investigators
are determined
733
00:43:49,987 --> 00:43:52,623
to make sure they do.
734
00:43:52,623 --> 00:43:55,159
What's important is
getting to the truth.
735
00:43:55,159 --> 00:43:59,830
So if the truth is something
that may hurt the company,
736
00:43:59,830 --> 00:44:01,165
let the chips fall
where they may.
57812
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