All language subtitles for 30-01-2024fgfhEEeee

Not so long ago, the German publication Bild
shocked its readers with the information

that the German armed forces are
preparing for war with Russia,

according to a very scary scenario. According
to it, Russia will inflict a crushing defeat on

Ukraine as early as 2024 and will launch first
a hybrid and later an open invasion of Europe.

This article was perceived by many as something
expected by the Bundeswehr in the near future,

as Ukraine is supposedly losing the
war and its defeat is inevitable.

The events described in Bild are a scenario
for exercises and training of Bundeswehr units,

within which they should act and improve their
skills. But, it is the startling realism of

the events that has frightened many, but how
much of this "realism" corresponds to reality?

To begin with, it is necessary to understand what

the current Russian grouping in the
war zone in Ukraine is capable of?

As of today, it is 462,000 personnel, 2,800
tanks, 6,800 Armored fighting vehicles,

4,600 barrel artillery and over 1,000 MLRS.
At first glance this is a colossal potential,

but in reality it is a monstrous shortage of
Russian troops, which you can see in the table.

The lack of standard equipment
affects the ability of units to

perform combat tasks. And we can
clearly see this in recent times.

During two years of full-scale war in Ukraine,

the Russian army has lost tens of thousands of
vehicles and its military-industrial complex

is now struggling to compensate for the
losses, unable to fully staff the units

in the combat zone. Then what new
tank divisions can we talk about?

Another interesting point lies in the offensive
capabilities of Russian troops in general.

In 2022, Russian troops numbered 180,000,
professionally and fully staffed units and

had an initial effectiveness much higher
than the current 460,000 personnel.

Let me remind you that in 2022
a group of 40 thousand personnel

was attacking the capital of Ukraine.
And now for more than three months,

a 45,000-strong group cannot
encircle the small Avdiivka.

Or an even more striking example. 100 thousand
army in the direction of Lyman-Kupiansk axis for

the sixth month rests on the fortified
area at the small village of Synkivka.

Hybrid threats to the Baltic States
and Poland are also quite realistic,

but without a clear, open form of invasion,
because in 2025 the Russian army will be even

more depleted. An open war against NATO
would be suicidal for Russia in 2025.

But in this scenario, here's what's interesting...

According to the NATO scenario, after the
capture of Ukraine in extremely short time,

a 48-hour march of Russian troops from Belarus
in the direction of Lithuania, with access to

the Kaliningrad region of Russia in order to
lay a land corridor should have been realized.

Moscow did not believe that NATO would
invoke Article 5 of collective security

and start fighting for Lithuania before
48 hours, while the Russians would stall,

explaining from the UN podium
that this was not an invasion,

but the need to create a humanitarian
land corridor to the Kaliningrad region.

But in Ukraine, things did not
go as planned for the Russians,

and they have been bogged down in fierce
battles for the second year in a row.

Therefore, the scenario in general is not
fictitious, but quite real. But there is

one nuance in its successful realization
for Russia. And that nuance is Ukraine.