All language subtitles for The.Fog.Of.War.Eleven.Lessons.From.The.Life.Of.Robert.S..McNamara.2003.1080p.WEBRip.x264-[YTS.AM]

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Any military commander
who is honest with himself

or with those he's speaking to
will admit

that he has made mistakes
in the application of military power.

He's killed people, unnecessarily.
His own troops or other troops.

Through mistakes,
through errors of judgment.

A hundred, or thousands, or tens of
thousands, maybe even 100,000.

But he hasn't destroyed nations.
And the conventional wisdom is

don't make the same mistake twice.
Learn from your mistakes.

And we all do. Maybe we make
the same mistake three times,

but hopefully not four or five.

There'll be no learning period
with nuclear weapons.

Make one mistake
and you're gonna destroy nations.

In my life, I've been part of wars.

Three years in the U.S. Army
during World War II.

Seven years as secretary of defense
during the Vietnam War.

Thirteen years at the World Bank.
Across the world.

At my age, 85

I'm at an age where I can look back and
derive some conclusions about my actions.

My rule has been, "Try to learn."

Try to understand what happened.

Develop the lessons and pass them on.

This is the secretary of defense of
the United States, Robert McNamara.

His department absorbs 10 percent
of the income of this country

and over half of every tax dollar.

His job has been called
the toughest in Washington

and McNamara is the most controversial
figure that has ever held the job.

Walter Lippmann calls him both
the best secretary of defense

and the first one to ever assert
civilian control over the military.

His critics call him a "con man",
"an IBM machine with legs",

"an arrogant dictator".

Mr. Secretary, I've noticed
in several cabinet offices

that little silver calendar thing there.
Can you explain that?

Yes, this was given by President Kennedy.

On the calendar are engraved the dates
October 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23,

24, 25, 26, 27, and finally 28,
were the dates

when we literally looked down
the gun barrel into nuclear war.

Under a cloak of deceit,

the Soviet Union introduced
nuclear missiles into Cuba,

targeting 90 million Americans.

The CIA said the warheads
had not been delivered yet.

They thought 20 were coming
on a ship named the Poltava.

We mobilized 180,000 troops.

The first day's air attack was planned
at 1080 sorties, a huge air attack.

Kennedy was trying to keep us out of war.

I was trying to help him
keep us out of war.

And General Curtis LeMay, whom I served
under as a matter of fact, in World War II,

was saying, "Let's go in.
Let's totally destroy Cuba."

On that critical Saturday, October 27th,

we had two Khrushchev messages
in front of us.

One had come in Friday night,

and it had been dictated by a man who was
either drunk, or under tremendous stress.

Basically, he said, "If you'll
guarantee you won't invade Cuba,

we'll take the missiles out."

Then, before we could respond,
we had a second message

that had been dictated by
a bunch of hard-liners.

And it said, in effect, "If you attack

we're prepared

to confront you with
masses of military power."

So, what to do? We had
the soft message and the hard message.

At the elbow of President Kennedy was Tommy
Thompson, former U.S. Ambassador to Moscow.

He and Jane, his wife, had lived with
Khrushchev and his wife on occasion.

Tommy Thompson said, "Mr. President,
I urge you to respond to the soft message."

The president said to Tommy,
"We can't. That'll get us nowhere."

Tommy said, "Mr. President, you're wrong."
Now, that takes a lot of guts.

In Thompson's mind was this thought:

"Khrushchev's gotten himself
in a hell of a fix."

He would then think to himself,
"My God,

if I can get out of this with a deal
that I can say to the Russian people:

'Kennedy was going to destroy Castro
and I prevented it."'

Thompson, knowing Khrushchev as he did,
thought: "Khrushchev will accept that."

And Thompson was right.
That's what I call empathy.

We must try to put ourselves inside their
skin and look at us through their eyes

just to understand the thoughts that lie
behind their decisions and their actions.

Khrushchev's advisors were saying:

"There can be no deal unless you
somewhat reduce the pressure on us

when you ask us to reduce
the pressure on you."

Also, we had attempted to invade Cuba.

Well, with the Bay of Pigs. That
undoubtedly influenced their thinking.

I think that's correct.

But more importantly, from a Cuban
and a Russian point of view,

they knew what, in a sense,
I really didn't know.

We had attempted to assassinate Castro

under Eisenhower and Kennedy,
and later, under Johnson.

And in addition to that, major voices
in the U.S. were calling for invasion.

In the first message,
Khrushchev said this:

"We and you ought not pull
on the ends of a rope,

which you have tied the knots of war.

Because the more the two of us pull,

the tighter the knot will be tied.

And then it will be necessary
to cut that knot

and what that would mean
is not for me to explain to you.

I have participated in two wars
and know that war ends

when it has rolled through
cities and villages

everywhere sowing death and destruction.

For such is the logic of war.

If people do not display wisdom,
they will clash like blind moles

and then mutual annihilation
will commence."

I want to say, and this is very important:
At the end, we lucked out.

It was luck that prevented nuclear war.

We came that close to nuclear war
at the end.

Rational individuals.

Kennedy was rational. Khrushchev
was rational. Castro was rational.

Rational individuals came that close
to total destruction of their societies.

And that danger exists today.

The major lesson of
the Cuban Missile Crisis is this:

The indefinite combination of
human fallibility and nuclear weapons

will destroy nations.

Is it right and proper that today there are
7,500 strategic offensive nuclear warheads,

of which 2,500 are on 15-minute alert
to be launched

by the decision of one human being?

It wasn't until January, 1992,

in a meeting chaired by Castro in Havana,
Cuba that I learned

162 nuclear warheads,
including 90 tactical warheads,

were on the island at the time
in this critical moment of the crisis.

I couldn't believe what I was hearing

and Castro got very angry with me,
because I said,

"Mr. President, let's stop this meeting.
This is totally new to me.

I'm not sure I got the translation right."

Mr. President, I have three questions.

Number one, did you know
the nuclear warheads were there?

Number two, if you did, would you
have recommended to Khrushchev

in the face of a U.S. attack,
that he use them?

Three, if he had used them,
what would've happened to Cuba?

He said, "One,
I knew they were there.

Two, I would not have
recommended to Khrushchev.

I did recommend to Khrushchev
they be used.

Three, what would happen to Cuba?
It would've been totally destroyed."

That's how close we were.

And he was willing to accept that?

Yes Oh, and he went on to say,

"Mr. McNamara,
if you and President Kennedy

had been in a similar situation,
that's what you would've done."

I said, "Mr. President, I hope to God
we would not have done it."

Pull the temple down on our heads?
My God!

In a sense, we'd won.
We got the missiles out without war.

My deputy and I brought
the five chiefs over

and we sat down with Kennedy.
And he said, "Gentlemen, we won.

I don't want you ever to say it,
but you know we won, I know we won."

And LeMay said, "Won? Hell, we lost!
We should go in and wipe them out today."

LeMay believed that ultimately we'd
confront these people with nuclear weapons.

And by God, we better do it
when we have greater superiority

than we will have in the future.

At the time, we had a 17-to-1 strategic
advantage in nuclear numbers.

We'd done 10 times
as many tests as they had.

We were certain we could retain
that advantage if we limited the tests.

The chiefs were all opposed.

They said, "The Soviets will cheat."

Well, I said, "How will they cheat?"

You won't believe this, but they said,

"They'll test them behind the moon."

I said, "You're out of your mind."

That's absurd.

It's almost impossible for our people today
to put themselves back into that period.

In my seven years as secretary,

we came within a hairsbreadth
of war with the Soviet Union

on three different occasions.

Twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a year,

for seven years as secretary of defense,
I lived the Cold War.

During the Kennedy administration,
they designed a 100-megaton bomb.

It was tested in the atmosphere.
I remember this.

Cold War? Hell, it was a hot war.

I think the human race needs to
think more about killing, about conflict.

Is that what we want in this 21st century?

My earliest memory is of
a city exploding with joy.

It was November 11, 1918.
I was 2 years old.

You may not believe that
I have the memory, but I do.

I remember the tops of the streetcars
being crowded with human beings,

cheering and kissing and screaming.

End of World War I. We'd won.

But also celebrating the belief of many
Americans, particularly Woodrow Wilson,

we'd fought a war to end all wars.

His dream was that the world
could avoid great wars in the future.

Disputes among great nations
would be resolved.

I also remember that I wasn't allowed
to go outdoors to play with my friends

without wearing a mask.

There was an ungodly flu epidemic.

Large numbers of Americans were dying,
600,000. And millions across the world.

My class in the first grade was housed
in a shack, a wooden shack.

But we had an absolutely superb teacher.

And this teacher gave a test
to the class every month

and she re-seated the class
based on the results of that test.

There were vertical rows, and she put
the person with the highest grade

in the first seat on the left-hand row.

And I worked my tail off
to be in that first seat.

Now, the majority of the classmates
were whites, Caucasians, so on.

Wasps, if you will.

But my competition for that first seat
were Chinese, Japanese and Jews.

On Saturday and Sunday,
I played with my classmates.

They went to their ethnic schools.
They learned their native language.

They learned their culture, history.

And they came back determined on
Monday to beat that damn Irishman.

But they didn't do it very often.

One congressman called you
"Mr. I-Have-All-The-Answers McNamara."

And there's been suggestion
from some congressmen

that you come up there,
in spite of their experience,

prepared to give them lessons in things.
Is that your attitude?

No. Perhaps they don't know how much
I don't know. And there is much indeed.

I do make a serious effort

to prepare myself properly for
these congressional discussions.

I suppose I spend, perhaps,

100 or 120 hours in testifying
before Congress each year.

And each hour of testimony requires
three to four hours of preparation.

What about the contention that
your attitude is sometimes arrogant?

Have you ever been wrong, sir?

Oh, yes, indeed. My heavens. I'm not
gonna tell you when I've been wrong.

If you don't know,
I'm not going to tell you.

Oh, on countless occasions.

I applied to Stanford University.
I very much wanted to go.

But I couldn't afford it, so I lived
at home and I went to Berkeley.

Fifty-two dollars a year tuition.

I started Berkeley at the bottom
of the Depression.

Twenty-five million males were unemployed.

Out of that class of 3,500,

three elected to Phi Beta Kappa
at the end of sophomore year.

Of those three, one became
a Rhodes Scholar, I went to Harvard,

the third went to work for $65 a month
and was damn happy to have the job.

The society was on the verge of
I don't want to say revolution,

although, had Roosevelt not done
some of the things he did,

it could've become far more violent.

In any event,
that was what I was thrown into.

I never heard of Plato and Aristotle
before I became a freshman at Berkeley.

And I remember the professor, Lowenberg,
the freshman philosophy professor

I couldn't wait to go to another class.

I took more philosophy courses,

particularly one in logic
and one in ethics.

Stress on values

something beyond one's self

and a responsibility to society.

After graduating University of California,

I went to Harvard Graduate School
of Business for two years

and then I went back to San Francisco.

I began to court this young lady that
I'd met when we were 17

in our first week at Berkeley:
Margaret Craig.

And I was making some progress
after eight or nine months.

I proposed and she accepted.

She went with her aunt and her mother
on a trip across the country.

She telegraphed me,

"Must order engraved invitations to
include your middle name, what is it?"

I wired back,
"My middle name is Strange."

She said,
"I know it's strange, but what is it?"

Well, I mean, it is Strange.
It's Robert Strange McNamara.

And it was a marriage made in heaven.

At the end of a year,
we had our first child.

The delivery costs were $100,
and we paid that $10 a month.

Those were some of the happiest days
of our lives.

And then the war came.

I'd been promoted to assistant professor.
I was the youngest at Harvard.

And on a salary, by the way,
of $4,000 a year.

Harvard Business SchooI's market
was drying up.

The males were being drafted
or volunteering.

So the dean, being farsighted,
brought back a government contract

to establish an officer candidate
school for what was called

Statistical Control in the Air Force.

We said, "Look, we're not gonna
take anybody you send up here.

We're gonna select the people."

You have a punch card for every
human being brought into the Air Corps.

We're gonna run those punch cards
through the IBM sorting machines

and we're gonna sort on age, education,
accomplishment, grades, et cetera.

We were looking for the best
and the brightest.

The best brains, the greatest
capacity to lead, the best judgment.

The U.S. was just beginning to bomb.

We were bombing by daylight.
The loss rate was very, very high.

So they commissioned a study.
And what did we find?

We found the abort rate was 20 percent.

Twenty percent of the planes leaving
England to bomb Germany

turned around before
they got to the target.

That was a hell of a mess.
We lost 20 percent of our capability.

I think it was called Form 1-A or something
like that, it was a mission report.

And if you aborted a mission,
you had to write down why.

So we get all these things
and we analyze them

and we finally concluded:
It was baloney.

They were aborting out of fear.

Because the loss rate
was four percent per sortie.

The combat tour was 25 sorties.

It didn't mean 100 percent would die,
but a lot of them were gonna be killed.

They knew that and they found reasons
to not go over the target.

So we reported this.

One of the commanders was Curtis LeMay.
Colonel in command of a B-24 group.

He was the finest combat commander
of any service I came across in war.

But he was extraordinarily belligerent,
many thought brutal.

He got the report. He issued an order.

He said, "I will be in the lead plane
on every mission.

Any plane that takes off
will go over the target

or the crew will be court-martialed."

The abort rate dropped overnight.

Now, that's the kind of a commander he was.

Ladies and gentlemen,
the president of the United States.

My friends, on this Christmas Eve,

there are over 10 million men in the
Armed Forces of the United States alone.

One year ago,
1,700,000 were serving overseas.

By next July first, that number
will rise to over five million.

Plenty of bad news for the Japs
in the not-too-far-distant future.

The U.S. Air Force had a new airplane,
named the B-29.

The B-17 s and B-24s in Europe
bombed from 15, 16,000 feet.

The problem was that they were subject to
anti-aircraft fire and to fighter aircraft.

To relieve that, this B-29 was being
developed that bombed from high altitude

and it was thought we could destroy
targets more efficiently and effectively.

I was brought back from the 8th Air Force

and assigned to the first B-29s,
the 58th Bomb Wing.

We had to fly those planes from
the bases in Kansas to India.

Then we had to fly fuel
over the hump into China.

The airfields were built
with Chinese labor.

It was an insane operation.

I can still remember them
hauling these huge rollers

to crush the stone and make them flat.

Somebody would slip, the roller would roll
over him everybody would laugh and go on.

We were supposed to take these B-29s

There were no tanker aircraft there.
We were to fill them with fuel,

fly from India to Chengdu,
offload the fuel, fly back to India,

make enough missions
to build up fuel in Chengdu,

fly to Yawata, Japan,
bomb the steel mills and go back to India.

We had so little training on
this problem of maximizing efficiency

we actually found,
to get some of the B-29s back,

instead of offloading fuel,
they had to take it on.

To make a long story short,
it wasn't worth a damn.

And it was LeMay who really
came to that conclusion

and led the chiefs to move the whole thing
to the Marianas,

which devastated Japan.

LeMay was focused on only one thing:
Target destruction.

Most Air Force generals can say
how many planes they had,

how many tons of bombs they dropped,
or whatever it was.

But he was the only person
that I knew

in the senior command in the Air Force
who focused solely

on the loss of his crews
per unit of target destruction.

I was on the island of Guam,
in his command, in March of 1945.

In that single night, we burned to death
100,000 Japanese civilians in Tokyo.

Men, women and children.

Were you aware this was going to happen?

Well, I was

part of a mechanism that,
in a sense, recommended it.

I analyzed bombing operations,
and how to make them more efficient.

I.e., not more efficient
in the sense of killing more,

but more efficient in
weakening the adversary.

I wrote one report analyzing
the efficiency of the B-29 operations.

The B-29 could get above the fighter
aircraft and above the air defense,

so the loss rate would be much less.

The problem was,
the accuracy was also much less.

Now, I don't want to suggest

that it was my report that led to
I'll call it the firebombing.

It isn't that I'm absolving myself
of blame for the firebombing.

I don't want to suggest that it was I
that put in LeMay's mind

that his operations
were totally inefficient

and had to be drastically changed.
But, anyhow, that's what he did.

He took the B-29s down to 5,000 feet
and he decided to bomb with firebombs.

I participated in the interrogation
of the B-29 bomber crews

that came back that night.

A room full of crewmen
and intelligence interrogators.

A captain got up, a young captain said:

"Goddamn it, I'd like to know who
the son of a bitch was

that took this magnificent airplane,
designed to bomb from 23,000 feet

and he took it down to 5,000 feet,
and I lost my wingman.

He was shot and killed."

LeMay spoke in monosyllables.

I never heard him say
more than two words in sequence.

It was basically, "Yes", "No", "Yep",

"That's all", or "Hell with it",
That was all he said.

And LeMay was totally intolerant
of criticism.

He never engaged in discussion
with anybody.

He stood up.

"Why are we here? Why are we here?

You lost your wingman.
It hurts me as much as

it does you. I sent him there.

And I've been there, I know what it is.

But you lost one wingman
and we destroyed Tokyo."

Fifty square miles of Tokyo were burned.

Tokyo was a wooden city, and when
we dropped firebombs, it just burned it.

The choice of incendiary bombs,
where did that come from?

I think the issue is not so much
incendiary bombs. I think the issue is

In order to win, should you kill
100,000 people in one night?

By firebombing or any other way?

LeMay's answer would be, clearly, "Yes."

"McNamara, do you mean to say
that instead of killing 100,000,

burning to death 100,000 Japanese civilians
in that one night,

we should have burned to death
a lesser number or none?

And then had our soldiers

cross the beaches in Tokyo
and been slaughtered in tens of thousands?

Is that what you're proposing?
Is that moral? Is that wise?"

Why was it necessary to drop the nuclear
bomb if LeMay was burning up Japan?

And he went on from Tokyo
to firebomb other cities.

58 percent of Yokohama. Yokohama
is roughly the size of Cleveland.

58 percent of Cleveland destroyed.

Tokyo is roughly the size of New York.
51 percent of New York destroyed.

99 percent of the equivalent of
Chattanooga, which was Toyama.

40 percent of the equivalent of
Los Angeles, which was Nagoya.

This was all done before
the dropping of the nuclear bomb.

Which, by the way,
was dropped by LeMay's command.

Proportionality should be
a guideline in war.

Killing 50 to 90 percent of the people
in 67 Japanese cities

and then bombing them
with two nuclear bombs

is not proportional,
in the minds of some people

to the objectives
we were trying to achieve.

I don't fault Truman for
dropping the nuclear bomb.

The U.S.-Japanese War was one of the
most brutal wars in all of human history.

Kamikaze pilots, suicide, unbelievable.

What one can criticize is that the
human race prior to that time and today

has not really grappled with
what are, I'll call it "the rules of war".

Was there a rule then that said
you shouldn't bomb, shouldn't kill,

shouldn't burn to death 100,000 civilians
in a night?

LeMay said, "If we'd lost the war, we'd all
have been prosecuted as war criminals."

And I think he's right.

He, and I'd say I
were behaving as war criminals.

LeMay recognized that what
he was doing would be thought immoral

if his side had lost.

But what makes it immoral if you lose
and not immoral if you win?

At some point, we have to approach
Vietnam, and I want to know

how you can best set that up for me.

Yeah, well

that's a hard, hard question.
I think

I think we have to approach it
in the context of the Cold War.

But first I'll have to talk about Ford.
I've got to go back to the end of the war.

I had a terrible headache,

so Marg drove me in to
the Air Force regional hospital.

A week later, Marg came in
many of the same symptoms.

It's hard to believe, and I don't think
I've heard of another case

where two individuals,
husband and wife,

came down, essentially,
at the same time with polio.

We were both in the hospital
on V-J Day.

A friend of mine said, "We're gonna
find a corporation in America that needs

the advice and capabilities of
this extraordinary group I'm forming

and you gotta be in it."

I said, "To hell with it.
I'm going back to Harvard.

Marg and I wanna do that.
I'm gonna spend my life there."

He said, "Look, Bob, you can't pay Marg's
hospital bills. You're crazy as hell."

He said, "By the way, the company that most
needs our help in all the U.S. is Ford."

I said, "How'd you learn that?"
"I read an article in Life magazine."

Of the top 1,000 executives at Ford,

I don't believe there were
10 college graduates

and Henry Ford II needed help.

They were gonna give us tests.
Two full days of testing,

intelligence tests, achievement tests,
personality tests, you name it.

This sounds absurd, but I remember
a question on one of the tests was:

"Would you rather be a florist
or a coal miner?"

I had been a florist. I worked as a florist
during some of my Christmas vacations.

I put down coal miner.
I think the reasons are obvious to you.

This group of 10 people had been trained
in the officer candidate school at Harvard.

In some tests, we had the highest marks
that had ever been scored.

In other tests, we were in
the upper one percentile.

From 1926 to 1946, including the war years,
Ford Motor Company just barely broke even.

It was a God-awful mess.

I thought we had a responsibility
to the stockholders

and God knows you cannot believe
how bad the situation had been.

They had no market research
organization. I set one up.

Manager said,
"What do you want studied?"

I said, "Find out who's buying Volkswagens.

Everybody says it's a no-good car.
It was only selling about 20,000 a year,

but I want to know what's gonna happen.

Is it gonna stay the same,
go down, or go up?

Find out who buys them."

He came back six months later,
he said,

"Well, they're professors,
and they're doctors and they're lawyers

and they're obviously people
who can afford more."

Well, that set me to thinking about
what we in the industry should do.

Was there a market we were missing?

At this time nobody believed
Americans wanted cheaper cars.

They wanted conspicuous consumption.

Cadillac, with these huge,
ostentatious fins

set the style for the industry
for 10 or 15 years.

And that's what we were up against.

We introduced the Falcon
as a more economical car

and it was a huge success profit-wise.

We accomplished a lot.

I said, "What about accidents?
I hear a lot about accidents."

"Oh, yes, we'll get you some data on that."

There were about 40,000 deaths per year
from automobile accidents

and about a million,
or a million-two injuries.

I said, "What causes it?" "It's obvious.
It's human error and mechanical failure."

I said, "If it's mechanical failure,
we might be involved. Let's dig into this.

If it's mechanical failure,
I want to stop it."

Well, he said, "There's really
very few statistics available."

I said, "Damn it,
find out what can we learn."

"The only place we can find
that knows anything about it

is Cornell Aeronautical Labs."

They said,
"The major problem is packaging."

They said, "You buy eggs and you
know how eggs come in a carton?"

I said, "I don't buy eggs.
My wife does it."

They said, "Well, you ask her,
when she puts that carton down

on the drain board when she gets home,
do the eggs break?"

I asked Marg and she said no.

Cornell said, "That's because
they're packaged properly.

Now, if we packaged people in cars the
same way, we could reduce the breakage."

We lacked lab facilities, so we dropped
human skulls in different packages,

down the stairwells of
the dormitories at Cornell.

Well, that sounds absurd,
but that guy was absolutely right.

It was packaging
which could make the difference.

In a crash, the driver was often
impaled on the steering wheel.

The passenger was often injured
because he'd hit the windshield

or the header bar, or the instrument panel.

So in the 1956 model Ford,

we introduced steering wheels
that prevented being impaled.

We introduced padded instrument panels,
and we introduced seat belts.

We estimated if there would be
100 percent use of the seat belts,

we could save 20-odd thousand lives a year.

Everybody was opposed to it.

You couldn't get people to use seat belts.
But those who did saved their lives.

Now, let me jump ahead.

It's July, 1960.

John Bugas, vice president,
industrial relations,

clearly had his eyes on
becoming president.

I'm the group vice president in charge
of all of the car divisions.

Henry was a night owl.
He always wanted to go out.

You know, it's 2 a.m. or something.

He said, "Come up, have a nightcap."
"I don't want one, I'm going to bed."

John said, "I'll come up, Henry."
"I didn't ask you. I asked Bob."

He said, "Bob, come on up."
So I finally went up.

That's when he asked me to be president.

I was the first president in the history
of the company

that had ever been president other
than a member of the Ford family.

And after five weeks, I quit.

The telephone rang a person comes on
and says: "I'm Robert Kennedy.

My brother, Jack Kennedy, would like you to
meet our brother-in-law, Sergeant Shriver."

Four o'clock, Sarge comes in.
Never met him.

And he said, "I've been authorized
by my brother-in-law, Jack Kennedy,

to offer you the position of
secretary of the treasury."

I said, "You're out of your mind.

I know a little about finance,
but I'm not qualified for that position."

"Anticipating you might say that,

the president-elect authorized me
to offer you the secretary of defense."

"I was in World War II for three years,

but secretary of defense?
I'm not qualified for that."

He said, "Anticipating that,

would you do him the courtesy
of agreeing to meet with him?"

So I go home. I meet with Marg.

If I could appoint every senior official in
the department, and if I was guaranteed

I wouldn't have to be part of
that damn Washington social world.

She said, "Well, okay, why don't you
write a contract with the president

and if he'll accept those conditions,
do it."

My total net worth at the time
was on the order of $800,000,

but I had huge unfulfilled stock options
worth millions.

And I was one of
the highest-paid executives in the world.

And the future was brilliant.

We had called our children in.
Their life would be totally changed.

The salary of a cabinet secretary then
was $25,000 a year.

So we explained to the children they'd
be giving up a few. They could care less.

Marg could care less.

It was snowing.

The Secret Service took me in the house
by the back way.

I can still see it. There's a loveseat,

two armchairs with a lamp table
in between.

Jack Kennedy is sitting in one and
Bobby Kennedy's sitting in the other.

"Mr. President, it's absurd.
I'm not qualified."

"Look, Bob."

He said, "I don't think there's
any school for presidents either.

Let's announce it now.
I'll write the announcement."

So he wrote out the announcement,
we walk out the front door.

All of these television cameras
and press, till hell wouldn't have it.

That's how Marg learned I had accepted.
It was on television, live.

All right,
why don't we do some pictures afterwards?

I've asked Robert McNamara to assume the
responsibilities of secretary of defense.

And I'm glad and happy to say that
he has accepted this responsibility.

Mr. McNamara leaves the presidency of the
Ford company at great personal sacrifice.

That's the way it began.

You know, it was a traumatic period.

My wife probably got ulcers from it, may
even ultimately have died from the stress.

My son got ulcers.
It was very traumatic but

they were some of the best years
of our life

and all members of my family
benefited from it.

It was terrific.

October 2nd. I had returned from Vietnam.

At that time,
we had 16,000 military advisors.

I recommended to President Kennedy
and to the Security Council

that we establish a plan and an objective
of removing all of them within two years.

Kennedy announced we were going to pull out

all our military advisors
by the end of '65,

going to take 1,000 out at the end of '63,
and we did.

But there was a coup in South Vietnam.

Diem was overthrown

and he and his brother were killed.

I was present with the President

when together we received information
of that coup.

I've never seen him

more upset. He totally blanched.

Kennedy and I had tremendous problems
with Diem, but my God,

he was the authority.
He was the head of state.

And he was overthrown by a military coup.

And Kennedy knew and I knew,
that to some degree,

the U.S. government
was responsible for that.

I was in my office in the Pentagon
when the telephone rang and it was Bobby.

The President had been shot in Dallas.

Perhaps 45 minutes later, Bobby called
again and said the president was dead.

Jackie would like me
to come out to the hospital.

We took the body to the White House
about whatever it was, 4 a.m.

and called the superintendent
of Arlington Cemetery.

And he and I

walked over those grounds.

They're hauntingly beautiful grounds.
White crosses, row and row.

And finally I thought
I'd found the exact spot,

the most beautiful spot in the cemetery.

I called Jackie at the White House
and asked her to come out there.

She immediately accepted.

And that's where the president
is buried today.

A park service ranger came up to me
and said that he...

He had...

...escorted President Kennedy on a tour
of those grounds a few weeks before.

And Kennedy said that was
the most beautiful spot in Washington.

That's where he's buried.

I will do my best.

That is all I can do.

I ask for your help and God's.

Make no bones of this.

Don't try to sweep this under the rug.
We are at war in Vietnam.

And yet the president and his secretary
of defense continues to mislead

and misinform the American people,
and enough of it's gone by.

On August 2nd,

the destroyer Maddox reported it was
attacked by a North Vietnamese patrol boat.

It was an act of aggression against us.
We were in international waters.

I sent officials from the Defense
Department out and we recovered

pieces of shells that were
clearly identified

as North Vietnamese from
the deck of the Maddox.

So there was no question in my mind
that it had occurred.

But, in any event, we didn't respond.

And it was very difficult.
It was difficult for the president.

There were very, very senior people,
in uniform and out, who said,

"My God, this president is..."

They didn't use the word "coward",
but in effect,

"He's not protecting
the national interest."

Two days later,

the Maddox and the Turner Joy,
two destroyers reported they were attacked.

There were sonar soundings.
Torpedoes had been detected.

Other indications of attack
from patrol boats.

We spent 10 hours that day trying to
find out what the hell had happened.

At one point the commander said,
"We're not certain of the attack."

Another point they said, "We're positive."

Then finally, late in the day,

Admiral Sharp said,
"Yes, we're certain it happened."

So I reported this to Johnson,
and as a result,

there were bombing attacks
on targets in North Vietnam.

Johnson said,
"We may have to escalate.

I'm not gonna do it without
Congressional authority."

And he put forward a resolution,
the language of which

gave complete authority to the president
to take the nation to war:

The Tonkin Gulf Resolution.

Now, let me go back to
the August 4th attack.

It was just confusion.
And events afterwards showed

that our judgment that
we'd been attacked that day was wrong.

It didn't happen.

And the judgment that

we'd been attacked on August 2nd
which we'd made, was right. We had been.

Although that was disputed at the time.

So we were right once and wrong once.

Ultimately, President Johnson
authorized bombing in response

to what he thought
had been the second attack.

It hadn't occurred, but that's irrelevant
to the point I'm making here.

He authorized the attack on
the assumption it had occurred.

And his belief that
it was a conscious decision

by the North Vietnamese political
and military leaders

to escalate the conflict

and an indication
they would not stop short of winning.

We were wrong.

But we had in our minds
a mindset that led to that action.

And it carried such heavy costs.

We see incorrectly, or we see
only half of the story at times.

- We see what we want to believe.
- You're absolutely right.

Belief and seeing.
They're both often wrong.

We Americans know, although others appear
to forget the risk of spreading conflict.

We still seek no wider war.

We introduced "Rolling Thunder"

which, over the years, became
a very, very heavy bombing program.

Two to three times as many bombs
as were dropped on Western Europe

during all of World War II.

This is not primarily a military problem.

It's a battle for the hearts and minds
of the people of South Vietnam.

As a prerequisite, we must be able
to guarantee their physical security.

It was announced today that total
American casualties in Vietnam,

now number 4,877, including 748 killed.

Secretary of Defense McNamara, on
each of his seven trips to Vietnam

has found some positive aspect
of the course of the war.

The most vivid impression I'm bringing
back is that we've stopped losing the war.

The North Vietnamese, we believe,
have nine regiments of their army...

Some of the men had a little training
in a park in Kentucky before coming.

But it didn't prepare them for thicket
of trees, spiked vines, thorn bushes,

almost perpendicular cliffs,
90-degree temperatures, insects...

This has changed from a nasty little war
to a nasty middle-sized war.

The Vietnamese are still doing most
of the fighting and most of the dying,

but week after week,
American casualty figures go up.

Now, America wins the wars that
she undertakes. Make no mistake about it.

And we have declared war
on tyranny and aggression.

If this little nation goes down the drain
and can't maintain independence,

ask yourself what's gonna happen
to all the other little nations.

Let me go back one moment.

In the Cuban Missile Crisis, at the end,

I think we did put ourselves
in the skin of the Soviets.

In the case of Vietnam, we didn't
know them well enough to empathize.

And there was total misunderstanding
as a result.

They believed we had simply replaced
the French as a colonial power

and we were seeking to subject
South and North Vietnam

to our colonial interests,
which was absolutely absurd.

And we, we saw Vietnam as
an element of the Cold War.

Not what they saw it as, a civil war.

There aren't many examples in which
you bring two former enemies together

at the highest levels,
and discuss what might have been.

I formed the hypothesis that each of us
could have achieved our objectives

without the terrible loss of life.

And I wanted to test that
by going to Vietnam.

The former foreign minister of Vietnam,
a wonderful man named Thach

said, "You're totally wrong.

We were fighting for independence.
You were fighting to enslave us."

We almost came to blows.
That was noon on the first day.

"Do you mean to say
it was not a tragedy for you

when you lost 3,400,000 Vietnamese killed,

which on our population base is
the equivalent of 27 million Americans?

What did you accomplish?

You didn't get more than
we were willing to give at the start.

You could've had the whole damn thing:
Independence, unification."

"Mr. McNamara, you must never
have read a history book.

If you had, you'd know we weren't
pawns of the Chinese or the Russians.

Didn't you know that?

Don't you understand that we've been
fighting the Chinese for 1,000 years?

We were fighting for independence,
and we'd fight to the last man.

And we were determined to do so

and no amount of bombing or U.S.
pressure would've ever stopped us."

What makes us omniscient?

Have we a record of omniscience?

We are the strongest nation
in the world today.

I do not believe we should ever

apply that economic, political
or military power unilaterally.

If we had followed that rule in Vietnam,
we wouldn't have been there.

None of our allies supported us.

Not Japan, not Germany,
not Britain or France.

If we can't persuade nations
with comparable values

of the merit of our cause,
we'd better re-examine our reasoning.

Americans suffered the heaviest
casualties of the war last week.

543 killed in action. Another 1,247
were wounded and hospitalized.

The deaths raise the U.S. total
in the war so far to 18,239.

South Vietnamese put their losses
for the week at 522 killed.

Communist losses were not reported.

Contributing to those record casualties
has been

the Communist bombardment of
the Marine outpost at Khe Sanh.

There, the North Vietnamese have
been tightening their ring around...

The military expects a full-scale assault.

To what extent did you feel that
you were the author of stuff

or that you were an instrument
of things outside of your control?

Well, I don't think I felt either.

I just felt that
I was serving at the request

of a president who'd been elected
by the American people.

And it was my responsibility
to try to help him...

...to carry out the office as he believed
was in the interest of our people.

What is morally appropriate
in a wartime environment?

Let me give you an illustration.

While I was secretary, we used
what's called "Agent Orange" in Vietnam.

A chemical that strips leaves off of trees.

After the war, it is claimed that
that was a toxic chemical

and it killed many individuals,
soldiers and civilians exposed to it.

Were those who issued the approval
to use Agent Orange criminals?

Were they committing a crime
against humanity?

Let's look at the law.

Now, what kind of law
do we have that says

these chemicals are acceptable in war
and these chemicals are not.

We don't have clear definitions
of that kind.

I never in the world would have
authorized an illegal action.

I'm not really sure I authorized
Agent Orange, I don't remember it.

But it certainly occurred, the use
of it occurred while I was secretary.

Norman Morrison was a Quaker.

He was opposed to war,
the violence of war, the killing.

He came to the Pentagon,
doused himself with gasoline.

Burned himself to death below my office.

He held a child in his arms, his daughter.

Passers-by shouted, "Save the child!"
He threw the child

out of his arms, and the child lived
and is alive today.

His wife issued a very moving statement:

"Human beings must stop killing
other human beings."

And that's a belief that I shared.

I shared it then and I believe it
even more strongly today.

How much evil must we do
in order to do good?

We have certain ideals,
certain responsibilities.

Recognize that at times you will have
to engage in evil, but minimize it.

I remember reading that
General Sherman, in the Civil War

the mayor of Atlanta pleaded with him
to save the city.

And Sherman essentially said to the mayor

just before he torched it
and burned it down,

"War is cruel. War is cruelty."

That was the way LeMay felt.

He was trying to save the country.
He was trying to save our nation.

And in the process, he was prepared
to do whatever killing was necessary.

It's a very, very difficult position
for sensitive human beings to be in.

Morrison was one of those.
I think I was.

50,000 people came to Washington
to demonstrate against the war.

About 20,000 of them marched on
the Pentagon.

The Pentagon is a very, very difficult
building to defend.

We placed troops carrying rifles around it.
U.S. Marshals in front of the soldiers.

But I told the president, not a rifle would
be loaded without my personal permission.

And I wasn't gonna grant it.

What effect did all of this dissent
have on your thinking?

I mean, Norman Morrison is '65.
This is '67.

Well, it was a very tense period.

Very tense period for my family,
which I don't want to discuss.

How was your thinking
changing during this period?

I don't think my thinking was changing.

We were in the Cold War.
And this was a Cold War...

...activity.

Some commentators have said the war
is turning into a kind of stalemate.

No, no. I think on the contrary
as General Westmoreland has pointed out

in recent weeks in Saigon,
the military operations,

the large-unit military operations,
continue to show very substantial progress.

One of the lessons I learned early on:
Never say never. Never, never, never.

Never say never.

And secondly, never answer
the question that is asked of you.

Answer the question that you wish
had been asked of you.

And quite frankly, I follow that rule.
It's a very good rule.

When you talk about the responsibility
for something like the Vietnam War...

...whose responsibility is it?

It's the president's responsibility.

I don't want to fail to recognize

the tremendous contribution
I think Johnson made to the country.

I don't want to put the responsibility
for Vietnam on his shoulders alone,

but I do... I am inclined to believe
that if Kennedy had lived,

he would've made a difference.
We wouldn't have had 500,000 men there.

Two very telling photographs.

One of them has Johnson like this...

You can just see him thinking,
"My God, I'm in a hell of a mess.

And this guy is trying to tell me
to do something that I know is wrong

and I'm not gonna do.

But how the hell
am I gonna get out of this?"

The other photograph,
you can see me saying,

"Jesus Christ. I love this man,
I respect him, but he's totally wrong.

What am I gonna do?"

Johnson couldn't persuade me,
and I couldn't persuade him.

I had this enormous respect and affection,
loyalty to both Kennedy and Johnson.

But at the end, Johnson and I
found ourselves poles apart.

And I said to a very close and dear friend
of mine, Kay Graham, a former publisher.

"Even to this day, Kay, I don't know
whether I quit or was fired."

She said, "You're out of your mind.
Of course you were fired."

November 1, 1967.

I presented a memo to Johnson that said,
"The course we're on is totally wrong.

We've gotta change it.

Cut back at what we're doing in Vietnam.

We gotta reduce the casualties,"
and so on.

It was an extraordinarily
controversial memo. And I took it to him.

I delivered it myself.

"Mr. President, nobody has seen this.

Not Dean Rusk, not the chairman
of the Joint Chiefs. Nobody."

"I know that it may contain
recommendations and statements

that you do not agree with or support."

I never heard from him.

Something had to give.

There was a rumor I was facing
a mental breakdown,

I was under such pressure and stress.

I don't think that was the case at all.

But it was a really traumatic departure.

That's the way it ended.

Except for one thing.

He awarded me the Medal of Freedom

in a very beautiful ceremony
at the White House.

And he was very, very warm in his comments.

And I became so emotional,
I could not respond.

Mr. President,

I cannot find words to express
what lies in my heart today.

And I think I'd better respond
on another occasion.

And had I responded, I would have said,
"I know what many of you are thinking.

You're thinking this man is duplicitous.

You're thinking that he has held things
close to his chest.

You're thinking that...

...he did not respond fully to the desires
and wishes of the American people.

I wanna tell you you're wrong."

Of course he had personal idiosyncrasies.
No question about that.

He didn't accept all the advice
he was given.

On several occasions, his associates
advised him to be more forthcoming.

He wasn't.

People did not understand there were
recommendations and pressures

that would carry the risk of war
with China and of nuclear war.

And he was determined to prevent it.

I'm arguing that he had a reason
in his mind for doing what he did.

And, of course, shortly after I left,

Johnson concluded that
he couldn't continue.

At this point, how many Americans
had been killed in Vietnam?

About 25,000. Less than half of
the number ultimately killed, 58,000.

Historians don't really like
to deal with counterfactuals

with what might have been.

They want to talk about history.

"How the hell do you know,
McNamara, what might have been?

Who knows?"

Well, I know certain things.

What I'm doing is thinking it through
with hindsight.

But you don't have hindsight
available at the time.

I'm very proud of my accomplishments.

And I'm very sorry that in the process
of accomplishment, I've made errors.

We all make mistakes.

We know we make mistakes.

I don't know any military commander
who is honest,

who would say he has not made a mistake.

There's a wonderful phrase:
"The fog of war".

What "the fog of war" means is:

War is so complex it's beyond
the ability of the human mind

to comprehend all the variables.

Our judgment, our understanding,
are not adequate.

And we kill people unnecessarily.

Wilson said,
"We won the war to end all wars."

I'm not so naive or simplistic
to believe we can eliminate war.

We're not gonna change human nature
any time soon.

It isn't that we aren't rational.
We are rational.

But reason has limits.

There's a quote from T.S. Eliot
that I just love.

"We shall not cease from exploring...

...and at the end of our exploration,
we will return to where we started...

...and know the place for the first time."

Now that's, in a sense,
where I'm beginning to be.

After you left the Johnson administration,

why didn't you speak out against
the Vietnam War?

I'm not going to say any more
than I have.

These are the kinds of questions
that get me in trouble.

You don't know what I know about how
inflammatory my words can appear.

A lot of people misunderstand the war,
misunderstand me.

A lot of people think I'm a son of a bitch.

Do you feel in any way responsible
for the war? Do you feel guilty?

I don't want to go into further discussion.
It just opens up more controversy.

I don't wanna add anything to Vietnam.

It is so complex that anything I say
will require additions and qualifications.

Is it the feeling that you're damned if
you do and if you don't, no matter what?

Yeah, that's right.

And I would rather be damned if I don't.