Original subtitles

Why can't Russia keep control over the left bank of the Kherson region?

The fact of forming a bridgehead on the left bank in such unfavorable conditions,

the quantitative superiority of the enemy and

the lack of full-fledged logistics seemed incredible, but it happened.

The Russian grouping Dnieper has about 68 thousand personnel, 380 tanks,

900 Armored fighting vehicles, 500 artillery barrels and 80 multiple rocket launchers.

At first glance, this is a rather large and powerful grouping,

which should be able to exercise full control over the left bank, but there is a nuance.

For all its formidability, the grouping is critically under-equipped and this

limits the enemy's ability to use it effectively.

A group of troops equal to 85 Battalion tactical groups needs to control almost

250 kilometers of the left bank, which is one BTG per 3 kilometers,

not taking into account the rear area. In addition, the Russian command is deprived

of the ability to deploy units for mobile response to emerging threats.

Also, the enemy has already lost control of the road of the first frontier. Now

the main logistical artery is highway 2206 and country roads,

which are under close surveillance of Ukrainian artillery and drones.

What we have in the end.

The Russian forces, despite their numerical superiority over the Defense Forces of Ukraine on

the left bank, cannot fully exploit them, as they actually lack the resources to control the entire

Kherson region. The Group of Forces is limited in its actions and effectiveness of the units used.

There is no need to talk about the formation of a mobile reserve of operational level - this task is

unfeasible in the current conditions. The enemy is progressively losing control of vital logistics.

So we should prepare for a goodwill gesture? No, not so fast.

Today the enemy has one indisputable advantage,

which they use to slow down the Ukrainians' actions not only on the left bank,

but actually along the entire battle line - it is aviation and Guided bombs.

The mass use of Guided bombs is the main braking element and the main salvation of

the occupants from defeat in a number of locations, including the left bank.

The second salvation of the enemy is still quantitative superiority,

because the command of the Russian troops can afford to neglect losses and fill

certain areas with manpower to create a numerical barrier. But in conditions

of artillery superiority from the right bank this is not a long-lasting solution.

But on this only it will not be possible to hold the left bank,

and the resource and solutions that could allow it to do so,

at present, the occupiers do not have and are unlikely to appear in the foreseeable future.

In turn, the inevitable processes on the left bank can be accelerated by the impact on the

main logistical artery of the enemy - the Crimean Bridge, which feeds the entire mainland south.

If such an incident occurs, then the events - on the left bank and on the Zaporizhzhya

direction - gradually, but inevitably will take a completely different turn.