All language subtitles for 23-11-2023gfchgceeee

Obviously, the Russian command on the left
bank of the Dnipro near the villages of Krynky,

Pidstepne and Pischanivka will for the time being
have to fight with only a limited contingent,

or rather part of the forces of
the 7th Airborne Assault Division.

After all, its other part the Russian
command again brought into battle in

the Tokmak direction. In order to prevent the
expansion of wedging of the advanced units of

the AFU into the first position of the main
defense line near the village of Verbove.

Over the past few days, the enemy
managed to somewhat narrow the

AFU bridgehead in the area of
Krynky in the flank directions.

Despite significant losses in weapons and
military equipment in this direction from the

fire of Ukrainian artillery and tactical attack
drones of the AFU, the enemy's forward units

are trying to constantly attack, acting mainly
along the coastal road Oleshky - Nova Kakhovka,

preventing the Ukrainian troops
from expanding the bridgehead.

West of the town of Oleshki,
along the Konka River,

some developments are also taking place.
It is still difficult to say exactly what,

but by certain indications it seems
that some small infantry groups of the

AFU have managed to cross the river in this
direction and are already west of the city.

On this point it is worth noting.

One can argue at length and with
stubbornness "on paper" about the

operational expediency of the active actions
of the AFU in the rush across the Dnipro,

especially in the context of the expenditure of
human lives and resources. However, one thing

is certain - the command of the Russian group of
troops "Dnieper" at the moment is quite difficult.

First of all, with regard to the distribution
and use of its forces and means, in conditions

when it has to act not against one
but several AFU bridgeheads and areas

at once. It just has to, metaphorically
speaking, "rush" from one to the other.

It is quite difficult to create some kind of
mobile reserve of the operational level to

simplify the performance of this task
or to maneuver freely with forces and

means along the first position of its
coastal defense line. Given the fire

initiative of Ukrainian artillery
in the operational-tactical zone,

as well as the proper level of intelligence of
the AFU in this strip, the performance of such

actions as the concentration and deployment of
units and subdivisions entails certain "costs".

They have to operate from deep within the
operational formation of the troops. This is

unnecessary time and hassle, especially when any
movement of your forces and means is immediately,

almost instantly, detected by Ukrainian
intelligence with a subsequent "firing" response.

This situation is even worse when
you have less than two tanks,

two artillery barrels and four armored
fighting vehicles per 1 km of front.

You have to concentrate them strategically,
both in terms of place and time, to prevent

simultaneous enemy activity in multiple
locations, thereby exposing other areas

and directions concurrently. Nothing will
help the Russian command here, no newly

appointed general will close a 250 km front with
forces that are not available "here and now".

It is important to remember that "logical on
paper" ideas, especially in the military context,

"live" only until the appearance of
practical results that contradict them.