All language subtitles for 04-11-2023hfchfcgeeee

This week, The Economist published a high-profile
article with a review and vision of further

military operations in Ukraine by the commander-in-chief
of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Zaluzhnyi.

And in this article, quite succinctly and
clearly set the accents as to how the Ukrainian

defense forces should act in the future and
what caused the slowdown of the offensive

launched this summer.

The Russian media picked up the term "positional
warfare" and began to develop it to the level

of a deafening stalemate of the Ukrainians
in the war, although the meaning was quite

different.

The calculation of the Ukrainian command was
to inflict such losses on the enemy that would

force them to retreat to more favorable lines,
but the Russian command did otherwise.

They began reinforcing their defensive lines
and positions with personnel, which served

as a brake element.

The enemy had colossal losses in personnel,
which should have forced the opposing side

to retreat.

But instead, Russia began moving its units
from the Kherson region to the Zaporizhzhya

region for reinforcement.

The Russians' first line of defense, the supply
line, was underestimated.

It was formed according to the classical Soviet
method, but the Russian command hypertrophied

the mining of fields to an unprecedented level
in history.

There were up to 5 landmines of both anti-tank
and anti-personnel types placed on one square

meter.

No army in the world had encountered such
dense mining, and even during World War II,

there was no such extensive mining of supply
routes.

At the start of the offensive, the AFU lacked
demining equipment.

This affected the pace of advance in the first
weeks of the offensive and led to the slowing

down of processes at the initial stage.

He also mentions the factor of dominance in
airspace.

Russia began to use corrected planning bombs,
and 300 or more bombs flew to Ukrainian positions

every day.

The record number per day was 1,000 bombs.

An offensive and any active operations are
simply impossible under such conditions.

And it is precisely because of such difficulties
that Zaluzhnyi emphasizes the problem of air

dominance of Russian aviation before the start
of deliveries of F-16 fighters to Ukraine.

That is why the opinion about an inevitable
period of positional war has arisen.

But it is not about freezing the war, but
about the need to revise the overall strategy

and prepare the offensive of the AFU at a
completely different level.

He also raises the issue of Electromagnetic
warfare complexes.

The Russian forces, while not dominating the
use of drones, are much more effective in

using their Electromagnetic warfare, which
found the key to reduce the effectiveness

of 155 mm GPS-guided Excalibur artillery shells.

All of this leads to the fact that the war
in Ukraine is increasingly resembling a positional

one.

Positional warfare is a type of warfare in
which the confrontation between sides occurs

on continuous, relatively stable fronts with
deeply entrenched defenses, with advances

not measured in kilometers or tens of kilometers,
but rather in tens and hundreds of meters.

But positional warfare can both favor the
enemy, accumulate reserves, and deplete them.

And this is Zaluzhnyi's main message.

Now it is important for the Ukrainians not
so much to liberate territories as to deplete

the enemy, while decisions are being made
to qualitatively improve the army's offensive

capabilities.

These qualitative changes are possible already
in 2024, but until then the main task of the

Ukrainian army should be to hold the front
line and create conditions that would not

allow the Russians to build up their potential.

Now, I have a question for you: in your estimation,
how much longer do you think the war in Ukraine

will continue if we consider its hypothetical
conclusion to be the Ukrainian Armed Forces

reaching the borders of 2013?