All language subtitles for 29-10-2023fghchgcjheee

The Russian occupation forces have gone on
the offensive in many parts of the front.

It seems that Russia simply has an endless
human resource with which it can parry any

offensive by the Ukrainian defense
forces. But is this really the case?

Enemy casualties almost crossed the
300,000 mark. And the total number of

"partially mobilized" through September 2023
was about 550,000 people. But is this number

sufficient and does it effectively
solve the tasks set for the enemy?

It would seem that this number fully covers
the losses, but when we talk about losses,

we primarily mean liquidated
and wounded, prisoners,

deserters and refuseniks. But practically no
one takes into account several existing needs.

The first need is compensation for
losses in order to restore the combat

effectiveness of units after incomparable
losses in the performance of combat tasks.

The second need voiced by the Russian side is the
creation of new units in the rear, which in the

short term should not be sent to the combat zone.
That is, recruit people who won’t compensate.

The third need is rotational. On the battlefield,
units need to be replaced by equivalent units.

If we cover all these needs in their
entirety, Russia needs to mobilize

40,000 to 50,000 people every month, but this
is unlikely before Putin's election in 2024.

Russian troops are not as effective now as they
were at the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine,

at the beginning of the war there was an elite
with years of experience. Now most soldiers are a

mobilized reserve and their successes are limited
to localized offensives or defense. Shortages

of equipment, ammunition, and gear all affect
the survivability of poorly trained personnel.

Having called up more than 500,000
men, Russia could not achieve within

a year even 10% of the goals that the "elite"
grouping of 180,000 men achieved in the first

half of 2022. This is a simple and eloquent
comparison that emphasizes the importance of

a professional component in the army, as well
as regular supply and compensation for losses.

And yet, even without large-scale
achievements in the combat zone,

this resource plays an inhibiting role, slowing
down the progress of the Ukrainian Defense Forces.

The solution to this problem is trivial and
obvious, but not easy when you are on the

offensive. As statistics has shown, their
problems begin at losses of 20 thousand or

more occupants per month, of course, in
conjunction with the technical component.

This is by far the most effective value
to exsanguinate its defense potential.

For example, not having a sufficient
number of armored combat vehicles,

the occupants are forced to attack either by
placing troops on top of the armor of tanks,

or by using unarmored civilian transport.
And this increases the casualty rate.

As the war is prolonged by
attracting human resources,

the situation with its technical support
worsens. And the worse this component is,

however paradoxical it may sound,
the more manpower is needed.

And here the Russian army runs into an existential
impasse, when it is impossible to provide more

technical components to the front, and it will
no longer be possible to compensate for its

shortage with human resources – as well as to
ensure the growing resource of this component.

The number of Russian troops and
their mobilization potential have

always been called the advantage of Russian
troops, but they are also their weak point.