All language subtitles for 17-10-2023vjcxxzdrxteeee

In recent days, reports have become more
frequent that Russian troops in Ukraine

have moved into some large-scale offensive.
But the enemy is already constantly in a state

of permanent offensive, which consists
of systematic counterattacks. But how

serious the current trends are, should
be analyzed separately and step by step.

To begin with, let's consider the general
picture of the combat zone in Ukraine,

which should be considered as "five bridgeheads"
on which defensive or offensive actions,

as well as specific, unique operations are carried
out. But let's talk about everything in order.

The Luhansk bridgehead is an exclusively
defense-type bridgehead. In total,

it is 150 Battalion tactical groups or about 120
thousand personnel. It was on this bridgehead

that back in the summer the Russians launched an
attempt to attack along the Lyman-Kupiansk axis,

but without much success and with serious losses.
The enemy underestimated the lines of Ukrainian

defense forces, attacked from open positions
and had a serious understaffing of units.

The Donetsk bridgehead is considered
the most capable and best manned,

with about 160 BTGs in this troop group.
Nevertheless, the Donetsk bridgehead is

not a defense bridgehead for the Ukrainian
side, but on the contrary, it is divided

into areas of different functionality,
with high intensity of combat operations.

On the Zaporizhzhya bridgehead, the AFU is
mainly on the offensive, which the Russian troops

are trying to slow down as much as possible by
concentrating a large number of forces and means,

primarily manpower. The total number of the
enemy corresponds to 130 BTGs. At the same time,

this numerous resource is critically
insufficient to hold positions. The

main objective is to hold positions until
weather conditions deteriorate in the south.

The Kherson bridgehead has 80 BTGs, which
has the worst staffing in the combat zone

after the Crimean group of troops. There are
no active offensive actions on this bridgehead

from the Ukrainian side. But the Russian side
regularly loses positions under pressure from

Ukrainian sabotage groups and artillery
from the right bank, which has a height

advantage. The gray zone gradually increases
on this bridgehead and absorbs the enemy.

The Crimean peninsula is the bridgehead where
conditions for subsequent military operations

are now being formed. It has long been considered
a deep rear, but not now. The Crimean group of

troops has the worst manning and combat capability
of all groups, numbering 12,000 personnel.

Their goal is to prevent sabotage without
conducting large-scale offensive operations.

The Russian command sees a large-scale
offensive operation in Crimea only when

the AFU approaches the administrative border
with the peninsula, which already implies the

liberation of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions
and the retreat of the Russian occupiers

into Crimea. Then the number of defense
potential will exceed 100 thousand people.

Conclusions :

Russian forces will not be able to
demonstrate an offensive operation at

the turn of 2023-2024 comparable to the invasion
in February 2022. On a number of bridgeheads,

the lack of resources for a large-scale
offensive is obvious. At the same time,

by creating the appearance of a heightened
threat in the Avdiivka area, the Russians

are stymied by a fortification where they
will need more forces and assets that can

only be pulled from the Bakhmut area, where
the Russians' defenses are already crumbling.

The Russian forces do not have the
initiative and advantages on the bridgeheads,

but they manage to slow down the advance of
the AFU, thanks to their ability to shuffle

manpower so far. Their main goal now is
to stop the AFU offensive at any cost.