All language subtitles for 06-10-2023hcjhghgee

According to "Western experts" from some
publications, the Russian occupation forces are

now actively using a kind of "elastic defense,"
the essence of which is to withdraw from their

positions, allowing the Ukrainian defense forces
to advance and then suddenly counterattack until

the Ukrainian assault troops gain a foothold.
So suddenly that I'm getting tired of saying it.

The purpose of elastic defense is to minimize
losses and preserve the ability to resist attacks,

as well as to create conditions for counterattack
and recovery of positions after enemy aggression.

This is maneuverable defense, which was
described back in the late 19th century,

in the sections of "Military Science" that
successfully migrated to the beginning of

the 20th century in Soviet manuals,
which are used by Putin's generals.

But the main thing is that the actions of the
Russians can hardly be called "elastic defense.

First of all, they often do not leave their
positions within the framework of such tactics,

but try to hold on to every stronghold at
all costs, clinging to it with their hands

and feet with a dead grip. Often these hands
and feet remain in the strongholds. Secondly,

it is traditional and has always been
so, when they lose a village, a trench,

a foxhole, a stronghold, they launch waves
of furious counterattacks in an attempt to

recapture the lost positions. And this
is not a sudden tactic of the Russians,

which experts write about, but a
classic one - they always do this.

Klishchiivka, Andriivka, Robotyne, Urozhayne
and many other villages and locations the

Russians have always frantically counterattacked
trying to get them back under their control,

and before that by colossal sacrifices in
attempts to hold them. That's not "elastic

defense," also known as "maneuverable
defense". This is a progressive retreat

of the enemy and there is no need to attach
additional meanings to it, it is useless.

And while some publications are trying
to justify the inevitable retreat of

the Russian army, the United States and
NATO allies are drawing conclusions from

the Russian-Ukrainian war. Certainly, it
primarily pertains to the scale of battles

and the required level of massiveness
for conducting military operations.

The US used to practice "planned
wars" with strict timetables and

good organization. But now American analysts
think differently about how to prepare for wars.

The main lesson they have learned is that
quantity matters. Other than the United States,

none of the allies in NATO has enough armor and

ammunition to last several months in a war
of similar magnitude to the one in Ukraine.

In their view, the Russian invasion of Ukraine
shows that the pursuit of precision in military

action that has dominated U.S. defense
strategy may not always be effective.

The war highlighted the significance of mass
actions on the battlefield, which have an

immediate impact, whereas the effects of precision
strikes take time and may lose relevance. The

battlefield can change while precision strikes
are operating deep within enemy territory.

And this was especially important to realize
before the likely confrontation with China.

If Ukraine's allies had provided precision
long-range weapons from the outset,

Ukraine would not now have to slog
through endless Russian minefields.

Until the HIMARS arrived,
the occupiers used tactic

of a barrage of fire with impunity and
pounded Ukraine with hundreds of guns,

but then everything changed. Prigozhin's whining
about shell starvation is the result of the fact

that numerous ammunition depots were destroyed
by high-precision pinpoint strikes of HIMARS.

But if there were more of them and not only
them, but it would be an alternative history.