All language subtitles for 17-08-2023dxsedzster

Today I want to raise the issue of military
expediency and military significance of

certain defense areas in the context
of the developing Ukrainian offensive.

A classic example of the "political will" to
try to hold the situation despite the military

inexpediency was the Russians' defense of Kherson,
which lost all its military significance back

in mid-spring last year, when the Russians
finally gave up trying to attack Mykolaiv.

However, they held the defense area until
November, losing the personnel of their

airborne and mechanized units in unfavorable
conditions due to the geography of the area,

and it was extremely stupid. The situation
was similar with other settlements.

Obviously, the Ukrainian command's current margin
of time to implement a large-scale offensive

expires in early November - due to weather
conditions. I emphasize - a large-scale offensive.

The Ukrainian defense forces have about eighty
days left before the weather conditions change

significantly, which will negatively affect the
capabilities of wheeled vehicles of the Ukrainian

defense forces. Is it a lot for the realization of
access to the Sea of Azov? Enough, quite enough.

Despite desperate attempts to prolong their agony,

the occupiers can no longer be
saved, at least in the south.

So, what is the main problem for the
defending side? It is the accumulation

of general "fatigue" of the defense area
followed by a leapfrog breakthrough.

Why? Let's go back in recent history.

The Ukrainians had this with the
defense of Popasna last year.

Perfectly built before the full-scale invasion,
the defense took the main blow in the form of

countless hordes of Russian troops, held out
for about three months, and ceased to exist

with a fairly significant rollback. And
this line of defense was qualitatively no

worse than what we see from the Russians. These
weren't just continuous lines of fortifications,

but well-constructed platoon and
company-level strongpoint systems.

Moreover, visibility allowed for objective control
for tens of kilometers to the south and southeast.

The Russians have nothing like this in
the south, the geography is not the same.

And what do the Russians have? In the direction
of Staromlynivka there are no heights,

the defense line is a few kilometers away,
in fact, the fighting is already in the

small village of Zavitne Bazhannia, after
which, apparently, the fate of Staromlynivka

will resemble Urozhayne - they will hold
on to it until physical extermination.

At the same time, the very line
of defense they are holding on to

has been under intensive shelling
by the AFU since the end of May.

Let's assume that about three more weeks
will pass and the Ukrainian troops will

finally liberate Rabotino. In that
case, what options can save Tokmak?

Tokmak, located on the banks of one small river,
built in the form of circular defense - the best

place to destroy the remnant of the battalions
worn out Russian in the format of simply

beating. The only problem will no longer be the
significantly damaged communication lines between

the second and third lines of defense,
but the high-rise buildings in Tokmak,

like the elevator clearly visible in the
photograph from the Ukrainian drone. However,

again, this is until the first tank strikes from
the Ukrainian tanks. And after that, freedom...

Countless fields, no major population centers,
accumulated critical losses of the Russian army.

And apparently, at this time, a major offensive
will begin from Huliaipole to the Polohy area,

and everything will go into motion.
Ukrainian reserves have already started

to enter the battle, since yesterday marders,
Challengers, Strykers have been spotted.

Advancing here is difficult, you're too
conspicuous, and the enemy can't linger

in Ukrainian fields either. The shore of the
Sea of Azov awaits the Ukrainian fighters,

while the Russian fighters are waiting
for something completely different.