All language subtitles for 19-06-2023cdrxdr

Today there will be two topics: what the Russians
have with the fortifications on the southern

front and about the "forgotten" Bakhmut.

There are some processes going on there.

In terms of defensive architecture, the Russian
fortifications on the southern front are all

one line of fortifications.

What can be seen on the direction near Tokmak
are auxiliary obstacles, they are not a single

system.

On the eastern flank, what is marked with
an oval, south of Vuhledar itself, although

there is one line, but it is fortified by
strongpoints.

On the map you can see them just behind the
line.

But exactly in the area of the ledge (highlighted
by a circle), there are not even auxiliary

lines, there is literally - one line of fortifications.

This is because most recently the enemy was
still planning to capture Vuhledar and build

their combat orders on the line Velyka Novosilka
- Vuhledar (highlighted in black line), for

further advancement to the north.

But he did not succeed in taking this town.

But the ledge remained and this is the first
reason.

The second is the complexity of logistics.

There are no railroad connections and no logistics
centers.

Logistical centers of the enemy - they are
also fortified districts with a circular defense.

Tokmak, for example - are powerful logistical
hubs.

But the area marked with a circle is steppes
with worthless roads.

Knowing that the AFU has successes and liberated
settlements there, the Russian command faces

a dilemma.

To drive more forces into that area without
being able to adequately support them, or

not to drive them in, leaving only the forces
that hold that single line without depth there.

There is such a thing as leading obstacle
emplacement.

That is, you create obstacles (including mines)
by deliberately leaving areas without obstacles,

so that the enemy will go exactly to them,
where you will wait for him and where you

will organize him firebags.

The global plan of the Russian General Staff
was that if the Ukrainians go on this ledge

- they will be crushed by aviation, artillery
and tank counterattacks.

It’s a classic of Soviet doctrine.

But what if the enemy's air and artillery
can't, and their tank counterattacks are repulsed?

Drive battalion after battalion along with
equipment into these steppes as stationary

targets and with no logistical rear near them?

And what to do if the breakout happened somewhere
else, and you can no longer leave this area.

When you've driven your reserves there, and
it's no longer possible to get them off quickly.

And if you decided that it was a cunning plan
and still did not throw reserves there, but

the Ukrainians outsmarted you and continue
to develop an offensive on the ledge and break

that single line?

There are a lot of questions.

I do not know about the Russian General Staff,
but the Ukrainian General Staff already has

answers to them, as well as plans for further
developments.

Let me remind you that the initiative is dictated
by the coming, not the defending.

Any defensive lines are either bypassed, or
hacked in specific directions, or seeped through

in certain narrow sections.

We do not know what the Ukrainians have in
mind here, but the most important thing to

understand is that no matter how events develop
further, it will be the Ukrainian General

Staff, not the Russian one, who will decide
the place and time.

While all the attention is focused on the
south, Bakhmut has somehow been forgotten

in the information flow.

And in vain, because it is still a very lively
bridgehead, with exciting prospects, for which

conditions are already being formed.

The Russian command in recent weeks has pulled
up serious forces to Bakhmut, to strengthen

the flanks, but this has not given any global
advantage.

The Ukrainian side continues to advance on
a daily basis and is now engaging Berkhivka

and Klishchiivka with an obvious intent on
their release.

It is difficult to say when this will happen,
because now the process of forming the conditions

for the successful extirpation of the numerous
gathering of the enemy, for which the artillery

is primarily responsible.

Methodically destroying enemy manpower and
artillery.

This is the main problem for the Russian occupiers.

They have been able to gather masses, including
reserves, to stabilize the collapse of the

flanks, but without the support of artillery,
even this mass cannot hold them.

And that is exactly what the Ukrainian forces
are doing now - depriving the occupiers of

this chance.

Ukraine's goals and objectives at this stage
are quite clear and in the foreseeable future

it is obvious that Bakhmut will be covered
from the north and south, but further plans

are shrouded in the fog of war.