All language subtitles for 06-05-2023etesih

It is becoming increasingly clear that the
AFU is systematically attacking the enemy's

fuel logistics.

The attack on the oil depot is one of the
elements of preparation for the counteroffensive

actions of the AFU.

This was confirmed by the speaker of the Operational
Command "South", which is responsible for

this direction.

The tactic of destroying enemy logistics is
one of the most effective since the beginning

of the war.

One of the elements of the reflection of enemy
convoys to Kyiv was the undermining of fuel

logistics.

The fact is that supply lines according to
the canons should not exceed 100 km, and for

one Battalion tactical group on average 10-12
fuel tankers are needed.

In the occupied territories the enemy is not
able to accumulate a reserve of fuel due to

the destroyed relevant infrastructure and
the missile reach of Himars systems.

The only safe way to supply goes through the
Crimea, but even this stretches logistics

well over a hundred kilometers.

In total, the enemy has over 500 oil depots,
but within reach of a few hundred kilometers

this figure is much more modest, only 35-40
oil depots.

In less than a week the AFU successfully attacked
six enemy oil depots.

Of course one attack will not take out all
the tanks, but for example in Sevastopol 60%

of the capacity was destroyed after only one
attack.

This is by the way a key fuel hub in Crimea,
which now has 10 destroyed tanks and several

damaged ones.

Now add that the attacks are carried out in
small groups of 3-5 drones, and it will take

at least 5 months to repair the damage in
Sevastopol.

The AFU will be like "pianists playing" on
enemy oil depots, destroying tank after tank.

The aggressor country's command has to make
a decision to either pull precious air defense

from the front or from under Putin's ass to
protect the oil depots.

Because it turns out that Ukrainian drones
fly hundreds of kilometers of enemy territory

and reach the target, and Russians have problems
protecting even a small number of strategic

airfields.

So one can only wish: "Play Maestro, play!"

The initial stage of preparation of the counteroffensive
is so media-intensive, as well as the counteroffensive

itself: the Minister of Defense almost every
day gives a comment on the readiness of the

AFU, the speakers openly say that destruction
of logistics is preparation and much more,

which may seem illogical.

Add the drones in the Kremlin and no matter
who launched them, the hysterics of the leader

of the Wagner group, the media disorganization
of Russian propagandists.

All this information layering reinforces Zelensky's
tour and symbolic speeches in The Hague, which

the press is already dubbing a "historic moment.

There is a balance between the military expediency
of making this or that information public

and the political heating of this topic for
the corresponding negotiating positions on

arms.

The key goal is to increase belief in success.

The key outcome is to increase military assistance
on the principle of "Still a bit short to

achieve maximum results."

The second point is that the initial phase
of the counteroffensive has already begun

and that Zelensky is performing his international
functions as president at the time of this

start.

He is not "directing Commander-in-Chief Zaluzhnyi
in manual mode."

This is a critical aspect to success: politicians
should stay out of the military's business.

Therefore, hopefully the full effect of the
information layering will result in "faith"

and, as a consequence, additional military
aid packages.