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Welcome folks, I would like to talk to you today about the imbalance of the Russian

occupational forces and the potential threat of their invasion of Ukraine.

According to the information that has appeared in

open sources on the composition of Russian troops, we can confirm

the fact of their absolute inability to conduct large-scale offensive operations.

But in order to explain why the Russians are now limited in their ability to conduct full-scale

offensive operations, one should use such a measure as a battalion-tactical group.

Yes, it is not really applicable to Russian forces right now,

for a number of reasons, but it is a telling measure.

So, according to the latest data on the composition of the occupation troops deployed on

the territory of Ukraine we can observe a complete inconsistency of this entire mass with the

staffing of Battalion tactical groups. According to the table, there are only 74 full-fledged

groups on the territory of Ukraine, all the rest will have a deficit of functionality in all

parameters except cannon fodder. This is largely why the Russian forces have no classic Battalion

tactical groups for a long time, but only adaptive homunculi like the Storm and others like it.

After the loss of manpower and equipment led to the disappearance of the Battalion

tactical groups as a class, the Russian army began to move less and less on a broad front.

As its losses continued to rise, and its equipment deteriorated,

the army began to confine itself to narrower areas and locales.

At the end of April 2023 with 369 thousand soldiers on the territory of Ukraine the Russian

command proudly and aspirationally reports in its daily report not about the capture of the region,

district, city or village, but about the capture of the street in the small town of Bakhmut.

The most interesting thing is that all this mass, driven into Ukraine,

is now unable not only to attack on a broad front and seize regions

and districts, but also to conduct full-fledged defensive operations.

Also, tell me at least one example of a successful occupant defense in an AFU counteroffensive ?

They could not hold the Northern bridgehead in the defense,

they could not hold Kharkov region, the right-bank Kherson region as well,

although there natural channels allowed to conduct a long-term defense and not only, but - no.

So, no matter how many Russian soldiers dig trenches, it doesn’t help them...

But what is most interesting about this story is that having all this mass on the territory

of Ukraine, without any result for itself, Russian troops have weakened the contingent

in the territory of Russia itself, which is practically unprotected and, the funniest,

the weakest contingent they have in the temporarily occupied territories of Crimea.

Those "brilliant" minds have managed to dig themselves into an even deeper hole

than they were in back in July 2022, when it was already painfully obvious that their

presence on the right bank was a one-way ticket to oblivion. And now, it seems like

they're repeating the same mistake all over again in virtually every occupied territory.

It's like they're trying to set a new world record for military incompetence!

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