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Ukraine's counteroffensive will begin in ...
But what's the rush, I'll tell you about it a little later...
You know, the Chinese use the same hieroglyph for the characteristics of a wise and cunning man.
And military cunning is not considered a deception at all.
Such non-standard strategies, developed in ancient China,
form the basis of the essay "Thirty-Six Stratagems. They cover the field of politics,
diplomacy, espionage and are based on the experience of three thousand years.
The treatise recommends, for example:
-๏ธ do "dirty work" with other people's hands; -๏ธ to disguise one's true
intentions with a false purpose; -๏ธ use a long-rejected technology or method;
- deceive the enemy into believing that he is acquiring something,
thereby diverting his attention; - free a cornered enemy to relax,
and then attack unexpectedly; - influence an army through their leader...
Most effective, however,
is to introduce more chaos by throwing in false information to disorient the enemy.
In connection with the Ukrainian counteroffensive, it is appropriate to recall the German command's
"Kremlin" operation to disinform Stalin on the eve of the attack.
In general, Nazi Germany since the mid-30s began to declare the inevitability of war with the USSR.
Soviet intelligence understood that the war would begin. The question is when?
In '41 a kaleidoscope of insinuations began - dates of possible attack changed twice a day.
But analytics was weak after Stalin's "purges",
and the intelligence did not know what to report to the leader. However, Stalin
considered himself to be the best analyst, just as Putin considers himself to be now.
In general, I am sure that this skilful and subtle information-psychological operation on the timing
and readiness of the Ukrainian counteroffensive successfully disoriented everyone who was needed.
But at the same time it only optimized the algorithm of the future counterattack,
without violating the sober accounting of forces,
discipline, cold calculation and daring ambition of Ukraine to defeat the enemy.
And now I will name the date of Ukraine's counteroffensive. It will begin in November '22,
in December, in spring, in March, when the ground dries up, April 30...
You get the idea...
I'm wrapping up for today, but I'll see you all tomorrow.
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