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THE GREAT RESPECT THAT I HAVE

FOR YOUR LEADERSHIP, MR. PRESIDENT,

IN THIS LITTLE-UNDERSTOOD, UNFAMILIAR WAR,

THE FIRST WAR OF THE 21st CENTURY,

IT IS NOT WELL KNOWN, IT WAS NOT WELL UNDERSTOOD,

IT IS COMPLEX FOR PEOPLE TO COMPREHEND,

AND I KNOW WITH CERTAIN CERTAINTY THAT OVER TIME

THE CONTRIBUTIONS YOU'VE MADE WILL BE RECORDED BY HISTORY.

[OVERLAPPING NEWS REPORTS AND RADIO CHATTER]

Narrator: ON MAY 1st, 2003, PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH

DECLARED AN END TO MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS IN IRAQ AND SAID

"IN THE BATTLE OF IRAQ, THE UNITED STATES AND OUR ALLIES HAVE PREVAILED."

FOUR YEARS LATER, AFTER OVER 3,000 AMERICAN DEATHS AND OVER 20,000 AMERICAN WOUNDED,

IRAQ HAS DISINTEGRATED INTO CHAOS.

BAGHDAD HAS TEN BOMBINGS, TEN, FIFTEEN BOMBINGS A DAY,

AND IT'S MAYBE 50 K.I.A.

BUT I SUSPECT THAT'S DRASTICALLY UNDER-REPORTED.

WE'RE PROBABLY CAPTURING A THIRD OF WHAT'S ACTUALLY OCCURRING.

Narrator: MILLIONS OF IRAQIS HAVE LOST ACCESS TO DRINKING WATER,

SEWAGE TREATMENT AND ELECTRICITY SINCE THE INVASION.

BAGHDAD, A CITY OF SIX MILLION, HAS BEEN UNDER AN 8:00 P.M. CURFEW SINCE MARCH OF 2006.

OVER THREE MILLION IRAQIS HAVE FLED TO NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES.

ESTIMATES OF THE CIVILIAN DEATH TOLL RANGE AS HIGH AS 600,000.

PEOPLE WHO DIE, THEY'RE LUCKY,

BUT PEOPLE LIVING, THEY'RE DEAD WHILE THEY ARE ALIVE.

THE WEST PART AND THE NORTH PART OF IRAQ ARE CONTROLLED BY INSURGENTS.

THE REST OF IRAQ IS CONTROLLED BY MILITIAS.

Narrator: IRAQ'S TWO MAJOR MUSLIM GROUPS, THE SHI'ITE MAJORITY AND SUNNI MINORITY,

ARE INCREASINGLY AT WAR.

FROM JANUARY 2003 TO JANUARY 2005,

I WAS THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL.

WE PRODUCED THE FIRST NATIONAL ESTIMATE ON THE STATE OF THE INSURGENCY IN IRAQ.

THE ESTIMATE DELIVERED PRETTY BAD NEWS.

IT BASICALLY LAID OUT SORT OF BAD, WORSE AND WORST SCENARIOS.

THE PRESIDENT CALLED IT GUESSWORK

AND HIS PRESS SPOKESMAN

CALLED IT HAND-WRINGING AND NAY-SAYING.

UM, WHAT WAS REALLY REVEALING TO ME

WAS THE PRESIDENT HADN'T READ IT.

Paul Hughes: SEPTEMBER 11TH OF 2001 WAS A VERY CLEAR, BRIGHT, BEAUTIFUL DAY,

AND I HAD JUST COME BACK FROM THE PENTAGON BARBER SHOP,

WALKED BY MY OFFICE AND GLANCED UP ON THE TELEVISION SCREEN,

AND THERE WAS, UH, ONE OF THE TWIN TOWERS BURNING.

WE NEVER HEARD THE PLANE COME IN. AT LEAST I DIDN'T.

SUDDENLY THE WHOLE WORLD TURNED UPSIDE DOWN.

I SAW THAT FIREBALL AND I GOTTA TELL YOU,

I SAW THAT AND I SAID TO MYSELF, I'M GOING TO DIE TODAY.

THAT PLANE HAD COME DIRECTLY UNDER OUR SECTION OF THE OFFICES.

THE ARMY BUDGET OFFICE WHERE 38 ARMY EMPLOYEES WERE KILLED WAS DIRECTLY BENEATH US,

AND THE NAVY'S NEW COMMAND CENTER WAS TWO FLOORS BENEATH US.

EVERYBODY WAS KILLED IN THOSE TWO SECTIONS.

THIS WAS SOMETHING THAT OSAMA BIN LADEN HAD ORCHESTRATED

BECAUSE HE WAS THE ONLY TERRORIST I COULD THINK OF

WHO COULD HAVE COORDINATED THIS KIND OF ACTIVITY.

Man: OH, SO YOU HAD THAT THOUGHT IMMEDIATELY?

IMMEDIATELY, IMMEDIATELY.

Narrator: A MONTH AFTER SEPTEMBER 11TH,

THE UNITED STATES ENTERED AFGHANISTAN

IN SEARCH OF AL-QAEDA AND OSAMA BIN LADEN.

BUT EVEN BEFORE THE AFGHAN WAR, SEVERAL SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS

WERE LOOKING AT ANOTHER TARGET,

ONE THAT HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE 9/11 ATTACKS.

WHEN THE PLANES HIT THE PENTAGON,

I WAS IN THE BUILDING,

AND THEN I GUESS THE NEXT BIG THING THAT SORT OF HAPPENED WAS

WE IMMEDIATELY GOT TASKED TO SEE IF WE COULD DRAW ANY RELATIONSHIP

BETWEEN SADDAM AND AL-QAEDA.

I WENT RIGHT AWAY TO THE COUNTER-TERRORISM GROUP,

TO THEIR CHIEF IRAQ ANALYST.

THE TWO OF US SAT DOWN OVER A FEW DAYS

AND LOOKED AT ALL THE HISTORICAL REPORTING

THAT WE COULD GO THROUGH.

Man: AND WHAT DID YOU CONCLUDE?

WELL, WE CONCLUDED THAT THERE WAS NO RELATIONSHIP.

HIS REGIME AIDS AND PROTECTS TERRORISTS

INCLUDING MEMBERS OF AL-QAEDA.

WE CONTINUE TO WATCH IRAQ'S INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.

WHAT I WANNA BRING TO YOUR ATTENTION TODAY

IS THE POTENTIALLY MUCH MORE SINISTER NEXUS BETWEEN IRAQ

AND THE AL-QAEDA TERRORIST NETWORK.

WE DON'T WANT THE SMOKING GUN TO BE A MUSHROOM CLOUD.

IRAQ HAS DRONES, AND THEY'RE GONNA TAKE THESE DRONES

AND THEY'RE GONNA PUT THEM ON THESE SHIPS

AND THEY'RE GONNA ARM THE DRONES WITH CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

AND THEY'RE GONNA FLY THESE DRONES OFF THE SHIPS

AND ATTACK THE EAST COAST OF UNITED STATES.

YOU KNOW, THIS IS ABSOLUTE FANTASY LAND.

THESE PEOPLE WERE, I DON'T KNOW WHAT THEY WERE SMOKING,

BUT IT MUST HAVE BEEN VERY GOOD.

Narrator: GEORGE W. BUSH'S FOREIGN POLICY INNER CIRCLE--

CHENEY, RUMSFELD AND WOLFOWITZ--

SET THE ADMINISTRATION ON COURSE FOR WAR WITH IRAQ.

CONDOLEEZZA RICE SIDED WITH THEM.

COLIN POWELL AND RICHARD ARMITAGE,

THE ONLY SENIOR OFFICIALS WITH COMBAT EXPERIENCE,

EXPRESSED CONCERNS PRIVATELY

BUT SUPPORTED THE ADMINISTRATION IN PUBLIC

BUSH'S ADVISERS HAD BEEN INVOLVED WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN

SINCE HE INVADED IRAN IN 1980

IN A BRUTAL WAR THAT KILLED NEARLY A MILLION PEOPLE.

IRAQ USED CHEMICAL WEAPONS

AGAINST BOTH THE IRANIAN MILITARY AND INNOCENT CIVILIANS.

SADDAM INVESTED BILLIONS OF DOLLARS

IN NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAMS

WHILE MURDERING 300,000 OF HIS OWN CITIZENS.

BUT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, FEARING IRAN,

SUPPORTED SADDAM WITH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AND ECONOMIC AID.

DONALD RUMSFELD MET WITH SADDAM IN 1983.

COLIN POWELL WAS REAGAN'S NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER

FROM 1987 TO 1989.

THE '80s WERE REALLY SUMMED UP IN A DREADFUL

BUT VERY TELLING STATE DEPARTMENT DOCUMENT

FROM 1987, WHICH SAID

HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE ASIDE, COMMA,

OUR INTERESTS RUN ROUGHLY PARALLEL TO THOSE OF IRAQ.

Narrator: THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR ENDS IN STALEMATE IN 1988.

IN 1990, SADDAM INVADES KUWAIT.

A U.S.-LED COALITION EXPELS HIM IN A WAR

MASTERMINDED BY DICK CHENEY, THEN SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,

PAUL WOLFOWITZ, THEN UNDER- SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY,

AND COLIN POWELL, THEN CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.

THE FIRST PRESIDENT BUSH URGES IRAQIS TO STAGE A COUP AGAINST SADDAM.

THERE'S ANOTHER WAY FOR THE BLOODSHED TO STOP

AND THAT IS FOR THE IRAQI MILITARY AND THE IRAQI PEOPLE

TO TAKE MATTERS INTO THEIR OWN HANDS

AND FORCE SADDAM HUSSEIN THE DICTATOR TO STEP ASIDE.

Narrator: YET WHEN IRAQ'S SOUTHERN SHI'ITES RISE UP,

THE ADMINISTRATION ALLOWS SADDAM TO REPRESS THEM.

14 OUT OF IRAQ'S 18 GOVERNORATES WERE UNDER REBEL CONTROL

WHEN GENERAL SCHWARTZKOPF ALLOWED SADDAM HUSSEIN

TO USE HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS

TO MASSACRE THE REBELS' MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN.

Narrator: THE 1991 ARMISTICE REQUIRES IRAQ TO DISARM,

BUT SADDAM REFUSES TO COMPLY.

AS A RESULT, IRAQ'S ECONOMY CRUMBLES

UNDER A U.N. EMBARGO INSTITUTED IN 1993

AND CONTINUED BY THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION.

SADDAM'S FAVORITE ELITE REMAIN WEALTHY,

BUT ORDINARY IRAQIS ARE PLUNGED INTO EXTREME POVERTY

AND MANY TURN TO FUNDAMENTALIST ISLAM.

IN 1993, WHEN GEORGE BUSH SENIOR VISITS KUWAIT,

SADDAM ATTEMPTS TO ASSASSINATE HIM.

SEVEN YEARS LATER, HIS SON IS ELECTED PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

WHEN YOU SEE THE SAME ARCHITECTS OF THOSE POLICIES

ON THE ONE HAND, TALKING ABOUT

GETTING RIGHT WHAT THEY HAD GOTTEN WRONG BACK IN 1991,

YOU KNOW, FINISHING THE JOB,

IT WAS TEMPTING TO SAY, "WELL, MAYBE THEY'VE LEARNED."

George W Bush, on TV: SADDAM HUSSEIN AND HIS SONS

MUST LEAVE IRAQ WITHIN 48 HOURS.

THEIR REFUSAL TO DO SO WILL RESULT IN MILITARY CONFLICT

COMMENCED AT A TIME OF OUR CHOOSING.

George Packer: IF YOU WANNA DATE THE BEGINNING OF

THE DISASTER OF POST-WAR IRAQ,

IT WOULD BE JANUARY 20TH, 2003,

WHEN BUSH SIGNED WITHOUT, AS FAR AS I CAN TELL,

ANY REAL DISCUSSION WITHIN THE WHITE HOUSE OR THE ADMINISTRATION,

NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE NUMBER 24,

WHICH GAVE CONTROL OF POST-WAR IRAQ TO THE PENTAGON.

THAT DOCUMENT ESSENTIALLY MADE DONALD RUMSFELD

THE MAIN ACTOR ON POST-WAR IRAQ.

THIS WAR WAS CONCEIVED BY A VERY SMALL GROUP OF PEOPLE

INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION.

THEY HAD AN ENTIRELY NAIVE VISION OF WHAT IRAQ WAS

AND WHAT IRAQIS WOULD DO ONCE THE REGIME FELL.

Narrator: IN FORMULATING ITS VIEWS ON POST-SADDAM IRAQ,

THE ADMINISTRATION RELIED HEAVILY ON A MAN NAMED AHMED CHALABI.

SINCE 1992, CHALABI HAD BEEN PRESIDENT OF

THE IRAQI NATIONAL CONGRESS, OR I.N.C.

WIDELY VIEWED WITH SUSPICION...

CHALABI HAD BEEN CONVICTED IN JORDAN OF A HUGE BANK FRAUD.

THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY FOUND HIS INFORMATION UNRELIABLE

OR EVEN FRAUDULENT.

AT BEST I THINK THEY WERE LIARS

AND AT WORST THEY WERE PROVOCATEURS.

IF IT'S AN I.N.C. SOURCE

IT WAS ALWAYS LOOKED AT VERY, VERY SKEPTICALLY

BY THE ANALYSTS.

BUT THAT WASN'T THE CASE WITH THE POLICY MAKERS.

CHALABI ASSERTED THAT POST-WAR IRAQ

WOULD BE PRO-AMERICAN AND EASILY STABILIZED,

PARTICULARLY IF CHALABI HIMSELF WAS IN CHARGE.

AND SO THE PLAN WAS, ESSENTIALLY,

WE'LL STAY FOR THREE OR FOUR MONTHS

WE WILL INSTALL A GOVERNMENT MADE UP OF EXILES

AND LED BY AHMED CHALABI,

AND THEN IN AUGUST OR SEPTEMBER OF 2003

WE WILL BEGIN A DRASTIC REDUCTION OF TROOPS.

LARRY DI RITA ADDRESSED US IN ONE FORM

AND SAID BY THE END OF AUGUST OF 2003

WE WILL HAVE ALL BUT 25 TO 30,000 TROOPS OUT OF IRAQ.

I HEARD HIM SAY THAT IN A ROOM FULL OF PEOPLE,

AND I TURNED TO MY COLLEAGUES

AND I SAID, "THIS GUY DOESN'T KNOW WHAT HE'S TALKING ABOUT.

"IT'S PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE."

Narrator: THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S FUTURE OF IRAQ PROJECT,

A 13-VOLUME STUDY ON POST-WAR IRAQ,

WAS IGNORED BY THE PENTAGON.

THERE WAS AN AWFUL LOT OF THINKING AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

THERE WERE BOARD FEET OF VOLUMES ON HOW WE SHOULD DO THIS.

AND ALMOST NONE OF THIS WAS INTEGRATED

INTO THE PENTAGON'S THINKING.

THE SECRETARY'S FRUSTRATION, ALONG WITH MY OWN, GREW,

AS WE WATCHED OUR CAREFUL PLANNING,

OUR DETAILED PLANNING,

ESSENTIALLY DISCARDED

AND THE PEOPLE WHO'D BEEN INVOLVED IN IT

ESSENTIALLY DISCARDED,

SO THAT MORE LOYAL,

IN LINE WITH THE REPUBLICAN PARTY'S VIEWS AND SO FORTH

PEOPLE COULD BE APPOINTED TO KEY POSITIONS IN IRAQ.

AT THIS HOUR, AMERICAN AND COALITION FORCES

ARE IN THE EARLY STAGES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

TO DISARM IRAQ, TO FREE ITS PEOPLE,

AND TO DEFEND THE WORLD FROM GRAVE DANGER.

I JOINED THE MARINES BECAUSE I THINK I'VE ALWAYS JUST FELT

IT'S A REALLY IMPORTANT JOB, AND I DIDN'T FEEL LIKE

I'D BE CONTENT WITH MYSELF GOING THROUGH LIFE

KNOWING THAT OTHER PEOPLE HAD FOUGHT FOR MY FREEDOM.

I JOINED THE ARMY TO SUPPORT MY COUNTRY

AND I THOUGHT IT WAS A GOOD THING TO DO, YOU KNOW.

IT WAS AN HONOR TO GO THERE AND HELP MY FELLOW SOLDIERS

TO DO WHAT THEY TELLED US TO GO AND DO THERE,

MAYBE TAKE OUT A DICTATOR OUT OF THE POWER,

TO RE-ESTABLISH THE DEMOCRACY.

[RADIO CHATTER]

Omar Fekeiki: I JUST, WAS WAITING FOR THE WAR TO HAPPEN

BECAUSE IT WAS THE ONLY RAY OF HOPE I HAD TO LOOK FOR,

UM, AND WHEN IT HAPPENED I WAS EXCITED,

AND THAT THINGS WILL MOVE SLOWLY

BUT TOWARDS BETTER CIRCUMSTANCES.

THANK YOU, MR. BUSH.

Man: WE VERY LIKE MR. BUSH!

Children, chanting: NO, NO, SADDAM! YES, YES, BUSH!

NO, NO, SADDAM! YES, YES, BUSH!

Chris Allbritton: IT WAS JUST A CONFUSING, LOUD, NOISY, SCARY, HOPEFUL PLACE

ALL KIND OF WRAPPED UP TOGETHER.

I WOULD SEE KIDS WITH SKI CAPS ON THAT SAID "F.B.I." ACROSS IT

AND THEY WOULD BE GIVING ME THE BIG THUMBS-UP.

AND THEN I WOULD HAVE OTHER YOUNG MEN

WHO WERE PROBABLY FEDAYIN IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES

GIVING ME VERY HARD STARES

AND, YOU KNOW, KIND OF SIZING ME UP

AND ALWAYS KIND OF LOOKING AT THE LICENSE PLATE OF THE CAR.

THE IRAQIS WERE WAITING TO SEE

WHAT THIS WAS GOING TO BRING THEM.

THE PRESENCE OF THE AMERICANS HAD NOT BEEN REJECTED YET

BY THE IRAQIS.

NO SADDAM, NO SADDAM!

Omar Fekeiki: I'VE SEEN PEOPLE WELCOMING THE COALITION TROOPS

BECAUSE WE THOUGHT EVERYTHING IS PLANNED, EVERYTHING IS PREPARED.

THERE YA GO.

Narrator: DURING WORLD WAR 2, THE UNITED STATES

STARTED PLANNING THE OCCUPATION OF GERMANY

TWO YEARS IN ADVANCE,

BUT THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION DIDN'T CREATE THE ORGANIZATION

THAT WOULD MANAGE THE OCCUPATION OF IRAQ

UNTIL 60 DAYS BEFORE THE INVASION.

O.R.H.A., THE ORGANIZATION FOR RECONSTRUCTION

AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

REPORTED DIRECTLY TO DEFENSE SECRETARY RUMSFELD.

Jay Garner: I GOT A CALL FROM THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

IN LATE JANUARY,

AND THEY WOULD LIKE FOR ME TO HANDLE

HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS RECONSTRUCTION.

Narrator: RETIRED ARMY GENERAL JAY GARNER WAS APPOINTED TO RUN O.R.H.A.

IN THE FIRST GULF WAR, HE HAD COMMANDED 22,000 SOLDIERS

RESPONSIBLE FOR HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

IN THE KURDISH ZONE OF NORTHERN IRAQ.

THIS TIME, HE WOULD BE RUNNING THE ENTIRE COUNTRY.

Man: DID YOU THINK THAT YOU WERE PREPARED TO RUN IRAQ?

I DON'T THINK WE WERE EVER PREPARED, I MEAN, YOU KNOW, TO--

A TASK OF THAT MAGNITUDE PROBABLY TAKES YEARS TO PREPARE.

BUT OF COURSE NOBODY HAD YEARS.

I GOT A PHONE CALL ON MY CELL PHONE

FROM SOMEONE AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT

TELLING ME THAT RICH ARMITAGE WAS LOOKING FOR ME

AND WANTED ME BACK IN WASHINGTON RIGHT NOW.

AMBASSADOR BARBARA BODINE WAS PLACED IN CHARGE OF BAGHDAD

ONLY THREE WEEKS BEFORE THE WAR.

SHE WAS A CAREER FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER

WHO HAD SERVED IN YEMEN, IRAQ,

AND HAD BEEN A HOSTAGE IN KUWAIT FOR FIVE MONTHS

AFTER SADDAM'S INVASION IN 1990.

SHE WAS ONE OF THE FEW STATE DEPARTMENT MID-EAST EXPERTS

THAT THE PENTAGON ALLOWED INTO IRAQ.

SHE WAS ONE OF THE FEW WE COULD GET IN.

I THOUGHT THAT THEY INITIALLY MADE A MISTAKE--

THEY THOUGHT THEY HAD A WOMAN AND SHE'D BE AN EASY MARK--

BUT BARBARA'S ONE OF THE TOUGHEST MEMBERS OF THE SERVICE.

Narrator: BY 2003, ARMY COLONEL PAUL HUGHES

HAD WORKED IN THE PENTAGON FOR SIX YEARS

DOING PLANNING AND STRATEGY WORK

FOR SENIOR DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS.

I WOUND UP BEING ASSIGNED

TO THE OFFICE OF RECONSTRUCTION AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

UNDER JAY GARNER,

AND I WAS THE DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC POLICY FOR HIM.

WE WERE GIVEN A SUITE OF OFFICES

THAT HAD BEEN UNOCCUPIED FOR A COUPLE OF YEARS,

HAD NO COMPUTERS IN IT, YOU HAVE PEOPLE SHOWING UP DAILY

ASKING, "WHERE DO I SIT?"

THEY HAD NO STAFF, I HAD NO PERSONNEL.

I HAD NOTHING FROM EITHER A SENIOR DEPUTY

DOWN TO A SECRETARY.

THERE WAS ONLY ONE MEETING AT THE NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

AND IT WAS THE--I THINK THE CONSENSUS OPINION

OF THE PEOPLE WHO WENT TO THAT MEETING

WITH WHOM I SPOKE AFTERWARDS, UM...

THAT, HEY, THIS IS CRAZY.

UH, THAT WAS OUR FIRST MEETING,

AND WE'RE NOT GIVEN A WHOLE LOT CONFIDENCE BY THAT FIRST MEETING

BECAUSE, ESSENTIALLY,

WE DIDN'T DO ANYTHING EXCEPT MEET EACH OTHER.

IT WAS COMPLETELY UNSTRUCTURED.

THERE WERE NO PLANS. THERE TRULY WERE NO PLANS.

Hughes: ON THE 16TH OF MARCH, O.R.H.A. FLEW OUT TO KUWAIT CITY.

WE HAD 167 PEOPLE THAT FLEW WITH US.

167 PEOPLE THAT WERE TO ESSENTIALLY BECOME

THE GOVERNMENT OF A COUNTRY OF 25 MILLION.

Seth Moulton: AFTER THE FALL OF BAGHDAD,

WE HAD NO IDEA WHAT REALLY WAS GONNA HAPPEN,

AND THERE CERTAINLY DIDN'T SEEM TO BE MUCH OF A PLAN.

WHAT WE WERE GENERALLY BEING TOLD

IS THAT WE'D BE GETTING BACK ON THE SHIPS,

YOU KNOW, WITHIN A MONTH OR TWO OF ESSENTIALLY CONQUERING IRAQ.

Bodine: WHILE WE WERE IN KUWAIT

WE WERE AS GLUED TO THE TELEVISION SET

AS EVERYONE ELSE.

THERE WAS THE REALIZATION THAT THERE WAS ABSOLUTE LAWLESSNESS

AND CHAOS GOING ON IN IRAQ.

Allbritton: THE AMERICANS WEREN'T DOING ANYTHING.

THEY WOULD SIT AT CERTAIN INTERSECTIONS

BUT THEY WOULDN'T ACTUALLY GET OUT OF THE HUMVEES

OR OUT OF THE TANKS AND REALLY DO MUCH.

Fekeiki: TIME PASSED, AND WE DIDN'T SEE ANY PROGRESS.

THE ONLY PROGRESS WE FOUND IS THE UNCONTROLLED FREEDOM.

LOOTERS HAD TO LOOT ALL THE GOVERNMENTAL BUILDINGS

AND EVEN PRIVATE-OWNED COMPANIES.

THE LOOTING WAS PARTLY A FACTOR OF THE TROOP LEVELS

AND THE SENSE THAT RUMSFELD COMMUNICATED TO HIS COMMANDERS

AND HIS COMMANDERS COMMUNICATED DOWN THE CHAIN TO THE PLATOON

AND COMPANY LEVEL, THAT WE WERE NOT THERE TO RUN IRAQ,

WE WERE THERE TO GET RID OF THE REGIME AND GET OUT.

WE'RE NOT UNDER MARTIAL LAW HERE.

Hughes: IN HIS ORDER, GENERAL McKIERNAN WAS NOT TOLD

TO ESTABLISH MARTIAL LAW.

YOU KNOW, NOT ONCE WAS MARTIAL LAW WAS DECLARED.

I'LL JUST, I'LL TELL YOU HONESTLY WE'RE IN A TRANSITION PERIOD

I MEAN THERE IS AN IRAQI CIVIL LAW BUT THERE'S NO...

YOU JUST HEARD THAT WE JUST OPENED UP THE FIRST TWO COURTS TODAY

SO I MEAN, WHEN YOU'RE STARTING TO NOTHING...

HAD MARTIAL LAW BEEN DECLARED,

WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN AUTHORIZED UNDER THE 4TH GENEVA CONVENTION,

MAYBE WE WOULD HAVE HAD A BIT MORE SECURITY.

WE'RE A PLATOON OF MARINES. I MEAN, WE COULD...

WE COULD CERTAINLY STOP LOOTING IF WE...

IF THAT WAS OUR ASSIGNED TASK.

James Fallows: THE GREATEST MYSTERY OF POST-WAR IRAQ

INVOLVES THAT MONTH OR SO AFTER THE FALL OF BAGHDAD

OF WHY THE US DIDN'T DO ANYTHING

TO CONTROL THE LOOTING BECAUSE, IN A WAY,

EVERYTHING THAT'S BEEN A PROBLEM SINCE THEN

STARTED IN THAT FIRST MONTH.

PEOPLE AT THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL,

SECRETARY POWELL, MYSELF AND OTHERS,

UH, C.I.A. DIRECTOR, DID EXPRESS CONCERN ABOUT THE LOOTING.

Man: UH, DID YOU EXPRESS ANY CONCERN TO PRESIDENT BUSH?

UH, I WAS AT A MEETING WHERE IT WAS EXPRESSED BY MY BOSS.

Man: TELL ME WHAT MR. POWELL SAID AT THAT MEETING.

WELL, YOU KNOW, THAT'S NOT THE WAY WE GENERALLY WORK.

OUR ADVICE TO THE PRESIDENT IS GENERALLY KEPT THAT WAY,

PRIVATE TO THE PRESIDENT.

Bodine: THE WORD CAME FROM WASHINGTON

THAT WE'RE NOT GETTING INVOLVED IN THAT,

WE'RE NOT GONNA STOP THE LOOTING,

WE'RE NOT DOING POLICE WORK,

THAT'S NOT WHAT WE'RE HERE FOR. AND I THINK...

Man: SO THERE WERE EXPLICIT INSTRUCTIONS FROM WASHINGTON

TO NOT INTERFERE WITH THE LOOTING?

YES.

HOSPITALS, GOVERNMENT OFFICES, UNIVERSITIES, MINISTRIES,

Packer: ONE C.P.A. ESTIMATE HAD THE COST OF THE LOOTING

AT $12 BILLION.

THAT WAS THE REVENUE FOR IRAQ IN 2003-2004.

I PICKED UP A NEWSPAPER TODAY, AND I COULDN'T BELIEVE IT.

I READ EIGHT HEADLINES THAT TALKED ABOUT

"CHAOS! VIOLENCE! UNREST!"

AND IT JUST WAS, "HENNY PENNY, THE SKY IS FALLING!"

JUST IMAGINE THE ROOM, THE SUITE THAT WE WERE SITTING IN,

AND ALL THAT YOU HAVE IS CONCRETE WALLS, EVERYTHING IS GONE.

WE'RE TALKING PEOPLE COMING IN WITH INDUSTRIAL CRANES

AND WALKING OFF WITH PARTS OF A POWER PLANT.

THINK WHAT'S HAPPENED IN OUR CITIES

WHEN WE'VE HAD RIOTS AND PROBLEMS, AND LOOTING.

STUFF HAPPENS!

Moulton: THIS WAS NOT JUST PEOPLE STEALING STUFF FROM GROCERY STORES.

I MEAN, THIS WAS PEOPLE CHIPPING CONCRETE WALLS

INTO LITTLE PIECES

SO THEY COULD TAKE THE REBAR OUT.

THE IMAGES YOU ARE SEEING ON TELEVISION

YOU ARE SEEING OVER AND OVER AND OVER,

AND IT'S THE SAME PICTURE OF SOME PERSON

WALKING OUT OF SOME BUILDING WITH A VASE.

I THINK THAT WAS PROBABLY THE DAY THAT WE LOST THE IRAQIS.

AND YOU THINK, "MY GOODNESS! WERE THERE THAT MANY VASES?!"

[LAUGHTER]

IS IT POSSIBLE THAT THERE WERE THAT MANY VASES

IN THE WHOLE COUNTRY?

THAT'S WHEN IT BECAME VERY CLEAR THAT...

THIS LIBERATION REALLY DIDN'T HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH THE AVERAGE IRAQI.

THERE WAS A BELIEF THAT THE AMERICANS

ACTUALLY ENCOURAGED THE LOOTING,

OR WANTED IT TO HAPPEN.

THE DESTRUCTION OF OUR COUNTRY,

HOW COULD THEY LET THIS HAPPEN?

SO, WHETHER YOU WERE SUNNI OR SHI'AH,

YOU WERE OUTRAGED ABOUT THE LOOTING.

WE HAD DONE A LIST OF 20 SITES

THAT WE THOUGHT NEEDED TO BE PROTECTED,

UM, HISTORICAL, CULTURAL, ARTISTIC, RELIGIOUS.

AND WE HAD PROVIDED THAT

AND IT REALLY MADE NO DIFFERENCE WHATSOEVER.

Narrator: THE IRAQ NATIONAL MUSEUM IN BAGHDAD,

NUMBER ONE ON O.R.H.A.'S LIST,

CONTAINED SOME OF THE WORLD'S MOST IMPORTANT ARTIFACTS

OF EARLY HUMAN CIVILIZATION.

THE MUSEUM WAS NEVER PROTECTED.

Narrator: IRAQ'S NATIONAL LIBRARY AND NATIONAL ARCHIVES

CONTAINING THOUSANDS OF ANCIENT MANUSCRIPTS WERE BURNT DOWN.

ALL WHAT ARE WRITTEN OR WERE WRITTEN

ARE KEPT IN THIS LIBRARY.

NOW WE HAVE NO NATIONAL HERITAGE.

THREE DAYS AGO, ME AND DR. JABAR KHALIL,

CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE BOARD OF ANTIQUITIES,

WENT TO THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE MARINES IN PALESTINE HOTEL.

WE WAITED THERE FOR ABOUT FOUR HOURS

TILL WE MET A COLONEL THERE.

AND AT THAT DAY, HE PROMISED THAT HE WILL SEND ARMORED CARS

TO PROTECT WHAT'S LEFT FROM THE MUSEUM.

THREE DAYS AGO TILL NOW, NOBODY CAME.

TO TRY TO LAY OFF THE FACT OF THAT UNFORTUNATE...

UH, ACTIVITY, UH...

ON--ON A DEFECT IN A WAR PLAN,

IT STRIKES ME AS A STRETCH.

WEREN'T YOU URGED SPECIFICALLY BY SCHOLARS AND OTHERS

ABOUT THE DANGER TO THAT MUSEUM? AND WEREN'T YOU URGED

TO PROVIDE A GREATER LEVEL OF PROTECTION AND SECURITY

IN THE INITIAL PHASES OF THE OPERATION?

NOT TO MY KNOWLEDGE.

Packer: NO ONE CAN CLAIM THAT THEY WERE CAUGHT

BY SURPRISE BY THE LOOTING,

I JUST DON'T THINK THEY WANTED TO KNOW.

THEY DIDN'T WANNA HEAR IT.

Narrator: IN THE MONTHS LEADING UP TO THE INVASION,

A DEBATE OVER TROOP LEVELS REQUIRED IN IRAQ

HAD BEEN PRIVATELY BREWING

BETWEEN THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP AND DONALD RUMSFELD.

RUMSFELD AND HIS DEPUTY PAUL WOLFOWITZ

BELIEVED THAT A FORCE OF UNDER 100,000 TROOPS

WOULD BE SUFFICIENT

FOR THE INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF IRAQ.

A MONTH BEFORE THE INVASION,

THE FIGHT OVER TROOP LEVELS BECAME PUBLIC

AS THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY, ERIC SHINSEKI,

TESTIFIED BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE,

IGNORING PRESSURE FROM RUMSFELD AND WOLFOWITZ.

Carl Levin: GENERAL SHINSEKI, UH...

COULD YOU GIVE US SOME IDEA AS TO THE MAGNITUDE

OF THE ARMY'S FORCE REQUIREMENT

FOR AN OCCUPATION OF IRAQ?

SOMETHING ON THE ORDER OF SEVERAL HUNDRED THOUSAND SOLDIERS

ARE PROBABLY, YOU KNOW, A FIGURE THAT WOULD BE REQUIRED.

WHAT IS, I THINK, REASONABLY CERTAIN HERE IS...

THE IDEA THAT IT WOULD TAKE SEVERAL HUNDRED THOUSAND U.S. FORCES

I THINK IS FAR FROM THE MARK.

IT'S HARD TO CONCEIVE THAT IT WOULD TAKE MORE FORCES

TO PROVIDE STABILITY IN POST-SADDAM IRAQ

THAN IT WOULD TAKE TO CONDUCT THE WAR ITSELF

AND TO SECURE THE SURRENDER OF SADDAM'S SECURITY FORCES

AND HIS ARMY. HARD TO IMAGINE.

HARD TO IMAGINE.

ANYONE WHO HAD ANY EXPERIENCE

IN THE INTERVENTIONS OF THE '90S KNEW THAT THE OPPOSITE WAS TRUE.

YOU NEED X NUMBERS OF SOLDIERS PER THOUSAND CITIZENS

SIMPLY TO PROVIDE A MODICUM OF SECURITY.

BUT PAUL WOLFOWITZ COULDN'T IMAGINE IT.

WE'RE TALKING ABOUT POST-HOSTILITIES,

CONTROL OVER A PIECE OF GEOGRAPHY THAT'S FAIRLY SIGNIFICANT

WITH, UH, THE KINDS OF ETHNIC TENSIONS

THAT COULD LEAD TO OTHER PROBLEMS,

AND SO IT TAKES A SIGNIFICANT GROUND FORCE PRESENCE.

DID GENERAL SHINSEKI GET IT RIGHT?

HE WAS ASKED FOR HIS BEST MILITARY OPINION,

AND HIS EXPERIENCE EXCEEDS MINE.

HE COMMANDED OUR FORCES IN BOSNIA,

HE DID IT FOR A YEAR PLUS,

HE KNOWS WHAT HE'S TALKING ABOUT.

SECRETARY POWELL, AND TO THE SAME EXTENT MYSELF,

UH, WE ARGUED FOR MORE AND MORE TROOPS

AND WE MADE SOME DIFFERENCE, BUT ULTIMATELY

WE DIDN'T SEE THAT WE MADE ENOUGH OF A DIFFERENCE.

PERSONALLY I FEEL THE WAR WOULD BE GOING DIFFERENTLY

IF YOU HAD, UM...

LEADERSHIP THAT REALLY UNDERSTOOD,

NUMBER ONE, WHAT IT'S LIKE TO BE ON THE GROUND,

THAT ACTUALLY SERVED IN THE ARMED FORCES,

AND, NUMBER TWO, REALLY HAD A GOOD MANAGERIAL GRASP

OF MAKING THIS THING WORK.

Narrator: THE SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS

WHO OVERRULED THE MILITARY AND STATE DEPARTMENT

HAD NO EXPERIENCE WITH POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS

AND LITTLE OR NO MILITARY EXPERIENCE.

CHENEY HAD AVOIDED MILITARY SERVICE DURING VIETNAM

THROUGH FIVE DRAFT DEFERMENTS.

RUMSFELD WAS A NAVY PILOT IN THE 1950S BUT HAD NEVER SEEN COMBAT.

WOLFOWITZ AND RICE HAD NEVER SERVED IN THE MILITARY.

BUSH HAD AVOIDED THE VIETNAM DRAFT

BY JOINING THE TEXAS AIR NATIONAL GUARD.

HE ALSO HAD NO FOREIGN POLICY EXPERIENCE

PRIOR TO BECOMING PRESIDENT.

WE'RE LOOKING AT IT, I SAY WE,

THOSE OF US WHO HAD MILITARY EXPERIENCE,

AND WE WOULD TALK ABOUT THIS OFTEN, UM,

THIS DOESN'T LOOK GOOD.

Narrator: IN MID-APRIL 2003, WITH LOOTING STILL UNDER WAY,

RUMSFELD CANCELED DEPLOYMENT OF THE 1st CAVALRY DIVISION,

A FORCE OF 16,000 SOLDIERS.

IT SHOCKED US. YOU KNOW, HOW CAN YOU TURN OFF THAT DIVISION?

IF WE HAD HAD THAT DIVISION FOLLOWING US INTO IRAQ,

WE WOULD HAVE STABILIZED A LOT MORE OF IRAQ

JUST THROUGH OUR PRESENCE.

Narrator: ON APRIL 19th, O.R.H.A. FINALLY ENTERED IRAQ

TO BEGIN POST-WAR OPERATIONS.

OF THE 20 MINISTRIES WE WANTED TO BRING BACK

16 OF THOSE BUILDINGS WERE DESTROYED

AS A PROD--AS A FUNCTION OF LOOTING.

Bodine: WE WERE STARTING FROM ZERO.

I MEAN, IF THERE ARE NO DESKS AND THERE ARE NO CHAIRS,

THERE ARE NO TYPEWRITERS LEFT,

WHERE DO WE GO AND MEET THE IRAQI'S TO START WORKING?

THERE WAS NO STRUCTURE LEFT, UM,

PHYSICAL STRUCTURE OR BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURE.

I HAD TO PUT PEOPLE OUT ON THE STREET

WALKING AROUND ASKING, "DO YOU KNOW ANYBODY THAT'S IN--

"DO YOU KNOW THE PEOPLE IN MINISTRY OF HEALTH?

"DO YOU KNOW THE PEOPLE WHO ARE IN THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR?

"DO YOU KNOW THE PEOPLE IN THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION?"

WITHIN THE GROUP ITSELF, WE HAD...

I THINK PROBABLY FIVE WHO SPOKE ANY AMOUNT OF ARABIC.

Bodine: WE HAD NO PHONE LISTS,

WE HAD NO PHONES FOR A WHILE,

SO I GUESS HAVING A PHONE LIST WAS NOT REALLY THAT IMPORTANT.

WE HAD NO INFORMATION, WE HAD NO PLACE TO GO,

WE DIDN'T KNOW WHO TO CONTACT.

UM, NOT THE BEST WAY TO--

NOT THE BEST WAY TO START AN OCCUPATION.

AND WHAT FOLLOWED WAS THIS PERVASIVE SENSE OF LAWLESSNESS

THAT IRAQ NEVER RECOVERED FROM.

AND GUYS WITH GUNS TOOK OVER

AND THEY WERE THE IRAQI GUYS WITH GUNS.

[GUNFIRE]

Hughes: THE FIREFIGHTS I GOT CAUGHT UP IN

WERE NOT FIREFIGHTS WHERE AMERICANS WERE BEING ATTACKED,

IT WAS IRAQI ON IRAQI FIREFIGHTS.

YOU'D JUST BE DRIVING DOWN THE STREET AND SUDDENLY

THERE IS A FUSILLADE OF FIRE THAT JUST OPENS UP ON YOU,

AND YOU'RE JUST IN THE MIDDLE OF THESE GUYS

SHOOTING AT EACH OTHER.

Packer: THE STREETS WERE CHAOTIC,

PEOPLE COULD KILL AND GET AWAY WITH IT,

THERE WAS NO WORKING POLICE FORCE.

JUST PRIOR TO THE INVASION,

SADDAM RELEASED ABOUT 100,000 PRISONERS,

COMMON CRIMINALS FROM THE JAILS.

IN FEBRUARY OF 2003,

I GOT AN INVITATION TO COME AND BRIEF THE ADVISORY PANEL

THAT ADVISES SECRETARY RUMSFELD

ON DEFENSE POLICY MATTERS.

WHAT I TOLD THEM WAS THAT, BASED ON OUR EXPERIENCES

IN PREVIOUS PEACE OPERATIONS

AND ON WHAT HAD HAPPENED IN IRAQ HISTORICALLY,

IT WAS VERY LIKELY THAT IF THE U.S. INTERVENED

AND CAPTURED BAGHDAD

THAT WE WERE LIKELY TO FACE MASSIVE CIVIL DISTURBANCE.

I SUGGESTED THAT WE NEEDED ABOUT 2,500 CONSTABULARY FORCES,

ABOUT 4,000 CIVIL POLICE STREET COPS,

AND THEN TEAMS OF JUDICIAL ADVISORS

AND CORRECTIONS OFFICERS.

IN THE END THEY AGREED THAT WELL, THIS WAS A GOOD IDEA,

THERE WASN'T ENOUGH TIME, BUT MAYBE FOR THE NEXT WAR.

Nir Rosen: PRIOR TO THE WAR, THE BAGHDAD MORGUE RECEIVED

ONE MURDER CASE A MONTH.

WITHIN A MONTH THEY WERE GETTING ABOUT 25 A DAY.

THEY WERE SEEING RAPES OFTEN FOR THE FIRST TIME,

RAPES AND MURDERS.

IRAQI GIRLS WERE BEING KIDNAPPED.

SO IRAQI WOMEN DISAPPEARED FROM THE STREETS,

THEY STOPPED GOING TO SCHOOL, THEY STOPPED DRIVING.

THE AMERICANS WERE NOT ACTING AS THE POLICE.

THEY DIDN'T KNOW THE STREETS OF BAGHDAD, THEY DIDN'T SPEAK THE LANGUAGE,

THEY DIDN'T HAVE INTERPRETERS IN SUFFICIENT NUMBERS

THEY DIDN'T HAVE INTELLIGENCE ABOUT WHAT WAS GOING ON,

SO IT WAS A FREE-FOR-ALL,

AND YOU JUST FELT, OH, THERE'S A VOID HERE.

[IMAM SINGING]

VERY QUICKLY THE MOSQUE CAME IN AND FILLED IN THE VACUUM

THAT THE AMERICANS CREATED

BY GETTING RID OF SADDAM AND LEAVING NOTHING IN HIS PLACE.

IN SHIA NEIGHBORHOODS, THEY VERY QUICKLY ESTABLISHED CONTROL,

AND PARTICULARLY THE CLERICS ASSOCIATED WITH MUQTADA AL-SADR.

Narrator: MUQTADA AL-SADR WAS THE SON OF A FAMOUS SHI'ITE CLERIC,

AND STARTED A BID FOR POWER BASED ON HIS FATHER'S NETWORK

OF MOSQUES AND CHARITIES.

Narrator: ONLY A FEW DAYS AFTER AMERICAN TROOPS ENTERED BAGHDAD,

HE ASSASSINATED A PRO-AMERICAN SHI'ITE LEADER.

THEN HE BEGAN CREATING A HEAVILY ARMED MILITIA, THE MAHDI ARMY,

WHICH TOOK OVER BAGHDAD'S SHI'ITE GHETTO

AND MUCH OF SOUTHERN IRAQ.

Samantha Power: IF YOU TENDED TO THE ISSUES OF POLICING,

IF THERE HADN'T BEEN THE LOOTING,

THEN YOU WOULDN'T HAVE HAD PEOPLE TURNING

TO SECTARIAN MILITIAS

AS THEIR SOURCES OF NEIGHBORHOOD SECURITY.

Narrator: O.R.H.A. WORKED ON RECALLING THE IRAQI MILITARY

TO DEAL WITH THE SECURITY VACUUM.

THE ARMY CENTRAL COMMAND, CENTCOM, SUPPORTED THIS POLICY.

WHAT CENTCOM HAD DONE, THEY HAD FACTORED INTO THEIR PLANNING

THE BRINGING BACK OF THE IRAQI ARMY.

THEY USED THE IRAQI ARMY TO SEAL THE BORDERS,

TO PROVIDE STATIC SECURITY THINGS

AND ALSO HELP IN THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THEIR OWN NATION.

RUMSFELD CALLED ME AND HE SAID, "HEY, JAY,

"I LIKE EVERYTHING THAT'S GOING ON,

"YOU'RE DOING A GREAT JOB, YOU AND YOUR TEAM,

"GLAD YOU'RE NOW IN BAGHDAD AND ALL THAT, AND BY THE WAY,

"THE PRESIDENT IS APPOINTING JERRY BREMER

"AS THE PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY."

Narrator: BREMER WAS A FORMER FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER.

LIKE MOST OFFICIALS SENT TO IRAQ,

BREMER DID NOT SPEAK ARABIC,

HAD NO PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE WITH THE MID-EAST

OR POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION

AND HAD NEVER SERVED IN THE MILITARY.

AFTER BREMER'S ARRIVAL, O.R.H.A. WOULD BE PHASED OUT

AND THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY, C.P.A.,

WOULD TAKE ITS PLACE.

Bremer: WE INTEND TO HAVE A VERY EFFECTIVE, EFFICIENT

AND WELL-ORGANIZED HANDOVER. UH...

GENERAL GARNER AND I ARE PLEDGED TO WORKING VERY CLOSELY TOGETHER.

HE'S DONE AN OUTSTANDING JOB.

Garner: WE SET UP A SERIES OF BRIEFINGS FOR HIM,

HE SPENT A DAY GOING THROUGH WHAT EVERYBODY WAS DOING,

AND THEN HE TOOK CHARGE.

I CAME HOME LIKE 3rd OR 4th OR 5th OF JUNE.

Narrator: BETWEEN MAY 1st AND HIS DEPARTURE FOR IRAQ ON MAY 10th,

BREMER WORKED AT THE PENTAGON

AND MET FREQUENTLY WITH RUMSFELD, WOLFOWITZ

AND UNDER-SECRETARY DOUG FEITH.

BREMER ALSO WORKED CLOSELY WITH WALTER SLOCOMBE,

A FORMER UNDER-SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WHOM RUMSFELD HAD APPOINTED TO BE IN CHARGE OF POST-WAR POLICY

FOR IRAQ'S MILITARY.

Slocombe: THEY CONTACTED ME IN MID-MARCH OF 2003.

Man: DID IT CROSS YOUR MIND TO THINK, YOU KNOW,

ISN'T IT KIND OF LATE FOR THEM TO BE THINKING ABOUT THIS?

YES.

Man: DID YOU TELL THEM THAT?

NO.

Narrator: LIKE BREMER,

SLOCOMBE HAD NEVER SERVED IN THE MILITARY,

HAD NEVER BEEN TO IRAQ,

HAD NO POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION EXPERIENCE

AND SPOKE NO ARABIC.

IN BREMER'S FIRST 10 DAYS AT WORK,

WHILE STILL IN WASHINGTON D.C.,

HE MADE THREE FATEFUL POLICY DECISIONS.

HIS FIRST DECISION WAS TO STOP THE FORMATION

OF AN INTERIM IRAQI GOVERNMENT,

EVEN THOUGH JAY GARNER HAD BEEN WORKING TO ESTABLISH ONE.

Armitage: JAY GARNER WAS CERTAINLY SUPPORTIVE

THAT THEY GET SOME GOVERNING BODY OF IRAQIS,

BUT, UH, THIS WAS DONE AWAY WITH ON THE WAY TO BAGHDAD

AND I DIDN'T THINK GENERAL GARNER KNEW ABOUT IT BEFOREHAND

AND NOR DID I.

WE HAD EXPECTED, AND I THINK I CAN SAY WE HAD BEEN PROMISED

THAT THERE WOULD BE A SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT

VIRTUALLY IMMEDIATELY.

"I'M IN CHARGE AND EVERYONE WILL DO WHAT I SAY, AND THAT'S IT.

"UNDERSTAND?"

AND THAT'S KIND OF THE WAY, UH,

L. PAUL BREMER CAME ACROSS.

MUCH, MUCH, MUCH TOO HARD-CORE AND TOO MISSION-DRIVEN

TO SEE THAT HIS EXCLUSION OF THE IRAQIS EARLY ON

FROM MAJOR PARTICIPATION IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

WAS A GRIEVOUS ERROR.

IN MAY OF 2003, WE GOT THE-- THE LEGAL OCCUPATION OF IRAQ.

I SAID AT THAT TIME, AND I BELIEVE NOW,

THAT THAT WAS A MISTAKE.

WE WANT THE AMERICAN TROOPS

BASICALLY TO LEAVE IRAQ COMPLETELY

AND LET THE IRAQI PEOPLE BASICALLY TO RULE IRAQ.

Narrator: THE REACTION TO HIS NEXT TWO DECISIONS

WOULD BE DRAMATICALLY WORSE.

DE-BA'ATHIFICATION

I AM TODAY ESTABLISHING AN IRAQI DE-BA'ATHIFICATION COUNCIL

TO ENSURE THAT THE STRUCTURE AND INFLUENCE

OF THE BA'ATH PARTY IS ELIMINATED FOR GOOD.

Narrator: BREMER'S SECOND DECISION,

HIS FIRST FORMAL ORDER AS HEAD OF THE C.P.A.,

PURGED AN ESTIMATED 50,000 MEMBERS OF THE BA'ATH PARTY,

WHICH SADDAM HAD USED TO RULE IRAQ.

FOR MOST, BREMER'S ORDER MEANT PERMANENT UNEMPLOYMENT.

THE POLICY ALSO CRIPPLED IRAQ'S GOVERNMENT,

EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM AND ECONOMY

BECAUSE IT PURGED SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

WHO HAD JOINED THE PARTY

SIMPLY TO SURVIVE UNDER SADDAM'S REGIME.

I WAS WALKING DOWN THE HALL AND AMBASSADOR ROBIN RAPHEL

CAME TO ME AND SAID, "HAVE YOU SEEN THIS?"

I SAID, "WHAT IS IT, ROBIN?"

SHE SAYS, "DE-BA'ATHIFICATION."

SO I READ IT REAL QUICK AND I SAID,

"I DON'T THINK WE CAN DO THIS."

SHE SAID, "WELL, I THINK YOU OUGHT TO GO TALK TO JERRY."

SO WE WENT TO SEE HIM AND I SAID,

"HOW ABOUT LETTING US GO THROUGH THIS

"AND LET'S GET ON THE PHONE WITH RUMSFELD

"AND SEE IF WE CAN SOFTEN THIS A LITTLE BIT."

AND HE SAID, "NO, I DON'T HAVE THAT FLEXIBILITY.

"I'VE BEEN GIVEN MY ORDERS AND I'M GOING TO EXECUTE 'EM."

SO THAT ENDED THAT DISCUSSION.

HE MAY HAVE COME IN AND SPOKEN TO ME AT GREAT LENGTH ABOUT IT,

I JUST DON'T REMEMBER IT, HONESTLY DON'T REMEMBER IT.

Interviewer: YOU DON'T REMEMBER THESE GUYS COMING IN AND SAYING,

"THIS IS 30 TO 50,000 PEOPLE"? DOESN'T MEAN IT DIDN'T HAPPEN.

"MY GOD, WHAT ARE YOU DOING?"

I JUST DON'T--

YOU KNOW, I WAS WORKING 20 HOURS A DAY IN THAT PERIOD AS WELL.

THIS WASN'T THE ONLY THING ON MY LIST OF THINGS TO DO

THE FIRST FIVE DAYS I WAS THERE.

Narrator: BREMER APPOINTED AHMED CHALABI

TO HEAD THE DE-BA'ATHIFICATION COUNCIL.

CHALABI USED THE POSITION TO ELIMINATE POLITICAL RIVALS.

DE-BA'ATHIFICATION WAS SO DEEP

THAT WE WEREN'T ABLE TO GET THE GOVERNMENT RUNNING

AS EFFICIENTLY AS WE SHOULD HAVE,

AS FAST AS WE SHOULD HAVE,

AND YOU HAD A LOT OF DISENFRANCHISED BA'ATHISTS.

Amazia Baram: THERE WERE PEOPLE WHO WERE KICKED OUT OF THEIR JOBS

EVEN THOUGH THEY WERE JUST PROFESSIONALS,

ENGINEERS, UH, DIRECTORS.

THE TECHNOCRATS, THE INTELLIGENTSIA,

THE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL LIBRARIAN.

BEING CONQUERED AND THEN LOSING YOUR JOB

AND NOT HAVING ANY MEANS TO SUPPORT YOURSELF OR YOUR FAMILY,

WAS AN INCREDIBLY HUMILIATING EXPERIENCE.

Narrator: IT WAS BREMER'S THIRD DECISION, HOWEVER,

THAT WAS THE MOST EXPLOSIVE.

DISBANDING THE IRAQI MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICES,

THE MOST IMPORTANT INSTITUTIONS IN IRAQ.

C.P.A. ORDER NUMBER TWO

DISBANDED THE IRAQI ARMY, REPUBLICAN GUARD,

SPECIAL REPUBLICAN GUARD AND SECRET POLICE.

OVERNIGHT, BREMER RENDERED UNEMPLOYED

AND THEREBY INFURIATED HALF A MILLION ARMED MEN,

EQUIVALENT TO FIRING OVER FIVE MILLION PEOPLE

IN THE UNITED STATES.

AND SO THESE MEN, RATHER THAN HELPING TO PREVENT AN INSURGENCY

INSTEAD CREATED ONE.

I CAN'T BELIEVE THEY DID THAT.

HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF FAMILIES DEPENDED ON THE ARMY.

THEY DIDN'T HAVE AN INCOME, THEY DIDN'T HAVE PROVIDERS.

WE VERY HUNGRY, NO BREAD, NO FOOD, NO MONEY, WE WANT JOBS.

CHILDREN, WOMEN, WIVES, SISTERS, FATHERS,

UM, STOPPED EATING BECAUSE THEY DIDN'T HAVE ENOUGH MONEY.

OFFICIALLY I THINK IT'S 27% UNEMPLOYMENT, OFFICIALLY.

IT'S ALMOST CERTAINLY MUCH HIGHER.

I WOULD GUESS ANYWHERE FROM 40 TO 50%.

IS IT ANY WONDER THAT MANY OF THESE PEOPLE

WHO ALMOST ALL HAD AT LEAST SOME MILITARY TRAINING,

SINCE YOU HAD TO SERVE IN THE ARMY IN IRAQ,

OR THEY WERE ACTIVE MILITARY,

WOULD TURN TO JOINING THE INSURGENCY

JUST AS A MEANS TO FEED THEIR FAMILY

AND AS A MEANS OF REGAINING SOME OF THAT PRIDE.

Narrator: IN DECIDING TO DISBAND THE IRAQI MILITARY,

BREMER WAS UNDOING A POLICY

SUPPORTED BY BOTH THE U.S. MILITARY AND BY O.R.H.A.

Garner: PAUL HUGHES HAD A TEAM

THAT WAS SEEKING OUT THE IRAQI ARMY,

AND HE WAS BEGINNING TO FIND A LOT OF 'EM,

AND HE HAD FOUND A LOT OF 'EM,

AND WE HAD MADE OVERTURES TO BRING THEM BACK.

THESE SOLDIERS WHEN THEY REGISTERED HAD TO SIGN...

OR FILL OUT A QUESTIONNAIRE

ABOUT WHO THEY WERE, WHAT UNIT THEY WERE WITH, WHAT THEY DID,

WHAT THEIR SKILLS WERE,

WHAT MILITARY EQUIPMENT THEY HAD AT HOME,

WHAT--JUST A LOT OF INFORMATION

THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN USEFUL TO US.

AND I WAS COLLECTING ALL OF THAT.

Narrator: BUT THE D.O.D. ADVISORY TEAM

IN CHARGE OF DEALING WITH THE IRAQI MILITARY,

HEADED BY WALTER SLOCOMBE,

HAD REMAINED IN WASHINGTON D.C. AND HAD NEVER VISITED IRAQ.

I SAID, "I DON'T SEE ANY REASON TO GO OUT THERE.

"I CAN GET READY BETTER HERE IN WASHINGTON."

AND I URGED THEM TIME AND AGAIN

IN MY CONVERSATIONS WITH THEM FROM BAGHDAD

THAT THEY NEEDED TO GET OVER THERE

BECAUSE THERE WERE PEOPLE WAITING ON THEM

AND ON ONE MAN IN PARTICULAR TO SHOW UP

SO HE COULD MAKE DECISIONS AND GET THE BALL ROLLING.

IN HIS ABSENCE I WAS LEFT WITH THE DUTY

OF HAVING TO DEAL WITH THE IRAQI ARMY

JUST TO KEEP CONTACT WITH THEM.

Lawrence Wilkerson: THE IRAQI ARMY WAS ESSENTIALLY STANDING THERE WAITING,

THEY WERE WAITING FOR AN OVERTURE,

THEY WERE WAITING FOR WHAT THEY THOUGHT WOULD HAPPEN

THAT SOMEONE WOULD COME TO THEM

AND SAY, "THIS IS THE PLAN, AND YOU'RE INTEGRAL TO THAT PLAN,

"AND WE NEED YOU."

NO ONE EVER DID THAT.

WHEN THE WAR WAS OVER,

WHEN THE MAJOR MANEUVER FIGHTING WAS OVER,

THERE WERE SIMPLY NO UNITS STILL IN EXISTENCE,

EVERYBODY HAD GONE HOME.

GENERALS AND COMMANDERS WERE COMING BACK

WITH ENTIRE DIVISIONS SAYING "HERE ARE MY PEOPLE."

ONE OF THE IRAQI OFFICERS,

TOWARDS THE END OF, I DUNNO, THE SECOND OR THIRD MEETING

WHEN BAGHDAD WAS GOING-- I MEAN IT WAS IN CHAOS, SAID,

"COLONEL PAUL, I CAN HAVE 10,000 MILITARY POLICEMEN

"FOR YOU NEXT WEEK, YOU JUST TELL ME."

I TOOK THAT BACK TO BERNIE KERIK'S STAFF

AND NOTHING WAS DONE WITH IT.

Hughes: FIVE DAYS AFTER BREMER ISSUED HIS ORDER,

WE WERE FAREWELLING JAY GARNER

BECAUSE HE WAS GONNA LEAVE IRAQ FOR GOOD THE NEXT DAY.

WE HAD TWO HUMVEES ON THE HIGHWAY

HEADING OUT FROM THE GREEN ZONE,

THEY WERE AMBUSHED AND TWO SOLDIERS WERE KILLED.

AND THAT WAS WHEN IN MY MIND THE INSURGENCY BEGAN.

Man: GO, GO, GO! GO, GO, GO!

MY COLLEAGUES AND I COULD SIT ON THE BALCONY

OR ON THE ROOF OF THE REPUBLICAN PALACE AT NIGHT

AND WE COULD WATCH THE TRACERS THROUGHOUT BAGHDAD.

WE COULD WATCH THE FLARES OF DIFFERENT COLORS THAT WENT UP

MARKING WHERE AMERICAN CONVOYS

OF CERTAIN COMPOSITIONS WERE MOVING

AND BEING FOLLOWED BY THE INSURGENTS.

THESE GUYS ALL KNEW WHERE THOSE MUNITIONS WERE,

THEY KNEW HOW TO GET TO THOSE WEAPONS AND HOW TO USE THEM,

AND YOU'VE JUST SENT THEM AWAY AND SAID THEY DON'T EXIST?

COMMON SENSE TELLS ME YOU DON'T DO THAT.

I MEAN, YOU HAD HUGE AMMUNITION DUMPS

THAT WEREN'T GUARDED UNTIL SEVERAL WEEKS

IF NOT A COUPLE OF MONTHS AFTER MAJOR COMBAT ACTIONS ENDED.

I'M STANDING THERE WATCHING THESE INSURGENTS

PULL OUT ROCKETS AND MORTARS AND BOMBS

FROM THESE WEAPONS CACHES THAT THE IRAQIS HAD STORED

AND STASHED EVERYWHERE.

AND YOU'D GO TO THE BRITISH OR TO THE U.S., WHOEVER WAS THERE,

WITH YOUR LITTLE G.P.S. RECEIVER AND SAY,

"HEY, GUYS, YOU KNOW,

"WE FOUND LIKE 18 THOUSAND MILLION TONS OF BOMBS

"AND THERE ARE BUNCH OF IRAQIS THERE WITH AK-47s

"TAKING IT AWAY.

"PROBABLY NOT THE BEST IDEA. HERE'S WHERE IT'S LOCATED."

AND THEY SAY TO YOU,

"WE JUST DON'T HAVE ENOUGH PEOPLE TO COVER IT."

AND I JUST, I COULDN'T BELIEVE IT, IT WASN'T THE RIGHT ANSWER.

GO THERE AND TAKE CARE OF IT FOR YOUR SECURITY,

FOR THE CIVILIANS' SECURITY, FOR EVERYBODY,

IT'S JUST A BAD IDEA.

[MAN SHOUTING IN ARABIC]

Man: DID ANYBODY WARN YOU THAT DISBANDING THE ARMY IN THIS WAY

WOULD AND THEN WAS FUELING MAJOR GROWTH OF THE INSURGENCY?

CERTAINLY NOT IN THOSE TERMS.

Man: NOBODY SAID THAT TO YOU?

NO. I ALSO DON'T BELIEVE IT'S TRUE,

BUT NOBODY SAID IT, NOBODY SAID--

YOU DON'T BELIEVE IT'S TRUE?

NO, I DO NOT BELIEVE IT'S TRUE.

A NUMBER OF THE MOST SENIOR GENERALS

UH, CAME TO THE CANAL HOTEL TO U.N. HEADQUARTERS,

AND THEY WERE VERY EXPLICIT AT THE CONSEQUENCE

OF LETTING THIS ORDER STAND

AND OF MARGINALIZING

THIS INCREDIBLY POWERFUL SEGMENT OF SOCIETY

WOULD BE AN INSURGENCY.

A LEBANESE DIPLOMAT NAMED HASSAN SALAMI

TURNED TO HIS COLLEAGUE AS THE GENERALS WALKED AWAY

AFTER ONE OF THEIR MEETINGS

AND SAID, "I SEE BULLETS IN THEIR EYES.

"I SEE BULLETS IN THEIR EYES."

Narrator: EVEN MORE REMARKABLE THAN THE DECISION TO DISBAND THE ARMY

WAS HOW THAT DECISION WAS MADE--

SECRETLY, OVER A SINGLE WEEK,

BY A FEW MEN IN WASHINGTON D.C. WHO HAD NEVER BEEN TO IRAQ.

THEY DID NOT CONSULT WITH THE MILITARY COMMANDERS IN IRAQ,

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,

O.R.H.A., THE STATE DEPARTMENT,

THE C.I.A., THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL,

OR EVEN APPARENTLY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

WALTER SLOCOMBE AND PAUL HUGHES WERE RE-INTERVIEWED

IN ORDER TO RECONSTRUCT THE EVENTS

LEADING TO THE DISSOLUTION OF THE ARMY.

THESE GUYS CALLED THEMSELVES THE INDEPENDENT MILITARY GATHERING.

THE INDEPENDENT MILITARY GATHERING HAD 100,000 ON 9th MAY

Man: AND THEY ALREADY HAD 100,000?

YEAH, THIS WAS A NATIONWIDE EFFORT.

THEY BROUGHT ME-- I WANTED THE PRINTOUTS,

I WANTED THE DISKS, AND THEY GIVE THEM TO ME,

AND I TOOK THEM BACK WITH ME TO O.R.H.A.

I SAID, "HERE WE GO," AND I TOLD WALT AND HIS CREW,

"I'VE GOT THESE THINGS, THEY'RE HERE WAITING FOR YOU."

HUGHES BELIEVED THAT HE HAD AN OPENING TO SOME IRAQI OFFICERS

WHO WOULD HAVE BEEN PREPARED TO RECONSTITUTE UNITS. I DON'T--

Man: HE ALREADY HAD ATTAINED REGISTRATION STATEMENTS FROM 137,000.

NO, HE DIDN'T. HE HADN'T DONE THAT. HE MAY HAVE GOTTEN--

'CAUSE NOBODY COULD HAVE GOTTEN STATEMENTS FROM 130,000 ANYBODY

FOR ANYTHING, IN THE CHAOS THAT PREVAILED AT THAT POINT.

THEY HAD A COURIER SYSTEM SET UP

THAT WAS RUNNING AROUND THE METROPOLITAN AREA OF BAGHDAD,

OF MOSUL, OF BASRA AND KIRKUK

AND I DON'T UNDERSTAND, I MEAN--I--

GIVEN HOW DIFFICULT IT WAS TO DO ANYTHING

JUST OPERATIONALLY OR ORGANIZATIONALLY,

NOBODY HAD 137,000.

WALT WASN'T THERE.

HE NEVER MET WITH THESE PEOPLE, HE HAD NO CLUE.

Man: SO DID YOU TELL SLOCOMBE THIS, THAT THIS WAS GOING ON?

YES, HE KNEW THIS. HE AND HIS STAFF KNEW THIS.

Man: AMBASSADOR BREMER,

YOU HAD ALREADY MADE A RECOMMENDATION TO HIM

AND HE HAD ALREADY MADE AT LEAST A TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATION

TO SECRETARY RUMSFELD

ABOUT THE DISSOLUTION OF THE ARMY, UM--

ABOUT ISSUING THE ORDER THAT HE FINALLY ISSUED, YEAH.

YES, ON MAY 9TH.

YES. OK.

9th MAY WAS THE LAST TIME I HAD A CONVERSATION

WITH WALT SLOCOMBE.

AND WE TALKED ON THE PHONE BEFORE I WENT OUT.

DID YOU EVER SAY TO HIM,

"WE'RE THINKING OF DISBANDING THE IRAQI ARMY

"AND STOPPING YOUR EFFORTS TO RECALL THE IRAQI ARMY?"

ONE OF THE THINGS WE--I DID WAS JUST--

DID YOU EVER SAY THAT TO HIM?

IN THOSE WORDS, NO.

THE CONVERSATION WAS, "I'M COMING OVER,

"I'M CONCERNED ABOUT WHERE I'M GOING TO BE LIVING,"

YOU KNOW, "AM I GONNA HAVE A MOTOR POOL WITH ME,

"MY OWN COOKS?" YADA-YADA-YADA.

I MEAN, IT WAS NOTHING ABOUT THE IRAQI MILITARY.

AND I WAS GIVING HIM AN UPDATE ON WHAT--

SO HE DIDN'T SAY THAT HE HAD ALREADY

COME TO THE TENTATIVE CONCLUSION

AND RECOMMENDED TO BREMER TO DISSOLVE THE ARMY?

ABSOLUTELY NOT, BECAUSE HAD HE SAID THAT

I WOULD HAVE BEEN ON JAY'S DOORSTEP POSTHASTE.

SO YOU GUYS CAME UP WITH THIS IDEA

AND RECOMMENDED TO SECRETARY RUMSFELD

WITHOUT HAVING SPOKEN TO ANY OF THE SENIOR PEOPLE IN IRAQ

RESPONSIBLE FOR THESE MATTERS?

IT WAS SUBJECT TO, AND PRECISELY BECAUSE OF THE FACT

THAT IT ACTUALLY HAD BEEN ONLY THOUGHT OF FOR FEW DAYS,

BECAUSE BREMER WAS GOING OUT AND BREMER SAID TO RUMSFELD,

"BEFORE I MAKE A RECOMMENDATION I WILL TALK TO PEOPLE ON THE GROUND."

WAS THAT A SURPRISE TO YOU? HAD THIS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH YOU?

NO, IT HADN'T BEEN DISCUSSED WITH ME, IT WAS A SURPRISE,

A BIG SURPRISE.

REALLY? MM-HM.

YOU NEVER CALLED UP GARNER AND SAID

"WE'RE THINKING OF DOING THIS,

"DO YOU THINK THIS IS A GOOD IDEA?"

I DON'T THINK I DID.

DON'T YOU THINK THAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN AN MISTAKE?

NO.

WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION? WHAT DID YOU THINK?

I THOUGHT IT WAS A POOR IDEA.

I THOUGHT WE NEEDED TO BRING THEM BACK.

JOHN ABIZAID AND DAVE McKIERNAN WERE CONSTANTLY TELLING ME,

"HOW ABOUT HURRYING UP? LET'S GET THE ARMY BACK,

"LET'S GET THE ARMY BACK."

THERE IS A LARGE NUMBER

OF FORMER IRAQI SOLDIERS THAT ARE UNEMPLOYED NOW.

THAT IS A HUGE CONCERN NOT ONLY FROM A SECURITY STANDPOINT

BUT FROM AN ECONOMIC STANDPOINT,

THEY'RE NOT EARNING AN INCOME RIGHT NOW.

AND THERE'S THE ANNOUNCEMENT

THAT THE IRAQI ARMY HAS BEEN DISBANDED, AND I WAS FLOORED,

AND AT THIS PARTICULAR POINT IN TIME, WALT SLOCOMBE AND HIS TEAM

STILL WERE NOT IN IRAQ.

COLONEL HUGHES WAS THE PERSON WHO WAS IN CHARGE

OF DEALING WITH THE IRAQI ARMY

BECAUSE NONE OF THE PEOPLE FROM YOUR ADVISORY GROUP

HAD YET SHOWED UP IN IRAQ, INCLUDING YOU.

DIDN'T YOU THINK THAT MAYBE

YOU SHOULD SPEAK WITH HIM ABOUT THIS?

OH, I TALKED WITH HIM A LOT. THAT'S FUNNY.

HE SAYS THAT THE ORDER OF DISBANDING THE ARMY

CAME AS A COMPLETE SURPRISE TO HIM

AND THAT HE LEARNED OF IT BY WATCHING IT ON TELEVISION

IN AN AIRPORT.

THAT'S EX...WELL, IF THAT'S SO

THAT'S SURPRISING TO ME, BUT IMPOSSIBLE.

I TALKED TO HIM-- I MEAN, I TALKED TO HIM--

I--

WE WORKED TOGETHER ON A DAILY BASIS

DURING THE TIME I WAS THERE.

HE CAME ON 16th MAY. 16th MAY?

FOR A FOUR-DAY WHIRLWIND TOUR OF THE COUNTRY.

OH.

AND THEN HE LEFT,

AND HE DIDN'T COME BACK UNTIL THE MIDDLE OF JUNE.

REALLY? CORRECT.

HE DIDN'T TELL YOU THAT?

THIS IDEA TO DISBAND THE ENTIRE ARMY

WAS ONE THAT CAME AS QUITE A SURPRISE TO ME.

I SEE.

WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION WHEN YOU LEARNED OF IT?

I FELT WE'D JUST CREATED A PROBLEM.

WE HAD A LOT OF OUT-OF-WORK SOLDIERS.

THE PRESIDENT HAD ALREADY MADE A DIFFERENT DECISION

WHICH WAS TO KEEP BATTALION AND BELOW IN FORCE.

EARLIER, YES. YEAH.

WELL, WITHIN, I MEAN, A COUPLE OF DAYS' PROXIMITY.

I THINK MOST OF US WERE CAUGHT RELATIVELY UNAWARES

OR COMPLETELY UNAWARES BY THIS DISBANDING OF THE ARMY.

Armitage: SECRETARY POWELL FOUND OUT ABOUT IT AS I DID.

WHICH WAS HOW?

IT JUST WAS WE FOUND OUT ONE DAY

JERRY ANNOUNCED THAT HE DISBANDED THE ARMY.

Man: HOW ABOUT CONDOLEEZZA RICE?

WELL, SHE OUGHT TO SPEAK FOR HERSELF.

DO YOU HAVE ANY IDEA HOW MUCH THE PRESIDENT KNEW

ABOUT THESE DECISIONS IN ADVANCE? WHETHER HE--

AS I'VE SAID BEFORE, I DON'T KNOW

IF HE WAS INFORMED BY MR. RUMSFELD OR NOT.

NO IDEA.

I WASN'T IN MY OFFICE BUT TWO HOURS

AND A YOUNG M.P. COMES TO SEE ME AND HE GOES,

"COLONEL HUGHES, I'VE GOT SOME IRAQI OFFICERS

"THAT WANNA MEET WITH YOU."

AND I WAS THINKING TO MYSELF, "HOLY COW.

"WHAT DO I TELL THESE GUYS?"

SO I FINALLY CAME DOWNSTAIRS

AND MET WITH THEM IN THE ROTUNDA OF THE REPUBLICAN PALACE.

COLONEL MIRJAN SAYS, "COLONEL PAUL, WHAT HAPPENED?"

AND I SAID TO HIM, "I DON'T KNOW WHAT HAPPENED.

"I HAVE NO IDEA HOW THIS CAME ABOUT."

AND HE SAID, "ALL THESE SOLDIERS, THEY NOW HAVE NO RECOURSE.

"THEY HAVE NO MONEY COMING TO THEM.

"WHAT ARE THEY SUPPOSED TO DO?"

Man: OH, SHIT.

Man: HOW MANY TIMES DID I TELL YOU?

SHIT! 2nd man: FUCK!

3rd man: OH, MY EAR!

Man: WE NEED TO GET THE FUCK OUT OF HERE.

THERE ARE SOME WHO FEEL LIKE THAT, YOU KNOW,

THE CONDITIONS ARE SUCH THAT THEY CAN ATTACK US THERE.

MY ANSWER IS BRING 'EM ON.

I WAS IN THE BUCKET.

THE BUCKET IS A NON-ARMORED VEHICLE.

ANYTHING THAT HAPPENS, YOU GONNA GET IT.

SO NOBODY WANTS TO BE IN THERE.

I SUFFERED THE BLAST, ALMOST-- ALMOST DIRECTLY, SIR,

OF THAT BLAST AND THEN I CAME--

I STARTED HEARING THE FIREFIGHT

FROM THE FAR TO THE CLOSEST-- PAM-PAM. WE START FIRING.

WE HAVE A LIMITED PROBLEM OF SOME BITTER ENDERS,

SOME SMALL REMNANTS OF THE OLD REGIME

WHO ARE USING PROFESSIONAL MILITARY TACTICS

TO ATTACK AND KILL OUR SOLDIERS AS THEY DID, UH, THIS MORNING.

WE WILL-- SO YOU DON'T THINK

THIS IS A COORDINATED CAMPAIGN?

NO, THERE'S NO-- THAT THIS IS A GUERRILLA WAR,

THAT SUDDENLY WE'VE MOVED INTO A PHASE OF GUERRILLA WAR?

AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THAT BLAST,

I SUFFERED A PENETRATING TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY

AND I LOST THE PERCEPTION OF THE LIGHT IN MY RIGHT EYE.

I SUFFERED PELLETS IN MY LEFT EYE

THAT GETS ME A MACULAR HOLE IN THE RETINA,

UH, BUT WE FIGHT, WE FIGHT UNTIL WE HEAR THE CEASE-FIRE.

I WAS A GUNNER, AND MY DRIVER LOST BOTH HIS LEGS

AND THEY'D EJECTED ME OUT

AND I SUFFERED A FRACTURE FEMUR, NEARLY LOST MY RIGHT ARM

AND A COLLAPSED LUNG AND CLOSED HEAD WOUNDS.

I HAVE SINCE GONE TO THE DICTIONARY AND I HAVE LOOKED UP

SEVERAL THINGS, ONE OF WHICH I CAN'T IMMEDIATELY RECAPTURE,

BUT ONE WAS "GUERRILLA WAR",

ANOTHER WAS "INSURGENCY", ANOTHER WAS, UH...

"UNCONVENTIONAL WAR". PARDON ME?

Man: QUAGMIRE? [LAUGHTER]

NO, THAT'S SOMEONE ELSE'S BUSINESS, QUAGMIRES,

I DON'T DO QUAGMIRES.

A GUY I KNOW, HE'S A COUNTER-INSURGENCY EXPERT.

HE WAS AT THE PALACE WHERE THE C.P.A.

IS HEADQUARTERED, AND HE WAS TALKING TO AN ARMY COLONEL

WHOSE DESK WAS RIGHT OUTSIDE BREMER'S OFFICE

AND HE SAID, HE USED THE WORD "INSURGENCY", AND THE ARMY COLONEL

HELD UP HIS HAND AND SAID, "THERE IS NO INSURGENCY IN IRAQ.

"THERE IS A HIGH LEVEL OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE."

Bodine: THE SECURITY PROBLEM

INCREASINGLY ATE INTO OUR ABILITY TO DO OUR JOB.

I HAD HOPED TO ESTABLISH SOME NEIGHBORHOOD ADVISORY COUNCILS.

THESE THREE DIRECTOR GENERALS

GAVE PROBABLY THE MOST COHERENT BRIEFING ON THE STRUCTURE

AND ORGANIZATION OF A 1500-YEAR-OLD CITY

THAT I THINK ANYONE COULD HAVE GOTTEN.

ONE OF THEM LAUNCHED INTO THIS PLAN FOR...

NEIGHBORHOOD ADVISORY GROUPS.

HE HAD THIS WHOLE GRASS-ROOTS, BOTTOM-UP, DEMOCRATIZATION THING

NAILED, IT WAS AN ABSOLUTELY BEAUTIFUL PLAN.

Man: AND WHAT HAPPENED TO IT?

HE WAS ASSASSINATED.

THE COUNTRY WAS SLIPPING MORE AND MORE OUT OF CONTROL

THE ENTIRE TIME, AND I THINK IN SOME WAYS

BREMER AND HIS AIDES DIDN'T KNOW

HOW BAD THINGS WERE GETTING OUTSIDE THE BLAST WALLS.

Narrator: HEADQUARTERED IN SADDAM'S FORMER REPUBLICAN PALACE,

THE C.P.A. COMPOUND, CALLED THE GREEN ZONE,

WAS SHIELDED BY 7 MILES OF BLAST WALLS.

THERE WERE HUGE LINES OF IRAQIS, ENGINEERS, PUBLIC OFFICIALS,

PEOPLE JUST WILLING TO HELP, TO TRANSLATE,

STANDING IN LINE AT THE GATES OF PALACE,

MADE TO WAIT AND NOT BEING RECEIVED BY ANYONE.

THEY'RE JUST TOLD, "GO AWAY AND DON'T COME BACK."

THESE PEOPLE CAME THERE AND TRIED ONCE AND TWO TIMES

AND THREE TIMES AND THEN GAVE UP.

I ABSOLUTELY HATED THE GREEN ZONE.

I GOT OUT EVERY CHANCE I COULD TO MEET WITH IRAQIS

AND SIT IN THEIR HOMES AND HEAR THEIR COMPLAINTS

AND THEIR THOUGHTS.

AND I WOULD COME BACK AND TELL DAN SENOR,

"YOU HAVE A PROBLEM, YOU'RE NOT COMMUNICATING TO THE IRAQIS."

VIRTUALLY NOBODY IN THE C.P.A.

AT A SENIOR LEVEL SPOKE ARABIC.

ONE COULD COUNT MAYBE FIVE OR SIX

AMONG THE TOP 40 OR 50, 70 OFFICIALS.

WE HAD REGIONAL EXPERTS WHO HAD SERVED IN IRAQ.

BUT AS HAS BEEN DOCUMENTED, MANY OF THEM WERE NOT

INVOLVED IN INITIAL PARTS

AFTER THE INVASION OF IRAQ AND THE INITIAL OCCUPATION

SO THAT EXPERTISE WAS LOST.

Man: TELL US HOW YOUR TIME THERE ENDED.

UM-- I UNDERSTAND...

IT'S A SENSITIVE SUBJECT.

SAY WHAT YOU'RE COMFORTABLE SAYING.

UM...

WELL, I WILL SAY THAT IT ENDED MUCH SOONER

THAN I HAD ANTICIPATED,

UH, AND IT ENDED MUCH SOONER THAN I WOULD HAVE WANTED.

UM, I REALLY WOULD HAVE LIKED TO HAVE STAYED

AND TRIED TO HAVE--GIVEN ALL--

GIVEN THE FRUSTRATIONS AND THE LIMITATIONS

IT WAS STILL A VERY WORTHWHILE PLACE TO BE

AND A WORTHWHILE THING TO BE TRYING TO DO.

DO YOU KNOW WHY SHE WAS FIRED?

UH, I KNOW WHY. I WAS TOLD.

WHAT WAS IT?

THAT SHE WAS DIFFICULT TO GET ALONG WITH

AND SHE WAS OFFERING OPINIONS

THAT WERE COUNTER TO THE PREVAILING WISDOM IN BAGHDAD AT THE TIME.

WE WERE GETTING NEW PEOPLE IN AFTER BREMER SHOWED UP.

KIDS RIGHT OUT OF COLLEGE, YOU KNOW?

THEY'D HAVE A BACCALAUREATE DEGREE,

JUST GOT IT THE FALL-- THE PREVIOUS SPRING.

DADDY MADE A CONTRIBUTION TO THE CAMPAIGN

SO THE KID GETS A CHANCE TO GO OVER

AND EXPERIENCE SOME FUN TRAVEL AND ADVENTURE.

UM, PRETTY BOYS, THAT'S WHAT I CALLED THEM,

AND THEY SAT AROUND BREMER'S FRONT DOOR AND DID NOTHING.

DURING THE COURSE OF MY TIME IN THE GREEN ZONE,

WHEN I WAS IN THE PALACE, I BUMPED INTO ONE OF MY STUDENTS,

JUST GRADUATED.

I ASKED HER WHAT SHE WAS DOING AND SHE SAID, "WELL, I..."

SHE COULDN'T BELIEVE HER LUCK.

"I'M BEING ASKED TO, UH,

"TO DO THE TRAFFIC PLAN FOR THE CITY."

AND I ASKED IF SHE HAD ANY TRAINING IN MUNICIPAL PLANNING

AND SHE SAID NO.

SO SHE'S FRESH OUT OF SCHOOL

AND HAD BEEN PUT IN CHARGE OF SOMETHING QUITE COMPLICATED,

TO SAY THE LEAST, AND BEING OUT IN BAGHDAD TRAFFIC,

THE NEED WAS APPARENT.

MOST OFFICIALS THERE WERE ON THREE-MONTH CONTRACTS.

AS SOON AS SOMEBODY WOULD DEVELOP

THE APPROPRIATE RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE IRAQIS,

IN 90 DAYS, 100 DAYS, 120 DAYS, THEY'D GO HOME,

AND THAT IS A TERRIBLE WAY TO RUN AN ORGANIZATION.

THERE WAS A VERY STRONG, UM, PREFERENCE

ON THE, UM--BY THE PENTAGON

TO HAVE AMERICAN COMPANIES DOING THE WORK.

AND THERE WERE NUMEROUS INSTANCES WHERE LOCAL IRAQI CONTRACTORS,

PROPOSED THAT THEY COULD DO PIECES OF WORK

FOR MUCH, MUCH LESS THAN IN FACT

THE AMERICANS CONTRACTORS COULD HAVE DONE.

Moulton: ANN AND I TOOK A VERY DIFFERENT APPROACH TO OUR WORK

THAN MANY COALITION UNITS HAVE

BECAUSE WE WORKED VERY, VERY CLOSELY WITH THE IRAQIS.

IF WE'RE SITTING IN A MEETING, IT WAS AMERICANS, UM,

AND IRAQIS, AND THE IRAQIS HAD JUST AS MUCH SAY AS WE DID.

Moulton: WE WERE BUILDING BORDER FORTS RIGHT NEXT TO FORTS BEING PUT UP

BY THE ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS

THROUGH THAT BIG AMERICAN CONTRACTOR PARSONS.

I MEAN, WE HAD OUR FORTS DESIGNED, BUILT AND DEDICATED

IN A PERIOD OF ABOUT FIVE MONTHS.

I THINK WHEN WE LEFT, THE PARSONS FORTS,

WHICH HAD BEEN STARTED MAYBE A YEAR BEFORE WE ARRIVED,

WERE STILL NOT FINISHED.

THE MILITARY OFFICERS WOULD OFTEN BE OUT IN THE FIELD,

EXPENDING THE SMALL AMOUNT OF FUNDS THAT THEY HAD

FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION TO, SAY, CLEAN UP THE STREET,

EFFECT SOME TEMPORARY IMPROVEMENTS

IN THE SEWAGE SYSTEM.

ONCE THE MILITARY HAD EXPENDED

ITS SMALL AMOUNT OF MONEY TO DO THAT,

IT WOULD COME BACK TO C.P.A.

"WE NEED THIS, THIS AND THIS

"FOR THESE PROJECTS, AND IT'S GOING TO COST US THIS MUCH," AND SO FORTH.

AND IT WOULD DISAPPEAR, IT WOULD SIMPLY DISAPPEAR.

"WHAT HAPPENED TO MY REQUEST?"

"UH, WHAT REQUEST?"

HA. AND THIS HAPPENED OVER AND OVER AGAIN.

THIS $18 BILLION THAT WAS COMMITTED BY CONGRESS,

UH, WAS REALLY MISCONCEIVED AND MISSPENT,

IF IT WAS SPENT AT ALL.

WE EXPECT TO PRODUCE ENOUGH ELECTRICITY

FOR ALL IRAQIS TO HAVE

ELECTRICAL SERVICE 24 HOURS DAILY,

SOMETHING ESSENTIAL TO THEIR HOPES FOR THE FUTURE.

THERE WAS FRAUD, THERE WAS CORRUPTION, UM, THERE WAS WASTE.

Woman: THE ORDINARY PEOPLE HAVE THEIR ELECTRICITY

ONLY FOR TWO OR THREE HOURS A DAY.

WATER COMES EVERY, LIKE, NOW AND THEN, EVERY TWO OR THREE DAYS.

Fekeiki: WE SPENT WINTER SHIVERING, COVERED IN BLANKETS,

BECAUSE WE DIDN'T HAVE ENOUGH FUEL TO OPERATE THE HEATERS.

THAT'S--THAT'S-- THAT'S THE LIFE WE LIVE.

Narrator: IN MAY 2003,

THE UNITED NATIONS SENT ITS BEST EXPERT

IN POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION TO HELP THE U.S. OCCUPATION.

HE WAS A BRAZILIAN DIPLOMAT NAMED SERGIO VIEIRA DE MELLO.

Power: EVEN THOUGH THE U.N. WAS GIVEN NOTHING MEANINGFUL TO DO,

KOFI ANNAN SAID, "LET ME SEND MY BEST.

"IF ANYBODY CAN CARVE OUT A BIGGER ROLE FOR THE U.N.,

"IT'S MY GUY, IT'S SERGIO VIEIRA DE MELLO."

AND I WAS PART OF HIS TEAM, AND I WAS HIS...

PRINCIPAL POLITICAL ADVISOR AT THAT TIME

AND WE WENT TOGETHER TO BAGHDAD.

OUR POLITICAL TEAM WERE ALL ARABIC SPEAKERS,

AND WITH GOOD EXPERIENCE WORKING IN THE REGION AND SO ON.

ONE OF THINGS THAT SERGIO DID THAT IS VERY, VERY POIGNANT

IN RETROSPECT IS THAT...

SEEING THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD BOARDED ITSELF UP

IN THE GREEN ZONE AND WAS NOT ACCESSING THE IRAQI STREET,

SERGIO CREATED A STRUCTURE IN IRAQ

THAT WAS PRECISELY THE OPPOSITE OF THE GREEN ZONE.

YOU MIGHT CALL IT THE ANTI-GREEN ZONE.

I'M LISTENING, I'M LISTENING TO POLITICAL LEADERS,

YOU KNOW, THAT I'LL BE MEETING WITH THEM ON A DAILY BASIS.

WE HAD VARIOUS DISCUSSIONS WITH THESE MILITARY

WHO CAME TO THE U.N.,

AND MET WITH SERGIO VIEIRA DE MELLO

AND ASKED HIM, YOU KNOW, TO MEDIATE

IN THE DISPUTE THAT THEY HAVE WITH THE C.P.A.

YOU'D HAVE THESE LONG, LONG LINES RIGHT OUTSIDE THE GREEN ZONE

BUT THEY COULD NOT MAKE THEIR COMPLAINTS FELT.

IN THE U.N. COMPOUND BY CONTRAST IT WAS INCREDIBLY POROUS.

IF YOU WANTED TO COMPLAIN, THE U.N. WAS, WAS VERY, VERY EAGER

TO HEAR YOUR COMPLAINT, AND SERGIO SAW IT AS HIS ROLE

TO RELAY THOSE COMPLAINTS TO BREMER, AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS

IN THE HOPES THAT SOME OF THESE THINGS WOULD GET TENDED TO

BEFORE AN INSURGENCY TOOK ROOT.

I'M MEETING WITH HIM REGULARLY,

AND SHARING MY ADVICE AND MY EXPERIENCE WITH HIM.

SOON AS BREMER HAD MADE USE OF SERGIO,

HAD MADE USE OF THE U.N.,

UH, HE HAD ALMOST NO TIME FOR THE UNITED NATIONS.

AND SO WHAT SERGIO LIVED THROUGH

WAS TWO MONTHS OF, IN EFFECT, BEING USED

AS A VEHICLE TO GET TO CERTAIN SEGMENTS OF THE IRAQI SOCIETY,

AND THEN FOR HIS LAST MONTH

WHAT HE ENDURED WAS NOT HAVING HIS PHONE CALLS RETURNED.

AND SO ON ISSUES LIKE DETENTION POLICY,

UH, HOODINGS WAS ONE OF THE ISSUES THAT SERGIO RAISED

AGAIN AND AGAIN WITH BREMER AND WITH GENERAL SANCHEZ,

THE HOODING OF PRISONERS, BREMER WOULD HEAR NONE OF IT.

THE THREE OR FOUR CRUCIAL MONTHS AFTER THE FALL OF BAGHDAD,

THE TWO MAIN THINGS THE U.S. MILITARY WAS DOING ON THE GROUND WERE

LOOKING FOR W.M.D. SUPPLIES AND LOOKING FOR SADDAM HUSSEIN.

THE PROCESS OF THOSE SEARCHES,

BUSTING IN THE DOORS AT NIGHT,

ROUNDING UP PEOPLE, TAKING THEM TO ABU GHRAIB,

HAVING MASS ARRESTS, IT HAD A REALLY EMBITTERING EFFECT.

Man: GO! LET'S GO!

LET'S GO! LET'S GO!

IF YOU HAPPEN TO BE A MILITARY-AGED IRAQI

IN AN AREA OF OPERATION WHERE THE AMERICAN MILITARY WENT INTO,

THERE WAS A GOOD CHANCE YOU WERE GOING TO BE ARRESTED

OR INTERNED AS A SUSPECTED INSURGENT.

JUST FOR BEING A MILITARY-AGE MAN IN THAT AREA OF OPERATION.

IN MANY OCCASIONS YOU TAKE THE, YOU KNOW,

THE IRAQI MAN OF MILITARY AGE OUT OF HIS FAMILY,

YOU'RE TAKING THE BREADWINNER.

Burke: YOU ANGER NOT JUST HIM BUT YOU ANGER AN EXTENDED FAMILY

'CAUSE HE'S PROBABLY SUPPORTING MORE THAN HIS IMMEDIATE FAMILY.

WHENEVER THEY HEAR THE AMERICAN HELICOPTERS

OR AMERICAN TANKS DRIVING IN THEIR STREETS,

THEY IMMEDIATELY WAKE UP,

EVEN IF IT'S LIKE TWO O'CLOCK IN THE MORNING,

AND PREPARE THEMSELVES FOR THE DETENTION.

BECAUSE FOR THEM THIS IS A USUAL THING HAPPENING EVEN NOW.

THERE WERE ATTACKS ON THE AMERICAN SOLDIERS THEMSELVES

AND SO THEY RESPONDED TO THOSE ATTACKS

BY GOING OUT AND TRYING TO FIND THE INSURGENTS,

AND IN GOING OUT AND TRYING TO FIND THE INSURGENTS,

THEY SOMETIMES ARRESTED THE WRONG PERSON.

THEY EVEN SOMETIMES KILLED THE WRONG PERSON.

UH, ONCE PEOPLE WERE ARRESTED THEY TENDED TO DISAPPEAR

IN THE AMERICAN MILITARY PRISON SYSTEM

FOR A LONG TIME WITHOUT A TRACE.

THEIR FAMILIES COULDN'T GET ANY WORD OF THEM.

IT'S DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND WHAT IT FEELS LIKE TO BE AN OCCUPIED PERSON.

THEY POINT THEIR GUNS AT YOU FROM THEIR JEEPS.

THEY STOP YOU WHEN YOU'RE DRIVING.

IRAQIS COULD NOT UNDERSTAND INSTRUCTIONS

GIVEN TO THEM AT TRAFFIC CHECKPOINTS.

IF THEY WOULD APPROACH TOO QUICKLY

THEY WOULD GET SHOT AND KILLED.

MOST OF THE AMERICAN UNITS THAT I SPENT TIME WITH

HAVE TRIED VERY, VERY HARD TO ALWAYS DO THE RIGHT THING

AND TO NOT KILL ANYONE OR INJURE ANYONE

THEY HAVEN'T INTENDED TO OR NEEDED TOO.

UH, BUT THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT WARS ARE MESSY,

AND THIS ONE IN IRAQ,

WITH THE WAY THE INSURGENCY IS BEING WAGED,

IS PARTICULARLY SO.

ONE AFTER ANOTHER YOU HAVE THESE SHORT-TERM DECISIONS

WHICH BY THE END OF 2003

MEANT YOU HAD A COUNTRY WITH AN INSURGENCY UNDER WAY.

[SPEAKING ARABIC]

[EXPLOSION]

[PEOPLE SHOUTING AND SCREAMING]

Power: A RUSSIAN-MADE TRUCK

PULLED UP RIGHT OUTSIDE SERGIO VIEIRA DE MELLO'S WINDOW

AND SET OFF JUST A HUGE AMOUNT OF EXPLOSIVES.

THE ENTIRE SOUTHWESTERN CORNER OF THE U.N. BUILDING COLLAPSED.

SERGIO WAS UNDER THE RUBBLE AND ALIVE

FOR MORE THAN THREE HOURS AWAITING RESCUE.

WE LOST MANY COLLEAGUES IN THAT BOMBING

AND I THINK IT WAS, YOU KNOW, THE SIGN THAT SOMETHING DRAMATIC

HAD HAPPENED IN THE COUNTRY, THAT THE INSURGENCY HAD BECOME

VERY LETHAL, FULL-FLEDGED,

READY FOR A LONG STRUGGLE AND LONG FIGHT, YOU KNOW,

WITH THE COALITION FORCES.

BY 2004, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MILITARY

AND THE IRAQI PEOPLE HAD GROWN TOXIC.

Man: ALL RIGHT, THIS IS THE CORNER WHERE LITTLE SHITS

LIKE TO THROW ROCKS AT US.

[MAN TALKING ON RADIO, INDISTINCT]

GOD DAMN!

[CRASH]

RIGHT THERE! OH, BUT WE CAN'T USE DEADLY FORCE.

WE CAN'T USE DEADLY FORCE.

Boy: FUCK YOU!

FUCK YOU, YOU LITTLE SHIT!

YOU SEE, UM, ALL THESE CIVILIANS WHO COME OVER TO WORK FOR...

THE PRIVATE CONTRACTORS

WHO ARE DOING SO MUCH OF THE WORK WITH THE RECONSTRUCTION,

REALLY JUST BECAUSE WE DON'T HAVE ENOUGH TROOPS.

I'VE SEEN AN AWFUL LOT OF CIVILIAN CONTRACTORS

WHO HAVE BEEN PARTICULARLY VIOLENT AND, UM,

AND VERY SHORT-SIGHTED IN TERMS OF WHAT THEY'RE DOING.

[* COUNTRY MUSIC PLAYING]

[MACHINE GUN FIRING]

[GUNFIRE]

[GUNFIRE]

[RADIO CHATTER, GUNFIRE]

[GUNSHOTS]

Man: DID HE ALREADY FIGHT THE AMERICANS?

[2nd MAN TRANSLATES]

Narrator: BY EARLY 2004, FALLUJAH,

A CITY OF 350,000 PEOPLE WEST OF BAGHDAD,

HAD BECOME THE CENTER OF THE SUNNI INSURGENCY.

ON MARCH 31st, 2004,

FOUR AMERICAN MILITARY CONTRACTORS WERE KILLED,

AND THEIR BODIES WERE DRAGGED THROUGH THE STREETS OF FALLUJAH

BY CHEERING CROWDS.

BEGINNING IN EARLY 2004,

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL,

A POWERFUL 12-PERSON COMMITTEE

THAT SITS ON TOP OF AMERICA'S INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY,

CONDUCTED SEVERAL ASSESSMENTS OF THE GROWING INSURGENCY

WHICH IT PRESENTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE

AND SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS.

WELL, WE WERE CHRONICLING WHAT WAS A DEEPENING INSURGENCY.

IT WAS BROADENING AND WAS NOT LIMITED TO FOREIGN FIGHTERS

OR DISAFFECTED BA'ATHISTS.

WHAT WE CALL THE INSURGENCY

REALLY IS A MULTIFACETED, DEEPLY ROOTED THING.

UH, IT'S JUST NOT A FEW BA'ATHIST DEAD-ENDERS,

IT'S NOT JUST A FEW EXTREMISTS FROM OVERSEAS,

UH, BUT RATHER REFLECTED MULTIPLE MOTIVATIONS

AND FRUSTRATIONS

AMONG THE IRAQI PEOPLE THEMSELVES.

Hutchings: AS THE ECONOMIC SITUATION WAS DETERIORATING,

AS PEOPLE'S PERSONAL SECURITY WAS BECOMING WEAKER,

AND AS RESENTMENT OF THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION WAS GROWING.

THE C.I.A., UH, UH,

LAID OUT A, UH...

SEVERAL SCENARIOS

THAT SAID LIFE COULD BE LOUSY, LIFE COULD BE OK,

LIFE COULD BE BETTER.

THE PRESIDENT HADN'T READ IT,

NOT EVEN A ONE-PAGE SUMMARY OVER WHICH WE WORKED SO HARD

TO REDUCE THESE FINDINGS TO A SINGLE READABLE PAGE.

THE PRESIDENT HAD NOT READ EVEN THE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY?

CORRECT.

AND THEY WERE JUST, UH, UH...

GUESSING AS TO WHAT THE CONDITIONS MIGHT BE LIKE.

WHAT'S YOUR ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN IRAQ

WHO HAVE BEEN ACTIVE AT SOME LEVEL IN THE INSURGENCY?

ACTIVE IN SOME LEVEL, UH, IF YOU SAY SUPPORTING,

PROVIDING SAFE HAVEN TO,

POTENTIALLY YOU KNOW, WELL OVER A HUNDRED THOUSAND PEOPLE.

Narrator: DESPITE THE INTENSIFICATION OF THE INSURGENCY,

THERE WERE STILL NOT SUFFICIENT ARMORED VEHICLES

FOR AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN IRAQ.

WE NEVER HAD A SINGLE ARMORED HUMVEE

WHILE WE WERE IN IRAQ THROUGHOUT 2003.

WE WENT TO IRAQ IN 2004

WITH UNARMORED HUMVEES

AND THEY WERE GIVEN ARMOR KITS IN KUWAIT

WHICH WERE JUST SORT OF CUT-OUT DOORS WITH NO WINDOWS,

UM, AND A BULLETPROOF WINDSHIELD AND THAT'S ABOUT IT.

IF YOUR HUMVEE HADN'T BEEN ARMORED,

WHAT DO YOU THINK THE DAMAGE FROM THAT I.E.D. WOULD HAVE BEEN?

I THINK IT WOULD HAVE BEEN DEADLY.

WHY DO WE SOLDIERS HAVE TO DIG THROUGH LOCAL LANDFILLS

FOR PIECES OF SCRAP METAL

AND COMPROMISED BALLISTIC GLASS TO UP-ARMOR OUR VEHICLES,

AND WHY DON'T WE HAVE THOSE RESOURCES

READILY AVAILABLE TO US?

[CHEERING]

IT--IT'S ESSENTIALLY A MATTER OF PHYSICS,

IT ISN'T A MATTER OF MONEY.

IT ISN'T A MATTER, ON THE PART OF THE ARMY, OF DESIRE,

IT'S A MATTER OF PRODUCTION AND CAPABILITY OF DOING IT.

WE HAVE AUTOMOBILE PLANTS CLOSING DOWN IN AMERICA.

YOU KNOW? I MEAN, I'M NOT A FACTORY EXPERT,

JUST RETOOL THEM TO PRODUCE SOME ARMORED HUMVEES.

IT SHOULDN'T BE THAT DIFFICULT.

YOU GO TO WAR WITH THE ARMY YOU HAVE,

AND NOT THE ARMY YOU MIGHT WANT OR WISH TO HAVE AT A LATER TIME.

Narrator: IN NOVEMBER 2004, THE PENTAGON DECIDED TO ATTACK FALLUJAH

IN AN ATTEMPT TO RECAPTURE THE CITY

FROM THE SUNNI INSURGENCY.

FALLUJAH'S 350,OOO RESIDENTS WERE WARNED TO LEAVE.

THE BATTLE DESTROYS 70% OF THE CITY

AND RENDERS 150,000 PEOPLE HOMELESS.

DESPITE INTENSE COMBAT, MANY INSURGENTS ESCAPE.

40 MARINES ARE KILLED.

WHILE THE U.S. MILITARY WAS PREOCCUPIED WITH FALLUJAH,

SHI'ITE MILITIAS WERE TAKING OVER SOUTHERN IRAQ.

THERE'S NOTHING LIKE AN ARMY OR A MAJOR, UM...

LARGE ELEMENTS OF HUNDREDS OF PEOPLE

TRYING TO OVERTHROW OR TO CHANGE THE SITUATION.

Narrator: IN AUGUST 2004,

THE HOLY CITY OF NAJAF IS TAKEN OVER BY THE MAHDI ARMY,

THE SHI'ITE MILITIA CONTROLLED BY MUQTADA AL-SADR.

Moulton: ESSENTIALLY THE TURNOVER WE GOT FROM THE ARMY UNIT

THAT WE REPLACED WAS

THAT MOST THINGS IN NAJAF ARE PRETTY PEACEFUL.

EXCEPT THERE'S THIS 3,000-MAN MILITIA FORCE

THAT OCCUPIES THE CENTER OF THE CITY.

A LOT OF ROUNDS FLYING, A LOT OF MORTARS LANDING.

MY PLATOON WAS THE FIRST INTO THE POLICE STATION.

WE JUST TOOK UP POSITIONS ALONGSIDE THE IRAQI POLICE,

AND DEFENDED IT FROM THE MILITIA.

BUT IT WASN'T UNTIL THE END OF AUGUST

THAT WE ACTUALLY DID A FULL-SCALE ASSAULT

ON THE OLD CITY OF NAJAF AND TOOK IT OVER.

IF DEMOCRACY CANNOT PROVIDE FOR THE IRAQI PEOPLE,

PEOPLE WILL SAY, "TO HELL WITH DEMOCRACY,

"WE NEED A STRONG MAN."

AND I CAN SEE THE STRONG MAN ALREADY IN THE OFFING,

HIS NAME IS MUQTADA AL-SADR.

AND I WOULD SAY THIS IS NOT A GOOD CHOICE

FOR THE FUTURE LEADER OF IRAQ.

WHERE YOU PART OF THE DELIBERATIONS

ABOUT WHETHER TO CAPTURE OR KILL MUQTADA AL-SADR?

UH, YES, I WAS.

DID WE SEE MUQTADA AL-SADR AS A TROUBLEMAKER

AND A THORN IN THE SIDE?

ABSOLUTELY, AND WE WANTED TO ARREST HIM.

IT GETS BACK, IN MY VIEW, TO THE MATTER OF TROOP STRENGTH.

THE U.S. MILITARY DIDN'T WANT TO BE DIVERTED

FROM THEIR MAJOR MISSION,

TO GO AFTER WHAT WOULD HAVE BEEN A PROBABLY SHORT-TERM

BUT DIFFICULT AND I'M SURE BLOODY BATTLE,

UH, AND ULTIMATELY THAT'S WHAT WON OUT.

Narrator: AFTER ELECTIONS WERE HELD IN IRAQ ON DECEMBER 15th 2005,

THE UNITED IRAQI ALLIANCE,

OF WHICH MUQTADA AL-SADR'S PARTY IS A MAJOR PARTICIPANT,

TOOK NEARLY HALF THE SEATS IN IRAQ'S CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.

THAT'S NOT EASY A MARINE WHO'S SOMEONE, YOU KNOW...

SOME OF MY BUDDIES WERE KILLED BY HIM AND HIS MILITIA,

AND NOW LOOKING AT IRAQ AND SEEING HIM AS A RISING POLITICIAN,

THAT'S FRUSTRATING.

Narrator: ANOTHER SHI'ITE GROUP WITHIN SADR'S ALLIANCE IS S.C.I.R.I.,

THE SUPREME COUNCIL FOR ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN IRAQ.

S.C.I.R.I.'S LEADERSHIP LIVED IN IRAN FOR 20 YEARS,

AND IS FREQUENTLY PRO-IRANIAN.

THESE TWO SHI'ITE GROUPS,

WHICH SOMETIMES ENGAGE IN ARMED COMBAT WITH EACH OTHER,

ARE POLITICALLY ALLIED AGAINST SUNNI GROUPS.

MUQTADA AL-SADR'S MAHDI ARMY

CONTINUES TO CLASH WITH U.S. FORCES.

THE LEVEL OF ACTIVITY THAT WE SEE TODAY,

FROM A MILITARY STANDPOINT I THINK WILL CLEARLY DECLINE,

AND I THINK THEY ARE IN THE LAST THROES, IF YOU WILL, OF THE INSURGENCY.

WHEN SECRETARY RUMSFELD AND VICE-PRESIDENT CHENEY

MADE THEIR COMMENTS ABOUT THE INSURGENCY DYING OUT,

BEING A FEW DEAD-ENDERS, ET CETERA,

YOU KNEW THAT THE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

ALREADY INDICATED THAT THEY WERE WRONG?

I HAD BEEN TO IRAQ EIGHT TIMES,

I KNEW WHAT THE FACTS ON THE GROUND WERE.

THEY'LL HAVE TO SPEAK AND THEY WILL BE JUDGED

BY THEIR OWN WORDS AND ACTIONS,

BUT, UH, I KNEW WHAT THE FACTS WERE.

Narrator: STARTING IN 2005, THE ADMINISTRATION SLOWLY BEGAN

TO CORRECT SOME OF ITS MISTAKES.

IT ACCELERATED TRAINING OF THE IRAQI ARMY

AND APPOINTED A MUSLIM DIPLOMAT,

ZALMAY KHALILZAD, AS AMBASSADOR.

IN JUNE OF 2006,

AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD SENT AN OMINOUS CABLE

TO CONDOLEEZZA RICE.

IRAQIS WORKING FOR THE EMBASSY

COULD NOT TELL THEIR FAMILIES WHERE THEY WORKED

FOR FEAR OF BEING KILLED.

THEY ASK WHAT WILL HAPPEN IF THE AMERICANS EVACUATE.

MANY PLAN AHEAD FOR THEIR OWN ABDUCTION.

SIX MONTHS LATER,

THE DAY AFTER REPUBLICANS LOSE CONTROL OF CONGRESS,

PRESIDENT BUSH ANNOUNCES DONALD RUMSFELD'S RESIGNATION.

THE NEW SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ROBERT GATES,

IS A PRAGMATIST WHO HAD BEEN PRIVATELY CRITICAL OF THE WAR.

I AM MAKING A CHANGE AT THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

TO BRING A FRESH PERSPECTIVE AS TO HOW TO ACHIEVE SOMETHING

I THINK MOST AMERICANS WANT, WHICH IS A VICTORY.

Narrator: BY THE TIME RUMSFELD IS REPLACED,

IRAQ IS OUT OF CONTROL.

THE COUNTRY IS INCREASINGLY DOMINATED BY MILITIAS,

INSURGENTS, CRIMINALS AND WARLORDS.

MIXED AREAS ARE PURGED BY ETHNIC CLEANSING.

SHI'ITE MILITIAS HAVE INFILTRATED THE POLICE,

USING THEM FOR SECTARIAN KILLINGS.

KIDNAPPINGS AND VIOLENT DEATHS

HAVE REACHED SEVERAL HUNDRED PER DAY.

Ussayran: WE HAVE SO MANY KINDS OF MILITIA.

YOU HAVE THE MAHDI MILITIA,

YOU HAVE THE BADR MILITIA,

YOU HAVE MANY MILITIAS IN THIS COUNTRY.

AND THEY ALL ARE VERY DEMOCRATIC

IN ARRESTING PEOPLE AND KILLING THEM.

Allbritton: SECURITY IS TERRIBLE IN MANY NEIGHBORHOODS

WITH AN EVER-PRESENT THREAT OF CAR BOMBS AND I.E.D.s.

KIDNAPPINGS, ESPECIALLY SHEER MONEY-MAKING GANGSTER STUFF.

KIDNAPPING OF A SMALL BOY RIGHT IN FRONT OF THE HOTEL,

YOU KNOW, A CAR JUST STOPPED, GRABBED THE BOY AND DROVE OFF.

PARENTS WILL GET A RANSOM NOTE AND THEY'LL SOMEHOW

HAVE TO RAISE THIS AMOUNT OF MONEY IN A WEEK.

IT'S NOT WHERE YOU JUST HAVE ONE OR TWO OR THREE KIDNAPPINGS

BUT YOU HAVE HUNDREDS, AND YOU GET OVERWHELMED.

YOU JUST HAVE A DELUGE OF INDIVIDUALS

WHO ARE ASKING FOR HELP OR--OR--

OR SOON DON'T ASK FOR HELP ANYMORE.

WHY REPORT IT TO THE POLICE? ONE, WE DON'T TRUST THEM.

TWO, THEY MAY BE COMMITTING SOME OF THE CRIME.

Allbritton: THE UNIFORMS THAT THEY USE JUST PROLIFERATED ALL OVER THE PLACE.

SO YOU REALLY HAVE LOTS OF ROGUE ELEMENTS

AND PEOPLE THAT ARE USING OR WORKING UNDER THE GUISE OF THE SECURITY SERVICES.

Ussayran: NOW YOU CAN SEE PEOPLE ARRESTED BY MANY SOURCES.

YOU DON'T KNOW WHO ARE THEY.

FAKE CHECKPOINTS IN THE STREETS STOP PEOPLE PASSING

AND LOOK INTO THEIR I.D.s AND SEE IF THEY WERE SHI'ITES,

SUNNIS, KURDS, ARABS, AND THEN...

EITHER KIDNAP THEM OR KILL THEM IN THE SAME PLACE.

Ussayran: WHEN I SAY GOOD-BYE TO MY HUSBAND

I THINK I'M NOT COMING BACK.

Narrator: BY LATE 2006, BAGHDAD HAD FALLEN INTO NEAR ANARCHY.

THE U.S. MILITARY CONTROLLED THE GREEN ZONE

AND THE AREA AROUND BAGHDAD AIRPORT.

IRAQI SECURITY FORCES CONTROLLED AREAS IN THE EAST AND SOUTH.

THE SUNNI MILITIAS CONTROLLED

SEVERAL PREDOMINANTLY SUNNI NEIGHBORHOODS.

MUQTADA AL-SADR'S MAHDI ARMY DOMINATED LARGE AREAS

INCLUDING THE ENORMOUS SHI'ITE SLUM OF SADR CITY.

S.C.I.R.I.'S RIVAL SHI'ITE MILITIA, THE BADR BRIGADE,

CONTROLLED WEALTHIER SHI'ITE AREAS.

NEIGHBORHOOD ORGANIZATIONS CONTROLLED MANY SMALL ZONES.

LARGE AREAS WERE ESSENTIALLY CONTROLLED BY NO ONE.

Narrator: FROM A STUDY CONDUCTED BY

HARVARD PROFESSOR LINDA BILMAS

AND NOBEL LAUREATE JOSEPH STIGLITZ,

AS OF EARLY 2007, THE U.S. HAS SPENT $379 BILLION

DIRECTLY ON THE WAR IN IRAQ.

FUTURE OPERATING COSTS ARE ESTIMATED AT $389 BILLION.

THE COSTS OF VETERANS' HEALTHCARE

AND LOST PRODUCTIVITY OF THOSE SERVING IN IRAQ

IS $482 BILLION.

THE COSTS OF DEMOBILIZATION AND REPLACING MILITARY EQUIPMENT,

WHICH IS BEING USED UP SIX TIMES FASTER THAN NORMAL,

IS $160 BILLION.

THE INCREASE IN OIL PRICES DUE TO THE WAR,

HAVE COST THE U.S. ECONOMY $450 BILLION.

IN TOTAL, THE ECONOMIC COST OF THE WAR

IS PROJECTED TO REACH $1.8 TRILLION DOLLARS.

I'M SUFFERING FROM...

POST-TRAUMATIC MIGRAINES

AND POST-TRAUMATIC EPILEPSY.

SOMETIMES I HAVE BAD MEMORIES ABOUT WHAT HAPPENED

BUT I'M NOT SCARED OF THEM.

DO YOU FEEL EMOTIONALLY OK?

UH, SOMETIMES THAT'S A LITTLE...

SOMETIMES YES, SOMETIMES NO.

STILL HAVE TROUBLE, YOU KNOW, DEALING WITH, UM,

UM, YOU KNOW,

WHAT HAPPENED TO ME AND MY PARTNER, YOU KNOW, SOMETIMES.

Bilmes: THE BIG, BIG COST IN TERMS OF VETERANS' DISABILITY

IS FOR THE MANY HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE

WHO COME BACK AND THEY FIND THAT THEY CAN'T WORK

AND HOLD DOWN A JOB IN THE WAY THEY USED TO

BECAUSE THEY'RE JUST NOT QUITE THE SAME AS THEY WERE BEFORE.

Man: HOW HOT DOES IT GET IN THIS COUNTRY?

120 YESTERDAY.

Man: 120 YESTERDAY? YEP.

LAST CONTRACT I EVER SIGN WITH THE GOVERNMENT.

SOME OF THESE UNITS HAVE BEEN THERE NOW

ON THEIR THIRD TOUR OF DUTY,

AND SOME OF THEM DON'T SEE AN END TO IT.

THEY THINK THEY'LL BE BACK THERE FOR THEIR FIFTH,

SIXTH AND SEVENTH TOURS OF DUTY BEFORE THIS ENDS.

WE DON'T HAVE ENOUGH TROOPS.

HOW COULD WE PROTECT AGAINST

A POSSIBLE CONFLICT IN PYONGYANG,

A POSSIBLE CONFLICT WITH IRAN,

OTHER POTENTIALITIES IN THE WORLD,

WHEN WE'VE GOT EVERYTHING TIED UP

WITH REGARD TO IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN?

IRAN IS ODDLY,

GIVEN HOW MUCH WE DISLIKE THE IRANIAN REGIME,

THE SINGLE GREATEST BENEFICIARY OF THE WAR IN IRAQ.

WE ELIMINATED THEIR HISTORIC ENEMY FOR THEM

AND PUT THEM ON TOP IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

I MEAN, WHEN YOU HAVE MASSIVE CIVIL WAR,

VIOLENT, NASTY CIVIL WAR

ON TOP OF 20% OF THE WORLD'S OIL SUPPLY,

THAT WILL PROBABLY ENGULF OTHER REGIONAL PLAYERS--

IRAN, SAUDI ARABIA, JORDAN, SYRIA, MAYBE EVEN EGYPT.

Amazia Baram: IF IRAQ DISINTEGRATES AND BECOMES AN ARENA OF CIVIL WAR,

MUCH OF IT WILL BECOME LIKE LITTLE AFGHANISTAN.

IT'S WHERE TERRORISTS ALL OVER THE WORLD WILL FIND REFUGE.

IF IRAQ GOES BACK TO SOME SORT OF ISLAMOFASCIST REGIME,

LIKE WE HAD UNDER THE TALIBAN IN AFGHANISTAN,

THEN WE ARE BACK TO SEPTEMBER 10TH 2001,

EXCEPT MUCH LARGER SCALE

AND BILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN OIL MINING IN THEIR DISPOSAL.

WHEN WE WERE FIRST STARTING THE RECONSTRUCTION

WE WOULD SORT OF JOKE

THAT THERE WERE 500 WAYS TO DO IT WRONG

AND TWO OR THREE WAYS TO DO IT RIGHT,

AND WHAT WE DIDN'T UNDERSTAND

WAS THAT WE WERE GONNA GO THROUGH ALL 500.

WHY DO YOU THINK ALL THOSE MISTAKES WERE MADE?

I DON'T KNOW.

I HAVE NO IDEA. PUZZLING.

Packer: PRESIDENT BUSH WAS MISSING IN ACTION

ON THE PLANNING FOR THE POST-WAR.

HE DEFERRED TO HIS VICE-PRESIDENT

AND HIS SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THE CONTROL OVER THOSE DECISIONS.

Burke: WHY ON EARTH, IF YOU WERE PRESIDENT OF UNITED STATES,

WOULD YOU PLAN TO USE MILITARY FORCE AND THEN DIVORCE YOURSELF

FROM ESSENTIALLY THE MOST IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THAT USE

AND THAT IS THE AFTERMATH.

WHO WAS IN CHARGE OF THIS WAR?

I DON'T WANNA GO THROUGH THE LIST. I MEAN IT WAS--

IT WAS THE PRESIDENT, THE VICE-PRESIDENT,

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,

THOSE AROUND, AROUND ALL THOSE PEOPLE.

DO YOU INCLUDE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER?

SURE.

THE VICE-PRESIDENT YOU INCLUDE?

YEAH.

THAT WAS THE INNER TEAM

THAT PRODUCED THE THINKING BEHIND THE WAR.

MY MISTAKE WAS PROBABLY NOT FINDING A WAY TO GET MYSELF

MORE INVOLVED ON THE PLANNING PROCESS OF THINGS.

I SEE.

SO THE DISSOLUTION OF THE ARMY

WOULDN'T HAVE BEEN A SURPRISE, FOR EXAMPLE?

WELL, AND I COULD HAVE RAISED HELL ABOUT IT, YOU KNOW,

AND HAD MY DAY IN COURT. I MAY HAVE LOST BUT I'D HAD MY DAY IN COURT.

THE SYSTEM OUGHT TO BE PARTICIPATORY

AND OUGHT TO INCLUDE PEOPLE WHO ARE WILLING TO SAY,

"UH, THIS MAKES NO SENSE, MR. PRESIDENT.

"THIS IS A BAD IDEA."

AND I DON'T THINK THAT KIND OF DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

EXISTED IN THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION.

I STRONGLY DIDN'T FEEL MYSELF PARTICIPATING

IN SUCH A DECISION-MAKING PROCESS.

THE ADMINISTRATION NEVER ASKED FOR ANY...

ESTIMATE OR COMMUNITY ASSESSMENT ON IRAQ BEFORE WE WENT TO WAR.

NOBODY SEEMED TO BE INTERESTED

IN WHAT THE COMMUNITY HAD TO SAY?

I THINK IT'S MORE A MATTER THAT MINDS WERE MADE UP

THE TIME THAT THE COURSE WAS SET.

UH, WHATEVER ANALYSIS ON THESE SORTS OF ISSUES

WAS TO HAVE BEEN DONE,

THE DECISION MAKERS FELT

THEY HAD ALREADY DONE IT THEMSELVES.

Man: VICE-PRESIDENT CHENEY OF COURSE HAS MADE

AND TAKES MANY OF THE SAME POSITIONS

THAT SECRETARY RUMSFELD DID ON THE WAR.

DOES HE STILL HAVE YOUR COMPLETE CONFIDENCE?

YES, HE DOES. DO YOU EXPECT HIM TO--

THE CAMPAIGN IS OVER. YES, HE DOES.

AND HE'LL BE HERE FOR THE REMAINED OF YOUR TERM? YES, HE WILL.

THERE ARE NIGHTS WHEN I DON'T SLEEP VERY WELL,

THAT I FAULT MYSELF FOR NOT PUSHING THE ISSUE,

THAT I THINK I SHOULD HAVE GONE AND KICKED HIS DOOR IN AND SAID,

"DAMN IT, LISTEN.

"THIS WAS A MISTAKE.

"WE NEED TO DO SOMETHING TO RECTIFY IT."

BUT I NEVER HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO DO IT,

AND TRYING TO KICK IN A DOOR, YOU KNOW,

WITH AN AMBASSADOR WHO'S ESSENTIALLY THE, YOU KNOW,

THE CZAR OF IRAQ.

YOU KNOW, FOR A COLONEL TO TRY AND DO IT

JUST WASN'T GOING TO HAPPEN.

YOU COULDN'T GET PAST THE FRONT DOOR.

IF MY SPEAKING OUT ADDS EVEN INFINITESIMALLY

TO THE CRITICISM THAT COUNTS OF THIS ADMINISTRATION,

THEN THAT'S GOOD.

I DON'T PRETEND TO SAY THAT I'VE BEEN EFFECTIVE IN THAT REGARD,

BUT I JUST CAN'T HOLD MY PEACE ANY LONGER.

WE WILL BRING TO THE IRAQI PEOPLE FOOD

AND MEDICINES

AND SUPPLIES

AND FREEDOM.

Man: HEAR THE CHEER, CHEER, CHEER!

AND IT JUST WAS, "HENNY PENNY, THE SKY IS FALLING!"

GENERAL GARNER AND I ARE PLEDGED

TO WORKING VERY CLOSELY TOGETHER.

THERE IS A LARGE NUMBER OF FORMER IRAQI SOLDIERS

THAT ARE UNEMPLOYED NOW.

ONE WAS, UH, "GUERRILLA WAR",

ANOTHER WAS "INSURGENCY", ANOTHER WAS "UNCONVENTIONAL WAR".

PARDON ME? QUAGMIRE.

NO, THAT'S, UH, SOMEONE ELSE'S BUSINESS, QUAGMIRES.

I DON'T DO QUAGMIRES.

[MEN SHOUTING, WOMAN SCREAMING]

Man: INSIDE, INSIDE.

I'M LISTENING, I'M LISTENING TO POLITICAL LEADERS.

Man: OH!

2nd man: STAY DOWN, STAY DOWN, STAY DOWN.

SOME DAY, MY LIFE IN THE FUTURE, I GOTTA LOOK BACK TO IRAQ,

AND I GOTTA SEE SOMETHING DONE IN THERE,

SO I CAN LOOK BACK AND SAY

I WAS PART OF THIS,

AND MY SUFFERING AND MY LOSS HAVE A--HAVE A MEANING.

[SPEAKING ARABIC]

IF THE SITUATION GETS BETTER, I AM GOING TO LEAVE IRAQ.

I WILL LEAVE IRAQ, BUT NOW...

I'M A FIGHTER, I MEAN, ALL MY LIFE.

I WON'T LEAVE IRAQ NOW.

Fekeiki: FROM HERE WE CAN'T CHANGE ANYTHING

BECAUSE IT'S OUT OF CONTROL NOW.

I DON'T HAVE FUTURE PLANS FOR BEING IN IRAQ.

I DON'T SEE THE BIT OF LIGHT IN THE--

AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL YET.

Rosen: THIS IS WHAT IT IS.

THIS IS HOW WE LIVE IT, THIS IS HOW WE SEE IT,

THIS IS HOW WE SMELL IT AND FEEL IT.

IT'S NOT A SITUATION THAT YOU CAN SAY, "LET'S TRY THIS,

"IT WILL HELP. TRY THIS, IT WILL HELP." NO, IT'S NOT.

AND ARE YOU TELLING ME THAT'S THE BEST AMERICA CAN DO?

NO.

DON'T TELL ME THAT, DON'T TELL THE MARINES

WHO FOUGHT FOR A MONTH IN NAJAF THAT,

DON'T TELL ME THE MARINES WHO--

WHO ARE STILL FIGHTING EVERY DAY IN FALLUJAH

THAT THAT'S THE BEST AMERICA CAN DO.

THAT MAKES ME ANGRY.