All language subtitles for No.End.In.Sight.2007

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THE GREAT RESPECT THAT I HAVE

FOR YOUR LEADERSHIP,
MR. PRESIDENT,

IN THIS LITTLE-UNDERSTOOD,
UNFAMILIAR WAR,

THE FIRST WAR OF
THE 21st CENTURY,

IT IS NOT WELL KNOWN, IT
WAS NOT WELL UNDERSTOOD,

IT IS COMPLEX FOR
PEOPLE TO COMPREHEND,

AND I KNOW WITH CERTAIN
CERTAINTY THAT OVER TIME

THE CONTRIBUTIONS YOU'VE MADE
WILL BE RECORDED BY HISTORY.

[OVERLAPPING NEWS
REPORTS AND RADIO CHATTER]

Narrator: ON MAY 1st, 2003,
PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH

DECLARED AN END TO MAJOR
COMBAT OPERATIONS IN IRAQ AND SAID

"IN THE BATTLE OF IRAQ, THE UNITED
STATES AND OUR ALLIES HAVE PREVAILED."

FOUR YEARS LATER, AFTER OVER 3,000 AMERICAN
DEATHS AND OVER 20,000 AMERICAN WOUNDED,

IRAQ HAS DISINTEGRATED
INTO CHAOS.

BAGHDAD HAS TEN BOMBINGS,
TEN, FIFTEEN BOMBINGS A DAY,

AND IT'S MAYBE 50 K.I.A.

BUT I SUSPECT THAT'S
DRASTICALLY UNDER-REPORTED.

WE'RE PROBABLY CAPTURING A
THIRD OF WHAT'S ACTUALLY OCCURRING.

Narrator: MILLIONS OF IRAQIS HAVE
LOST ACCESS TO DRINKING WATER,

SEWAGE TREATMENT AND
ELECTRICITY SINCE THE INVASION.

BAGHDAD, A CITY OF SIX MILLION, HAS BEEN
UNDER AN 8:00 P.M. CURFEW SINCE MARCH OF 2006.

OVER THREE MILLION IRAQIS HAVE
FLED TO NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES.

ESTIMATES OF THE CIVILIAN DEATH
TOLL RANGE AS HIGH AS 600,000.

PEOPLE WHO DIE, THEY'RE LUCKY,

BUT PEOPLE LIVING, THEY'RE
DEAD WHILE THEY ARE ALIVE.

THE WEST PART AND THE NORTH PART
OF IRAQ ARE CONTROLLED BY INSURGENTS.

THE REST OF IRAQ IS
CONTROLLED BY MILITIAS.

Narrator: IRAQ'S TWO MAJOR MUSLIM GROUPS,
THE SHI'ITE MAJORITY AND SUNNI MINORITY,

ARE INCREASINGLY AT WAR.

FROM JANUARY 2003
TO JANUARY 2005,

I WAS THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL.

WE PRODUCED THE FIRST NATIONAL ESTIMATE
ON THE STATE OF THE INSURGENCY IN IRAQ.

THE ESTIMATE DELIVERED
PRETTY BAD NEWS.

IT BASICALLY LAID OUT SORT OF
BAD, WORSE AND WORST SCENARIOS.

THE PRESIDENT
CALLED IT GUESSWORK

AND HIS PRESS SPOKESMAN

CALLED IT HAND-WRINGING
AND NAY-SAYING.

UM, WHAT WAS REALLY
REVEALING TO ME

WAS THE PRESIDENT
HADN'T READ IT.

Paul Hughes: SEPTEMBER 11TH OF 2001
WAS A VERY CLEAR, BRIGHT, BEAUTIFUL DAY,

AND I HAD JUST COME BACK
FROM THE PENTAGON BARBER SHOP,

WALKED BY MY OFFICE AND GLANCED
UP ON THE TELEVISION SCREEN,

AND THERE WAS, UH, ONE OF
THE TWIN TOWERS BURNING.

WE NEVER HEARD THE PLANE
COME IN. AT LEAST I DIDN'T.

SUDDENLY THE WHOLE
WORLD TURNED UPSIDE DOWN.

I SAW THAT FIREBALL
AND I GOTTA TELL YOU,

I SAW THAT AND I SAID TO
MYSELF, I'M GOING TO DIE TODAY.

THAT PLANE HAD COME DIRECTLY
UNDER OUR SECTION OF THE OFFICES.

THE ARMY BUDGET OFFICE WHERE 38 ARMY
EMPLOYEES WERE KILLED WAS DIRECTLY BENEATH US,

AND THE NAVY'S NEW COMMAND
CENTER WAS TWO FLOORS BENEATH US.

EVERYBODY WAS KILLED
IN THOSE TWO SECTIONS.

THIS WAS SOMETHING THAT OSAMA
BIN LADEN HAD ORCHESTRATED

BECAUSE HE WAS THE ONLY
TERRORIST I COULD THINK OF

WHO COULD HAVE COORDINATED
THIS KIND OF ACTIVITY.

Man: OH, SO YOU HAD THAT
THOUGHT IMMEDIATELY?

IMMEDIATELY, IMMEDIATELY.

Narrator: A MONTH
AFTER SEPTEMBER 11TH,

THE UNITED STATES
ENTERED AFGHANISTAN

IN SEARCH OF AL-QAEDA
AND OSAMA BIN LADEN.

BUT EVEN BEFORE THE AFGHAN WAR,
SEVERAL SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS

WERE LOOKING AT ANOTHER TARGET,

ONE THAT HAD NOTHING TO
DO WITH THE 9/11 ATTACKS.

WHEN THE PLANES
HIT THE PENTAGON,

I WAS IN THE BUILDING,

AND THEN I GUESS THE NEXT BIG
THING THAT SORT OF HAPPENED WAS

WE IMMEDIATELY GOT TASKED TO SEE
IF WE COULD DRAW ANY RELATIONSHIP

BETWEEN SADDAM AND AL-QAEDA.

I WENT RIGHT AWAY TO THE
COUNTER-TERRORISM GROUP,

TO THEIR CHIEF IRAQ ANALYST.

THE TWO OF US SAT
DOWN OVER A FEW DAYS

AND LOOKED AT ALL THE
HISTORICAL REPORTING

THAT WE COULD GO THROUGH.

Man: AND WHAT DID YOU CONCLUDE?

WELL, WE CONCLUDED THAT
THERE WAS NO RELATIONSHIP.

HIS REGIME AIDS AND
PROTECTS TERRORISTS

INCLUDING MEMBERS OF AL-QAEDA.

WE CONTINUE TO WATCH IRAQ'S
INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.

WHAT I WANNA BRING TO
YOUR ATTENTION TODAY

IS THE POTENTIALLY MUCH MORE
SINISTER NEXUS BETWEEN IRAQ

AND THE AL-QAEDA
TERRORIST NETWORK.

WE DON'T WANT THE SMOKING
GUN TO BE A MUSHROOM CLOUD.

IRAQ HAS DRONES, AND THEY'RE
GONNA TAKE THESE DRONES

AND THEY'RE GONNA
PUT THEM ON THESE SHIPS

AND THEY'RE GONNA ARM THE DRONES
WITH CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

AND THEY'RE GONNA FLY
THESE DRONES OFF THE SHIPS

AND ATTACK THE EAST
COAST OF UNITED STATES.

YOU KNOW, THIS IS
ABSOLUTE FANTASY LAND.

THESE PEOPLE WERE, I DON'T
KNOW WHAT THEY WERE SMOKING,

BUT IT MUST HAVE BEEN VERY GOOD.

Narrator: GEORGE W. BUSH'S
FOREIGN POLICY INNER CIRCLE--

CHENEY, RUMSFELD AND WOLFOWITZ--

SET THE ADMINISTRATION ON
COURSE FOR WAR WITH IRAQ.

CONDOLEEZZA RICE
SIDED WITH THEM.

COLIN POWELL AND
RICHARD ARMITAGE,

THE ONLY SENIOR OFFICIALS
WITH COMBAT EXPERIENCE,

EXPRESSED CONCERNS PRIVATELY

BUT SUPPORTED THE
ADMINISTRATION IN PUBLIC

BUSH'S ADVISERS HAD BEEN
INVOLVED WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN

SINCE HE INVADED IRAN IN 1980

IN A BRUTAL WAR THAT KILLED
NEARLY A MILLION PEOPLE.

IRAQ USED CHEMICAL WEAPONS

AGAINST BOTH THE IRANIAN
MILITARY AND INNOCENT CIVILIANS.

SADDAM INVESTED
BILLIONS OF DOLLARS

IN NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL AND
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAMS

WHILE MURDERING 300,000
OF HIS OWN CITIZENS.

BUT THE REAGAN
ADMINISTRATION, FEARING IRAN,

SUPPORTED SADDAM WITH MILITARY
INTELLIGENCE AND ECONOMIC AID.

DONALD RUMSFELD MET
WITH SADDAM IN 1983.

COLIN POWELL WAS REAGAN'S
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER

FROM 1987 TO 1989.

THE '80s WERE REALLY
SUMMED UP IN A DREADFUL

BUT VERY TELLING STATE
DEPARTMENT DOCUMENT

FROM 1987, WHICH SAID

HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHEMICAL
WEAPONS USE ASIDE, COMMA,

OUR INTERESTS RUN ROUGHLY
PARALLEL TO THOSE OF IRAQ.

Narrator: THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR
ENDS IN STALEMATE IN 1988.

IN 1990, SADDAM INVADES KUWAIT.

A U.S.-LED COALITION
EXPELS HIM IN A WAR

MASTERMINDED BY DICK CHENEY,
THEN SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,

PAUL WOLFOWITZ, THEN UNDER-
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY,

AND COLIN POWELL, THEN CHAIRMAN
OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.

THE FIRST PRESIDENT BUSH URGES
IRAQIS TO STAGE A COUP AGAINST SADDAM.

THERE'S ANOTHER WAY
FOR THE BLOODSHED TO STOP

AND THAT IS FOR THE IRAQI
MILITARY AND THE IRAQI PEOPLE

TO TAKE MATTERS
INTO THEIR OWN HANDS

AND FORCE SADDAM HUSSEIN
THE DICTATOR TO STEP ASIDE.

Narrator: YET WHEN IRAQ'S
SOUTHERN SHI'ITES RISE UP,

THE ADMINISTRATION ALLOWS
SADDAM TO REPRESS THEM.

14 OUT OF IRAQ'S 18 GOVERNORATES
WERE UNDER REBEL CONTROL

WHEN GENERAL SCHWARTZKOPF
ALLOWED SADDAM HUSSEIN

TO USE HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS

TO MASSACRE THE REBELS'
MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN.

Narrator: THE 1991 ARMISTICE
REQUIRES IRAQ TO DISARM,

BUT SADDAM REFUSES TO COMPLY.

AS A RESULT, IRAQ'S
ECONOMY CRUMBLES

UNDER A U.N. EMBARGO
INSTITUTED IN 1993

AND CONTINUED BY THE
CLINTON ADMINISTRATION.

SADDAM'S FAVORITE
ELITE REMAIN WEALTHY,

BUT ORDINARY IRAQIS ARE
PLUNGED INTO EXTREME POVERTY

AND MANY TURN TO
FUNDAMENTALIST ISLAM.

IN 1993, WHEN GEORGE
BUSH SENIOR VISITS KUWAIT,

SADDAM ATTEMPTS
TO ASSASSINATE HIM.

SEVEN YEARS LATER, HIS SON IS
ELECTED PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

WHEN YOU SEE THE SAME
ARCHITECTS OF THOSE POLICIES

ON THE ONE HAND, TALKING ABOUT

GETTING RIGHT WHAT THEY
HAD GOTTEN WRONG BACK IN 1991,

YOU KNOW, FINISHING THE JOB,

IT WAS TEMPTING TO SAY,
"WELL, MAYBE THEY'VE LEARNED."

George W Bush, on TV:
SADDAM HUSSEIN AND HIS SONS

MUST LEAVE IRAQ WITHIN 48 HOURS.

THEIR REFUSAL TO DO SO WILL
RESULT IN MILITARY CONFLICT

COMMENCED AT A
TIME OF OUR CHOOSING.

George Packer: IF YOU WANNA
DATE THE BEGINNING OF

THE DISASTER OF POST-WAR IRAQ,

IT WOULD BE JANUARY 20TH, 2003,

WHEN BUSH SIGNED
WITHOUT, AS FAR AS I CAN TELL,

ANY REAL DISCUSSION WITHIN THE
WHITE HOUSE OR THE ADMINISTRATION,

NATIONAL SECURITY
PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE NUMBER 24,

WHICH GAVE CONTROL OF
POST-WAR IRAQ TO THE PENTAGON.

THAT DOCUMENT ESSENTIALLY
MADE DONALD RUMSFELD

THE MAIN ACTOR ON POST-WAR IRAQ.

THIS WAR WAS CONCEIVED BY A
VERY SMALL GROUP OF PEOPLE

INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION.

THEY HAD AN ENTIRELY NAIVE
VISION OF WHAT IRAQ WAS

AND WHAT IRAQIS WOULD
DO ONCE THE REGIME FELL.

Narrator: IN FORMULATING ITS
VIEWS ON POST-SADDAM IRAQ,

THE ADMINISTRATION RELIED HEAVILY
ON A MAN NAMED AHMED CHALABI.

SINCE 1992, CHALABI
HAD BEEN PRESIDENT OF

THE IRAQI NATIONAL
CONGRESS, OR I.N.C.

WIDELY VIEWED WITH SUSPICION...

CHALABI HAD BEEN CONVICTED
IN JORDAN OF A HUGE BANK FRAUD.

THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
FOUND HIS INFORMATION UNRELIABLE

OR EVEN FRAUDULENT.

AT BEST I THINK THEY WERE LIARS

AND AT WORST THEY
WERE PROVOCATEURS.

IF IT'S AN I.N.C. SOURCE

IT WAS ALWAYS LOOKED
AT VERY, VERY SKEPTICALLY

BY THE ANALYSTS.

BUT THAT WASN'T THE CASE
WITH THE POLICY MAKERS.

CHALABI ASSERTED
THAT POST-WAR IRAQ

WOULD BE PRO-AMERICAN
AND EASILY STABILIZED,

PARTICULARLY IF CHALABI
HIMSELF WAS IN CHARGE.

AND SO THE PLAN
WAS, ESSENTIALLY,

WE'LL STAY FOR
THREE OR FOUR MONTHS

WE WILL INSTALL A
GOVERNMENT MADE UP OF EXILES

AND LED BY AHMED CHALABI,

AND THEN IN AUGUST
OR SEPTEMBER OF 2003

WE WILL BEGIN A DRASTIC
REDUCTION OF TROOPS.

LARRY DI RITA ADDRESSED
US IN ONE FORM

AND SAID BY THE END
OF AUGUST OF 2003

WE WILL HAVE ALL BUT 25 TO
30,000 TROOPS OUT OF IRAQ.

I HEARD HIM SAY THAT IN
A ROOM FULL OF PEOPLE,

AND I TURNED TO MY COLLEAGUES

AND I SAID, "THIS GUY DOESN'T
KNOW WHAT HE'S TALKING ABOUT.

"IT'S PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE."

Narrator: THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S
FUTURE OF IRAQ PROJECT,

A 13-VOLUME STUDY
ON POST-WAR IRAQ,

WAS IGNORED BY THE PENTAGON.

THERE WAS AN AWFUL LOT OF
THINKING AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

THERE WERE BOARD FEET OF
VOLUMES ON HOW WE SHOULD DO THIS.

AND ALMOST NONE OF
THIS WAS INTEGRATED

INTO THE PENTAGON'S THINKING.

THE SECRETARY'S FRUSTRATION,
ALONG WITH MY OWN, GREW,

AS WE WATCHED OUR
CAREFUL PLANNING,

OUR DETAILED PLANNING,

ESSENTIALLY DISCARDED

AND THE PEOPLE WHO'D
BEEN INVOLVED IN IT

ESSENTIALLY DISCARDED,

SO THAT MORE LOYAL,

IN LINE WITH THE REPUBLICAN
PARTY'S VIEWS AND SO FORTH

PEOPLE COULD BE APPOINTED
TO KEY POSITIONS IN IRAQ.

AT THIS HOUR, AMERICAN
AND COALITION FORCES

ARE IN THE EARLY STAGES
OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

TO DISARM IRAQ,
TO FREE ITS PEOPLE,

AND TO DEFEND THE
WORLD FROM GRAVE DANGER.

I JOINED THE MARINES BECAUSE
I THINK I'VE ALWAYS JUST FELT

IT'S A REALLY IMPORTANT
JOB, AND I DIDN'T FEEL LIKE

I'D BE CONTENT WITH
MYSELF GOING THROUGH LIFE

KNOWING THAT OTHER PEOPLE
HAD FOUGHT FOR MY FREEDOM.

I JOINED THE ARMY TO
SUPPORT MY COUNTRY

AND I THOUGHT IT WAS A
GOOD THING TO DO, YOU KNOW.

IT WAS AN HONOR TO GO THERE
AND HELP MY FELLOW SOLDIERS

TO DO WHAT THEY TELLED
US TO GO AND DO THERE,

MAYBE TAKE OUT A
DICTATOR OUT OF THE POWER,

TO RE-ESTABLISH THE DEMOCRACY.

[RADIO CHATTER]

Omar Fekeiki: I JUST, WAS
WAITING FOR THE WAR TO HAPPEN

BECAUSE IT WAS THE ONLY
RAY OF HOPE I HAD TO LOOK FOR,

UM, AND WHEN IT
HAPPENED I WAS EXCITED,

AND THAT THINGS WILL MOVE SLOWLY

BUT TOWARDS BETTER
CIRCUMSTANCES.

THANK YOU, MR. BUSH.

Man: WE VERY LIKE MR. BUSH!

Children, chanting: NO, NO,
SADDAM! YES, YES, BUSH!

NO, NO, SADDAM! YES, YES, BUSH!

Chris Allbritton: IT WAS JUST A CONFUSING,
LOUD, NOISY, SCARY, HOPEFUL PLACE

ALL KIND OF WRAPPED UP TOGETHER.

I WOULD SEE KIDS WITH SKI CAPS
ON THAT SAID "F.B.I." ACROSS IT

AND THEY WOULD BE GIVING
ME THE BIG THUMBS-UP.

AND THEN I WOULD
HAVE OTHER YOUNG MEN

WHO WERE PROBABLY
FEDAYIN IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES

GIVING ME VERY HARD STARES

AND, YOU KNOW,
KIND OF SIZING ME UP

AND ALWAYS KIND OF LOOKING
AT THE LICENSE PLATE OF THE CAR.

THE IRAQIS WERE WAITING TO SEE

WHAT THIS WAS
GOING TO BRING THEM.

THE PRESENCE OF THE AMERICANS
HAD NOT BEEN REJECTED YET

BY THE IRAQIS.

NO SADDAM, NO SADDAM!

Omar Fekeiki: I'VE SEEN PEOPLE
WELCOMING THE COALITION TROOPS

BECAUSE WE THOUGHT EVERYTHING
IS PLANNED, EVERYTHING IS PREPARED.

THERE YA GO.

Narrator: DURING WORLD
WAR 2, THE UNITED STATES

STARTED PLANNING THE
OCCUPATION OF GERMANY

TWO YEARS IN ADVANCE,

BUT THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION
DIDN'T CREATE THE ORGANIZATION

THAT WOULD MANAGE
THE OCCUPATION OF IRAQ

UNTIL 60 DAYS
BEFORE THE INVASION.

O.R.H.A., THE ORGANIZATION
FOR RECONSTRUCTION

AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

REPORTED DIRECTLY TO
DEFENSE SECRETARY RUMSFELD.

Jay Garner: I GOT A CALL FROM THE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

IN LATE JANUARY,

AND THEY WOULD
LIKE FOR ME TO HANDLE

HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS
RECONSTRUCTION.

Narrator: RETIRED ARMY GENERAL JAY
GARNER WAS APPOINTED TO RUN O.R.H.A.

IN THE FIRST GULF WAR, HE
HAD COMMANDED 22,000 SOLDIERS

RESPONSIBLE FOR
HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

IN THE KURDISH ZONE
OF NORTHERN IRAQ.

THIS TIME, HE WOULD BE
RUNNING THE ENTIRE COUNTRY.

Man: DID YOU THINK THAT YOU
WERE PREPARED TO RUN IRAQ?

I DON'T THINK WE WERE EVER
PREPARED, I MEAN, YOU KNOW, TO--

A TASK OF THAT MAGNITUDE
PROBABLY TAKES YEARS TO PREPARE.

BUT OF COURSE NOBODY HAD YEARS.

I GOT A PHONE CALL
ON MY CELL PHONE

FROM SOMEONE AT
THE STATE DEPARTMENT

TELLING ME THAT RICH
ARMITAGE WAS LOOKING FOR ME

AND WANTED ME BACK IN
WASHINGTON RIGHT NOW.

AMBASSADOR BARBARA BODINE
WAS PLACED IN CHARGE OF BAGHDAD

ONLY THREE WEEKS BEFORE THE WAR.

SHE WAS A CAREER
FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER

WHO HAD SERVED IN YEMEN, IRAQ,

AND HAD BEEN A HOSTAGE
IN KUWAIT FOR FIVE MONTHS

AFTER SADDAM'S INVASION IN 1990.

SHE WAS ONE OF THE FEW STATE
DEPARTMENT MID-EAST EXPERTS

THAT THE PENTAGON
ALLOWED INTO IRAQ.

SHE WAS ONE OF THE
FEW WE COULD GET IN.

I THOUGHT THAT THEY
INITIALLY MADE A MISTAKE--

THEY THOUGHT THEY HAD A
WOMAN AND SHE'D BE AN EASY MARK--

BUT BARBARA'S ONE OF THE
TOUGHEST MEMBERS OF THE SERVICE.

Narrator: BY 2003, ARMY
COLONEL PAUL HUGHES

HAD WORKED IN THE
PENTAGON FOR SIX YEARS

DOING PLANNING AND STRATEGY WORK

FOR SENIOR DEFENSE
DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS.

I WOUND UP BEING ASSIGNED

TO THE OFFICE OF RECONSTRUCTION
AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

UNDER JAY GARNER,

AND I WAS THE DIRECTOR
OF STRATEGIC POLICY FOR HIM.

WE WERE GIVEN A SUITE OF OFFICES

THAT HAD BEEN UNOCCUPIED
FOR A COUPLE OF YEARS,

HAD NO COMPUTERS IN IT, YOU
HAVE PEOPLE SHOWING UP DAILY

ASKING, "WHERE DO I SIT?"

THEY HAD NO STAFF,
I HAD NO PERSONNEL.

I HAD NOTHING FROM
EITHER A SENIOR DEPUTY

DOWN TO A SECRETARY.

THERE WAS ONLY ONE MEETING AT
THE NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

AND IT WAS THE--I THINK
THE CONSENSUS OPINION

OF THE PEOPLE WHO
WENT TO THAT MEETING

WITH WHOM I SPOKE
AFTERWARDS, UM...

THAT, HEY, THIS IS CRAZY.

UH, THAT WAS OUR FIRST MEETING,

AND WE'RE NOT GIVEN A WHOLE LOT
CONFIDENCE BY THAT FIRST MEETING

BECAUSE, ESSENTIALLY,

WE DIDN'T DO ANYTHING
EXCEPT MEET EACH OTHER.

IT WAS COMPLETELY UNSTRUCTURED.

THERE WERE NO PLANS.
THERE TRULY WERE NO PLANS.

Hughes: ON THE 16TH OF MARCH,
O.R.H.A. FLEW OUT TO KUWAIT CITY.

WE HAD 167 PEOPLE
THAT FLEW WITH US.

167 PEOPLE THAT WERE
TO ESSENTIALLY BECOME

THE GOVERNMENT OF A
COUNTRY OF 25 MILLION.

Seth Moulton: AFTER
THE FALL OF BAGHDAD,

WE HAD NO IDEA WHAT
REALLY WAS GONNA HAPPEN,

AND THERE CERTAINLY DIDN'T
SEEM TO BE MUCH OF A PLAN.

WHAT WE WERE
GENERALLY BEING TOLD

IS THAT WE'D BE GETTING
BACK ON THE SHIPS,

YOU KNOW, WITHIN A MONTH OR TWO
OF ESSENTIALLY CONQUERING IRAQ.

Bodine: WHILE WE WERE IN KUWAIT

WE WERE AS GLUED
TO THE TELEVISION SET

AS EVERYONE ELSE.

THERE WAS THE REALIZATION THAT
THERE WAS ABSOLUTE LAWLESSNESS

AND CHAOS GOING ON IN IRAQ.

Allbritton: THE AMERICANS
WEREN'T DOING ANYTHING.

THEY WOULD SIT AT
CERTAIN INTERSECTIONS

BUT THEY WOULDN'T ACTUALLY
GET OUT OF THE HUMVEES

OR OUT OF THE TANKS
AND REALLY DO MUCH.

Fekeiki: TIME PASSED, AND
WE DIDN'T SEE ANY PROGRESS.

THE ONLY PROGRESS WE FOUND
IS THE UNCONTROLLED FREEDOM.

LOOTERS HAD TO LOOT ALL
THE GOVERNMENTAL BUILDINGS

AND EVEN PRIVATE-OWNED
COMPANIES.

THE LOOTING WAS PARTLY A
FACTOR OF THE TROOP LEVELS

AND THE SENSE THAT RUMSFELD
COMMUNICATED TO HIS COMMANDERS

AND HIS COMMANDERS COMMUNICATED
DOWN THE CHAIN TO THE PLATOON

AND COMPANY LEVEL, THAT WE
WERE NOT THERE TO RUN IRAQ,

WE WERE THERE TO GET RID
OF THE REGIME AND GET OUT.

WE'RE NOT UNDER
MARTIAL LAW HERE.

Hughes: IN HIS ORDER, GENERAL
McKIERNAN WAS NOT TOLD

TO ESTABLISH MARTIAL LAW.

YOU KNOW, NOT ONCE WAS
MARTIAL LAW WAS DECLARED.

I'LL JUST, I'LL TELL YOU HONESTLY
WE'RE IN A TRANSITION PERIOD

I MEAN THERE IS AN IRAQI
CIVIL LAW BUT THERE'S NO...

YOU JUST HEARD THAT WE JUST
OPENED UP THE FIRST TWO COURTS TODAY

SO I MEAN, WHEN YOU'RE
STARTING TO NOTHING...

HAD MARTIAL LAW BEEN DECLARED,

WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN AUTHORIZED
UNDER THE 4TH GENEVA CONVENTION,

MAYBE WE WOULD HAVE
HAD A BIT MORE SECURITY.

WE'RE A PLATOON OF
MARINES. I MEAN, WE COULD...

WE COULD CERTAINLY
STOP LOOTING IF WE...

IF THAT WAS OUR ASSIGNED TASK.

James Fallows: THE GREATEST
MYSTERY OF POST-WAR IRAQ

INVOLVES THAT MONTH OR
SO AFTER THE FALL OF BAGHDAD

OF WHY THE US DIDN'T DO ANYTHING

TO CONTROL THE LOOTING
BECAUSE, IN A WAY,

EVERYTHING THAT'S BEEN
A PROBLEM SINCE THEN

STARTED IN THAT FIRST MONTH.

PEOPLE AT THE NATIONAL
SECURITY COUNCIL,

SECRETARY POWELL,
MYSELF AND OTHERS,

UH, C.I.A. DIRECTOR, DID EXPRESS
CONCERN ABOUT THE LOOTING.

Man: UH, DID YOU EXPRESS ANY
CONCERN TO PRESIDENT BUSH?

UH, I WAS AT A MEETING WHERE
IT WAS EXPRESSED BY MY BOSS.

Man: TELL ME WHAT MR. POWELL
SAID AT THAT MEETING.

WELL, YOU KNOW, THAT'S NOT
THE WAY WE GENERALLY WORK.

OUR ADVICE TO THE PRESIDENT
IS GENERALLY KEPT THAT WAY,

PRIVATE TO THE PRESIDENT.

Bodine: THE WORD
CAME FROM WASHINGTON

THAT WE'RE NOT
GETTING INVOLVED IN THAT,

WE'RE NOT GONNA
STOP THE LOOTING,

WE'RE NOT DOING POLICE WORK,

THAT'S NOT WHAT WE'RE
HERE FOR. AND I THINK...

Man: SO THERE WERE EXPLICIT
INSTRUCTIONS FROM WASHINGTON

TO NOT INTERFERE
WITH THE LOOTING?

YES.

HOSPITALS, GOVERNMENT
OFFICES, UNIVERSITIES, MINISTRIES,

Packer: ONE C.P.A. ESTIMATE
HAD THE COST OF THE LOOTING

AT $12 BILLION.

THAT WAS THE REVENUE
FOR IRAQ IN 2003-2004.

I PICKED UP A NEWSPAPER
TODAY, AND I COULDN'T BELIEVE IT.

I READ EIGHT HEADLINES
THAT TALKED ABOUT

"CHAOS! VIOLENCE! UNREST!"

AND IT JUST WAS, "HENNY
PENNY, THE SKY IS FALLING!"

JUST IMAGINE THE ROOM, THE
SUITE THAT WE WERE SITTING IN,

AND ALL THAT YOU HAVE IS
CONCRETE WALLS, EVERYTHING IS GONE.

WE'RE TALKING PEOPLE COMING
IN WITH INDUSTRIAL CRANES

AND WALKING OFF WITH
PARTS OF A POWER PLANT.

THINK WHAT'S
HAPPENED IN OUR CITIES

WHEN WE'VE HAD RIOTS
AND PROBLEMS, AND LOOTING.

STUFF HAPPENS!

Moulton: THIS WAS NOT JUST PEOPLE
STEALING STUFF FROM GROCERY STORES.

I MEAN, THIS WAS PEOPLE
CHIPPING CONCRETE WALLS

INTO LITTLE PIECES

SO THEY COULD
TAKE THE REBAR OUT.

THE IMAGES YOU ARE
SEEING ON TELEVISION

YOU ARE SEEING OVER
AND OVER AND OVER,

AND IT'S THE SAME
PICTURE OF SOME PERSON

WALKING OUT OF SOME
BUILDING WITH A VASE.

I THINK THAT WAS PROBABLY
THE DAY THAT WE LOST THE IRAQIS.

AND YOU THINK, "MY GOODNESS!
WERE THERE THAT MANY VASES?!"

[LAUGHTER]

IS IT POSSIBLE THAT THERE
WERE THAT MANY VASES

IN THE WHOLE COUNTRY?

THAT'S WHEN IT BECAME
VERY CLEAR THAT...

THIS LIBERATION REALLY DIDN'T HAVE
ANYTHING TO DO WITH THE AVERAGE IRAQI.

THERE WAS A BELIEF
THAT THE AMERICANS

ACTUALLY ENCOURAGED THE LOOTING,

OR WANTED IT TO HAPPEN.

THE DESTRUCTION OF OUR COUNTRY,

HOW COULD THEY LET THIS HAPPEN?

SO, WHETHER YOU
WERE SUNNI OR SHI'AH,

YOU WERE OUTRAGED
ABOUT THE LOOTING.

WE HAD DONE A LIST OF 20 SITES

THAT WE THOUGHT
NEEDED TO BE PROTECTED,

UM, HISTORICAL, CULTURAL,
ARTISTIC, RELIGIOUS.

AND WE HAD PROVIDED THAT

AND IT REALLY MADE NO
DIFFERENCE WHATSOEVER.

Narrator: THE IRAQ NATIONAL
MUSEUM IN BAGHDAD,

NUMBER ONE ON O.R.H.A.'S LIST,

CONTAINED SOME OF THE WORLD'S
MOST IMPORTANT ARTIFACTS

OF EARLY HUMAN CIVILIZATION.

THE MUSEUM WAS NEVER PROTECTED.

Narrator: IRAQ'S NATIONAL
LIBRARY AND NATIONAL ARCHIVES

CONTAINING THOUSANDS OF ANCIENT
MANUSCRIPTS WERE BURNT DOWN.

ALL WHAT ARE WRITTEN
OR WERE WRITTEN

ARE KEPT IN THIS LIBRARY.

NOW WE HAVE NO
NATIONAL HERITAGE.

THREE DAYS AGO, ME
AND DR. JABAR KHALIL,

CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE
BOARD OF ANTIQUITIES,

WENT TO THE HEADQUARTERS OF
THE MARINES IN PALESTINE HOTEL.

WE WAITED THERE
FOR ABOUT FOUR HOURS

TILL WE MET A COLONEL THERE.

AND AT THAT DAY, HE PROMISED
THAT HE WILL SEND ARMORED CARS

TO PROTECT WHAT'S
LEFT FROM THE MUSEUM.

THREE DAYS AGO TILL
NOW, NOBODY CAME.

TO TRY TO LAY OFF THE
FACT OF THAT UNFORTUNATE...

UH, ACTIVITY, UH...

ON--ON A DEFECT IN A WAR PLAN,

IT STRIKES ME AS A STRETCH.

WEREN'T YOU URGED SPECIFICALLY
BY SCHOLARS AND OTHERS

ABOUT THE DANGER TO THAT
MUSEUM? AND WEREN'T YOU URGED

TO PROVIDE A GREATER LEVEL
OF PROTECTION AND SECURITY

IN THE INITIAL PHASES
OF THE OPERATION?

NOT TO MY KNOWLEDGE.

Packer: NO ONE CAN CLAIM
THAT THEY WERE CAUGHT

BY SURPRISE BY THE LOOTING,

I JUST DON'T THINK
THEY WANTED TO KNOW.

THEY DIDN'T WANNA HEAR IT.

Narrator: IN THE MONTHS
LEADING UP TO THE INVASION,

A DEBATE OVER TROOP
LEVELS REQUIRED IN IRAQ

HAD BEEN PRIVATELY BREWING

BETWEEN THE MILITARY
LEADERSHIP AND DONALD RUMSFELD.

RUMSFELD AND HIS
DEPUTY PAUL WOLFOWITZ

BELIEVED THAT A FORCE
OF UNDER 100,000 TROOPS

WOULD BE SUFFICIENT

FOR THE INVASION AND
OCCUPATION OF IRAQ.

A MONTH BEFORE THE INVASION,

THE FIGHT OVER TROOP
LEVELS BECAME PUBLIC

AS THE CHIEF OF STAFF
OF THE ARMY, ERIC SHINSEKI,

TESTIFIED BEFORE THE SENATE
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE,

IGNORING PRESSURE FROM
RUMSFELD AND WOLFOWITZ.

Carl Levin: GENERAL
SHINSEKI, UH...

COULD YOU GIVE US SOME
IDEA AS TO THE MAGNITUDE

OF THE ARMY'S FORCE REQUIREMENT

FOR AN OCCUPATION OF IRAQ?

SOMETHING ON THE ORDER OF
SEVERAL HUNDRED THOUSAND SOLDIERS

ARE PROBABLY, YOU KNOW, A
FIGURE THAT WOULD BE REQUIRED.

WHAT IS, I THINK,
REASONABLY CERTAIN HERE IS...

THE IDEA THAT IT WOULD TAKE SEVERAL
HUNDRED THOUSAND U.S. FORCES

I THINK IS FAR FROM THE MARK.

IT'S HARD TO CONCEIVE THAT
IT WOULD TAKE MORE FORCES

TO PROVIDE STABILITY
IN POST-SADDAM IRAQ

THAN IT WOULD TAKE TO
CONDUCT THE WAR ITSELF

AND TO SECURE THE SURRENDER
OF SADDAM'S SECURITY FORCES

AND HIS ARMY. HARD TO IMAGINE.

HARD TO IMAGINE.

ANYONE WHO HAD ANY EXPERIENCE

IN THE INTERVENTIONS OF THE '90S
KNEW THAT THE OPPOSITE WAS TRUE.

YOU NEED X NUMBERS OF
SOLDIERS PER THOUSAND CITIZENS

SIMPLY TO PROVIDE A
MODICUM OF SECURITY.

BUT PAUL WOLFOWITZ
COULDN'T IMAGINE IT.

WE'RE TALKING ABOUT
POST-HOSTILITIES,

CONTROL OVER A PIECE OF
GEOGRAPHY THAT'S FAIRLY SIGNIFICANT

WITH, UH, THE KINDS
OF ETHNIC TENSIONS

THAT COULD LEAD
TO OTHER PROBLEMS,

AND SO IT TAKES A SIGNIFICANT
GROUND FORCE PRESENCE.

DID GENERAL
SHINSEKI GET IT RIGHT?

HE WAS ASKED FOR HIS
BEST MILITARY OPINION,

AND HIS EXPERIENCE EXCEEDS MINE.

HE COMMANDED OUR
FORCES IN BOSNIA,

HE DID IT FOR A YEAR PLUS,

HE KNOWS WHAT
HE'S TALKING ABOUT.

SECRETARY POWELL, AND
TO THE SAME EXTENT MYSELF,

UH, WE ARGUED FOR
MORE AND MORE TROOPS

AND WE MADE SOME
DIFFERENCE, BUT ULTIMATELY

WE DIDN'T SEE THAT WE MADE
ENOUGH OF A DIFFERENCE.

PERSONALLY I FEEL THE WAR
WOULD BE GOING DIFFERENTLY

IF YOU HAD, UM...

LEADERSHIP THAT
REALLY UNDERSTOOD,

NUMBER ONE, WHAT IT'S
LIKE TO BE ON THE GROUND,

THAT ACTUALLY SERVED
IN THE ARMED FORCES,

AND, NUMBER TWO, REALLY
HAD A GOOD MANAGERIAL GRASP

OF MAKING THIS THING WORK.

Narrator: THE SENIOR
ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS

WHO OVERRULED THE MILITARY
AND STATE DEPARTMENT

HAD NO EXPERIENCE WITH
POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS

AND LITTLE OR NO
MILITARY EXPERIENCE.

CHENEY HAD AVOIDED MILITARY
SERVICE DURING VIETNAM

THROUGH FIVE DRAFT DEFERMENTS.

RUMSFELD WAS A NAVY PILOT IN THE
1950S BUT HAD NEVER SEEN COMBAT.

WOLFOWITZ AND RICE HAD
NEVER SERVED IN THE MILITARY.

BUSH HAD AVOIDED
THE VIETNAM DRAFT

BY JOINING THE TEXAS
AIR NATIONAL GUARD.

HE ALSO HAD NO FOREIGN
POLICY EXPERIENCE

PRIOR TO BECOMING PRESIDENT.

WE'RE LOOKING AT IT, I SAY WE,

THOSE OF US WHO HAD
MILITARY EXPERIENCE,

AND WE WOULD TALK
ABOUT THIS OFTEN, UM,

THIS DOESN'T LOOK GOOD.

Narrator: IN MID-APRIL 2003,
WITH LOOTING STILL UNDER WAY,

RUMSFELD CANCELED DEPLOYMENT
OF THE 1st CAVALRY DIVISION,

A FORCE OF 16,000 SOLDIERS.

IT SHOCKED US. YOU KNOW, HOW
CAN YOU TURN OFF THAT DIVISION?

IF WE HAD HAD THAT DIVISION
FOLLOWING US INTO IRAQ,

WE WOULD HAVE STABILIZED
A LOT MORE OF IRAQ

JUST THROUGH OUR PRESENCE.

Narrator: ON APRIL 19th,
O.R.H.A. FINALLY ENTERED IRAQ

TO BEGIN POST-WAR OPERATIONS.

OF THE 20 MINISTRIES WE
WANTED TO BRING BACK

16 OF THOSE BUILDINGS
WERE DESTROYED

AS A PROD--AS A
FUNCTION OF LOOTING.

Bodine: WE WERE
STARTING FROM ZERO.

I MEAN, IF THERE ARE NO DESKS
AND THERE ARE NO CHAIRS,

THERE ARE NO TYPEWRITERS LEFT,

WHERE DO WE GO AND MEET
THE IRAQI'S TO START WORKING?

THERE WAS NO STRUCTURE LEFT, UM,

PHYSICAL STRUCTURE OR
BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURE.

I HAD TO PUT PEOPLE
OUT ON THE STREET

WALKING AROUND ASKING, "DO
YOU KNOW ANYBODY THAT'S IN--

"DO YOU KNOW THE PEOPLE
IN MINISTRY OF HEALTH?

"DO YOU KNOW THE PEOPLE WHO
ARE IN THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR?

"DO YOU KNOW THE PEOPLE IN
THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION?"

WITHIN THE GROUP
ITSELF, WE HAD...

I THINK PROBABLY FIVE WHO
SPOKE ANY AMOUNT OF ARABIC.

Bodine: WE HAD NO PHONE LISTS,

WE HAD NO PHONES FOR A WHILE,

SO I GUESS HAVING A PHONE LIST
WAS NOT REALLY THAT IMPORTANT.

WE HAD NO INFORMATION,
WE HAD NO PLACE TO GO,

WE DIDN'T KNOW WHO TO CONTACT.

UM, NOT THE BEST WAY TO--

NOT THE BEST WAY TO
START AN OCCUPATION.

AND WHAT FOLLOWED WAS THIS
PERVASIVE SENSE OF LAWLESSNESS

THAT IRAQ NEVER RECOVERED FROM.

AND GUYS WITH GUNS TOOK OVER

AND THEY WERE THE
IRAQI GUYS WITH GUNS.

[GUNFIRE]

Hughes: THE FIREFIGHTS
I GOT CAUGHT UP IN

WERE NOT FIREFIGHTS WHERE
AMERICANS WERE BEING ATTACKED,

IT WAS IRAQI ON
IRAQI FIREFIGHTS.

YOU'D JUST BE DRIVING DOWN
THE STREET AND SUDDENLY

THERE IS A FUSILLADE OF FIRE
THAT JUST OPENS UP ON YOU,

AND YOU'RE JUST IN THE
MIDDLE OF THESE GUYS

SHOOTING AT EACH OTHER.

Packer: THE STREETS
WERE CHAOTIC,

PEOPLE COULD KILL
AND GET AWAY WITH IT,

THERE WAS NO
WORKING POLICE FORCE.

JUST PRIOR TO THE INVASION,

SADDAM RELEASED
ABOUT 100,000 PRISONERS,

COMMON CRIMINALS FROM THE JAILS.

IN FEBRUARY OF 2003,

I GOT AN INVITATION TO COME
AND BRIEF THE ADVISORY PANEL

THAT ADVISES SECRETARY RUMSFELD

ON DEFENSE POLICY MATTERS.

WHAT I TOLD THEM WAS THAT,
BASED ON OUR EXPERIENCES

IN PREVIOUS PEACE OPERATIONS

AND ON WHAT HAD HAPPENED
IN IRAQ HISTORICALLY,

IT WAS VERY LIKELY THAT
IF THE U.S. INTERVENED

AND CAPTURED BAGHDAD

THAT WE WERE LIKELY TO FACE
MASSIVE CIVIL DISTURBANCE.

I SUGGESTED THAT WE NEEDED
ABOUT 2,500 CONSTABULARY FORCES,

ABOUT 4,000 CIVIL
POLICE STREET COPS,

AND THEN TEAMS OF
JUDICIAL ADVISORS

AND CORRECTIONS OFFICERS.

IN THE END THEY AGREED THAT
WELL, THIS WAS A GOOD IDEA,

THERE WASN'T ENOUGH TIME,
BUT MAYBE FOR THE NEXT WAR.

Nir Rosen: PRIOR TO THE WAR,
THE BAGHDAD MORGUE RECEIVED

ONE MURDER CASE A MONTH.

WITHIN A MONTH THEY WERE
GETTING ABOUT 25 A DAY.

THEY WERE SEEING RAPES
OFTEN FOR THE FIRST TIME,

RAPES AND MURDERS.

IRAQI GIRLS WERE
BEING KIDNAPPED.

SO IRAQI WOMEN DISAPPEARED
FROM THE STREETS,

THEY STOPPED GOING TO
SCHOOL, THEY STOPPED DRIVING.

THE AMERICANS WERE
NOT ACTING AS THE POLICE.

THEY DIDN'T KNOW THE STREETS OF
BAGHDAD, THEY DIDN'T SPEAK THE LANGUAGE,

THEY DIDN'T HAVE INTERPRETERS
IN SUFFICIENT NUMBERS

THEY DIDN'T HAVE INTELLIGENCE
ABOUT WHAT WAS GOING ON,

SO IT WAS A FREE-FOR-ALL,

AND YOU JUST FELT,
OH, THERE'S A VOID HERE.

[IMAM SINGING]

VERY QUICKLY THE MOSQUE
CAME IN AND FILLED IN THE VACUUM

THAT THE AMERICANS CREATED

BY GETTING RID OF SADDAM AND
LEAVING NOTHING IN HIS PLACE.

IN SHIA NEIGHBORHOODS, THEY
VERY QUICKLY ESTABLISHED CONTROL,

AND PARTICULARLY THE CLERICS
ASSOCIATED WITH MUQTADA AL-SADR.

Narrator: MUQTADA AL-SADR WAS
THE SON OF A FAMOUS SHI'ITE CLERIC,

AND STARTED A BID FOR POWER
BASED ON HIS FATHER'S NETWORK

OF MOSQUES AND CHARITIES.

Narrator: ONLY A FEW DAYS AFTER
AMERICAN TROOPS ENTERED BAGHDAD,

HE ASSASSINATED A
PRO-AMERICAN SHI'ITE LEADER.

THEN HE BEGAN CREATING A HEAVILY
ARMED MILITIA, THE MAHDI ARMY,

WHICH TOOK OVER
BAGHDAD'S SHI'ITE GHETTO

AND MUCH OF SOUTHERN IRAQ.

Samantha Power: IF YOU TENDED
TO THE ISSUES OF POLICING,

IF THERE HADN'T
BEEN THE LOOTING,

THEN YOU WOULDN'T
HAVE HAD PEOPLE TURNING

TO SECTARIAN MILITIAS

AS THEIR SOURCES OF
NEIGHBORHOOD SECURITY.

Narrator: O.R.H.A. WORKED ON
RECALLING THE IRAQI MILITARY

TO DEAL WITH THE
SECURITY VACUUM.

THE ARMY CENTRAL COMMAND,
CENTCOM, SUPPORTED THIS POLICY.

WHAT CENTCOM HAD DONE, THEY
HAD FACTORED INTO THEIR PLANNING

THE BRINGING BACK
OF THE IRAQI ARMY.

THEY USED THE IRAQI
ARMY TO SEAL THE BORDERS,

TO PROVIDE STATIC
SECURITY THINGS

AND ALSO HELP IN THE
RECONSTRUCTION OF THEIR OWN NATION.

RUMSFELD CALLED ME
AND HE SAID, "HEY, JAY,

"I LIKE EVERYTHING
THAT'S GOING ON,

"YOU'RE DOING A GREAT
JOB, YOU AND YOUR TEAM,

"GLAD YOU'RE NOW IN BAGHDAD
AND ALL THAT, AND BY THE WAY,

"THE PRESIDENT IS
APPOINTING JERRY BREMER

"AS THE PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY."

Narrator: BREMER WAS A FORMER
FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER.

LIKE MOST OFFICIALS
SENT TO IRAQ,

BREMER DID NOT SPEAK ARABIC,

HAD NO PREVIOUS
EXPERIENCE WITH THE MID-EAST

OR POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION

AND HAD NEVER
SERVED IN THE MILITARY.

AFTER BREMER'S ARRIVAL,
O.R.H.A. WOULD BE PHASED OUT

AND THE COALITION
PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY, C.P.A.,

WOULD TAKE ITS PLACE.

Bremer: WE INTEND TO HAVE
A VERY EFFECTIVE, EFFICIENT

AND WELL-ORGANIZED
HANDOVER. UH...

GENERAL GARNER AND I ARE PLEDGED
TO WORKING VERY CLOSELY TOGETHER.

HE'S DONE AN OUTSTANDING JOB.

Garner: WE SET UP A SERIES
OF BRIEFINGS FOR HIM,

HE SPENT A DAY GOING THROUGH
WHAT EVERYBODY WAS DOING,

AND THEN HE TOOK CHARGE.

I CAME HOME LIKE 3rd
OR 4th OR 5th OF JUNE.

Narrator: BETWEEN MAY 1st AND HIS
DEPARTURE FOR IRAQ ON MAY 10th,

BREMER WORKED AT THE PENTAGON

AND MET FREQUENTLY
WITH RUMSFELD, WOLFOWITZ

AND UNDER-SECRETARY DOUG FEITH.

BREMER ALSO WORKED
CLOSELY WITH WALTER SLOCOMBE,

A FORMER UNDER-SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE

WHOM RUMSFELD HAD APPOINTED
TO BE IN CHARGE OF POST-WAR POLICY

FOR IRAQ'S MILITARY.

Slocombe: THEY CONTACTED
ME IN MID-MARCH OF 2003.

Man: DID IT CROSS YOUR
MIND TO THINK, YOU KNOW,

ISN'T IT KIND OF LATE FOR THEM
TO BE THINKING ABOUT THIS?

YES.

Man: DID YOU TELL THEM THAT?

NO.

Narrator: LIKE BREMER,

SLOCOMBE HAD NEVER
SERVED IN THE MILITARY,

HAD NEVER BEEN TO IRAQ,

HAD NO POST-WAR
RECONSTRUCTION EXPERIENCE

AND SPOKE NO ARABIC.

IN BREMER'S FIRST
10 DAYS AT WORK,

WHILE STILL IN WASHINGTON D.C.,

HE MADE THREE FATEFUL
POLICY DECISIONS.

HIS FIRST DECISION WAS
TO STOP THE FORMATION

OF AN INTERIM IRAQI GOVERNMENT,

EVEN THOUGH JAY GARNER HAD
BEEN WORKING TO ESTABLISH ONE.

Armitage: JAY GARNER WAS
CERTAINLY SUPPORTIVE

THAT THEY GET SOME
GOVERNING BODY OF IRAQIS,

BUT, UH, THIS WAS DONE AWAY
WITH ON THE WAY TO BAGHDAD

AND I DIDN'T THINK GENERAL
GARNER KNEW ABOUT IT BEFOREHAND

AND NOR DID I.

WE HAD EXPECTED, AND I THINK I
CAN SAY WE HAD BEEN PROMISED

THAT THERE WOULD BE A
SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT

VIRTUALLY IMMEDIATELY.

"I'M IN CHARGE AND EVERYONE
WILL DO WHAT I SAY, AND THAT'S IT.

"UNDERSTAND?"

AND THAT'S KIND OF THE WAY, UH,

L. PAUL BREMER CAME ACROSS.

MUCH, MUCH, MUCH TOO
HARD-CORE AND TOO MISSION-DRIVEN

TO SEE THAT HIS EXCLUSION
OF THE IRAQIS EARLY ON

FROM MAJOR PARTICIPATION IN
THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

WAS A GRIEVOUS ERROR.

IN MAY OF 2003, WE GOT THE--
THE LEGAL OCCUPATION OF IRAQ.

I SAID AT THAT TIME,
AND I BELIEVE NOW,

THAT THAT WAS A MISTAKE.

WE WANT THE AMERICAN TROOPS

BASICALLY TO LEAVE
IRAQ COMPLETELY

AND LET THE IRAQI PEOPLE
BASICALLY TO RULE IRAQ.

Narrator: THE REACTION
TO HIS NEXT TWO DECISIONS

WOULD BE DRAMATICALLY WORSE.

DE-BA'ATHIFICATION

I AM TODAY ESTABLISHING AN
IRAQI DE-BA'ATHIFICATION COUNCIL

TO ENSURE THAT THE
STRUCTURE AND INFLUENCE

OF THE BA'ATH PARTY
IS ELIMINATED FOR GOOD.

Narrator: BREMER'S
SECOND DECISION,

HIS FIRST FORMAL ORDER
AS HEAD OF THE C.P.A.,

PURGED AN ESTIMATED 50,000
MEMBERS OF THE BA'ATH PARTY,

WHICH SADDAM HAD
USED TO RULE IRAQ.

FOR MOST, BREMER'S ORDER
MEANT PERMANENT UNEMPLOYMENT.

THE POLICY ALSO CRIPPLED
IRAQ'S GOVERNMENT,

EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM AND ECONOMY

BECAUSE IT PURGED SENIOR
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

WHO HAD JOINED THE PARTY

SIMPLY TO SURVIVE
UNDER SADDAM'S REGIME.

I WAS WALKING DOWN THE HALL
AND AMBASSADOR ROBIN RAPHEL

CAME TO ME AND SAID,
"HAVE YOU SEEN THIS?"

I SAID, "WHAT IS IT, ROBIN?"

SHE SAYS, "DE-BA'ATHIFICATION."

SO I READ IT REAL
QUICK AND I SAID,

"I DON'T THINK WE CAN DO THIS."

SHE SAID, "WELL, I THINK YOU
OUGHT TO GO TALK TO JERRY."

SO WE WENT TO
SEE HIM AND I SAID,

"HOW ABOUT LETTING
US GO THROUGH THIS

"AND LET'S GET ON THE
PHONE WITH RUMSFELD

"AND SEE IF WE CAN
SOFTEN THIS A LITTLE BIT."

AND HE SAID, "NO, I DON'T
HAVE THAT FLEXIBILITY.

"I'VE BEEN GIVEN MY ORDERS
AND I'M GOING TO EXECUTE 'EM."

SO THAT ENDED THAT DISCUSSION.

HE MAY HAVE COME IN AND SPOKEN
TO ME AT GREAT LENGTH ABOUT IT,

I JUST DON'T REMEMBER IT,
HONESTLY DON'T REMEMBER IT.

Interviewer: YOU DON'T REMEMBER
THESE GUYS COMING IN AND SAYING,

"THIS IS 30 TO 50,000 PEOPLE"?
DOESN'T MEAN IT DIDN'T HAPPEN.

"MY GOD, WHAT ARE YOU DOING?"

I JUST DON'T--

YOU KNOW, I WAS WORKING 20
HOURS A DAY IN THAT PERIOD AS WELL.

THIS WASN'T THE ONLY THING
ON MY LIST OF THINGS TO DO

THE FIRST FIVE DAYS I WAS THERE.

Narrator: BREMER
APPOINTED AHMED CHALABI

TO HEAD THE
DE-BA'ATHIFICATION COUNCIL.

CHALABI USED THE POSITION
TO ELIMINATE POLITICAL RIVALS.

DE-BA'ATHIFICATION WAS SO DEEP

THAT WE WEREN'T ABLE TO
GET THE GOVERNMENT RUNNING

AS EFFICIENTLY AS
WE SHOULD HAVE,

AS FAST AS WE SHOULD HAVE,

AND YOU HAD A LOT OF
DISENFRANCHISED BA'ATHISTS.

Amazia Baram: THERE WERE PEOPLE
WHO WERE KICKED OUT OF THEIR JOBS

EVEN THOUGH THEY
WERE JUST PROFESSIONALS,

ENGINEERS, UH, DIRECTORS.

THE TECHNOCRATS,
THE INTELLIGENTSIA,

THE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL LIBRARIAN.

BEING CONQUERED AND
THEN LOSING YOUR JOB

AND NOT HAVING ANY MEANS TO
SUPPORT YOURSELF OR YOUR FAMILY,

WAS AN INCREDIBLY
HUMILIATING EXPERIENCE.

Narrator: IT WAS BREMER'S
THIRD DECISION, HOWEVER,

THAT WAS THE MOST EXPLOSIVE.

DISBANDING THE IRAQI MILITARY
AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICES,

THE MOST IMPORTANT
INSTITUTIONS IN IRAQ.

C.P.A. ORDER NUMBER TWO

DISBANDED THE IRAQI
ARMY, REPUBLICAN GUARD,

SPECIAL REPUBLICAN
GUARD AND SECRET POLICE.

OVERNIGHT, BREMER
RENDERED UNEMPLOYED

AND THEREBY INFURIATED
HALF A MILLION ARMED MEN,

EQUIVALENT TO FIRING
OVER FIVE MILLION PEOPLE

IN THE UNITED STATES.

AND SO THESE MEN, RATHER THAN
HELPING TO PREVENT AN INSURGENCY

INSTEAD CREATED ONE.

I CAN'T BELIEVE THEY DID THAT.

HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF
FAMILIES DEPENDED ON THE ARMY.

THEY DIDN'T HAVE AN INCOME,
THEY DIDN'T HAVE PROVIDERS.

WE VERY HUNGRY, NO BREAD, NO
FOOD, NO MONEY, WE WANT JOBS.

CHILDREN, WOMEN,
WIVES, SISTERS, FATHERS,

UM, STOPPED EATING BECAUSE
THEY DIDN'T HAVE ENOUGH MONEY.

OFFICIALLY I THINK IT'S 27%
UNEMPLOYMENT, OFFICIALLY.

IT'S ALMOST CERTAINLY
MUCH HIGHER.

I WOULD GUESS
ANYWHERE FROM 40 TO 50%.

IS IT ANY WONDER THAT
MANY OF THESE PEOPLE

WHO ALMOST ALL HAD AT
LEAST SOME MILITARY TRAINING,

SINCE YOU HAD TO
SERVE IN THE ARMY IN IRAQ,

OR THEY WERE ACTIVE MILITARY,

WOULD TURN TO
JOINING THE INSURGENCY

JUST AS A MEANS
TO FEED THEIR FAMILY

AND AS A MEANS OF
REGAINING SOME OF THAT PRIDE.

Narrator: IN DECIDING TO
DISBAND THE IRAQI MILITARY,

BREMER WAS UNDOING A POLICY

SUPPORTED BY BOTH THE
U.S. MILITARY AND BY O.R.H.A.

Garner: PAUL HUGHES HAD A TEAM

THAT WAS SEEKING
OUT THE IRAQI ARMY,

AND HE WAS BEGINNING
TO FIND A LOT OF 'EM,

AND HE HAD FOUND A LOT OF 'EM,

AND WE HAD MADE OVERTURES
TO BRING THEM BACK.

THESE SOLDIERS WHEN THEY
REGISTERED HAD TO SIGN...

OR FILL OUT A QUESTIONNAIRE

ABOUT WHO THEY WERE, WHAT
UNIT THEY WERE WITH, WHAT THEY DID,

WHAT THEIR SKILLS WERE,

WHAT MILITARY EQUIPMENT
THEY HAD AT HOME,

WHAT--JUST A LOT OF INFORMATION

THAT WOULD HAVE
BEEN USEFUL TO US.

AND I WAS COLLECTING
ALL OF THAT.

Narrator: BUT THE
D.O.D. ADVISORY TEAM

IN CHARGE OF DEALING
WITH THE IRAQI MILITARY,

HEADED BY WALTER SLOCOMBE,

HAD REMAINED IN WASHINGTON
D.C. AND HAD NEVER VISITED IRAQ.

I SAID, "I DON'T SEE ANY
REASON TO GO OUT THERE.

"I CAN GET READY BETTER
HERE IN WASHINGTON."

AND I URGED THEM TIME AND AGAIN

IN MY CONVERSATIONS
WITH THEM FROM BAGHDAD

THAT THEY NEEDED
TO GET OVER THERE

BECAUSE THERE WERE
PEOPLE WAITING ON THEM

AND ON ONE MAN IN
PARTICULAR TO SHOW UP

SO HE COULD MAKE DECISIONS
AND GET THE BALL ROLLING.

IN HIS ABSENCE I WAS
LEFT WITH THE DUTY

OF HAVING TO DEAL
WITH THE IRAQI ARMY

JUST TO KEEP CONTACT WITH THEM.

Lawrence Wilkerson: THE IRAQI ARMY WAS
ESSENTIALLY STANDING THERE WAITING,

THEY WERE WAITING
FOR AN OVERTURE,

THEY WERE WAITING FOR WHAT
THEY THOUGHT WOULD HAPPEN

THAT SOMEONE WOULD COME TO THEM

AND SAY, "THIS IS THE PLAN, AND
YOU'RE INTEGRAL TO THAT PLAN,

"AND WE NEED YOU."

NO ONE EVER DID THAT.

WHEN THE WAR WAS OVER,

WHEN THE MAJOR MANEUVER
FIGHTING WAS OVER,

THERE WERE SIMPLY NO
UNITS STILL IN EXISTENCE,

EVERYBODY HAD GONE HOME.

GENERALS AND COMMANDERS
WERE COMING BACK

WITH ENTIRE DIVISIONS
SAYING "HERE ARE MY PEOPLE."

ONE OF THE IRAQI OFFICERS,

TOWARDS THE END OF, I DUNNO,
THE SECOND OR THIRD MEETING

WHEN BAGHDAD WAS GOING--
I MEAN IT WAS IN CHAOS, SAID,

"COLONEL PAUL, I CAN HAVE
10,000 MILITARY POLICEMEN

"FOR YOU NEXT WEEK,
YOU JUST TELL ME."

I TOOK THAT BACK TO
BERNIE KERIK'S STAFF

AND NOTHING WAS DONE WITH IT.

Hughes: FIVE DAYS AFTER
BREMER ISSUED HIS ORDER,

WE WERE FAREWELLING JAY GARNER

BECAUSE HE WAS GONNA LEAVE
IRAQ FOR GOOD THE NEXT DAY.

WE HAD TWO HUMVEES
ON THE HIGHWAY

HEADING OUT FROM THE GREEN ZONE,

THEY WERE AMBUSHED AND
TWO SOLDIERS WERE KILLED.

AND THAT WAS WHEN IN MY
MIND THE INSURGENCY BEGAN.

Man: GO, GO, GO! GO, GO, GO!

MY COLLEAGUES AND I
COULD SIT ON THE BALCONY

OR ON THE ROOF OF THE
REPUBLICAN PALACE AT NIGHT

AND WE COULD WATCH THE
TRACERS THROUGHOUT BAGHDAD.

WE COULD WATCH THE FLARES OF
DIFFERENT COLORS THAT WENT UP

MARKING WHERE AMERICAN CONVOYS

OF CERTAIN COMPOSITIONS
WERE MOVING

AND BEING FOLLOWED
BY THE INSURGENTS.

THESE GUYS ALL KNEW
WHERE THOSE MUNITIONS WERE,

THEY KNEW HOW TO GET TO THOSE
WEAPONS AND HOW TO USE THEM,

AND YOU'VE JUST SENT THEM
AWAY AND SAID THEY DON'T EXIST?

COMMON SENSE TELLS
ME YOU DON'T DO THAT.

I MEAN, YOU HAD HUGE
AMMUNITION DUMPS

THAT WEREN'T GUARDED
UNTIL SEVERAL WEEKS

IF NOT A COUPLE OF MONTHS AFTER
MAJOR COMBAT ACTIONS ENDED.

I'M STANDING THERE
WATCHING THESE INSURGENTS

PULL OUT ROCKETS AND
MORTARS AND BOMBS

FROM THESE WEAPONS CACHES
THAT THE IRAQIS HAD STORED

AND STASHED EVERYWHERE.

AND YOU'D GO TO THE BRITISH OR
TO THE U.S., WHOEVER WAS THERE,

WITH YOUR LITTLE
G.P.S. RECEIVER AND SAY,

"HEY, GUYS, YOU KNOW,

"WE FOUND LIKE 18 THOUSAND
MILLION TONS OF BOMBS

"AND THERE ARE BUNCH
OF IRAQIS THERE WITH AK-47s

"TAKING IT AWAY.

"PROBABLY NOT THE BEST IDEA.
HERE'S WHERE IT'S LOCATED."

AND THEY SAY TO YOU,

"WE JUST DON'T HAVE
ENOUGH PEOPLE TO COVER IT."

AND I JUST, I COULDN'T BELIEVE
IT, IT WASN'T THE RIGHT ANSWER.

GO THERE AND TAKE CARE
OF IT FOR YOUR SECURITY,

FOR THE CIVILIANS'
SECURITY, FOR EVERYBODY,

IT'S JUST A BAD IDEA.

[MAN SHOUTING IN ARABIC]

Man: DID ANYBODY WARN YOU THAT
DISBANDING THE ARMY IN THIS WAY

WOULD AND THEN WAS FUELING
MAJOR GROWTH OF THE INSURGENCY?

CERTAINLY NOT IN THOSE TERMS.

Man: NOBODY SAID THAT TO YOU?

NO. I ALSO DON'T
BELIEVE IT'S TRUE,

BUT NOBODY SAID
IT, NOBODY SAID--

YOU DON'T BELIEVE IT'S TRUE?

NO, I DO NOT BELIEVE IT'S TRUE.

A NUMBER OF THE
MOST SENIOR GENERALS

UH, CAME TO THE CANAL
HOTEL TO U.N. HEADQUARTERS,

AND THEY WERE VERY
EXPLICIT AT THE CONSEQUENCE

OF LETTING THIS ORDER STAND

AND OF MARGINALIZING

THIS INCREDIBLY POWERFUL
SEGMENT OF SOCIETY

WOULD BE AN INSURGENCY.

A LEBANESE DIPLOMAT
NAMED HASSAN SALAMI

TURNED TO HIS COLLEAGUE
AS THE GENERALS WALKED AWAY

AFTER ONE OF THEIR MEETINGS

AND SAID, "I SEE
BULLETS IN THEIR EYES.

"I SEE BULLETS IN THEIR EYES."

Narrator: EVEN MORE REMARKABLE
THAN THE DECISION TO DISBAND THE ARMY

WAS HOW THAT DECISION WAS MADE--

SECRETLY, OVER A SINGLE WEEK,

BY A FEW MEN IN WASHINGTON
D.C. WHO HAD NEVER BEEN TO IRAQ.

THEY DID NOT CONSULT WITH
THE MILITARY COMMANDERS IN IRAQ,

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,

O.R.H.A., THE STATE DEPARTMENT,

THE C.I.A., THE NATIONAL
SECURITY COUNCIL,

OR EVEN APPARENTLY THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

WALTER SLOCOMBE AND PAUL
HUGHES WERE RE-INTERVIEWED

IN ORDER TO
RECONSTRUCT THE EVENTS

LEADING TO THE
DISSOLUTION OF THE ARMY.

THESE GUYS CALLED THEMSELVES
THE INDEPENDENT MILITARY GATHERING.

THE INDEPENDENT MILITARY
GATHERING HAD 100,000 ON 9th MAY

Man: AND THEY
ALREADY HAD 100,000?

YEAH, THIS WAS A
NATIONWIDE EFFORT.

THEY BROUGHT ME-- I
WANTED THE PRINTOUTS,

I WANTED THE DISKS, AND
THEY GIVE THEM TO ME,

AND I TOOK THEM BACK
WITH ME TO O.R.H.A.

I SAID, "HERE WE GO," AND
I TOLD WALT AND HIS CREW,

"I'VE GOT THESE THINGS,
THEY'RE HERE WAITING FOR YOU."

HUGHES BELIEVED THAT HE HAD
AN OPENING TO SOME IRAQI OFFICERS

WHO WOULD HAVE BEEN PREPARED
TO RECONSTITUTE UNITS. I DON'T--

Man: HE ALREADY HAD ATTAINED
REGISTRATION STATEMENTS FROM 137,000.

NO, HE DIDN'T. HE HADN'T DONE
THAT. HE MAY HAVE GOTTEN--

'CAUSE NOBODY COULD HAVE GOTTEN
STATEMENTS FROM 130,000 ANYBODY

FOR ANYTHING, IN THE CHAOS
THAT PREVAILED AT THAT POINT.

THEY HAD A COURIER SYSTEM SET UP

THAT WAS RUNNING AROUND THE
METROPOLITAN AREA OF BAGHDAD,

OF MOSUL, OF BASRA AND KIRKUK

AND I DON'T
UNDERSTAND, I MEAN--I--

GIVEN HOW DIFFICULT
IT WAS TO DO ANYTHING

JUST OPERATIONALLY
OR ORGANIZATIONALLY,

NOBODY HAD 137,000.

WALT WASN'T THERE.

HE NEVER MET WITH THESE
PEOPLE, HE HAD NO CLUE.

Man: SO DID YOU TELL SLOCOMBE
THIS, THAT THIS WAS GOING ON?

YES, HE KNEW THIS. HE
AND HIS STAFF KNEW THIS.

Man: AMBASSADOR BREMER,

YOU HAD ALREADY MADE A
RECOMMENDATION TO HIM

AND HE HAD ALREADY MADE AT
LEAST A TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATION

TO SECRETARY RUMSFELD

ABOUT THE DISSOLUTION
OF THE ARMY, UM--

ABOUT ISSUING THE ORDER
THAT HE FINALLY ISSUED, YEAH.

YES, ON MAY 9TH.

YES. OK.

9th MAY WAS THE LAST
TIME I HAD A CONVERSATION

WITH WALT SLOCOMBE.

AND WE TALKED ON THE
PHONE BEFORE I WENT OUT.

DID YOU EVER SAY TO HIM,

"WE'RE THINKING OF
DISBANDING THE IRAQI ARMY

"AND STOPPING YOUR EFFORTS
TO RECALL THE IRAQI ARMY?"

ONE OF THE THINGS
WE--I DID WAS JUST--

DID YOU EVER SAY THAT TO HIM?

IN THOSE WORDS, NO.

THE CONVERSATION
WAS, "I'M COMING OVER,

"I'M CONCERNED ABOUT
WHERE I'M GOING TO BE LIVING,"

YOU KNOW, "AM I GONNA
HAVE A MOTOR POOL WITH ME,

"MY OWN COOKS?" YADA-YADA-YADA.

I MEAN, IT WAS NOTHING
ABOUT THE IRAQI MILITARY.

AND I WAS GIVING HIM
AN UPDATE ON WHAT--

SO HE DIDN'T SAY
THAT HE HAD ALREADY

COME TO THE TENTATIVE CONCLUSION

AND RECOMMENDED TO
BREMER TO DISSOLVE THE ARMY?

ABSOLUTELY NOT,
BECAUSE HAD HE SAID THAT

I WOULD HAVE BEEN ON
JAY'S DOORSTEP POSTHASTE.

SO YOU GUYS CAME
UP WITH THIS IDEA

AND RECOMMENDED TO
SECRETARY RUMSFELD

WITHOUT HAVING SPOKEN TO
ANY OF THE SENIOR PEOPLE IN IRAQ

RESPONSIBLE FOR THESE MATTERS?

IT WAS SUBJECT TO, AND
PRECISELY BECAUSE OF THE FACT

THAT IT ACTUALLY HAD BEEN
ONLY THOUGHT OF FOR FEW DAYS,

BECAUSE BREMER WAS GOING
OUT AND BREMER SAID TO RUMSFELD,

"BEFORE I MAKE A RECOMMENDATION I
WILL TALK TO PEOPLE ON THE GROUND."

WAS THAT A SURPRISE TO YOU?
HAD THIS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH YOU?

NO, IT HADN'T BEEN DISCUSSED
WITH ME, IT WAS A SURPRISE,

A BIG SURPRISE.

REALLY? MM-HM.

YOU NEVER CALLED
UP GARNER AND SAID

"WE'RE THINKING OF DOING THIS,

"DO YOU THINK THIS
IS A GOOD IDEA?"

I DON'T THINK I DID.

DON'T YOU THINK THAT
MIGHT HAVE BEEN AN MISTAKE?

NO.

WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION?
WHAT DID YOU THINK?

I THOUGHT IT WAS A POOR IDEA.

I THOUGHT WE NEEDED
TO BRING THEM BACK.

JOHN ABIZAID AND DAVE McKIERNAN
WERE CONSTANTLY TELLING ME,

"HOW ABOUT HURRYING UP?
LET'S GET THE ARMY BACK,

"LET'S GET THE ARMY BACK."

THERE IS A LARGE NUMBER

OF FORMER IRAQI SOLDIERS
THAT ARE UNEMPLOYED NOW.

THAT IS A HUGE CONCERN NOT
ONLY FROM A SECURITY STANDPOINT

BUT FROM AN ECONOMIC STANDPOINT,

THEY'RE NOT EARNING
AN INCOME RIGHT NOW.

AND THERE'S THE ANNOUNCEMENT

THAT THE IRAQI ARMY HAS BEEN
DISBANDED, AND I WAS FLOORED,

AND AT THIS PARTICULAR POINT IN
TIME, WALT SLOCOMBE AND HIS TEAM

STILL WERE NOT IN IRAQ.

COLONEL HUGHES WAS THE
PERSON WHO WAS IN CHARGE

OF DEALING WITH THE IRAQI ARMY

BECAUSE NONE OF THE PEOPLE
FROM YOUR ADVISORY GROUP

HAD YET SHOWED UP
IN IRAQ, INCLUDING YOU.

DIDN'T YOU THINK THAT MAYBE

YOU SHOULD SPEAK
WITH HIM ABOUT THIS?

OH, I TALKED WITH HIM
A LOT. THAT'S FUNNY.

HE SAYS THAT THE ORDER
OF DISBANDING THE ARMY

CAME AS A COMPLETE
SURPRISE TO HIM

AND THAT HE LEARNED OF IT
BY WATCHING IT ON TELEVISION

IN AN AIRPORT.

THAT'S EX...WELL, IF THAT'S SO

THAT'S SURPRISING
TO ME, BUT IMPOSSIBLE.

I TALKED TO HIM-- I
MEAN, I TALKED TO HIM--

I--

WE WORKED TOGETHER
ON A DAILY BASIS

DURING THE TIME I WAS THERE.

HE CAME ON 16th MAY. 16th MAY?

FOR A FOUR-DAY WHIRLWIND
TOUR OF THE COUNTRY.

OH.

AND THEN HE LEFT,

AND HE DIDN'T COME BACK
UNTIL THE MIDDLE OF JUNE.

REALLY? CORRECT.

HE DIDN'T TELL YOU THAT?

THIS IDEA TO DISBAND
THE ENTIRE ARMY

WAS ONE THAT CAME AS
QUITE A SURPRISE TO ME.

I SEE.

WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION
WHEN YOU LEARNED OF IT?

I FELT WE'D JUST
CREATED A PROBLEM.

WE HAD A LOT OF
OUT-OF-WORK SOLDIERS.

THE PRESIDENT HAD ALREADY
MADE A DIFFERENT DECISION

WHICH WAS TO KEEP
BATTALION AND BELOW IN FORCE.

EARLIER, YES. YEAH.

WELL, WITHIN, I MEAN, A
COUPLE OF DAYS' PROXIMITY.

I THINK MOST OF US WERE
CAUGHT RELATIVELY UNAWARES

OR COMPLETELY UNAWARES BY
THIS DISBANDING OF THE ARMY.

Armitage: SECRETARY POWELL
FOUND OUT ABOUT IT AS I DID.

WHICH WAS HOW?

IT JUST WAS WE FOUND OUT ONE DAY

JERRY ANNOUNCED THAT
HE DISBANDED THE ARMY.

Man: HOW ABOUT CONDOLEEZZA RICE?

WELL, SHE OUGHT TO
SPEAK FOR HERSELF.

DO YOU HAVE ANY IDEA HOW
MUCH THE PRESIDENT KNEW

ABOUT THESE DECISIONS
IN ADVANCE? WHETHER HE--

AS I'VE SAID BEFORE,
I DON'T KNOW

IF HE WAS INFORMED BY
MR. RUMSFELD OR NOT.

NO IDEA.

I WASN'T IN MY OFFICE
BUT TWO HOURS

AND A YOUNG M.P. COMES
TO SEE ME AND HE GOES,

"COLONEL HUGHES, I'VE
GOT SOME IRAQI OFFICERS

"THAT WANNA MEET WITH YOU."

AND I WAS THINKING
TO MYSELF, "HOLY COW.

"WHAT DO I TELL THESE GUYS?"

SO I FINALLY CAME DOWNSTAIRS

AND MET WITH THEM IN THE
ROTUNDA OF THE REPUBLICAN PALACE.

COLONEL MIRJAN SAYS,
"COLONEL PAUL, WHAT HAPPENED?"

AND I SAID TO HIM, "I DON'T
KNOW WHAT HAPPENED.

"I HAVE NO IDEA HOW
THIS CAME ABOUT."

AND HE SAID, "ALL THESE SOLDIERS,
THEY NOW HAVE NO RECOURSE.

"THEY HAVE NO MONEY
COMING TO THEM.

"WHAT ARE THEY SUPPOSED TO DO?"

Man: OH, SHIT.

Man: HOW MANY
TIMES DID I TELL YOU?

SHIT! 2nd man: FUCK!

3rd man: OH, MY EAR!

Man: WE NEED TO GET
THE FUCK OUT OF HERE.

THERE ARE SOME WHO
FEEL LIKE THAT, YOU KNOW,

THE CONDITIONS ARE SUCH
THAT THEY CAN ATTACK US THERE.

MY ANSWER IS BRING 'EM ON.

I WAS IN THE BUCKET.

THE BUCKET IS A
NON-ARMORED VEHICLE.

ANYTHING THAT HAPPENS,
YOU GONNA GET IT.

SO NOBODY WANTS TO BE IN THERE.

I SUFFERED THE BLAST,
ALMOST-- ALMOST DIRECTLY, SIR,

OF THAT BLAST AND THEN I CAME--

I STARTED HEARING THE FIREFIGHT

FROM THE FAR TO THE CLOSEST--
PAM-PAM. WE START FIRING.

WE HAVE A LIMITED PROBLEM
OF SOME BITTER ENDERS,

SOME SMALL REMNANTS
OF THE OLD REGIME

WHO ARE USING
PROFESSIONAL MILITARY TACTICS

TO ATTACK AND KILL OUR SOLDIERS
AS THEY DID, UH, THIS MORNING.

WE WILL-- SO YOU DON'T THINK

THIS IS A COORDINATED CAMPAIGN?

NO, THERE'S NO-- THAT
THIS IS A GUERRILLA WAR,

THAT SUDDENLY WE'VE MOVED
INTO A PHASE OF GUERRILLA WAR?

AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THAT BLAST,

I SUFFERED A PENETRATING
TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY

AND I LOST THE PERCEPTION
OF THE LIGHT IN MY RIGHT EYE.

I SUFFERED PELLETS
IN MY LEFT EYE

THAT GETS ME A MACULAR
HOLE IN THE RETINA,

UH, BUT WE FIGHT, WE FIGHT
UNTIL WE HEAR THE CEASE-FIRE.

I WAS A GUNNER, AND MY
DRIVER LOST BOTH HIS LEGS

AND THEY'D EJECTED ME OUT

AND I SUFFERED A FRACTURE
FEMUR, NEARLY LOST MY RIGHT ARM

AND A COLLAPSED LUNG
AND CLOSED HEAD WOUNDS.

I HAVE SINCE GONE TO THE
DICTIONARY AND I HAVE LOOKED UP

SEVERAL THINGS, ONE OF WHICH
I CAN'T IMMEDIATELY RECAPTURE,

BUT ONE WAS "GUERRILLA WAR",

ANOTHER WAS "INSURGENCY",
ANOTHER WAS, UH...

"UNCONVENTIONAL WAR". PARDON ME?

Man: QUAGMIRE? [LAUGHTER]

NO, THAT'S SOMEONE
ELSE'S BUSINESS, QUAGMIRES,

I DON'T DO QUAGMIRES.

A GUY I KNOW, HE'S A
COUNTER-INSURGENCY EXPERT.

HE WAS AT THE PALACE
WHERE THE C.P.A.

IS HEADQUARTERED, AND HE
WAS TALKING TO AN ARMY COLONEL

WHOSE DESK WAS RIGHT
OUTSIDE BREMER'S OFFICE

AND HE SAID, HE USED THE WORD
"INSURGENCY", AND THE ARMY COLONEL

HELD UP HIS HAND AND SAID,
"THERE IS NO INSURGENCY IN IRAQ.

"THERE IS A HIGH LEVEL
OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE."

Bodine: THE SECURITY PROBLEM

INCREASINGLY ATE INTO
OUR ABILITY TO DO OUR JOB.

I HAD HOPED TO ESTABLISH SOME
NEIGHBORHOOD ADVISORY COUNCILS.

THESE THREE DIRECTOR GENERALS

GAVE PROBABLY THE MOST
COHERENT BRIEFING ON THE STRUCTURE

AND ORGANIZATION OF
A 1500-YEAR-OLD CITY

THAT I THINK ANYONE
COULD HAVE GOTTEN.

ONE OF THEM LAUNCHED
INTO THIS PLAN FOR...

NEIGHBORHOOD ADVISORY GROUPS.

HE HAD THIS WHOLE GRASS-ROOTS,
BOTTOM-UP, DEMOCRATIZATION THING

NAILED, IT WAS AN
ABSOLUTELY BEAUTIFUL PLAN.

Man: AND WHAT HAPPENED TO IT?

HE WAS ASSASSINATED.

THE COUNTRY WAS SLIPPING
MORE AND MORE OUT OF CONTROL

THE ENTIRE TIME, AND
I THINK IN SOME WAYS

BREMER AND HIS AIDES DIDN'T KNOW

HOW BAD THINGS WERE GETTING
OUTSIDE THE BLAST WALLS.

Narrator: HEADQUARTERED IN
SADDAM'S FORMER REPUBLICAN PALACE,

THE C.P.A. COMPOUND,
CALLED THE GREEN ZONE,

WAS SHIELDED BY 7
MILES OF BLAST WALLS.

THERE WERE HUGE LINES OF
IRAQIS, ENGINEERS, PUBLIC OFFICIALS,

PEOPLE JUST WILLING
TO HELP, TO TRANSLATE,

STANDING IN LINE AT
THE GATES OF PALACE,

MADE TO WAIT AND NOT
BEING RECEIVED BY ANYONE.

THEY'RE JUST TOLD, "GO
AWAY AND DON'T COME BACK."

THESE PEOPLE CAME THERE
AND TRIED ONCE AND TWO TIMES

AND THREE TIMES
AND THEN GAVE UP.

I ABSOLUTELY HATED
THE GREEN ZONE.

I GOT OUT EVERY CHANCE I
COULD TO MEET WITH IRAQIS

AND SIT IN THEIR HOMES
AND HEAR THEIR COMPLAINTS

AND THEIR THOUGHTS.

AND I WOULD COME BACK
AND TELL DAN SENOR,

"YOU HAVE A PROBLEM, YOU'RE
NOT COMMUNICATING TO THE IRAQIS."

VIRTUALLY NOBODY IN THE C.P.A.

AT A SENIOR LEVEL SPOKE ARABIC.

ONE COULD COUNT
MAYBE FIVE OR SIX

AMONG THE TOP 40
OR 50, 70 OFFICIALS.

WE HAD REGIONAL EXPERTS
WHO HAD SERVED IN IRAQ.

BUT AS HAS BEEN DOCUMENTED,
MANY OF THEM WERE NOT

INVOLVED IN INITIAL PARTS

AFTER THE INVASION OF IRAQ
AND THE INITIAL OCCUPATION

SO THAT EXPERTISE WAS LOST.

Man: TELL US HOW
YOUR TIME THERE ENDED.

UM-- I UNDERSTAND...

IT'S A SENSITIVE SUBJECT.

SAY WHAT YOU'RE
COMFORTABLE SAYING.

UM...

WELL, I WILL SAY THAT
IT ENDED MUCH SOONER

THAN I HAD ANTICIPATED,

UH, AND IT ENDED MUCH SOONER
THAN I WOULD HAVE WANTED.

UM, I REALLY WOULD HAVE
LIKED TO HAVE STAYED

AND TRIED TO HAVE--GIVEN ALL--

GIVEN THE FRUSTRATIONS
AND THE LIMITATIONS

IT WAS STILL A VERY
WORTHWHILE PLACE TO BE

AND A WORTHWHILE
THING TO BE TRYING TO DO.

DO YOU KNOW WHY SHE WAS FIRED?

UH, I KNOW WHY. I WAS TOLD.

WHAT WAS IT?

THAT SHE WAS DIFFICULT
TO GET ALONG WITH

AND SHE WAS OFFERING OPINIONS

THAT WERE COUNTER TO THE PREVAILING
WISDOM IN BAGHDAD AT THE TIME.

WE WERE GETTING NEW PEOPLE
IN AFTER BREMER SHOWED UP.

KIDS RIGHT OUT OF
COLLEGE, YOU KNOW?

THEY'D HAVE A
BACCALAUREATE DEGREE,

JUST GOT IT THE FALL--
THE PREVIOUS SPRING.

DADDY MADE A CONTRIBUTION
TO THE CAMPAIGN

SO THE KID GETS A
CHANCE TO GO OVER

AND EXPERIENCE SOME
FUN TRAVEL AND ADVENTURE.

UM, PRETTY BOYS, THAT'S
WHAT I CALLED THEM,

AND THEY SAT AROUND BREMER'S
FRONT DOOR AND DID NOTHING.

DURING THE COURSE OF
MY TIME IN THE GREEN ZONE,

WHEN I WAS IN THE PALACE, I
BUMPED INTO ONE OF MY STUDENTS,

JUST GRADUATED.

I ASKED HER WHAT SHE WAS
DOING AND SHE SAID, "WELL, I..."

SHE COULDN'T BELIEVE HER LUCK.

"I'M BEING ASKED TO, UH,

"TO DO THE TRAFFIC
PLAN FOR THE CITY."

AND I ASKED IF SHE HAD ANY
TRAINING IN MUNICIPAL PLANNING

AND SHE SAID NO.

SO SHE'S FRESH OUT OF SCHOOL

AND HAD BEEN PUT IN CHARGE OF
SOMETHING QUITE COMPLICATED,

TO SAY THE LEAST, AND
BEING OUT IN BAGHDAD TRAFFIC,

THE NEED WAS APPARENT.

MOST OFFICIALS THERE WERE
ON THREE-MONTH CONTRACTS.

AS SOON AS SOMEBODY
WOULD DEVELOP

THE APPROPRIATE
RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE IRAQIS,

IN 90 DAYS, 100 DAYS, 120
DAYS, THEY'D GO HOME,

AND THAT IS A TERRIBLE
WAY TO RUN AN ORGANIZATION.

THERE WAS A VERY
STRONG, UM, PREFERENCE

ON THE, UM--BY THE PENTAGON

TO HAVE AMERICAN
COMPANIES DOING THE WORK.

AND THERE WERE NUMEROUS INSTANCES
WHERE LOCAL IRAQI CONTRACTORS,

PROPOSED THAT THEY
COULD DO PIECES OF WORK

FOR MUCH, MUCH LESS THAN IN FACT

THE AMERICANS CONTRACTORS
COULD HAVE DONE.

Moulton: ANN AND I TOOK A VERY
DIFFERENT APPROACH TO OUR WORK

THAN MANY COALITION UNITS HAVE

BECAUSE WE WORKED VERY,
VERY CLOSELY WITH THE IRAQIS.

IF WE'RE SITTING IN A
MEETING, IT WAS AMERICANS, UM,

AND IRAQIS, AND THE IRAQIS
HAD JUST AS MUCH SAY AS WE DID.

Moulton: WE WERE BUILDING BORDER
FORTS RIGHT NEXT TO FORTS BEING PUT UP

BY THE ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS

THROUGH THAT BIG AMERICAN
CONTRACTOR PARSONS.

I MEAN, WE HAD OUR FORTS
DESIGNED, BUILT AND DEDICATED

IN A PERIOD OF
ABOUT FIVE MONTHS.

I THINK WHEN WE LEFT,
THE PARSONS FORTS,

WHICH HAD BEEN STARTED
MAYBE A YEAR BEFORE WE ARRIVED,

WERE STILL NOT FINISHED.

THE MILITARY OFFICERS WOULD
OFTEN BE OUT IN THE FIELD,

EXPENDING THE SMALL AMOUNT
OF FUNDS THAT THEY HAD

FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION TO,
SAY, CLEAN UP THE STREET,

EFFECT SOME
TEMPORARY IMPROVEMENTS

IN THE SEWAGE SYSTEM.

ONCE THE MILITARY HAD EXPENDED

ITS SMALL AMOUNT
OF MONEY TO DO THAT,

IT WOULD COME BACK TO C.P.A.

"WE NEED THIS, THIS AND THIS

"FOR THESE PROJECTS, AND IT'S GOING
TO COST US THIS MUCH," AND SO FORTH.

AND IT WOULD DISAPPEAR,
IT WOULD SIMPLY DISAPPEAR.

"WHAT HAPPENED TO MY REQUEST?"

"UH, WHAT REQUEST?"

HA. AND THIS HAPPENED
OVER AND OVER AGAIN.

THIS $18 BILLION THAT WAS
COMMITTED BY CONGRESS,

UH, WAS REALLY
MISCONCEIVED AND MISSPENT,

IF IT WAS SPENT AT ALL.

WE EXPECT TO PRODUCE
ENOUGH ELECTRICITY

FOR ALL IRAQIS TO HAVE

ELECTRICAL SERVICE
24 HOURS DAILY,

SOMETHING ESSENTIAL TO
THEIR HOPES FOR THE FUTURE.

THERE WAS FRAUD, THERE WAS
CORRUPTION, UM, THERE WAS WASTE.

Woman: THE ORDINARY
PEOPLE HAVE THEIR ELECTRICITY

ONLY FOR TWO OR
THREE HOURS A DAY.

WATER COMES EVERY, LIKE, NOW
AND THEN, EVERY TWO OR THREE DAYS.

Fekeiki: WE SPENT WINTER
SHIVERING, COVERED IN BLANKETS,

BECAUSE WE DIDN'T HAVE ENOUGH
FUEL TO OPERATE THE HEATERS.

THAT'S--THAT'S--
THAT'S THE LIFE WE LIVE.

Narrator: IN MAY 2003,

THE UNITED NATIONS
SENT ITS BEST EXPERT

IN POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION
TO HELP THE U.S. OCCUPATION.

HE WAS A BRAZILIAN DIPLOMAT
NAMED SERGIO VIEIRA DE MELLO.

Power: EVEN THOUGH THE U.N. WAS
GIVEN NOTHING MEANINGFUL TO DO,

KOFI ANNAN SAID,
"LET ME SEND MY BEST.

"IF ANYBODY CAN CARVE OUT
A BIGGER ROLE FOR THE U.N.,

"IT'S MY GUY, IT'S
SERGIO VIEIRA DE MELLO."

AND I WAS PART OF HIS
TEAM, AND I WAS HIS...

PRINCIPAL POLITICAL
ADVISOR AT THAT TIME

AND WE WENT TOGETHER TO BAGHDAD.

OUR POLITICAL TEAM
WERE ALL ARABIC SPEAKERS,

AND WITH GOOD EXPERIENCE
WORKING IN THE REGION AND SO ON.

ONE OF THINGS THAT SERGIO
DID THAT IS VERY, VERY POIGNANT

IN RETROSPECT IS THAT...

SEEING THAT THE UNITED
STATES HAD BOARDED ITSELF UP

IN THE GREEN ZONE AND WAS
NOT ACCESSING THE IRAQI STREET,

SERGIO CREATED A
STRUCTURE IN IRAQ

THAT WAS PRECISELY THE
OPPOSITE OF THE GREEN ZONE.

YOU MIGHT CALL IT
THE ANTI-GREEN ZONE.

I'M LISTENING, I'M LISTENING
TO POLITICAL LEADERS,

YOU KNOW, THAT I'LL BE MEETING
WITH THEM ON A DAILY BASIS.

WE HAD VARIOUS DISCUSSIONS
WITH THESE MILITARY

WHO CAME TO THE U.N.,

AND MET WITH SERGIO
VIEIRA DE MELLO

AND ASKED HIM, YOU
KNOW, TO MEDIATE

IN THE DISPUTE THAT
THEY HAVE WITH THE C.P.A.

YOU'D HAVE THESE LONG, LONG
LINES RIGHT OUTSIDE THE GREEN ZONE

BUT THEY COULD NOT MAKE
THEIR COMPLAINTS FELT.

IN THE U.N. COMPOUND BY
CONTRAST IT WAS INCREDIBLY POROUS.

IF YOU WANTED TO COMPLAIN, THE
U.N. WAS, WAS VERY, VERY EAGER

TO HEAR YOUR COMPLAINT,
AND SERGIO SAW IT AS HIS ROLE

TO RELAY THOSE COMPLAINTS TO
BREMER, AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS

IN THE HOPES THAT SOME OF
THESE THINGS WOULD GET TENDED TO

BEFORE AN INSURGENCY TOOK ROOT.

I'M MEETING WITH HIM REGULARLY,

AND SHARING MY ADVICE
AND MY EXPERIENCE WITH HIM.

SOON AS BREMER HAD
MADE USE OF SERGIO,

HAD MADE USE OF THE U.N.,

UH, HE HAD ALMOST NO TIME
FOR THE UNITED NATIONS.

AND SO WHAT SERGIO LIVED THROUGH

WAS TWO MONTHS OF,
IN EFFECT, BEING USED

AS A VEHICLE TO GET TO CERTAIN
SEGMENTS OF THE IRAQI SOCIETY,

AND THEN FOR HIS LAST MONTH

WHAT HE ENDURED WAS NOT
HAVING HIS PHONE CALLS RETURNED.

AND SO ON ISSUES
LIKE DETENTION POLICY,

UH, HOODINGS WAS ONE OF
THE ISSUES THAT SERGIO RAISED

AGAIN AND AGAIN WITH BREMER
AND WITH GENERAL SANCHEZ,

THE HOODING OF PRISONERS,
BREMER WOULD HEAR NONE OF IT.

THE THREE OR FOUR CRUCIAL
MONTHS AFTER THE FALL OF BAGHDAD,

THE TWO MAIN THINGS THE U.S.
MILITARY WAS DOING ON THE GROUND WERE

LOOKING FOR W.M.D. SUPPLIES
AND LOOKING FOR SADDAM HUSSEIN.

THE PROCESS OF THOSE SEARCHES,

BUSTING IN THE DOORS AT NIGHT,

ROUNDING UP PEOPLE,
TAKING THEM TO ABU GHRAIB,

HAVING MASS ARRESTS, IT HAD
A REALLY EMBITTERING EFFECT.

Man: GO! LET'S GO!

LET'S GO! LET'S GO!

IF YOU HAPPEN TO BE
A MILITARY-AGED IRAQI

IN AN AREA OF OPERATION WHERE
THE AMERICAN MILITARY WENT INTO,

THERE WAS A GOOD CHANCE
YOU WERE GOING TO BE ARRESTED

OR INTERNED AS A
SUSPECTED INSURGENT.

JUST FOR BEING A MILITARY-AGE
MAN IN THAT AREA OF OPERATION.

IN MANY OCCASIONS
YOU TAKE THE, YOU KNOW,

THE IRAQI MAN OF MILITARY
AGE OUT OF HIS FAMILY,

YOU'RE TAKING THE BREADWINNER.

Burke: YOU ANGER NOT JUST HIM
BUT YOU ANGER AN EXTENDED FAMILY

'CAUSE HE'S PROBABLY SUPPORTING
MORE THAN HIS IMMEDIATE FAMILY.

WHENEVER THEY HEAR
THE AMERICAN HELICOPTERS

OR AMERICAN TANKS
DRIVING IN THEIR STREETS,

THEY IMMEDIATELY WAKE UP,

EVEN IF IT'S LIKE TWO
O'CLOCK IN THE MORNING,

AND PREPARE THEMSELVES
FOR THE DETENTION.

BECAUSE FOR THEM THIS IS A
USUAL THING HAPPENING EVEN NOW.

THERE WERE ATTACKS ON THE
AMERICAN SOLDIERS THEMSELVES

AND SO THEY RESPONDED
TO THOSE ATTACKS

BY GOING OUT AND TRYING
TO FIND THE INSURGENTS,

AND IN GOING OUT AND TRYING
TO FIND THE INSURGENTS,

THEY SOMETIMES ARRESTED
THE WRONG PERSON.

THEY EVEN SOMETIMES
KILLED THE WRONG PERSON.

UH, ONCE PEOPLE WERE ARRESTED
THEY TENDED TO DISAPPEAR

IN THE AMERICAN
MILITARY PRISON SYSTEM

FOR A LONG TIME WITHOUT A TRACE.

THEIR FAMILIES COULDN'T
GET ANY WORD OF THEM.

IT'S DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND WHAT IT
FEELS LIKE TO BE AN OCCUPIED PERSON.

THEY POINT THEIR GUNS
AT YOU FROM THEIR JEEPS.

THEY STOP YOU
WHEN YOU'RE DRIVING.

IRAQIS COULD NOT
UNDERSTAND INSTRUCTIONS

GIVEN TO THEM AT
TRAFFIC CHECKPOINTS.

IF THEY WOULD
APPROACH TOO QUICKLY

THEY WOULD GET SHOT AND KILLED.

MOST OF THE AMERICAN
UNITS THAT I SPENT TIME WITH

HAVE TRIED VERY, VERY HARD
TO ALWAYS DO THE RIGHT THING

AND TO NOT KILL ANYONE
OR INJURE ANYONE

THEY HAVEN'T INTENDED
TO OR NEEDED TOO.

UH, BUT THERE IS NO QUESTION
THAT WARS ARE MESSY,

AND THIS ONE IN IRAQ,

WITH THE WAY THE
INSURGENCY IS BEING WAGED,

IS PARTICULARLY SO.

ONE AFTER ANOTHER YOU HAVE
THESE SHORT-TERM DECISIONS

WHICH BY THE END OF 2003

MEANT YOU HAD A COUNTRY
WITH AN INSURGENCY UNDER WAY.

[SPEAKING ARABIC]

[EXPLOSION]

[PEOPLE SHOUTING AND SCREAMING]

Power: A RUSSIAN-MADE TRUCK

PULLED UP RIGHT OUTSIDE
SERGIO VIEIRA DE MELLO'S WINDOW

AND SET OFF JUST A HUGE
AMOUNT OF EXPLOSIVES.

THE ENTIRE SOUTHWESTERN CORNER
OF THE U.N. BUILDING COLLAPSED.

SERGIO WAS UNDER
THE RUBBLE AND ALIVE

FOR MORE THAN THREE
HOURS AWAITING RESCUE.

WE LOST MANY COLLEAGUES
IN THAT BOMBING

AND I THINK IT WAS, YOU KNOW,
THE SIGN THAT SOMETHING DRAMATIC

HAD HAPPENED IN THE COUNTRY,
THAT THE INSURGENCY HAD BECOME

VERY LETHAL, FULL-FLEDGED,

READY FOR A LONG STRUGGLE
AND LONG FIGHT, YOU KNOW,

WITH THE COALITION FORCES.

BY 2004, THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE MILITARY

AND THE IRAQI PEOPLE
HAD GROWN TOXIC.

Man: ALL RIGHT, THIS IS THE
CORNER WHERE LITTLE SHITS

LIKE TO THROW ROCKS AT US.

[MAN TALKING ON
RADIO, INDISTINCT]

GOD DAMN!

[CRASH]

RIGHT THERE! OH, BUT WE
CAN'T USE DEADLY FORCE.

WE CAN'T USE DEADLY FORCE.

Boy: FUCK YOU!

FUCK YOU, YOU LITTLE SHIT!

YOU SEE, UM, ALL THESE CIVILIANS
WHO COME OVER TO WORK FOR...

THE PRIVATE CONTRACTORS

WHO ARE DOING SO MUCH OF THE
WORK WITH THE RECONSTRUCTION,

REALLY JUST BECAUSE WE
DON'T HAVE ENOUGH TROOPS.

I'VE SEEN AN AWFUL LOT
OF CIVILIAN CONTRACTORS

WHO HAVE BEEN
PARTICULARLY VIOLENT AND, UM,

AND VERY SHORT-SIGHTED IN
TERMS OF WHAT THEY'RE DOING.

[* COUNTRY MUSIC PLAYING]

[MACHINE GUN FIRING]

[GUNFIRE]

[GUNFIRE]

[RADIO CHATTER, GUNFIRE]

[GUNSHOTS]

Man: DID HE ALREADY
FIGHT THE AMERICANS?

[2nd MAN TRANSLATES]

Narrator: BY EARLY
2004, FALLUJAH,

A CITY OF 350,000 PEOPLE
WEST OF BAGHDAD,

HAD BECOME THE CENTER
OF THE SUNNI INSURGENCY.

ON MARCH 31st, 2004,

FOUR AMERICAN MILITARY
CONTRACTORS WERE KILLED,

AND THEIR BODIES WERE DRAGGED
THROUGH THE STREETS OF FALLUJAH

BY CHEERING CROWDS.

BEGINNING IN EARLY 2004,

THE NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL,

A POWERFUL 12-PERSON COMMITTEE

THAT SITS ON TOP OF AMERICA'S
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY,

CONDUCTED SEVERAL ASSESSMENTS
OF THE GROWING INSURGENCY

WHICH IT PRESENTED
TO THE WHITE HOUSE

AND SENIOR
ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS.

WELL, WE WERE CHRONICLING
WHAT WAS A DEEPENING INSURGENCY.

IT WAS BROADENING AND WAS
NOT LIMITED TO FOREIGN FIGHTERS

OR DISAFFECTED BA'ATHISTS.

WHAT WE CALL THE INSURGENCY

REALLY IS A MULTIFACETED,
DEEPLY ROOTED THING.

UH, IT'S JUST NOT A FEW
BA'ATHIST DEAD-ENDERS,

IT'S NOT JUST A FEW
EXTREMISTS FROM OVERSEAS,

UH, BUT RATHER REFLECTED
MULTIPLE MOTIVATIONS

AND FRUSTRATIONS

AMONG THE IRAQI
PEOPLE THEMSELVES.

Hutchings: AS THE ECONOMIC
SITUATION WAS DETERIORATING,

AS PEOPLE'S PERSONAL
SECURITY WAS BECOMING WEAKER,

AND AS RESENTMENT OF THE
AMERICAN OCCUPATION WAS GROWING.

THE C.I.A., UH, UH,

LAID OUT A, UH...

SEVERAL SCENARIOS

THAT SAID LIFE COULD BE
LOUSY, LIFE COULD BE OK,

LIFE COULD BE BETTER.

THE PRESIDENT HADN'T READ IT,

NOT EVEN A ONE-PAGE SUMMARY
OVER WHICH WE WORKED SO HARD

TO REDUCE THESE FINDINGS
TO A SINGLE READABLE PAGE.

THE PRESIDENT HAD NOT READ
EVEN THE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY?

CORRECT.

AND THEY WERE JUST, UH, UH...

GUESSING AS TO WHAT THE
CONDITIONS MIGHT BE LIKE.

WHAT'S YOUR ESTIMATE OF
THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN IRAQ

WHO HAVE BEEN ACTIVE AT
SOME LEVEL IN THE INSURGENCY?

ACTIVE IN SOME LEVEL,
UH, IF YOU SAY SUPPORTING,

PROVIDING SAFE HAVEN TO,

POTENTIALLY YOU KNOW, WELL
OVER A HUNDRED THOUSAND PEOPLE.

Narrator: DESPITE THE
INTENSIFICATION OF THE INSURGENCY,

THERE WERE STILL NOT
SUFFICIENT ARMORED VEHICLES

FOR AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN IRAQ.

WE NEVER HAD A
SINGLE ARMORED HUMVEE

WHILE WE WERE IN
IRAQ THROUGHOUT 2003.

WE WENT TO IRAQ IN 2004

WITH UNARMORED HUMVEES

AND THEY WERE GIVEN
ARMOR KITS IN KUWAIT

WHICH WERE JUST SORT OF
CUT-OUT DOORS WITH NO WINDOWS,

UM, AND A BULLETPROOF
WINDSHIELD AND THAT'S ABOUT IT.

IF YOUR HUMVEE
HADN'T BEEN ARMORED,

WHAT DO YOU THINK THE DAMAGE
FROM THAT I.E.D. WOULD HAVE BEEN?

I THINK IT WOULD
HAVE BEEN DEADLY.

WHY DO WE SOLDIERS HAVE TO
DIG THROUGH LOCAL LANDFILLS

FOR PIECES OF SCRAP METAL

AND COMPROMISED BALLISTIC
GLASS TO UP-ARMOR OUR VEHICLES,

AND WHY DON'T WE
HAVE THOSE RESOURCES

READILY AVAILABLE TO US?

[CHEERING]

IT--IT'S ESSENTIALLY
A MATTER OF PHYSICS,

IT ISN'T A MATTER OF MONEY.

IT ISN'T A MATTER, ON THE
PART OF THE ARMY, OF DESIRE,

IT'S A MATTER OF PRODUCTION
AND CAPABILITY OF DOING IT.

WE HAVE AUTOMOBILE PLANTS
CLOSING DOWN IN AMERICA.

YOU KNOW? I MEAN, I'M
NOT A FACTORY EXPERT,

JUST RETOOL THEM TO PRODUCE
SOME ARMORED HUMVEES.

IT SHOULDN'T BE THAT DIFFICULT.

YOU GO TO WAR WITH
THE ARMY YOU HAVE,

AND NOT THE ARMY YOU MIGHT WANT
OR WISH TO HAVE AT A LATER TIME.

Narrator: IN NOVEMBER 2004, THE
PENTAGON DECIDED TO ATTACK FALLUJAH

IN AN ATTEMPT TO
RECAPTURE THE CITY

FROM THE SUNNI INSURGENCY.

FALLUJAH'S 350,OOO RESIDENTS
WERE WARNED TO LEAVE.

THE BATTLE DESTROYS
70% OF THE CITY

AND RENDERS 150,000
PEOPLE HOMELESS.

DESPITE INTENSE COMBAT,
MANY INSURGENTS ESCAPE.

40 MARINES ARE KILLED.

WHILE THE U.S. MILITARY WAS
PREOCCUPIED WITH FALLUJAH,

SHI'ITE MILITIAS WERE
TAKING OVER SOUTHERN IRAQ.

THERE'S NOTHING LIKE
AN ARMY OR A MAJOR, UM...

LARGE ELEMENTS OF
HUNDREDS OF PEOPLE

TRYING TO OVERTHROW OR
TO CHANGE THE SITUATION.

Narrator: IN AUGUST 2004,

THE HOLY CITY OF NAJAF IS
TAKEN OVER BY THE MAHDI ARMY,

THE SHI'ITE MILITIA CONTROLLED
BY MUQTADA AL-SADR.

Moulton: ESSENTIALLY THE TURNOVER
WE GOT FROM THE ARMY UNIT

THAT WE REPLACED WAS

THAT MOST THINGS IN
NAJAF ARE PRETTY PEACEFUL.

EXCEPT THERE'S THIS
3,000-MAN MILITIA FORCE

THAT OCCUPIES THE
CENTER OF THE CITY.

A LOT OF ROUNDS FLYING,
A LOT OF MORTARS LANDING.

MY PLATOON WAS THE FIRST
INTO THE POLICE STATION.

WE JUST TOOK UP POSITIONS
ALONGSIDE THE IRAQI POLICE,

AND DEFENDED IT
FROM THE MILITIA.

BUT IT WASN'T UNTIL
THE END OF AUGUST

THAT WE ACTUALLY DID
A FULL-SCALE ASSAULT

ON THE OLD CITY OF
NAJAF AND TOOK IT OVER.

IF DEMOCRACY CANNOT
PROVIDE FOR THE IRAQI PEOPLE,

PEOPLE WILL SAY, "TO
HELL WITH DEMOCRACY,

"WE NEED A STRONG MAN."

AND I CAN SEE THE STRONG
MAN ALREADY IN THE OFFING,

HIS NAME IS MUQTADA AL-SADR.

AND I WOULD SAY THIS
IS NOT A GOOD CHOICE

FOR THE FUTURE LEADER OF IRAQ.

WHERE YOU PART OF
THE DELIBERATIONS

ABOUT WHETHER TO CAPTURE
OR KILL MUQTADA AL-SADR?

UH, YES, I WAS.

DID WE SEE MUQTADA
AL-SADR AS A TROUBLEMAKER

AND A THORN IN THE SIDE?

ABSOLUTELY, AND WE
WANTED TO ARREST HIM.

IT GETS BACK, IN MY VIEW, TO
THE MATTER OF TROOP STRENGTH.

THE U.S. MILITARY DIDN'T
WANT TO BE DIVERTED

FROM THEIR MAJOR MISSION,

TO GO AFTER WHAT WOULD HAVE
BEEN A PROBABLY SHORT-TERM

BUT DIFFICULT AND I'M
SURE BLOODY BATTLE,

UH, AND ULTIMATELY
THAT'S WHAT WON OUT.

Narrator: AFTER ELECTIONS WERE
HELD IN IRAQ ON DECEMBER 15th 2005,

THE UNITED IRAQI ALLIANCE,

OF WHICH MUQTADA AL-SADR'S
PARTY IS A MAJOR PARTICIPANT,

TOOK NEARLY HALF THE SEATS
IN IRAQ'S CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.

THAT'S NOT EASY A MARINE
WHO'S SOMEONE, YOU KNOW...

SOME OF MY BUDDIES WERE
KILLED BY HIM AND HIS MILITIA,

AND NOW LOOKING AT IRAQ AND
SEEING HIM AS A RISING POLITICIAN,

THAT'S FRUSTRATING.

Narrator: ANOTHER SHI'ITE GROUP
WITHIN SADR'S ALLIANCE IS S.C.I.R.I.,

THE SUPREME COUNCIL FOR
ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN IRAQ.

S.C.I.R.I.'S LEADERSHIP
LIVED IN IRAN FOR 20 YEARS,

AND IS FREQUENTLY PRO-IRANIAN.

THESE TWO SHI'ITE GROUPS,

WHICH SOMETIMES ENGAGE IN
ARMED COMBAT WITH EACH OTHER,

ARE POLITICALLY ALLIED
AGAINST SUNNI GROUPS.

MUQTADA AL-SADR'S MAHDI ARMY

CONTINUES TO CLASH
WITH U.S. FORCES.

THE LEVEL OF ACTIVITY
THAT WE SEE TODAY,

FROM A MILITARY STANDPOINT
I THINK WILL CLEARLY DECLINE,

AND I THINK THEY ARE IN THE LAST
THROES, IF YOU WILL, OF THE INSURGENCY.

WHEN SECRETARY RUMSFELD
AND VICE-PRESIDENT CHENEY

MADE THEIR COMMENTS ABOUT
THE INSURGENCY DYING OUT,

BEING A FEW
DEAD-ENDERS, ET CETERA,

YOU KNEW THAT THE
INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

ALREADY INDICATED
THAT THEY WERE WRONG?

I HAD BEEN TO IRAQ EIGHT TIMES,

I KNEW WHAT THE FACTS
ON THE GROUND WERE.

THEY'LL HAVE TO SPEAK
AND THEY WILL BE JUDGED

BY THEIR OWN WORDS AND ACTIONS,

BUT, UH, I KNEW
WHAT THE FACTS WERE.

Narrator: STARTING IN 2005, THE
ADMINISTRATION SLOWLY BEGAN

TO CORRECT SOME OF ITS MISTAKES.

IT ACCELERATED TRAINING
OF THE IRAQI ARMY

AND APPOINTED A MUSLIM DIPLOMAT,

ZALMAY KHALILZAD, AS AMBASSADOR.

IN JUNE OF 2006,

AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD
SENT AN OMINOUS CABLE

TO CONDOLEEZZA RICE.

IRAQIS WORKING FOR THE EMBASSY

COULD NOT TELL THEIR
FAMILIES WHERE THEY WORKED

FOR FEAR OF BEING KILLED.

THEY ASK WHAT WILL HAPPEN
IF THE AMERICANS EVACUATE.

MANY PLAN AHEAD FOR
THEIR OWN ABDUCTION.

SIX MONTHS LATER,

THE DAY AFTER REPUBLICANS
LOSE CONTROL OF CONGRESS,

PRESIDENT BUSH ANNOUNCES
DONALD RUMSFELD'S RESIGNATION.

THE NEW SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE, ROBERT GATES,

IS A PRAGMATIST WHO HAD BEEN
PRIVATELY CRITICAL OF THE WAR.

I AM MAKING A CHANGE AT
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

TO BRING A FRESH PERSPECTIVE
AS TO HOW TO ACHIEVE SOMETHING

I THINK MOST AMERICANS
WANT, WHICH IS A VICTORY.

Narrator: BY THE TIME
RUMSFELD IS REPLACED,

IRAQ IS OUT OF CONTROL.

THE COUNTRY IS INCREASINGLY
DOMINATED BY MILITIAS,

INSURGENTS, CRIMINALS
AND WARLORDS.

MIXED AREAS ARE PURGED
BY ETHNIC CLEANSING.

SHI'ITE MILITIAS HAVE
INFILTRATED THE POLICE,

USING THEM FOR
SECTARIAN KILLINGS.

KIDNAPPINGS AND VIOLENT DEATHS

HAVE REACHED SEVERAL
HUNDRED PER DAY.

Ussayran: WE HAVE SO
MANY KINDS OF MILITIA.

YOU HAVE THE MAHDI MILITIA,

YOU HAVE THE BADR MILITIA,

YOU HAVE MANY
MILITIAS IN THIS COUNTRY.

AND THEY ALL ARE VERY DEMOCRATIC

IN ARRESTING PEOPLE
AND KILLING THEM.

Allbritton: SECURITY IS TERRIBLE
IN MANY NEIGHBORHOODS

WITH AN EVER-PRESENT
THREAT OF CAR BOMBS AND I.E.D.s.

KIDNAPPINGS, ESPECIALLY SHEER
MONEY-MAKING GANGSTER STUFF.

KIDNAPPING OF A SMALL BOY
RIGHT IN FRONT OF THE HOTEL,

YOU KNOW, A CAR JUST STOPPED,
GRABBED THE BOY AND DROVE OFF.

PARENTS WILL GET A RANSOM
NOTE AND THEY'LL SOMEHOW

HAVE TO RAISE THIS
AMOUNT OF MONEY IN A WEEK.

IT'S NOT WHERE YOU JUST HAVE
ONE OR TWO OR THREE KIDNAPPINGS

BUT YOU HAVE HUNDREDS,
AND YOU GET OVERWHELMED.

YOU JUST HAVE A
DELUGE OF INDIVIDUALS

WHO ARE ASKING FOR HELP OR--OR--

OR SOON DON'T ASK
FOR HELP ANYMORE.

WHY REPORT IT TO THE POLICE?
ONE, WE DON'T TRUST THEM.

TWO, THEY MAY BE
COMMITTING SOME OF THE CRIME.

Allbritton: THE UNIFORMS THAT THEY USE
JUST PROLIFERATED ALL OVER THE PLACE.

SO YOU REALLY HAVE
LOTS OF ROGUE ELEMENTS

AND PEOPLE THAT ARE USING OR WORKING
UNDER THE GUISE OF THE SECURITY SERVICES.

Ussayran: NOW YOU CAN SEE
PEOPLE ARRESTED BY MANY SOURCES.

YOU DON'T KNOW WHO ARE THEY.

FAKE CHECKPOINTS IN THE
STREETS STOP PEOPLE PASSING

AND LOOK INTO THEIR I.D.s
AND SEE IF THEY WERE SHI'ITES,

SUNNIS, KURDS,
ARABS, AND THEN...

EITHER KIDNAP THEM OR
KILL THEM IN THE SAME PLACE.

Ussayran: WHEN I SAY
GOOD-BYE TO MY HUSBAND

I THINK I'M NOT COMING BACK.

Narrator: BY LATE 2006, BAGHDAD
HAD FALLEN INTO NEAR ANARCHY.

THE U.S. MILITARY
CONTROLLED THE GREEN ZONE

AND THE AREA AROUND
BAGHDAD AIRPORT.

IRAQI SECURITY FORCES CONTROLLED
AREAS IN THE EAST AND SOUTH.

THE SUNNI MILITIAS CONTROLLED

SEVERAL PREDOMINANTLY
SUNNI NEIGHBORHOODS.

MUQTADA AL-SADR'S MAHDI
ARMY DOMINATED LARGE AREAS

INCLUDING THE ENORMOUS
SHI'ITE SLUM OF SADR CITY.

S.C.I.R.I.'S RIVAL SHI'ITE
MILITIA, THE BADR BRIGADE,

CONTROLLED
WEALTHIER SHI'ITE AREAS.

NEIGHBORHOOD ORGANIZATIONS
CONTROLLED MANY SMALL ZONES.

LARGE AREAS WERE ESSENTIALLY
CONTROLLED BY NO ONE.

Narrator: FROM A
STUDY CONDUCTED BY

HARVARD PROFESSOR LINDA BILMAS

AND NOBEL LAUREATE
JOSEPH STIGLITZ,

AS OF EARLY 2007, THE
U.S. HAS SPENT $379 BILLION

DIRECTLY ON THE WAR IN IRAQ.

FUTURE OPERATING COSTS
ARE ESTIMATED AT $389 BILLION.

THE COSTS OF
VETERANS' HEALTHCARE

AND LOST PRODUCTIVITY
OF THOSE SERVING IN IRAQ

IS $482 BILLION.

THE COSTS OF DEMOBILIZATION
AND REPLACING MILITARY EQUIPMENT,

WHICH IS BEING USED UP SIX
TIMES FASTER THAN NORMAL,

IS $160 BILLION.

THE INCREASE IN OIL
PRICES DUE TO THE WAR,

HAVE COST THE U.S.
ECONOMY $450 BILLION.

IN TOTAL, THE ECONOMIC
COST OF THE WAR

IS PROJECTED TO REACH
$1.8 TRILLION DOLLARS.

I'M SUFFERING FROM...

POST-TRAUMATIC MIGRAINES

AND POST-TRAUMATIC EPILEPSY.

SOMETIMES I HAVE BAD
MEMORIES ABOUT WHAT HAPPENED

BUT I'M NOT SCARED OF THEM.

DO YOU FEEL EMOTIONALLY OK?

UH, SOMETIMES THAT'S A LITTLE...

SOMETIMES YES, SOMETIMES NO.

STILL HAVE TROUBLE, YOU
KNOW, DEALING WITH, UM,

UM, YOU KNOW,

WHAT HAPPENED TO ME AND MY
PARTNER, YOU KNOW, SOMETIMES.

Bilmes: THE BIG, BIG COST IN
TERMS OF VETERANS' DISABILITY

IS FOR THE MANY HUNDREDS
OF THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE

WHO COME BACK AND THEY
FIND THAT THEY CAN'T WORK

AND HOLD DOWN A JOB
IN THE WAY THEY USED TO

BECAUSE THEY'RE JUST NOT QUITE
THE SAME AS THEY WERE BEFORE.

Man: HOW HOT DOES IT
GET IN THIS COUNTRY?

120 YESTERDAY.

Man: 120 YESTERDAY? YEP.

LAST CONTRACT I EVER
SIGN WITH THE GOVERNMENT.

SOME OF THESE UNITS
HAVE BEEN THERE NOW

ON THEIR THIRD TOUR OF DUTY,

AND SOME OF THEM
DON'T SEE AN END TO IT.

THEY THINK THEY'LL BE
BACK THERE FOR THEIR FIFTH,

SIXTH AND SEVENTH TOURS
OF DUTY BEFORE THIS ENDS.

WE DON'T HAVE ENOUGH TROOPS.

HOW COULD WE PROTECT AGAINST

A POSSIBLE CONFLICT
IN PYONGYANG,

A POSSIBLE CONFLICT WITH IRAN,

OTHER POTENTIALITIES
IN THE WORLD,

WHEN WE'VE GOT
EVERYTHING TIED UP

WITH REGARD TO IRAQ
AND AFGHANISTAN?

IRAN IS ODDLY,

GIVEN HOW MUCH WE
DISLIKE THE IRANIAN REGIME,

THE SINGLE GREATEST
BENEFICIARY OF THE WAR IN IRAQ.

WE ELIMINATED THEIR
HISTORIC ENEMY FOR THEM

AND PUT THEM ON TOP
IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

I MEAN, WHEN YOU
HAVE MASSIVE CIVIL WAR,

VIOLENT, NASTY CIVIL WAR

ON TOP OF 20% OF THE
WORLD'S OIL SUPPLY,

THAT WILL PROBABLY ENGULF
OTHER REGIONAL PLAYERS--

IRAN, SAUDI ARABIA, JORDAN,
SYRIA, MAYBE EVEN EGYPT.

Amazia Baram: IF IRAQ DISINTEGRATES
AND BECOMES AN ARENA OF CIVIL WAR,

MUCH OF IT WILL BECOME
LIKE LITTLE AFGHANISTAN.

IT'S WHERE TERRORISTS ALL
OVER THE WORLD WILL FIND REFUGE.

IF IRAQ GOES BACK TO SOME
SORT OF ISLAMOFASCIST REGIME,

LIKE WE HAD UNDER THE
TALIBAN IN AFGHANISTAN,

THEN WE ARE BACK TO
SEPTEMBER 10TH 2001,

EXCEPT MUCH LARGER SCALE

AND BILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN
OIL MINING IN THEIR DISPOSAL.

WHEN WE WERE FIRST
STARTING THE RECONSTRUCTION

WE WOULD SORT OF JOKE

THAT THERE WERE 500
WAYS TO DO IT WRONG

AND TWO OR THREE
WAYS TO DO IT RIGHT,

AND WHAT WE DIDN'T UNDERSTAND

WAS THAT WE WERE
GONNA GO THROUGH ALL 500.

WHY DO YOU THINK ALL
THOSE MISTAKES WERE MADE?

I DON'T KNOW.

I HAVE NO IDEA. PUZZLING.

Packer: PRESIDENT BUSH
WAS MISSING IN ACTION

ON THE PLANNING
FOR THE POST-WAR.

HE DEFERRED TO
HIS VICE-PRESIDENT

AND HIS SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THE CONTROL OVER
THOSE DECISIONS.

Burke: WHY ON EARTH, IF YOU
WERE PRESIDENT OF UNITED STATES,

WOULD YOU PLAN TO USE MILITARY
FORCE AND THEN DIVORCE YOURSELF

FROM ESSENTIALLY THE MOST
IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THAT USE

AND THAT IS THE AFTERMATH.

WHO WAS IN CHARGE OF THIS WAR?

I DON'T WANNA GO THROUGH
THE LIST. I MEAN IT WAS--

IT WAS THE PRESIDENT,
THE VICE-PRESIDENT,

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,

THOSE AROUND, AROUND
ALL THOSE PEOPLE.

DO YOU INCLUDE NATIONAL
SECURITY ADVISER?

SURE.

THE VICE-PRESIDENT YOU INCLUDE?

YEAH.

THAT WAS THE INNER TEAM

THAT PRODUCED THE
THINKING BEHIND THE WAR.

MY MISTAKE WAS PROBABLY
NOT FINDING A WAY TO GET MYSELF

MORE INVOLVED ON THE
PLANNING PROCESS OF THINGS.

I SEE.

SO THE DISSOLUTION OF THE ARMY

WOULDN'T HAVE BEEN A
SURPRISE, FOR EXAMPLE?

WELL, AND I COULD HAVE
RAISED HELL ABOUT IT, YOU KNOW,

AND HAD MY DAY IN COURT. I MAY
HAVE LOST BUT I'D HAD MY DAY IN COURT.

THE SYSTEM OUGHT
TO BE PARTICIPATORY

AND OUGHT TO INCLUDE
PEOPLE WHO ARE WILLING TO SAY,

"UH, THIS MAKES NO
SENSE, MR. PRESIDENT.

"THIS IS A BAD IDEA."

AND I DON'T THINK THAT KIND
OF DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

EXISTED IN THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION.

I STRONGLY DIDN'T FEEL
MYSELF PARTICIPATING

IN SUCH A
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS.

THE ADMINISTRATION
NEVER ASKED FOR ANY...

ESTIMATE OR COMMUNITY ASSESSMENT
ON IRAQ BEFORE WE WENT TO WAR.

NOBODY SEEMED TO BE INTERESTED

IN WHAT THE
COMMUNITY HAD TO SAY?

I THINK IT'S MORE A MATTER
THAT MINDS WERE MADE UP

THE TIME THAT THE
COURSE WAS SET.

UH, WHATEVER ANALYSIS
ON THESE SORTS OF ISSUES

WAS TO HAVE BEEN DONE,

THE DECISION MAKERS FELT

THEY HAD ALREADY
DONE IT THEMSELVES.

Man: VICE-PRESIDENT
CHENEY OF COURSE HAS MADE

AND TAKES MANY OF
THE SAME POSITIONS

THAT SECRETARY
RUMSFELD DID ON THE WAR.

DOES HE STILL HAVE YOUR
COMPLETE CONFIDENCE?

YES, HE DOES. DO
YOU EXPECT HIM TO--

THE CAMPAIGN IS
OVER. YES, HE DOES.

AND HE'LL BE HERE FOR THE
REMAINED OF YOUR TERM? YES, HE WILL.

THERE ARE NIGHTS WHEN
I DON'T SLEEP VERY WELL,

THAT I FAULT MYSELF FOR
NOT PUSHING THE ISSUE,

THAT I THINK I SHOULD HAVE GONE
AND KICKED HIS DOOR IN AND SAID,

"DAMN IT, LISTEN.

"THIS WAS A MISTAKE.

"WE NEED TO DO
SOMETHING TO RECTIFY IT."

BUT I NEVER HAD THE
OPPORTUNITY TO DO IT,

AND TRYING TO KICK
IN A DOOR, YOU KNOW,

WITH AN AMBASSADOR WHO'S
ESSENTIALLY THE, YOU KNOW,

THE CZAR OF IRAQ.

YOU KNOW, FOR A
COLONEL TO TRY AND DO IT

JUST WASN'T GOING TO HAPPEN.

YOU COULDN'T GET
PAST THE FRONT DOOR.

IF MY SPEAKING OUT
ADDS EVEN INFINITESIMALLY

TO THE CRITICISM THAT
COUNTS OF THIS ADMINISTRATION,

THEN THAT'S GOOD.

I DON'T PRETEND TO SAY THAT I'VE
BEEN EFFECTIVE IN THAT REGARD,

BUT I JUST CAN'T HOLD
MY PEACE ANY LONGER.

WE WILL BRING TO
THE IRAQI PEOPLE FOOD

AND MEDICINES

AND SUPPLIES

AND FREEDOM.

Man: HEAR THE
CHEER, CHEER, CHEER!

AND IT JUST WAS, "HENNY
PENNY, THE SKY IS FALLING!"

GENERAL GARNER AND I ARE PLEDGED

TO WORKING VERY
CLOSELY TOGETHER.

THERE IS A LARGE NUMBER
OF FORMER IRAQI SOLDIERS

THAT ARE UNEMPLOYED NOW.

ONE WAS, UH, "GUERRILLA WAR",

ANOTHER WAS "INSURGENCY",
ANOTHER WAS "UNCONVENTIONAL WAR".

PARDON ME? QUAGMIRE.

NO, THAT'S, UH, SOMEONE
ELSE'S BUSINESS, QUAGMIRES.

I DON'T DO QUAGMIRES.

[MEN SHOUTING, WOMAN SCREAMING]

Man: INSIDE, INSIDE.

I'M LISTENING, I'M LISTENING
TO POLITICAL LEADERS.

Man: OH!

2nd man: STAY DOWN,
STAY DOWN, STAY DOWN.

SOME DAY, MY LIFE IN THE
FUTURE, I GOTTA LOOK BACK TO IRAQ,

AND I GOTTA SEE
SOMETHING DONE IN THERE,

SO I CAN LOOK BACK AND SAY

I WAS PART OF THIS,

AND MY SUFFERING AND MY
LOSS HAVE A--HAVE A MEANING.

[SPEAKING ARABIC]

IF THE SITUATION GETS BETTER,
I AM GOING TO LEAVE IRAQ.

I WILL LEAVE IRAQ, BUT NOW...

I'M A FIGHTER, I
MEAN, ALL MY LIFE.

I WON'T LEAVE IRAQ NOW.

Fekeiki: FROM HERE WE
CAN'T CHANGE ANYTHING

BECAUSE IT'S OUT OF CONTROL NOW.

I DON'T HAVE FUTURE
PLANS FOR BEING IN IRAQ.

I DON'T SEE THE
BIT OF LIGHT IN THE--

AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL YET.

Rosen: THIS IS WHAT IT IS.

THIS IS HOW WE LIVE IT,
THIS IS HOW WE SEE IT,

THIS IS HOW WE
SMELL IT AND FEEL IT.

IT'S NOT A SITUATION THAT
YOU CAN SAY, "LET'S TRY THIS,

"IT WILL HELP. TRY THIS,
IT WILL HELP." NO, IT'S NOT.

AND ARE YOU TELLING ME
THAT'S THE BEST AMERICA CAN DO?

NO.

DON'T TELL ME THAT,
DON'T TELL THE MARINES

WHO FOUGHT FOR A
MONTH IN NAJAF THAT,

DON'T TELL ME THE MARINES WHO--

WHO ARE STILL FIGHTING
EVERY DAY IN FALLUJAH

THAT THAT'S THE
BEST AMERICA CAN DO.

THAT MAKES ME ANGRY.