Original subtitles

General of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Serhiy Nayev gave an interview, I highlighted the

main theses:

The Russian leadership does not abandon attempts to establish control over the entire territory

of Ukraine.

But so far the enemy has no forces for offensive actions in other operational directions except

Donetsk and Luhansk.

Combat experience has shown the extreme effectiveness of mine-blast obstacles combined with gunfire.

Given this, mine laying was significantly intensified, including in the depth of defense.

More than 4,000 Russian citizens, most of whom are mobilized, undergo a three-month

training course in Belarus under the guidance of local instructors, making up the Russian

ground force.

They are then sent to the territory of Ukraine to participate in combat operations.

The intensity of the use of munitions by the Russians significantly exceeds the rate of

their production.

The enemy is removing remnants from Belarus at an accelerated pace and looking for other

suppliers.

It is known that the processes of repair and maintenance of artillery ammunition to be

disposed of have begun.

In the south of Ukraine, in the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions, the enemy is fortifying

the defensive lines and increasing the grouping at the expense of the mobilized forces.

In the future, the aggressor wants to seize new territories to create buffer zones to

ensure security for the occupied territories already "incorporated into the Russian Federation.

And now my observations about the occupier's southern grouping, which has critically lost

the efficiency of supplying and managing forward units.

In fact, since the beginning of 2023, there has been a decrease in the level of manning

of Russian troops' units with personnel and equipment in the left-bank Kherson and Zaporizhzhia

regions.

At that time, a number of enemy units had personnel staffing levels averaging 70% of

their authorized strength, while the equipment staffing levels could be as low as 50% or

even 30% of authorized strength depending on the type.

This was due to the concentration of major logistics support flows on Bakhmut.

As fighting intensified in the areas of Bakhmut, Vuhledar, Marinka, and Avdiivka, as well as

the increased availability of troops and equipment in Luhansk Region for the offensive against

Lyman and Kupyansk, supply to the South deteriorated significantly and now does not meet the minimum

requirements for an effective grouping.

For example, beginning in mid-February, the occupation forces in Zaporizhzhia region have

concentrated up to 11 Battalion tactical groups.

Likewise, the reserve was systematically formed, up to 6-7 groups.

All this suggested that the enemy intended to advance in the direction of Orikhiv and

Hulyaipole ...

But there was a nuance.

All this seemingly threatening mass had big supply problems.

Not only were the advance units not compensated for their daily losses in equipment, but even

trivial ammunition.

Most of the units were armed primarily with small arms.

The problem with the provision of heavy weapons and a proportionate amount of ammunition was

not just acute but critical.

It has been going on for months, worsening every day.

But the Russian command is unable to solve it due to a lack of resources and the ability

to set up a support system.

One can only imagine what will happen to the supply of forward units and the entire South

in general, if the situation there intensifies several times, and the need for logistic support

increases three or four times or more.

Meanwhile, the Ukrainian side is already probing for weaknesses in the Russian defense, as

evidenced by the recent videos of strikes on the territory of temporarily occupied Crimea.

Everything is just beginning.