Original subtitles

In January, I noted that with the resources available for an offensive,

the Russian side would not be able to fully attack and would only imitate the process.

This is now reflected in much of the war zone, but the enemy in the Luhansk direction stands

out in particular. Russian forces have managed to lose the initiative without a serious offensive.

In the Luhansk direction the enemy forces concentrated a serious strike fist,

which was simply impossible not to use. But they missed their chance and lost all initiative.

This resulted from the fact that having accumulated resources, but not initiating active

offensive actions, the Russian occupants regularly suffer losses under fire pressure from the AFU.

In particular, units of the 27th Separate Guards Motor Rifle Brigade

have lost combat effectiveness without even taking a full-scale offensive.

Units of the 26th Tank Regiment suffered serious losses, and the infantry component

was forced to demonstrate a gesture of goodwill at a number of positions.

They simply ran away, as it was impossible to hold their positions without fire support.

At this point in the Luhansk bridgehead, the occupants have :

- A critical lack of equipment, especially an acute shortage of tanks exceeding 60%;

-lack of Armoured fighting vehicle, on average 40% incomplete;

-Lack of proportional distribution of ammunition for artillery;

The Russian troops, even having some foreseeable resource,

are not capable of more than local assaults at the moment.

Similarly, the enemy's push toward Dvorichna, along the R-79 road, in eastern Ukraine,

has stalled. Stuck on the left bank of the Oskol, the 138th Separate Guards Motor Rifle

Brigade with BARS units, which began to be actively thrown into the meat grinder

in living waves, very quickly lost its potential and is now choking on losses.

I talked about the BARS units in one of the past videos, in short - they are a

substitute for the Wagner group, only under the Russian command, not under Prigozhin.

In fact, the entire line, Kreminna-Svatove-Troitske is

weakened by the months-long shelling of this area by AFU forces and the lack of

opportunity for Russian troops to take the initiative and intensify combat operations.

A month ago, I had assumed that the occupants' offensive in Luhansk Region had stalled before it

had even begun, even given the considerable resource on the Svatove-Kreminna line,

which had not exhausted itself. And as of mid-March, this has only been confirmed.

The other day there was news that Europe would hand over 1 million artillery shells in one year.

Is 1 million a year a lot or a little?

1 million shells per year is 83 thousand per month or 2,750 rounds per day.

Now the Ukrainian Armed Forces fire an average of 5,000 rounds per day of mixed ammunition.

As a result, Ukraine for the year ahead will be provided with supplies only from European partners

with western caliber, for example, 155 mm which exceed 50% of the daily supply of ammunition.

In turn, similar supplies are made not only by the EU, but also by the United States.

Thus, in the long term Ukraine will be able to receive more Western standard rounds than it

currently receives, which will allow it to exceed the daily firing capacity of 5,000 rounds per day.

In other words, we are talking about a systematic increase of the AFU's firepower,

while the enemy's firepower is clearly degraded.

And yes, even with the return of all its territories, the war will not end and it

is important not to forget. And someone to prepare a suitcase for The Hague, if he lives, of course.