All language subtitles for 21-03-23ggggggssd

In January, I noted that with the
resources available for an offensive,

the Russian side would not be able to fully
attack and would only imitate the process.

This is now reflected in much of the war zone,
but the enemy in the Luhansk direction stands

out in particular. Russian forces have managed to
lose the initiative without a serious offensive.

In the Luhansk direction the enemy forces
concentrated a serious strike fist,

which was simply impossible not to use. But they
missed their chance and lost all initiative.

This resulted from the fact that having
accumulated resources, but not initiating active

offensive actions, the Russian occupants regularly
suffer losses under fire pressure from the AFU.

In particular, units of the 27th
Separate Guards Motor Rifle Brigade

have lost combat effectiveness without
even taking a full-scale offensive.

Units of the 26th Tank Regiment suffered
serious losses, and the infantry component

was forced to demonstrate a gesture
of goodwill at a number of positions.

They simply ran away, as it was impossible
to hold their positions without fire support.

At this point in the Luhansk
bridgehead, the occupants have :

- A critical lack of equipment, especially
an acute shortage of tanks exceeding 60%;

-lack of Armoured fighting
vehicle, on average 40% incomplete;

-Lack of proportional distribution
of ammunition for artillery;

The Russian troops, even having
some foreseeable resource,

are not capable of more than
local assaults at the moment.

Similarly, the enemy's push toward Dvorichna,
along the R-79 road, in eastern Ukraine,

has stalled. Stuck on the left bank of the
Oskol, the 138th Separate Guards Motor Rifle

Brigade with BARS units, which began to
be actively thrown into the meat grinder

in living waves, very quickly lost its
potential and is now choking on losses.

I talked about the BARS units in one of
the past videos, in short - they are a

substitute for the Wagner group, only under
the Russian command, not under Prigozhin.

In fact, the entire line,
Kreminna-Svatove-Troitske is

weakened by the months-long shelling of
this area by AFU forces and the lack of

opportunity for Russian troops to take the
initiative and intensify combat operations.

A month ago, I had assumed that the occupants'
offensive in Luhansk Region had stalled before it

had even begun, even given the considerable
resource on the Svatove-Kreminna line,

which had not exhausted itself. And as of
mid-March, this has only been confirmed.

The other day there was news that Europe would
hand over 1 million artillery shells in one year.

Is 1 million a year a lot or a little?

1 million shells per year is 83 thousand
per month or 2,750 rounds per day.

Now the Ukrainian Armed Forces fire an average
of 5,000 rounds per day of mixed ammunition.

As a result, Ukraine for the year ahead will be
provided with supplies only from European partners

with western caliber, for example, 155 mm which
exceed 50% of the daily supply of ammunition.

In turn, similar supplies are made not only
by the EU, but also by the United States.

Thus, in the long term Ukraine will be able to
receive more Western standard rounds than it

currently receives, which will allow it to exceed
the daily firing capacity of 5,000 rounds per day.

In other words, we are talking about a
systematic increase of the AFU's firepower,

while the enemy's firepower is clearly degraded.

And yes, even with the return of all its
territories, the war will not end and it

is important not to forget. And someone to prepare
a suitcase for The Hague, if he lives, of course.