Original subtitles

If losses in the ranks of the occupation troops remain stable,

the Russian command will not be able to create a new combat group and will be

forced to intensify mobilization activities in the near future.

To make up for current losses, the command is forced to conscript tens of thousands of

recruits every month. This includes not only the replacement of liquidated, wounded or captured

soldiers, but also the rotational needs associated with the regular shifts of soldiers at the front.

Thus, the monthly compensation for losses is

50,000 or more, and there is no prospect of this number decreasing, only increasing.

In the near future, the enemy command will be

forced to increase mobilization from 50,000 to 100,000 per month.

Mobilization of 100,000 a month will allow not only to close the monthly compensation,

but also to deploy the formation of new units to create a strike force of 200,000,

if the Russian generals have an offensive in mind.

But there is a nuance to this system of accumulation and formation.

Thanks to this process, the group of 200 thousand will be able to collect in 4 months. The training

process will take up to six months, taking into account the recruitment of the last 4th group.

Usually they take two to three months for one group.

But if they stop mobilizing after 4 months, who will compensate them?

A vicious circle appears. If the mobilization process is stopped,

the groups intended to form a strike group will have to go not to a new

large-scale offensive, but to compensate for losses.

But there is another, very important, detail.

Let's assume that the Russian command succeeded in gathering 200,000 heads. What next? And then

not only training, but also manning more than 300 Battalion tactical groups. And that's 3,300 tanks,

9,900 Armoured fighting vehicles, 3,600 barrel artillery, 3,600 MLRS, and so on.

Do you think Russia has all this?

They do not have it all in stock, they were not preparing for such a protracted war,

so all the equipment has remained in storage. But even if they take it all out of storage,

it would be impossible to man that much equipment out of storage in six months.

And not only equipment, but also ammunition in the required quantity.

For example, to provide 3,300 tanks with a resource of 600 rounds.

This is the depletion of just one barrel, after that it needs to be changed.

That is, almost 2 million rounds. The 3,600 artillery pieces must

have a minimum proportion of 3 million rounds. Minimum! And so on.

And is it possible for the Russian forces,

to provide this grouping with all of the above ammunition?

Thus, even so exaggerated, what is called "at the top", it is possible to say that

now there is no possibility for Russia to create a full-fledged shock grouping of 200

thousand people. And even more than that. Its current grouping has lost its offensive potential.

In the current state the Russian troops are only able to carry out local offensive operations,

and not infrequently limited to a narrow offensive front.

And importantly, even these capabilities are gradually but surely decreasing.

And while some have lost their potential,

the other side has built it up and will very soon go on a counteroffensive.

According to all the forecasts, the enemy will collect these 200 thousand not for the offensive,

but only for protection and plugging the holes. Cannon fodder, prepare for the worst!