All language subtitles for 10-03-2023mnmdcdfccc

In September 2022, partial mobilization was
deployed in Russia, as a result of which hundreds

of thousands of absolutely incapable people
were drafted into the army of the occupiers,

for the preparation of which sometimes
even 2 weeks were not allocated.

The command of the Russian troops aimed to
solve the problem of personnel shortages

due to significant losses and to plug the
main holes on the front as soon as possible,

achieving tactical success. But in
reality it did not work out as planned.

The result of the partial mobilization was
the appearance in the ranks of the invaders

of a large number of unprofessional
and low-quality resources, which by

themselves did not solve the problems
at the front, but only made them worse,

being a catalyst of degradation processes
in the army. These are the participants in

the past meat waves that we have seen before.
And also the rare lucky ones who have not yet

participated in these insane attacks, but
they still have everything ahead of them.

Currently, the Russian army is facing critical
issues with organizing battles at the battalion,

company, and platoon levels. This
is because 80% of their commanders

lack even theoretical knowledge, let alone
practical experience, in organizing attacks.

When organizing offensive or assault
actions, there is no practical training,

nor do they take into account basic things such
as the front and depth of the combat mission,

the duration of the offensive, and the moral
and psychological state of the personnel.

All of this is due to the lack of professional
officers in the units of the Russian troops,

from the lower to the middle ranks.

As a result, in most cases, command is not
exercised during combat or is of poor quality.

As a direct result, many enemy units often
operate in a very template-oriented manner,

using repetitive tactical moves, without any unit
maneuvers. Not having a clear sequence of actions

of the elements of the combat order, their
changes in the performance of the combat task.

In fact, most enemy offensives lack
interaction between advancing units

and between fire support units, which
also lack even basic organization.

In particular, fire support units do not always,
and often very rarely, interact with military

and special reconnaissance, engineering units,
electronic warfare units, drone units, and so on.

This leads to a reduction in
the effectiveness of gunfire.

Similarly, the lack of professional personnel in
the ranks of artillery units leads to an increase

in the number of rounds used, which does not
comply with established norms, firing rules and

fire control. In a situation of ammunition
shortage, this is a critical phenomenon.

Similarly, the low level of experience leads to
the use by artillery units of weapons that are

not suited to inflicting significant damage
on the target. This in turn also leads to a

senseless waste of ammunition, as well as to
the detection of a position and even its loss.

In fact, the Russian Army is now saturated with
such a non-professional component that in the next

few years it will not be possible to restore in
any way the officer and quality resource in the

troops, at least possessing basic knowledge.
Given the trends, the situation will worsen.