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Zulu
In September 2022, partial mobilization was deployed in Russia, as a result of which hundreds
of thousands of absolutely incapable people were drafted into the army of the occupiers,
for the preparation of which sometimes even 2 weeks were not allocated.
The command of the Russian troops aimed to solve the problem of personnel shortages
due to significant losses and to plug the main holes on the front as soon as possible,
achieving tactical success. But in reality it did not work out as planned.
The result of the partial mobilization was the appearance in the ranks of the invaders
of a large number of unprofessional and low-quality resources, which by
themselves did not solve the problems at the front, but only made them worse,
being a catalyst of degradation processes in the army. These are the participants in
the past meat waves that we have seen before. And also the rare lucky ones who have not yet
participated in these insane attacks, but they still have everything ahead of them.
Currently, the Russian army is facing critical issues with organizing battles at the battalion,
company, and platoon levels. This is because 80% of their commanders
lack even theoretical knowledge, let alone practical experience, in organizing attacks.
When organizing offensive or assault actions, there is no practical training,
nor do they take into account basic things such as the front and depth of the combat mission,
the duration of the offensive, and the moral and psychological state of the personnel.
All of this is due to the lack of professional officers in the units of the Russian troops,
from the lower to the middle ranks.
As a result, in most cases, command is not exercised during combat or is of poor quality.
As a direct result, many enemy units often operate in a very template-oriented manner,
using repetitive tactical moves, without any unit maneuvers. Not having a clear sequence of actions
of the elements of the combat order, their changes in the performance of the combat task.
In fact, most enemy offensives lack interaction between advancing units
and between fire support units, which also lack even basic organization.
In particular, fire support units do not always, and often very rarely, interact with military
and special reconnaissance, engineering units, electronic warfare units, drone units, and so on.
This leads to a reduction in the effectiveness of gunfire.
Similarly, the lack of professional personnel in the ranks of artillery units leads to an increase
in the number of rounds used, which does not comply with established norms, firing rules and
fire control. In a situation of ammunition shortage, this is a critical phenomenon.
Similarly, the low level of experience leads to the use by artillery units of weapons that are
not suited to inflicting significant damage on the target. This in turn also leads to a
senseless waste of ammunition, as well as to the detection of a position and even its loss.
In fact, the Russian Army is now saturated with such a non-professional component that in the next
few years it will not be possible to restore in any way the officer and quality resource in the
troops, at least possessing basic knowledge. Given the trends, the situation will worsen.
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