Original subtitles

Ukrainian Defense Minister Alexei Reznikov's request for European partners to supply Ukraine

with 250,000 shells a month has led to a number of interesting conclusions.

Although with a couple of unknowns that add to the intrigue.

First of all, I would like to note that the Ukrainian Armed Forces fire an average of

5,000 artillery rounds per day with an error of up to 15 percent.

This is comprehensive, with both NATO and post-Soviet calibers.

In turn, the Russian occupiers are currently firing up to 15,000 rounds per day and this

figure is decreasing. For example in November-December 2022 they were firing

20,000 shots per day. From February to April 2022, the figure was in excess of 70-80

thousand rounds per day. What’s called, feel the difference. Hereafter I will refer to

it simply as "shots", but remember that this is the amount that is fired per day.

And now let's go back to the 250,000 requested by the Ukrainian side. How much is that not

per month, but per day? On average, 8,000. That is 60% more than the current rate. If Reznikov

requested such a number of shells from European partners, they are predominantly NATO calibers.

Let's assume that the AFU is able to fire 8,000 rounds only with NATO calibers and, at the same

time, up to 3,000 rounds with post-Soviet shells. In total, we get 11 thousand rounds per day.

Some may say that it will still be less than the Russian troops,

who make an average of 15,000 shots.

Yes, that's true, but there's a nuance.

Firstly, 11 thousand rounds are mainly high-precision and long-range rounds,

according to the characteristics of which Russian artillery as to Beijing from the Kremlin crawls.

Secondly, the AFU fired an average of 5,000 rounds a day during 2022. Yes, there were peak

moments when up to 8 thousand shots and even more were fired. But I'm talking about the average!

And at this average, the Ukrainian army not only held the defense, but also counterattacked.

Third, while international partners are increasing shell production,

opening new lines and increasing daily output, Russia has no such opportunity.

In one year of war with Ukraine, it has not been able to increase shell production by even 10%!

This is all due to the total degradation of the Russian military-industrial complex,

its technical and technological component, about which I periodically speak.

Let me remind you that the Soviet Union, which at that time was much more powerful than today's

Russia, could not provide its citizens with toilet paper. I am not saying there was none,

but most of the country was cutting up newspapers and using them for indirect purposes.

What are the chances of surviving when the shells run out and you have no idea

what you’re fighting for? By May, Russian artillery will not be able to carry even

10,000 rounds per day. By July they will reach a consumption of exclusively domestically produced

shells - 4-5 thousand rounds. If Russia does not find a 3rd party shell supplier, a "shell

stroke" will overtake it as soon as summer. Thus, the predator itself will turn into prey.