Original subtitles

Does the Russian Armed Forces have the ability to attack the Chernihiv,

Sumy, and Kharkiv regions from their territory?

The question has become quite relevant in recent days in the context of discussions

of the offensive capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces and,

in general, the threat of opening a second front.

Well, everything is quite simple.

As of today, up to 25 battalion tactical groups (hereinafter simply groups) with

a total strength of about 17,000 people are concentrated along the border with

Ukraine in the Kursk, Bryansk, and Belgorod regions of Russia.

These groups are stretched along the border and do not

represent a concentration in one location-sector.

The total equipment of these groups by combat vehicles is as follows:

Tanks - about 100 instead of the standard 275;

Armored vehicles - just over 360 instead of the standard 825;

Barrel artillery - 200 instead of the standard 300;

Multiple rocket launchers - 30 instead of the standard 300 !!!

As we can see, the standard equipment of these groups sometimes does not reach 50% or more!

I want to draw special attention to this point because this quantitative discrepancy vividly

demonstrates the level of equipment shortage in the units of the Russian Armed Forces and

the inability of the occupiers' command to quickly and effectively solve this problem.

The next point is the length of the front. The Sumy, Chernihiv, and Kharkiv regions are more

than 700 km of the common border with Russia, and the 25 groups physically cannot cover this front.

Given the current quality of Russian units, their professional composition and equipment,

their functionality corresponds to 3 groups per 1 km of the front.

In other words, 25 groups can cover a maximum of 8 km of the front,

which corresponds to a narrow-focused offensive,

for example, along the E-105 highway to Kharkiv or N-07 to Sumy. But for this, all this defective

and under-equipped mass must be concentrated in one location, exposing the entire border.

That is, all the forces that are now concentrated along the border are,

firstly, deterrent-defensive, secondly, limiting the actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces,

and thirdly, an element of provocations and sabotage,

in particular, for terrorist artillery shelling of Ukrainian territory.

That is precisely why everything is quite simple.

Offensives from the Kursk, Bryansk, and Belgorod regions towards Chernihiv, Sumy,

and Kharkiv should not be expected. Infiltration of sabotage-reconnaissance groups - yes.

Suicidal attempts to seize border villages - yes. But not more than that.

Currently, there's a lot of discussion about the news from the "far north of

Westeros" about a resident of the Omsk region who tragically passed away while

participating in a blini-eating competition. It's important to note that she was experiencing

difficulty breathing and had turned blue, yet continued to eat despite the obvious danger.

This is like describing briefly the course of a so-called "special military operation".

Life and its unexpected turns are truly the best storyteller.