Original subtitles

I will start with intelligence from British intelligence and the AFU General Staff.

British intelligence: Vuhledar is under heavy artillery fire.

It is likely that the occupiers will make another assault attempt. Russian General Muradov,

who is responsible for this area, is under great political pressure and will certainly do so,

despite the fact that he clearly lacks the strength to make a significant breakthrough.

AFU General Staff: due to the huge losses at Vuhledar, the so-called "Cossack volunteer

detachment", which plugged the holes of the 155th Marine Brigade after its defeat,

refuses to participate further in the offensive.

The Russian Armed Forces have been developing an offensive in the areas of Bakhmut, Avdiivka,

Marinka, Vuhledar, Kreminna and Kupyansk for about a month now.

This is the "major offensive" of which they have been talking so much, calling it a "big offensive.

The idea of the enemy General Staff was to develop the offensive in many directions, creating the

most difficult situation in the Bakhmut direction and solving the problem of disposing of the Wagner

group at the same time. To force the Ukrainian General Staff to throw reserves into the Bakhmut

direction, and in the meantime to strike the main blow in the Vuhledar direction.

Vuhledar, unlike Bakhmut or other directions, is a key point and its

capture is of paramount importance for the further occupation of the Donetsk region.

To create a sense of a large offensive in the directions of Kupyansk and Kreminna the

forces of special operations were involved. They were not supposed to break through the

front or occupy new territories, but to ensure the intensity of combat operations,

thereby creating an alarming situation for the Ukrainian General Staff from these directions.

Many Russian actions in the aforementioned directions were not so much a full-fledged

offensive as an imitation offensive with the sole purpose of confusing the Ukrainian command.

The offensive at Vuhledar, which was the main effort, followed strictly the

Soviet military doctrine. First the mechanized infantry tried to break through the defenses,

and when they thought they had succeeded, a tank battalion was introduced.

The plan was to finally break through the defenses and bypass the city by encircling it.

We have all seen the result. In the end, all these attempts were a failure; the tanks were burned,

and the infantry was eventually knocked out and pushed back from the city.

The tank offensive was supported by the Russian special forces,

which was also beaten, losing not only part of its personnel, but also its senior commanders.

That defeat effectively nullified the entire Russian offensive,

which had been in preparation for months.

There is an important remark here: despite the failure of the operation, the Russian General

Staff of the Armed Forces did not dare to activate its reserve of tens of thousands of mobilized men.

This is true in terms of the art of war - you only use the reserves to develop success in

case of a successful offensive, or to use them during active defense to plug holes.

The Russian General Staff is now waiting for a retaliatory Ukrainian counterattack

and will use this reserve precisely to contain the Ukrainian assault and mechanized brigades.