All language subtitles for 17-02-2023hvbgsd

Let's estimate the losses of the
occupiers ? Russian troop losses

are showing a steady increase
with a strong pre-requisite for

a new record in February. In addition to
the forecast, there is another point...

As the number of losses of the occupants
increases, the number of destroyed armored

fighting vehicles continues to decrease. According
to Foreign Policy at the moment the Russian side

has slightly more than 10 thousand armored
vehicles left. Although it is not known how

many of them are actually combat-ready. Also
Foreign Policy says that 3,950 vehicles are

ready. Mathematically this number of armored
vehicles may be possible, but it is worth

paying attention to one nuance: for a long time
now the occupiers have been trying to attack

without much armor support, which noticeably
reduces their potential. If armored vehicles

were actually available in such quantity, they
would not be gathering dust in the warehouses.

I have repeatedly drawn a parallel
between the provision of medium and

light armor to units and offensive losses.

For example, if in March 2022 the
enemy lost just over 3,900 men,

and almost 900 armored fighting vehicles,
in January 2023 losses exceeded 2,700,

and the losses of the armored fighting
vehicles were less than 300 units.

That is, the ratio of destroyed vehicles to
losses of personnel has decreased by 16 times.

And this is not because the Russian troops have
become better at fighting, if you think so.

Now we can observe not only an increase
in losses among the occupying forces,

but also a decrease in losses
of armored fighting vehicles,

the shortage of which remains an acute
unsolvable problem for the Russian command.

Personnel losses are on the rise and Putin's
generals are once again forced to change their

war tactics. The Russian General Staff's plan to
replace heavy equipment with soldiers' carcasses

does not work. Tactics of the Second
World War, which was used by the USSR,

is not designed for technological resistance of
the modern army. Here you can see for yourself:

Occupant casualties rose in February, and at the
current rate are expected to be 24,000-25,000.

If you count the wounded, you get 65,000
casualties in January and 75,000 in February.

If we consider that the Russian occupation
group makes up 350,000 people, then only

in two months it will lose 190,000 soldiers
through irrecoverable and sanitary losses.

Of course, some of the crippled will
be replaced by the medically treated.

But most importantly, the Putin General Staff
should understand that the non-recoverable losses

of the occupation troops are too great, so it is
impossible to compensate for the lack of heavy

equipment by manpower in the future. Of course,
we should not throw various Private military

companies and another wave of mobilization off
the scales. But given the clumsiness of the

entire Russian military vertical, these efforts
will not fundamentally affect the overall trend.

The only way out for the enemy is to seek
another strategy. What are the options?

They will try to squeeze something out of the air
by launching the rest of their rockets, S-300s,

drones, and even retrieving grandfather's balloons
from the depots. As a matter of fact, this has

already been going on for the last 2-3 days.
Nor should general mobilization be ruled out.

The Kremlin's obvious bet is on a kind of
militaristic masochism: stalling for time,

expecting a successful counteroffensive by
the AFU and the defeat of the Russian army.