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The enemy offensive is inevitable and Liman is one of the probable directions for Russian
troops to attack, which everyone has been discussing for a week.
In my deep conviction, an offensive in the direction of Liman is a very foolish undertaking
for the Russian troops with an extremely dubious outlook.
But judging by the way the occupants are saturating this location with forces and means, we can
say that they will take this step after all.
If in general speaking about constantly pulsating information about some epic offensive of Russia,
this pulsation is partly true - the offensive will be.
But for some reason he is being credited with the scale that the occupying forces will not
be able to muster.
And besides that, they will also trap themselves.
For example, the Luhansk Region, the Svatovo-Kreminna sector.
Preparing for a conventional offensive, the Russian occupation troops drove additional
paratrooper units there, thus bringing the total grouping to nearly 9,000.
This is quite a serious concentration of forces and equipment, but there is a nuance.
The nuance lies in the fact that the direction from which all this biomass can launch an
offensive is, so to speak, extremely uncomfortable due to a number of terrain, landscape and
logistical factors.
Yes, using the factor of quantitative superiority and ignoring losses, they can achieve temporary
goals.
But, first, this phenomenon will have a temporary effect, until the exhaustion of the limited
resource for such an offensive.
And second, by achieving a temporary objective, in this direction, Russian troops lose a resource
that could have been used in other locations.
For example, near Vuhledar, where the marines of the Pacific Fleet were sent to be canned,
while units of the 12th Special Forces Brigade of Military Intelligence were ground into
mincemeat.
Or near Avdiivka, where another gang unit lost its combat effectiveness due to the prohibitive
level of losses.
Or, returning to 0the subject of Bakhmut, to redeploy and concentrate these forces to
reinforce the assault on the city, under which the occupants continue to lose their forces.
And this is happening regardless of who is storming it, the convicts or the brave paratroopers.
The results of all this disposable biomass are practically the same.
Russian troops are limited in their ability to freely distribute human and technical resources.
They cannot send units where they are needed and vice versa without appreciable damage
to combat capability.
Limited resources mean limited capabilities.
So the question arises when you are critically limited in resources, but preparing an offensive
in several directions, some of which are obviously a failure, how can this whole adventure for
you end up in general, even where you can expect situational success?
Back to the theme of the last video.
Yes, the information campaign about the "colossal" losses of the AFU continues.
But when I first talked about it, I understood that it would be organized on a large scale
(different countries, speakers, and platforms), but I did not think that it would be so mediocre
- cheap stuffing sources and worthless information platforms, as well as complete intra-Russian
incoherence.
In general, this psychological attack showed that Russia as of 2023 has already exhausted
resources for such campaigns of 2014 and even 2021.
Russian propaganda can only rely on cheap, long-discredited characters, or on platforms
whose affiliation with Russia is more obvious.
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