Original subtitles

The general picture in the combat zone to date is as follows.

Southern bridgehead:

Left bank Kherson region in the state of formation of an operating zone with a depth of 10-20 km.

In fact, all conditions for its formation have been created,

there is a process of fixing and strengthening of capabilities for fire pressure/control.

This operating area looks very interesting, especially if we take into account such a place

as the Kinburn Spit, which is a dagger under the rib for the Russian grouping

on the left bank - kind of alive so far, but breathing is becoming increasingly difficult.

The command of the Russian troops is well aware of this, but cannot do anything about it.

Zaporizhzhya location in the state of forming conditions for a counterattack.

At the moment the conditions are not formed,

but the possibility of shooting through to the Azov coast accelerates this process.

Russian troops have concentrated up to 15 Battalion tactical groups

in the area in the front line and about 6 Battalion tactical groups in the reserve.

It is noteworthy that these 6 Battalion tactical group are focused on the crossroads between

the left bank of Kherson and the Zaporozhye location, that is, with a one-time activation

of certain actions, can be used extremely ineffectively. Obviously, it will be.

East, the Donbass bridgehead :

Donetsk location without significant changes continues to play blocking and

drawing resources of Russian troops. In the near and medium term, a change in this role

in this area should not be expected. And as soulless as it may sound, it has to.

In fact, it is on what Ukrainian soldiers do in the Donetsk location will hold all that will be

done on the other bridgeheads. And it is not only about tying the enemy resource, but also

about solving a number of other, very important tasks, which is not the time to talk about...

The Luhansk direction is a location formed for a counteroffensive, which has both fire

control of the main logistical arteries, hypertrophied and expanded gray zone,

and exhausted resource of the 20th Guards Combined Arms Army units.

Against this general background, the critical lack of artillery in the Russian forces in

three locations looks very striking, with the exception of Donetsk, where there is

not a surplus, but enough to occasionally simulate a rampart of fire near Bakhmut.

Otherwise, in almost all locations there is a certain decrease in the efficiency of the

management system and support system. Logistics and the ability to compensate for losses in a

timely manner, even as a poor resource in the form of useless recruits, are deteriorating.

Thus, 3 out of 4 locations are either in a very promising position,

or are going through a ripening process, for further immersion in this position.

What could be the deciding factor for the starting signal, who knows? Only the AFU General Staff.