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Why are the attacks on Russian airfields an important and key event?
First, it is a potential weakening of their frontline.
Russia is big. It cannot in principle cover all of its territory with its air defenses.
Close all their bases with anti-aircraft systems too. They are already catastrophically short of
air defense equipment. They are taking their S-300 missile systems and bringing them from
Syria precisely because of the shortage. Now the Russian command faces the dilemma of removing some
air defense forces from the front and moving them under important strategic facilities,
thereby weakening the front even more, or leave their bases unprotected.
Secondly, it is Ukrainian potential. Kiev has shown that it strictly follows word and deed,
and has the ability to create conditions and means to influence the enemy at large distances,
including military installations in Moscow and Saint Petersburg.
Third is the change in the rules of the game. Whereas before Ukraine was a passive victim,
now it is gradually but surely taking over the initiative at all levels, up to and including the
strategic level. Eventually, the war will have to move to a state where Russia fights off Ukraine,
rather than where Ukraine fights off Russia. After that, it will already be possible for
Kiev to fully demand the end of hostilities at the negotiating table on its own terms.
This is a return to the 1991 borders, reparations, and disarmament of Russia.
Fourth, it is a demonstration of Russia's extreme vulnerability. The attacks took place not just
anywhere, but at military airfields, where strategic aviation capable of carrying nuclear
weapons is located. That is, one component of the Kremlin's nuclear triad. The shield was rotten
and was punctured by several accurate blows. This is a signal to NATO and the West in general that
there is no point in being afraid of the nuclear bear. It is vulnerable and cannot do anything
substantial in response. By the way, there is already such an understanding, for example, Austin
Lloyd said that the U.S. does not limit Ukraine in any way in the creation of long-range weapons.
Fifth, there is the cost. Russia's strategic bombers are piecemeal machines and insanely
expensive. Restoring and repairing them is time consuming and expensive.
The Kremlin does not spare hundreds of thousands of its subjects,
but the expensive military vehicles are an exhaustible and difficult resource to restore.
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