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The situation in the southern bridgehead continues to deteriorate for the Russian occupation troops.
First, they are unable to fully manage forward units due to serious risks to
headquarters and command posts in the near-fire zone. This forces the Russian
troops to place these facilities, to put it mildly, outside the main operational zone,
which has its own negative impact on the effectiveness of command and control.
Second, logistics continue to be wanting, and the supply system, despite the 24/7 reverse loading of
the Crimean Bridge railway artery, does not fully support this group of troops. To date, they can
compensate for average statistical losses, but cannot restore units to a fighting condition.
Thirdly, as Ukraineโs armed forces are being strengthened on the right bank,
they are expanding their capacity to exert fire pressure on the left bank.
In other words, the high-risk zone, let's call it that, for Russian troops is expanding every day.
And this, in turn, has an additional impact on the management and support system.
I would like to note that similar conditions on the right bank have
been formed by the armed forces of Ukraine for the occupiers for months.
On the left bank, after the flight of Russian troops from the right bank, they have already
been formed at the initial level and with every day only speeds up their full-scale creation.
Conclusions - corresponding. All processes on the left bank will flow much faster than on the right.
And this is already clearly visible.
At the same time, British Intelligence said that the Swatov direction is
probably the most vulnerable to the Russian armed forces at the moment.
The occupiers continue to build fortifications,
but they may be filled with mostly ill-trained mobilized ones. For successful defensive and
offensive operations, the Russian command lacks both qualified soldiers and equipment.
The Dutch defense analytics and war research website Oryx,
which collects information from open sources, has so far recorded more than 8 thousand captured,
damaged or destroyed military equipment of the occupants. The number of tanks lost by
the Russian Armed Forces, confirmed by visual evidence, exceeded 1,500.
Naturally, this is the lowest bar of losses, and the real figures are higher.
Ukraine's documented losses are still,
as at the beginning of the war, about 3.5 times lower than Russian losses.
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