All language subtitles for 0008-011

I will give some specifics on such a notion
as a "shortage" of artillery ammunition for

the Russian occupiers and why they are doing
poorly in the short run.

A shortage of air-, sea- and land-based missile
weapons began to show itself in Russia at

the turn of April and May.

On the other hand, shortage of ammunition
for artillery, both barrel and reactive, began

to show the first signs in early June.

This is due to the fact that Russia at the
time of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine

had in warehouses and storage according to
various estimates of 15 to 20 million shots.

It was by June that the warehouses with the
short-haul supply, Belgorod, Kursk, Rostov,

and Voronezh regions had exhausted themselves.

Currently, they perform only a transit function.

At this moment the ammunition crisis in Russia
is snowballing and growing at an increasing

rate.

As I said earlier, Russian troops in the offensive
and in the defense always use the "rampart

of fire" tactic, including the use of artillery.

To carry out an effective offensive in Ukraine
the occupiers need the potential of 50 thousand

- 70 thousand shots per day.

To carry out effective defense, this indicator
averages 30 thousand - 40 thousand shots per

day.

Currently, they can provide themselves only
20 thousand shots per day, which is completely

lacking even for defense.

To be more precise, they do not have the capacity
to mount an effective offensive or to defend

fully.

If you do not consider the Kherson direction,
then 20 thousand shots per day - this is still

2 times more than the artillery shots of the
Ukrainian forces.

But, they have a considerable advantage in
range and accuracy.

In turn, the number of shots the enemy will
fall.

Using solely the potential of its production
from scratch, Russia can provide its troops

with a potential of only 3-5 thousand a day.

In 2023, the Russian army will inevitably
face exactly this figure.

And even supplies of ammunition from North
Korea, which are already entering Russian

territory, will not help them in any way.

I shall cite a purely situational example.

Let's imagine an echelon of 10 cars, although
the first and so far the only one arriving

in Russia from North Korea was only 3 cars.

But still.

Such a train can carry an average of 500 tons
of supplies.

Let's take the 152 mm shell for example.

They, depending on the type, may be of different
weight, 43 kg or 46 kg or more.

But, for simplicity of understanding and calculation,
let's take 50 kg.

That is, one such echelon is about 10,000
rounds.

Today Russia is carrying out an average of
20,000 rounds a day.

So, the echelon will be driven more than 10
thousand kilometers to gut its potential in

half a day?

Apparently, the Russian command is in such
a desperate position that it is willing to

ship ammunition from North Korea just to somehow
maintain the firepower capacity of its troops.