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1
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2
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- So we entered this room.
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Around the table were
perhaps a dozen visitors,
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most of them military,
10
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mentioning that I had recently been
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an advisor at the province
level in South Vietnam.
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People stopped and looked at me
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and one said I've always wondered
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what happens at the province level?
15
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16
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The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
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remind me of the issues
we faced back then.
18
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We just didn't know who to
trust among the Vietnamese.
19
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Who were the sympathizers
and who were the enemy?
20
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Who could you believe?
21
00:02:08,639 --> 00:02:12,143
US military saw this as
an organizational problem.
22
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They thought it could be solved
23
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by reorganizing the way the
Vietnamese fought the war.
24
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The US had developed a system
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for coordinating intelligence collection,
26
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but America didn't wanna be
viewed as a colonial ruler
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forcing its policies on Vietnam.
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Our orders were to persuade
our Vietnamese counterparts
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to implement this system
at the province level.
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As if that would overcome
the lack of motivation,
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lack of will, and lack of honesty
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in the Vietnamese military.
33
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We couldn't get them to do anything.
34
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We weren't trained to deal
with the Vietnamese people
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and their traditions.
36
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Our military leaders
didn't seem interested.
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But we had unlimited faith in organization
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and bureaucracy as tools of war.
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That lead to a breakdown of communication
40
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between those of us at the province level
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and those planning the war from higher up.
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43
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How does the typical
American in the early 1960s
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wind up in Vietnam?
45
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I agreed to go into the
Army in May of 1966.
46
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And I was commissioned and
went to Fort Benning, Georgia
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for infantry school training.
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The culmination of the infantry training
49
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was escape and evasion:
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what to do if we were
captured by the enemy.
51
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At a predetermined point,
you were allowed to escape.
52
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Your job was to find your
way back to safe haven,
53
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and to do that you were supposed
to not get captured again.
54
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Well I think I was the only one
55
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who got captured twice on
the way trying to get back.
56
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Next was combat intelligence training.
57
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How to identify the enemy,
how to classify them,
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how to collect intelligence about them,
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and put them into some kind of analysis
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of what was going on.
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62
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In August or so of 1966,
this was still based
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upon the Korean War and so we had maps
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with information about large
units moving here and there,
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and it really had very little relevance
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to what we were going to
find in South Vietnam.
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And my own view on the Vietnam War
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was that the worst I thought
it might've been misguided,
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but I couldn't conclude
that it was immoral.
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That there was some justification
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for assisting a nation that
was resisting a takeover
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even if it were kind of a civil war.
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Midway through the
training, we got our orders.
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The Army had designated for
South Vietnam the Four Corps.
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I Corps ran along the DMZ.
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II Corps was central highlands to the west
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and then the coast on the east.
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00:06:47,350 --> 00:06:50,733
III Corps was the area around Saigon.
81
00:06:52,360 --> 00:06:56,483
And then IV Corps was
the Mekong Delta area.
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00:06:57,845 --> 00:07:01,720
II Corps was where I wound up being sent,
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in the province of Ninh Thuan
and in the town of Phan Rang.
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And there I was assigned to be part
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of Advisory Team Number 39,
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Military Assistance
Command Vietnam, the MACV.
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88
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We were there as advisors
who worked in parallel
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with the Vietnamese officers
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who were in charge of
that province, the ARVN.
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A kind of parallel military structure
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to that of the South Vietnamese military.
93
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So you had a commanding
officer at the corps level
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who advised the commanding
general of the ARVN unit.
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And then on down the line
with various officers,
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including what we would be
97
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which were the staff
intelligence officers, the S2.
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So that you really had no true
civilian leadership anymore,
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it was all based on a military structure.
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One of our tasks in the
intelligence business
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was to observe the
province that we were in.
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105
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The guerrilla warfare primarily consisted
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of Viet Cong units, often
in the mountain areas.
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They would come down from
wherever they were hiding
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and enter hamlets.
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We would get reports
overnight about these episodes
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and then set up ambushes.
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113
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I was part of the 519th
Military Intelligence Battalion.
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The intelligence corps was not part
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of the regular army unit,
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and we were assigned to
these advisory teams.
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We had dual loyalties, one was
through the American stream
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of intelligence collection,
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and the other was working
with the Vietnamese military.
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We would spend part of the
day doing our own analysis,
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writing our own reports
for the US military,
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and then meeting with our
Vietnamese counterparts.
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We were supposed to help the Vietnamese
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understand the information
that they were collecting.
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Here I was, a 23-year-old
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with about six weeks of
intelligence training.
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My counterpart, the senior
Vietnamese intelligence officer,
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had been in the business
for at least 10 years.
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The idea that we could
teach them much
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was a bit presumptuous.
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133
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I used to go into these hamlets
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and I would hear sometimes the children
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sometimes the women saying
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My interpreter told me
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stood for lieutenant.
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meant very big,
139
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maybe very fat, it wasn't too clear
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00:12:03,070 --> 00:12:06,330
what exactly that meant.
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00:12:06,330 --> 00:12:07,610
That was what I was worried about,
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and so I said to him well, I
said, I've gotta do something,
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but I said what's the word for handsome?
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And he said well
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So after that, whenever
I'd hear somebody say
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I'd say,
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which would,
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they thought was hilarious of course.
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00:12:36,680 --> 00:12:39,790
There was a great deal of
friendliness on the part
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of most of the Vietnamese
people for the Americans.
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Even by people who might otherwise
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have been under the threat
of Viet Cong retaliation.
153
00:12:51,088 --> 00:12:53,671
154
00:13:04,730 --> 00:13:08,090
But even with the
Vietnamese military forces,
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there was a dichotomy
between the true believers
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00:13:12,420 --> 00:13:14,810
in the cause for resisting
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what they saw as Communist takeover,
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and others who were willing to deal
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00:13:20,820 --> 00:13:24,396
with the Viet Cong or
with their sympathizers.
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00:13:24,396 --> 00:13:26,979
161
00:13:41,140 --> 00:13:45,720
The Regional Forces and the Popular Forces
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effectively, well they
weren't very effective,
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00:13:48,620 --> 00:13:52,020
but they were a National
Guard kind of unit,
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00:13:52,020 --> 00:13:55,690
very little training, some of
them with no training at all,
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00:13:55,690 --> 00:13:58,743
often with very old, inadequate weapons.
166
00:14:01,690 --> 00:14:03,970
There would be a small group of men,
167
00:14:03,970 --> 00:14:08,970
sometimes elderly men, who
would take turns at night
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00:14:09,270 --> 00:14:12,023
and guard the hamlet from intruders.
169
00:14:12,990 --> 00:14:16,363
Sometimes they were successful,
oftentimes they were not.
170
00:14:19,300 --> 00:14:23,660
A small group of these
Popular Force people,
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they had seen an ARVN, an army
truck, headed towards an area
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that we considered Viet Cong controlled.
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They stopped the truck and
were holding it and the driver.
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And in the truck was a load
of American medical supplies.
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These Popular Force people were offered
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more money than they would
ever see in their lives
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by the driver to just forget
about this and let him go on.
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And they refused and they
held them until we arrived.
180
00:15:09,900 --> 00:15:14,190
Tracing back the origins of this truck
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we found that it had
been under the command
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of the operations officer
in the Vietnamese army
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who was part of the province structure.
184
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The man that it was generally agreed
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was the most effective officer
in their whole organization.
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He was considered to be the kind of person
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we could really work with.
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What all this meant was that he was,
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at the very least, willing to sell
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these medical supplies to the Viet Cong.
191
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Now here were these Popular Forces folks
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who took this great
risk to their own lives
193
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and at the cost of a
very lucrative pay off
194
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in support of the cause,
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and here is this army
officer who is highly admired
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and aggressive, who may
be the one betraying it.
197
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198
00:16:22,950 --> 00:16:23,783
The Central Highlands,
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00:16:23,783 --> 00:16:26,750
the Trường Sơn cordillera,
are a mountainous,
200
00:16:26,750 --> 00:16:30,170
largely jungle-covered
region military strategists
201
00:16:30,170 --> 00:16:32,570
on both sides of this struggle are agreed
202
00:16:32,570 --> 00:16:34,660
that he who gains the highlands
203
00:16:34,660 --> 00:16:37,223
will have won the fight for Vietnam.
204
00:16:38,800 --> 00:16:40,960
Villages of the highlands are inhabited
205
00:16:40,960 --> 00:16:44,190
by many races known to the outside world
206
00:16:44,190 --> 00:16:47,760
by the French term Montagnards,
or mountain people.
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00:16:47,760 --> 00:16:49,140
They are known to themselves
208
00:16:49,140 --> 00:16:51,603
by such tribal names as Rade and M'nong.
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00:16:53,090 --> 00:16:55,940
Are vastly different from
the light-skinned lowlanders
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00:16:55,940 --> 00:16:57,983
whom the world knows as Vietnamese.
211
00:16:59,500 --> 00:17:00,850
Through these mountain villages
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00:17:00,850 --> 00:17:02,510
for more than a decade have passed
213
00:17:02,510 --> 00:17:04,990
increasing numbers of
Communist guerrillas.
214
00:17:04,990 --> 00:17:09,310
The Montagnard on his own
ground is a formidable ally.
215
00:17:09,310 --> 00:17:11,339
A man of great personal courage,
216
00:17:11,339 --> 00:17:12,900
the Montagnard holds the key
217
00:17:12,900 --> 00:17:16,520
to a strategically vital
area of Southeast Asia.
218
00:17:16,520 --> 00:17:19,569
If he can be won to
the government's cause,
219
00:17:19,569 --> 00:17:21,349
the guerrillas' jungle sanctuary
220
00:17:21,349 --> 00:17:24,183
in the Vietnamese
highlands will disappear.
221
00:17:25,064 --> 00:17:27,160
222
00:17:27,160 --> 00:17:30,803
- You know what is corruption
under these circumstances?
223
00:17:32,960 --> 00:17:36,220
Well the district that was in
the northern part of Ninh Chu
224
00:17:36,220 --> 00:17:38,750
was dominated by Montagnards
225
00:17:38,750 --> 00:17:43,380
who had a very difficult time
with most of the Vietnamese,
226
00:17:43,380 --> 00:17:45,573
who treated them as second class citizens.
227
00:17:46,490 --> 00:17:50,440
They had a district chief
there that we were working with
228
00:17:50,440 --> 00:17:52,793
who was ethnically Vietnamese.
229
00:17:54,470 --> 00:17:58,900
When we went up to these
hamlets in that area,
230
00:17:58,900 --> 00:18:02,570
we'd be asking the Popular Force people
231
00:18:02,570 --> 00:18:06,240
how they were getting along,
what they needed, et cetera,
232
00:18:06,240 --> 00:18:08,570
and they kept complaining
that they were hungry,
233
00:18:08,570 --> 00:18:10,493
that they weren't getting enough rice.
234
00:18:11,930 --> 00:18:14,360
Well one of the ways
that they were rewarded
235
00:18:14,360 --> 00:18:16,210
for their service was the rice
236
00:18:16,210 --> 00:18:19,090
which the United States provided.
237
00:18:19,090 --> 00:18:21,510
It would eventually go
to the district chief,
238
00:18:21,510 --> 00:18:23,290
and the district chief would distribute it
239
00:18:23,290 --> 00:18:24,883
to the Popular Forces.
240
00:18:26,620 --> 00:18:29,100
We realized that the district chief
241
00:18:29,100 --> 00:18:31,760
had to be siphoning off rice,
242
00:18:31,760 --> 00:18:34,110
selling it on the black market,
243
00:18:34,110 --> 00:18:38,173
and cutting back on what he
gave to the Popular Forces.
244
00:18:39,890 --> 00:18:44,033
This kind of corruption, we
thought, was truly outrageous.
245
00:18:45,130 --> 00:18:48,830
And so we began what turned
out to be a long campaign
246
00:18:48,830 --> 00:18:49,730
to get rid of him.
247
00:18:51,730 --> 00:18:54,550
One day my colleagues and I noticed
248
00:18:54,550 --> 00:18:57,940
that there were literally
hundreds of Montagnards
249
00:18:57,940 --> 00:19:01,820
walking along the road or coming
down out of the mountains,
250
00:19:01,820 --> 00:19:03,173
some of them crying.
251
00:19:04,920 --> 00:19:08,930
They said he was the best
district chief they'd ever had.
252
00:19:08,930 --> 00:19:10,600
That he was the first one
253
00:19:10,600 --> 00:19:13,513
who had treated the Montagnards fairly,
254
00:19:14,400 --> 00:19:19,340
and that all in all he was
the best guy they'd ever known
255
00:19:19,340 --> 00:19:21,010
among the Vietnamese.
256
00:19:21,010 --> 00:19:23,290
And here we were, the proud Americans,
257
00:19:23,290 --> 00:19:25,110
and we made sure he got out of there.
258
00:19:25,110 --> 00:19:27,520
As I said, I think I said to the colonel,
259
00:19:27,520 --> 00:19:29,470
we should've just paid him directly
260
00:19:29,470 --> 00:19:32,192
in order to keep doing what he was doing.
261
00:19:32,192 --> 00:19:34,859
262
00:19:42,901 --> 00:19:47,901
- Control one, control two.
263
00:19:48,301 --> 00:19:50,384
Control one, control two.
264
00:19:51,219 --> 00:19:53,886
265
00:19:55,150 --> 00:19:59,260
- With Phan Rang Air Base right nearby,
266
00:19:59,260 --> 00:20:03,220
we would often get calls
from the Air Force pilots
267
00:20:03,220 --> 00:20:05,760
coming back to the air base who
268
00:20:05,760 --> 00:20:08,910
for some reason or another had
not dropped their ordinance
269
00:20:08,910 --> 00:20:11,242
on the original targets.
270
00:20:11,242 --> 00:20:13,825
271
00:20:17,450 --> 00:20:21,820
And since you didn't wanna
land with ordinance on board,
272
00:20:21,820 --> 00:20:25,500
they would ask us for any
targets of opportunity
273
00:20:25,500 --> 00:20:28,433
that they could drop their bombs on.
274
00:20:30,301 --> 00:20:32,968
275
00:20:40,040 --> 00:20:43,150
You wound up sometimes not much more
276
00:20:43,150 --> 00:20:45,340
than picking a dot on the map
277
00:20:45,340 --> 00:20:47,993
where there might be some VC somewhere.
278
00:20:49,050 --> 00:20:51,633
279
00:20:59,690 --> 00:21:02,340
There was a darker side to the colonel,
280
00:21:02,340 --> 00:21:05,590
often related to his desires
281
00:21:05,590 --> 00:21:07,993
to become a higher grade officer.
282
00:21:10,360 --> 00:21:13,590
One that I remember vividly involved
283
00:21:13,590 --> 00:21:16,920
a decision that he made about defoliating
284
00:21:16,920 --> 00:21:18,783
part of a mountainside.
285
00:21:21,350 --> 00:21:26,350
Because the technology or the
weapons system was available,
286
00:21:28,380 --> 00:21:30,230
the colonel thought he oughta use it.
287
00:21:38,200 --> 00:21:40,823
Where he decided to use it was in an area
288
00:21:40,823 --> 00:21:43,620
that we had only rarely been able
289
00:21:43,620 --> 00:21:46,253
to even see from our aircraft.
290
00:21:50,330 --> 00:21:52,600
The mountains were covered with clouds
291
00:21:52,600 --> 00:21:56,333
and the aircraft could
not safely get into them.
292
00:22:00,480 --> 00:22:03,220
The Montagnards lived
high in the mountains.
293
00:22:03,220 --> 00:22:07,700
Often they would burn off a
section of the mountainside
294
00:22:07,700 --> 00:22:11,773
and then plant, and then move
on to a different section.
295
00:22:15,220 --> 00:22:17,340
Now we'd had a number of reports,
296
00:22:17,340 --> 00:22:18,770
and it probably was true,
297
00:22:18,770 --> 00:22:21,250
that there was some infiltration
298
00:22:21,250 --> 00:22:24,323
of Viet Cong down through that area.
299
00:22:25,640 --> 00:22:27,800
But it tended to be an area in which
300
00:22:27,800 --> 00:22:29,943
both sides sort of left alone.
301
00:22:32,390 --> 00:22:34,310
Some of us argued that, you know,
302
00:22:34,310 --> 00:22:37,670
we'd never had any hostile
fire at our aircraft
303
00:22:37,670 --> 00:22:40,123
while we were traveling in that area.
304
00:22:42,050 --> 00:22:43,740
But the colonel was insistent
305
00:22:43,740 --> 00:22:48,580
and one day we saw come into the offices
306
00:22:48,580 --> 00:22:53,580
a crew of kind of older Air Force pilots
307
00:22:53,910 --> 00:22:58,110
with fluorescent scarves around their neck
308
00:22:58,110 --> 00:23:01,900
who announced themselves as the people
309
00:23:01,900 --> 00:23:04,567
who effectively delivered Agent Orange.
310
00:23:16,190 --> 00:23:21,000
A few weeks later, our Air Force observers
311
00:23:21,000 --> 00:23:23,833
went up into the area to
see what the result was.
312
00:23:27,940 --> 00:23:31,390
For the first time in our experience there
313
00:23:31,390 --> 00:23:33,140
they heard rifle shots.
314
00:23:33,140 --> 00:23:35,333
Shots at the aircraft.
315
00:23:37,030 --> 00:23:38,950
They reported that to the colonel
316
00:23:38,950 --> 00:23:40,990
at the briefing that night,
317
00:23:40,990 --> 00:23:44,130
and of course the colonel
turned to me and said,
318
00:23:44,130 --> 00:23:46,393
see I told you there were VC up there.
319
00:23:47,660 --> 00:23:50,100
And I think I held my tongue,
320
00:23:50,100 --> 00:23:54,430
but later pointed out that
they didn't shoot at us before
321
00:23:54,430 --> 00:23:56,990
but who wouldn't shoot at an aircraft now
322
00:23:56,990 --> 00:24:00,550
after we dumped all of this shit on them?
323
00:24:00,550 --> 00:24:02,373
And we're killing their plants?
324
00:24:04,191 --> 00:24:06,774
325
00:24:09,620 --> 00:24:12,580
The American advisors lived in a compound
326
00:24:12,580 --> 00:24:16,060
that was located along a main highway
327
00:24:16,060 --> 00:24:20,323
that ran between Phan
Rang and the air base.
328
00:24:21,930 --> 00:24:25,340
And along the highway there was a pipeline
329
00:24:25,340 --> 00:24:26,943
to carry jet fuel.
330
00:24:28,390 --> 00:24:31,840
One Sunday afternoon, we
were relaxing in our rooms
331
00:24:31,840 --> 00:24:36,840
when we heard screaming
and a loud explosion.
332
00:24:39,000 --> 00:24:42,420
We saw the small huts that people lived in
333
00:24:42,420 --> 00:24:44,663
across the way in flames.
334
00:24:46,560 --> 00:24:50,060
And then dozens of people either on fire
335
00:24:50,060 --> 00:24:51,943
or running away from the fire.
336
00:24:53,830 --> 00:24:56,653
The pipeline had developed a leak.
337
00:24:57,670 --> 00:24:59,780
Either that or the native Vietnamese
338
00:24:59,780 --> 00:25:02,360
had been using some of the jet fuel
339
00:25:02,360 --> 00:25:04,633
for their own cooking purposes.
340
00:25:07,500 --> 00:25:11,470
We ran back to the
compound to get blankets
341
00:25:11,470 --> 00:25:14,163
or anything we could to
help put out the flames.
342
00:25:15,690 --> 00:25:17,490
I noticed one of our surgeons
343
00:25:17,490 --> 00:25:20,723
who was standing nearby but not reacting.
344
00:25:22,300 --> 00:25:25,350
I said to him, why aren't you helping?
345
00:25:25,350 --> 00:25:27,720
He showed me his hands and said
346
00:25:27,720 --> 00:25:31,600
these are hands that have
been trained as a surgeon.
347
00:25:31,600 --> 00:25:35,540
I can't afford to risk
them and risk my future
348
00:25:37,270 --> 00:25:39,543
in order to help these people.
349
00:25:43,411 --> 00:25:46,078
350
00:26:46,810 --> 00:26:49,930
The work of intelligence.
351
00:26:49,930 --> 00:26:52,440
There really are two components to it.
352
00:26:52,440 --> 00:26:57,313
One is to record incidents
of contact with the enemy.
353
00:27:02,330 --> 00:27:06,710
We'd get reports of three
VC having entered a hamlet
354
00:27:06,710 --> 00:27:10,710
and conducted an indoctrination lecture,
355
00:27:10,710 --> 00:27:13,170
and so with the help of my interpreter,
356
00:27:13,170 --> 00:27:15,198
we would interview people.
357
00:27:15,198 --> 00:27:17,531
358
00:27:21,830 --> 00:27:24,850
There was a civilian component.
359
00:27:24,850 --> 00:27:28,430
Representatives from the
Central Intelligence Agency
360
00:27:28,430 --> 00:27:32,393
that was the advisor
to the National Police.
361
00:27:36,350 --> 00:27:41,040
There was the information
received through American sources
362
00:27:44,710 --> 00:27:48,120
to pinpoint areas where Viet Cong
363
00:27:48,120 --> 00:27:51,143
or NVA units might be located.
364
00:27:53,096 --> 00:27:56,013
365
00:28:06,090 --> 00:28:08,730
The second part was collecting information
366
00:28:08,730 --> 00:28:10,943
reported by agents.
367
00:28:14,470 --> 00:28:19,093
These created the greatest
problem in terms of evaluation.
368
00:28:20,538 --> 00:28:23,455
369
00:28:26,930 --> 00:28:29,500
Without knowing the agents,
370
00:28:29,500 --> 00:28:33,283
many of them would have to
be classified as F, unknown.
371
00:28:35,210 --> 00:28:39,592
Most often, the information
itself would be unknown.
372
00:28:39,592 --> 00:28:42,509
373
00:28:52,790 --> 00:28:54,470
We'd get a report, for example,
374
00:28:54,470 --> 00:28:57,230
that an NVA battalion had moved
375
00:28:57,230 --> 00:29:00,913
through this mountainous
area on its way south.
376
00:29:03,150 --> 00:29:07,170
Possible, but there was
no other evidence of it.
377
00:29:07,170 --> 00:29:10,420
It was either unlikely or
it was at least unknown.
378
00:29:10,420 --> 00:29:12,203
We didn't know who the agent was.
379
00:29:13,310 --> 00:29:16,520
And part of the reason we
didn't know who the agent was
380
00:29:16,520 --> 00:29:19,760
was because of the Vietnamese system
381
00:29:19,760 --> 00:29:23,503
of not sharing much
information about their agents.
382
00:29:29,470 --> 00:29:31,800
One of the other problems
associated with this was
383
00:29:31,800 --> 00:29:36,800
that the various Vietnamese
intelligence agencies
384
00:29:37,590 --> 00:29:39,470
refused to share information
385
00:29:39,470 --> 00:29:41,283
about their agent with one another.
386
00:29:46,370 --> 00:29:48,470
This really complicated our lives,
387
00:29:48,470 --> 00:29:52,370
because one of the things
that you would like to have
388
00:29:52,370 --> 00:29:55,480
is to get the same or similar information
389
00:29:55,480 --> 00:29:56,830
from two different sources.
390
00:29:57,884 --> 00:30:00,801
391
00:30:02,364 --> 00:30:05,140
So now we've got this NVA battalion moves
392
00:30:05,140 --> 00:30:08,460
through this area reported by one agent,
393
00:30:08,460 --> 00:30:11,633
perhaps coming through
the Vietnamese military.
394
00:30:13,060 --> 00:30:16,000
And we get a report
from the National Police
395
00:30:16,000 --> 00:30:19,310
that their agent had seen an NVA battalion
396
00:30:19,310 --> 00:30:21,833
coming through the area
in a similar fashion.
397
00:30:23,420 --> 00:30:24,720
One would like to conclude
398
00:30:24,720 --> 00:30:26,590
that that was accurate information.
399
00:30:26,590 --> 00:30:29,490
The problem was we were never sure
400
00:30:29,490 --> 00:30:32,700
that it wasn't the same agent
selling the same information
401
00:30:32,700 --> 00:30:34,503
to both of the different services.
402
00:30:35,383 --> 00:30:38,050
403
00:30:45,063 --> 00:30:47,896
404
00:30:49,850 --> 00:30:53,683
A building had been blown up
in the downtown Phan Rang area.
405
00:30:54,770 --> 00:30:57,490
Two construction workers had been killed,
406
00:30:57,490 --> 00:30:59,803
Vietnamese construction
workers these were.
407
00:31:01,830 --> 00:31:05,573
It evidently had been
a Viet Cong operation.
408
00:31:07,250 --> 00:31:09,810
None of us could understand why
409
00:31:09,810 --> 00:31:12,080
this particular building or these people
410
00:31:12,080 --> 00:31:15,102
might have been targeted by the VC.
411
00:31:15,102 --> 00:31:17,602
412
00:31:19,300 --> 00:31:23,610
We were informed that the
advisors to the National Police
413
00:31:23,610 --> 00:31:27,573
would be arriving in
country on Air America.
414
00:31:29,020 --> 00:31:32,413
The people who were coming
were obviously CIA people.
415
00:31:33,950 --> 00:31:37,280
The Viet Cong knew that
these two individuals
416
00:31:37,280 --> 00:31:41,460
were agents working for the
Central Intelligence Agency,
417
00:31:41,460 --> 00:31:42,293
but we didn't.
418
00:31:43,224 --> 00:31:45,891
419
00:31:49,384 --> 00:31:54,290
There had been an uproar in
Washington by President Johnson,
420
00:31:54,290 --> 00:31:56,760
and he had told the CIA to send people
421
00:31:56,760 --> 00:31:59,283
and get them out there
to get more information.
422
00:32:00,520 --> 00:32:05,520
My image of the CIA
functionary in our province.
423
00:32:06,770 --> 00:32:08,770
I'd never seen him come out of his house,
424
00:32:08,770 --> 00:32:13,253
nevermind do anything
even a little more risky.
425
00:32:16,640 --> 00:32:20,553
It did not surprise me at all
that he was not calling in.
426
00:32:23,840 --> 00:32:28,713
He was notoriously a man
who liked his alcohol,
427
00:32:30,330 --> 00:32:33,833
liked some of the young
women from the area.
428
00:32:38,330 --> 00:32:40,550
A lot of the people who'd been assigned
429
00:32:40,550 --> 00:32:43,570
to these provincial roles
430
00:32:43,570 --> 00:32:46,680
had never been out of the
office in Langley, Virginia.
431
00:32:46,680 --> 00:32:50,180
They were desk people, analytic people,
432
00:32:50,180 --> 00:32:52,440
something like that had happened to me
433
00:32:52,440 --> 00:32:55,464
in terms of being sent out into the field.
434
00:32:55,464 --> 00:33:00,464
435
00:33:33,940 --> 00:33:36,380
We were as intelligence officers
436
00:33:36,380 --> 00:33:39,593
brought to Saigon to be
briefed on the Phoenix program.
437
00:33:41,370 --> 00:33:44,220
The Phoenix program was an effort
438
00:33:44,220 --> 00:33:47,253
to try to improve, on one level,
439
00:33:48,280 --> 00:33:51,432
intelligence collection coordination.
440
00:33:51,432 --> 00:33:54,349
441
00:33:56,260 --> 00:34:01,260
It also aimed at the
identification of the individuals
442
00:34:01,370 --> 00:34:05,823
within the normal hamlet
village operations,
443
00:34:06,800 --> 00:34:11,800
but who were secretly part
of the Viet Cong apparatus.
444
00:34:13,090 --> 00:34:15,920
And the point of that identification
445
00:34:15,920 --> 00:34:20,920
was to then conduct
assassinations against them.
446
00:34:23,330 --> 00:34:26,340
The program was really
aimed at identification
447
00:34:26,340 --> 00:34:30,170
of individuals, ostensibly civilians,
448
00:34:30,170 --> 00:34:35,170
who would be taken out
as potential leaders
449
00:34:35,230 --> 00:34:37,483
of a Viet Cong government.
450
00:34:41,030 --> 00:34:44,199
The program as it was to
operate at the province level
451
00:34:44,199 --> 00:34:45,860
was with the establishment
452
00:34:45,860 --> 00:34:48,902
of an intelligence
tactical operation center.
453
00:34:50,540 --> 00:34:53,060
Wherever intelligence was being collected
454
00:34:53,060 --> 00:34:56,853
from all sources would be
brought together and shared.
455
00:34:58,910 --> 00:35:02,173
When we asked what the
Vietnamese knew about this,
456
00:35:03,240 --> 00:35:08,240
they said that they had asked
the Vietnamese commanders
457
00:35:09,390 --> 00:35:14,390
to institute these things but
they had decided against it.
458
00:35:14,700 --> 00:35:18,130
And so we were supposed
to persuade our colleagues
459
00:35:18,130 --> 00:35:22,430
and counterparts at the
local level to do this,
460
00:35:22,430 --> 00:35:25,660
so that it would be in place and then
461
00:35:25,660 --> 00:35:28,490
the ambassador could
simply tell the president
462
00:35:28,490 --> 00:35:30,223
that it now already existed.
463
00:35:32,270 --> 00:35:36,000
Well there was no way that
the Vietnamese lieutenant
464
00:35:36,000 --> 00:35:40,660
was going to institute a
system for sharing information
465
00:35:40,660 --> 00:35:44,290
unless he got direct orders
from higher authorities,
466
00:35:44,290 --> 00:35:49,013
and so our ability to really
do this was very limited.
467
00:35:50,590 --> 00:35:53,950
But the controversy about whether or not
468
00:35:53,950 --> 00:35:57,640
either an individual or that
the United States military
469
00:35:57,640 --> 00:36:00,860
is justified in assassinating people
470
00:36:00,860 --> 00:36:05,800
who have not quote done
anything that we know of yet
471
00:36:06,750 --> 00:36:11,290
as participants in a plot to do something
472
00:36:11,290 --> 00:36:16,290
is obviously a very
difficult moral question.
473
00:36:19,007 --> 00:36:21,507
474
00:36:43,400 --> 00:36:48,010
We had problems associated
with the use of force
475
00:36:48,010 --> 00:36:52,253
and extracting confessions
out of prisoners.
476
00:36:54,310 --> 00:36:56,600
One technique involved the use
477
00:36:56,600 --> 00:37:00,763
of the American military field telephone.
478
00:37:03,700 --> 00:37:07,340
We called it ringing somebody up.
479
00:37:07,340 --> 00:37:09,310
This field phone,
480
00:37:09,310 --> 00:37:14,123
that you generated a
electrical shock by winding up,
481
00:37:15,090 --> 00:37:18,480
would be used by attaching
the bare wires to,
482
00:37:18,480 --> 00:37:21,920
perhaps, a finger on one hand and a toe,
483
00:37:21,920 --> 00:37:24,700
or in some cases to genitalia,
484
00:37:24,700 --> 00:37:28,763
that depended on the
mood of the operatives.
485
00:37:31,380 --> 00:37:34,220
One day I walked into an interrogation
486
00:37:34,220 --> 00:37:36,403
of a Viet Cong prisoner.
487
00:37:39,390 --> 00:37:41,450
The Vietnamese, our counterparts,
488
00:37:41,450 --> 00:37:44,150
were using this telephone as a way
489
00:37:44,150 --> 00:37:46,433
to encourage him to speak.
490
00:37:48,920 --> 00:37:51,580
We asked them not to do that,
491
00:37:51,580 --> 00:37:54,090
told them they should not do that,
492
00:37:54,090 --> 00:37:57,050
and then basically had to leave.
493
00:37:57,050 --> 00:37:59,170
They did stop for awhile
while we were there,
494
00:37:59,170 --> 00:38:01,953
but I'm sure it probably
continued afterwards.
495
00:38:03,860 --> 00:38:06,150
This goes along with things like
496
00:38:06,150 --> 00:38:08,800
threatening to throw
people out of helicopters
497
00:38:08,800 --> 00:38:10,433
if somebody didn't talk.
498
00:38:11,680 --> 00:38:15,722
Clearly that kind of
psychological threat was used.
499
00:38:15,722 --> 00:38:18,389
500
00:38:29,380 --> 00:38:33,193
South Korea had sent a couple
of battalions of forces.
501
00:38:34,890 --> 00:38:38,210
We didn't have much contact until one day
502
00:38:38,210 --> 00:38:43,210
we got a call that three
Vietnamese woodcutters
503
00:38:43,330 --> 00:38:46,500
had been killed in an ambush
504
00:38:46,500 --> 00:38:48,870
that had been set up by the ROKs,
505
00:38:48,870 --> 00:38:51,373
the Republic of Korean soldiers.
506
00:38:53,470 --> 00:38:58,470
These were innocent people,
although they were near areas
507
00:38:58,650 --> 00:39:01,673
that we considered free fire zones.
508
00:39:03,200 --> 00:39:04,680
The problem for the woodcutters was
509
00:39:04,680 --> 00:39:06,480
that was where the wood was.
510
00:39:06,480 --> 00:39:08,960
And even though they weren't
supposed to go in there,
511
00:39:08,960 --> 00:39:11,210
for their livelihoods
that's where they went.
512
00:39:12,680 --> 00:39:14,340
Well, early one morning,
513
00:39:14,340 --> 00:39:18,250
the Koreans had set up
an ambush along a trail,
514
00:39:18,250 --> 00:39:23,250
and evidently had cut down
these three woodcutters.
515
00:39:26,490 --> 00:39:29,670
Already, there had been an
offer made to compensate
516
00:39:29,670 --> 00:39:33,310
the families of the woodcutters
with great apologies,
517
00:39:33,310 --> 00:39:35,830
but the Vietnamese were looking
518
00:39:35,830 --> 00:39:38,633
for some other kind of compensation.
519
00:39:41,270 --> 00:39:44,453
We agreed to meet with the ROK commander.
520
00:39:46,110 --> 00:39:48,020
We approached him with the question
521
00:39:48,020 --> 00:39:51,010
of was there some other gesture
522
00:39:51,010 --> 00:39:53,903
that they thought the Koreans could make.
523
00:39:55,210 --> 00:39:58,510
The commander talked
with a few of his aids
524
00:39:59,390 --> 00:40:01,670
and he came back and he said,
525
00:40:01,670 --> 00:40:04,680
would it help if we returned their ears?
526
00:40:05,557 --> 00:40:08,224
527
00:40:55,000 --> 00:40:59,133
This would've been in
the middle part of 1967.
528
00:41:00,570 --> 00:41:04,860
The US Army sources
were doing a reanalysis
529
00:41:05,751 --> 00:41:09,630
of the numbers of Viet Cong and NVA troops
530
00:41:09,630 --> 00:41:10,993
that we were confronting.
531
00:41:11,930 --> 00:41:14,270
At the same time, coming down through
532
00:41:14,270 --> 00:41:15,990
the Vietnamese chain of command,
533
00:41:15,990 --> 00:41:18,390
they were getting the same requirement.
534
00:41:18,390 --> 00:41:20,200
They were to do their analysis
535
00:41:20,200 --> 00:41:22,683
of the size of the enemy force.
536
00:41:24,770 --> 00:41:28,780
Basically an attempt to finally figure out
537
00:41:28,780 --> 00:41:32,490
not only how many Viet
Cong military there were,
538
00:41:32,490 --> 00:41:34,470
but also this infrastructure,
539
00:41:34,470 --> 00:41:38,563
this parallel governmental
universe that existed.
540
00:41:39,660 --> 00:41:41,930
Maybe even going down to sympathizers
541
00:41:41,930 --> 00:41:45,634
who would be part of the Viet Cong effort.
542
00:41:45,634 --> 00:41:48,301
(intense music)
543
00:42:01,460 --> 00:42:03,390
And it resulted in what came to be known
544
00:42:03,390 --> 00:42:06,010
as the corral reports.
545
00:42:06,010 --> 00:42:09,030
We were gonna round up all of the enemy
546
00:42:09,030 --> 00:42:11,692
in a corral kind of situation.
547
00:42:11,692 --> 00:42:14,359
548
00:42:19,870 --> 00:42:23,030
The Viet Cong had a
political military structure
549
00:42:23,030 --> 00:42:25,663
that was parallel to that of the ARVN.
550
00:42:27,480 --> 00:42:31,320
They had a province chief
and they had various levels
551
00:42:31,320 --> 00:42:35,060
of command that would be
like the shadow government
552
00:42:35,060 --> 00:42:37,583
if and when they took over the province.
553
00:42:40,396 --> 00:42:43,063
554
00:42:49,385 --> 00:42:52,052
555
00:42:55,880 --> 00:43:00,200
Only a few weeks before,
101st Airborne Division
556
00:43:00,200 --> 00:43:03,990
had conducted an operation in the province
557
00:43:03,990 --> 00:43:07,670
on an area identified as the location
558
00:43:07,670 --> 00:43:11,083
of the Viet Cong's province chief.
559
00:43:15,996 --> 00:43:20,996
560
00:43:22,556 --> 00:43:25,306
561
00:43:33,850 --> 00:43:37,790
We had a pile of documents
that appeared to be lists
562
00:43:37,790 --> 00:43:42,053
of people and gave us some
ideas about troop strength.
563
00:43:44,070 --> 00:43:47,713
The measure that was being
used was body counts.
564
00:43:49,130 --> 00:43:51,500
The commanding general
of the 101st Airborne
565
00:43:51,500 --> 00:43:54,700
was very disappointed
in the number of bodies
566
00:43:54,700 --> 00:43:56,933
identified as Viet Cong.
567
00:43:58,220 --> 00:44:03,220
And so he questioned us, why
they didn't find more VC there.
568
00:44:05,220 --> 00:44:07,560
We said something to the effect of
569
00:44:07,560 --> 00:44:09,320
what did you expect to find there?
570
00:44:09,320 --> 00:44:12,040
You found the province capital.
571
00:44:12,040 --> 00:44:14,000
And they said well we had these reports
572
00:44:14,000 --> 00:44:19,000
about NVA battalions
and we said, you know,
573
00:44:19,580 --> 00:44:21,810
I think, sir, if you look at those reports
574
00:44:21,810 --> 00:44:24,260
you'll see that we consider those reports
575
00:44:24,260 --> 00:44:29,260
either doubtful or F-6
unknown, unable to classify.
576
00:44:31,020 --> 00:44:33,730
Well obviously they'd never
looked at the classification.
577
00:44:33,730 --> 00:44:35,610
They never looked at that, they just read
578
00:44:35,610 --> 00:44:37,700
whatever the report was and so you learn
579
00:44:37,700 --> 00:44:39,690
that it wasn't working.
580
00:44:39,690 --> 00:44:42,676
That up the chain they
were simply interested
581
00:44:42,676 --> 00:44:47,320
in the numbers and weren't
paying any attention
582
00:44:47,320 --> 00:44:48,483
to the evaluation.
583
00:44:51,300 --> 00:44:53,880
Coming back to this Corral Report.
584
00:44:53,880 --> 00:44:57,680
We developed some numbers about the size
585
00:44:57,680 --> 00:45:01,219
of the Viet Cong force that
operated in the province.
586
00:45:01,219 --> 00:45:03,886
587
00:45:10,307 --> 00:45:12,974
588
00:45:21,510 --> 00:45:24,390
A few weeks later, the
colonel called us in
589
00:45:24,390 --> 00:45:27,010
and said that Saigon was not happy
590
00:45:27,010 --> 00:45:30,850
because our estimates
of Viet Cong strength
591
00:45:30,850 --> 00:45:33,733
and those of the Vietnamese did not match.
592
00:45:34,700 --> 00:45:36,400
And that we should reconcile them.
593
00:45:38,870 --> 00:45:41,730
We asked what the Vietnamese had offered,
594
00:45:41,730 --> 00:45:44,090
and they had said some much lower figure
595
00:45:44,090 --> 00:45:45,590
than what we had come up with.
596
00:45:47,220 --> 00:45:49,113
He says what do you think this means.
597
00:45:50,540 --> 00:45:54,750
And I said Colonel, I
don't think they want
598
00:45:54,750 --> 00:45:56,810
our higher numbers (laughs).
599
00:45:56,810 --> 00:46:00,576
I think they want the
Vietnamese lower numbers.
600
00:46:00,576 --> 00:46:03,493
601
00:46:11,030 --> 00:46:15,743
He finally decided to send
them the Vietnamese numbers,
602
00:46:16,620 --> 00:46:20,390
afraid that he was going
to alienate his superiors
603
00:46:20,390 --> 00:46:24,113
if he continued to argue the
case for the higher numbers.
604
00:46:27,580 --> 00:46:31,180
A few weeks later, I met
with some of my friends
605
00:46:31,180 --> 00:46:32,730
who were still at Tan Son Nhut,
606
00:46:33,840 --> 00:46:37,580
a major base known as Pentagon East,
607
00:46:37,580 --> 00:46:42,580
and they were operating there
as intelligence officers:
608
00:46:42,670 --> 00:46:45,300
looking at the big map of South Vietnam
609
00:46:45,300 --> 00:46:47,840
and receiving reports
from around the country,
610
00:46:47,840 --> 00:46:49,930
and making the Order of Battle,
611
00:46:49,930 --> 00:46:52,913
what units were where and
how many were, et cetera.
612
00:46:54,810 --> 00:46:56,290
And they said you've gotta come over
613
00:46:56,290 --> 00:47:00,330
and see the new Order of
Battle map that we've created.
614
00:47:00,330 --> 00:47:02,490
We've gotten all these corral reports
615
00:47:02,490 --> 00:47:05,270
and we now have numbers for people.
616
00:47:05,270 --> 00:47:08,483
We think we have a picture
of the whole countryside.
617
00:47:12,310 --> 00:47:13,750
I had to say to them, you know,
618
00:47:13,750 --> 00:47:15,180
I think that's a wonderful map,
619
00:47:15,180 --> 00:47:17,580
you've got a nice
diagram, nice set up here.
620
00:47:17,580 --> 00:47:21,130
I said there's only one
problem with the map,
621
00:47:21,130 --> 00:47:23,360
we sent you those numbers and we know
622
00:47:23,360 --> 00:47:25,562
those aren't the right numbers.
623
00:47:25,562 --> 00:47:28,479
624
00:47:31,550 --> 00:47:34,510
The numbers that we were talking about
625
00:47:34,510 --> 00:47:37,960
tried to be inclusive of everybody
626
00:47:37,960 --> 00:47:40,503
who might be a part of the enemy force.
627
00:47:41,890 --> 00:47:44,400
The Vietnamese were willing, perhaps,
628
00:47:44,400 --> 00:47:47,060
only to look at the numbers of people
629
00:47:47,060 --> 00:47:50,953
in the kind of official military position.
630
00:47:54,580 --> 00:47:57,890
There were different levels of commitment
631
00:47:57,890 --> 00:48:01,260
to the Viet Cong cause
and it was very important
632
00:48:01,260 --> 00:48:04,250
to know whether or not there were people
633
00:48:04,250 --> 00:48:06,270
in the hamlets who were sympathetic,
634
00:48:06,270 --> 00:48:08,483
even if they weren't the military people.
635
00:48:09,370 --> 00:48:11,510
And so that was part of the disagreement
636
00:48:11,510 --> 00:48:14,023
about how to count the enemy force.
637
00:48:16,780 --> 00:48:18,820
Our position was that there were many more
638
00:48:18,820 --> 00:48:21,359
than the Vietnamese were willing to admit.
639
00:48:21,359 --> 00:48:24,276
640
00:48:27,630 --> 00:48:30,450
One of our colleagues responsible
641
00:48:30,450 --> 00:48:33,403
for briefing General Westmoreland,
642
00:48:34,280 --> 00:48:36,043
the commander in the entire area,
643
00:48:39,140 --> 00:48:42,713
and Ellsworth Bunker, who was
the ambassador at the time,
644
00:48:46,660 --> 00:48:48,660
he had been concerned about the fact
645
00:48:48,660 --> 00:48:50,810
that they were going to have to justify
646
00:48:50,810 --> 00:48:54,410
these much larger numbers
than had been used before
647
00:48:54,410 --> 00:48:56,870
by the American military to assess
648
00:48:56,870 --> 00:48:58,183
the nature of the problem.
649
00:49:00,960 --> 00:49:03,850
Instead, he said, there
was no reaction from them
650
00:49:03,850 --> 00:49:07,440
except for a discussion
between the two of them
651
00:49:07,440 --> 00:49:09,210
about how they were gonna present
652
00:49:09,210 --> 00:49:10,610
these numbers to Washington.
653
00:49:13,780 --> 00:49:16,880
It was probably less the
case that Westmoreland
654
00:49:16,880 --> 00:49:20,920
was fudging the numbers than it was
655
00:49:20,920 --> 00:49:22,960
that the whole bureaucratic system
656
00:49:22,960 --> 00:49:24,940
was designed to fudge the numbers
657
00:49:24,940 --> 00:49:27,258
before they got to Westmoreland.
658
00:49:27,258 --> 00:49:30,175
659
00:49:55,710 --> 00:49:58,430
By telling us they didn't
want the higher numbers
660
00:49:58,430 --> 00:50:00,740
that we were getting and giving them,
661
00:50:00,740 --> 00:50:02,993
they were telling us to keep them lower.
662
00:50:05,400 --> 00:50:08,050
The political atmosphere
and the political leadership
663
00:50:10,110 --> 00:50:12,740
are obviously vested in a certain policy
664
00:50:15,330 --> 00:50:18,653
and they don't like the bad
news being brought to them.
665
00:50:21,180 --> 00:50:25,750
So we contributed to that,
we made the compromise
666
00:50:25,750 --> 00:50:30,325
of changing our numbers
to meet the expectations
667
00:50:30,325 --> 00:50:33,371
of those people above us.
668
00:50:33,371 --> 00:50:35,954
669
00:50:52,013 --> 00:50:53,870
Virtually everybody that you saw
670
00:50:53,870 --> 00:50:56,020
could tell you what day they were on
671
00:50:56,020 --> 00:51:00,570
in terms of the 365 days
that they were scheduled
672
00:51:00,570 --> 00:51:01,733
to be in country.
673
00:51:04,490 --> 00:51:08,320
You had to worry for
people who were very new
674
00:51:08,320 --> 00:51:10,450
to being in country,
675
00:51:10,450 --> 00:51:13,480
but also then when you got short,
676
00:51:13,480 --> 00:51:16,653
when you were only a month
or so away from leaving.
677
00:51:18,440 --> 00:51:21,693
One of our observer pilots,
678
00:51:22,920 --> 00:51:25,493
who also was getting ready to return home,
679
00:51:26,770 --> 00:51:31,680
was on a reconnaissance
mission and saw a truck
680
00:51:31,680 --> 00:51:36,173
driving up into Viet Cong controlled area.
681
00:51:38,700 --> 00:51:42,253
He fired off his M60 machine gun,
682
00:51:43,280 --> 00:51:47,380
planning to strafe alongside of the road
683
00:51:47,380 --> 00:51:50,333
as a warning to frighten the driver.
684
00:51:51,680 --> 00:51:54,503
The rounds strafe the truck itself.
685
00:51:55,950 --> 00:51:58,430
The driver fell out of the truck
686
00:51:58,430 --> 00:52:00,843
and turned out to be killed.
687
00:52:01,760 --> 00:52:03,813
Something that he didn't mean to do.
688
00:52:06,200 --> 00:52:11,200
In this war zone, you felt you
ought to be doing something
689
00:52:11,540 --> 00:52:16,150
that would make a mark as
part of that war effort,
690
00:52:16,150 --> 00:52:21,150
and it was a dangerous kind
of psychology that took over.
691
00:52:21,530 --> 00:52:24,290
And I felt that this guy
in some ways had had that.
692
00:52:24,290 --> 00:52:29,290
He hadn't had any real
confrontation with the enemy.
693
00:52:34,080 --> 00:52:37,423
There would've been the
possibility of an investigation.
694
00:52:39,380 --> 00:52:44,250
As it was, we were able to
construct a reasonable case
695
00:52:44,250 --> 00:52:46,430
that this individual had to be either
696
00:52:46,430 --> 00:52:49,210
dealing with the Viet
Cong, paying the Viet Cong,
697
00:52:49,210 --> 00:52:51,420
or in some way cooperating with them
698
00:52:51,420 --> 00:52:53,820
in order to be in that area.
699
00:52:53,820 --> 00:52:58,003
And as far as I know
that's as far as that went.
700
00:53:01,750 --> 00:53:06,750
Well, you know, had some
moral twinges about it,
701
00:53:07,770 --> 00:53:09,883
especially in retrospect.
702
00:53:11,950 --> 00:53:15,470
The government of Vietnam
and of the United States
703
00:53:15,470 --> 00:53:19,413
offered its apologies,
there was compensation paid,
704
00:53:21,543 --> 00:53:26,250
and I often wonder how
that individual feels
705
00:53:26,250 --> 00:53:30,250
about the episode, whether
that continues to be a thought.
706
00:53:30,250 --> 00:53:32,550
But I know at the time it was something
707
00:53:32,550 --> 00:53:36,952
that had really bothered him a great deal.
708
00:53:36,952 --> 00:53:39,535
709
00:53:41,770 --> 00:53:44,770
710
00:53:51,331 --> 00:53:53,914
711
00:54:22,680 --> 00:54:25,670
The American military went
through a very elaborate
712
00:54:25,670 --> 00:54:29,350
set of codes for identifying people,
713
00:54:29,350 --> 00:54:32,743
you know, that it would be
a mistake to use real names.
714
00:54:34,250 --> 00:54:38,523
I was known as Silver Lightning Alpha Two.
715
00:54:41,060 --> 00:54:43,820
So we're out in this little
operation in this hamlet,
716
00:54:43,820 --> 00:54:48,520
and I get a radio call to
Silver Lightning Two Alpha
717
00:54:48,520 --> 00:54:53,400
that your son, John Jay
Murphy, has been born (laughs).
718
00:54:53,400 --> 00:54:56,740
Which of course broke all
code violations and the like,
719
00:54:56,740 --> 00:55:00,470
but I remember spending
the rest of that day
720
00:55:00,470 --> 00:55:03,880
taking pictures of children
just trying to imagine,
721
00:55:03,880 --> 00:55:06,610
you know, what my new son looked like.
722
00:55:06,610 --> 00:55:09,693
723
00:55:37,425 --> 00:55:40,758
724
00:55:42,220 --> 00:55:45,350
Each month there would be a junior officer
725
00:55:45,350 --> 00:55:48,060
from one of the teams
who would be assigned
726
00:55:48,060 --> 00:55:53,060
to go to Saigon to pick up
a satchel full of money,
727
00:55:53,710 --> 00:55:56,260
both military payment certificates
728
00:55:56,260 --> 00:55:59,800
which was the American currency,
729
00:55:59,800 --> 00:56:03,933
and a thick book of official papers.
730
00:56:10,480 --> 00:56:13,843
I wound up having to do
what we call the pay run.
731
00:56:19,200 --> 00:56:22,390
We had to fly out to an advisory team
732
00:56:22,390 --> 00:56:24,950
that was experiencing attacks
733
00:56:24,950 --> 00:56:28,703
by a North Vietnamese battalion
virtually every night.
734
00:56:31,410 --> 00:56:34,040
Needless to say, I was
particularly interested
735
00:56:34,040 --> 00:56:36,780
in getting to them early in the day
736
00:56:36,780 --> 00:56:40,299
and leaving before nightfall.
737
00:56:40,299 --> 00:56:43,632
738
00:56:51,590 --> 00:56:53,450
It took us awhile to figure out
739
00:56:53,450 --> 00:56:56,270
where their landing area was.
740
00:56:56,270 --> 00:56:59,113
And it turned out to be
on the side of a hill.
741
00:57:03,580 --> 00:57:06,383
Landing was no real problem.
742
00:57:08,000 --> 00:57:10,640
I paid the people that were there,
743
00:57:10,640 --> 00:57:12,783
and we got ready to take off.
744
00:57:13,850 --> 00:57:16,730
The pilot was not as
big or as heavy as me,
745
00:57:16,730 --> 00:57:19,560
but heavier than some of the others.
746
00:57:19,560 --> 00:57:21,980
So together we had quite a bit of weight
747
00:57:21,980 --> 00:57:25,110
with the machine guns,
the rockets, the lead,
748
00:57:25,110 --> 00:57:26,993
and this little single engine.
749
00:57:28,210 --> 00:57:30,660
We sat at the top of the hill and he said,
750
00:57:30,660 --> 00:57:32,990
I don't think we've
got enough engine power
751
00:57:32,990 --> 00:57:36,040
to go up the hill and
get enough air speed.
752
00:57:36,040 --> 00:57:37,790
So we're gonna have to go downhill.
753
00:57:38,845 --> 00:57:42,980
And we came down the hill,
building up airspeed,
754
00:57:42,980 --> 00:57:45,253
I felt us leave the ground.
755
00:57:46,760 --> 00:57:49,244
We started to hear pop, pop, pop.
756
00:57:49,244 --> 00:57:51,280
The pilot noticed
757
00:57:51,280 --> 00:57:52,723
that he was losing fuel.
758
00:57:53,850 --> 00:57:56,853
We had taken a couple of
rounds in the fuel tank.
759
00:57:58,430 --> 00:58:01,213
And then we began to come down again.
760
00:58:02,360 --> 00:58:05,363
We come back down right
at the foot of the hill,
761
00:58:06,440 --> 00:58:08,750
bounced up in the air,
762
00:58:08,750 --> 00:58:11,580
bounced back down on the
other side of the hill,
763
00:58:11,580 --> 00:58:15,853
and go plowing into this grassy area.
764
00:58:17,470 --> 00:58:21,070
The pilot shouts to get out and as I do,
765
00:58:21,070 --> 00:58:22,610
I look over and I notice
766
00:58:22,610 --> 00:58:26,253
that the fuel in the wing is dripping.
767
00:58:27,530 --> 00:58:29,740
I try to climb out, I'm in the back seat
768
00:58:29,740 --> 00:58:32,780
of a two seat plane here,
769
00:58:32,780 --> 00:58:37,750
but got suck between the
front seat and the doorway.
770
00:58:37,750 --> 00:58:41,670
Had to back out and then literally dove
771
00:58:41,670 --> 00:58:46,370
over the front seat out the door,
772
00:58:46,370 --> 00:58:49,173
rolled on the ground away from the plane,
773
00:58:50,280 --> 00:58:54,350
and as we stood there looking at the plane
774
00:58:54,350 --> 00:58:57,040
waiting to see if it's
gonna go up in flames,
775
00:58:57,040 --> 00:58:59,330
I remember that I probably have about
776
00:58:59,330 --> 00:59:03,420
20,000 dollars in military
payment certificates
777
00:59:03,420 --> 00:59:06,140
and pee-as-toos still in the plane
778
00:59:06,140 --> 00:59:09,680
and the army is awful
if you lose the money
779
00:59:09,680 --> 00:59:10,710
on these pay runs.
780
00:59:10,710 --> 00:59:12,530
We've been warned over and over again.
781
00:59:12,530 --> 00:59:14,800
I can just see it burning up and having
782
00:59:14,800 --> 00:59:19,283
to try to explain that
this money burned away.
783
00:59:21,070 --> 00:59:24,350
I was able to go back and retrieve the bag
784
00:59:25,300 --> 00:59:27,503
and then it occurs to me,
785
00:59:28,580 --> 00:59:32,770
I may have to stay in
this place this night
786
00:59:32,770 --> 00:59:35,990
because that NVA battalion
is still out there.
787
00:59:35,990 --> 00:59:37,710
How am I gonna get out of here now
788
00:59:37,710 --> 00:59:40,383
that our plane is unable to fly?
789
00:59:41,920 --> 00:59:46,090
So we immediately begin calling for help,
790
00:59:46,090 --> 00:59:48,780
but now they have to fly another plane out
791
00:59:48,780 --> 00:59:51,160
with another pilot to get me,
792
00:59:51,160 --> 00:59:53,523
and I have to complete the pay run.
793
00:59:55,340 --> 00:59:59,856
I complete the pay run
and I go back to Saigon.
794
00:59:59,856 --> 01:00:02,439
795
01:00:03,530 --> 01:00:05,730
One of the buildings
that's been taken over
796
01:00:05,730 --> 01:00:09,210
in downtown Saigon is the headquarters
797
01:00:09,210 --> 01:00:12,583
of the finance branch of the Army.
798
01:00:14,530 --> 01:00:17,950
I go to turn in the money that I have left
799
01:00:17,950 --> 01:00:21,903
and the signed slips for
people who've collected it.
800
01:00:24,820 --> 01:00:26,860
I get to the office in the morning,
801
01:00:26,860 --> 01:00:28,913
we get the bag, the money is in it,
802
01:00:29,970 --> 01:00:32,790
take it to the sergeant who's responsible
803
01:00:32,790 --> 01:00:34,563
for checking the signatures,
804
01:00:35,620 --> 01:00:39,490
and he stops at one point, oh,
he says, we've got a problem.
805
01:00:39,490 --> 01:00:41,810
I said what's the problem?
806
01:00:41,810 --> 01:00:44,890
He said you see here,
the official signature
807
01:00:44,890 --> 01:00:49,853
for this sergeant is John J Jones.
808
01:00:50,900 --> 01:00:54,140
He signed it J James Jones.
809
01:00:54,140 --> 01:00:56,590
That's an incorrect
signature, I can't accept it.
810
01:00:57,781 --> 01:00:59,090
Can't accept it.
811
01:00:59,090 --> 01:01:00,950
He says you can't turn in the money,
812
01:01:00,950 --> 01:01:03,500
you can't turn in the pay slips,
813
01:01:03,500 --> 01:01:05,950
you've gotta go back and
get the right signature.
814
01:01:08,980 --> 01:01:11,550
That would've been bad enough except
815
01:01:11,550 --> 01:01:15,720
when I look at JJ Jones
or whatever his name was
816
01:01:15,720 --> 01:01:18,570
he's at this outpost where we
crashed the plane (laughs).
817
01:01:19,820 --> 01:01:23,640
And so theoretically
I'm supposed to go back
818
01:01:23,640 --> 01:01:26,083
and get a new signature from this guy.
819
01:01:28,090 --> 01:01:29,520
I said you gotta be kidding me.
820
01:01:29,520 --> 01:01:30,920
I said this is ridiculous.
821
01:01:30,920 --> 01:01:34,490
I said I'm gonna just, no,
he says you can't do that.
822
01:01:34,490 --> 01:01:37,297
You can't just sign it
yourself you know (laughs)
823
01:01:37,297 --> 01:01:38,597
we'd really be in trouble.
824
01:01:39,577 --> 01:01:42,825
So, so I have to take everything back.
825
01:01:42,825 --> 01:01:45,870
I get together with my pilot.
826
01:01:45,870 --> 01:01:48,860
I'll tell you one thing he
said, that's gonna happen
827
01:01:48,860 --> 01:01:51,637
is no way am I going
back in there with you
828
01:01:51,637 --> 01:01:53,400
in the plane.
829
01:01:53,400 --> 01:01:55,690
He says give me the stuff, I'll go.
830
01:01:55,690 --> 01:01:58,180
I'll fly in there, I'll get the signature,
831
01:01:58,180 --> 01:02:00,047
and that was fine with me (laughs).
832
01:02:01,036 --> 01:02:03,453
833
01:02:20,562 --> 01:02:22,562
So we entered this room.
834
01:02:23,660 --> 01:02:27,620
Around the table were
perhaps a dozen visitors,
835
01:02:27,620 --> 01:02:29,283
most of them military,
836
01:02:30,570 --> 01:02:33,100
mentioning that I had recently
837
01:02:33,100 --> 01:02:36,453
been an advisor at the province
level in South Vietnam.
838
01:02:37,420 --> 01:02:39,510
People stopped and looked at me
839
01:02:39,510 --> 01:02:42,600
and one said I've always wondered
840
01:02:42,600 --> 01:02:45,037
what happens at the province level.
841
01:02:45,037 --> 01:02:46,810
842
01:02:46,810 --> 01:02:51,160
In walked the man we had
evidently been waiting for
843
01:02:51,160 --> 01:02:54,050
who was disheveled, although he wore
844
01:02:54,050 --> 01:02:56,859
a very preppy, blue, pinstriped suit.
845
01:02:56,859 --> 01:03:00,380
846
01:03:00,380 --> 01:03:04,460
He sat down at the table,
put his head in his hands,
847
01:03:04,460 --> 01:03:06,850
rubbed his eyes a bit and said,
848
01:03:06,850 --> 01:03:08,760
you'll have to excuse me I've been up
849
01:03:08,760 --> 01:03:10,840
in the war room all night.
850
01:03:10,840 --> 01:03:13,430
The president wants to
know what's going on.
851
01:03:13,430 --> 01:03:16,063
Somebody said to him well
what's the latest news.
852
01:03:17,530 --> 01:03:21,200
And he looked at him and
he said, we don't know.
853
01:03:21,200 --> 01:03:22,880
We just don't know.
854
01:03:22,880 --> 01:03:26,050
None of our people are reporting in.
855
01:03:26,050 --> 01:03:29,713
This news that not even the
CIA knew what was happening,
856
01:03:30,590 --> 01:03:32,710
we had probably gotten more reports
857
01:03:32,710 --> 01:03:36,021
through the military channels
than they were getting.
858
01:03:36,021 --> 01:03:38,688
859
01:04:11,110 --> 01:04:15,050
There's no doubt in my
mind that in the short run
860
01:04:15,970 --> 01:04:19,090
the United States could've won quote
861
01:04:19,090 --> 01:04:23,383
the war in Vietnam by taking
it over and running it.
862
01:04:24,860 --> 01:04:27,210
To do that, however, they would've had
863
01:04:27,210 --> 01:04:30,307
to have become the colonial rulers,
864
01:04:30,307 --> 01:04:33,333
and in the long run we
could never win at that.
865
01:04:34,570 --> 01:04:37,190
We had in many ways a connection
866
01:04:37,190 --> 01:04:39,400
with some of the population,
867
01:04:39,400 --> 01:04:43,840
which saw us as a useful
and positive force,
868
01:04:43,840 --> 01:04:45,570
but who also had to deal
869
01:04:45,570 --> 01:04:48,913
with this kinda corrupt,
or inefficient, leadership.
870
01:04:52,280 --> 01:04:57,280
Someone once asked me is what
we hear about Vietnam true.
871
01:04:57,940 --> 01:05:00,900
And my answer used to be
everything you ever heard
872
01:05:00,900 --> 01:05:03,363
about Vietnam is true in some way.
873
01:05:04,340 --> 01:05:07,660
None of us had the same experience,
874
01:05:07,660 --> 01:05:12,543
none of us went through exactly
the same kinds of learning,
875
01:05:14,380 --> 01:05:17,120
but that's been the Vietnam that I knew
876
01:05:17,120 --> 01:05:20,785
and the stories that I tell.
877
01:05:20,785 --> 01:05:23,368
63962
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