All language subtitles for The.Crime.of.the.Century.S01E01

[TV static drones]

[bright tone]

[indistinct chatter]

- Morning, morning.

- Oh, so they're
working on him?

- They worked on him.

- Oh, really?
- Yeah.

- Which unit is it?
Upstairs?

- It's up on the top corner.
- On top here?

[tense music]

- January 13, 2021.

We'll get started
at 0540 hours.

Victim's information:

date of birth: 9,'97.

Long history of drug use.

The mother called in
at 0306 hours

for medical assistance

for her son, the victim.

She found him in his bedroom.

She said he was cold
to the touch.

Officers and medics arrived
on scene.

The lower half of the body--
the legs--were cold,

but the upper body
was still warm,

so officers and the medics
started performing CPR

for approximately 15 minutes.

- [sniffles]

- See if it works.

It's worked like money

the last several times
I've done it.

♪ ♪

- In the victim's bedroom,

we found a spoon
with a brown residue

inside of a shoebox

as well as a needle
and several baggies.

[machine whirring]

- So that's positive
off the spoon.

Fentanyl.

Yeah.

[machine beeps]

- Ultimately
was pronounced deceased

0336 hours.

[over radio]
Well, it's gonna be

a beautiful, sunny day today.

And we can expect
much more of the same...

[whistle blows,
people shouting]

♪ ♪

[bird cawing]

[singer vocalizing
irregularly]

[insects buzzing]

[singers vocalizing]

[train rattling]

♪ ♪

[music fades,
wind howls gently]

narrator:
For thousands of years,

a demand for opioid has
attracted commerce

and crime.

The narcotic comes
from the resin

that oozes from the bulb
of the poppy.

From the reign of King Tut,

the Egyptians were the first
to cultivate vast fields

of the drug,

which they sold
throughout the Mediterranean.

Alexander the Great
expanded the market

by introducing opium to India,

where today it is
still cultivated by hand.

It's known for soothing pain,

but carries the looming danger
of desperate addiction.

During the Inquisition,
Catholic clerics called it

the stuff of the devil,

but its lure
and commercial value

were hard to resist.

By the 16th century,

the resin was rolled
into black pills

called "Stones of Immortality"

and marketed as a pain killer
called laudanum.

During
the Industrial Revolution,

infants were narcotized
with laudanum

by mothers without childcare
who needed to leave home

to work the factories
and the mines.

The smoking of opium expanded
the global market into China,

where millions
became addicted.

By the 19th century,
the British East India Company

built vast opium factories,

where the stuff was rolled
into cannonballs

and then shipped off
to Chinese merchants

called the hong.

American dealers
like John Jacob Astor

and FDR's grandfather,
Warren Delano,

cashed in by manufacturing
the stuff in Turkey.

By 1839,

opium was the world's
most traded commodity.

Concerned by addiction
and overdoses,

the Chinese emperor
appointed a drug czar,

who dumped thousands
of cannonballs of opium

into the sea.

In a fury, opium companies
pushed the British government

to start a war with China

to keep the profits flowing.

In time, opium developed
as a prescription drug.

- The Merck Company
launched a product

called morphine.

Bayer introduced

a cough suppressant

called heroin.

When addiction rose
to dangerous levels,

the U.S. made heroin illegal,

creating a new
global crime business

dominated by the Italian mafia
and Mexican cartels.

Big pharma turned
to the mass manufacturer

of other opium products
like morphine and oxycodone

and learned how
to mechanize the process.

They created a demand
for narcotics,

addicting millions
of men, women, and children

which, in turn, fueled
the illegal drug trade

from pill mills
to heroin dealers,

to illegal fentanyl factories.

The terrible truth
is that the business

of criminal cartels
and pharmaceutical companies

is connected.

Together, they generate
$100 billion of income a year

by cultivating and catering

to a desperate need
for opioids.

That business model has
a terrible cost.

Within the last 20 years,

more than 500,000 Americans

have been killed by overdoses.

[dramatic music]

♪ ♪

[reporter speaking Spanish]

- You know,
when I started off

telling the story
of the opium crisis,

I'd never written about

the pharmaceutical industry
before,

but I'd written a lot
about illicit drugs.

I had done some big stories
about

the Sinaloa drug cartel.

I was impressed
by the logistical complexity

and the seriousness with which
they thought about the idea

of innovating product lines.

Like when they first
were really rolling out

methamphetamine in a big way,

they would actually send
free samples to key markets,

and the way they thought
about wholesale distribution,

sort of how far down the chain
they'd go,

bringing the money
back to Mexico,

the way they'd
institutionalized corruption.

So I was looking at cocaine
and methamphetamine,

but increasingly it seemed that

Mexican heroin was making
a comeback in a big way

in the United States.

What creates the market

for this very dynamic
drug cartel,

where they're thinking
all the time

about their different products,
and what should we send,

and, you know, how's pot doing
versus cocaine,

and--no, truly--

and what they realize is, God,
there's all these people now

who want heroin.

It turns out that
that was a population

of hundreds of thousands,
and millions of people

who had been abusing
prescription drugs,

whether they were getting them
from a doctor

or buying them on the street.

And for a variety of reasons,

it was getting harder
to obtain,

and they find themselves
buying heroin.

You suddenly had this
huge population of buyers

who'd kind of come
into the market

through the back door.

They'd come in
through the world

of illicit pharmaceuticals.

And I started looking
at opioids,

and when you do that,

you pretty quickly stumble
on the Sackler family.

[soft, unsettling music]

[bells tolling]

♪ ♪

- I often say
I approach collecting

as a biologist,

that I want enough data

to be able to draw
valid conclusions.

Art is a passion
pursued with discipline.

Science is a discipline
pursued with passion.

You have to really pursue
the object.

You just don't sit there

and have the objects come
to you.

You want to be
a great collector,

you better think of the fact

that you're gonna
commit yourself

to a real passionate hunt.

[funky music]

narrator:
Arthur Sackler's passion

as a collector
made him famous.

With his brothers,
the Sackler family

chiseled its reputation
for generosity

on the walls of museums
and colleges.

♪ ♪

No American family
has profited more

from controlled substances--
from Valium to OxyContin--

than the Sacklers.

They built a fortune
of more than $14 billion

by becoming some
of the world's

most successful drug pushers.

- ♪ I'm your mama,
I'm your daddy ♪

♪ I'm that nigga
in the alley ♪

♪ I'm your doctor
when in need ♪

♪ Want some coke?
Have some weed ♪

♪ You know me,
I'm your friend ♪

♪ Your main boy,
thick and thin ♪

♪ I'm your pusherman ♪

♪ ♪

♪ I'm your pusherman ♪

♪ Lord, Lord, hm ♪

[music fades]

[meandering music]

♪ ♪

- So there are
three Sackler brothers.

They grew up in Flatbush
in Brooklyn.

They had immigrant parents
who'd come from eastern Europe,

and they were
kind of quintessential

hungry sons of immigrants,

early 20th century,
trying to go out there

and make a name
for themselves.

All three brothers end up
going to medical school.

And Arthur Sackler,
who was the oldest brother

and kind of the patriarch--

almost as much a parent
to his younger brothers

as he was an older brother--

kind of leads the charge,

and he ends up, in the '40s,

at Creedmoor Psychiatric
Hospital in Queens,

which is this vast asylum.

6,000 beds.

And Arthur ends up bringing

his younger brothers
into the fold.

Something he often did
in their lives,

is he brings Raymond
and Mortimer,

his two brothers,
along with him.

[soft indistinct chatter,
door clangs]

And at that time,

there were certain stubborn
medical mysteries

having to do
with mental illness.

There were new innovations,

and one of them was
electroshock therapy.

And the Sackler brothers
end up in a situation

in which they are
administering

electroshock therapy
between the three of them

to thousands of patients
at this place.

[solemn music]

♪ ♪

It struck them as crude
and inhumane,

and the brothers were
kind of repulsed by this.

And so they start trying
to find other solutions

to these mysteries,

and they become convinced
that it's brain chemistry

that is causing things
like schizophrenia,

and that
if it's a chemical problem,

then there's probably
a chemical solution.

So the idea that, you know,

there's no affliction for which

we might not be able
to devise a pill.

[pensive music]

So the Sacklers buy

a small pharmaceutical company
in 1952,

a company called
Purdue Frederick.

♪ ♪

It was this little concern.

You know, they sold tonics

and kind of
unglamorous products.

Ear wax remover.
That kind of thing.

While his brothers
are running Purdue Frederick,

Arthur Sackler ends up
buying and owning

a medical advertising company
called MacAdams

and in pretty rapid succession,

comes up with a whole series
of revolutionary ideas

that completely transform
the landscape

of how we sell drugs
in this country.

narrator: Arthur Sackler
was a pioneer

in bringing
Madison Avenue techniques

to the selling of drugs.

But in doing so,
he often crossed the line

from promotion to fraud.

The essential trick was
to hire doctors

and use them as pitchmen
to sell to other doctors.

He even paid a division head
at the FDA

to promote his drugs.

Occasionally, he would invent
expert witnesses.

- One of the companies
that he represents

has an ad,

and it just had a series
of business cards

of doctors

from different parts
of the country.

At the time when this ad runs,

there was
an investigative reporter

who decides he wants
to get in touch

with these doctors.

So he writes letters
to all of them.

And the doctors don't exist.

So you see pretty quickly

how this can get
kind of perverted,

and at a certain point,
the idea that the doctor,

who we're raised to think of

as a real kind of custodian
of our health,

can be enlisted in a sham
or just outright invented

in the interest
of selling a product.

- I get the impression
that you have a very good time.

- I'm having a ball.
[chuckles]

[somber music]

narrator: In the 1960s,
Sackler became incredibly rich

by expanding the market
for addictive tranquilizers,

convincing doctors
and patients

that they needed Librium
and Valium

for everyday anxiety.

When widespread abuse
and addiction followed,

a senate committee
investigated

Sackler's
promotional campaign.

Sackler would blame
the problem

on reckless patients.

- In Arthur's case,
he said

when asked about the idea
that people became addicted

to drugs like Valium,

"The drug isn't the problem.

The user is the problem."

♪ ♪

Arthur Sackler died

before OxyContin
was ever invented,

but Arthur Sackler
created the world

in which Purdue
and the Sackler family

would be very successful.

[foreboding music]

♪ ♪

Their first really big hit

is a pain drug
called MS Contin.

MS Contin is morphine,

but they developed a system

that they called contin,
which is short for continuous.

It's essentially a seal
around a pill

so that if you take that pill,

the active chemical in it

will enter your bloodstream
slowly, continuously

over a long period of time.

MS Contin was
an innovative drug.

It was used chiefly in
cancer pain-type situations.

And at a certain point,

the company knew
that the patent

on MS Contin--

the company's exclusive right
to produce it--

was going to be expiring soon.

At the point where you lose
that exclusive right,

you have generic versions
of that drug

and you're just gonna
see your profits nosedive.

So they start thinking,

"Well, what are we gonna find
to replace this?"

They start talking
about oxycodone.

Oxycodone is
a very powerful opioid,

much more powerful
than morphine.

It's also quite addictive,
but they had this notion.

"You know, what if we took

"the contin system
that we created

"for morphine

and used it with oxycodone?"

So rather than it being
a huge dose

that will just overwhelm
your system,

it slowly goes
into your bloodstream

over the course of 12 hours.

narrator: Controlled-release
oxycodone, or OxyContin,

would be the drug
that triggered

what we call
the opioid crisis.

But what if we discovered
that the crisis

started with a crime?

Through a set
of secret documents

and never-before-released
depositions,

we found powerful evidence

that Purdue may have hidden
the dangers of OxyContin

in favor of the profits
that would come

from touting its benefits.

- Would you state
your name, please?

- Richard Sackler.

- Everybody who worked
at Purdue Pharma,

I think, was pretty heavily
invested in OxyContin,

but no one more so
than Raymond's son,

Richard Sackler,
who was also a doctor.

- That's correct.
Yep.

- He wants to do things

that are
a little more ambitious.

He's got big visions.

He was working
around the clock.

He was incredibly demanding.

He would be
micromanaging staff.

If you sent him an email
at, you know, midnight,

he would write you back
right away.

Very fixated on the success
of this drug.

narrator: Sackler launched
OxyContin with one

of the largest pharmaceutical
marketing campaigns

in history, but oddly,

he kept his own role hidden

and never gave interviews
about the drug

until he was forced to testify
in this deposition

when the state of Kentucky
sued

and ultimately settled
with Purdue

for its history
of deceptive marketing.

We had a product

that had tremendous potential.

For 100 years, and even today,

there is no drug

that is more effective

or safer than opioids

for treating pain
over a long term.

- But whether
it's effective or not

also depends on other factors
such as abuse.

I mean, you can kill somebody
and take away their pain,

but that certainly wouldn't
be effective, would it?

- I don't think that death

would be considered a sign

of efficacy.

- Correct.
- Yes, I mean,

in the extreme,

yes, what you say is correct.

- So just because
it takes away pain

doesn't mean it's a good drug,
does it?

- No.

[birds chirping]

[soft, unsettling music]

♪ ♪

Andrew: When we talk
about opioid pain medicines,

you're converting
the natural molecules

that exist in opium

into this stronger version

that gets into the brain
faster,

that has
a more rewarding effect.

That's basically
the same process

for making heroin.

So when we talk about drugs
like hydrocodone and oxycodone,

you're talking about drugs
that are semisynthetic,

just like heroin

and that produce effects
that are indistinguishable

from heroin.

These are essentially
heroin pills,

which doesn't mean that doctors
should never prescribe them.

These are good medicines
for easing pain

at the end of life,

for a couple of days
after major surgery

or a serious accident.

But unfortunately,
Purdue Pharma

and other opioid makers

started to promote
their opioids

for common
chronic pain conditions

where opioids
are much more likely

to harm patients
than help them.

♪ ♪

narrator: In 1994, Purdue
started its FDA application

for the approval of OxyContin.

Not only did Purdue minimize

the addictive nature
of the drug,

its executives launched
a plan,

with the approval
of the Sackler family,

to market the drug to
the widest possible audience.

The risks of OxyContin
might have been acceptable

for some people,

like patients painfully dying
from cancer,

but not for teenagers
with knee pain.

So in its application
to the FDA,

Purdue promoted the safety
of OxyContin.

- Had Purdue submitted
an application to FDA

seeking approval of OxyContin

for treating pain at the end
of life from cancer,

the burden would have
been easier for Purdue,

but they never would've really
been interested in that

because you can't really get
a blockbuster drug

if the drug is
gonna be promoted

for pain at the end of life.

There aren't enough patients
with end-of-life cancer pain

and they're not gonna be
on the product for very long.

You've got to get
that drug prescribed

for common conditions.

But to get FDA approval
to do that,

you need the evidence

that the drug is
both safe and effective

for these common conditions.

[elusive music]

narrator: But Purdue
didn't have any evidence

that the drug was safe,

so the company
obtained the help

of a medical officer at FDA.

His name was Curtis Wright.

♪ ♪

Working closely with Purdue,

Wright allowed the company
to claim

that OxyContin
was not very addictive

or prone to abuse.

Purdue executives camped out
for three days

in a rented room
near Wright's office

and worked with him to draft

the official FDA review
of OxyContin

in a way that Wright promised
would be promptly approved.

♪ ♪

- Okay,
so this is a document

that was leaked to us

that showed a pretty unusual
amount of interaction

between Purdue officials
and Curtis Wright at the FDA.

- Wow, uh...

This is the first time
I've ever seen this, uh...

This isn't just unethical.

I-I think
this could be illegal,

that they allowed Purdue
to do this.

And if it's illegal,
it would look as though

both Purdue and Curtis Wright
may have broken the law.

There's no way that
this should be allowed,

that a drug company
would be involved

in drafting the review
of its application.

- And this is a document

from the medical officer review

of Curtis Wright.

- This is part
of the approval.

Part of the FDA approval.
- Right.

And he's the guy that actually
approved it to be sold

or, you know, allow you all
to sell it, from the FDA.

- That's my recollection.

- Y'all ultimately hired him
a few years later,

didn't you?

- Um...

We did hire him

but not after his tenure

at the FDA.

Um,

we discussed it and agreed

that we should not hire
somebody who had ju--

who had reviewed our product
and then left.

And so he went
to another company.

- He went there
for a short period of time

and then came to work
for you all.

- I don't remember.
It was certainly...

It was certainly--

I--my recollection is
a couple of years,

two or three years,
but I don't recall exactly.

The record, I'm certain,
could be produced.

- All right,
well, let's take a look...

narrator: The record shows
that Wright joined Purdue

just over a year
after leaving the FDA.

In his first year at Purdue,

Wright's compensation
was greater than $370,000.

It was a tidy sum for the man
who had allowed Purdue

to use
the OxyContin package insert

as a marketing tool.

Suggesting
that low-dose patients

wouldn't get addicted,

the insert also claimed,
without any evidence,

that the product was believed
to reduce

abuse liability.

- If you're Richard Sackler,

if you're Purdue,

that is a tremendously
helpful thing

to have in the package insert,
right?

Because it means that your army

of hundreds and hundreds
of sales reps

can go out and meet
with doctors and say,

"Look, Doc, it's right here
in the package insert.

The FDA approved this,"

with this crucial line

about how
the delayed absorption

is believed
to reduce the abuse liability.

Like, believed
by Purdue Pharma,

you know, on a hopeful,
"wishful thinking" kind of day.

♪ ♪

It's a phrase that gives rise
to the opioid epidemic.

♪ ♪

This was a momentous,

historic mistake
by the agency.

[thunder rumbling]

[sirens wailing]

[device buzzing]
- Rescue 45.

In the [unintelligible] area.

114.

- This event right here.
- 1-11.

209 Northwest
[unintelligible].

- What motivated me
to become a EMT,

my freshman year
when I was in high school,

I had two classmates
that had overdosed on opioids

as I was in the English class

learning on grammar
and punctuation.

I was sitting
in the front room--

the classroom--
and heard two thumps

of two classmates falling out
of their desks.

Started foaming at the mouth.

[melancholy country music]

♪ ♪

961 Wise.
We'll be in the area.

Do you have a description of
what the residents look like?

♪ ♪

I have ran a overdose call

where I had four overdoses
at once.

Me and my coworker walked
into the household,

where we had two 16-year-olds.

One of them was a brother.
The other one was a cousin.

And the parents.

They, all four,
had both overdosed

on oxycodone.

I work

sometimes 100 hours-plus
a week

for two jobs,
and the stuff I do see,

it does have a bad mix

with my family life.

There has been times
to where I have

went to a room by myself
and...

just sit there
and talk to myself,

and basically
broke down crying.

I ask myself sometimes

if I want to continue
doing this job.

It's made a hard impact.

- They had a terrible problem
down in Lee County,

which was not in my territory,

but it was next door to it.

All that area,
that was the first area

where the abuse exploded,

down around Norton
and Richlands.

It exploded right there first,
from what I could see,

and then moved into Bluefield,

and Princeton, and Beckley,

and then on down to Bristol
and Wytheville.

And it spread like cancer.

[John Denver's "Take Me Home,
Country Roads" playing]

- ♪ Almost heaven ♪

♪ West Virginia ♪

♪ Blue Ridge Mountains ♪

♪ Shenandoah River ♪

♪ ♪

both: ♪ Life is old there ♪

♪ Older than the trees ♪

♪ Younger than the mountains ♪

- Hey, buddy, you with us?
- ♪ Growin' like a breeze ♪

♪ Country roads ♪

♪ Take me home ♪
- Go.

- ♪ To the place ♪

♪ I belong ♪

♪ West Virginia,
mountain mama ♪

- Was it always West Virginia
for you?

- Well, my first eight years
was in Ohio,

up around in Medina,

right around Cleveland,
in a log cabin.

- ♪ All my memories ♪

- Dad worked
at a Chevrolet plant

where they made transmissions.

But he had a mid-life crisis,
I guess, in his 40s,

and he got the urge
to come home to West Virginia,

where he and my mom
were raised.

And it was about the same time

"Take Me Home, Country Roads"
came out too.

- [chuckles]

- And so maybe that had
something to do with it.

- ♪ Country roads ♪

♪ Take me home ♪

- Moved to a place called
Sundial, West Virginia.

down in the coal fields.

I had four brothers
and one sister.

Dad worked in the mines

till he blew out his lungs
from black lung

and from asthma

from being in belt fires.

Dad wanted me to go to college.
I wanted to go.

I first asked him if I could

go into the mines like him,
you know.

"That paid good money.
How about that, Dad?"

He said, "No, Mark."

He says, "You're so clumsy,

you'll get killed
the first shift."

So I went to college
at Concord University,

down in the southern part
of the state of West Virginia

at Athens

and got a degree to teach

biology and chemistry
in high school.

But the first job
that I got out of college

was a pharmaceutical job
with Mead Johnson

about 1988.

I didn't know much about sales,

and I'm not even--
I wasn't even sure

that I would really stick
with it or liked it,

but I came to be hired on
with Purdue

when I was called
by Mark Radcliffe,

who was my district manager.

He's pretty infamous right now.

He's been in a federal prison.

He called me and said,
"If you work hard,

you'll make tremendous amounts
of money."

Uncapped bonus.

That's what caught my ear,
was uncapped bonus.

There was no cap on it.
No ceiling.

And I thought, "Well,
that's the kind of money

I'd like to make."

I started in April of '98,

signing on to sell OxyContin
primarily.

OxyContin was
what they stressed

they wanted sales out of.

[compelling music]

It was supposed to me
that it was a veritable

treasure chest
of untapped sales out there

because there were
so many people

that were undertreated
for pain,

or they weren't being treated
at all

because physicians were afraid
to use

stronger pain medications
for them,

and they were suffering.

And I could see the mission
being described to me,

and then I signed onto it.

It sounded like
a very honorable thing to do.

Helping patients that
were suffering from pain,

get their relief,
and give 'em their life back.

♪ ♪

- Today, we essentially
consider pain

in any form to be dangerous,

that the experience of pain

leaves a kind of psychic scar.

The origin of this concept
really comes from Freud,

that when we have traumatic
childhood experiences,

those can influence
the development

of adult psychopathology,

and that that can often happen
on an unconscious level.

You can not be aware

that certain
neurotic tendencies

that you have as an adult

have their origins
in some kind of

early traumatic experience.

And that, in and of itself,

was a very modern
and new idea.

150 years ago,
doctors believed

that pain was actually good
for you,

that when patients
experience pain

during a surgical procedure,
for example,

that that would boost
the cardiovascular response,

that would boost
the immune response,

that it helped
with the healing process,

that there was
a spiritual component.

You know, this whole idea that

what doesn't kill you
makes you stronger.

That was very much ingrained
in medical training

and in the medical system
to the point

that in the mid-1800s,
when anesthesia

was first invented,

some of the most prominent
surgeons in this country

didn't want to adopt it
because they wanted

their patients to feel pain
during procedures

in order to expedite
the healing process.

Like, we don't think that way
about pain anymore.

You know, now we think,
"Oh, my goodness, pain!

Like, I've got to get rid of it
immediately."

But what makes
the opioid crisis unique

is that the pills themselves

are so inherently addictive

that if you then add that

to all
of the business incentives

to overprescribe,

you do end up with
this kind of perfect storm

that leads to the crisis
that we have today.

[TV static drones, buzzes]

- You know, guys,

you know, as far as the Purdue

Frederick Sales Organization

is concerned,

it's a high-energy sales

organization.

It's one of the best
sales organizations

in the pharmaceutical industry,

and they're hard-driven.

And if we're gonna write a song
for these folks,

it's a song that's gotta smoke.

[feedback squeals]
Okay.

[electric guitar music]

♪ ♪

[scattered cheering]
Purdue, are you ready to rock?

[uproarious cheers
and applause]

- Whoo!

[poignant organ music playing]

♪ Well, I want to tell you
a story ♪

♪ About people ♪

♪ About a company
called Purdue Frederick ♪

♪ And they did so good in '96 ♪

♪ Now, people ♪

I think they're really ready
to rock right now.

I said, are you ready
to rock right now?

[crowd cheering]

Put your hands together
if you're ready now.

["Shout" tune plays]

narrator: In the late '90s,

Purdue celebrated
its marketing muscle.

There were 600 sales reps
pitching healthcare providers

all over the country.

Using parties and junkets

to lure doctors
to write scripts,

Purdue's pitchmen banked
$40 million a year in bonuses.

At the turn of the century,

OxyContin sales exceeded
$1 billion a year,

passing Viagra as America's
most profitable drug.

- ♪ You know you make me
want to sell ♪

♪ New prescriptions ♪
- ♪ Sell! ♪

- I was very gladdened

to see that OxyContin
was meeting

with such a strong,
positive reception,

by both physicians
and patients.

- ♪ Hey, hey ♪

- Ladies, and gentlemen...

- The doctors
that we targeted,

they called me Moneybags
and Easy Money,

I guess,
because in their mind,

once you got them on OxyContin
or a opioid

and they got hooked,

you were going to get
reoccurring prescriptions.

And the monthly bonus checks.

My first year with Purdue,

I believe I made
in the neighborhood

of about 170.
170,000.

- ♪ Selling MS Contin ♪

♪ Every day ♪

♪ Selling OxyContin ♪

- My final year,
it was almost 300,000.

- ♪ Now wait a minute! ♪

♪ You know you make me want ♪
- ♪ Sell! ♪

- ♪ New prescriptions ♪
- ♪ Sell! ♪

♪ Expenses risen ♪

- Sometimes doctors tell us
they feel

that our sales representatives
have been pushy.

They are insistent
because they're on a mission

to bring this medication
to people who need it

to restore their quality
of life.

- Hi, Lauren.
- Hi, Doctor.

- Nice to see you today.
- Nice to see you as well.

- Yeah, they called me
Easy Money,

but there wasn't nothing easy
about it

because we had such a wall
to break away.

At least early on, doctors
were afraid of the opiates,

and they didn't believe
in using high doses.

They didn't believe in using it
in non-cancer pain,

so we had to overcome all that.

- In this program,
these and other patients,

all of whom have suffered
through years

of varying degrees
of chronic pain,

tell the story of their long,
often frustrating,

always painful search
for adequate treatment.

- They had a video called
"I Got My Life Back"

I played many a-times
in physicians' offices,

sort of humanize the idea
of treating pain patients.

- Since I've been
on this new pain medication...

- I'm more of a partner
to my husband again.

- Now I can go to a movie.
- I'm still alive.

- When they mentioned
the dosages

that they were on...

- I'm currently
at 1,200 milligrams

of OxyContin.

- You know,
some physicians,

their mouth would drop open
and, you know,

we would explain to them that

there was no maximum
on the dosage,

that you could go
with a pure opioid

that had no secondary product
in it

like Tylenol, or ibuprofen,
or aspirin.

- This medication does
not turn you into a zombie.

- The opioids have
given my life back to me.

- The gold nugget was

non-cancer, chronic pain.

OxyContin, it's the one
to start with

and the one to stay with.

- What is pain?

Pain is suffering.
Pain is soreness.

Throbbing. Aching.

Pain is whatever the person
experiencing the pain

says it is.

- [incredulously] Amazing!

Purdue was so generous.

They had video tapes.

They had manuals.
They had posters.

They disseminated that

to all the hospitals
in the country

who had to educate
their doctors.

It meant that I,
a psychiatrist,

had to go
an all-day-long course on pain.

I didn't have to go
to an all-day-long course

on, you know, cardiology
or radiology.

- [echoing] The fact is that
pain should be treated

as aggressively
as the underlying condition

that causes the pain.

- I was taught that
pain should be treated

like the fifth vital sign.

When you take blood pressure,

when you take
respiratory rate,

when you take heart rate,
temperature,

you should show them

this scale from one to ten.

One is like tiny,
little bit of pain,

and ten is the worst pain
you could imagine.

- [echoing] Incorporating
pain management

into nursing education
at all levels

will produce staff members
who are skilled

in pain management.

- We were constantly being told

that there was
a growing epidemic of pain,

that more and more people
were in pain,

that it was the responsibility
of the doctors

to alleviate pain.

- [echoing] There is always
something that can be done

to reduce pain.

- You needed to
"Get over your opioid phobia."

- [echoing] We doctors
were wrong in thinking

that opioids can't be used
long-term.

- "No dose is too high

and your patient
can't get addicted."

- [echoing]
Less than 1%

of patients
taking opioids

actually
become addicted.

- "And if you don't use them,

"you are a bad doctor.

You want people to suffer."

- [echoing]
Take opioids seriously.

[soft ominous music]

- So we tried to abate
all their fears

that were well-founded,

that they had acquired
through medical school

and through practicing
before we got to 'em

about opioids.

We took all that away
and then turned them loose.

[thoughtful string music]

♪ ♪

- There was
great recognition

that we had millions
and millions of Americans

who deserved to have
their pain treated

more humanely.

Frankly, that's why we go
to medical school, right?

We're there really to provide
relief of suffering

as much as anything.

Only once every generation
or two

is there such a dramatic shift

in the way in which
we can help patients

in such a large way

that I thought
I was at the beginning

of this new frontier.

And that's how I became

addicted to the treatment
of pain.

Hello, everyone.
I'm Lynn Webster.

For many people that
experience chronic pain,

it's as malignant as a cancer.

- I had a lot of experience
with Lynn Webster

over the years.

He's unfortunately been one
of the leading educators

across the country

on opioid prescribing,

taking lots of money
from drug companies--

hundreds of thousands--

probably more than
any other key opinion leader.

- Thank you.
- Helping them market

or serving on advisory boards.

He's spoken at hundreds

of medical events.

- The problem
is not hydrocodone.

The problem's
hydrocodone abuse.

- I don't think there's anyone
he wouldn't work for.

[laughing]
I don't know.

- My space in lecturing was

what I viewed
was more academic.

- But you--

you were sometimes paid
by pharmaceutical firms.

- Not--no, no. Not to speak.
- Oh.

- Now, pharmaceutical companies
may hire an educational company

to put together a program.

I would be contracted then
with an educational company

to put on the program,

so it wouldn't be directly.

It's indirectly, I suppose,

but they had no,
no influence on the content.

Zero.
I would never do that.

Thank you very much.
Hello, everyone.

Most of my speaking

was about the risk of opioids.

Opioids can be used safer

than they have been used
in the past

because it is, frankly,
your health.

You know, I think that
the definition of addiction,

um, has to be defined.
[chuckles]

You have to be exposed
to a drug that's rewarding,

like an opioid,

in order to develop the disease
of addiction,

but it's not sufficient,

meaning most people exposed
to an opioid

will never develop
an addiction to it,

regardless of how long
they're on it.

- A whole generation of doctors

bought into this idea

that it's okay
to use opioids liberally

as long as you're giving them

to a patient in pain,

that somehow there's
a magic halo effect

with that prescription pad,

and your patient
won't get addicted.

And if they look like
they're getting addicted,

they're not really addicted.

They're pseudoaddicted.
Now, what's pseudoaddiction?

- Pseudoaddiction is

when a patient is
looking like a drug addict

because they're pursuing
pain relief.

- "Pseudoaddiction"
was a made-up word...

- It only came out about 1990,
but it's crucial.

- In a single case report.

The doctors who wrote
that case report said,

"Aha, we discovered
that this individual

"who looks like
someone who's addicted

"isn't really addicted.

They are 'pseudoaddicted.'"

- Relief-seeking behavior

mistaken as drug addiction.

- "They're really in pain,

and you just need to go up
on the dose."

- Hold on for just a moment.
Let me bring in David Haddox.

- One of the authors
of that study was Haddox,

who went on to work
for Purdue Pharma.

- Good morning.

- And was a lead spokesperson
for them

around more
opioid prescribing.

- No one's talked
about the patients.

- There was never
any science

behind the concept
of pseudoaddiction.

- This message
about pseudoaddiction

was probably the single
most dangerous message

in this whole campaign

because it's exactly
the opposite

of what a prescriber should do.

- A lot of us were,
at that time--

still today--
wonder sometimes

if addiction is really
a behavior.

How do we differentiate
a behavior

that is really somebody
experiencing unrelenting pain,

or they want the drug
for the psychological effect?

You know, I've been criticized
because I said

the treatment of--differen--
I mean, one treat--

one option in trying
to understand

if it's in pseudoaddiction,

the treatment should be,
give more drug.

[eerie music]

- The idea
of pseudoaddiction,

that was talked about
in training a fair amount.

And the way you need
to explain it to a physician

is--was false addiction.

They do look like
they're becoming addicted

or drug-seeking,

and that's a sign you need
to increase the dose.

It made sense when your--

your eyes are glossed over

with a mission
to treat untreated pain.

It filled right in a gap
of any of your knowledge,

and the story seemed
to build on itself.

And, "Yeah, that makes sense.
Pseudoaddiction."

Well, looking back on it,
you know,

that's pretty hypocritical
and crazy.

- You don't think
that there was

a great enthusiasm
for higher doses

without being concerned
about the possible downside?

- Oh, yes.
Absolutely.

I think that there was
a lot of enthusiasm.

I owned it because I thought--

I thought I could
just give enough,

and my patients
would have a normal life.

I know, and all
anesthesiologists know,

you can give enough opioid
to take away the pain.

The problem is,
will they be awake,

or alive?

[soft music]

♪ ♪

[car horn honking]

[bell tolling]

- I served a mission
for my church,

a Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints.

After returning
from that mission,

I was a pediatric psychiatrist

at the local hospital,

and Carol was graduating
as a nurse

from Weber State University,

and that's where we met.

♪ ♪

With our first child,

the due date had passed,

and she said, "We've got
to get this on the road.

"Go get Dad's boat.

We're going to Pineview Dam.

We get up there.

She skis a lap,
beaches on the sand,

and says, "Okay, I'm ready
to have the baby."

She wasn't afraid of anything.

[music fades]

This never should've happened.

[crashing]

One day,

Carol and my oldest son

were going to Sam's Club,

and an 84-year-old woman
ran the stop sign,

and my son's vehicle
T-boned her car,

and she was thrown
into the windshield.

A neurosurgeon
rebuilt her neck

with a plate and screws.

There was pain associated.

It was being managed very well

by our primary care physician,

but then a neighbor came
to visit Carol one day,

who was suffering
from lower back issues,

and he recommended
that Carol go see

Lifetree Pain Clinic.

Dr. Lynn Webster,
he ran the clinic.

- Why did you name
your clinic "Lifetree"?

- [chuckles]

Well, I had
to name it something.

I wanted people to feel like

there was some stability
to my clinic.

That's the roots basically
of a tree.

I was hoping it to be

really a strength
for my patients.

- Webster prescribed
oxycodone.

She was on fentanyl.

She was on amitriptyline.

She was on a hypnotic
for sleep.

Her mannerisms, her behavior,

everything changed after
she started going to Lifetree

in a negative way.

She would take the medication,

and then she would
get confused.

She would get loopy.

And then, you know,
a half hour, 45 minutes later,

she would think, "Oh, I've got
to take my medication."

She'd take it again.

[disquieting string music]

Numerous times,
I found her unconscious

in the strangest of places.

And then,
when she'd come out of it,

she would have no knowledge
of it.

And so I started
taking pictures

of when I would find her.

And the only reason
I took the pictures

is so that I could show her

because she did not believe me.

[indistinct TV chatter]

♪ ♪

[birds singing]

We'd end up
in the emergency room.

And my son, John,

got all of the pills
that Lifetree had prescribed,

and we took them out there.

And I remember the physician

saying,

"You got to be kidding me.

You got to be kidding me.
You got to be kidding me."

And he was able to convince her

to go in the program.

She was able to get off

of all of the pills,

all of the patches.

She was in great shape.
She was happy.

She was smiling.
She was involved.

[soft music]

And she was on Tylenol.

And the next thing
that I know is that

she informed me that

Dr. Webster wanted to meet
with she and I

to discuss her condition.

So we went down,
and I'll never forget.

He made a statement,
and I'm still baffled by it.

He said,
"A chronic pain sufferer

"cannot be an addict.

"I am her physician.

"I will prescribe
the medications

"that I think she needs,

"and she will be
under my care.

And that will be
the end of it."

- I would often say
to my patients,

when I was giving them
higher doses of opioids,

I'd say,

"Take this medicine
just as I say.

Or you may not wake up
in the morning."

Almost inevitably,
these patients would stop,

and look me in the eye,
and say, "Doc,

"that's okay.

I can't live
with the pain I have."

- He gets her back
on all these medications,

and immediately
she was dissociative.

She was lethargic
all the time.

But Dr. Webster refused

to listen to the family.

My children, I tried.

We would call up and say,

"We need to get a message
to Dr. Webster

that he--that Carol
is not in a good way."

- There was always some tension
between the family

and my patient,

and my effort
to try to find a way

to help her with her pain

within a reasonable framework

of what her family would accept

was a challenge.

- He didn't spend
really any time with her

on a monthly basis.

He had PAs that were
doling out medicine.

Webster wasn't minding
the store.

He was traveling
around the country,

and he was promoting
the use of opioids.

It was money.

It was ego.

- Whenever we're looking
at providing a treatment,

we're always looking
at the potential risk

versus the potential harm,

and opioids can provide

more potential benefit
than the potential harm.

[tense music]

♪ ♪

[singers vocalizing]

♪ ♪

[insects buzzing]

narrator: 10,000 miles
from its headquarters

in Connecticut,

Purdue Pharma sought
the solution

to a pressing
production problem.

The company was so successful

that it was running out
of opium.

To find enough supply
for the soaring demand,

Purdue turned
to a company famous

for its promise
of "no more tears."

[uplifting music]

- In just this one moment,

your baby is getting
even more than clean.

The scent, the lather.

Even the tiny bubbles
of a Johnson's bath

are helping
to enhance the experience.

- Johnson & Johnson,

They have this brand

that makes people think
of baby shampoo,

and talcum powder,
and wholesome products.

But they are also the kingpin
in the opioid crisis.

Johnson & Johnson wasn't just

selling its own opioids
and promoting them

for conditions
where we shouldn't use them,

promoting long-term use,

high-dose use.

Johnson & Johnson was
also supplying Purdue

and all of the other
opioid manufacturers

in the United States
with the opium

that was making it possible
for the U.S.

to be flooded with opioids.

The traditional way to extract

opium is you lance
the poppy head.

Then someone goes
through the field,

scraping off the opium sap.

And it's very labor-intensive.

But in Tasmania,
what Johnson & Johnson did

was to really industrialize
the process,

creating a product called
concentrate of poppy straw.

They would basically cut
the whole plant

at a certain point
where it's richest

in the alkaloids,

and then process the straw
to get the opium out.

narrator: Johnson & Johnson
also genetically altered

the nature of the plant

to create a super poppy,

that was surging
with thebaine,

a narcotic in oxycodone.

To persuade Tasmanian farmers

to switch from potatoes
to poppies,

J&J offered luxury vacations

and awarded prizes--
Mercedes and BMWs--

to farmers

who could produce
the most potent crop.

[dramatic music]

♪ ♪

Soon, 74,000 acres of Tasmania
were devoted

to opium.

J&J lobbied
the U.S. government

for unlimited access
to American markets

and promoted its product
in a brochure

called "Finding Relief."

[train horn blares]

In the United States, Purdue
used the opioids from Tasmania

to flood the country
with OxyContin.

But the pills
weren't just for pain.

They were being diverted
from doctors

to people looking
for a heroin high.

From the mid-'90s,

the company's sales reps
weren't willing or able

to recognize the abuse that
was happening all around them.

- Looking back
and reflecting on it,

what Purdue also did
to their benefit--

and I sincerely think
it was probably a strategy--

was when they hired people,

they hired representatives
from other companies

that didn't sell opioids.

They didn't like
to have people,

from what I've seen,
come in to their company

that was preexposed
to the problems

with abuse diversion
and things like that.

You see what I'm saying?

The number one thing we were
taught about addiction was,

in the package insert,
it says,

"Delayed absorption
of OxyContin

is believed to reduce
the abuse potential."

That sentence was pounded in.

I pounded it in doctors' heads.

"Delayed absorption
of OxyContin

is believed to reduce
the abuse potential."

Over and over and over
and over and over.

"Delayed absorption
of OxyContin

is believed to reduce
the abuse potential."

And I would always
let them know it,

you know, "Nothing gets
in these package inserts

"that hasn't been reviewed,

you know, excruciatingly
by the FDA."

- From the inception of

the launch of OxyContin,

we focused
our salesmen's attention

to physicians whose practice--

and their practice was to use--

write a lot of prescriptions
for opioids.

We didn't go to people
who didn't write them.

We went to people who did.

[ominous music]

- Dr. Frank Sutherland
was a osteopath

down in Grundy, Virginia.

Grundy, Virginia is a little
old Podunk town, coal town

that's down in a bowl
coming from Richlands.

It's just straight down,

swerve-y and curvy,
and you get down there,

and there's a lot of
hardworking people down there,

but there's a lot of people
that, um,

are, um...

druggies, I guess
you should say.

I went in to see Frank,
and pretty quickly,

he jumped on the bandwagon,

writing OxyContin
very regularly,

probably seeing
80 patients a day.

I also noticed
in his waiting room

more and more I went,
that he had patients in there

that looked like they were
rough around the edges.

And I would hear conversations,
pick up a tidbit about,

you know, "You need to ask
for this many."

And they was talking
about OxyContin.

♪ ♪

I didn't sell opioids before.

I didn't abuse them,

so I didn't know
you could crush it

and snort it.

But obviously,
if you do crush it,

you get away
from the time release,

therefore there's trouble.
You could get the whole dose.

I brought that
to Frank's attention.

He says, "I know who they are.
I know who they are."

You know, I said, "Okay.

"You know, as long as you know
who they are.

"You know, I don't want you
to prescribe--give OxyContin

to somebody you know
that's abusing."

But then I had a doctor
that I actually seen one time.

I went in, and he was
wiping his nose

and doing this trick,
coming up from his desk.

He was cutting up OxyContin

and snorting them
right off his own desk.

As it went on,

you kept hearing
more and more stories.

You had, say,
the nurse in the office

explain to you
that her grandson

pulled one
out of the drug cabinet

and snorted it and overdosed.

You know,
"What? Are you kidding me?"

You know, and I start hearing
more and more stories

from nurses that I knew
for 15 years.

And by the time it got to

the end of '99,

I was pretty convinced
that we had

a major problem on our hands.

That's when I started trying
to pass the information

up to the top.

The emails that I sent up
were right to the point.

You know, "There's gonna be
a death train coming.

"We've got to do something
about this.

This is just chaos out here.
I can't believe it."

I thought that they would
at least have the decency

to listen to one
of their best reps

with some concerns,

but they did not even want
to entertain the discussion.

You know, "It's not your job
to be a policeman.

"Go in there and sell.
You're a salesman."

You know, I was sort of like
a canary in a coal mine,

but nobody was running,

nobody was leaving.

♪ ♪

[lights clicking, humming]

[footsteps approaching]

- I was at work one day,

sitting around the newsroom,

and an editor came over to me.

He said, "I've gotten a tip,"

from a source of his
that was on a pharmacy board,

who told him there was
this new drug, OxyContin.

It had become the hottest drug
on the street,

and the number of overdoses
were rising.

And he thought we should be
looking into what was going on.

[melancholy music]

We started calling around,

speaking to pharmacists,
speaking to doctors,

trying to get
an understanding,

because prior to this,
I had never really done

any reporting
about the drug industry.

So all the things
that I was learning

were relatively new to me.

They were also kind of strange
and appalling at the same time.

♪ ♪

One of the real turning points
for me

came when I found there was
a study that was done

in the late 1990s,

which showed that

drug addicts were seeking out

long-acting opioids

because they were pure

and because they had
much higher volumes

of the active narcotic

than the shorter-acting drugs.

This seems
to disprove the theory

that long-acting opioids
are less prone to abuse,

but there was no question
that OxyContin was

being promoted as,
like, a safer, better,

more effective, less abusable
form of pain treatment.

- It says here under--
on page 30,

"OxyContin's wide availability

"may have increased
opportunities

for illicit use."

Did you ever do any studies

on abuse liability
for OxyContin

before you all put it
on the market?

- I'm not aware of any.

[page flips]

♪ ♪

- And I wondered whether
Purdue knew about that study,

whether they had distributed
that study,

whether they told the FDA
about that study.

I asked them
all those questions,

which they refused to answer.

Purdue, when we started
speaking to them,

were adamant
that neither the drug

nor their manner
of promoting the drug

had anything to do
with the overdoses.

I became somewhat obsessed

with learning
about what Purdue knew

and when they knew it.

narrator: Beginning
with a series of articles

for "The New York Times,"

Barry Meier began
to investigate possible crimes

committed by Purdue
and the Sackler family.

That led to a book called
"Pain Killer,"

which was the first
detailed account

of the opioid crisis

and how it had spread
from Maine to Mexico.

It focused on Appalachia

and the westernmost sliver
of Virginia

that points like a knife

between the heartlands
of Kentucky and Tennessee.

[gentle country music]

In the town of St. Charles,

Barry Meier discovered
a citizens' crusade

to protect local communities

against the assault
of OxyContin

led by a doctor

named Art Van Zee.

- If you're in a small town,

and you have
a hospital practice,

and you're involved
in a lot of things

in internal medicine
for 44 years,

you do get to do
a lot of things

that are meaningful to you

and rewarding.

- How many babies
do you suspect

you delivered in that time?

- Oh, I don't deliver babies.

So I've seen a lot
of young people grow up,

and I've been involved
with multiple generations

of some families, you know,
in terms of their care,

but, yeah--
but we don't deliver babies.

It was 1999, 2000

when OxyContin really came
like a tsunami

into the coal fields.

9% of the seventh graders

had tried OxyContin
at least once

and 25% of the 11th graders.

- It's morphine.

It's being, like,
on a morphine high.

You're kind of numb.

You're free,
and you're like, "Ah,"

but you're itching.

- I was going in
after midnight sometimes

to take care of young people
overdosed

on OxyContin, on respirators.

I was really, in many ways,
unprepared for this.

- Where were these pills
coming from?

- They're everywhere.

- Early on
in the reporting,

when we were
tracking down doctors

and tracking down pharmacists,

I spoke to Art by phone,

and we began to chat

quite a bit.

He was increasingly
freaked out

by how Purdue
was marketing the drug.

And he would supply me with

materials that
he had sent to Purdue.

- Letters and some emails

about what we were seeing.

"Dear Dr. Haddox,
I'm writing you

"as medical director
at Purdue Pharmaceuticals

"to give you
further information.

"Over the last two years,

"we've seen numerous
young people abusing

"and becoming addicted
to OxyContin.

"Frequent overdoses,
infections,

"abscesses, Hepatitis C

"related to intravenous
drug abuse.

"About 70% of serious crimes
in the county

"are now drug related.

"Some counties in Maine are
experiencing similar problems.

"These problems
are enormous ones

"for poor rural areas
such as ours

"with minimal resources

"for dealing with
hard-core narcotic addiction.

"I would look forward
to having a dialogue with you

"further about this.

Sincerely, Art Van Zee."

They indicated they were
concerned about it.

narrator: When Purdue
wrote back to Dr. Van Zee,

the correspondence included
two former FDA officials

who now work for Purdue.

One of them was the man

who had pushed through
the approval of OxyContin,

Curtis Wright.

While the tone
was conciliatory,

the message was clear:

Purdue wasn't gonna fix
the problem.

So Van Zee dug in
for a longer battle.

- I became more involved,
but, I mean, it was

the whole community that
was becoming more involved.

We had a community-wide
meeting at the high school

to address and speak to

the OxyContin problem.

There was something
on the order of 800 people

that--it was
an overflow crowd.

I mean, you couldn't get
800 people

in that high school auditorium
for any other thing

except maybe the high school
football state championship

or something like that.

[ambient country music]

♪ ♪

Not too long after that,
we got a call

from Dr. Haddox.

He wanted to know
if he could meet with me.

- We've been very actively
educating physicians

and other
healthcare practitioners

on appropriate
selection criteria

to get the right drug
to the right patients.

- We met
in Duffield, Virginia

at a motel there.

They offered us $100,000

to try to deal with--
to deal with the problem.

And we just felt,
you know, at the time,

that it just kind of
been a setup.

We thought it was more
of a publicity deal

than a real attempt to

deal with the problems.

[indistinct chatter]

We started on a petition

to ask the FDA
to recall OxyContin,

that it was causing
an unordinary amount

of harm and suffering,

and that it should be recalled.

- Purdue Pharma
reportedly spent $26 million

last year educating doctors as
to the wonders of OxyContin,

but Art Van Zee believes
the drug was overpromoted

and is now being
overprescribed.

- They've very heavily marketed

to the extent that no other

narcotic has ever been
marketed.

narrator:
Dr. Van Zee decided

to take the matter
to Congress.

Surely U.S. senators
would be concerned

about a drug epidemic

that was costing tens
of thousands of lives

all over the country.

- I was pretty much terrified

about speaking publicly

and speaking
before the Senate.

A lot of the Purdue people
were there.

Senator Clinton was there.

And Chris Dodd was there.

narrator: Chris Dodd was
the senator from Connecticut,

where Purdue Pharma had
its headquarters.

A proud booster
of the company,

Dodd asked Dr. Van Zee
why he thought

Purdue should be held
to account.

- I said something
to the effect of,

"In general, the experience is

"is if you got a abusable drug

"that's highly available,

it's gonna be highly abused."

And he kind of mused about,

"Is that a little
Appalachian saying?"

Or something like that.

narrator: Dodd defended Purdue
by suggesting

that the real problem was
drug addicts in rural areas.

"Instead of blaming
the company,

why not blame the addicts
for killing themselves?"

It was a grim talking point,

and it mirrored
Purdue's perspective

that OxyContin was not
responsible for addiction,

made in a meeting with Dodd

before the hearing.

Van Zee was unprepared
for the firestorm

of Purdue's
corporate campaign.

- I thought this is like that
huge wildfire at Yellowstone,

where we're sitting on one side

of the fire line
with squirt guns

and a lot of press
gathered around,

and then, on the back end,

they're dropping the napalm.

narrator:
Soon after the hearing,

Purdue rewarded Dodd

with a campaign contribution
that was 10 times larger

than what Purdue gave
to any other politician.

Art Van Zee returned
to western Virginia,

and the rest of the country
went about its business,

but the opioid crisis
did not go away.

It got worse.

By the end of 2002,

non-medical opioid use
in the U.S. increased

by 2.5 million Americans.

Addictions rates soared,

and so did overdoses.

- As these stories
start filtering out

from across the country,

there was a bit of
a bunker mentality,

I think, at the company,

a siege mentality,

a sense that they needed to
protect this product of theirs,

which was bringing them
billions of dollars

at that time.

Richard Sackler,
he's angry,

and you can feel the anger
in these emails.

- He says, quote,

"We have to hammer
on the abusers

"in every way possible.

"They are the culprits
and the problem.

They are reckless criminals."

- Yeah, yeah.

Well, the first response
I had to that:

there's only one reckless
criminal in this situation,

and it's Purdue Pharma.

They had no morals.

They had no ethics about 'em.

- In Richard Sackler's mind,
and this is a framework

that you then see
throughout the company,

and over the decades,
even today--

they argue that, "Drug abusers
would be abusing drugs

"no matter what.

You know,
if it wasn't OxyContin,

"it would be something else.

"And legitimate pain patients
who take the drug as prescribed

don't get addicted."

- You know,
this idea being that

you're dealing
with two separate species,

well, that's not how
it really is.

You know, patients who misuse

and get addicted to opioids

are legitimate pain patients.

- Far from apologizing,

Purdue Pharma
is fighting back,

saying its only intent is
to get relief

to the 50 million Americans
in pain.

But with the growing number
of doctors saying

they're afraid
to prescribe OxyContin

and at least two
major supermarket chains

refusing to carry it
for fear of robbery,

Purdue Pharma found itself
in need of a PR miracle,

so it went out and hired one.

- Well, we've been working
with Purdue

for about four months now.

- Seen here in a
company-provided news release,

former New York City Mayor
Rudy Giuliani,

has agreed to lend
his considerable credibility

to the drug maker's battle

to save its bestseller.

- They hire Rudy Giuliani.

This is right after he leaves
government in New York.

He's America's mayor

and becomes kind of
a hatchet man

for Purdue.

- This should be available
to people

so that they can have
not just a life,

but a quality of life.

- It's astonishing.

The real fervor
with which they pursued

and advanced this idea that,

"We're out here fighting for
the legitimate pain patients.

"For access.

"Access to the thing
that I am selling

and making billions
of dollars."

Purdue ends up getting pursued
by the authorities.

There's a federal prosecutor
in Virginia

who goes after them.

- The investigation
was conducted

by a very small office.

The United States
Attorney's Office

for the Western District
of Virginia,

in Abingdon, Virginia,

which is a beautiful,
little historic town

in the foothills
of the Appalachians.

[camera shutters clicking]

- Well, good afternoon, and
thank you all for being here.

We had a problem.
We had death rates.

We had reports
from medical examiners.

We had crime rates going up

in certain parts
of our community.

We had an explosion

of OxyContin availability

in our community.

And so, all of those things

led us to believe that

we needed to take a look

at this issue.

narrator: In 2001,
John Brownlee was

the U.S. attorney
in western Virginia.

With a small team
of investigators,

Brownlee began to look
into claims of OxyContin abuse

in Appalachia

and if Purdue
and the Sackler family

knew what was happening.

- They spent years gathering
documents from Purdue,

bringing people
before grand juries,

really doing a very extensive
investigation.

It just kept going
and going and going.

- Once you had
these millions of records,

these investigators
and lawyers

pieced together a case.

And then, when
you put it all together,

it equals a crime.

[tense music]

♪ ♪

- We at Purdue
are very distressed

that OxyContin,

which as you've heard
is providing so much relief

to so many people,

is being abused as well,

and we deeply regret
the tragic consequences

the have resulted from
the misuse of this medicine.

narrator: Just as Brownlee was
beginning his investigation,

Purdue's chief medical officer
was testifying

before Congress.

He was responding to an outcry

over an article
in "The Boston Globe"

about widespread
OxyContin abuse in Maine.

- Everybody was taken
by surprise, what happened.

We launched OxyContin in 1996,

and for the first four years
on the market,

we did not hear
of any particular problem.

In February of 2000,

was the first time
we became aware

that something different
was going on.

In February of 2000,

we got a copy of a letter

that then-U.S. Attorney
Jay McCloskey of Maine

sent to physicians in Maine,

warning them of problems
of OxyContin

that were occurring
in certain communities.

And since that time,

I am proud of our response.

As an executive
of this company,

I am very proud to be working
for this company.

Nobody has taken
the kind of initiative

for a problem that is not
just an OxyContin problem.

This is a problem
of drug abuse.

This is a problem
of prescription drug abuse,

and OxyContin is now clearly,

squarely in the midst
of that problem.

We've been advocates
of proper pain management.

- That testimony
by Goldenheim,

his sense of shock
and effrontery

you know, at the idea that
it was only in early 2000

when the company discovered

that the product
was being abused

and they immediately
sprung into action

and took it seriously,

and then to contrast that
with his own emails--

years of his own emails--

in which it becomes clear

that that's all lies.

He knew.
The company knew.

They knew that OxyContin
was being abused.

They discussed it.
They looked into it.

They saw it as a problem.

Literally there's a moment
where Goldenheim says

he wants to remove any
discussions about addiction

from email

because it's too sensitive.

[foreboding music]

♪ ♪

It's clear Goldenheim lied
under oath

in testimony to Congress.

narrator: It was also clear
to federal prosecutors.

They were discovering,
through witnesses

and the company's own emails,

that starting in 1996,

all the top Purdue executives
and the Sacklers

knew that
their time-release opioids,

MS Contin and OxyContin,

were easily and widely abused.

The company conducted
its own spoon and shoot study,

which revealed that addicts
could crush the pills,

add water,

and then shoot the drugs
with a needle.

In 1998,

key Sackler board members
and Purdue executives

were well-informed
about the street traffic

for their drugs.

30-milligram MS Contin pills
were selling for $40 a pop.

They were known
as purple peelers

because users looking
for a heroin high

would just peel off
the time-release coating.

The same went for OxyContin.

- While you were
still at Purdue,

do you recall hearing
any information

about OxyContin being abused
in West Virginia?

- Sure.

- And when was the earliest
you recalled hearing about it?

- Maybe a couple years
after its launch.

- Would that be 1988?

- '97.
- All right.

And what did you hear?

- That it was called
hillbilly heroin

in Appalachia.

- What was the source
of that information,

if you recall?

- Just gossip
throughout the company.

narrator: Sales reps
routinely warned Purdue

about abuse of the drug,

but the company
didn't urge caution.

Instead,
Purdue encouraged reps

to push higher
and higher doses to doctors.

That alarmed
one Purdue official,

who sent a note about
a new 160-milligram pill

to the company's
chief legal officer.

"They're killing themselves
with the 80s.

Why would we come out
with a 160?"

- There are actually
instances of reps

being aware that
there are patients

who are being prescribed just

unheard of, superhuman,

"enough to kill an elephant"
quantities of OxyContin

and apparently being all right
with that.

narrator:
In Naples, Florida,

prosecutors discovered
a plan by Purdue

to use a patient
as a poster child

for high doses of OxyContin.

The man's name was Gary Blinn.

A former heroin addict with
a high tolerance for opioids,

he told me he was looking
for relief

from crippling back pain

when he stumbled on a doctor
named Stephen Montaldi.

♪ ♪

- So I found Steve Montaldi.

We started
with steroid injections,

and he knew
how severe the case was,

and so he hit me
with the morphine.

I came out of the office
one day,

and there was a very attractive
young lady out there.

Asked if she could talk to me.

I said, "Sure."

She introduced herself.
"I'm Stephanie Cauffman.

"And I'm a representative
of Purdue.

"And we have a drug
called OxyContin.

"And we'd like to offer you a--

"a deal, a trial.

"You know, we pick up
all the costs

if you'd consider switching
to our drugs."

She said,
"There's a special formula.

"You just take
as much as you need.

"You can keep going up until
you get enough pain relief.

And chances of overdosing
are very slim."

You know, so no money.

They were gonna pay
for everything.

I said, "Sounds like a deal."

narrator: Stephanie Cauffman
was the Purdue sales rep

for Southwest Florida.

She would also enter
into a sexual relationship

with Blinn's doctor, Montaldi.

- She knew my history.

She was prepped.

- Why did Stephanie say
she was willing

to give you the drugs for free?

- Because it was a trial
from Purdue--excuse me.

You know, it was a--

they were testing it.

They started me with

maybe eight or ten,
twice a day.

160.
It's the highest dose.

And that wasn't working,

so they just kept on
raising it.

12, two times a day.
Then 15.

It wasn't doing it,
so we went up to 20.

And I said,
"This still isn't doing it."

So he made the phone call.

He told me it was
to the doctors at Purdue.

And they said, you know,
"Give him more."

♪ ♪

So that's when we got up
to the 25.

Twice a day.

50 pills a day.

It would almost
take me 15 minutes

just to eat them all.

You know, it was like sitting
down to a bowl of Cheerios.

You know?

I was starting to feel
a little toxic,

like my body
was telling me that

we're not doing well.

But, I mean, what can I do
but take more?

You know what I'm saying?
I mean...

When you're in that much pain
and--

and you're addicted to that--
such a high dose,

no matter what it is,

I mean,

you're a trapped rat.

narrator: Blinn was
taking the equivalent

of 200 hits of heroin a day.

He kept the prescription
bottle for 20 years

because he thought
something was not right.

- I knew I was being used.

My doses were--

were for being a guinea pig
or an example.

I think their plan
didn't start off like,

"Here's what we're gonna do
with this guy."

When they saw that I--

I was, uh,

you know, functioning
taking the higher doses,

I believe they thought
they could just,

you know, "Okay, give him
as many as he wants."

You know, they knew
that was a goal,

to keep on adding more.

narrator:
When Montaldi left town,

he kept prescribing
high dosages for Blinn

without reviewing
his condition.

Cauffman herself would
deliver the drugs to Blinn.

Even though
the pills were free,

Cauffman got a bonus
for the high doses.

More important, Purdue
used Blinn's prescription

as a marketing tool
to prove to other doctors

that no dose of OxyContin
was too high.

- That seems
kind of over the line,

but for somebody like Cauffman,
you know,

was she punished?

Was she fired?
What happened to her?

- She was promoted.

She--
[laughs incredulously]

She was promoted.
She, um...

She got moved up
to headquarters,

and they gave her
a new position

training other sales reps.

- Our objective
in communicating with doctors

through trained
sales representatives,

literature,
and educational programs

is to educate them about
the proper use of OxyContin.

[soft dramatic music]

♪ ♪

- Somewhere there
in the middle of my career,

I got a subpoena in the mail

from the federal
prosecuting attorney

from Abingdon, Virginia,

and I needed to be there
at this time

and be ready to testify
in front of a grand jury.

That floored me.
That scared me.

It run a chill down my spine.

They wanted information

concerning
Dr. Frank Sutherland

and how he was overprescribing
OxyContin.

When I called Howard Udell,

the lead counsel
for Purdue Pharma,

he listened to me,
and he chuckled

when I said I needed
some representation.

He said, "You're on your own."

Said, "That shouldn't be
any problem."

I said, "Are you kidding me?

"You know, I'm being subpoenaed

"by the federal government

over OxyContin, and you're
not gonna send anybody down?"

"Well, no.
No, you'll be all right."

Click.

narrator:
In addition to Mark Ross,

Stephanie Cauffman,
Gary Blinn,

and scores of doctors,
patients, and sales reps

were called before
Brownlee's grand jury.

That testimony, plus
internal Purdue documents,

became a part of
a 120-page prosecution memo.

While it's still
a secret government document,

we managed to obtain a copy.

It makes a powerful case for a
nationwide criminal conspiracy

that included fraud,
pill mills,

doctors trading drugs for sex,
false statements to Congress,

and attempts
to target key officials

of the Bush Administration.

It argues that
the FDA was used

to falsely and fraudulently
market OxyContin

and that key executives
and the Sacklers

helped conceal the abuse

and addictive nature
of the drug.

♪ ♪

In 2006,
Brownlee sent the memo

to the Department of Justice

for final review.

- 100-page or more pros' memos
are fairly rare.

It had an incredible amount
of detail.

I thought that it was
an overwhelming case

of criminal liability

by the company,
and by the individuals.

I'll read you

what my deputy said to us

about this evidence
in this case.

"Perhaps no case in history
rivals

"the burden placed
on public health and safety

"as that articulated
by our line prosecutors

"in western district
of Virginia.

"OxyContin abuse
has significantly impacted

"the lives of millions
of Americans

"in the fraudulent scheme
and conduct articulated

"in this matter

as a direct correlation
to that threat."

So that was front and center
for us

and for the prosecutors.

The charges were wire fraud,
mail fraud,

and misbranding.

There were money laundering
charges as well

and conspiracy, of course,

because this was

a very complex fact pattern

that many people
were involved in,

making sure that this crime

both was committed
and was committed effectively.

narrator: It looked like
there might finally be justice

for the damage done,

but when Purdue heard
that some of its executives

might go to prison,

the company mounted
an influence campaign...

- Yeah, one last question.

All right.
One last answer.

narrator: Led by former
U.S. Attorney's Mary Jo White

and Rudolph Giuliani.

- Thank you very much.
- Mr. Mayor?

narrator:
They went over the heads

of Brownlee's prosecutors

to Alice Fisher, the head
of the Criminal Division,

and to Fisher's boss,
Paul McNulty.

One of them bowed
to political pressure

and agreed not to put
the executives on trial.

When questioned
about the decision,

neither one would
take responsibility

for trading a guilty plea

in exchange for bearing
the most damning evidence

against Purdue.

- Based upon
what I had seen,

I was mortified.

There could be
no rhyme or reason

that you would've squashed
the prosecutors

from prosecuting
these executives

to the full extent of the law

and to prosecute the company
to the full extent of the law,

because that's what
the Department of Justice

missionized us to do.

Lots of times,
why you prosecute these cases

is to get out
in the public milieu

exactly what was going on.

Even if we lose,

the public is gonna know
this was a righteous case

that we really
should've prosecuted.

narrator:
The Department of Justice

manufactured a press release

to make the deal look tough.

The company,
as an institution,

pled guilty to a felony

and paid a $600 million fine.

- Also, Purdue's
chief executive officer

Michael Friedman,

general counsel Howard Udell,

and former chief medical
officer Paul Goldenheim,

pleaded guilty
to a misdemeanor charge

in misbranding OxyContin

and collectively paid
$34.5 million in penalties.

narrator: It was the illusion
of justice.

At the courthouse,
the parents of children

who had died of overdoses
showed up to be heard.

Some had a chance
to speak directly

to the Purdue executives

about the children
they had lost.

Said one mother,
"You created this drug.

"You pushed it.
You lied about it.

"You killed my son
and so many others,

and continued to do so
as I speak."

[solemn music]

♪ ♪

While waiting for the bus

to take them
to the corporate jet,

the Purdue executives
and their lawyers

expressed no remorse

and denied
any personal responsibility.

None of them would spend a day
in prison.

Purdue paid the executives'
fines and legal costs

and gave two of them bonuses
to compensate them

for the pain
they had suffered.

- Do you believe
Purdue's marketing

was overly aggressive?

- No.

- Yeah. Do you believe
Purdue's marketing

was appropriate?

- I believe so.

- When the deal
was announced,

Purdue represented it
as a shocking verdict

that was extremely onerous
for them

and hugely damaging
to the reputation

of the executives.

Was that your view
inside the department?

- No, I think the general view
inside the department is,

they paid the speeding ticket.

- You know, what happens
to the company is,

you know, it's something
we just didn't look into.

- Purdue Pharma,
up until 2006,

they made about $9 billion

marketing OxyContin.

$9 billion.

They paid somewhere
in the neighborhood

of $600- to $700-million
as a fine.

Why would anyone
not repeat that conduct?

If the worst that could happen
is you have to give,

what I would say, is
a miniscule amount of that--

of those profits
to the government?

You can keep doing business
the way you've been doing it.

You are basically telling
pharmaceutical companies,

"You have a green light
to do this."

- Yes.

[melancholy music]

♪ ♪

- After the settlement,

Purdue doesn't pull
the emergency brake.

They don't recall the drug.

Instead, they double down.
They keep selling.

And the Sacklers
start wondering

how they can
keep sales increasing.

And there's two answers.

One is, "We want
to sell bigger doses,

and we want people on them
for longer."

To say as explicitly
as the Sacklers said,

in the face
of the opioid crisis,

"How do we keep this show
going?"

You know, it was
breathtakingly cynical.

- Do you know how much
the Sackler family has made

off the sale of OxyContin?

- I don't know.

- But fair to say
it's over a billion dollars?

- It would be fair
to say that, yes.

- Do you know
if it's over $10 billion?

- I don't think so.

- Do you know
if it's over $5 billion?

- I don't know.
- All right.

narrator: The Sackler family
is worth over $10 billion,

in the neighborhood
of the Mellons

and the Rockefellers.

The world's
most famous museums,

including the Museum
of Natural History,

the Smithsonian,
and the Tate Modern,

boast collections
bearing the Sackler name.

[singers vocalizing]

An article on the family's
real estate holdings

showcase sprawling estates

with vast grounds, pools,
and tennis courts

and a New York City townhouse

likely worth
more than $50 million.

The Sacklers bought
the Caribbean luxury getaway

of Amanyara

and scores of opulent hotels.

They collected a portfolio
of 17 ski resorts,

many in states scarred
by the opioid crisis.

The family moved billions
out of the company

as the money from OxyContin
kept rolling in.

[soft dramatic music]

♪ ♪

After the 2007 settlement,

Purdue's revenue soared

to a company record
of $3 billion a year,

the best performance
in the company's history.

Following Purdue's example,

other manufacturers
and distributors

rushed into the opioid market.

They flooded towns and
counties in the United States

with 100 billion pills.

The companies knew exactly
where the pills were going

and that many
were not for pain.

Addiction rates soared,
and so did overdoses.

160,000 Americans died

in the seven years
after the Purdue settlement.

- What'd she take?

- Acknowledge me
if you can hear me.

- Waking up?
- Are you coming out of it?

narrator:
For more than 20 years,

Americans have watched
the human cost

of the opioid crisis

as if it were an epidemic
without a cause.

- Open your eyes.

narrator: But what if
we had seen early on

the evidence that
the crisis was manufactured

by a series of cynical crimes?

- You're all right.
You're all right.

narrator:
More than a decade passed

before that evidence
began to surface,

in leaks
of the prosecution memo

that had buried
when the government failed

to bring Purdue to trial.

- Reading the prosecution memo

was like an incredible slap
in the face.

The tragedy of this episode

really does relate
to how this case was resolved

because by burying
the prosecution memo,

the Justice Department
effectively agreed

to bury critical information

that doctors,

public health officials,

and patients needed to know

about the dangers of opioids.

[soft dramatic music
concludes]

[dog whines]

- It was the day
before Thanksgiving.

I got home

around 3:00 to 4:00
in the afternoon,

and I found Carol in the den,

on the floor,

with her head
under one of the chairs

and a telephone
right by the side of her.

Turned her over,

grabbed the phone,

called 911,

and began CPR.

Based on what I know now,

it appears that she passed away

sometime between 10:00
and 11:00 that morning.

[solemn music]

♪ ♪

We sued Lynn Webster
and Lifetree.

And before it was settled,

there is what's called
a DOPL hearing--

which a DOPL stands

for Department
of Professional Licensing--

and Lynn Webster was
in that meeting.

And that's when he asserted
that Carol was suicidal.

He tried to put all
of the responsibility

onto Carol Ann.

He couldn't accept
responsibility of his actions.

I did not have
any direct communication,

other than to look
across the table

and basically tell him that

he killed my wife.

- Let me tell you something.

I had several patients die
in my practice.

- At Lifetree?
- At Lifetree, yeah.

And I was very cognizant always

that opioids could contribute
to an overdose.

And I was also cognizant that

without treatment of pain,

then they could commit suicide,

so it's--

what are you to do?

I mean, here's the story

of so many people
with severe pain:

life is not worth living

unless they have
their pain treated.

You, as a clinician,
are always there

trying to decide,

is the lack of treatment

going to cause more harm

than the treatment?

Every one of my patients,

I had to give
that consideration to.

It's not easy

to make the right choice
all of the time.

- In her final
monthly prescription,

one week prior to her death,
she was given

60 50-milligram tablets
of amitriptyline,

30 40-milligram tablets
of Celexa,

224 30-milligram tablets
of oxycodone,

112 10/325-milligram tablets
of Percocet,

60 1-milligram tablets
of Requip,

60 1-milligram tablets
of Xanax,

and a--oh, sorry--

60 4-milligram tablets
of Zanaflex.

It's a muscle relaxant.

So if you saw
that monthly level

of prescription for a patient,

would that be a rather
significant pain dose?

- I think for any patient,

except maybe someone who's
near the very end of life,

if I were to learn

that a physician had prescribed
that regimen

to a patient, I would--

I would, I think, contact
the state medical board

and report that prescriber
because they are clearly

putting that patient's life
at risk.

♪ ♪

narrator: In 2009, there were

so many overdose deaths tied
to the Lifetree Pain Clinic

that the medical examiner's
office felt compelled

to report them.

The next year,

the DEA launched a raid
on Lifetree.

- They came in with badges,
and, I mean,

pretty frightening to my staff.

And the office was full--
- Guns?

- They didn't have guns drawn.
No.

But they had guns.
They were obvious.

I mean, I felt--

I was
on a wonderful career path

of feeling like
at the end of the game,

I'd feel proud that I had, um--

I was able to be
in this profession

and I could help people.

I still feel that way,

but, um, that event

has forever tarnished me.

narrator: Webster was also
tarnished by the evidence.

Records from Lifetree
show a pattern

of prescribing unusually
high amounts of opioids

as well as confirmations
of a number of patient deaths.

[eerie music]

♪ ♪

- There were as many
as 100 overdose deaths

at your clinic, or they're
suspecting that there were.

Was--would that have been
a large number

relative
to your patient population?

- Well, I think so.

I think that--I think, uh--
I think--

you know, I don't know
what is a large number

or what isn't a large number.

Remember, these are
high-risk patients.

Many of these, not all,

but many of these
were high-risk patients.

Many people
who used these drugs

for the wrong reason,

and I'm sure I had some,

in my practice,

are at risk of overdosing.

Plus, I also had people
who die of old age,

cancer.

I don't know
what that number means.

- That, to me, sounds
like mass manslaughter.

You know, having two patients
die of opioid treatment,

when you're treating back pain,
is a high number.

Patients shouldn't die
from treatment

for non-life threatening
conditions.

narrator: The DEA sought to
prosecute Webster and Lifetree

for the illegal distribution
of controlled substances

and possible manslaughter.

- I wanted to know if I could
ask you a couple of questions.

We've been trying
to reach out to your team to--

- I've got an appointment
right now.

narrator: But despite
an 80-page summary report

containing forensic details
of possible crimes,

the Department of Justice
declined to prosecute,

citing lack of evidence.

- Will you answer
a couple questions for us?

- No.

- You don't want
to answer any questions?

- No.
- Okay.

- You know, I think
the criminalization

of trying
to treat people in pain

who are doing the right thing
or attempt to

project a criminal event,

is very chilling.

What happened has happened,
and there's been a lot said

that I think is painful,

and all I could do is fuel,

I think, more pain

if I discussed it anymore.

- We're supposed to forgive.

I have tried
to forgive Webster.

But at the same time,
we shouldn't forget.

And if we don't learn
from things,

we go nowhere.

- ♪ Let's get it started ♪

♪ In here ♪

♪ ♪

narrator: But we didn't learn.

Starting in 2013,

a powerful synthetic opioid
surged in popularity.

Fentanyl.

- ♪ A transdermal system
that releases ♪

♪ Fentanyl through ♪
[unintelligible]

narrator: It's 100 times
more powerful than morphine.

Rather than reckoning
with its dangers,

companies sold it
as aggressively

as drug cartels.

But instead of gun-toting
dealers on street corners,

men and women in suits
and lab coats

pushed opioids
with cash bonuses,

PowerPoint presentations,

and pain management jamborees.

Flushed with campaign cash
from big pharma,

Congress would look
the other way,

letting American companies
flaunt bottles of deadly drugs

like parade floats.

[electronic hip-hop music]

- ♪ Yo, oh,
you think you're bad? ♪

♪ Well, I'm the baddest,
I was created in a lab ♪

♪ With the latest tactics ♪

[music fades]

[gentle music]

♪ ♪

- This is my poem
to Purdue Pharma

called "Death Train."

"When we first met,
I loved what I saw.

"It was a natural fit.

"Together, we had no walls.

"Your mission was my mission.
We were inseparable.

"The extent I would work
for you was incalculable.

"I cut you a path that
was extremely lucrative.

"Maximizing sales
was our imperative.

"But I learned that
you never would listen.

"And if you did, you would
never change your position.

"I tried four separate times

"to warn you
of this death train.

"But despite all my efforts,
they ended in vain.

"You and your strategies
caused massive abuse,

"addiction, and death.

"Oh, what a tragedy.
Oh, what a mess.

"The very fiber
of our communities

"was ripped to sunder

"as you continued to rape,
pillage, and plunder.

"So many families torn apart.

"Teenagers dying
alone in the dark.

"The deeds
you've done

"gave you no shame.

"Now you want
to blame others.

"You want others
to take the blame.

"Though the victims
of your crime

"can never be made whole,

"Purdue Pharma should give back

"all the money they stole.

"And if need be,
the authorities should squeeze

"all the OxyContin
billions

"out of your souls.

"Then the company
should be ripped apart

and thrown deep in a hole."

[singer vocalizing]

♪ ♪

♪ ♪

[bright tone]

ALEC BURLAKOFF: You can make
a lot of money

getting doctors to prescribe
a medication

to people who don't need it.
And none of it's doable,

unless you break the rules.

SCOTT HIGHAM: This was a new
drug cartel

that was being established
in the United States.

DAVID LAZARUS: What they
would do is bribe doctors

to write as many scripts
as we possibly can.

SCOTT: People were dying
by the tens of thousands,

and their own representatives

-are selling them
down the river.
-Lights.

-(SIREN WAILS)
-OFFICER: Get on the ground!

The whole thing is disgusting.
Clearly we're breaking the law.

Back then, did I really care
about being responsible? No.

♪ (DRAMATIC OUTRO PLAYS) ♪