All language subtitles for field.of.operations.leningrad.2020

OpenSubtitles recommends using Nord VPN
from 3.49 USD/month ----> osdb.link/vpn

This is the terrifying story

of the titanic duel fought

between the armies of Hitler
and Stalin in the bitter cold

of an Arctic winter outside Leningrad.

It was here that the men of
the German Army Group North

fought and died with
the men of the Red Army.

The German forces were so
constantly short of manpower

and material, that they
christened the pitiless war

they were fighting, "The
eternal war of the poor man".

The Russians too, had to
endure terrible hardship.

And the siege of Leningrad
contains heartrending tales

of suffering and heroism,

but the Russian sacrifice was
ultimately to be vindicated.

For the men of Army Group North

there was to be no such satisfaction.

Most were destined never
to return to Germany.

The ceaseless demands of the
cruelest conflict in history

would ultimately claim the
whole Army Group as its victim.

In late 1940

when Adolf Hitler finally
confirmed to the general staff

that he had irrevocably
decided to attack Russia,

a plan was swiftly
conceived by General Marcks

which envisaged a two pronged
advance by two huge army

groups totaling over 3,500,000 men.

The German grand strategy

was for two great parallel advances.

The first aimed at Leningrad in the North,

then swinging South to Moscow.

And the second at Odesa on the black sea.

During the winter of 1939,

Finland had been involved in
an uneven struggle with Soviet

Russia to protect her territory.

Under the leadership of
field marshal Mannerheim

the Fins had doggedly resisted

the superior Russian forces,

but ultimately had to yield

valuable territory around Leningrad.

Britain had refused to
help the Fins who in 1941,

turned to Germany for aid in
regaining their lost territory.

Hitler hoped to draw Finland

into an offensive war with Russia,

but the finish objective was
simply to address the balance,

not the conquest of Russia.

Although the Fins would play a small part

in the battle for Leningrad,

their refusal to mount an
invasion of Soviet territory

would ultimately have dire
consequences for Hitler.

Under the Marcks plan,

elements of Army Group North,

were to capture Leningrad,

then drive North to link up with the Fins

and eliminate all Russian forces

in the Baltic region.

Only then was Moscow to be attacked

from the West and North simultaneously.

From the very outset

Hitler found it impossible to prioritize

the objectives for his Russian campaign.

After much discussion and argument,

the Marcks plan was subsequently
revised to produce three

separate army groups.

Each aimed at a different objective.

Army Group North was to capture Leningrad,

Army Group Center was to capture Moscow

and Army Group South was aimed at Odesa.

With three major objectives to achieve

it was clear from the
outset that German forces

would be dangerously overstretched.

Sections of the German military

were very opposed to the venture,

but Hitler refused to accept

the advice of his staff officers.

His gamblers instinct told
him that if he delayed

even for one year,

the crowds that cheered
the latest successes

so fervently, might no longer
be willing to follow him into

so hazardous an undertaking.

And there was surely no
greater military adventure

than the invasion of Russia.

Following the spectacular
victories in Poland, Norway,

France and the Balkans,

the German forces assembled for
Barbarossa expected to fight

a short campaign,

which would secure their
victories throughout Europe.

Hitler became convinced that
he could crush the Red Army

as easily as he had
defeated his other enemies.

In the spring of 1941

field marshal von Rundstedt,

who had spent most of the first world war

on the Eastern front,
asked Hitler outright

if he knew what it meant to invade Russia.

The commander in chief,
field marshal von Brauchitsch

and his chief of the
general staff general Halder

also counseled Hitler
against the operation.

It was all to no avail

as Hitler simply refused
to heed their warnings.

Field Marshall von Rundstedt,

the commander of Army Group South

was forthright in his views
on the forthcoming battle.

"This war with Russia
is a nonsensical idea

to which I can see no happy ending.

But if for political reasons,

the war is unavoidable,

then we must face the
fact that it cannot be won

in a single summer campaign.

Just look at the distances involved.

We cannot possibly defeat the
enemy and occupy the whole

of Western Russia from the
Baltic to the black sea

within a few short months.

We should prepare for a long war

and go for our objectives step by step.

First of all,

a strong Army Group North
should capture Leningrad

and the area around it.

This would enable us to
link up with the Fins,

eliminate the red fleet
from the Baltic and increase

our influence in Scandinavia.

The central and Southern
army groups should

for the time being

advance only to align running Odesa, Kiev,

Orsha, Lake Ilmen.

Then if we have sufficient time this year

Army Group North could advance Southeast

from Leningrad towards Moscow
while Army Group Center

move eastwards on the capital.

All further operations should
be postponed until 1942,

when we should make new
plans based on the situation

"as it then is."

Had Hitler followed von
Rundstedt's good advice,

the history of the Western
world may well have followed

a very different pattern.

Hitler, however, did have good grounds

for rejecting the advice of his officers.

While the German army in
the 1930s had been building

its strength under Hitler,

Stalin had been destroying
the Russian officer Corps.

By the end of the purge,

the Russian army had lost
three of the five remaining

marshals of the Soviet union,

all 11 deputy ministers of defense,

75 of the 80 members
of the military Soviet,

all the commanders of
the military districts,

13 of the 15 army commanders,

more than half the Corps commanders

and approximately 30% of the officers

below brigade level.

Stalin had considered himself safe

as he did not intend to become
involved in Western affairs.

He had made complex peace treaties

and alliances with both
Britain and Germany

and hoped they would fight
a mutually destructive war

in the West.

Less than one year later, however,

Stalin's hopes of a protracted
war between the Western

powers and Hitler, evaporated
with the brilliant success

of Hitler's Blitzkrieg tactics,
which saw Denmark, Norway,

Holland, Belgium, and France
fall in rapid succession.

The lightning campaign through
the Balkans in Greece in 1941

could only produce more
grounds for disquiet.

Though Stalin accepted
that war with Germany

was now almost inevitable,

he certainly did not expect
to be attacked in 1941.

He decided Russia had at
least until the spring of 1942

to prepare herself.

His explosive denials of all contrary

information was so fierce that
vital intelligence concerning

German preparations was kept
from him by subordinates

fearful of the violence of his temper.

As the German buildup towards
operation Barbarossa continued

Stalin's attempts to pacify
Hitler grew more desperate.

He had already stated in
an interview with Pravda

in November 1939,

that it was not Germany who had
attacked Britain and France,

but Britain and France
who had attacked Germany.

Stalin now forbade

any criticism of Germany to
be printed in the newspapers.

In 1940, he increased Russian supplies

to Germany and withdrew

recognition of the Norwegian

and Belgian governments in exile.

In the following year

when Hitler successfully invaded

Greece and Yugoslavia,
Stalin quickly expelled

the Yugoslavian ambassador

to Moscow and refused a request

to recognize the Greek
government in exile.

Stalin felt he was continuing
to buy time with these

unrequited concessions, but
his use of the breathing space,

which he had already obtained
was totally devoid of any

worthwhile attempt to remedy
his military disadvantages.

The main Russian force charged
with defending Leningrad

was the Northwest Front under Kuznetsov.

In theory, the Russian forces

were larger and more generously supplied

with tanks, guns, and aircraft.

In practice, the Red Army as a whole

proved to be so demoralized by

internal disruptions that they
were disastrously unprepared.

In addition, much of the Russian equipment

was obsolete or unserviceable

with the result that in the
opening battles at least,

there was to be no real contest.

As a result of Stalin's purges,

the Soviet forces were
less than equal to the task

of combating a highly
professional, well organized army,

which was accustomed to
success on the battlefield.

Many divisions where between
six to 7,000 men short

of wartime establishment.

Levies of experienced personnel
had been hived off to build

new tank and aviation units.

Only one of the six Soviet
mechanized Corps had received

their full compliment of equipment.

Three of the four motorized divisions

had no tanks whatsoever.

And four out of every five vehicles

in the tank fleets were obsolete.

Four of the Corps could only
deploy one quarter of their

designated motor vehicles.

And in another four Corps

one in three motor
vehicles needed repairs.

From even a cursory analysis,

the Soviet Red Army and
the German Wehrmacht

were anything but equal adversaries.

In the Western part of Russia,

the Red Army consisted
of about 5,000,000 men

with 1,000,000 in the Leningrad sector.

Although the tank strength of the Red Army

on the 21st of June, 1941 was
an impressive 23,108 machines,

only 8,000 were battle
ready and in good condition.

Of these, less than 1200 were deployed

in the Leningrad sector.

Many of the Soviet tanks
where the outdated T26

and T28 medium tanks,

there were even a few of
the outdated T35 machines,

a massive multi turreted tank,

which proved to be a
disastrous failure in action.

In June, 1941

the time of the German attack,

Army Group North was commanded

by field Marshall Ritter Von Leeb

and was composed of two subsidiary armies.

The 16th army, initially
commanded by field Marshall Busch

and the 18th army commanded
by general Von Kuchler.

For the initial thrust into Russia

under the Barbarossa directive

Army Group North enjoyed the support

of a powerful tank force

designed as Panzer Group
IV under the leadership

of general Hoepner.

For air support Army
Group North could call

upon Luftflotte One,
commanded by general Keller.

The Stukas of Luftflotte One

were to provide the flying artillery

for the lightning attack
of the 22nd of June.

Naval support was available
from the powerful battle group

North under the command of Admiral Carls,

who set about planning the campaign

with his senior commanders.

As commander of Army Group North

Von Leeb had excellent credibility.

He had formerly commanded
the German Army Group center,

which had succeeded
brilliantly in the attack

on France in 1940.

He was extremely well-supported
by some of the most capable

commanders the German
army had in its ranks.

As the German officers could
draw on the experiences

of the war in Poland, France,
Norway, and the Balkans,

the quality of their
commanders was always likely

to be superior to that of the Russians.

For the great assault on Russia,

Army Group North could count

on over 800,000 men and 800 tanks

organized into three armored divisions,

three motorized infantry divisions,

20 infantry divisions, and
three security divisions.

Army group North was by no
means the armored juggernaut

of popular mythology.

Four-fifths of the soldiers had to walk

into battle like the soldiers of Napoleon

over a century earlier.

In 1941, the mechanized era

was still in its infancy

and Army Group North

needed 200,000 horses to draw
their guns and equipment.

The Army Group could deploy 1200 guns

in terms of tanks and aircraft,

Army Group North could boasts
600 tanks and 430 aircraft.

Most of them superior to the Russian tanks

and all of them in better condition.

Army Group North tends to
be treated in some respects

as the poor relation

compared to Army Group
South and army group Center.

But initially, although
there were fewer formations

of Army Group North,

they actually achieved
their initial objectives

with great skill and speed.

Ribbentrop, Hitler's foreign
minister had successfully

concluded a non-aggression pact

between Germany and Russia in 1940.

Nevertheless, Stalin was wise enough

to remain wary of his sinister

neighbors to the West.

Stalin's overall military strategy

required the expansion of Soviet
territory to create a deep

barrier of Russian held territory
between the Soviet union

and Nazi Germany.

It was this consideration
which had led Stalin

to collaborate with Hitler
in the invasion of Poland.

Ironically, the secret negotiations

instigated by Germany had also

granted Stalin the freehand
in the Baltic and Finland,

which had precipitated the winter war,

which the Fins were now so keen to avenge.

From behind this defensive wall

Stalin planed to allow the Western allies

and Germany to fight a mutually
destructive war in the West,

as they had done for four
years during the great war.

The early war Russian fighters
were already obsolete.

Aircraft such as the Polikarpov I153

a lumbering biplane,

and the Polikarpov I16 known
as the ratter were easily

outclassed by the new
generation of German fighters.

These included the German
Messerschmitt 109 fighters,

which were faster and more
maneuverable than anything

the Russians could throw against them.

At last, at 04:00 on
the 22nd of June, 1941,

the code word "Dortmund"
crackled down the wires

and the full force of
operation Barbarossa,

Germany's invasion of Soviet
Russia, was unleashed.

AS they had come to expect

the German army sliced through

the opposition on the way to Leningrad.

Faced by the result of his own failures

in military matters, Stalin panicked.

While his army headquarters desperately

tried to piece together
the most rudimentary

picture of what was happening,

he ordered an immediate counter
offensive on all fronts.

As the first reports of the devastation

he had helped to create filtered through,

he was close to breaking point.

"All that Lennon created,
we have lost forever",

he declared, before retreating
to his dacha not to emerge

until the 3rd of July.

What really stunned the Red
Army commanders was that this

massive German assault had
proceeded long after it had left

its artillery support behind.

The Red Army command had planned

for conventional meeting
engagements and frontline battles.

The perceived wisdom was
that these would develop

over days or even weeks.

Next would come a large
series of complex engagements.

And then the real war would begin.

In reality, using the
new Blitzkrieg tactics,

the German advance was so
swift that within hours of

the launch of Barbarossa

tank columns from Panzer Group IV were

approaching Riga some 50
miles behind the front.

This extended Blitzkrieg technique,

especially the bold use of
armor came as an extraordinary

and disorientating
surprise to the Russians,

even to the senior Soviet commanders.

Within 48 hours,

general staff reports
made it perfectly plain,

that they had lost
control of the situation.

They were in complete chaos,

and many did not know
where their troops were

or what was happening.

They certainly did not have
accurate reports of German

movements, and there was
no real intelligence.

So they were not even sure

where the German thrusts were aimed.

All that they did know
was that in the Northwest,

there was total collapse.

In consequence, Stalin
operated his usual practice.

He had most of the front
commanders arrested and then shot

as a consequence of the confusion

which raged throughout the army,

many of the Red Army
divisions simply broke up

and formed very large pockets

of leaderless troops.

Passing these groups

of disorientated men, Von
Leeb's Army Group North

scythed into the Baltic
States, capturing Riga,

the Latvian capital.

The number of prisoners taken
and the war material captured

or destroyed in operation Barbarossa

was assuming astronomical proportions.

It is hardly surprising
that Hitler, his commanders

and the troops themselves

now believed that the Red Army

must be nearing the end of its resources,

both in manpower and in weapons.

Prisoners confess that the German attack

had been completely unexpected.

Moscow, it seemed, was certain
to fall into German hands.

Great optimism prevailed
in Army Group Center.

Hitler had already set up
a special engineer command

whose task was to be the
demolition of the Kremlin.

The propaganda ministry
saw fit to make a bombastic

statement announcing that
the war in the East was won

and the Red Army practically annihilated.

During the early stages of the campaign,

the Stuka dive bombers of Luftflotte One

played their familiar role

as the German storm broke against Russia.

The initial moves followed the
classic Blitzkrieg pattern,

no declaration of war
and a fast moving assault

designed to disorientate and
confuse the Russian army.

As the forces of Army
Group North drove further

into the Baltic States,

Latvia and Estonia were quickly captured.

These lightning advances were greeted

with joy by the citizens
of cities like Riga,

where the population viewed the
German armies as liberators.

In scenes of unprompted joy,

the German soldiers were
greeted with flowers and kisses

from the local girls.

A great deal of the Naval
effort throughout the campaign

lay in suppressing Soviet Naval activity

by laying thousands of mines,

a task, which continued

even in the face of fierce air resistance.

These ships of Carl's battle group

continued with the task

of mine laying, despite the
attentions of the red air force.

On land, the presence of
a strong armored force

in the form of Panzer Group IV

gave Army Group North some
much needed tank support

during the headlong advance into Russia.

Nevertheless, the rudimentary road system

of the Baltic States

and Northern Russia played
havoc with the tanks.

Right at the beginning
of the Russian campaign,

the Germans experienced the
problems which dust can cause

in motor vehicles.

Tanks sustained severe
damage from the dust

they stirred up while
crossing vast sandy regions,

many tanks had no dust filters
and on those which were

equipped, the filters soon
became thoroughly clogged.

Quartz dust was sucked into engines,

which became so ground out
that many tanks were rendered

unserviceable, in other tanks,

the abrasive action of dust
reduced engine efficiency

and massively increased fuel consumption.

The sand roads undoubtedly
caused problems.

They greatly slowed tanks or trucks.

They also caused huge dust clouds,

which were raised by convoys.

These dust clouds frequently
provoked air attacks

by the surviving aircraft
of the red air force.

As the red air force
re-gathered its strength,

these attacks resulted
in serious losses of men,

vehicles and horses.

For as long as they were in
support of Army Group North,

the tanks of Panzer Group IV
played an invaluable role,

but even with the Panzers,

the swift advances of June and
July ground to a halt against

the tough defenses of the Stalin line,

which were encountered in
August and early September.

While the fortifications of the
frontier districts left much

to be desired,

there were still extensive
fortifications to be overcome

deep within mother Russia.

Although they did not
form a solid unbroken line

of fortifications, like
the French Maggiano line,

the heavily defended Stalin
line or the Leningrad line

as the German forces in the North knew it,

was a formidable series
of prepared defenses.

Areas of great importance were

surrounded with heavy fortifications
and the German armored

units driving for Leningrad
encountered fortification

systems up to six miles in depth,

including well-positioned
earth and concrete bunkers

with built-in guns and
other heavy weapons.

There were also concrete
pillboxes with disappearing

armored cupolas for
artillery and machine guns.

A speedy elimination of these
strong defenses with the means

available to a force
designed for mobile warfare

was extremely difficult.

The area of Krasnogvardeysk,

South of Leningrad, had been developed

according to sound soviet
defensive principles,

and was effectively turned
into an outlying fortress

for the defensive Leningrad.

During early September, 1941

it presented great difficulties

to the advance of the German forces.

Krasnogvardeysk blocked all
highways and railroads leading

to Leningrad from the South

and constituted the main
bulwark of Russian resistance.

The Russians defended it persistently.

Repeated attacks by several

infantry divisions were repulsed.

It was only taken in the
course of a general attack

on the Leningrad line

and after bitter pillbox
fighting in the area

immediately surrounding Krasnogvardeysk.

Only the flexible leadership
of battle-tested armored forces

attacking with great vigor

made it possible to
overcome the defense zones

which had been set up
with a sound knowledge

of the latest defense techniques.

Within a week, the German
sixth Panzer division

had been forced to break

through and roll up 12
positions, repel several

counter attacks and take

more than 300 heavily fortified bunkers.

Like all German operations in Russia

from an early stage, it became
apparent to the commanders,

to the troops,

to the high command that the
task they had taken on and the

tasks they may have to take
on were beginning to exceed

by far, the resources to hand.

In general terms,

the forces were adequate
for the immediate tasks

which Army Group North had to fulfill.

It was a very accomplished command

and it did manage to achieve
what Hitler ordered to be done,

which was to seize the Baltic States,

establishing them as a base for
further operations in Russia

and move right up to Leningrad.

From October, 1941 onwards,

Hitler tended to
vacillate between striking

into the Ukraine as the
main strategic objective

and attacking Moscow,

which was the nerve
center of Soviet Russia.

Army Group North therefore

came a poor third in terms
of allocation of resources.

It is fair to suggest
that Hitler's high command

failed to provide Von Leeb
with enough resources,

which in turn prevented Army
Group North from achieving

its objective of the capture of Leningrad.

In the North,

the fighting for the Stalin line

proved to be an attritional nightmare

with German casualties soon mounting

to first world war levels.

The Russians were very adept at preparing

inhabited places for defense.

In a short time,

a village would be converted
into a little fortress.

Wooden houses had well
camouflaged gun ports

almost flush with the floor.

Their interiors were reinforced
with sandbags or earth.

Observation slots were cut into
roofs and bunkers built into

floors and connected with
adjacent houses or outside

defenses by narrow trenches.

Although almost all inhabited places

were crammed with troops,

they seem deserted to German
reconnaissance since even water

and food details were allowed to leave

their shelters only after dark.

The Russians blocked approach
routes with well camouflaged

anti-tank guns or dug-in tanks.

Wrecks of knocked out tanks
were specially favored

for use as observation posts.

And as in placements for
heavy infantry weapons

and bunkers for living
quarters were dug under them.

Permanent structures
destroyed by artillery fire,

or aerial bombs were
utilized as defense points,

the ruins hid weapons
and served to strengthen

the underlying bunkers.

Even the heaviest shelling
would not drive the Russians

from these positions.

They could only be
dislodged with hand grenades

or flame throwers in costly
hand-to-hand fighting.

The Russians when they did retreat

frequently burned or blasted
building suitable for housing

command posts or other important
military installations.

Quite often, however, they left castles,

former country seats and other
spacious dwellings intact,

but only after they had mined
the walls in a completely

inconspicuous manner with
delayed action bombs,

which were often set to
explode several weeks later.

These were meant to blow up
entire German headquarters

at one time.

The possible presence
of time bombs in cities,

railroad stations, bridges,

and other important structures
always had to be taken into

account in German thinking,

exacting a great psychological toll.

Entirely new to the Germans
was the Russian use of forest

fires as a hot weather weapon.

In mid-summer when the trees

were tinder dry,

the Russians attempted to
delay German forces advancing

on Leningrad by putting
forests to the torch.

Not only the physical,

but the psychological impact
of such fires was severe.

The crackling of the burning trees,

the acrid gray black smoke,

the increasingly unbearable
heat and the feeling

of uncertainty put troops
under a severe strain.

Despite the tenacity of a
hard fought series of grueling

battles in which the SS
police division particularly

distinguished itself, the Stalin line

was finally broken in late August

and Army Group North surged onwards.

On the Baltic front, Von
Leeb's Army Group North

had captured the city of Novgorod,

a vital target in the
approach to Leningrad.

The beleaguered defenders of Novgorod

had fought to the death.

But this resistance too had been in vain.

The Germans had discovered
the city's defensive plans

on the corpse of a Soviet officer.

With the Stalin line broken

general Hoepner's fourth
Panzer group resumed its drive

toward Leningrad, but
without supporting infantry

its progress was limited.

Leningrad was a vital center
of the wartime production

industry and reserves
and equipment were poured

into the defense of the city.

As the Germans approached,

the citizens now formed into
militia divisions of which

were flung against the Germans
more in despair than hope.

Following a basic training
period, averaging 16 hours,

the first militia divisions
were sent to the front only six

days after being formed.

The second division marched to
the front only two days after

its establishment and the third,

the same day it was established.

Nonetheless, some Russian civilians

obviously felt caught between two fires,

one senior Soviet officer

later summed up the choices available.

He declared, "We were faced with a choice

between two dictators
Hitler on the one hand

and Stalin on the other.

But we prefer to pick the
one who spoke Russian."

An ominous development for
the Germans at this point

was the appearance on the battlefield

of the Russian medium T34
tank and the heavy KV 1.

Both of these machines were
clearly superior to the German

tanks and were all but impervious

to most German anti-tank weapons,

especially the puny 37
millimeter anti-tank gun,

which was then the main
German anti-tank weapon.

The 37 millimeter was so
ineffective against Soviet armor

that it was nicknamed "the door
knocker" by the disgruntled

German anti-tank gunners.

These puny 37 millimeter
guns were intended to deal

with some of the best armor in the world.

General Erhard Raus who
fought with Army Group North

left a clear account
of the first encounter

with the new Russian armor

in the shape of the trusty KV1 tanks,

which attacked the third Panzer division.

"Then there suddenly appeared
for the first time a battalion

of heavy enemy tanks of
previously unknown type.

The tanks overran the armored
infantry regiment and broke

through into the artillery position.

The projectiles of all defense
weapons bounced off the thick

enemy armor, 100 German tanks
were unable to check the 20

Russian dreadnoughts and suffered losses.

Several Czech built tanks,

which are bogged down in
the grain fields because of

mechanical trouble were
flattened by the enemy monsters.

The same fate befell a 150 millimeter

medium Howitzer battery,

which kept on firing
until the last minute.

Despite the fact that it scored
numerous direct hits from as

close a range as 200
yards, it's heavy shells

were unable to put even a
single rank out of action.

The situation became critical.

Only the 88 millimeter flak
finally knocked out a few

of the Russian KV1s

"and forced the others to
withdraw into the woods."

The only bright sign for the
Wehrmacht was that the new

Russian tanks were still
in relatively short supply

and their battle drill was poor.

Once the scattered formations
have been dealt with the road

to Leningrad lay open again.

Despite the limitations
of some of its weaponry,

by September, Army Group North

had destroyed for all practical purposes,

the Soviet Northwest front,

it had virtually eliminated
two Russian armies

driven to the outskirts of Leningrad.

The collapse of the
Northwestern front was a real

catastrophe for the Red
Army and brought Stalin

to the brink of despair.

Leningrad's fate hung by a thread

at the beginning of September,

but Stalin was to make one inspired move.

He appointed Marshal Zhukov
to the command of Leningrad.

And this remarkable soldier

was to prove himself equal to the task.

As Army Group North drove
headlong towards Leningrad,

a further huge haul of confused
Russian prisoners was taken

in the Baltic States and a
large body of Russian troops was

isolated in what became known
as the Oranienbaum pocket

on the Baltic coast to
the West of Leningrad.

The Oranienbaum pocket
was a small semicircle

of Russian held territory,

an area of ground that
was never to be taken

by army group North,

despite all attempts over
the next three years.

And it was to prove a tactical thorn

in the side of the 18th army.

When the 18th army in Panzer Group IV

burst into the Leningrad
area in September, 1941,

they swept forward at high speed

and as they moved swiftly North,

they either destroyed or
brushed aside the Soviet armies.

One tiny element of
the Soviet eighth army,

which had suffered
catastrophically from the attack

was pushed right up to the coast.

There, around the town of Oranienbaum,

three elements of the eighth
army kept up resistance

for virtually three years.

The bridge had acquired
enormous strategic significance.

The Oranienbaum area enabled the Russians

to protect the Island of Kronstadt.

This Island was vital to
the Naval base directly

to the West of Leningrad.

It enabled the Soviet
forces in the region,

both Naval and military, to
prevent the German forces

of army group North completely denying

Leningrad the resources
which enabled it to survive

the subsequent siege of Leningrad.

On September the fourth, 1941

senior lieutenant Dariusz
of the first Panzer regiment

radioed back to headquarters

that his unit had reached Leningrad.

Other units from the 18th
army pressed on to capture

Shlisselburg to the East of Leningrad.

With the arrival of the
rest of the 18th army

to reinforce the Panzers,
on the 8th of September,

the German stranglehold

on the city of Leningrad
tightened further.

The capture of Shlisselburg to the East

signaled the end of rail transport.

The German invaders
surged on as far as Tikvin

deep inside the Russian hinterland.

Despite the best efforts
of the population,

the first shells began to rain down

on Leningrad early in September.

It marked the beginning of a
crucial episode in the war.

The Epic siege of the city,
which would last for 900 days.

As the German advance into
Northern Russia continued

the rail link to Leningrad was cut.

The fate of Leningrad and with it,

30 Russian divisions
appeared to be sealed.

The next stage of the battle
was expected to be an attack

on the beleaguered city.

Contrary to their own expectations

the men of the German 18th
army were not to be asked

to mount a full-scale attack on the city.

And after a series of
hotly contested battles

for the outskirts,

Hitler uncharacteristically
ordered his troops to take

Leningrad by means of
a long drawn out siege.

It has been suggested that he was unnerved

by the remote controlled explosions,

which the Russians had used
so effectively in Kiev.

It is a decision which
still provokes debate today.

There are really two possible
explanations for the failure

of Army Group North to take Leningrad.

One was the conflicting
priorities in the mind

of Adolf Hitler and the army high command.

Hitler vacillated between

prioritizing a number of objectives.

There is also a school of thought

which favors Hitler's adverse
reaction to the huge losses

of the German sixth army in
Kiev in August and September.

In Kiev, thousands of German troops

were lost to remote controlled explosions

and thousands of others to
desperate street fighting.

This, it is thought,

persuaded Hitler that
no German troops should

be made vulnerable by committing
them to the inner city

streets of Moscow and Leningrad.

In any event,

the 18th army lacked the really
heavy artillery necessary

to reduce the defenses of Leningrad.

The massive guns of the German
siege train had already been

allocated to the sector
of Army Group South,

where they were earmarked
for the coming battles

in the Crimea.

To move them all the way across Russia

would have delayed the
operation into winter.

To compound the problems of the battles

for the attackers, Panzer group four

was withdrawn from Army Group
North in late September, 1941

in order to support Army Group
Center in operation Typhoon,

the final drive on Moscow.

No German Army Group could
afford to lose its tanks,

but Army Group North lost
virtually all of its armor.

The withdrawal of the
tanks from Army Group North

meant that the army
was virtually immobile.

It was to remain so
for almost three years.

It is easy to suggest that
the loss of Panzer Group four

in September, 1941

was directly responsible for the failure

of Army Group North to take its strategic

objective of Leningrad.

However, this is by no means certain.

The capture of a city as large

and well defended as Leningrad
was by no means certain,

even with a strong armored force.

Nevertheless, the removal
of Panzer Group four

clearly did not help the
cause of Army Group North.

It meant that Army Group
North would be denied this one

formation and the size, speed
and fighting power to advance

quickly into the regions
beyond the city of Leningrad,

link up with the Fins
and effectively cut off

the city from its supplies.

The disappearance of Panzer
Group four proved to be

a forerunner of things to come.

From that point onwards,

the evidence was clear that of
the three German army groups

Army Group North was considered
to be the poor relation.

It soon became obvious that
they could expect to receive no

substantial additional
support of any kind.

And the artillery siege train

would never be sent to Leningrad.

The 18th army, therefore,
had no alternative,

but to take Leningrad by siege.

It seemed that the decisive
battles on the Eastern front

would be fought elsewhere.

With the commencement of
the siege of Leningrad,

a relatively stable frontline

appeared in the Northern sector.

The 16th army fought on the right flank

of the Northern sector,

where it was adjacent to the
left wing of Army Group Center.

The 18th Army fought on the left flank

of the 16th army and as such

formed the extreme Northern
end of the front line.

Army Group North was to
remain doggedly committed

to the Northern flank

of the German armies
fighting on the Eastern front

for the entire duration of the war.

The siege of Leningrad was the
stage for an intense struggle

that would in later years
be recognized as a key event

in that conflict of inhuman savagery.

The opening stages were bitterly fought

in the suburbs of the city.

When general Zhukov arrived
to take over the defense

of the city on the 10th
of September, 1941,

he found the defenders
in an advanced state

of disorganization and the
inhabitants close to panic.

Undaunted, he briskly set
about bolstering its defenses.

A shortage of anti-tank guns
was dealt with by converting

anti-aircraft artillery to the task

of attempting to halt the Panzers.

Six brigades of Naval
infantry and students were

formed and reinforcements drafted in

from the Karelian Isthmus.

Zhukov began to take
the fight to the Germans

through raids and counter attacks.

But by now the German troops
had pierced the inner circle

of defenses and were
rampaging through the suburbs.

After a furious exchange
of advances and retreats,

by the end of the month,

the defenders were hanging onto their city

by their fingernails.

It seemed inevitable that
Leningrad would capitulate,

but as Zhukov awaited a renewed assault,

the fourth Panzer group suddenly departed

to join the battle for Moscow

and the remaining German
forces began to build defenses.

Hitler had decreed that Leningrad

would not be taken by force.

It would instead be
starved into submission,

but there was a flaw in the plan.

Although the supply
situation was difficult,

without Panzer Group four

the ring around the city
was never completely closed.

It was still possible to reach
the city over land through

the Virgin forests of
the Russian motherland.

It was also possible to
bring in supplies by boat,

across the waters of Lake Lagoda.

In October, there was
some temporary relief

for the defenders.

The roads had disintegrated
into canals of bottomless mud

along which wheeled vehicles
could drive only at a snail's

pace and only if they were towed by tanks.

This was the "rasputitsa",
the season of mud,

which came as a debilitating surprise

to the Germans in 1941,

general Raus went to great
lengths after the war to explain

the great significance
of the muddy season.

"German losses of tanks and
motorized equipment of all types

were extraordinarily
high during the autumn

muddy period of 1941.

The first time that the mud
of Russia was encountered a

division of the fourth Panzer
group operating in the area

North of Gzhatsk, during the same period,

lost 50 tanks without a shot being fired.

35 of them within three days,

these losses were
extremely serious since no

"replacements were received."

The Germans had no conception
of mud as it exists

in European Russia.

In the autumn of 1941,

when frontline troops
were already stuck fast,

the German high command still
believed that mud could be

conquered by brute force.

An idea that led to serious losses

of vehicles and equipment.

At the height of the muddy season,

tractors and recovery
vehicles normally capable

of traversing difficult
terrain are helpless,

and attempts to plow
through the muddy mass

makes roads even more impassable.

Tanks, heavy recovery vehicles,

and even vehicles with
good ground clearance

simply pushed an ever-growing
wall of mud before them,

until they finally stopped half
buried by their own motion.

A sudden frost in the autumn of 1941,

cemented a crippled buried column

into a state of complete uselessness.

And it never moved again.

Because it could not be
reached in any other way,

gasoline, tow ropes and food
supplies were airdropped along

the line of stranded armor,

but all attempts to move, were futile.

Often when drivers found
themselves bogged down

far from any habitation,

they abandoned their vehicles
and set out on foot to contact

friendly troops in the nearest village

or sought food and shelter

from local civilians in
order to remain alive until

the worst of the muddy season passed.

For the muddy seasons, vehicles
with high ground clearance,

lightweight and low unit
ground pressure were necessary.

German trucks had low ground
clearance and could not get

traction in deep mud.

Since German supply cars had
wheels too narrow for muddy

terrain, they sank deep into soft ground.

Even the German Maultier and Ost schlepper

of the later years were bogged down in mud

as their tracks were too narrow.

Raus noted that the awkward looking

and slow Russian tractor
of pre-war vintage

salvaged the heaviest
most deeply mired loads

after German equipment
failed to budge them.

Inside Leningrad, food
supplies to the besieged city

had been diminishing
throughout the autumn.

By late November,

they were at their lowest
ebb for the entire duration

of the siege.

Manual workers were receiving

only 250 grams of bread per day.

One third of their normal requirement.

Without water for sanitation

and basic medical supplies,

disease became inevitable.

As winter arrived and temperatures

fell to the minus twenties,

thousands began to die each day.

Total starvation threatened constantly.

To the Germans

collapse seemed imminent.

Back in Berlin, a
reception with Adolf Hitler

as a guest of honor,

was organized to celebrate
the fall of the stricken city.

The invitations were
printed, but never posted.

Russian resistance remained
stubborn and defiant.

Even women soldiers in the
Red Army were in combat units,

the ferocity and
inhumanity of the conflict

beggars the imagination.

In an attempt to relieve
the appalling conditions

in the city, the Russians marked a road

across the frozen Southwest
corner of Lake Ladoga.

And by the 22nd of November,
convoys of supply lorries

were just managing to stave
off famine in the city.

It was a hazardous passage
through the biting Northeastern

gales, which swept across the Lake.

The German Luftwaffe also did its best

to intercept the convoys and
break the surface of the ice.

Yet for all its horror,

the Russians knew that defending
this lifeline to the city

was the only possible way of
keeping the inhabitants alive.

But for some,

the food coming across the
ice was too little too late.

Victims of starvation, suffering
from falling blood pressure

and the wasting of the heart
and internal organs would never

regain their health.

Many would die months after food

and medical supplies finally arrived.

The children who survived would
emerge totally traumatized

by the siege as an eyewitness recalled.

"It was reflected in the way
many of the children played all

by themselves in the way that
even in that collective games,

they played in silence with grave faces.

I saw faces of children,

which reflected such thoughtfulness
and sorrow that those

eyes and faces told one more
than could be gathered from all

"the stories of the horrors of famine."

As events unfolded it soon
became clear that in spite of all

the hardships of the siege of Leningrad,

the Northern sector was
considered by both sides

to be of secondary importance.

The men of Army Group North

soon became convinced
that they were fighting

what they referred to as, "the
eternal war of the poor man".

Casualties along the
whole of the Russian front

had been enormous,

but only 67,000
replacements were allocated

to army group North

as against 131,000 to Army Group Center

and 119,000 to Army Group South.

When it came to allocating fresh divisions

from the reserves, the situation

was even less favorable.

Of 21 new divisions released

by army high command
in the autumn of 1941,

only three were allocated
to Army Group North.

It was a further indication
of things to come.

One unexpected benefit for the
Army Group was the occasional

support which they received
from German Naval units

operating in the Baltic.

As one flank rested on the Baltic seas

Army Group North was the
only formation which could

look for substantial support
from the Kriegsmarine.

The German Navy had
played a significant role

in the Soviet German war.

In the Baltic,

the Germans sealed up

the powerful Russian
front with minefields.

By doing so,

they also trapped the
Soviet submarine fleet.

As the Germans advanced
along the Baltic coastline,

they took control of Russian
bases so that the Soviet Baltic

fleet had to remain
bottled up in Leningrad.

The function of the Soviet
Baltic fleet during 1941 and 42

was limited solely to supplying
fire support to the Soviet

forces fighting to defend the city.

This aspect of the fighting
was also to provide the stage

for a daring attack led by the
Stukas of Hans-Ulrich Rudel.

The Luftwaffe was ordered

to sink the Soviet battleship Marat.

Rudel managed this amazing
feat in the face of fierce

anti-aircraft fire with a
single well-placed bomb.

On the deficit side,

the 18th army had to
become involved in a number

of amphibious operations to
capture the Baltic islands,

which placed a great
strain on what were already

severely limited resources.

Throughout the whole course of the war,

the lack of powerful
reinforcements severely limited

the strategic options available
for the Army Group command.

It also required a great
deal of juggling of available

divisions to maintain the
extended frontline and the siege

of Leningrad, which was to
drag on for almost three years.

The Germans had closed
right up on the city

and into the outer suburbs,
but the ring was not closed.

An important consideration

at this time was the role of the Fins.

They agreed to move close to
Leningrad, their fifth general

Mannerheim making it quite
clear that he was prepared

to take action to recover
Finnish territory,

yielded to Russia in
the winter war of 1939,

but that he would not take
part in the direct attack

on Leningrad itself.

That was one of the
conditions Finland made

on entering the war against Russia

on the side of the Germans.

Mannerheim was as mindful

of the political conditions as he was

of the military conditions
because of Finland's

vulnerability to future
Russian aggression.

This meant that the German
and Finnish armies were never

able to cut off Leningrad completely

from the rest of the world.

In both winter and summer,

the Russian forces were still
able to get resources across

Lake Ladoga in the Northeast of the city.

From the winter of 1942 onwards,

the railway to the East
of Leningrad was completed

and Leningrad was connected to
the rest of the Soviet union,

which enabled the forces
to supply the inhabitants

of the city, helping some of
them to survive the siege.

The Soviet negotiators in the
Soviet Finnish peace talks,

which took place in 1944,

actually recalled that the
Russians recognized what the Fins

had done for them.

If the Fins had moved forward
and closed the ring of siege

around Leningrad, it would've
meant the death of the city.

Despite the fact that some supplies

got through, it was precious little.

Starvation drove the
population to extreme measures,

including the horrifying
excess of cannibalism.

The first cases occurred at the
beginning of December, 1941.

The Soviet criminal code

made no mention of such
a crime as cannibalism.

So Soviet officials could at
first only define it as an

extreme form of banditry.

According to the top secret
report of the military

procurator of Leningrad, A. A Kuznetsov,

dated 27th of February, 1942

investigations of cannibalism
led to criminal charges

against 26 individuals in December, 1941,

366 in January, 1942 and 494

in the first two weeks of February, 1942.

Investigation revealed that
not only was human flesh

consumed by individuals,

but it was also sold to other citizens.

By the 20th of February 1942,
866 individuals were under

criminal investigation
or actual indictment

for suspected cannibalism.

Only 18% of this number had
any previous criminal record.

Of the 886 suspect
individuals, 322 were men

and 564 women.

Almost 30% were aged over 40.

The next largest group
being in their thirties.

More ghoulish still,

was the discovery of extensive intrusions

into cemeteries and the
mutilation of the recent dead.

One evening in March, 1942,

the watchman at the Piskaryovskoye
cemetery detained a woman

with a sack.

Once opened, the sack revealed
the bodies of five infants.

The increase in cannibalism
forced the city authorities

to set up police guards at
all the major cemeteries.

With the first snows of 1941
came a cruelly bitter winter.

The temperature continued to
fall and the German soldiers

now paid dearly for the
arrogance of the high command

that had refused to admit the
possibility of anything other

than a quick decisive campaign.

Few men in the German trenches
had more than summer clothing

and frostbite took an agonizing tole.

German machinery and guns
had never been designed

to function in such extremes.

Engines seized up, metal
tank tracks split apart

in the cold, ammunition would not fire.

The fierceness of the cold

was far beyond the
experience of most Germans.

Emboldened by the problems
they saw in the German ranks

a series of Soviet counterattacks
managed to roll back

many of the German gains around Leningrad.

With incredible exertions,

the Germans kept up a
semblance of defense.

The tactics of winter warfare
centered around contests

for the possession of
roads and inhabited places.

In Russia, villages and roads

were infinitely more important than they

were on the rest of the continent.

In other German theaters of war,

no one particular road ever
became a crucial factor

since a well-developed road network

always offered a choice
of alternate routes.

In Russia, the possession of a single road

was often a matter of life

or death for an entire army.

The extreme tactical importance
of inhabited places during

the six months of winter explains
the fact that the Russians

would frequently much rather
destroy them than surrender

them to the enemy.

In the bitter trench
warfare outside Leningrad,

the defender had a definite
advantage in winter

because as a rule,

their positions could
not be seen in the snow,

except at very close range.

The defenders were able to
keep their forces undercover

and wait until the moment their fire

could be used most effectively.

The attacker was also
impeded and easily detected

even in camouflaged clothing.

The principal weapon of the
defender became the machine gun

as its performance was
not diminished by snow

in which mortars and light artillery lost

most of their effectiveness.

Replacements were also becoming a problem

for the German forces.

After the war,

it became clear from the
diaries of Army Group North

that the commanders of both
formations had intentionally

prohibited, even during calm periods,

the removal of a unit from
the front in order to grant it

a period of rest.

It was better to keep the
divisions at the front and assign

them to a narrower sector

as otherwise a reserve unit,

which had been removed from
the Northern front was certain

to be taken by the Supreme
command and assigned more

pressing pressure points
on either the central

or the Southern front.

Although the Northern
front was regarded as being

of secondary importance, it
was in no sense, a backwater.

There was still a great deal
of terrible fighting in very

difficult terrain with
extensive swamps and few roads

through the vast sections
of trackless forest,

which presented a logistical nightmare.

Army group North and the army
divisions were facing the most

difficult conditions on the Eastern front.

The climate and the terrain
were completely different.

Around Leningrad, it is
very marshy and boggy.

There were also very few roads.

So all transport logistics
were very difficult indeed.

To compound the difficulties
for the Germans,

by October of 1941,

the first partisan attacks
had begun to cause severe

difficulties in the rear areas.

The effects of these attacks
were further compounded

by the fact that the underdeveloped

infrastructure of Russia

meant that there were
very few roads or railways

which could be used as alternatives

to those blocked by partisan activity.

The Russian winter was a nightmare

along the whole of the front,

but it was Army Group North

which bore the brunt of the
most extreme Russian winters.

It is impossible to
exaggerate the cruel realities

of fighting in the ferocious
winters of Northern Russia.

In addition to their geographical

and climactic difficulties,

the fighting spirit of the Red
Army facing Army Group North

was no less intense

than that displayed on the other sectors.

The siege of Leningrad
has become synonymous

with endurance and suffering,

but there was also a great
deal of intense combat

as a series of miniature battles rolled

backwards and forwards

around the siege lines outside Leningrad.

Despite coming very close to victory

on a number of occasions,

Army Group North was never
able to close the ring

around Leningrad completely.

And the high command continued
to draw desperately needed

divisions away from the
Army Group North sector,

in order to feed other
hard-pressed sectors.

The result of this attrition
from two directions

was that a ferocious Soviet
offensive in January, 1944,

finally broke the resistance

of Army Group North and raised the siege.

The lifting of the siege
of Leningrad in 1944

forced Army Group North

to fall back to a new defensive front

composed of a series of
partially constructed

defenses known as "The Panther line".

This line should have
represented a fallback position

for the German forces, but work
was beginning much too late.

The Panther line was envisaged
as a series of strong

fortifications incorporating
parts of the Northern regions

of the Soviet union in a
line running Southwards

from Lake Dvina and Lake Pscov

near the town of Nava

on the Baltic coast of Estonia.

It was envisaged that the German troops

retreating behind the line

would occupy a series of
excellent defensive points.

The German troops would
therefore have a respite

from the rigors of the retreat

and be able to hold
the Soviet army at bay.

Meanwhile, the armored formations

and the air formations of the German army

were repaired and returned
to the fray to renew combat

with their Soviet foes.

However, the Panther line

was constructed merely as an afterthought

when it was much too late.

The German armies had suffered defeats

and simply did not have

enough troops to man the line effectively.

In those areas where adequate defenses

had been prepared in the line

and there were sufficient German troops

and aircraft available,

it proved a very formidable obstacle

for the Soviet army to overcome.

Had it been properly prepared

as part of a coherent
overall strategic plan,

the Panther line could have been held.

The Panther line was only ever
going to provide a temporary

solution to the mounting
problems of Army Group North.

The destruction of the
neighboring Army Group Center

in June, 1944,

tore a huge gap in the German
lines and left the right flank

of Army Group North
vulnerable to a Soviet attack.

Hitler was forced to sanction
another series of withdrawals.

From the Panther line, Army Group North

were forced to retreat
in relatively good order

towards Germany fighting a
series of ferocious defensive

battles as they went.

The most notable of these being

the defense of Nava in 1944.

The battle for Narva plays
a very important part

in the Soviet German war

because Narva is the gateway to Estonia.

The Germans recognized the
importance of holding Narva.

And there were initially
12 divisions organized

into what was called "Abteilung Narwa",

a special force grouping,

which was to fight with enormous
courage and distinction.

The defense of Narva was a
bitterly fought encounter.

A breakthrough here would have compromised

many German troops in the Baltic regions

of Estonia and Latvia.

European SS, along with the German

regular army divisions managed to hold

back the forces of the
Soviet Leningrad front

throughout January, February, and March.

Their bitter attritional
contest was not characterized

by sophisticated tactical maneuvers.

It was a bloody slugging-match.

The German formations were
saved by the early spring thaw

of late March, 1944,

which produced seas of mud
floods of at least one foot deep

in an area of 100 to 140 miles square.

Even Soviet tanks stuck
fast in the torrents of mud

and the German forces were
able to retreat once more.

The incredible resistance
offered by Army Group Narva,

a scratch formation drawn
from the slender resources

of Army Group North

represents an impressive example

of military improvisation

and stands comparison with the other

German defensive battles fought elsewhere

in Russia and Italy.

The mainstay of resistance in
Narva was the third SS Panzer

Corps, which included the long
serving SS police division

along with the new SS Viking division

comprised of volunteers from
different nationalities.

By October, 1944,

the situation around Narva

from a German point of view, was hopeless.

But unlike the countless
garrisons squandered by Hitler

in a pointless series of
hold-at-all-costs orders,

Army Group Narva managed to escape

and rejoin Army Group North.

Constant retreat was now the
order of the day as the army

group was driven back

through the Baltic States towards Germany.

But Army Group North
would never make it home.

While the Red Army
rolled on towards Berlin,

the men of Army Group
North were finally cornered

in the Courland peninsula of Latvia.

There, the battered remnants

of the Army Group held off all attacks

by the Red Army for six long months.

They were under siege from late October,

1944 through to May, 1945.

In January, 1945, the two armies,

which had served since
1941 as Army Group North

were renamed Army Group Courland.

The hard-won mantle of Army Group North

was transferred to a scratch assembly

of beaten units under the command

of a swift succession
of temporary leaders.

The spirit of the men of Army Group North

remained behind in Courland.

The German divisions,

which found their way to Courland

were stuck there.

They were blockaded by the
Russians and there was nothing

they could do.

They could no longer make
any useful contribution

to the greater course
of the war elsewhere.

In many respects,

it was a very wasteful and irresponsible

gesture on the part of Hitler.

This albeit scratch army was
still a considerable force,

which could have made a
valuable contribution elsewhere,

but it was not to be made available.

Despite everything that
the besieged Red Army

could throw at them,

the surviving elements of
the 16th and 18th armies

now officially known
as Army Group Courland

continued to resist all further attempts

to force them into surrender.

Fighting for the Courland
peninsula was grinding in nature.

It was not like the
Western and Eastern fronts

characterized by large formations,

sweeping along the frontier
and impressive sophisticated

operations, in the Courland
fighting, the Germans

trapped in this region
were gradually, slowly

and surely pushed back

in spectacular fashion into something

of a geographical
cul-de-sac by the Red Army.

They were well served to
the bitter end by the ships

of the Kriegsmarine

who managed to evacuate some divisions

recalled to Germany.

On occasion, they even managed to bring in

some much needed reinforcements.

The German Navy did have
an important role to play

when the Red Army began to advance

along the Baltic coast to
break into East Prussia,

because if at all possible the German Navy

had to try and contain
Soviet Naval operations.

Even more importantly,

they had a grievous burden,

to try and evacuate as many
of the German civilians

and German military units

who had been trapped
and transport them back

into German territory.

The Naval aspect in the
closing stage of the war

does demonstrate that the German Navy

could operate well even
in the face of disaster,

which was now pending.

The Kriegsmarine was absolutely
vital in explaining why

German formations fought bitterly

to the end for the pointless

battle for the Courland peninsula.

The peninsula, from the
Army's point of view

was militarily useless,

indeed many German commanders
in late 1944 and spring 1945

constantly requested Hitler

to give up the Courland peninsula.

This would release the 26 divisions

that were fighting there

in order to bolster their defense in what

were more important military
regions nearer to home.

The German Navy had used
the Baltic sea throughout

World War Two as a training ground

for its submarine commanders.

Donitz, a committed Nazi

who was in charge of
the Navy at this stage,

regarded the retention of the
Gulf of Danzig in the Baltic

sea as essential in order to
train his submarine commanders

to use the extremely powerful
new submarine, the type 21,

which the German Navy were developing

towards the end of the war.

The Kriegsmarine therefore
played a critical role in

explaining why the German
formations fought so bitterly for

the Courland peninsula.

Trapped in Courland, the survivors

of the old Army Group North

maintained their cohesion
and fighting ability

until the final surrender
on may the eighth, 1945,

almost four years since they
had first moved into Russia.

On that day 203,000 men
began the long march

into Soviet captivity.

Many would never return.

And others were held as
slave laborers until 1955,

a high price to pay
for their long defense.

Of the three huge army groups
which Hitler sent into Russia,

it could be argued that Army
Group North was the most

successful in carrying out
the tasks assigned to it.

Although the campaign ultimately
ended in failure for them,

the men of Army Group North
retained their military cohesion

with some units achieving the
rare distinction of serving

for the whole four years

of the Russian war in the same army group.

OpenSubtitles recommends using Nord VPN
from 3.49 USD/month ----> osdb.link/vpn