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1
00:00:03,440 --> 00:00:05,760
They say life is a competition.
2
00:00:08,320 --> 00:00:10,400
The fight to be first.
3
00:00:12,600 --> 00:00:15,120
The survival of the fittest.
4
00:00:16,960 --> 00:00:17,960
Winning.
5
00:00:19,800 --> 00:00:23,200
Nobody wants to be a loser.
6
00:00:23,200 --> 00:00:27,280
Now, winning basically means getting
more of what you want in life,
7
00:00:27,280 --> 00:00:29,960
and, as a mathematician, I can help
with that.
8
00:00:29,960 --> 00:00:33,240
Because there is a real science
to success,
9
00:00:33,240 --> 00:00:37,640
based on ideas from some of the last
century's most beautiful minds.
10
00:00:37,640 --> 00:00:42,320
# Everyone's a winner, baby
That's the truth. #
11
00:00:42,320 --> 00:00:47,080
From how you can analyse and take
advantage of your opponents...
12
00:00:47,080 --> 00:00:50,400
You need to find a way to be as
unpredictable as possible.
13
00:00:51,720 --> 00:00:55,160
..to deciding whether to cheat or
play fair...
14
00:00:55,160 --> 00:00:57,600
You can put a good apple in a barrel
of bad apples,
15
00:00:57,600 --> 00:00:59,600
it's always going to turn bad.
16
00:00:59,600 --> 00:01:03,160
..being more strategic will help you
get ahead.
17
00:01:04,240 --> 00:01:07,280
But if all of this sounds a bit
selfish,
18
00:01:07,280 --> 00:01:12,000
I'll also be showing you how
cooperation can trump conflict,
19
00:01:12,000 --> 00:01:14,920
and how everyone can be a winner.
20
00:01:14,920 --> 00:01:17,640
Hello, Sheriff.
Hi, Hannah. How are you?
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00:01:17,640 --> 00:01:20,960
You are walking away with no money
because you are an idiot.
No. You're an idiot.
22
00:01:22,920 --> 00:01:27,080
Whether it is happier relationships
you are after, a bargain,
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00:01:27,080 --> 00:01:29,040
or a better world,
24
00:01:29,040 --> 00:01:32,240
a look at the science of winning can
help
25
00:01:32,240 --> 00:01:34,880
and reveal some surprising truths.
26
00:01:36,280 --> 00:01:39,000
So join me.
You'll lose out if you don't.
27
00:01:52,120 --> 00:01:57,160
To get the best result in any
situation, maths can help.
28
00:01:57,240 --> 00:01:59,640
Let's take just one example.
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00:01:59,640 --> 00:02:02,800
Something as simple as ordering
dinner.
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00:02:02,800 --> 00:02:06,360
Should you choose burger or steak?
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00:02:09,080 --> 00:02:11,880
Now, you absolutely cannot
afford it,
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00:02:11,880 --> 00:02:15,000
but that steak does look incredibly
tempting.
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00:02:15,000 --> 00:02:17,080
And it's almost your birthday,
34
00:02:17,080 --> 00:02:21,720
surely you deserve a £25 splurge
every now and then?
35
00:02:21,720 --> 00:02:26,760
First of all, ask yourself, what do
you really want -
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00:02:26,880 --> 00:02:29,320
steak or savings?
37
00:02:30,360 --> 00:02:34,360
Well, you need to decide
what winning means for you.
38
00:02:34,360 --> 00:02:37,600
And that might change
when your mates arrive.
39
00:02:39,760 --> 00:02:43,440
Let's imagine that everybody has
exactly the same choice.
40
00:02:43,440 --> 00:02:45,600
Burger or steak.
41
00:02:45,600 --> 00:02:49,520
But you know that your friends are
notoriously frugal, so
42
00:02:49,520 --> 00:02:53,320
if they all go for the burger and
you split the bill evenly,
43
00:02:53,320 --> 00:02:57,880
you could end up getting
that tasty steak for a lot less.
44
00:02:58,800 --> 00:03:01,240
The £25 hit from your steak
45
00:03:01,240 --> 00:03:05,080
combined with the £5 for their
burgers means
46
00:03:05,080 --> 00:03:07,320
everyone pays £10 each,
47
00:03:07,320 --> 00:03:10,680
which frankly, for you,
is an amazing bargain.
48
00:03:12,040 --> 00:03:16,280
But hold on. The waiter is coming
over and is heading towards
49
00:03:16,280 --> 00:03:18,960
your friend, who you know loves
a rib eye.
50
00:03:18,960 --> 00:03:21,520
Is she thinking
what you're thinking?
51
00:03:21,520 --> 00:03:23,800
And what about the others?
52
00:03:23,800 --> 00:03:28,840
And so begins a frankly very British
game of silent guessing and
53
00:03:29,360 --> 00:03:32,480
calculating. If she goes for the
steak as well as you,
54
00:03:32,480 --> 00:03:35,600
then you're shelling out £15 each,
55
00:03:35,600 --> 00:03:40,040
but if he goes for the steak too,
then that's £20 a head,
56
00:03:40,040 --> 00:03:43,880
which is far more than you can
possibly afford.
57
00:03:43,880 --> 00:03:46,520
But is it really fair that your best
friend,
58
00:03:46,520 --> 00:03:49,280
who always does the generous thing,
59
00:03:49,280 --> 00:03:53,280
ends up spending £20
for a measly burger?
60
00:03:54,960 --> 00:03:57,600
So what is the real win here?
61
00:03:57,600 --> 00:03:59,840
Well, it's complicated.
62
00:03:59,840 --> 00:04:02,600
Do you prefer saving money,
63
00:04:02,600 --> 00:04:07,280
a delicious dinner,
or being fair to your friend?
64
00:04:07,280 --> 00:04:10,680
Having been fleeced, will she ever
want to meet up again?
65
00:04:12,080 --> 00:04:16,040
The key thing is that what you want
can be scored,
66
00:04:16,040 --> 00:04:20,680
and mathematicians like me give it a
fancy name - your expected utility.
67
00:04:20,680 --> 00:04:23,600
We express your preferences
68
00:04:23,600 --> 00:04:26,800
as values that capture just how much
69
00:04:26,800 --> 00:04:29,840
you instinctively want something,
70
00:04:29,840 --> 00:04:34,840
against the price, and then factor
in other stuff, like risk.
71
00:04:35,120 --> 00:04:37,560
In this case, that your dear friend
72
00:04:37,560 --> 00:04:40,520
might ditch you for busting
her budget.
73
00:04:42,600 --> 00:04:45,400
Looks like steak pipped friendship
this time.
74
00:04:47,600 --> 00:04:49,200
So there you go.
75
00:04:49,200 --> 00:04:51,920
If you can figure out everyone's
preferences
76
00:04:51,920 --> 00:04:53,720
and you know what YOU want,
77
00:04:53,720 --> 00:04:58,040
then the key question becomes,
at the lowest cost to yourself,
78
00:04:58,040 --> 00:05:01,960
without having any control over
other people's actions,
79
00:05:01,960 --> 00:05:04,480
how do you get what YOU want?
80
00:05:07,760 --> 00:05:10,160
Well, thankfully, mathematics can
81
00:05:10,160 --> 00:05:12,920
help you find a winning strategy,
too.
82
00:05:12,920 --> 00:05:15,920
Whatever decisions we make,
83
00:05:15,920 --> 00:05:18,600
having a good strategy means the
difference
84
00:05:18,600 --> 00:05:21,480
between knowing what you want
and getting it.
85
00:05:23,080 --> 00:05:27,320
It was the mid-20th-century maths
genius John von Neumann
86
00:05:27,320 --> 00:05:29,240
who, more than anyone else,
87
00:05:29,240 --> 00:05:32,360
turned our winning instincts into
a science.
88
00:05:35,040 --> 00:05:39,400
Von Neumann established a completely
new field of study,
89
00:05:39,400 --> 00:05:43,520
called Game Theory, which was
concerned with the mathematics
90
00:05:43,520 --> 00:05:46,440
of both cooperation and of conflict.
91
00:05:46,440 --> 00:05:50,520
How to avoid losing
and, more importantly, how to win.
92
00:05:50,520 --> 00:05:53,120
His efforts culminated in this here.
93
00:05:53,120 --> 00:05:57,720
A Theory Of Games And Economic
Behaviour, 641 pages,
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00:05:57,720 --> 00:06:00,400
packed to the brim with formulas,
95
00:06:00,400 --> 00:06:04,560
which was once described as one of
the most-influential
96
00:06:04,560 --> 00:06:07,960
and least-read books
of the last century.
97
00:06:09,600 --> 00:06:14,600
Written with the economist Oskar
Morgenstern and published in 1944,
98
00:06:15,040 --> 00:06:17,800
it proved how we can all get ahead
99
00:06:17,800 --> 00:06:21,280
when one party's loss
is the other's gain.
100
00:06:23,880 --> 00:06:26,800
It's not for the mathematically
faint-hearted,
101
00:06:26,800 --> 00:06:30,320
but at the core of the book is a
strategic principle
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00:06:30,320 --> 00:06:33,080
that is surprisingly intuitive.
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00:06:33,080 --> 00:06:36,760
And easily explained with some
cold, hard cash.
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00:06:38,200 --> 00:06:40,000
So, you and me are here.
105
00:06:40,000 --> 00:06:42,320
I'm going to have a go on those slot
machines
106
00:06:42,320 --> 00:06:44,800
and I have got a nice bag of
2p coins
107
00:06:44,800 --> 00:06:47,200
that you and I are going to share.
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00:06:47,200 --> 00:06:51,320
Now, the polite way to do this is
just to let you help yourself.
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00:06:51,320 --> 00:06:54,480
After all, I trust you to play fair.
110
00:06:55,680 --> 00:06:58,280
But actually, I really shouldn't.
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00:06:58,280 --> 00:07:01,120
Von Neumann assumes, rightly so,
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00:07:01,120 --> 00:07:04,360
that we both want
as many coins as we can get.
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00:07:04,360 --> 00:07:07,040
So, what SHOULD I do?
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00:07:07,040 --> 00:07:12,080
Well, I should split this into
two piles, as evenly as possible,
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00:07:12,640 --> 00:07:15,680
and then let you decide
which half you want.
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00:07:15,680 --> 00:07:19,640
Given that you're watching me like a
hawk, the only way I can guarantee
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00:07:19,640 --> 00:07:23,440
I don't lose out to you is
by me splitting and you choosing.
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00:07:28,400 --> 00:07:33,080
I don't get as many 2ps as I might
like, but I win by minimising the
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00:07:33,080 --> 00:07:37,360
maximum amount of fun at the fair
that I can lose to you.
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00:07:39,440 --> 00:07:41,720
This is known
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as the min-max theory,
and as strategies go,
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00:07:45,560 --> 00:07:47,720
you can apply it to pretty much
anything.
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00:07:47,720 --> 00:07:50,720
So, if you have got two kids that
are fighting over toys,
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00:07:50,720 --> 00:07:52,920
just get one of them to make two
piles
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00:07:52,920 --> 00:07:56,600
and the other one to pick which
pile they prefer,
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00:07:56,600 --> 00:08:01,240
or if you've got boring household
chores, you write two lists,
127
00:08:01,240 --> 00:08:03,520
and your partner chooses which list.
128
00:08:06,960 --> 00:08:08,520
It sounds pretty simple,
129
00:08:08,520 --> 00:08:13,120
but you have to remember that your
split will take into account
130
00:08:13,120 --> 00:08:16,560
your preferences, so you get to
decide if you think
131
00:08:16,560 --> 00:08:19,640
the utility of a huge pile of
ironing and doing
132
00:08:19,640 --> 00:08:22,600
all of the hoovering is the
equivalent of
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00:08:22,600 --> 00:08:26,840
the utility of unblocking the loo,
and sorting out all of the bins.
134
00:08:26,840 --> 00:08:31,480
Now, strangely, Von Neumann didn't
get into that particular conundrum
135
00:08:31,480 --> 00:08:35,480
in his book, but his proof that you
can always minimise the losses
136
00:08:35,480 --> 00:08:39,000
and maximise the gains, while taking
into account
137
00:08:39,000 --> 00:08:43,880
the preferences of two warring
parties was hugely influential.
138
00:08:46,120 --> 00:08:48,760
Such an analytical approach
to winning
139
00:08:48,760 --> 00:08:51,000
gripped people's imagination.
140
00:08:52,640 --> 00:08:55,920
And crucially, Von Neumann took
inspiration
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00:08:55,920 --> 00:08:58,520
from one rather unpredictable game.
142
00:09:00,880 --> 00:09:04,440
Von Neumann was an exceptional
mathematician.
143
00:09:04,440 --> 00:09:07,000
And perhaps because of its strategic
complexity,
144
00:09:07,000 --> 00:09:10,320
he was particularly interested
in poker.
145
00:09:10,320 --> 00:09:13,840
He said that real life is about
bluffing,
146
00:09:13,840 --> 00:09:16,760
about little tactics of deception,
147
00:09:16,760 --> 00:09:21,760
about asking yourself, what does
the other man think I mean to do?
148
00:09:22,160 --> 00:09:26,200
"And that is what games are about
in my theory."
149
00:09:29,280 --> 00:09:32,040
When it comes to winning big at
poker,
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00:09:32,040 --> 00:09:34,600
there's one woman you need to know.
151
00:09:34,600 --> 00:09:39,600
Wow! This is bold.
Four bet of 4,100.
152
00:09:40,200 --> 00:09:43,960
Sick move. Liv Boeree is the
European top-ranking
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00:09:43,960 --> 00:09:45,680
female poker player.
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00:09:45,680 --> 00:09:47,720
Really strong play by Liv Boeree,
155
00:09:47,720 --> 00:09:50,000
she's clearly been eating
her vitamins.
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00:09:50,000 --> 00:09:52,320
Vitamin B - for bluff.
157
00:10:06,840 --> 00:10:10,960
I'm meeting Liv to find out how
poker strategy might help us
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00:10:10,960 --> 00:10:13,920
get more of what we want in life.
159
00:10:15,320 --> 00:10:19,680
These days, the very best players
are very analytically minded folks
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00:10:19,680 --> 00:10:22,240
who are comfortable working with
maths,
161
00:10:22,240 --> 00:10:25,040
to sort of really get a solid
understanding
162
00:10:25,040 --> 00:10:28,320
of the theory behind the game.
And then the psychology is,
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00:10:28,320 --> 00:10:30,560
I like to think of it
as the cherry on top.
164
00:10:30,560 --> 00:10:32,480
OK, let's talk about the basics,
then.
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00:10:32,480 --> 00:10:34,960
What calculations are you making?
166
00:10:36,560 --> 00:10:39,480
Um, if I'm going to bet chips, if
it's 30% of the time
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00:10:39,480 --> 00:10:42,720
I'm going to be the best hand,
and 70% of the time I'm going to be
168
00:10:42,720 --> 00:10:44,600
the worst, then I can multiply those
169
00:10:44,600 --> 00:10:48,840
numbers against the chips that are
involved, and that'll be my expected
170
00:10:48,840 --> 00:10:50,840
value from a situation.
171
00:10:50,840 --> 00:10:54,480
And that applies in many real-life
situations, too.
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Say I am running late for a flight.
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I have two options. I can either...
174
00:10:59,600 --> 00:11:02,440
..go to the airport and try to make
my flight but run the risk
175
00:11:02,440 --> 00:11:04,880
of then missing it and losing the
value of the flight,
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00:11:04,880 --> 00:11:06,520
and having to buy a new one,
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00:11:06,520 --> 00:11:09,360
or I can stay home and do the sort
of safer bet,
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00:11:09,360 --> 00:11:11,400
and call and pay the change fee.
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00:11:11,400 --> 00:11:14,480
Thinking rationally and quantifying
things is the very first step to
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00:11:14,480 --> 00:11:16,320
thinking strategically.
Exactly. Yes.
181
00:11:16,320 --> 00:11:19,360
It's very hard to build strategies
182
00:11:19,360 --> 00:11:23,800
if you don't have a numerical idea
of the value of the outcomes
183
00:11:23,800 --> 00:11:25,760
of different strategies.
184
00:11:30,280 --> 00:11:33,560
By evaluating both the chances of
something happening
185
00:11:33,560 --> 00:11:35,760
and the outcome when it does,
186
00:11:35,760 --> 00:11:38,840
you have a better view of your best
options.
187
00:11:41,200 --> 00:11:45,880
But at this level, everyone is just
as calculating.
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To beat the optimal strategy,
you have to find an edge.
189
00:11:53,040 --> 00:11:56,360
There something that's called
game theory optimal, where,
190
00:11:56,360 --> 00:12:00,560
if you're playing this style, then
it means that you are unexploitable,
191
00:12:00,560 --> 00:12:05,360
basically. The best case that an
opponent can do to counter it
192
00:12:05,360 --> 00:12:08,040
is to also play
game theory optimal,
193
00:12:08,040 --> 00:12:12,320
therefore you just sort of reach the
same very high standard of play,
194
00:12:12,320 --> 00:12:16,160
and you're trying to not deviate
from it at all.
195
00:12:16,160 --> 00:12:18,960
And that's where sort of the more,
like, creativity
196
00:12:18,960 --> 00:12:21,880
and, I guess, the artistic side of
the game comes in,
197
00:12:21,880 --> 00:12:25,120
where you can do these deviations
from the optimal play
198
00:12:25,120 --> 00:12:27,160
to exploit your opponent's
weaknesses.
199
00:12:27,160 --> 00:12:29,000
But they could be doing that to you
as well.
200
00:12:29,000 --> 00:12:34,040
Exactly. So you need to find a way
to be as unpredictable as possible.
201
00:12:35,560 --> 00:12:39,080
Von Neumann's maths proves that
poker players must bluff,
202
00:12:39,080 --> 00:12:40,760
unpredictably,
203
00:12:40,760 --> 00:12:44,440
to avoid exploitation
by a savvy opponent.
204
00:12:44,440 --> 00:12:49,400
It is an essential strategy and it
can be applied elsewhere.
205
00:12:49,560 --> 00:12:52,360
You know, if you're in a business
negotiation,
206
00:12:52,360 --> 00:12:54,320
what is the minimum amount
you will take?
207
00:12:54,320 --> 00:12:58,000
There's a great opportunity to bluff
and give a high number because
208
00:12:58,000 --> 00:13:00,040
you're giving yourself the option
209
00:13:00,040 --> 00:13:02,040
for them to pay you
that high number.
210
00:13:02,040 --> 00:13:05,080
It might seem obvious, but bluffing
like this
211
00:13:05,080 --> 00:13:08,200
is exactly what gives you the edge
over others.
212
00:13:08,200 --> 00:13:11,360
Particularly if their loss
is your gain.
213
00:13:12,920 --> 00:13:15,920
Anything that is a competition,
to make yourself unexploitable
214
00:13:15,920 --> 00:13:18,040
will just put you at a huge
advantage.
215
00:13:20,280 --> 00:13:22,600
So quantify everything, folks.
216
00:13:22,600 --> 00:13:26,280
And don't make yourself
too easy to read.
217
00:13:26,280 --> 00:13:29,920
In win-lose games your carefully
calculated strategies
218
00:13:29,920 --> 00:13:34,880
can only get you what you want
if your opponents are in the dark.
219
00:13:43,000 --> 00:13:47,480
But what if you're involved in a
conflict where everyone could lose?
220
00:13:51,200 --> 00:13:53,880
During the second half
of the 20th century,
221
00:13:53,880 --> 00:13:57,400
the biggest problem that game
theorists has had to contend with
222
00:13:57,400 --> 00:14:00,160
was the Cold War.
The US and the Soviet Union
223
00:14:00,160 --> 00:14:03,640
were facing off against each other,
and just as in poker,
224
00:14:03,640 --> 00:14:08,680
every strategy, every move and
countermove had to be analysed.
225
00:14:09,400 --> 00:14:13,880
Except, this time, the stakes could
not have been higher.
226
00:14:17,240 --> 00:14:21,640
As an ally to the US, Britain had
to prepare for the worst.
227
00:14:23,640 --> 00:14:28,640
In 1961, a top-secret facility was
set up here in rural Worcestershire,
228
00:14:29,400 --> 00:14:32,080
Regional Seat of Government 9.
229
00:14:33,640 --> 00:14:35,360
It is one of a network of bunkers
230
00:14:35,360 --> 00:14:37,560
from which the British Government
would
231
00:14:37,560 --> 00:14:40,760
have operated in the event
of a nuclear war.
232
00:14:45,880 --> 00:14:48,560
The moment that the Second World War
233
00:14:48,560 --> 00:14:52,600
ended with such a devastating
show of nuclear force,
234
00:14:52,600 --> 00:14:56,160
the talk in the West began to focus
on trying to prevent
235
00:14:56,160 --> 00:15:00,280
a military face-off that would mean
that nuclear bunkers like this one
236
00:15:00,280 --> 00:15:02,280
would become a necessity.
237
00:15:02,280 --> 00:15:06,920
Now, the strategy that was on the
table at the time was referred to,
238
00:15:06,920 --> 00:15:10,960
somewhat euphemistically,
as preventative war.
239
00:15:10,960 --> 00:15:15,240
The idea being that the Americans
would launch an unprovoked attack
240
00:15:15,240 --> 00:15:20,320
on the Soviet Union before they had
the chance to acquire the bomb.
241
00:15:24,880 --> 00:15:27,720
But it would at least avoid a slow,
242
00:15:27,720 --> 00:15:31,520
expensive and far more dangerous
cold one.
243
00:15:34,040 --> 00:15:38,800
Preventative war is an argument
still used today over North Korea
244
00:15:38,800 --> 00:15:43,040
and at the time, its supporters
included Winston Churchill
245
00:15:43,040 --> 00:15:44,920
and von Neumann himself.
246
00:15:48,120 --> 00:15:52,760
In 1950, von Neumann remarked,
"With the Russians,
247
00:15:52,760 --> 00:15:56,480
"it's not a question of whether,
but of when.
248
00:15:56,480 --> 00:16:00,480
"If you say, 'Why not bomb them
tomorrow?' I say, 'Why not today?'
249
00:16:00,480 --> 00:16:03,240
"And if you say,
'Today at five o'clock,'
250
00:16:03,240 --> 00:16:05,480
"I say, 'Why not one o'clock?'"
251
00:16:05,480 --> 00:16:08,560
You can see where this kind of
reasoning ends,
252
00:16:08,560 --> 00:16:10,640
and it is perfectly rational.
253
00:16:10,640 --> 00:16:14,640
If someone has to win, better
that it be us.
254
00:16:18,040 --> 00:16:23,040
Despite the impeccable logic,
America didn't attack Russia.
255
00:16:23,600 --> 00:16:26,640
And then it was too late
because Russia got the bomb, too.
256
00:16:27,920 --> 00:16:32,920
By 1953, there was no outcome in
which only one side could win.
257
00:16:35,360 --> 00:16:37,960
This demanded a new strategy.
258
00:16:37,960 --> 00:16:40,120
Something which became known as
259
00:16:40,120 --> 00:16:44,680
mutually assured destruction,
or MAD for short. Basically,
260
00:16:44,680 --> 00:16:49,360
the threat of you using massively
destructive weapons on your enemy
261
00:16:49,360 --> 00:16:53,440
prevents your enemy from using
those same weapons on you.
262
00:16:53,440 --> 00:16:55,280
Once everybody is armed,
263
00:16:55,280 --> 00:17:00,320
nobody has an incentive to either
initiate a conflict or to disarm.
264
00:17:01,720 --> 00:17:06,600
And so, nuclear war was avoided,
but places like this
265
00:17:06,600 --> 00:17:11,520
and a hugely expensive, vast global
nuclear arsenal, was the result.
266
00:17:16,880 --> 00:17:19,120
Compared to von Neumann's games,
267
00:17:19,120 --> 00:17:22,120
in which one person's loss is the
other's gain,
268
00:17:22,120 --> 00:17:25,080
mutually assured destruction,
strangely,
269
00:17:25,080 --> 00:17:28,480
is something we come across far more
in real life.
270
00:17:29,960 --> 00:17:33,600
Because most conflicts, whether
at work, with friends or family
271
00:17:33,600 --> 00:17:37,320
have the potential to end up
in a stalemate.
272
00:17:40,840 --> 00:17:45,880
So often we choose strategies
that mean no-one wins.
273
00:17:51,920 --> 00:17:53,280
To explain why,
274
00:17:53,280 --> 00:17:57,000
I'd like to begin with a rather
unusual detective story.
275
00:18:00,480 --> 00:18:05,200
I'm looking at the Instagram page
of the rapper Ludacris.
276
00:18:05,200 --> 00:18:10,200
In 2015, he shared this picture with
his millions of followers.
277
00:18:10,200 --> 00:18:13,200
It had originally been posted on the
Facebook page of the police
278
00:18:13,200 --> 00:18:16,920
department in Franklin County,
Kentucky.
279
00:18:16,920 --> 00:18:19,600
And it reads...
"Attention, drug dealers.
280
00:18:20,800 --> 00:18:25,840
"We offer a free service to help you
eliminate your drug competition."
281
00:18:26,920 --> 00:18:30,360
And then under a quite large
marijuana leaf,
282
00:18:30,360 --> 00:18:33,360
there are a series of sections
where dealers
283
00:18:33,360 --> 00:18:35,800
can identify their competitors.
284
00:18:35,800 --> 00:18:40,320
You can fill out who your
competition is, where they live,
285
00:18:40,320 --> 00:18:43,680
their phone numbers,
even their hours of operation.
286
00:18:47,080 --> 00:18:49,880
It might seem like a gimmick, but
the fact is,
287
00:18:49,880 --> 00:18:53,120
Franklin County PD
were onto something.
288
00:18:54,320 --> 00:18:56,440
I think I need to find out a bit
more about this,
289
00:18:56,440 --> 00:18:57,920
so I'm going to call the sheriff.
290
00:18:57,920 --> 00:18:59,960
RINGING TONE
291
00:18:59,960 --> 00:19:01,680
Hello, Sheriff.
292
00:19:01,680 --> 00:19:04,280
Hi, Hannah. How are you?
I'm good, thank you.
293
00:19:04,280 --> 00:19:09,080
Why would a dealer call in and
tip off one of their competitors?
294
00:19:10,320 --> 00:19:12,160
Obviously, if they eliminate it,
295
00:19:12,160 --> 00:19:14,560
the more they get,
the more business they do,
296
00:19:14,560 --> 00:19:17,560
the more money, the potential
earning that they have,
297
00:19:17,560 --> 00:19:20,160
that they will make. And it helps
you get rid of your competition,
298
00:19:20,160 --> 00:19:21,600
you're the only game in town.
299
00:19:21,600 --> 00:19:23,880
Especially by having law enforcement
do it.
300
00:19:23,880 --> 00:19:26,280
Does this really work for you,
then, as a tactic,
301
00:19:26,280 --> 00:19:29,280
getting the criminals to do
the dirty on each other?
302
00:19:29,280 --> 00:19:32,280
Yes. It's something that was very
simple to do
303
00:19:32,280 --> 00:19:35,600
and, at the end of the day, if we
have got drug dealers
304
00:19:35,600 --> 00:19:38,000
turning in drug dealers,
that is a win.
305
00:19:38,000 --> 00:19:40,640
Police 1, drug dealers 0.
306
00:19:40,640 --> 00:19:43,480
Wow. This was obviously a pretty
good score
307
00:19:43,480 --> 00:19:47,360
for Sheriff Melton because what he
did was force
308
00:19:47,360 --> 00:19:51,840
the local drug dealers into the most
famous conundrum in
309
00:19:51,840 --> 00:19:54,040
the history of winning.
310
00:19:54,040 --> 00:19:57,680
It is called, appropriately enough,
the prisoner's dilemma,
311
00:19:57,680 --> 00:20:01,240
and it demonstrates very clearly the
dangers
312
00:20:01,240 --> 00:20:04,240
of falling into a lose-lose
situation
313
00:20:04,240 --> 00:20:07,200
when acting in your own
best interests.
314
00:20:07,200 --> 00:20:09,200
Think of it like this.
315
00:20:09,200 --> 00:20:13,280
Imagine Sheriff Melton has chucked
a couple of shady looking characters
316
00:20:13,280 --> 00:20:15,480
from his local beat into jail.
317
00:20:16,880 --> 00:20:20,200
He has got evidence to charge them
with possession,
318
00:20:20,200 --> 00:20:24,920
but can only get them for dealing
if they rat each other out.
319
00:20:24,920 --> 00:20:28,200
So, he puts them
in two separate cells
320
00:20:28,200 --> 00:20:31,520
and gives them both his
clever flyer.
321
00:20:33,240 --> 00:20:36,680
Our suspects must now consider
whether they should
322
00:20:36,680 --> 00:20:39,120
both keep their traps shut and only
323
00:20:39,120 --> 00:20:41,960
go away for one year each for
possession...
324
00:20:43,200 --> 00:20:45,800
..both rat the other out for dealing
325
00:20:45,800 --> 00:20:48,520
and each get
a three-year sentence...
326
00:20:50,720 --> 00:20:54,000
..or hope that they alone grass
the other up,
327
00:20:54,000 --> 00:20:57,800
getting off scot-free while their
competition gets
328
00:20:57,800 --> 00:21:02,360
a whopping five years - otherwise
known as the sucker's payoff.
329
00:21:06,360 --> 00:21:07,720
So, what to do?
330
00:21:08,880 --> 00:21:11,240
Well, this option is the best.
331
00:21:12,800 --> 00:21:17,640
But there's a risk it could quickly
turn sour if one person decides
332
00:21:17,640 --> 00:21:19,840
to basically betray the other.
333
00:21:22,400 --> 00:21:25,720
Good old Sheriff Melton knows these
two are toerags,
334
00:21:25,720 --> 00:21:27,640
and they know it too.
335
00:21:27,640 --> 00:21:30,120
So, to avoid being screwed over,
336
00:21:30,120 --> 00:21:33,200
the only stable solution for them
is this.
337
00:21:34,960 --> 00:21:37,640
They both must implicate the other.
338
00:21:37,640 --> 00:21:41,600
A win for Sheriff Melton,
but lose-lose for them.
339
00:21:43,360 --> 00:21:47,240
This unhappy scenario is called the
Nash equilibrium.
340
00:21:49,960 --> 00:21:54,200
It's a beautifully simple proof
that was published in 1950 by the
341
00:21:54,200 --> 00:21:58,160
mathematician John Nash, when he was
still in his early 20s.
342
00:22:00,200 --> 00:22:05,240
It won him a Nobel Prize, and it
transformed the analysis of winning.
343
00:22:06,640 --> 00:22:08,840
What Nash proved was that in a
situation
344
00:22:08,840 --> 00:22:11,720
with several possible outcomes,
like this one,
345
00:22:11,720 --> 00:22:15,760
where people either can't or
won't cooperate with each other,
346
00:22:15,760 --> 00:22:18,480
there is always a strategy
347
00:22:18,480 --> 00:22:23,160
which you and everyone else is best
off opting for.
348
00:22:23,160 --> 00:22:26,000
Now, in the case of
the prisoner's dilemma,
349
00:22:26,000 --> 00:22:30,360
paradoxically that strategy ends up
with lose-lose.
350
00:22:30,360 --> 00:22:34,080
Everybody wants to win by ratting
out their competition,
351
00:22:34,080 --> 00:22:37,840
and everyone wants to avoid
the sucker's payoff.
352
00:22:37,840 --> 00:22:42,400
And as a result,
everyone ends up going to jail.
353
00:22:44,400 --> 00:22:48,560
Being uncooperative can cost you
more than you bargained for.
354
00:22:50,840 --> 00:22:53,360
The reason Nash's proof matters so
much
355
00:22:53,360 --> 00:22:55,520
is because these kind of dilemmas
356
00:22:55,520 --> 00:23:00,520
constantly appear in real life
because of the way our individual
357
00:23:00,840 --> 00:23:05,360
interests often clash with those of
others and of society.
358
00:23:05,360 --> 00:23:10,360
Whether you are a drug dealer, or
just out for dinner with your mates,
359
00:23:10,720 --> 00:23:13,880
no-one wants to be the sucker,
right?
360
00:23:18,760 --> 00:23:23,680
I remember the day I was arrested,
then I was locked up for 48 hours.
361
00:23:23,760 --> 00:23:25,640
I remember thinking...
362
00:23:25,640 --> 00:23:29,360
"Oh, THIS is what happens."
363
00:23:29,360 --> 00:23:33,280
If ever there was an example of
Nash's theory in action,
364
00:23:33,280 --> 00:23:37,000
it is in the controversial world
of professional cycling.
365
00:23:38,160 --> 00:23:40,360
The global hero at the time was
Lance Armstrong.
366
00:23:40,360 --> 00:23:42,360
We were really good friends.
367
00:23:42,360 --> 00:23:45,760
I remember him saying, "I got caught
with my hand in the cookie jar".
368
00:23:45,760 --> 00:23:47,320
I knew what Lance was doing.
369
00:23:47,320 --> 00:23:50,600
It was like... Hang on a second.
370
00:24:07,360 --> 00:24:11,080
David is one of the highest profile
riders to talk candidly
371
00:24:11,080 --> 00:24:14,560
about the use of
performance-enhancing drugs
within cycling.
372
00:24:16,360 --> 00:24:19,480
Tell me about the first time that
you realised that cycling
373
00:24:19,480 --> 00:24:21,360
perhaps wasn't squeaky-clean.
374
00:24:21,360 --> 00:24:26,400
Um, my very first pro race in
February, 1997.
375
00:24:27,440 --> 00:24:30,200
My roommate was offered
a cortisone pill.
376
00:24:30,200 --> 00:24:33,680
We all carried around medical bags
and it was omnipresent.
377
00:24:33,680 --> 00:24:37,240
It was white noise, is what I've
always described it as.
378
00:24:37,240 --> 00:24:40,160
For four years, David trained and
raced clean,
379
00:24:40,160 --> 00:24:44,760
but the pressure to remain
competitive took its toll.
380
00:24:44,760 --> 00:24:48,120
Eventually, despite your initial
resistance,
381
00:24:48,120 --> 00:24:49,920
you did decide to give in.
382
00:24:49,920 --> 00:24:53,480
Yeah. I think that is the term -
I gave in.
383
00:24:53,480 --> 00:24:58,440
I didn't decide to join them, I gave
in and thought, "Well, you know,
384
00:24:58,440 --> 00:25:01,560
"I can't fight this any more".
385
00:25:01,560 --> 00:25:05,000
I was an ethical person,
but over time I just went...
386
00:25:05,000 --> 00:25:06,880
It wears you down?
387
00:25:06,880 --> 00:25:10,080
Well, just...the environment
you are in wears you down.
388
00:25:10,080 --> 00:25:12,800
You can put a good apple in a barrel
of bad apples,
389
00:25:12,800 --> 00:25:14,720
it's always going to turn bad.
390
00:25:20,040 --> 00:25:22,360
It's a classic prisoner's dilemma.
391
00:25:24,520 --> 00:25:28,040
In professional cycling,
riders compete to win.
392
00:25:29,720 --> 00:25:32,400
If doping makes winning more likely,
393
00:25:32,400 --> 00:25:35,600
then abiding by the rules risks
the sucker's payoff...
394
00:25:37,720 --> 00:25:41,520
..and so the rational thing to do
is cheat.
395
00:25:41,520 --> 00:25:46,520
Because a faster field and a doping
arms race has become the new norm.
396
00:25:48,520 --> 00:25:52,000
This dilemma unites all
competitive sport.
397
00:25:52,000 --> 00:25:55,840
Though it is a lose-lose scenario
if everyone cheats, nonetheless,
398
00:25:55,840 --> 00:25:59,840
for individuals,
cheating can give you the edge,
399
00:25:59,840 --> 00:26:02,080
IF you can get away with it.
400
00:26:02,080 --> 00:26:06,040
The fundamental reason I was there
was because I wanted to win.
401
00:26:06,040 --> 00:26:08,440
I was very ambitious. If the goals
you want to achieve
402
00:26:08,440 --> 00:26:12,040
are being achieved by the people who
are cheating, why don't I do it?
403
00:26:12,040 --> 00:26:15,240
David was the reigning world
time-trial champion
404
00:26:15,240 --> 00:26:19,560
when he was caught in 2004,
receiving a two-year ban.
405
00:26:19,560 --> 00:26:24,000
But after his punishment,
he returned to racing clean.
406
00:26:24,000 --> 00:26:28,680
David Millar comes up, hits the
line. Best time, 31:15.
407
00:26:28,680 --> 00:26:30,080
Millar is back.
408
00:26:33,040 --> 00:26:35,800
Every time I won, from then on, it
was to prove a point,
409
00:26:35,800 --> 00:26:37,560
that it was possible to win clean.
410
00:26:37,560 --> 00:26:39,960
And you were appealing because you
were clean? Because we were clean.
411
00:26:39,960 --> 00:26:44,160
It actually became a valuable asset
to be clean and win races.
412
00:26:44,160 --> 00:26:46,560
It goes back to that
whole barrel of apples,
413
00:26:46,560 --> 00:26:49,120
make sure it is a barrel of good
apples with one bad apple.
414
00:26:49,120 --> 00:26:50,920
That's easier to control.
415
00:26:50,920 --> 00:26:53,280
These guys will never have to
encounter it because we have
416
00:26:53,280 --> 00:26:55,480
an anti-doping culture
in professional cycling now.
417
00:26:57,920 --> 00:27:02,240
David's experience illustrates the
profound tension between individual
418
00:27:02,240 --> 00:27:06,280
drive to succeed
and the greater good.
419
00:27:06,280 --> 00:27:09,880
Our winning instincts can be both
our greatest asset
420
00:27:09,880 --> 00:27:11,720
and deeply destructive.
421
00:27:16,240 --> 00:27:19,240
This is something that is relevant
to all of us.
422
00:27:20,280 --> 00:27:23,760
If you think about it, how many
times have you been in a situation
423
00:27:23,760 --> 00:27:26,400
where you didn't want to upset the
balance of things
424
00:27:26,400 --> 00:27:29,040
for fear that you might end
up missing out?
425
00:27:29,040 --> 00:27:32,560
Maybe you have had a job
where you ended up staying later
426
00:27:32,560 --> 00:27:36,480
and later at work just because
everybody else was doing it,
427
00:27:36,480 --> 00:27:38,800
and you didn't want to look like
you were lazy.
428
00:27:38,800 --> 00:27:43,760
Or maybe you have failed to call
someone out for a racist or sexist
429
00:27:44,280 --> 00:27:46,800
comment just because
you didn't want to look bad,
430
00:27:46,800 --> 00:27:48,920
you didn't want to make the fuss.
431
00:27:48,920 --> 00:27:54,000
Or maybe, you have waited and waited
to tell someone that you love them,
432
00:27:54,440 --> 00:27:58,600
just because if you said it first,
and it wasn't reciprocated,
433
00:27:58,600 --> 00:28:00,920
you'd end up feeling heartbroken.
434
00:28:00,920 --> 00:28:04,880
Now, all of these situations are
real-life examples
435
00:28:04,880 --> 00:28:07,080
of Nash equilibrium.
436
00:28:08,240 --> 00:28:12,440
So, what can be done about these
traps which are, admittedly,
437
00:28:12,440 --> 00:28:13,880
very logical?
438
00:28:13,880 --> 00:28:17,520
How can we break out of them and
secure that elusive win-win?
439
00:28:22,320 --> 00:28:25,000
Well, I would like to show you one
option,
440
00:28:25,000 --> 00:28:27,600
with the help of my favourite ever
game show.
441
00:28:28,920 --> 00:28:32,240
So I have invited some people along
to a screening
442
00:28:32,240 --> 00:28:34,000
of its dramatic climax.
443
00:28:38,760 --> 00:28:42,080
You each have a golden ball
with the word "split"
444
00:28:42,080 --> 00:28:46,200
written inside. You each have a
golden ball with the word "steal".
445
00:28:46,200 --> 00:28:49,840
If you both choose the split ball,
446
00:28:49,840 --> 00:28:53,600
you split today's jackpot
of £100,150.
447
00:28:53,600 --> 00:28:56,560
If one of you splits and one of
you steals,
448
00:28:56,560 --> 00:29:01,560
whoever chooses the steal ball will
go home with today's jackpot.
449
00:29:02,120 --> 00:29:07,160
If you both choose the steal ball,
you go home with nothing.
450
00:29:07,720 --> 00:29:09,680
I am going to split this.
451
00:29:09,680 --> 00:29:13,080
I am very, very happy
to go home with 50,000.
452
00:29:13,080 --> 00:29:15,400
You're genuinely going to split
with me? If I stole off you,
453
00:29:15,400 --> 00:29:18,240
every single person there would
run over and lynch me.
454
00:29:18,240 --> 00:29:19,920
There's no way I could...
455
00:29:19,920 --> 00:29:23,600
Everyone who knew me would just be
disgusted if I stole.
456
00:29:23,600 --> 00:29:26,440
Sarah, I can look you straight
in the eye and tell you,
457
00:29:26,440 --> 00:29:29,480
I am going to split.
Promise? I swear down to you.
458
00:29:29,480 --> 00:29:30,920
I AM going to split.
459
00:29:30,920 --> 00:29:35,720
Sarah, Steve, choose either
the split or the steal ball now.
460
00:29:37,200 --> 00:29:39,240
Hold it up.
461
00:29:39,240 --> 00:29:40,600
We're going home with 50 grand each.
462
00:29:40,600 --> 00:29:42,040
I promise you that.
463
00:29:42,040 --> 00:29:43,160
Split or steal?
464
00:29:46,360 --> 00:29:48,720
SHOUTING AND GROANING
465
00:29:50,720 --> 00:29:53,240
You never know what's coming
in this game.
466
00:29:54,760 --> 00:29:57,880
Trust me, that never gets
any less painful to watch!
467
00:29:59,320 --> 00:30:02,360
I think we can all agree
that was pretty incredible.
468
00:30:02,360 --> 00:30:05,080
I'm just really shocked that she
would do such a thing.
469
00:30:05,080 --> 00:30:07,360
What would you have done in that
situation, though?
470
00:30:07,360 --> 00:30:09,560
To be honest, I would actually have
stolen as well.
471
00:30:09,560 --> 00:30:12,120
There you are, slight contradiction!
472
00:30:13,440 --> 00:30:16,440
She seemed to be reeling him in
really well
473
00:30:16,440 --> 00:30:18,840
to say, "Are you sure you're
going to split?
474
00:30:18,840 --> 00:30:21,080
"Do you promise me you are going to
split?"
475
00:30:21,080 --> 00:30:23,760
As soon as she knew that,
she could've equally thought,
476
00:30:23,760 --> 00:30:26,720
I'm going to split as well and we're
both going to leave with some money.
477
00:30:26,720 --> 00:30:28,800
Well, if you thought that was
interesting.
478
00:30:28,800 --> 00:30:31,800
I want to show you
another clip which might be
479
00:30:31,800 --> 00:30:34,440
one of my favourite things
of all time.
480
00:30:34,440 --> 00:30:36,960
That's the only introduction
I'm going to give you.
481
00:30:39,200 --> 00:30:40,720
Nick, Ibrahim.
482
00:30:42,360 --> 00:30:44,840
Ibrahim, I want you to trust me.
483
00:30:44,840 --> 00:30:48,200
100%, I'm going to pick
the steal ball.
484
00:30:48,200 --> 00:30:51,440
Sorry, you are going... I'm going
to choose the steal ball.
485
00:30:51,440 --> 00:30:52,760
I want you to do split,
486
00:30:52,760 --> 00:30:55,200
and I promise you that I will split
the money with you.
487
00:30:55,200 --> 00:30:56,840
After you've took the steal?
488
00:30:56,840 --> 00:31:00,240
Yes. You're going to take steal,
I'm going to take split.
489
00:31:00,240 --> 00:31:02,040
Yes. So you take the money...
490
00:31:02,040 --> 00:31:04,600
And I will split it with you.
After the show. Yes.
491
00:31:04,600 --> 00:31:06,360
CHUCKLING
492
00:31:06,360 --> 00:31:09,280
APPLAUSE
493
00:31:09,280 --> 00:31:11,320
Why don't we just both pick split?
494
00:31:11,320 --> 00:31:13,840
I'm not going to pick split,
I'm going to steal, Ibrahim.
495
00:31:13,840 --> 00:31:15,320
Honestly, 100% I'm going to steal.
496
00:31:15,320 --> 00:31:17,840
If you do split,
then I will split the money.
497
00:31:17,840 --> 00:31:21,280
I can't see myself doing that.
OK, well, I'm going to steal, so
we are going to leave with nothing.
498
00:31:21,280 --> 00:31:24,040
You are walking away with no money
because you're an idiot.
499
00:31:24,040 --> 00:31:26,680
That's not true. You're an idiot.
That's what you are.
500
00:31:26,680 --> 00:31:30,360
You're an idiot.
Nick, choose split or steal.
501
00:31:30,360 --> 00:31:33,240
Ibrahim, choose split or steal.
Now, please.
502
00:31:36,680 --> 00:31:38,840
Split or steal?
503
00:31:42,240 --> 00:31:44,040
Yes, congratulations!
504
00:31:44,040 --> 00:31:47,760
You have both split
and each receive £6,800.
505
00:31:47,760 --> 00:31:50,160
I would have split it.
Why did you put me through that?!
506
00:31:50,160 --> 00:31:52,640
Why would you do that to me?!
507
00:31:55,600 --> 00:31:59,400
Let's take a moment to recap
what just happened.
508
00:31:59,400 --> 00:32:02,080
By promising he will steal upfront,
509
00:32:02,080 --> 00:32:05,240
Nick removes two possible outcomes
to the game.
510
00:32:06,520 --> 00:32:11,280
This means Ibrahim can only steal
and be guaranteed nothing,
511
00:32:11,280 --> 00:32:15,920
or split, handing the cash to Nick
in the hope that he will share it.
512
00:32:17,000 --> 00:32:20,000
Nick knows Ibrahim wants the cash,
513
00:32:20,000 --> 00:32:23,360
so despite his ultimatum,
he also splits.
514
00:32:24,960 --> 00:32:26,280
It's a win-win,
515
00:32:26,280 --> 00:32:30,120
thanks to a brilliant way of forcing
cooperation.
516
00:32:34,080 --> 00:32:38,400
I am delighted that we are joined
today by Nick from that video.
517
00:32:43,240 --> 00:32:46,120
Wow! Thank you.
Nick, that was pretty amazing.
518
00:32:46,120 --> 00:32:48,920
How did it come about,
you appearing on Golden Balls?
519
00:32:48,920 --> 00:32:51,000
So, when I initially saw it,
520
00:32:51,000 --> 00:32:53,720
I thought it was a bit horrendous as
a game show
521
00:32:53,720 --> 00:32:57,600
because what happened basically
is you are rewarded for shafting
522
00:32:57,600 --> 00:33:01,920
people. And I just wanted to prove
that if you trust someone, actually,
523
00:33:01,920 --> 00:33:04,960
more often than not,
people will come through for you.
524
00:33:04,960 --> 00:33:06,520
That was the motivation behind it.
525
00:33:06,520 --> 00:33:09,320
Was there any point when you were
worried
526
00:33:09,320 --> 00:33:13,120
that he wouldn't go with you,
that he wouldn't go for split?
527
00:33:13,120 --> 00:33:18,000
If he didn't split, then he'd lost
everything,
528
00:33:18,000 --> 00:33:21,400
so you can either be stupid or
REALLY stupid -
529
00:33:21,400 --> 00:33:23,440
and when I say really stupid,
530
00:33:23,440 --> 00:33:25,880
you'd rather have nothing than
see somebody get something.
531
00:33:25,880 --> 00:33:28,320
You just had one clear strategy
you just needed to stick to.
532
00:33:28,320 --> 00:33:30,240
I tried to sort of remove the
dilemma.
533
00:33:30,240 --> 00:33:31,680
Forced him into a position?
534
00:33:31,680 --> 00:33:33,640
Yes. If you had won the money,
535
00:33:33,640 --> 00:33:36,240
would you have split it with him
outside of the game?
536
00:33:36,240 --> 00:33:38,520
Yes. I REALLY would have done.
537
00:33:38,520 --> 00:33:40,840
It was about proving that if you
trust people,
538
00:33:40,840 --> 00:33:42,760
sometimes they don't always
shaft you,
539
00:33:42,760 --> 00:33:45,200
and that was the philosophy
of why I wanted to do it.
540
00:33:45,200 --> 00:33:47,600
Were you expecting it to get
that much attention?
541
00:33:47,600 --> 00:33:49,640
No, nobody could have foreseen that.
542
00:33:49,640 --> 00:33:53,560
Harvard University teach it
in economics.
543
00:33:53,560 --> 00:33:57,360
UCL teach it... As do I!
Yes! Bath University do.
544
00:33:57,360 --> 00:33:59,680
I've been asked to go to New York
to talk about it.
545
00:33:59,680 --> 00:34:02,520
President Obama's economist has
included me in his book,
546
00:34:02,520 --> 00:34:04,600
it's just a bit insane, really.
547
00:34:04,600 --> 00:34:07,720
Yeah, wow. You did break
the prisoner's dilemma.
548
00:34:10,200 --> 00:34:13,680
It's safe to conclude that having a
strategic genius
549
00:34:13,680 --> 00:34:17,560
and all-round lovely man like Nick
take control
550
00:34:17,560 --> 00:34:19,600
can be a real win for all.
551
00:34:20,880 --> 00:34:25,200
So, like him, look for strategies
to force cooperation.
552
00:34:28,880 --> 00:34:33,080
Strong leadership, incentives
or shared morals and values
553
00:34:33,080 --> 00:34:36,960
underpin equilibria that
work in everyone's favour.
554
00:34:38,640 --> 00:34:40,720
But they are hard won
555
00:34:40,720 --> 00:34:44,040
and we don't need to look far to see
the terrible consequences
556
00:34:44,040 --> 00:34:46,520
of our failure to cooperate.
557
00:34:48,480 --> 00:34:50,840
There are many situations in life,
558
00:34:50,840 --> 00:34:55,800
egotistical behaviour is not only
morally problematic but it is also
559
00:34:56,320 --> 00:34:58,440
strategically unwise.
560
00:35:12,520 --> 00:35:16,080
I think a nice domestic example is
washing dishes.
561
00:35:16,080 --> 00:35:17,920
No-one loves it, OK.
562
00:35:17,920 --> 00:35:21,280
It is a little bit annoying,
you know.
563
00:35:21,280 --> 00:35:24,720
And we all know that it is better
for someone else to do it.
564
00:35:24,720 --> 00:35:27,240
But if you're living
in a shared house,
565
00:35:27,240 --> 00:35:32,240
the problem begins when all the
players decide to adopt my strategy
566
00:35:33,160 --> 00:35:36,560
and then NO-ONE is washing
the dishes.
567
00:35:36,560 --> 00:35:41,560
The outcome is a tower of dirty
plates, and it is not good.
568
00:35:42,480 --> 00:35:47,240
When you are taking into account
only your personal good
569
00:35:47,240 --> 00:35:50,440
and all your thinking is
self-centred,
570
00:35:50,440 --> 00:35:53,720
you don't care at all
about other players,
571
00:35:53,720 --> 00:35:57,520
the result may be a total disaster.
572
00:35:57,520 --> 00:36:01,920
It's so easy to disregard the small
impact we might make
573
00:36:01,920 --> 00:36:05,240
just by ditching stuff
for someone else to deal with.
574
00:36:06,600 --> 00:36:11,640
But many small acts of selfishness
can have huge consequences.
575
00:36:11,880 --> 00:36:16,920
It's a phenomenon known
as the tragedy of the commons.
576
00:36:17,160 --> 00:36:20,920
For example,
the damage to the atmosphere.
577
00:36:20,920 --> 00:36:25,800
The destruction of ocean ecosystems,
rainforest loggings,
578
00:36:25,800 --> 00:36:29,200
these issues are far more important.
579
00:36:29,200 --> 00:36:32,760
And it is really hard to tackle
with them,
580
00:36:32,760 --> 00:36:35,720
even with rules and regulations.
581
00:36:36,960 --> 00:36:39,520
Arguably, the challenge for
government
582
00:36:39,520 --> 00:36:44,560
is to create rules that align the
interests of individuals and society
583
00:36:44,960 --> 00:36:47,160
to find those win-wins.
584
00:36:49,240 --> 00:36:51,440
But like the rest of us,
585
00:36:51,440 --> 00:36:56,480
our leaders have their own political
and economic goals to pursue,
586
00:36:56,600 --> 00:37:01,200
meaning there will always be the
temptation for some to put their own
587
00:37:01,200 --> 00:37:03,800
short-term interests first.
588
00:37:09,960 --> 00:37:13,400
So, in the real conflicts we all
face,
589
00:37:13,400 --> 00:37:16,040
can we ever justify
being uncooperative?
590
00:37:21,240 --> 00:37:24,160
Definitely, I would argue -
on occasion.
591
00:37:25,560 --> 00:37:29,000
Because some people really don't
know what's good for them.
592
00:37:33,720 --> 00:37:38,760
I'd like to suggest we take a
potentially very unstable situation,
593
00:37:39,320 --> 00:37:44,320
taking two small argumentative
children on holiday,
594
00:37:44,760 --> 00:37:48,720
to demonstrate some strategies that
can ensure you win
595
00:37:48,720 --> 00:37:50,800
in a domestic stand-off.
596
00:37:54,320 --> 00:37:59,040
The first thing absolutely NOT to do
is to make a non-credible threat.
597
00:38:00,520 --> 00:38:03,080
Right, that's it.
Holiday's cancelled.
598
00:38:03,080 --> 00:38:05,360
I'm turning the car around,
we're going home.
599
00:38:07,960 --> 00:38:11,520
The kids quickly work out that you
won't do this,
600
00:38:11,520 --> 00:38:16,560
as it harms you just as much as
them. Everybody wants a holiday.
601
00:38:20,640 --> 00:38:24,160
So try a far more credible threat
instead.
602
00:38:25,440 --> 00:38:28,880
If you don't shut up, we're going to
be spending the first day of the
603
00:38:28,880 --> 00:38:31,200
holiday visiting an art gallery.
604
00:38:35,880 --> 00:38:39,160
As long as they know you REALLY like
art galleries
605
00:38:39,160 --> 00:38:43,600
and you know they really hate them,
this one is a much better strategy.
606
00:38:51,960 --> 00:38:56,600
Even better, try a grand gesture
called pre-commitment.
607
00:38:56,600 --> 00:39:00,240
If one of you starts arguing again,
one of you is going to go to bed
608
00:39:00,240 --> 00:39:01,680
at six o'clock all week
609
00:39:01,680 --> 00:39:04,440
and the other one can stay up
as late as they like.
610
00:39:07,560 --> 00:39:09,720
This one is quite a serious
pre-commitment
611
00:39:09,720 --> 00:39:12,680
because you are risking not
being able to pack them off to bed
612
00:39:12,680 --> 00:39:16,280
like normal, but you would just have
to hope that the prospect
613
00:39:16,280 --> 00:39:20,440
of them missing out is enough for
them to be smart and stay quiet.
614
00:39:25,040 --> 00:39:27,000
In order to get what you want,
615
00:39:27,000 --> 00:39:32,040
any adversary has to believe you
have the credibility and commitment
616
00:39:32,320 --> 00:39:34,400
to go through with your threats.
617
00:39:38,840 --> 00:39:42,720
But, in the end,
no matter how winning your tactics,
618
00:39:42,720 --> 00:39:46,520
there is one thing that is
incredibly difficult to deal with.
619
00:39:46,520 --> 00:39:50,480
KIDS: It's not fair!
620
00:40:01,600 --> 00:40:03,480
In any kind of interaction,
621
00:40:03,480 --> 00:40:07,800
our sense of what is and isn't fair
is incredibly powerful.
622
00:40:10,080 --> 00:40:14,800
And in some circumstances, it can
actually make us deliberately lose.
623
00:40:17,000 --> 00:40:20,720
To explore this apparently quite
irrational way of getting what
624
00:40:20,720 --> 00:40:23,320
we want, Haim and I are going to
play something
625
00:40:23,320 --> 00:40:27,000
called the ultimatum game,
and the rules are very simple.
626
00:40:28,840 --> 00:40:31,400
Two players, one is called the
proposer
627
00:40:31,400 --> 00:40:34,800
and the other is called the
respondent.
628
00:40:34,800 --> 00:40:38,160
The proposer gets a sum of money,
for example £100.
629
00:40:38,160 --> 00:40:40,800
Is that what you've got in there?
Yes, yes, yes.
630
00:40:40,800 --> 00:40:44,880
And the proposer has to decide how
to split the money.
631
00:40:44,880 --> 00:40:46,520
And the responder,
632
00:40:46,520 --> 00:40:51,520
the responder must decide
whether to accept or to reject.
633
00:40:51,520 --> 00:40:54,280
If the responder rejects the split,
634
00:40:54,280 --> 00:40:57,280
both players will end up
with nothing.
635
00:40:57,280 --> 00:41:00,520
And it is one short game.
Take it or leave it offer.
636
00:41:00,520 --> 00:41:03,920
OK. The fairest thing to do
obviously is to say 50-50.
637
00:41:03,920 --> 00:41:05,800
50-50, of course.
638
00:41:05,800 --> 00:41:09,040
I could get an extra £10
by saying 60-40.
639
00:41:09,040 --> 00:41:11,880
Easily, I think.
However I decide...
640
00:41:11,880 --> 00:41:14,800
I mean, I do genuinely get
some of the money.
641
00:41:14,800 --> 00:41:18,120
Yes, yes, yes, real money.
A real game. Everything is real.
642
00:41:19,360 --> 00:41:23,360
Now to make some offers to a series
of unsuspecting volunteers.
643
00:41:24,440 --> 00:41:28,720
I think I'm going to split it 70-30.
644
00:41:28,720 --> 00:41:30,440
I get the 70.
645
00:41:30,440 --> 00:41:33,720
Yes. Well, obviously it is really
unfair, but I'm going to accept it.
646
00:41:33,720 --> 00:41:36,440
You have to decide.
I'm going to accept it.
647
00:41:36,440 --> 00:41:38,000
OK. £30.
648
00:41:38,000 --> 00:41:39,680
OK. Are you going to check it?
649
00:41:39,680 --> 00:41:41,640
I'll check it, I'm a mathematician.
650
00:41:41,640 --> 00:41:43,560
Thank you. Thank you.
651
00:41:43,560 --> 00:41:47,400
So, unfair offer number one
works in my favour.
652
00:41:47,400 --> 00:41:51,680
What is your decision? OK, I'm going
to go for
653
00:41:51,680 --> 00:41:54,080
£80 to me and £20 to you.
654
00:41:54,080 --> 00:41:56,360
Yes or no,
take it or leave it offer.
655
00:41:56,360 --> 00:41:59,160
Leave it. No. But hang on,
you came here with nothing.
656
00:41:59,160 --> 00:42:01,840
I did, but I feel like
if you were like, "£50 for you,
657
00:42:01,840 --> 00:42:03,760
"£50 for me,"
I'd be fine with that.
658
00:42:03,760 --> 00:42:06,840
I would've said deal. We both came
here with nothing so we both should
659
00:42:06,840 --> 00:42:09,960
have left with something, and an
equal amount would've been better
660
00:42:09,960 --> 00:42:11,400
than an unequal amount.
661
00:42:11,400 --> 00:42:13,200
Wow. Goodness. OK.
662
00:42:13,200 --> 00:42:17,680
You see, it contradicts all the
economic predictions, yes?
663
00:42:17,680 --> 00:42:20,360
Economics says one is better than
none -
664
00:42:20,360 --> 00:42:22,600
20 is for sure better than none.
665
00:42:22,600 --> 00:42:26,600
Economics says
Sayed here should accept,
666
00:42:26,600 --> 00:42:28,720
but I am denied. Next?
667
00:42:29,840 --> 00:42:32,400
Hi. Hi. Hello.
668
00:42:32,400 --> 00:42:34,040
I quite like money.
669
00:42:34,040 --> 00:42:38,440
So £90 to me and £10 to you.
670
00:42:40,840 --> 00:42:43,480
You know what?
Why not, I'll take £10.
671
00:42:43,480 --> 00:42:45,040
You have £10.
672
00:42:45,040 --> 00:42:47,600
It is yours. Thank you very much.
673
00:42:47,600 --> 00:42:50,080
Hannah, you are now such a rich
person!
674
00:42:50,080 --> 00:42:52,640
Thank you very much.
Are you happy with your decision?
675
00:42:52,640 --> 00:42:54,880
It's pretty unfair, but...
Pretty unfair.
676
00:42:54,880 --> 00:42:58,200
I am a realist and I like £10
at least in my pocket,
677
00:42:58,200 --> 00:43:01,600
so I am at least £10 richer, so...
£10 is better than none.
678
00:43:01,600 --> 00:43:05,120
Yes.
A man after my own logical heart.
679
00:43:07,560 --> 00:43:12,560
After three offers, I've bagged £160
of a possible 240.
680
00:43:14,520 --> 00:43:16,960
So why did I not clean up?
681
00:43:16,960 --> 00:43:20,000
The 20-80 split,
682
00:43:20,000 --> 00:43:23,720
not taking the £20
seems bonkers to me.
683
00:43:23,720 --> 00:43:28,200
The 20, it is approximately the
world average of the split
684
00:43:28,200 --> 00:43:30,440
that people refuse to take.
685
00:43:30,440 --> 00:43:35,440
People seem to show an unwillingness
to accept unfairness and they are
686
00:43:35,680 --> 00:43:37,520
prepared to pay. Even at 80-20?
687
00:43:37,520 --> 00:43:40,160
They are basically being irrational,
right?
688
00:43:40,160 --> 00:43:45,120
People usually behave rationally
from their point of view,
689
00:43:45,120 --> 00:43:48,720
so it is really hard to define
what is rational, you know,
690
00:43:48,720 --> 00:43:51,040
what is not. For example, Sayed,
691
00:43:51,040 --> 00:43:55,600
yes, he paid £20, but to teach you a
lesson,
692
00:43:55,600 --> 00:44:00,600
£20, it seems to me a low price,
you see? Nothing, almost.
693
00:44:00,680 --> 00:44:03,880
Well, it was an expensive lesson
for me.
694
00:44:03,880 --> 00:44:05,560
For you, but not for him.
695
00:44:07,360 --> 00:44:11,600
It might seem like an irrational way
to get what we want, but what we're
696
00:44:11,600 --> 00:44:13,760
looking at here is the long game.
697
00:44:16,120 --> 00:44:20,720
The act of sacrificing a small win
to punish someone means
698
00:44:20,720 --> 00:44:25,480
they may well be less selfish with
us and others in the future.
699
00:44:26,840 --> 00:44:31,880
It's a perfectly rational way to
secure greater collective success.
700
00:44:42,080 --> 00:44:45,680
But most creatures on earth
AREN'T rational
701
00:44:45,680 --> 00:44:48,280
so why do we see cooperative,
702
00:44:48,280 --> 00:44:51,920
even altruistic behaviour
in the animal kingdom,
703
00:44:51,920 --> 00:44:55,400
that seems to benefit others more
than the individual?
704
00:44:57,240 --> 00:45:01,240
Surely this contradicts
the theory of evolution,
705
00:45:01,240 --> 00:45:04,160
based as it is on the struggle for
life
706
00:45:04,160 --> 00:45:06,720
and the survival of the fittest?
707
00:45:09,320 --> 00:45:11,560
When I learned about evolution
at school,
708
00:45:11,560 --> 00:45:15,160
I was under the impression that it
was all about competition.
709
00:45:15,160 --> 00:45:18,880
That every animal was necessarily
out for itself
710
00:45:18,880 --> 00:45:20,720
and the fitter you are,
711
00:45:20,720 --> 00:45:23,920
the more likely you are to
win fights for mates,
712
00:45:23,920 --> 00:45:26,360
for food and for territory.
713
00:45:26,360 --> 00:45:30,840
If you can ace THOSE conflicts, the
more likely you are to pass on your
714
00:45:30,840 --> 00:45:33,800
genes and win at the game of life.
715
00:45:35,320 --> 00:45:39,080
It has been said that nothing in
biology makes sense
716
00:45:39,080 --> 00:45:41,600
except in the light of evolution,
717
00:45:41,600 --> 00:45:44,640
and evolution has been based on
conflict.
718
00:45:44,640 --> 00:45:47,680
It is a struggle for existence.
719
00:46:04,560 --> 00:46:08,000
In animal behaviour,
there exists many examples
720
00:46:08,000 --> 00:46:10,680
where animals fight between
721
00:46:10,680 --> 00:46:15,160
the species, but where they
fight, according almost to rules,
722
00:46:15,160 --> 00:46:17,800
where they seem to restrain
themselves
723
00:46:17,800 --> 00:46:21,200
and don't escalate the conflict
too much.
724
00:46:22,200 --> 00:46:26,840
You could try to explain individuals
avoiding violence as being for the
725
00:46:26,840 --> 00:46:30,880
benefit of the group, but that's not
quite how evolution works.
726
00:46:32,160 --> 00:46:36,480
If there is a single individual
ready to escalate the conflict,
727
00:46:36,480 --> 00:46:38,880
and all others are going
to run away,
728
00:46:38,880 --> 00:46:41,640
when they see that
things become serious,
729
00:46:41,640 --> 00:46:43,920
then this individual will win
everything,
730
00:46:43,920 --> 00:46:45,400
will have many offsprings.
731
00:46:45,400 --> 00:46:49,080
The offspring will win his trait
of escalating a conflict
732
00:46:49,080 --> 00:46:52,360
and this trait
will become more and more frequent.
733
00:46:54,080 --> 00:46:59,000
In this scenario, aggressive
behaviour will always win out.
734
00:46:59,000 --> 00:47:01,520
So there has to be an alternative
explanation.
735
00:47:02,560 --> 00:47:07,600
It only began to emerge in the early
1970s, when British biologist John
736
00:47:08,160 --> 00:47:12,880
Maynard Smith was given a manuscript
to review, written by an unknown
737
00:47:12,880 --> 00:47:15,000
American called George Price.
738
00:47:16,280 --> 00:47:20,920
Now, Price wasn't a mathematician or
a biologist or a game theorist,
739
00:47:20,920 --> 00:47:23,080
but he had read von Neumann
740
00:47:23,080 --> 00:47:27,120
and he had written about
Cold War games and the uses
741
00:47:27,120 --> 00:47:32,120
of deterrence. His paper, titled
Antlers, Intraspecific Combat,
742
00:47:33,160 --> 00:47:38,120
And Altruism, suggested that things
like giant deer antlers weren't
743
00:47:42,520 --> 00:47:45,720
they were clever strategic
accessories
744
00:47:45,720 --> 00:47:48,400
that would help you limit conflict
745
00:47:48,400 --> 00:47:53,040
and avoid the destructive effects
of fighting.
746
00:47:53,040 --> 00:47:55,640
It's just like nuclear missiles,
747
00:47:55,640 --> 00:47:58,960
antlers are the kind of weapon that
you could
748
00:47:58,960 --> 00:48:01,400
parade in front of your enemy,
749
00:48:01,400 --> 00:48:04,000
hopefully without ever
having to actually use them.
750
00:48:05,880 --> 00:48:08,000
Maynard Smith was struck by this
751
00:48:08,000 --> 00:48:10,520
and, together with Price,
created a simple
752
00:48:10,520 --> 00:48:15,600
game to explore how such limited
war strategies could evolve.
753
00:48:17,080 --> 00:48:19,440
And he called it the Hawk-Dove Game.
754
00:48:20,480 --> 00:48:24,720
Picture an imaginary species of bird
that only has two inherited
755
00:48:24,720 --> 00:48:27,160
behavioural strategies.
756
00:48:27,160 --> 00:48:30,440
One is aggressive, or hawkish,
757
00:48:30,440 --> 00:48:34,200
and the other more cooperative,
or dovish.
758
00:48:34,200 --> 00:48:37,600
If two hawks clash over something
like food,
759
00:48:37,600 --> 00:48:40,200
their strategy means total war.
760
00:48:40,200 --> 00:48:45,040
They will fight, risking injury and
no guarantee of food either.
761
00:48:46,760 --> 00:48:48,920
Now, if a hawk and a dove meet,
762
00:48:48,920 --> 00:48:53,080
the dove initially stands up for
itself, but then scarpers.
763
00:48:54,800 --> 00:48:58,040
Finally, if doves meet,
they'll share.
764
00:48:59,520 --> 00:49:03,320
In each interaction,
both birds receive a score.
765
00:49:04,960 --> 00:49:09,080
And if these are added up over time,
it reveals which behaviours are most
766
00:49:09,080 --> 00:49:14,080
likely to benefit individuals, and
so survive down the generations.
767
00:49:17,040 --> 00:49:18,680
On the face of it,
768
00:49:18,680 --> 00:49:20,800
if everyone was displaying dovelike
behaviour,
769
00:49:20,800 --> 00:49:22,160
it looks like it could work,
770
00:49:22,160 --> 00:49:25,120
as well as being genuinely nice
for everyone.
771
00:49:25,120 --> 00:49:26,920
But, unfortunately,
772
00:49:26,920 --> 00:49:30,840
that's unstable because just one
meanie hawk could come along and
773
00:49:30,840 --> 00:49:33,400
immediately have the upper hand
on everybody.
774
00:49:33,400 --> 00:49:35,800
And if that hawkish behaviour really
took off,
775
00:49:35,800 --> 00:49:37,400
that too would be unstable,
776
00:49:37,400 --> 00:49:41,840
because of the constant risk and
cost of violence.
777
00:49:41,840 --> 00:49:46,840
Now, what the maths shows is that a
stable population is possible,
778
00:49:47,440 --> 00:49:52,480
but only if you have one-third hawks
and two-thirds doves.
779
00:49:53,200 --> 00:49:55,560
Now, those exact numbers might
change slightly
780
00:49:55,560 --> 00:49:57,160
if you tweak the payoff,
781
00:49:57,160 --> 00:50:02,200
but the key point here is that this
was mathematical proof that there
782
00:50:02,640 --> 00:50:07,000
was a strategic advantage to
avoiding conflict.
783
00:50:07,000 --> 00:50:09,160
Evolution, it turned out,
784
00:50:09,160 --> 00:50:12,880
is not simply a winner-takes-all
kind of game.
785
00:50:14,240 --> 00:50:19,200
And so, scientists took to this new
evolutionary form of game theory.
786
00:50:20,200 --> 00:50:24,560
The reason? To find the ultimate
long-term winning strategy
787
00:50:24,560 --> 00:50:26,440
for us all.
788
00:50:36,080 --> 00:50:39,440
It was an ingenious American
political scientist
789
00:50:39,440 --> 00:50:41,120
called Robert Axelrod
790
00:50:41,120 --> 00:50:43,880
who, around 1980,
took the next big step.
791
00:50:45,760 --> 00:50:49,560
Axelrod invited economists,
mathematicians,
792
00:50:49,560 --> 00:50:51,560
political scientists,
793
00:50:51,560 --> 00:50:54,440
psychologists and sociologists,
794
00:50:54,440 --> 00:50:58,800
all of whom had written theoretical
papers on co-operation and the
795
00:50:58,800 --> 00:51:02,880
prisoner's dilemma, to compete
in a computer tournament.
796
00:51:05,000 --> 00:51:07,560
The challenge was to design a
computer program
797
00:51:07,560 --> 00:51:09,880
that would play the best combination
798
00:51:09,880 --> 00:51:12,720
of attacking and more cooperative
behaviour.
799
00:51:15,560 --> 00:51:19,480
It was a bold move, considering the
golden age of popular computer games
800
00:51:19,480 --> 00:51:21,640
and coding was still in its infancy.
801
00:51:24,640 --> 00:51:26,760
Researchers from around the world
802
00:51:26,760 --> 00:51:29,680
mailed in their computer programs
via post.
803
00:51:29,680 --> 00:51:32,840
It was all to see which of
their electronic beasts,
804
00:51:32,840 --> 00:51:35,320
some of which were a lot more
cooperative than others,
805
00:51:35,320 --> 00:51:37,000
would emerge the winner.
806
00:51:39,440 --> 00:51:43,160
14 programs were to play 200
rounds of the prisoner's dilemma
807
00:51:43,160 --> 00:51:45,880
against themselves and one another.
808
00:51:48,320 --> 00:51:52,040
As you would expect, cooperating
with your opponent scores well.
809
00:51:55,840 --> 00:51:58,280
But you could get a much higher
payoff
810
00:51:58,280 --> 00:52:01,480
by attacking a co-operator
all of the time.
811
00:52:02,720 --> 00:52:05,840
But attack an attacker,
and your score will suffer.
812
00:52:05,840 --> 00:52:08,360
BEEPING
813
00:52:10,560 --> 00:52:12,560
And so, the tournament ran,
814
00:52:12,560 --> 00:52:15,600
with some players doing better
than others.
815
00:52:16,960 --> 00:52:20,680
One strategy, for example,
was nicknamed "the grudger".
816
00:52:20,680 --> 00:52:23,080
It would co-operate
until it was attacked,
817
00:52:23,080 --> 00:52:24,960
at which point it would get the hump
818
00:52:24,960 --> 00:52:27,840
and never co-operate again
for the rest of the game.
819
00:52:29,920 --> 00:52:32,080
After competing against
everyone else,
820
00:52:32,080 --> 00:52:34,920
the grudger crawled in
in seventh place.
821
00:52:36,360 --> 00:52:39,120
The surprise winner, with 504
points,
822
00:52:39,120 --> 00:52:41,440
was written
in just four lines of code,
823
00:52:41,440 --> 00:52:45,320
and was easily the simplest
program that had been submitted.
824
00:52:45,320 --> 00:52:47,640
It was called tit-for-tat.
825
00:52:47,640 --> 00:52:49,720
It would start off by cooperating
826
00:52:49,720 --> 00:52:52,960
and then would just copy whatever
the opponent did
827
00:52:52,960 --> 00:52:56,720
in the previous round - so if the
opponent either attacked or
828
00:52:56,720 --> 00:53:00,520
cooperated, tit-for-tat
would respond in kind.
829
00:53:03,560 --> 00:53:06,640
Tit-for-tat's behaviour over the
course of the competition
830
00:53:06,640 --> 00:53:10,080
is basically, "You scratch my back,
I'll scratch yours".
831
00:53:12,480 --> 00:53:15,720
So was this the winning strategy
everyone was looking for?
832
00:53:16,960 --> 00:53:18,360
Well, no.
833
00:53:19,480 --> 00:53:22,880
Because, unlike in real life,
these computer programs,
834
00:53:22,880 --> 00:53:26,360
including tit-for-tat,
could play endlessly,
835
00:53:26,360 --> 00:53:28,680
without ever making mistakes.
836
00:53:32,800 --> 00:53:36,400
Imagine if I decided to use
tit-for-tat as my new strategy
837
00:53:36,400 --> 00:53:41,440
for winning at life. So I would
co-operate by default - lovely -
838
00:53:41,920 --> 00:53:44,720
and only retaliate if someone
was really mean to me,
839
00:53:44,720 --> 00:53:46,560
just to teach them a lesson.
840
00:53:46,560 --> 00:53:49,360
But what if, idiotically,
841
00:53:49,360 --> 00:53:53,360
I sort of accidentally was
a bit mean to someone?
842
00:53:53,360 --> 00:53:56,200
Say I just bumped into them.
843
00:53:56,200 --> 00:53:57,880
Oh, sorry.
844
00:53:57,880 --> 00:54:00,520
If they are also playing
tit-for-tat,
845
00:54:00,520 --> 00:54:04,360
they'll have to shove me back -
formerly known as defecting.
846
00:54:06,400 --> 00:54:09,800
And then I'd have to do the same,
as would he.
847
00:54:09,800 --> 00:54:12,080
We'll defect for ever.
848
00:54:14,880 --> 00:54:16,880
Hmm. Not great, is it?
849
00:54:16,880 --> 00:54:20,880
But some scientists weren't quite
ready to give up on tit-for-tat
850
00:54:20,880 --> 00:54:24,160
just yet. Karl Sigmund and his
student Martin Nowak
851
00:54:24,160 --> 00:54:25,880
started experimenting
852
00:54:25,880 --> 00:54:30,320
with a new kind of evolutionary
tournament, but this time,
853
00:54:30,320 --> 00:54:31,960
as in the natural world,
854
00:54:31,960 --> 00:54:35,720
competing strategies could evolve
and make mistakes.
855
00:54:37,520 --> 00:54:42,400
Using computer simulations, they
watched strategies like tit-for-tat
emerge
856
00:54:42,400 --> 00:54:45,680
and compete over thousands of
generations.
857
00:54:48,120 --> 00:54:51,240
After the first 50 or 100 rounds,
858
00:54:51,240 --> 00:54:54,920
it seemed as if everyone was
a defector.
859
00:54:54,920 --> 00:54:56,680
Everyone? Not quite.
860
00:54:56,680 --> 00:55:00,920
There was one little minority
playing something like tit-for-tat,
861
00:55:00,920 --> 00:55:05,280
and this little minority
very slowly increased
862
00:55:05,280 --> 00:55:07,520
and became more and more frequent,
863
00:55:07,520 --> 00:55:11,400
and was actually defeating the
defectors.
864
00:55:11,400 --> 00:55:16,440
The key was to let natural
selection find the winning strategy.
865
00:55:16,680 --> 00:55:21,080
If you wait still longer, then you
will see that another,
866
00:55:21,080 --> 00:55:26,080
more generous form of tit-for-tat is
going to evolve and to take over.
867
00:55:26,720 --> 00:55:30,000
And here it comes,
generous tit-for-tat.
868
00:55:31,320 --> 00:55:34,800
This strategy will always co-operate
first.
869
00:55:37,240 --> 00:55:39,600
But when facing defection...
870
00:55:45,120 --> 00:55:48,960
..around one out of every three
times, it will just ignore it
871
00:55:48,960 --> 00:55:51,080
and co-operate, regardless.
872
00:55:53,840 --> 00:55:58,560
Of all the possible strategies,
and despite its forgiving ways,
873
00:55:58,560 --> 00:56:02,200
generous tit-for-tat consistently
came out on top.
874
00:56:03,840 --> 00:56:05,560
For me it is still...
875
00:56:06,840 --> 00:56:11,920
..one of the fondest remembrances
of my scientific life.
876
00:56:12,640 --> 00:56:15,800
There was no master program
behind it,
877
00:56:15,800 --> 00:56:19,320
no design for forgiveness,
so to speak.
878
00:56:19,320 --> 00:56:22,120
It came out all by itself.
879
00:56:22,120 --> 00:56:27,120
A purely mathematical simulation had
revealed that winning strategies,
880
00:56:27,600 --> 00:56:32,480
in the long run, tend to be
generous, hopeful and forgiving.
881
00:56:32,480 --> 00:56:37,320
Now, this basic moral code
just emerged.
882
00:56:37,320 --> 00:56:42,360
Perhaps you could even take this as
proof of the existence and advantage
883
00:56:42,440 --> 00:56:44,080
of goodness.
884
00:56:44,080 --> 00:56:46,320
So why, then, don't we live
885
00:56:46,320 --> 00:56:50,200
in a wonderful, generous and
forgiving utopia?
886
00:56:51,520 --> 00:56:55,400
The simulations
pointed to an answer.
887
00:56:55,400 --> 00:56:57,680
Over generations of stability,
888
00:56:57,680 --> 00:57:01,000
the main strategy becomes total
cooperation.
889
00:57:02,200 --> 00:57:07,160
But this is fragile because hawkish
defectors can rapidly take over...
890
00:57:08,760 --> 00:57:10,600
..and do their worst.
891
00:57:13,000 --> 00:57:17,040
And yet slowly, thanks to strategies
like tit-for-tat,
892
00:57:17,040 --> 00:57:20,160
cooperation emerges again and again.
893
00:57:22,640 --> 00:57:25,720
Despite its fragility,
there is hope.
894
00:57:25,720 --> 00:57:29,360
Because ultimately cooperation
can't be suppressed.
895
00:57:29,360 --> 00:57:33,560
Thanks to things like altruism,
kindness and reciprocity,
896
00:57:33,560 --> 00:57:36,640
it re-emerges time after time.
897
00:57:36,640 --> 00:57:41,640
And these aren't just codes that are
divined by priests and philosophers.
898
00:57:41,920 --> 00:57:46,360
They have pure mathematics
and evolution itself behind them.
899
00:57:58,800 --> 00:58:02,200
So where does that leave
you and me?
900
00:58:03,520 --> 00:58:06,080
Well, I wanted to try something out.
901
00:58:06,080 --> 00:58:08,120
Starting tonight.
902
00:58:08,120 --> 00:58:11,240
Now, this could work for any kind of
relationship, but let's imagine
903
00:58:11,240 --> 00:58:15,360
that it is your partner. What
I want you to do is to co-operate,
904
00:58:15,360 --> 00:58:18,800
but copy their previous move,
so if they come home one day
905
00:58:18,800 --> 00:58:20,640
with a big bunch of flowers,
906
00:58:20,640 --> 00:58:23,160
you should get to work
on your own romantic gesture.
907
00:58:23,160 --> 00:58:27,040
But if they come home one night
much drunker and later
908
00:58:27,040 --> 00:58:30,840
than they promised,
you get to do something equivalent.
909
00:58:30,840 --> 00:58:34,840
But every now and then, you should
forgive one of their slip-ups
910
00:58:34,840 --> 00:58:36,480
because nobody's perfect, and
911
00:58:36,480 --> 00:58:38,680
you are going to mess up, too,
at some point.
912
00:58:40,920 --> 00:58:42,800
So, there you have it.
913
00:58:42,800 --> 00:58:47,840
Strategies for a happier life and a
better world, all thanks to maths.
914
00:58:48,920 --> 00:58:51,160
I call that a win.
78353
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