All language subtitles for The.World.at.War.1973.S01E12.1080p.BDRip.x265.HEVC

l don't think many of the aircrew

knew what strategic bombing
really meant.

As schoolboys,
we joined the air force,

cos there was a war being fought

and there was a bit of glamour
attached to the air force.

lf you couldn't
get the Kraut in his factory,

it was just as easy
to knock him off in his bed.

lf old Granny Shickelgruber next door
got the chop, that's hard luck.

There are a lot of people who say
that bombing can never win a war.

Well, my answer to that is that it has
never been tried yet, and we shall see.

Affer the Battle of Britain,

the Royal Air Force
had cause to celebrate.

Fighter Command had shown how difficult
it was to destroy a country

which could defend its own air space.

A lesson the air staff, apparently,
neglected to teach itself.

Lord Trenchard had founded the serVice
as a force of strategic bombers.

Fighters for defence were secondary.

Long-range bombers, it was argued,

could win wars
without costly land battles.

They would bomb the industrial heart
out of an enemy

and totally demoralise
his civilian population.

ln 1939, the RAF was not really equipped
to put this thesis to the test.

But affer Dunkirk, it was the only force
capable of attacking Germany.

And the British public
desperately needed an attack.

The British Empire
is building up a bomber force

designed as the offensive air weapon
to smash the heart of Germany.

The first daylight raids
were disastrous.

Bombers fell easy prey to the Luffwaffe.

Still the RAF persevered,
though losses mounted.

Heavy casualties forced Bomber Command
to start flying at night.

OK, chaps, here we go.

Taxi out and take off.

Do you see what l see, skipper?

What do you see, my Scottish friend?

Fog. Dirty, yellow, stinking fog.

For aircrews
trained to attack in daylight,

night flying had its problems.

To find a target in Germany,

in the dead of night,

in any average weather conditions,

was quite far beyond the task

of any bomber crews.

We're over the Dutch coast.
Too much cloud to see where.

Patriotic films had no
difficulty in giving the impression

that determination
and a diet of raw carrots

could overcome the law saying
you cannot see in the dark.

- Can't see anything else but the Rhine.
- l hope it's not the Danube.

Keep on going. You might be able
to pick up something with lights on.

lf you could get visual pinpoints
en route,

you could get within five or seven miles
of the targets.

- Bomb doors open.
- Steady.

Once the target was reached,
it was a piece of cake...

Bombs gone.

..provided you were just
blowing up a studio model.

l hope we haven't
kept you waiting, sir.

Good Lord, no. Come and sit down.

- How did you get on?
- Caused a hell of a great big fire.

Buckets of smoke.
Visible, ooh, 50 miles away.

Well, old boy,
how about some bacon and eggs?

The truth was different.

ln fact, in those days,
and it's been proved since,

three bombs in every 100 got
within five miles of the aiming point.

In diesem Schlafsaal wurden neun Kinder
getötet und fünf schwer verletzt.

lnaccurate bombing
could be embarrassing.

The German propaganda ministry
quickly capitalised

on the destruction
of this children's hospital.

Das sind die Opfer
der britischen Mordbuben,

die dieses gemeine Verbrechen ganz
bewusst begangen haben.

Es wird unerbittlich gesühnt werden.

But the war cabinet's view
was that Germany had to be bombed.

And this was the only strategic
bombing Britain could then undertake.

Coventry and Liverpool indicated
German industry would suffer

if its workers were bombed out.

Professor Lindemann told Churchill that
de-housing a third of German workers

would bring industrial production
to a halt.

And there was popular pressure
to avenge the Blitz.

We ask no favours of the enemy.

We seek from them no... compunction.

On the contrary,

if tonight the people of London
were asked to cast their votes

as to whether a convention
should be entered into

to stop the bombing of all cities,

an overwhelming majority would cry:

"No, we will mete out to the Germans

the measure and more than the measure
they have meted out to us."

But the Germans were now
meting it out to the British bomber.

By the end of 1941 ,
Britain had lost 700 aircraff.

The navy and the army were demanding
bombers for the Atlantic and the desert.

Bomber Command
stood to be put out of business.

ln the face of mounting losses,

the cabinet ordered bombing operations
to be cut down,

to save the bomber force.

During the respite in February 1942,

Sir Arthur Harris took over as
Commander-in-Chief, Bomber Command.

He was determined to succeed
with new tactics and new bombers.

The Nazis entered this war
under the rather childish delusion

that they were going to bomb
everybody else

and nobody was going to bomb them.

At Rotterdam, London, Warsaw
and half a hundred other places,

they put that rather naive theory
into operation.

They sowed the wind and now
they are going to reap the whirlwind.

l put them onto the north German ports
in the Baltic,

because, having flown
quite a bit at night myself,

l realised that the easiest targets
to get hold of, of course,

were always the ones on the coastline.

Because if you can see anything,
you can see a coastline.

lf you can see a coastline
with its odd shapes,

you can find your way along to ports
and recognise them.

Lubeck and Rostock
were the first major targets.

As ports, they were easy to find.

And they burnt well.

ln March 1942,
230 bombers destroyed half Lubeck.

ln April,
Rostock was bombed into flames.

The style was set: night area bombing.

This was to become the pattern
for the next three years.

lt was terrifying,
it was indiscriminate,

but as far as Bomber Command
was concerned, there was no alternative.

How many occasions,

looking out of the window,
or walking out in the garden,

could you see up to 18 or 20,000 feet?

Maybe on two or three days at most.

On how many occasions can you
guarantee if you see up to it here,

that you could see down to it
500 miles away,

in the other end of Europe?

That was the situation.

There's no possibility
of hitting the individual targets,

consistently small targets,

until we got
the navigational electronic aids

that would show those targets up
in the dark or through clouds.

The first electronic aid
to navigation now came into serVice.

lt was called GEE.

Three radio transmitters in England
sent an invisible grid of signals

across western Europe.

By monitoring the signals
and plotting them on a map,

a navigator could tell
where his aircraff was.

GEE was first used at Cologne.

Here, Harris threw in every bomber
he could scrape up

for a monumental prestige attack.

ln your hands
lie the means of destroying

a major part of the resources by which
the enemy's war effort is maintained.

Press home your attack.
lf you individually succeed,

you will have delivered
the most devastating blow

against the very vitals of the enemy.

Let him have it right on the chin.

Send that message
to all groups and stations.

l was trying to show them
what could be achieved

with something approaching
an adequate force,

and that it would be achieved
without abnormal casualties.

The dark hours over Hitler's
Germany are about to be made hideous.

The men of Bomber Command
know well what they have to do.

A calm, moonlit night,
everything ready and waiting,

from planes to carrier pigeons.

They seem to know the ops are on.
Come on, fellas, get cracking.

Round the clock with the RAF.

At station affer station, there
are heavies, including Lancasters,

the heavy bomber of the moment,
ready for tonight.

For tonight is going
to be very, very interesting -

a thousand-bomber night.

On that night, May 30, 1942,

1 ,046 bombers took off for Cologne.

Wir hörten auch gleich
kurz darauf das Brummen

der anfliegenden Bomber.

We heard the drone
of the approaching bombers

and guessed that
it was a heavy formation.

And soon affer,
the first bombs fell around us.

We were all shaking with fear.
Some people nearly fainted.

Many of the patients were crying.

The roaring and crashing
came closer and closer.

We really thought
all hell was breaking loose.

Our part of the city was in flames.

People were running out of cellars
and out of houses.

Some were buried in the rubble.

Others were caught
by the falling masonry.

Many people actually caught fire,
running around like living torches.

We really didn't expect, in '42,
that such a heavy raid would take place.

We were only used to smaller attacks,

and when l got the news that about
1 ,000 bombers were attacking Cologne,

it was incredible.

The morale of the people
was not shattered too much.

lt was more like a short shock
which passed away.

German industry remained
resilient, although the industrial Ruhr

was under attack throughout 1942.

Damage was extensive,
but there was some slack in the economy

to be taken up in more war production.

The Nazi war machine was skilled
at orchestrating civilian morale.

Flugzeuggeräusch.

Bitte mal die Geschwindigkeit
von 02:15 Uhr nachmessen.

The Germans could give as well as take.

The Luffwaffe was acutely aware of
the lesson radar-controlled RAF fighters

had taught it
during the Battle of Britain.

Air defence chief General Kammhuber
evolved a most efficient system.

Across the North Sea coast

stretched an early-warning radar grid,
the Kammhuber Line.

This grid was divided into boxes.

ln each box was a night fighter,
waiting like a spider for the fly.

We overtook the plane on the side,
so he thought, "Ah, he hasn't seen me."

He still did some corkscrewing
or waving.

l just banked slightly to give
the gunners a good view underneath.

l moved off maybe ten degrees to port
and starboard during this manoeuvre,

but it wasn't violent
in any sense at all.

And then l was shooting this way
and diving directly,

or with a - what we said -
schräge Musik,

two two-centimetre cannons,

the same, only flying underneath,

and waiting, moving very easy.

We did the same
parallel to the other one, shooting.

Between the motors
you had about 5,000 litres of gasoline,

and that was burning very easily.

The advent of the Kammhuber Line,
and all that went with it,

was a startling sort of thing
to be confronted with,

because the German night defences
took a terrible toll of British bombers.

But now the RAF
was no longer alone.

Hiya, fellas. There's your birdseed
for Hitler. Come and get it.

Throughout 1942,
the US Eighth Army Air Force

had been building up in England.

The American air chiefs
believed they could succeed in daylight

without suffering the losses
the British had done.

They were convinced
they could bomb accurately by day.

Charlie's doing his twirl again.

Wish I had something like that.

You guys wouldn't know
what to do with it.

Took six months to teach you
how to pull a trigger.

Can the small talk.
You need to come home.

Their aircraff were very heavily armed.
Some carried up to 12 machine guns.

And they were trained
to fly in close formation.

Formation flying
was really the name of the game

as far as the Eighth Air Force
was concerned.

There was never anything like it
happened before or since.

They actually were sort of making
their own rules up as they went along,

because it was just a brand-new concept.

You made it possible
to have a more concentrated firepower

from the gunner's positions
of all your aeroplanes.

The fact that you could depend
on good formation, tight formation,

not only helped you
in defence of fighter attack,

it made your chances of achieving
good bombing results much better.

Because if you're bombing,
a squadron of aeroplanes was bombing,

and the pattern was
a good, tight pattern,

your results were bound to be good.

Bombs away.

Early raids into France
bore out American optimism.

Later, over Germany,
it was a different story.

They found at first, yes, the bombers

could cope pretty well with the fighters

and take acceptable losses,

if penetrations were not too deep,

if they kept good formation and they had
supporting fire, one from the other.

But the Germans were learning too.

They learned how to make their attacks
and penetrate formations.

And they started the head-on attacks,
to try to get the leader

and spread the formation.

Once they got the formation spread out,

then they could pick the bombers off
at will. More or less, anyway.

But it was too early to admit defeat.

At night, the British bombers flew on,
hundreds at a time, but each on its own.

We used to see them go over in
the early evening, one by one in trail,

l would not have changed places
for them.

l'd much rather have
the close formation, the firepower,

than go over the way they did.

Flying with the RAF,
you were Single Charlie.

Just affer we'd crossed the Dutch coast,

l felt a terrific bang in my face.

The windscreen was shot away
and l'd been wounded in the forearm,

the shoulder and the head. The plane
went out of control temporarily.

l didn't see any sense
in saying that l'm wounded,

in case they all thought,
"He's going to pop off any minute now."

Again, the gun exploded
in the front of the plane beside us

and the shell hit the engineer
who stood beside me in the forearm.

And l had bits in my leg and they
sort of skinned the skin off my hand.

The port elevator had been shot off -

it keeps the plane straight,
on each side of the tail,

and the port one had been shot off.

This meant that you had
to hold the stick back, right back,

as if you're going to climb like this,
to keep the plane straight and level.

The bomb aimer had to help push it back
because this hand was pretty weak,

my shoulder had been hit

and it was keeping the stick back by
holding my hands in front.

And the engineer held it
with his other hand, his good arm.

So we held it, combined, back,
to keep the plane straight and level.

lt wasn't
a "press on regardless" feeling,

it was just a fact that
the four engines were still flying.

lf we'd had any engine cut,
l'd have thought,

"Well, we can't get any further."

But another factor here was,
had l turned back,

we'd have another 700 planes
that are more or less on the same track,

and spread something like
eight or ten miles broad

and maybe
four to six thousand feet deep.

And you're turning back right into them,
heading through this lot to get back.

And then again, had l turned off, say
at 90 degrees, to try and avoid them,

you're still turning across
quite a number of them.

Then l watched the target indicators
and opened the bomb doors

and kept the plane steady as l could
on the target indicators, and level.

This is one of the things
they made a fuss about,

that we'd a picture
of the target affer all this.

But as soon as we'd a picture taken,
l turned to head for base.

One of the things
l remember feeling on this trip

was that we had to get back,
because l knew we were wounded.

None of the other members could fly it,
even on normal straight and levels,

so to fly it at night
with one elevator gone,

and having the stick in your belly
and no instruments, as it were,

would've been pretty well impossible.

We were shot at a few times on the way
back, but we weren't hit again.

Eventually, we came over England,
when l saw these beacons flashing.

As it touched down, the legs
of the undercarriage collapsed.

We went along on our belly
for maybe 50 yards or so.

And came to a stop. Switched off
engines to keep the fire hazard down.

lt was then only, that l knew
the navigator was killed,

because he'd slid forward beside me.

About how many enemy fighters
did you see?

I couldn't keep track,
but I counted about 65.

I stopped trying to count
when I got to 50, sir.

l think
it was generally understood

that the combat tour was 25 missions,

because you'd be dead
by the end of that time,

so there wasn't any point
in asking you to stay around any longer.

Bomber crews lived a curious war.

One day in action, the next on the town.

When our group wasn't flying,

they'd usually go into London.

Spend the day in London.

And sometimes,
if they had some money leff,

they'd call up to find out if there
was a mission going the next day,

and if not, they'd stay over.

Flak will be heavy,
probably accurate,

but you've been through worse before.

Remember that your biggest enemy
still is single-engine fighter planes.

l recall one evening
in the officers' club.

Our operations officer was pouring
Scotch into a one-armed bandit,

you know, these things
that you put quarters in,

trying to persuade the machine
to deliver a jackpot.

But... l guess it was a kind of an eat,
drink and be merry sort of life.

The going's gonna be rough.

You'll have to pull your necks in there
and stay in there and pitch, every man.

l think that flying is so impersonal,

that is to say combat flying,

that you don't get
that intimate sense of loss

if you see an aeroplane get shot down

that you'd have
if your buddy on a battlefield

had his head blown off
right within arm's length.

Men came from Britain,
America, Occupied Europe,

and the British Commonwealth

to fight and die in
the most determined air offensive yet.

ln January 1943, at Casablanca,
Churchill and Roosevelt

decided to combine
the British and US bombing efforts

in preparing Nazi Europe for D-day.

U-boat yards, aircraff plants...

..armament factories,

oil installations and transport,

were deemed priority targets
for round-the-clock precision bombing.

But precision bombing at night
was still impossible for Harris.

An attempt to pick off the Ruhr dams
with specially designed bombs

was only partially successful,

and cost the lives
of some of the best aircrews.

Though the raid led to improved accuracy
later on, not all the dams were hit.

Ruhr arms production was unaffected.

Harris believed that only the mounting
onslaught of night area bombing

would crush German industrial capacity.

At this time,
we were getting better aircraff.

The Lancaster
was coming out in great numbers.

We were losing the less efficient
Stirling and the Halifax.

We were getting better radar devices.

And we had extremely good navigators,
selected navigators.

And this was the essence
of the whole thing.

And these navigators were able
to get much closer to an aiming point

than we had previously.

Then we laid great lanes of flares,
hundreds of flares.

Even if we missed the aiming point,

we would identify some
very positive feature on the ground,

like a lake or a bend in the river.

And from there,
we could then creep on to the target

and put flares down,
different coloured flares.

And then later on,
we got target indicators.

And these were... Just imagine
a great bunch of incandescent grapes

falling from 2,000, 4,000, wherever
we wanted them to detonate from.

At the end of July 1943,

Harris deployed his improving technology
with devastating effect on Hamburg.

The effectiveness
of the first Hamburg raid

was due to us at last getting permission

to use something
we'd had in the bag for a long time,

which was known as "window",

which was the dropping
of clouds of aluminium paper strips,

which completely upset
not only the German location apparatus,

but also their gun-aiming apparatus.

None of us,
neither civilians nor firemen,

knew what happened on this night.

lt was a very heavy raid,

but we had almost the same
one year before.

We were not prepared
for the fire storm

which broke out
half an hour affer the raid.

The effect of the bombing,
combined with a heat wave,

was to create
a man-made tornado of flame.

A fire storm.

Und diese ganze Gegend
wurde von Kanälen...

l went to this area near the docks.

lt was crossed by canals.

People tried to leap down into them
out of the flames,

but the water was on fire.

lt's difficult to explain
why the water was burning.

There were many ships, small ships,
moored in the canals.

They had exploded, and burning oil
had been released onto the water.

And the people, who were themselves
on fire, jumped into it.

And they burnt, swam,
burnt and went under.

Most people
were killed by the fierce heat,

not burnt or suffocated
or poisoned by carbon monoxide.

We think that in some places,

the temperature
reached 1 ,000 degrees centigrade.

The British night attacks
and American day raids

lasted nearly a week.

30,000 died.

ln Hamburg,
we really found out the first time

that the morale of the German people
can be shattered so much

that work for industry,

the work in the armaments industry,
would collapse.

At the time, Speer said

six more raids like that
would have finished the war.

The Allies did not have that capacity.

The shock passed.

At the same time, the Eighth Air Force

had stepped up
the intensity of its daylight raids.

Next group will bomb
from an altitude of 13,000 feet.

We feel that this low altitude

will be equalised by the element
of surprise which is with us.

Two weeks affer Hamburg,
they planned to deal their knockout blow

against German industry.

Lights, please.

This group of buildings here
is your target.

This building will be the aiming point.

lf your bomb pattern
is concentrated in this area,

it should very effectively
knock out the factory.

The target was the
ball-bearing factories at Schweinfurt,

producing a major part
of Germany's needs.

The attacking force
was to be split into two.

The first wave would fight
to a secondary target,

the Messerschmitt aircraff plant
at Regensburg.

Then it would fly on unhindered
to North Africa.

The second wave,
ten minutes behind the first,

would then arrive at Schweinfurt,

whilst the German fighters
were on the ground refuelling.

Their battle
would be during the trip home.

l went in
without any fighter escort at all,

and flew clear across Europe
without fighter escort,

with about 125 aeroplanes
that l had in the division at the time.

German air defence staff
plotted the path of the first wave

as it flew further and further
into Germany.

They could not tell
the plan was going wrong.

British weather helped to upset
the Americans' careful plans.

Unexpected low cloud
delayed the takeoff of the second wave.

The result: the Luffwaffe,
refuelled and re-armed,

was waiting for them.

Well, we didn't expect an attack

coming that far into the country
without fighter escort.

And we were all very astonished.

Null. Anfrage Viktor.

Schweinfurt was the result of very good
conditions in favour of German fighters,

and the fact
we could bring all our fighters

into operation
to intercept the bomber stream.

This altogether
has favoured our results.

21 Flying Fortresses were lost

before the first bomb fell
on Schweinfurt.

The first division,
coming in later, had heavier losses,

because they had to go back out
in addition to coming in.

l think we wound up the day
by losing about 60 aeroplanes,

which didn't make anybody very happy.

Ich kam dann noch mal hoch und bin
von unten ins Ziel und...

hat dann prima hingehauen.

The cost was high.

But ball-bearing production
was disrupted for six weeks.

When you hit Schweinfurt first,

it was a nightmare getting true.

But then, l had
a very good representative, Kessler,

and he did with all means,
not only the repair,

but also the replacement
of ball bearings with other devices

which could do the job,

not as good as a ball bearing,
but it could be done.

ln the two-wave attack,

over 120 aircraff
were lost or damaged beyond repair.

To prove their point at Schweinfurt,
the Americans would have to go back.

Naturally, l was keenly disappointed,

largely because
in sending my crews back,

l knew they would sustain
additional losses.

lf we had done the job right
in the first place,

we could have avoided these losses.

But nobody who fires a gun
hits his target every time.

We went back
because we got good weather

and it was our highest priority target.

That's why we returned.

On 14th October, some 300 bombers
were marshalled over England.

There were aeroplanes
climbing all over England.

England was just an airport.

And this, l think, was real difficult.

lt took some time

to group a large number
of heavy bombers into a tight formation.

These complicated manoeuvres
gave warning to the Luffwaffe

of the strength and direction
of an attacking force.

Two thirds of all German fighters

were now concentrated
against the Eighth Air Force.

The fighter was the boogie man.

The fighter had eyes
and, in a great many instances,

the fighter had a pretty competent fella
at the controls.

And when he latched on to you,
you were in trouble lots of times.

l was that close
that l could really see the rear gunner.

l saw him as frightened as l was.

They'd call the positions
of the fighters out over their intercom.

Sometimes they'd get so frightened

that they'd continue
to hold the microphone down,

and keep hollering into the microphone.

And they started
at 1 ,000 metres, almost,

with their tracing ammunition,
in order to frighten us.

And l told my younger pilots,
who had no experience,

to close their eyes,
attacking from behind.

There wasn't much time
to think. You just put that gun sight on

and kept waving your head around
looking for enemy fighters

and kept the gun sight on 'em.

Pilot to navigator, what's the word?

We're making the run.

Right before we hit the target
was the worst part.

We got picked up by fighters, were
taken into the target and they leff,

and we dropped the bombs
and they picked us up affer the target.

More than 60%
of all ball-bearing production

at Schweinfurt was destroyed.

The Americans had lost
more than 60 Flying Fortresses.

lf you would have repeated those raids
shortly afferwards,

it wouldn't have given us
the time to rebuild.

Then it would have been
a disastrous result.

Could you take the losses
the forces took

when you didn't know
if you'd accomplish it?

When you thought ball bearings were
coming in from Sweden and Switzerland?

You didn't know.
You don't go on with those things.

So the strategy swung back
from pinpoint targets like Schweinfurt

to another night area offensive: Berlin.

With American support, Harris believed
he could wreck Berlin in six months

and win the war.

But the depleted Eighth Air Force
were not now able to join him.

He sent the most amazing signals.
And one that l'll always remember -

and this is the sort of thing
you read out to your crews at briefing -

this one went on to say:

"Tonight you go to the big city."
That's Berlin.

"You have the opportunity to light
a fire in the belly of the enemy

and burn his black heart out."

Well, crews, affer they stopped
cheering a thing like that,

they didn't want aircraff.

You could just fill their pockets
with bombs

and point them towards Berlin
and they'd take off on their own.

Bomber Command
had to go on on its own.

lt was a long way, and the weather
at the end of 1943 was particularly bad.

But each night, the bombers
fought their way to Berlin

and other cities deep in Germany.

Harris' crews wrought terrible damage.

Berlin is getting
a real taste of total war.

The terrific weight of RAF assaults
on the capital of Naziland

has set the Hun reeling.

How he must regret the ruthless attacks
he made on Warsaw, Rotterdam,

Belgrade, London,
Coventry and the rest.

The day and night of reckoning is here.

And what do you think of it, Keith?

Jerry definitely had it this time.
lt certainly was a wizard prang.

Yet many of Berlin's offices
and factories managed to go on working.

ln my experience,
people rather got numb.

They were going through the streets
like shadows.

But they were still working
like automats.

We had very little trouble
in getting there,

but one thing l did notice

was the vicious way
in which every German town

now seems
to throw up flak indiscriminately.

The technological advantages

which prevailed over Hamburg
no longer applied.

The German air defence
had leapfrogged ahead once more.

Berlin looked as if
it would indeed remain Berlin.

By early spring, 1944, Harris
had not totally destroyed the city.

Bomber Command had been
savagely mauled by the Germans.

ln those four months, in raids
against Berlin and other targets,

1 ,000 aircraff, the Command's
first-line strength, were lost.

But Harris did not,
and does not, concede defeat.

The casualties in the Battle of Berlin

were no more than we would have suffered

if we'd gone anywhere else in Germany,
deep into Germany.

People seem to forget
that Bomber Command

fought 1 ,000 battles during the war.

You can't succeed in every one.

l'm not saying the Battle of Berlin
was a defeat or anything like a defeat.

l think it was a major contribution
towards the defeat of Germany.

There were thousands
of heavy anti-aircraff guns,

millions of ammunition for them,

and hundreds of thousands of soldiers,

which were torn away
from our fight in the Eastern Front.

So l should say,
with air attacks on Germany,

you had, in an early stage, from '43 on,

really a so-called second front.

Despite all the devastation,
the Germans carried on.

German industry was still supplying

the armies fighting fiercely
in the east and in ltaly.

The strategic bombing thesis
remained as yet unproven.

The lessons of Schweinfurt
had been well learnt by the Americans.

Re-equipped, they joined the RAF
over Berlin in March 1944.

But now they were escorted
by the Mustang,

a remarkable aeroplane
which was to change everything.

lt had a bomber's range
and a fighter's performance.

The German day fighter
had now met its match.

By the end of spring 1944,
the German day fighter had lost

where the Spitfire and Hurricane
had won.

The Americans had finally beaten
the Luffwaffe over daylight Europe

with their long-range fighters.

We had nothing of the same effort.

And l think
they frightened us quite a bit.

l think the main concern

was the quantities
in which they were showing up.

The Germans had lost control
of their air space in daylight.

From now on, the Allies would be able to
launch day raids over Germany at will.

But, in March 1944,

both bomber forces were placed
under Eisenhower's overall command

to prepare for D-day.

There would be six months' respite

before the Allied bombers
could set out once more,

to break the will of the German people.