All language subtitles for Damian.Lewis-Spy.Wars.S01E01.The.Man.Who.Saved.the.World.x264-mSD.eztv

(suspenseful music)

(bird cawing)

(grass rustling)

Lewis: Any secret
agent walks a tightrope.

You have to know when to keep
going and when to jump off.

This is the story of oleg
antonovich gordievsky.

(drawer thudding)

One of the west's most
valuable cold war agents.

It's how he risked everything
to avert a third world war

That would destroy civilization.

And how he left everything he
knew, and everyone he loved,

To attempt one of the most
daring escapes in living memory.

(dogs growling)
(dogs barking)

For oleg gordievsky, it's
about how enlightenment

Triumphed over brutal
authoritarianism.

And how in the process he
became one nation's traitor

And another nation's hero.

(dramatic music)

(tense music)

Oleg gordievsky
was the son

Of a loyal kgb officer,

An ambitious diplomat stationed
in the consular department

Of the soviet
embassy in denmark.

In reality though,
gordievsky was no diplomat,

But a russian spy.

A rising star of the kgb
enjoying the freedoms

Of a liberal society,
while secretly conspiring

To bring about its demise.

Hansen: Denmark was a
frontline state,

If the cold war turned hot,

That was why denmark
was important.

Between 30 and 40%
of the employees

At the soviet
embassy in copenhagen

Would actually be
intelligence officers.

Lewis: This posed
a mounting threat

For denmark's
intelligence chiefs,

A threat which was becoming
far more sophisticated

And harder to detect.

Hansen: Kgb and gru officers
from the 1950s,

They are taken out
of a james cagney

Or a humphrey bogart movie.

In the 60s and the
70s, the kgb officer,

You couldn't tell him
from the next guy.

Lewis: Jorn
bro was in charge

Of the danish intelligence
service at the time.

Bro: A completely new sort of
intelligence officers appeared.

They were younger.

They were reasonably
well-dressed, well-groomed.

Lewis: One such officer

Was oleg antonovich gordievsky.

Bro: I learned about him as
soon as he entered denmark.

And we rather quickly found

Good reasons to believe
that he was kgb.

Lewis: Kgb spymaster,
mikhail lyubimov,

Was a friend and mentor
to the young gordievsky.

Lyubimov: I got acquainted with
gordie in '67 when I arrived

To copenhagen as the
deputy chief of station.

He was one of the
few intellectuals,

Very interested in music,
and he was there working

At our station in the
field of illegals.

Lewis: Constructing
and running a network

Of deniable russian
agents under deep cover,

Gordievsky soon caught the eye

Of the danish security service.

Danish intelligence
believed gordievsky

Was stealing the
identities of the dead

To provide new identities
for his soviet illegals.

Bro: We saw him
visiting cemeteries

And contacting clergymen,

And as he spoke to people
our interest increased.

Lewis: With the cold
war spying game

In full swing in copenhagen,

Both sides tried desperately
to recruit each other's agents.

What the danish intelligence
services couldn't know

Is how easy recruiting
this spy would be,

Because oleg gordievsky had
fallen in love with freedom.

During its 800 year history,

Copenhagen has won for
itself a reputation

For liberal ideas and
advanced social thinking.

Hansen: He met a country that
was completely different

From that what he had been told.

It's a free country, people
can do what they want.

Perhaps most important of all,
people can go to the library.

Bro: You are allowed
to read the books

Others are not allowed to read.

And he caught sight of the ways

In which the soviet
society did not function.

Hansen: It made a huge
impact on gordievsky

And made him perfect to
recruit him as an agent.

Lewis: In 1968, a single
momentous event provided

A catalyst for his eventual
defection, the prague spring.

(tank treads whirring)

The kremlin sent in tanks
backed by thousands of troops

To brutally suppress
a popular uprising.

Over a hundred people
were massacred.

(people shouting)
(engines droning)

Hansen: Gordievsky was
really shocked

About the soviet invasion
of czechoslovakia.

He grabbed one of the
phones at the embassy,

Called his wife back home and
was just crying his eyes out

And saying, well it's all over.

Lewis: Gordievsky
had lost his faith

In the soviet system.

And the phone call
was a pivotal moment.

Because it wasn't
just gordievsky's wife

Witnessing his despair that day.

(man speaking in tape recording)

Danish intelligence had bugged
the soviet embassy's phones.

Bro: Our monitoring section
asked me to come over

To the monitoring
console and listen.

It was obvious that he
was in a mental uproar.

He was really
sorry, really angry.

He was very honest in his
attitude to what happened.

(tanks rumbling)
(flames blasting)

Lewis: Later,
analysts would consider

If this was a careless
mistake on gordievsky's part

Or a signal to the other side.

Hansen: He's a very bright
and intelligent guy.

So when he made this phone call

I think it was very
deliberately done.

Bro: And we remarked it.

It wasn't forgotten.

That was the day where we
said, this man may be willing

To switch sides
and work with us.

Lewis: By 1973,
gordievsky had been promoted

To deputy of
political intelligence

At the heart of the kgb's
foreign operations in denmark.

But the danes knew they lacked

The experience and manpower
to run him as an agent.

So, for help in securing
gordievsky's services as a spy,

They turned to their ally,

Britain's secret
intelligence service, sis,

Also known as mi6.

Powell: Denmark's a
small country,

It had limited resources,

It did extremely
well to identify him.

Lewis: Charles
powell went on

To become margaret thatcher's
foreign policy advisor.

Powell: Britain was a close
intelligence ally,

And they very wisely
involved us too.

Lewis: The question was,

How to approach a
high-ranking official

Stationed at the
soviet consulate,

Without getting caught.

(man speaking foreign language)

Lyubimov: He was
running every morning.

He was a great badminton player
and a good one by the way.

Bro: We agreed that it
would be a very good idea

To make an approach
in the badminton hall.

None of his colleagues
would be there.

Lewis: In the spring of
1974, as gordievsky played

His regular game of badminton,
mi6 made their approach,

Taking gordievsky
completely by surprise.

The rendezvous at
the badminton hall

Was a huge gamble for everyone.

The british couldn't be sure

Gordievsky wasn't
a double agent,

Positioned by the kgb
to infiltrate them.

And for his part, gordievsky
couldn't be sure that the meet

Wasn't a trap set by the
kgb to test his loyalty.

Gordievsky agreed
to a second meeting

At a public location.

This time, it was
with mi6 alone.

Hansen: He doesn't want
the danes involved

Because he knows that the kgb

Has a contact inside
the danish police.

No government
member, no minister,

Was told about this operation.

In the center of copenhagen
there's a big hotel

And that was the setting
where oleg gordievsky

Met with his mi6 contact
and the first steps

Toward him becoming a
british agent was taken.

Lewis: By the summer
of 1975, mi6 had their man.

But gordievsky insisted
on three conditions

From his new employers.

He was never to be
followed or photographed.

His colleagues at the consulate
weren't to be compromised.

And unlike many
other double agents,

Gordievsky wasn't to
receive any payment

In exchange for secrets.

Hansen: He's doing this for
ideological reasons.

He's doing this because
that's what his heart

Is telling him to do.

(tense music)

Lewis: Gordievsky's
early missions for mi6

Involved smuggling top-secret
microfilm documents

From the soviet embassy
and passing them

To his british handlers
in a classic brush pass.

Bro: They were switched
to an mi6 officer

Who took it to a room nearby
and during half an hour

Copied the films and had
it back to gordievsky

Who brought it back
to the embassy.

Lewis: The microfilm
gordievsky provided

Likely held the
names and details

Of soviet agents
located in the nordics.

What's more, they detailed
the inner workings

Of the kgb's station
in copenhagen.

Betraying these
secrets to the british,

Gordievsky had become
a traitor to the ussr.

There was no going back.

Bro: I think he must have been
walking on glass at the feeling.

It was so brave, so courageous.

If he was sweating,
I'd understand him.

He must really had
cripples in the stomach.

But bravery is to control
your fear, not to be fearless.

Lewis: Gordievsky
knew the risks

For him and his family.

Bro: In moscow, interrogated,
probably tortured,

And then in the end,
sentenced to death and shot.

(gun firing)

I'm sure.

(gun firing)

Lewis: For four years,
gordievsky continued

To provide top-secret russian
intelligence to the british.

But by 1978, his posting in
denmark would come to an end.

Mi6 were about to lose one
of their greatest assets.

For gordievsky, the glory
days of his diplomatic posting

To the west were over.

It would be four years
before he re-awakened

As a british spy.

(dramatic music)

(upbeat music)

(wheels squealing)

Lewis: Oleg gordievsky had
been posted back to moscow,

A kgb man tied to the grim
soviet system he now despised.

Throughout, the
british authorities

Had kept their distance

To ensure his safety.

He was desk-bound, handling
classified documents

On soviet agents operating
across western europe.

It was tantalizing information

For the british
intelligence service.

But instead they decided
to play the long game.

Powell: By putting a long-term
bet on gordievsky,

So we all practice
self-denial and we won't make

Any attempt to
contact him at all.

Lewis: In June 1982,

Their patience finally paid off,

Because gordievsky was being
posted to the one place

Where he could do the most
damage to the kgb, london.

Powell: He might well have
been sent to anywhere,

He might have gone to sweden

Or to germany or
all sorts of things.

But we just were lucky,
we got a bullseye there.

Lewis: Before leaving,
he met with his old friend

And fellow operative,
mikhail lyubimov,

For personal advice on what
to expect from the british.

Lyubimov: He was completely
unprepared, and he consulted me.

I recommended him to
read "somerset maugham"

Or things like that.

Of course, it sounds
now very funny,

But partly I am responsible
for his education

As a british agent. (chuckling)

(camera clicking)

Lewis: In his four
long years in moscow,

Gordievsky hadn't
forgotten his trade-craft,

And he followed procedure
to reignite his contacts

With british intelligence
almost immediately.

Powell: There was a number which
would always be manned

And which would have, at the
very least, a message on it.

He could re-establish contact.

(dramatic music)

Lewis: Mi6 set up meetings

In a safe house in west london.

In a rare interview recorded
in 2007, oleg gordievsky

Revealed how his british
handlers ran the encounters.

Gordievsky: I met my british
contacts once a month.

It was in bayswater,

A small flat was
rented by the service.

The meeting lasted
50 minutes only.

Because unlike in
copenhagen when sometimes

I was sitting for three
hours without any difficulty.

Here I was able to
use only lunchtime.

Lewis: Once again, as a
political intelligence officer

For the kgb, gordievsky proved

To be an invaluable mi6 asset.

Powell: The soviets were trying
to recruit agents within the uk

And within other countries,
and they succeeded

In some cases, of course
going back to the 1930s

When they recruited a
lot of british agents

On the basis of membership
of the communist party.

Lewis: Now his
information sent shock waves

Through the british
intelligence community.

The list of names he'd provided
of alleged soviet agents

Contained some of the
country's leading politicians

And trades union officials.

Goodman: The list of names
he passed across

To british intelligence

Clearly showed that the russians
were very, very interested

In penetrating
british establishment,

And we know that a number
of different british figures

Were involved in this, including
someone like michael foot.

(camera clicking)

Lewis: Though only made
public some years later,

Gordievsky's allegations against

The leader of the opposition,

And prominent trades
union leaders,

Including jack
jones and ron brown,

Led to deep concern
about the extent

To which the british
establishment

Had been penetrated by the kgb.

Gordievsky's information
led to police warnings,

Interrogations, and expulsions,

Thwarting much of the
damage to the west

That these alleged agents of
influence could have inflicted.

Powell: Gordievsky was at
the heart of the kgb

And therefore had
access to soviet agents

Operating in our
country and more widely.

But secondly, he understood
what was going on,

He understood the context of
soviet policy at the time.

I think he was quite
canny about knowing

What files to look for
and what information

Would be of interest to the uk.

Lewis: The british
intelligence services

Were all too aware of
the precarious position

In which they were placing
oleg gordievsky as a mole.

Powell: Gordievsky was
enormously important.

There was nothing
more secret in the uk

Than his existence
and who he was.

And ministers did
not know who he was,

The prime minister did
not know who he was,

And that was of course
was for his protection

And the protection of
an invaluable source.

Lewis: Yet
supporting a secret agent

Was a delicate balancing
act for the british.

Repeatedly, they had
to give him benign

Or bogus intelligence
he could take back

To his kgb bosses to
maintain his cover.

Powell: The sis were able to
supply him with information

Which wasn't really very
classified, but made him look

As though he had access
to credible information

And therefore was a, well,
high-performing kgb agent.

Lewis: So successful
was this deception,

In March 1983,
gordievsky was promoted

To the rank of
lieutenant-colonel in the kgb

And deputy head of
its london station.

But by this time, the cia was
taking a particular interest

In the high-grade intelligence
coming out of london.

The president
of the united states,

Ronald reagan.
(applauding)

In the u.S.,
president ronald reagan

Had been elected on a
strong anti-communist agenda

And was ratcheting
up his rhetoric.

Reagan: Thank you.

Lewis: On March
the 8th, 1983,

He made his most provocative
speech of the cold war.

Reagan: To ignore the
facts of history

And the aggressive impulses

Of an evil empire, to
simply call the arms race

A giant misunderstanding,
is folly.

It means the
betrayal of our past,

The squandering of our freedom.

(applauding)

Lewis: David major was
national security advisor

To the reagan
administration at the time.

Major: The political
relationship between the west

And the russians in the
early '80s was very cold.

There was a great distrust
between the two countries.

(yuri andropov speaking
foreign language)

Lewis: The leader
of the soviet union,

Yuri andropov, a career spy
who'd never visited the west,

Was convinced reagan
was secretly preparing

To mount a nuclear attack
on the soviet union.

(applauding)

In his previous role as kgb
chief, andropov's spy networks

In britain and america
had been unable to provide

Any hard detail on the
west's true intentions.

So andropov initiated
operation ryan,

The largest spy operation
launched by the soviets

In peacetime against the west.

Major: They were telling their
intelligence services

To go out and collect as
much evidence that they had

That we were going to have war.

Like how much blood
is being donated,

And when the lights are
out in the military,

And how much pizzas
they ordered,

Things that are all indications
of possibly, you know,

Confrontation, people
working late hours.

Powell: And some
of the indicators

That they were searching

Were perfectly absurd,
one I always remember

Is counting how many
lights were switched on

In the ministry of defense
after 10:00 p.M. At night.

Now, there were a lot, and
the reason there were a lot

Was not anything to
do with nuclear war.

It's 'cause the cleaners
were in cleaning the offices.

Lewis: However absurd,
the intelligence gathered

By agents of operation ryan
fueled andropov's suspicion.

Powell: I think he was
frankly paranoid.

Whether he was
medically paranoid

Or just paranoid in the sense

That one tosses the term
about, I don't know.

President reagan and
margaret thatcher were using

Very strong rhetoric
against the soviet union.

That enhanced his paranoia.

(camera clicking)

Lewis: By September
1983, andropov was convinced

The americans were about to
trigger a nuclear first strike.

(camera clicking)

Major: The russians became
convinced that we were going

To nuke them with a
bolt from the blue.

Powell: Andropov persuaded a lot
of his politburo colleagues

That this really was a
serious risk and a danger.

Lewis: Then, in
early November 1983,

To compound the growing tension,

President reagan authorized
a vast nato war game,

Able archer, a scripted
rehearsal for armageddon.

(jet screaming)

(helicopter blades whirring)

So, just as soviet listening
posts readied themselves

To detect the early signs
of a nuclear attack,

Nato began to simulate one.

(jet screaming)

Major: The way military
works is you have

What looks like an exercise and
it turns into a real attack.

And so they thought
that's what's happening.

They thought we were
preparing for war.

Powell: So we were
really teetering

A bit on the brink
at this stage.

Lewis: In direct response
to able archer, the soviets

Placed hundreds of ss-20
mobile ballistic missiles,

Each with 45 times the
power of hiroshima,

On heightened alert.

In the baltic, the northern
fleet prepared to attack.

Submarines and nuclear bombers

Armed with icbms were mobilized.

From the kgb's station
in central london,

Gordievsky witnesses the
ramping up of tensions.

Then, he makes a move that many
believe helps pull the world

Back from the brink of
nuclear annihilation.

(tense music)

(suspenseful music)

By early November 1983,

The soviet leadership
was convinced

They were just days away
from all-out nuclear war.

(tense music)

In london, fearing the
deadly repercussions

Of an increasingly
paranoid moscow,

And at great personal risk,

Oleg gordievsky took
decisive action.

To pass key intelligence
regarding the extent of hysteria

In the soviet leadership
to his british handlers.

Gordievsky: I spoke about
everything which I experienced.

You simply don't
understand the mentality

Of the old russian leaders.

You are playing with fire.

I knew it was a dramatic moment.

I knew moscow was nervous.

Goodman: To pass these
documents across

Was living on a knife edge.

He was risking death
every single time

He took a document
out of the office.

Every time he communicated
with british intelligence

Meant that he was
risking his life.

Lewis: Mi6 passed
gordievsky's information

To british prime minister,
margaret thatcher.

(camera clicking)

Thatcher made use of
her special relationship

With president reagan
to relay the information

Directly to the heart of the
american command structure.

Goodman: Prime minister
margaret thatcher used it

Very, very effectively
with president reagan.

She managed to
persuade him absolutely

On the basis of gordievsky's
intelligence that his speeches

Were simply inflaming
tensions with the russians,

It was feeding into
their sense of paranoia.

Lewis: Thatcher
convinced reagan

To tone down his rhetoric.

And through back-channels,
american diplomats were able

To provide reassurance to
their soviet counterparts.

(gentle upbeat music)

The intelligence provided
by mi6's prized asset,

Oleg gordievsky, had
helped pull the world back

From the brink of nuclear war.

A spy had kept the peace.

Major: Only one other
time that happened

Was the cuban missile crisis,

We came that close
to nuclear warfare.

(siren blaring)

Lewis: But the
americans couldn't know

Who was behind the sudden
cooling of tensions,

Because gordievsky was a
closely guarded secret.

Major: When we got
the information

It was from some
mysterious source.

So the question was, who
could have provided that?

Lewis: British intelligence
had devised a strategy

To protect their
source from exposure,

Even from their allies.

Powell: It was very
much concealed.

It wasn't all attributed
to a single agent.

It was presented
as if it was drawn

From our intelligence resources

With the implication that
it might well have been

Several different agents
bringing it altogether.

This was all because we
wanted to protect gordievsky.

Lewis: But given
the depth of the intel,

The cia were
increasingly unhappy

To be drip-fed information

On a need-to-know basis.

They wanted access
to the source.

Powell: The information
he provided

Became much more specific

And although even then
he was never named

Or identified to the americans,
I think it was pretty clear

That it was coming from one
extremely well-placed agent.

(tense music)

Lewis: That the cia would
seek out the source

Would set off a chain of events

That would prove to be
devastating to oleg gordievsky.

(dramatic music)

The man the americans
put in charge

Of tracing the source
was the cia's chief

Of soviet counterintelligence,

(camera clicking)
aldrich ames.

(camera clicking)

Through a process
of elimination,

Ames realized the
source must have been

A high-ranking kgb
man, in london.

He settled upon recently
promoted oleg gordievsky.

But the americans had
made a grave error.

What the cia couldn't know

Is that ames himself
was a kgb spy.

Bearden: You tell me what
the odds might be,

It's a lightning strike.

Lewis: Milton
bearden was deputy chief

Of the cia's soviet and
east european division.

Bearden: Ames decided to dump

All of the assets
working for the cia.

Maybe he wanted to close
those operations out

Because he feared that
somehow they might contribute

To his compromise, so he
thought, I'll kill them off.

(camera clicking)

Goodman: Aldrich ames
passed across

A carrier bag full of secrets.

And amongst those secrets was

The identity of oleg gordievsky.

(dramatic music)

(birds singing)

(ominous music)

Lewis: On Friday 17th
of may, gordievsky received

A summons from kgb
headquarters in moscow.

He was to return to
the ussr immediately.

Goodman: Gordievsky has been
given the pretense

Of returning to moscow
for a promotion.

And that raised the
alarm bells in his mind.

Lewis: He
couldn't be certain

If his cover had been blown.

But to disobey a direct
order would be tantamount

To a confession of guilt.

Powell: Never underestimate
the strain

Under which any agent operates.

Consequences, certainly
in the soviet system,

Would have been death.

Lyubimov: Well, of course,
he would be shot.

No problem.

(gun firing)

Lewis: Gordievsky
felt he had no option

But to return home
to face the kgb.

Almost immediately, he was
taken to a kgb safe house.

Their plan, to confront him
with their growing suspicions

Of his true loyalties.

(liquid trickling)

(glasses clinking)

(dramatic music)

Goodman: Gordievsky was drugged.

(agent speaking
foreign language)

He was interrogated.

He was accused of
being an mi6 spy.

Lewis: Yet somehow,
he must have found

The mental strength to
resist the russian drugs.

Goodman: At no point did he own
up to being an mi6 spy.

Lewis: So, the
kgb changed tactics.

Gordievdky: They decided to play
cat and mouse game with me.

And I was put under
house arrest only.

(suspenseful music)

Goodman: What would have been
very, very clear to gordievsky,

Was that time had run
out, now was the time

To get in touch with
his mi6 handlers

And finally get out
of the soviet union.

Lewis: The question now
was when and how

To initiate operation pimlico,

The first ever plan devised
by british intelligence

To exfiltrate an agent
from the soviet union.

(dramatic music)

(drawer slamming)

Gordievsky: In '77, we made the
first plan of escape.

I visualized the
situation when I would be

Under strong suspicion, and
not yet properly arrested,

And I will have time to
carry out an escape attempt.

Lewis: But by June 1985,

Mi6 had lost all contact
with their source.

Gordievsky had simply vanished.

They had no option
but to wait for him

To make the next move.

And that was only if
he was still alive.

Before triggering the
pre-arranged escape plan,

There was someone
gordievsky wanted to see,

His old friend mikhail lyubimov.

But lyubimov barely recognized
the man at his door.

Lyubimov: It was
another gordievsky

Whom I never saw before.

He was in a very chaotic
state, trembling hands.

Oleg, who never drank more
than one or two glasses,

He was like this,
a whole bottle,

A big bottle, about one liter.

I was his friend, his colleague.

Of course I didn't suspect
that he was mi6 man.

Lewis: These would
be the last moments

Oleg gordievsky would
spend with his old friend.

The time had now come to flee
the soviet union for good.

(suspenseful music)

Oleg gordievsky was
now under

Constant surveillance by
his fellow kgb agents.

(camera clicking)

Using russian spy-craft known
as proverka or dry cleaning,

He tried to shake-off
his kgb watch team.

To stay alive, he needed to
get out of the country, fast.

And that meant setting in
motion operation pimlico,

His mi6 extraction plan.

(exciting music)

(snare drum beating)

Gordievsky: I went to the
appointed place,

At exactly 7:00 o'clock,

Under the lamp
post near the road.

Lewis: From
there, gordievsky gave

A seemingly innocuous signal,

Exposing a british
supermarket carrier bag.

Gordievsky: A safeway bag, a
plastic bag in my hands,

For six minutes, to be
noticed by the british.

It was Tuesday.

It meant I would be
picked up on Saturday

The same week at 2:00 o'clock.

Bearden: Gordievsky must
have gone there,

And hoping against hope
that the brits would say,

Oh my god, there he
is, he's signaling us.

Lewis: To
acknowledge the signal,

An mi6 agent would
appear from the crowd,

Eating a pre-agreed
brand of chocolate bar.

Now gordievsky
would have to wait.

In london, the next stage
of operation pimlico

Required authorization
from the highest level.

Bearden: They'd had to go all
the way to maggie thatcher

To get clearance to
pull this exfiltration.

(camera clicking)

Lewis: It was down
to charles powell,

Foreign policy advisor to
prime minister thatcher

At the time, to deliver the news

Her source was
ready to come home.

Powell: The prime minister was
out of london in balmoral.

And her authorization
was needed.

It was so secret
that we couldn't

Communicate it by telephone.

So someone had to go up
and talk to her directly.

I flew up to scotland and
drove to the gates of balmoral,

Had to fight my way
past various equerries

Who were discussing
really important subjects,

Like whether the queen
mother could borrow

The queen's video tape
recorder that night or not.

And then I had to see the
queen's private secretary

Who was rather insistent
that he be informed

Why I had come to see
the prime minister,

And I'm afraid I insisted that
I couldn't possibly tell him,

And we had quite an
altercation about this.

And finally I got to see her.

We did our business within
five minutes or less,

And then it was a question
of getting back to london.

In moscow, for
gordievsky the next step

Would mean heartbreak.

Throughout his time
spying for the british,

He had shielded his wife
and children from the truth.

He knew getting his
family involved now

Would simply be too dangerous.

He would have to make his escape

Without telling them where
he was going, or why.

Gordievsky: I shook off
the surveillance.

Caught a train to
leningrad, from leningrad

Train, commuter train, and buses

In the direction of
the finish border.

About 30 miles before the border

I was hiding in the woods
at an appointed time

Which was 2:00 o'clock.

(suspenseful music)

Lewis: At the
soviet-finnish border,

Mi6 officers arrived
with a diplomatic car.

The plan was to conceal him in
the trunk of the ford sedan,

And smuggle him over
the border into finland.

As he made his way
to the rendezvous,

Gordievsky had no way of knowing

Whether he was walking into
a kgb trap or toward freedom.

(door slamming)

(wheels spinning)
(engine revving)

Goodman: In effect,
kidnapping a kgb officer

And transporting him
across the border

Out of the soviet union,
was a hugely risky plan.

Those mi6 officers
would almost certainly

Also have been
under observation,

So trying to drive to
the finnish border,

Driving across that border,

Trying to persuade
the border guards

That they were not the people
they were pretending to be

Would have been
fraught with risk.

(tense music)

(dog barking)

Lewis: That day,
one of the border guards

Sensed something wasn't right.

(dogs barking)

The female mi6 operative
had to think fast.

Somehow her chips were
enough to distract the dogs

And the moment passed.

(dogs barking)

Officer: Here you go.

Gordievsky: Nobody wanted
to waste time,

And nobody opened the boot,

And we went through
the five check points.

Lewis: From the
trunk of the vehicle,

Gordievsky wouldn't know if
he had made it to freedom

Until he heard the
pre-agreed signal.

The strains of sibelius'
"finlandia suite".

Powell: It is a remarkable
story, if anyone wants

A really good read
of a spy story,

This is better than any fiction.

Lewis:
Gordievsky's defection

Was one of the greatest
espionage triumphs

Of the cold war.

("finlandia suite"
by jean sibelius)

Powell: It was actually one
in the eye for the kgb

And the soviet system that we
had successfully done this.

(camera clicking)

After all, remember how
they crowed about philby,

(camera clicking)
burgess,

(camera clicking)
maclean,

And now here at last
they got it back,

And they got it back in spades.

Gordievsky: A kgb colonel under
house arrest and surveillance

In moscow, and then
escaping back to the west,

It was never happened before.

Lewis: Now that mi6's
most valued asset was safe,

His intelligence
could be freely shared

With britain's allies.

And reagan could reach
out to the soviet union's

New head of state,
mikhail gorbachev.

With real confidence
of the likelihood

Of a new rapprochement.

Powell: The americans re-engaged
with the russians

In geneva on arms
control and so on.

Bearden: And then all the
planets, I think,

Lined up, maggie
thatcher's in london,

Ronald reagan's in washington,

And together at this moment,

Started pulling
on the same rope.

(applauding)

Lewis: Oleg
gordievsky's actions

Heralded the beginning of
the end of the cold war.

(melancholy music)

But to some he remains
a controversial figure.

Lyubimov: Of course he
is a traitor.

The main motive of gordie
to become a british spy,

His vanity.

His vanity, he wanted to
become sort of a moses,

Anti-soviet moses.

Lewis: Hero or traitor,
oleg gordievksy paid

A high personal price
for his defection.

It would take another six years

And the fall of the soviet union

Before his family could
flee moscow to join him.

But by then, gordievsky's
marriage was over.

Lyubimov: I think that he's
a lonely, poor man.

(camera clicking)

In 2007, gordievsky
was appointed

Companion of the most
distinguished order for services

To the security of the
united kingdom by the queen.

It was the same gong given

The fictional cold
war hero, james bond.

Bro: For sure I can say that
last time I met him was in 2005.

The british celebrated
his successful escape

With danish assistance.

I was deeply honored
to be invited.

He was a fine man.

(rousing music)