All language subtitles for the.man.nobody.knew.2011.limited.docu.bdrip.xvid-psychd.cd2-eng

This was an
extraordinary moment

of presidential
carelessness,

and the result
was a President,

and his brother,

with their hands tied
behind their back,

and bullets
in their head.

And a shattered
illusion, which is

that we were building
a democracy in Vietnam.

It was only
three weeks later

that John Kennedy
was killed.

Lyndon Johnson said
when he found out

what the role of the
United States was,

"We just got a bunch
of thugs and killed them."

The U.S.
Responsibility

for Diem's death
was absolutely clear,

and once that was
done, it became,

not the South
Vietnamese war

against the
North Vietnamese,

it was our war.

The albatross was
around our neck,

and it was ours
from then on.

Subtitles downloaded from www.OpenSubtitles.org

The Americans,

when they go
into a country,

are trying to do
something rather

different from European
colonialists.

They're not going in
there to seize assets

or to strip value
out of a country.

Americans do
genuinely feel

that when they
gird themselves up

and go around
the world,

that they're on a...
a mission of... of

bringing, um,
bringing providence,

um, to bear.

They're going
in there for

what they perceive
as the good

of the people they're
trying to help.

They therefore
feel that

the local people
will think that

this is a gift that
they're bringing,

and why on earth
would local people

look a gift horse
in the mouth?

Local cultures
count.

Bombs, and that
sort of thing,

are powerless against
local cultures.

The early
experiments

of civilian irregular
defense groups

to provide security
to the villages

started by
William Colby

in conjunction with
U.S. Special Forces,

showed great
promise.

But the American Army
was disappointed

that Special Forces
were not being used

in an offensive
role.

They were providing
security to

the population,
not going out

finding, fixing,
and finishing the enemy.

And, and so we
stepped away

from that very
promising experiment,

and we moved to a very
conventional war.

Here's the headline
news, good morning.

President Johnson
held a news conference

last night,

said, among
other things,

that if more
American troops

are needed in Vietnam,
they'll be there.

We overwhelmed
the country

with that
large a force.

Imagine, what
would it be like?

I'm sitting in
Lincoln, Nebraska,

and all of a sudden
comes in these people,

I don't even know
who the hell they are.

They're taller
than I am, uh...

they're noisier
than I am,

they got a diff...
a much different culture,

much different
religion.

I mean,
the, the...

the religious
differences are huge.

You're violating
cultural taboos

almost every step
of the way.

It's shockingly
disruptive

and offensive.

And the paradox
of that is

we then provide the
political ammunition

that the opposition
needed,

provided them many
opportunities

for saying,
"See, this is why

you want to get
the Americans out."

Your father
was quite upset

by the disruption
that occurred,

and the... and the
difficulty that, that,

that attached to the
effort as a consequence.

He certainly was
not one who was

in favor of
turning the thing

over to the
military.

Never had been.

But when the
decision was made,

he went along
a hundred percent.

The Vietnam
that I knew

was being
destroyed.

This perfumed,
gorgeous,

liquid country was
being torn apart.

It was going
to be gone.

He told me
quite a lot

what he
was doing.

"Organizing
these villagers,

self-defense
teams."

It all made
a lot of sense.

But he would
leave the room,

why I'd look over
to the television,

and choppers
are coming in,

and B-52s,
napalm,

and guys firing
into the jungle.

Towns and fishing
villages that

I'd been to
would pop up.

It was, like,
out of a movie.

Like, "God, look what
happened to Nga Trang.

I don't remember
an airfield there.

Where are all
those bases?"

It was like that
that was a different war.

It wasn't the war

that my father
was fighting.

He was fighting
a completely

different war.

A problem
that you have

is that you are in,
in the habit

of fighting
the last war.

World War One
and World War Two

were set piece
battles.

So we crashed around
in the jungle

looking for
the V.C.

Or the North
Vietnamese forces,

while they engaged
in insurgency.

Reality intrudes.

Sooner or later,
one must recognize

the people who
understand

the heart of
an insurgency

are the people
who are dedicated,

most dedicated
to its defeat.

Well, you will
well remember,

uh, going to the
airport, to um,

when your dad
went off to, uh,

to Saigon
in, uh, '68.

At that time, it was
more and more troops,

more and
more troops.

His idea was to
use the troops

in a different way.

He kept pushing
for his methods.

What did we say?

"Guerilla war?"

He somehow couldn't
give up on it.

It was a lengthy
assignment.

He came back
periodically.

We'd go
to Vermont,

uh, try to
carry on life

as we'd
known it,

and it was, uh,
he was doing...

he was called
to serve,

and he did it.

He did it
capably.

When it comes to
long separations,

my mother was
at loose ends.

She lost the center
out of her life.

It was very
hard for her.

A year or so into
his being there,

my sister Catherine
became ill.

She'd had epilepsy
since she was a child.

Terrible seizures.

She developed
anorexia nervosa.

It was awful.

My mother
took on

the suffering
of my sister.

She would make
it go away

for my father.

It couldn't be
any other way,

everything for
the mission.

And I remember
I looked over

at her
one evening.

She was writing
him a letter

I think,
in Vietnam.

I saw that she
was a woman,

not just
my mother.

She was
Ionely.

She hadn't signed
up for this,

but she
did it.

A warrior,
what my dad was.

He liked being
in the fight.

I thought he
was the most

capable guy
they could have.

If anybody's going
to do that job,

he ought
to do it.

He could do it.

And he wasn't going
to complain about it.

Matter of fact,
he wanted

to do that job.

Ignatius had a vision
of his people

going anywhere
in the world

for the good
of souls,

as he put it.

In Jesuit culture,

there's a lot of
respect for autonomy.

The autonomy
of the person,

and for the way
in which God works

on the person,
uh, individually.

One can influence
people, and persuade

them in certain
directions,

not by what
one says,

but just to
observe what

Ignatius calls
"The movement

of the spirits"
in the person.

Letting them
do the talking,

asking the
occasional question,

and integrating what
they're saying

into the overall story
of their lives.

One does not need
to have a heavy hand

telling people
what to do.

It would be a
presumptuous director

or priest who
would simply say,

"God tells me what
you ought to do."

Um, and uh, I think
most Jesuits are,

are happy to stay
away from that.

When you encounter
an area that's

been taken over
by the enemy,

you can tell
right away,

I mean, the fear
is palpable.

These are
traumatized people.

The first thing
to do is to conduct

effective
reconnaissance,

and intelligence
collection.

And so, you
have to really

go into the town
and stay there.

Get into an edge
of the town.

Control some certain
portion of the town

where people can come
up to you safely

and talk to you.

It's immensely
important

to begin
working with

indigenous forces
right away.

Because one
of the things

the enemy
will use is,

well, the occupier
is here, you know,

the crusader is
here, and so-forth.

And the best
way for you

to clarify those
intentions

is to work with
the local populace,

and be seen in
a supportive role.

Treat the population
with respect,

and then people
will recognize

the enemy propaganda
for what it is.

They're desperate
in a lot of cases

for an
improved life,

so they'll come to you
with information.

Then you can begin
to understand

the dynamics
in the area

through this effective
reconnaissance.

You have to build
the confidence back

in the people that
you're going to leave,

but you're going
to leave in place

a security structure
that they can trust.

It was the
kind of simple,

yet novel ideas
that your father

put into place

and it came down to
making life better

in a given village

so that you
engendered trust

and ultimately
gained intelligence

from a much
more welcoming

local community.

Uh, at the
same time,

when you found
somebody that

the villagers
identified as

a bad guy,
kill him.

Quick.

The increasing
influence

of the government
resulted in a lot

of information
coming in.

A major problem was
how to decide

what was valid
information

and what was
actionable,

what we could do
something about.

The Phoenix Program

was an effort
to bring together

the various
disparate elements

of the intelligence
gathering organizations

from take action to
neutralize the bad guys

as a consequence
of that information.

This was a
major effort

that your dad
instigated.

The P.R.U.
Were really

the offensive
arm that

the irregular
forces had.

Often they were
former V.C.

Themselves who were
reconfigured

to work for
the government.

They had a very,
very effective

ratio of losses
to those that

they captured
or killed.

For every P.R.U.
That was lost,

why they, uh,
neutralized, killed,

or captured
sixty-seven V.C.

I remember
once talking

to him about
the P.R.U.'s

These were
former Vietcong

who were hired

and paid by
the Agency

to go out and,
and go into

V.C. Areas and,
and counterattack

and kill who
was ever there.

And Colby's response was,
'cause there was a...

I mean this was
a guy who understood

the hardness of life
and war and what needed

to be done, uh,
against an enemy,

um, there was
no option.

He said, "Now Steve,
the Indians were coming

in through
the windows.

And, and you
gotta shoot back."

Intelligence was
very effective

during that
couple of years.

We rounded up
a large number

of people who
gave up fighting

for the other side
and came in.

We had enough presence
by this time

in all the
hamlets that,

that the
Vietnamese knew

the South
Vietnamese knew

pretty much what
was going on,

and it was a
matter of getting

some of them
to tell you,

which the South
Vietnamese became

increasingly
effective at doing.

The Phoenix Program

was intended
to root out

the infrastructure
of the V.C.

North Vietnamese.

To gather
intelligence

where the insurgents
were located,

to cut them off,

to take their
supplies away.

They never
had too much

in the way
of supplies.

And to destroy
in effect

the infrastructure
of the insurgency.

And it is essential
in a counter-insurgency

to root out that
infrastructure.

Unless one is
able to root out

those who organize
the insurgency,

and cripple
their operations,

one is not going
to defeat them.

Colby received a great
deal of criticism

for the
Phoenix Program

here in the
United States,

but if you are
engaged in conflict

of that sort,

you must make use
of those tools

that are
indispensable

in winning
the conflict.

If you are afraid to
make use of those tools,

then you should not
be in that conflict.

Yes there
were abuses;

there was no
doubt about it.

The Agency had
installed a program

to hold and
to interrogate,

uh, people who
were captured,

and that was very
much a mixed bag

in the way these
folks were treated.

There was nobody
really looking

over the shoulder
of the South Vietnamese

who were doing the
interrogating and,

uh, they really
got out of hand,

some, on, on, on
certain occasions.

By the time I got
there in 1969,

it felt much
more like

an assassination
program,

I mean, because
it's very

difficult to
control it.

We were supporting
the Vietnamese units.

They were doing a lot
of the intel work;

go out in the
field with us.

There's no way
to know whether

the person
delivering

the intelligence
was reliable.

It wasn't
like you had

people that you
trusted completely.

You tell me
you've got

somebody out here
that's a part of

the infrastructure,

and I've, I've got
to make a decision

do I follow
up and,

and do something
about it?

So it felt like it
had been corrupted

in a bad way when
I saw it in '69.

This was a program
in which the only

way to, sort of,
bring things

under control
were to...

let the Vietnamese
people know

that if you're on
the wrong side

we're going
to kill you.

It was a
basic belief,

as it is always
when we go

in a country
where we have

no real
background,

that you can't
trust anybody.

And therefore
you have to

set a standard
'cause there was

so much killing
going on,

that the only thing
these people know,

the only thing they
know and respect

is harsh treatment to
bring people around.

We always
presumed that

whatever he
was doing was

always for the good,
never anything wrong.

Here was those posters
all over town

with the ace
of spades,

comparing him to
Heinrich Himmler.

Responsible
for the deaths

of twenty-nine,
thirty thousand people.

Thousands of
demonstrators

opposed to the
Vietnam War

assembled in the
nation's capital

for a mass protest.

The crowd,
estimated at

about fifty
thousand persons,

included adults,
students,

even children.

People would turn
to me and say,

"You know, your
dad was a murderer."

My immediate reaction
used to be,

"You don't know what
you're talking about."

And then I'd find
myself thinking,

"Was he?

Well, who was
he, really?"

It was tough
on my mother.

She became more
and more isolated.

A good part of her
crowd in Washington,

some C.I.A. People
were starting to

turn against
the war.

And she's being
the loyal wife.

She was a
good woman.

I don't know
if the truth

was really what
we were after.

We were maybe afraid
of the truth.

If he was
morally corrupt,

to the detriment
of thousands of

people, would
be the worst.

It's a very difficult
field, really.

Those who serve

have loyalty to
the Agency itself,

but certainly must have
inner loyalties

in their code
of behavior,

which they would
not violate,

and one has to
take on faith

and trust that
the right thing

is being done,

and perhaps the...

for the greater good.

It's very difficult,
I find, to explain.

Colby's response
to the potential

for abuse of
Phoenix was,

was very legalistic,
very American.

Whether it was
all that effective

is something
that I think

he may have even,

I, I think he knew
that the tool he had

in his hands, uh,
was an inadequate tool

given the human
reality of what

was happening when a
society falls apart

and people want
to settle scores,

take revenge, or just
abuse their power.

He always defended
the effort as necessary,

but that he had,

he had
reservations

as to do we have
the right, uh,

programmatic set of,
of guidelines,

behaviors, people
to do this

in the
right way?

The chair would
emphasize that

today's hearings
will not only be

an examination of

Mr. Colby's
qualifications

and background,
but will also

review a number
of policies relating

to the Central Intelligence
Agency itself.

My dad came back from
Vietnam in 1971

and went back
into the C.I.A.

He was appointed
by Richard Nixon

to be Director
of the C.I.A.

Now you are familiar
with the controversy

over the Phoenix
Program in Vietnam.

There have been
allegations that,

in effect, this
Phoenix Program was

an assassination
program.

What are
the facts?

Mr. Chairman,
I've, uh, testified

in, in extenso
on this subject,

uh, before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee

in February 1970,
uh, before the...

He was the lawyer when
he was testifying.

Calm, steady,
professional

in telling you just
enough of the truth.

No more,
never anymore.

- Under oath.

I'm prepared to,
uh, repeat it

if necessary.

That Phoenix
Program was not

a program of
assassination.

The Phoenix Program was

a part of the overall
Pacification Program,

which was designed to
strengthen the government

of South Vietnam
and its people

against the assault
led against them

by the North Vietnamese
through a program...

You couldn't get
too close to him.

He said,
"Oh, they can

follow me around
all day and all night,

all year long
and they'll never

find anything
on me.

I've got nothing
to hide."

I thought,
"How can there

be nothing that you
want to hide?"

- In order to bring some
order into the fight

between the
subversion,

uh, by the North
Vietnamese

and the Viet Cong
and the government.

How many, roughly,
would you estimate

were eliminated?

The word
"eliminate"

referred to
the entire,

uh, program against
the apparatus.

Well, you can
say, "kill 'em,"

if you wanted.

We, we
said, "kill".

Uh, the figure...

the word we
used was "kill"

for the people
who were killed

and there was
no euphemism

applied to
it at all.

Colby suffered
from a total

exaggeration of what
Phoenix was about.

Fortunately it
did not interfere

with his
confirmation

as Director of
Central Intelligence.

The first time I
talked to your father,

it was on
the phone.

It was in the middle
of Watergate.

The Senate
Watergate Committee

was focused on
the C.I.A. Role.

The trail led
to the C.I.A.,

but not as the
sponsor of Watergate,

uh, as one of
the enablers.

Watergate was a
White House operation.

Nixon was at
the center.

The C.I.A. Does what
the president wants.

Nixon was
criminal.

Nixon was poison.

The crimes and
lies were too many.

The idea that
a president

and a White House
would use the C.I.A.

For overtly illegal,
political activities

didn't really dawn
on lots of people.

When Colby became
the Director of

Central Intelligence
in 1973,

he didn't know about
the assassination plots

that had been ordered
by the White House

against Fidel Castro,
for example.

He didn't know
about the existence

of secret prisons
where suspected

double agents
were tortured.

Spying on Americans,
mind control experiments

with drugs on unwitting
human guinea pigs.

As he is learning
about these secrets,

Richard Nixon's existence
is threatened.

There's been an
obstruction of justice

at the White House.

Impeachable offenses
have taken place,

and the question is,

"Is the president
going to survive?"

In this atmosphere
of deep mistrust

of government,

had these secrets
been revealed,

it would have been
the death of the C.I.A.,

and Bill Colby
knew it.

Nixon had tried
to get the C.I.A.

To take responsibility for
Watergate

as a way
of getting

himself off the hook.

After the resignation
of Nixon,

it was almost
as though

the next big story
after Watergate was going

to be trouble in the
intelligence community.

As Nixon falls,

as a new president
is sworn in,

Colby keeps
the 'Family Jewels'

as they were known,
under wraps.

The danger of their
disclosure is immense.

I did learn
from people inside

the agency that there
had been these documents

called the
'Family Jewels'.

And I had your father's
phone number

and I called him.

He did see me,
and he didn't lie to me.

What he did was
if I said there was

at least a hundred
and twenty cases

of wire breaking,
or wiretapping

of American citizens, uh,
contrary to the law in,

in America, he said my number
is only sixty three.

It was a question
of numbers.

He did not back away
from the question of wrongdoing.

And so that's one hell
of a story.

Your father was essential
to publishing

the story about
domestic spying.

It was in the aftermath of
that New York Times story

that Bill called me to ask
to come over and speak

with me on
a very sensitive matter.

That was the meeting
in which Bill disclosed

the crown jewels... the CIA's
activities during the Cold War.

There were
some matters,

which clearly raised
legal problems.

And he would have been
delighted if I had said,

"Don't worry
about it Bill,

we're not going
to look into that."

Uh, but I don't think
he expected that.

I think he knew that we would
have had no alternative

but to carefully look
into all

the allegations
of illegality.

Colby feels compelled
to let President Ford

know what's in the
'Family Jewels'.

Colby sends a six-page letter
to Henry Kissinger,

the Secretary of State,
outlining the worst

of what could be revealed
when the Senate

and the House gin up their
investigative committees,

post-Watergate.

Kissinger slows down
when he gets to the passage

about assassination plots,
and mutters,

"Oh, well,
these are horrors."

Ford has a meeting with
Kissinger

and Vice President Rockefeller,
and Ford's Chief of Staff,

Donald Rumsfeld,
in which he says,

"The C.I.A. Will be destroyed
if this comes out."

Ford decided that he
would appoint a commission

to investigate
domestic surveillance

as revealed
by Sy Hersh's story.

Vice President Rockefeller was
the head of it;

Governor Reagan
was on it.

A lot of people,
most of them rather right wing.

At lunch the next day
at the White House,

Abe Rosenthal, then the editor
of the New York Times,

raised a point
and said,

"Mr. President,
I see that you've

appointed Rockefeller
and a bunch

of right-wingers
to investigate the C.I.A.

What credibility do you
think that they will have

since they are obviously
are supporters

of the C.I. A?"

Ford said, "Well, that's
an interesting question

I had to be very careful
about whom I appointed

to this commission,

because it's very likely
that they're going

to come across things
a lot more serious

than domestic
surveillance."

Abe says,
in his inimitable way,

Abe says,
"Like what?"

President Ford,
in his inimitable way says,

"Like assassinations."

A hush falls
over the lunch.

After the lunch,
the Times people

went to the
Times office,

big question,
what do we do

with what
we heard?

They went back
and forth.

Finally the publisher,
Sulzberger, said,

"This was
a social lunch,

the President
obviously misspoke.

He should not
have said that.

So we're not going
to do this story."

And that was
the end of it.

But it wasn't the end of it,
of course.

President Ford
has reportedly

warned associates that
if current investigations

go too far,
they could uncover

several assassinations
of foreign officials,

in which the C.I.A.
Was involved.

When this burst
on the scene,

with some of the
more colorful stories

that came out,
it was really

a witch's cauldron
that was brewing.

So I was all
for the President

using all
the executive authority

that he could
to contain this,

this problem.

It isn't
just assassinations.

It's the whole area
of activity of government

covered by a cloak
of excessive secrecy.

We didn't realize how this
pent-up passion

in the Congress,
feeling that they ought

to have been more entitled
to a role

in shaping national policy
toward the Vietnam War,

together with journalists
who were competing

to be on
the air every night

with something ever more
sensational

would so work together
to create just

this unstoppable tide
of disregard

for the
national interest.

This is a matter
of such gravity

it goes right to the roots
of our morality as a nation.

Therefore, it must be
dealt with by the Congress,

and it must be dealt
with as a matter of law.

None of us knew exactly what
to do at that point.

It wasn't quite we
were just trying to survive,

but it was a very,
very hectic period.

President Ford
was also weak.

An unelected president coming
in after

a presidential catastrophe,
he didn't have the authority

that a president usually
has with the Congress.

It was a really
desperate time.

This was a way
to destroy

the whole
intelligence system.

And then we had
to try to prevent that.

Mr. Chairman,
these last two months

have placed American
intelligence in danger.

The almost hysterical
excitement that surrounds

any new story

mentioning C.I.A.,
or referring even

to a perfectly
legitimate activity

of C.I.A.
Has raised the question

whether secret intelligence
operations can be conducted

by the United States.

Your father's calendar
was horrendous.

He did have an intelligence
organization to run.

If General Scowcroft called,
or if Kissinger called,

it didn't matter
what was on the calendar,

the calendar
had to be scrubbed

and everything
re-juggled.

He had the whole future
of the agency

on his shoulders.

April 1975,
Colby sits before

the National Security Council
and tries to tell them

that we are about to lose
the war in Vietnam.

Saigon is falling.

They don't want
to hear that.

He says, "we can try
for redoubt here,

or we can negotiate
a settlement.

We've got many,
many thousands of people,

Americans and Vietnamese
in Saigon

who are going
to be trapped.

We owe it to those people
to get them out.

We need to plan
for this now."

"Not while I'm Secretary
of State,"

says Henry Kissinger.

"We're not going to negotiate
any kind of settlement."

Colby had been dedicated
to Vietnam since 1959.

Sixteen years.

"We can save nothing,"
Kissinger says to Colby.

"Nothing but lives,"
says Bill Colby.

I don't know
how your father

maintained any composure
at all because not only did

he have to
protect his agency

against this withering
assault by dozens

of congressmen, senators,
staffers,

in a public setting,
with the cameras rolling,

but even among
the friendlies,

that is, people
in the executive branch

that he would have expected
to count on

to be supported by were
insisting

that he limit
what he said,

even stay too far
on the side

of maintaining
secrecy simply

to refuse
any larger role

by the Congress in the
influencing foreign policy

that it was
an enormously complex

and difficult atmosphere
to function in.

I don't know how he
could make it

from day to day
under those pressures.

We have to abandon
the old tradition

of total secrecy,
but I think we do

have to agree that there
are secrets in America,

in our ballot box
and other areas of our life

that we do respect,
and that intelligence

has a legitimate area
in which it needs secrets,

and in which
its secrets need

to be protected,
for the benefits not

of intelligence,
but for our nation.

Bill Colby believed that
confession, up to a point,

was good
for the soul.

That they could not stonewall
the Senate, and the House,

or the American people,
that they had to try

to be seen to be telling
the truth about

what they
had done.

It was an extraordinarily
difficult moment

because the President
of the United States

didn't want to do it,
and neither did

his Chief of Staff,
Don Rumsfeld.

Why did the agency
prepare toxins

of this character
in quantities sufficient

to kill many thousands
of people?

I can not explain why
that quantity was developed

except that this was
a collaboration

that we were engaged in
with the United States Army,

and we did develop this
particular 'weapon'

you might say,
as a possible, uh,

for possible use.

My husband testified
in complete honesty.

He did what needed
to be done.

To hide things from
Congress could possibly

have been the end
of the C.I.A.

It was a very challenging
and painful

and trying time for him,
for all of us

in the family.

The prime reason
for C.I.A.

Is to keep
America safe,

one still cannot do things
that are illegal or immoral.

The officer has
to have a moral compass

within himself.

I thought the moral compass
was seeing us through,

really, seeing us through
difficult times.

I think that the death
of your sister

and the attitudes of,
uh, the public sparked

a good deal of remorse
is not quite the word,

but guilt feelings
in your father.

And when the Church Committee
got rolling,

he began to reveal things
about the history

of the Agency that
did not have to be

revealed at
that time.

And at one of
the morning sessions,

General Walters,
who was his deputy,

said to him, "Well Bill,
I'm a Catholic, uh, too

and I believe that it
is enough to go

to the confessional
and to tell one's sins

in the confessional.

One doesn't have
to do that

before Congressional
committees."

We did have discussions
in the White House.

I remember Cheney saying,
"Can't you control him?"

I told him the President
wanted it done his way,

not Bill's way.

He disagreed,
but he was not rebellious.

It is essential that we
be able to assure our

foreign agents abroad,
a number of whom

have already expressed
their alarm and limited

what they tell us,
that their names

will be totally protected,
since their lives

or livelihoods
are at peril.

The responsibility
of someone who heads

an intelligence agency
is to respect

the authority and
responsibilities

of the legislature
to a point,

but to stand up
to them

when they are asking
for something

that exceeds their authority
or places

our national security
in danger.

I will follow
the Constitution and my oaths,

and I will respond.

There will
be certain things

that I will ask you
not to ask,

such as the name
of an agent someplace.

You have just stated
in open session

that you do not trust
four hundred

and thirty five members
of Congress.

And it would seem to me
for you as one person

to make the determination
that you do not trust

four hundred and thirty five
members,

each of whom
represent four hundred

and sixty four thousand people,
each of whom won

an open election in ostensibly
a democratic society,

I would say
to you sir,

you don't have the right
to play God.

Mr. Dellums,
I am not playing God,

I am only enforcing
the laws that

the& that the Congress passed
and the directives

of our government to protect
some of the necessary secrets

of the intelligence business,
to protect

that very free society
that both you

and I want
to protect.

He may have
naively believed,

or maybe had no choice
in believing

that Church
and Pike and those people

would handle it
in a rational way

and understand the damage
that could come out.

Um, and I think in that case,
he was mistaken.

There was just
too much public clamor,

and there was disbelief
all over.

People were looking
for ways to attack

and so, not only
what he delivered

became a target,
therefore, the Agency.

But then he
became a target.

It's the way
Washington works.

People don't
like failure.

Would you just tell me why
that letter

has to be
top secret?

Because it includes with it,
as attachments,

a number of top secret
documents.

Why can't I show
that letter

to anybody
I want to?

I would be glad
to review this

and if you want
to release

this particular letter.

I don't want you
to release

that letter,
Mr. Colby.

I have lived with this
for fourteen years.

I have drowned in pieces
of papers stamped

top secret that had
no right to be stamped

top secret whatsoever.

Bill Colby was a person
who spent the major portion

of his post-college years
in a clandestine activity

and it... that is not
the best place in the world

to develop the social skills
and the political skills

to deal with members
of Congress.

I don't think that
there should be

this kind
of surveillance.

It interferes with
First Amendment rights.

To impinge
upon the rights

of American citizens
where there

is clearly no reason
to do so&

My Constitution
didn't say anything

about assassination,
wiretapping,

abusing private citizens'
right to privacy,

I am trying to articulate
the way

in which we Americans
can gather together

to control this,
to supervise this

intelligence business,
but not to destroy it.

How many files
of this character

do you maintain on
other members of Congress?

What about
those Army files?

Do you have
any idea what volume

of records
were destroyed?

I do not, no.

Do you know
what documents

he destroyed?

Does this pistol
fire the dart?

Yes, Mr. Chairman.

What disciplinary action
has been taken?

No agency has
the right to rise

above any
other agency.

Don't you think that's
an exceedingly loose way

to run
an agency?

Um, particularly,
um, the C.I. A?

Well, we're going to try
to run it tighter.

My dad testified
thirty two times

to Congressional committees
in one year.

My father would come home,
watch the news,

comment on it.

He wouldn't even
really roll his eyes,

he'd be
always positive.

It'll work out.

He really did believe
actually in the wisdom

of the American people.

If he had lied
to the Congress,

he would have been
a broken man.

He couldn't lie
to those people.

Bill really became
a tortured soul

in this period.

He saw his life
and his life's work crumbling.

I often wondered if Bill
was not expiating his sins,

starting with the
Phoenix Program, and whatever

had gone wrong in it
that he felt responsible for.

Then the tragedy
of his daughter,

that, that he was
maybe like Job,

he had
to atone.

I would never say
he fell apart,

but it was
a very traumatic period,

and I think he could
be excused for,

uh, for getting overwhelmed
at times.

Bill Colby was
on the hot seat.

He was nominated by
the President,

confirmed by
the Senate to serve

as Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency.

Therefore he was
the individual

who had the baton,
he was the one

who had to deal with
the oversight committees.

A person in
that job does feel

that they're,
report to two places.

It is this question
of to whom do you owe

your ultimate loyalty?

Is your loyalty
to the agency,

your fellow people,
and to what

you have done,
done not to make money,

not for personal glory,

done because you,
the President,

or in, in,
in some cases,

his brother,
wanted it done,

or is the loyalty to
the Congress and an oath?

To this day,
there is a feeling

that people
on the Hill

don't really care,
don't understand.

And so when they ask
you something,

you really have
to make a choice.

When, in fact,
once you take an oath,

you don't
have a choice.

The C.I.A. And its Director
was always caught

between doing the wish
of the President

and the law.

And when the President said,
do this, do that,

um, the law got
set aside normally.

The Presidency in the person
of Nixon had lost

its moral authority.

Ford was kind of
the accidental President

in this post-Watergate
atmosphere.

He didn't have
the moral authority.

All of a sudden, you're
in this political world

as C.I.A. Director
and you have to establish

what's the authority?

Moral or otherwise.

And Congress,
under Article One,

has this incredible authority,
over even the C.I.A.

They had
the authority.

Colby tried to walk
a middle line, and finally,

really acquiesced
to the law.

It was a call he made
personally on the law.

Trust, as David Abshire
has said so often,

is the coin
of the realm.

And the most important
ingredient...

the oil on
the glue is truth.

Truth builds trust.

We are empowered
to go out

and engage in activities,
in which deception

is appropriate.

And we have
to remind ourselves,

however, that we
do not lie to each other.

And we do not lie
to the officials

of our government
who have a right to know.

Whatever you think
about Bill Colby

and the way he handled it,
he was tarnished

by his incessantly being called
up before the Congress

over and over
and over again.

He had lost any ability
to manage either his agency

or his relations
with the Hill.

He was
a spent force,

and it was... almost
an act of mercy

in a sense,
to end... to end it.

Because he was,
he was really

a tortured soul.

Did this come
as a personal disappointment

to you that you
are being requested to resign?

Oh no.

As I said, I've, uh,
I anticipated a change,

and if that's better
for their business,

well, that's fine.

Mr. Colby, looking back
at it now,

do you wish maybe you'd taken
a firmer stand

with some of the committees
in Congress,

and perhaps not given them
quite as much information

as you have?

Would you do
it differently?

I don't think so,
I think the best way

was to get rid
of the past

and transition
into a future

of intelligence
under the Constitution

in the new structure.

What is your, uh,
projection for the C.I. A?

Would you have any idea
for a successor based

on your
own experience?

Oh, I think the...
as you know,

I've often said
that an outsider

would be appropriate
for the job,

and I think
that makes sense still.

I think it shouldn't be
a partisan political figure,

obviously.

I consider myself
fortunate indeed,

to have been confirmed
for this challenging job.

I want this job,
I want to do it well,

and I'm proud to be a part
of the C.I.A.

Thank you very much.

My wife
and I went

to the swearing-in
of George Bush senior

as Director of C.I.A.,
who replaced your father.

Your father had left along
with a couple of other people

that Ford wanted
to get rid of.

And, I remember as we left
after the swearing-in,

and it was a great occasion
for Bush, and everything,

we saw your father come out
of the thing,

and walk down by himself,
and get in his car

and drive off.

And, uh, my wife
almost cried.

He looked Ionely,
he was leaving,

no pretensions... just quietly
gets in his car and leaves.

And that's,
that's something we always

kind of remembered
about him.

I remember talking
to President Ford

about why
George Bush senior

to replace your dad
as C.I.A. Director.

Ford said,
"I wanted a loyalist."

He didn't consider your father
a loyalist.

I asked about
who was loyal.

"George Bush," he said
"Cheney, Rumsfeld,

Kissinger,
and Greenspan."

When my father drove out
of the gates of the C.I.A.

For the last time,
he was not broken or tortured.

He left with the strength
of his convictions,

his belief in the law
and the Constitution,

certain that he had done
the right thing.

Over the next several years,
I came to understand

that my father lived
in a world of secrets.

Always watching, listening,
his eye on the door.

He was tougher,
smarter, smoother,

and could be crueler
than anybody I ever knew.

I'm not sure
he ever loved anyone,

and I never heard him
say anything heartfelt.

By the time
I turned thirty,

I came to understand
the man that nobody knew,

or at least
I thought I did.

When he said,
"I want a divorce,"

I was really
knocked over,

really surprised,
and shocked.

I said,
"But we're Catholic,

we don't believe
in divorce."

So there goes
the Catholicism?

I mean,
I don't know.

He was a dedicated
public servant

who gave his best to,
to his work.

And, um,

and I think, um,

we had a,

we had a good family life
as long as it lasted.

And, um, he must say
he was...

I guess I would say
he was a complicated person

whom maybe I
didn't know as well

as I would hope
to think I do.

My father
was a soldier.

He jumped out
of airplanes.

He lived
to serve.

Before he left
on his last mission,

he wrote a couple
of books and married again.

Ten years passed.

One night, he fixed
his favorite meal

and had
a few drinks.

Then he got in his canoe
and disappeared.

His body washed ashore
nine days later.

Foul play was suspected,
but I knew otherwise.

He'd called me two weeks
before he died,

asking for my absolution,
for his not doing enough

for my sister Catherine
when she was so ill.

When his body was found,
he was carrying a picture

of my sister
in his wallet.

The Coroner's report listed
the cause of death as drowning,

brought on by a stroke
or heart attack.

Call it whatever you like,
I think he'd had enough

of this life.

My father lived
in the shadows.

He liked
being invisible.

He always wanted
his ashes scattered

to the winds.

But it was we who needed
the permanence

that he could
never provide.

We wanted
a hero.

It was for us,
the family,

that he was buried
at Arlington.

He never really
needed us.

It was us
who needed him.

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