Would you like to inspect the original subtitles? These are the user uploaded subtitles that are being translated:
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"Laura,
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at this stage, I can offer nothing more than my word.
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I'm a senior government employee in the intelligence community
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I hope you understand that contacting you is extremely high risk
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and you are willing to agree to the following precautions
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before I share more.
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This will not be a waste of your time.
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The following sounds complex,
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but should only take minutes to complete for someone technical.
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I would like to confirm out of email
that the keys we exchanged were not intercepted
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and replaced by your surveillants.
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Please confirm that no one
has ever had a copy of your private key
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and that it uses a strong passphrase.
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Assume your adversary is capable
of one trillion guesses per second.
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If the device you store the private key
and enter your passphrase on
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has been hacked,
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it is trivial to decrypt our communications.
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Understand that the above steps
are not bullet proof,
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and are intended only to give us breathing room.
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In the end if you publish the source material,
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I will likely be immediately implicated.
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This must not deter you from releasing
the information I will provide.
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Thank you, and be careful.
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Citizen Four"
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Radio: ... surveillance means that there are facts
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under the law to apply to
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if we should take away the surveillance
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there are no facts the government could manufacture
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- Oh, that's right
and it's all about creating an independent record
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- To me this goes to the question
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of independently verifying
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what the government is doing.
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That's why I keep going
back to that question.
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- So, that was David Suruda.
After CBS News traffic and weather...
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Hey, can you hear me?
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I am here David, how are you?
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Well, I would just point...
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start by pointing to (what) Barack Obama
himself said about those questions
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when he was running for
the office that he now occupies.
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On December 2007 he said
"The president does not have
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the power under the Constitution to
unilaterally authorize a military attack
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in a situation that does not involve stopping
an actual or imminent threat to the nation".
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So by Obama's own words, the president doesn't
have the power that he is now exercising
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under the Constitution.
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And as far of why it matters,
in... on August 1st 2007
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when he laid out his reasons
why he was running for office
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and why he thought it was so important
to change the way we were doing things
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he said
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"No more ignoring the law
when it's inconvenient,
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that is not who we are.
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We will again set an example for the world
that the law is not subject
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to the whims of stubborn rulers."
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- So to allow presidents to simply
start wars on their own without any...
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For now, know that every border you cross, every purchase you make,
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every call you dial, every cell phone tower you pass,
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friend you keep, article you write,
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site you visit, subject line you type,
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and packet you route,
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is in the hands of a system
whose reach is unlimited
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but whose safeguards are not.
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Your victimisation by the NSA system means
that you are well aware
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of the threat
that unrestricted secret police pose
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for democracies.
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This is a story few, but you, can tell.
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Thank you for inviting me here,
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to give me the opportunity to express my story.
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But let me give you some of my background.
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I spent about 4 years in the military and then I went to NSA directly, so...
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so I ended up with about 37 years of service combined.
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Most of it was a lot of fun!
I tell you, it was really a lot of fun,
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breaking these puzzles.
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You know, solving problems
and things like that.
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So, and that's really what I did.
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Fundamentally started working with data,
looking at data and datasystems
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and how you do that.
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I was developing this concept of analysis
where you could lay it out in such a way
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that it could be coded and executed electronically.
Meaning you could automate analysis.
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And it has to do with metadata
and using metadata relationships.
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So that was the whole,
that was my whole theme there at NSA
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that was eventually what I ended up to,
I was the only one there doing that, by the way.
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So any rate, you know, 9/11 happened.
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And it must have been right after.
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A few days, no more than a week after 9/11
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that they decided to begin actively spying on everyone in this country.
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And they wanted that back part of our program to run all the spying.
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So that's that's exactly what they did.
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And then they started taking the telecom data,
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and expanded after that.
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So, I mean, the one I knew was AT&T,
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and that one provided
320 million records every day.
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That program was reauthorized every 45 days by the,
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what I call the "Yes Committee"
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which way Hayden, and Tenet, and the DOJ,
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that program was called STELLARWIND.
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So first I went to the
House Intelligence Committee,
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and the staff member I personally knew there
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and she then went to the Chairman
of that Committee, Nancy Pelosi,
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who was the Minority Rep.
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They were all briefed in to
the program at the time, by the way,
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and all the other programs that were going on,
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including all those CIA programs.
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I wasn't alone in this,
there were four others out of NSA,
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we were all trying to work interally
in the government over these years
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trying to get them to come around,
to being constitutionally acceptable,
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and take it in to the courts
and have the courts' oversight of it too.
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So we na�vely kept thinking
that that could, that could happen,
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and it never did.
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But any rate after that
and all the stuff we were doing
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they decided to raid us
to keep us quiet,
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threaten us, you know.
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So we were raided simultaneously,
four of us.
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In my case they came in
with guns drawn,
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I don't know why they did that,
but they did. So....
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"Laura,
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I will answer what I remember
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of your questions as best I can.
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Forgive the lack of structure, I am not a writer,
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and I have to draft this in a great hurry.
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What you know as STELLARWIND has grown,
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SSO,
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the expanded Special Source Operations that took over STELLARWIND's share
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of the pie
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has spread all over the world
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to practically include
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comprehensive coverage of the United States.
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Disturbingly, the amount of US communication
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ingested by NSA is still increasing.
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Publicly,
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we complain that things are going dark,
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but in fact our accesses are improving.
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The truth is that the NSA has never
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in its history
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collected more than it does now.
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I know the location of most
domestic interception points,
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and that the largest
telecommunication companies in the US
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are betraying the trust of their customers,
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which I can prove.
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We are building the greatest weapon
for oppression in the history of Man.
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Yet its directors
exempt themselves from accountability.
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NSA director Keith Alexander
lied to Congress,
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which I can prove.
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Billions of US communications
are being intercepted.
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In gathering evidence of wrongdoing
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I focused on the wronging
of the American people,
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but believe me when I say that
the surveillance we live under
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is the highest privilege
compared to how we treat
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the rest of the world,
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this I can also prove.
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On cyberoperations
the government's public position
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is that we still lack a policy framework.
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This too is a lie.
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There is a detailed policy framework,
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a kind of martial law for Cyber Operations
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created by the White House.
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It's called "Presidential Policy Directive 20"
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and was finalized at the end of last year.
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This I can also prove.
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I appreciate your concern for my safety,
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but I already know how this will end for me,
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and I accept the risk.
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If I have luck, and you are careful,
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you will have everything you need.
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I ask only that you ensure
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this information makes it home
to the American public.
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Does the NSA routinely intercept
American citizen's emails?
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No.
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Does the NSA intercept Americans'
cell phone conversations.
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No.
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Google searches?
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No.
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Text messages?
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No.
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Amazon.com orders?
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Nope
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Bank records?
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No.
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What judicial consent is required for NSA
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to intercept communications
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and information
involving American citizens?
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Within the United States
that would be the FBI lead.
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If it was a foreign actor in the United states
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the FBI would still have the lead
and could work that with NSA
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or other intelligence
agencies as authorized.
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But to conduct that kind
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of collection within the United states
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it would have to go through a court order.
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And the court would have to authorize it.
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We are not authorized to do it,
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nor do we do it.
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All rise.
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The United States Court of Appeals
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for the Ninth Circuit is now in session.
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Please be seated.
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Good morning and welcome
to the Ninth Circuit.
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The first case for argument is
Jewell vs. National Security Agency.
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You may proceed.
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May it please the Court,
Kevin Bankston for Carolyn Jewell
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and her fellow plaintiff appellants
in Jewell vs. NSA.
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- Your Honors,
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plaintiffs have specifically
alleged that their own communications
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and communications records have been
acquired by the government.
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But the District Court found that
we failed to allege facts
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that differentiated the injury
of our plaintiffs sufferred
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from the injury suffered
by every other AT&T user
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whose communications and records
have been acquired by the government.
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Basically concluding that so long as
every one is being surveilled,
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no one has standing to sue.
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However to deny standing to persons
who are injured simply because
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many others are also injured
would mean that the most injurious
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and widespread government actions
could be questioned by nobody.
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- Do they have anything concrete
that in fact a specific communication
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of your client was intercepted?
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- We have evidence that all
the communications passing
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between AT&T's network and other networks
in their Northern California facility
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have been intercepted,
so that would necessarily include
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the Internet communications of
our Northern California plaintiffs.
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- Okay, thank you.
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- Thank you, your honor
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- May it please the Court,
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I'm Thomas Byron from
the Department of Justice
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here on behalf of
the Government defendants.
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We think this litigation
need not be resolved in Federal Court.
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In light of the oversight
of the political branches
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both Legislative and Executive,
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which provides a better opportunity
for oversight and resolution
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of the concerns raised
concerning nationwide policies
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of alleged surveillance
in these complaints.
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- Even if it's revealed
that one or more of the plaintiffs
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had email or telephone conversations
intercepted that had nothing to do
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with the national security?
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- Your honor, I don't know
that anyone necessarily
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would have standing to raise
the particular claims that issue
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in these 2 cases.
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We think instead that the kinds of claims
that issue here against these defendants
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are those that are
better suited to resolution
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before the representative branches
of our government...
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- What role... would the Judiciary have
if your.. approach is adopted...
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- Judge Peterson, I think the...
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- I mean, we just get out of the way, is that it?
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- Well, Judge Peterson, what I think
is that there is a narrow category,
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subset of cases in which
it may be appropriate
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to step aside
for that narrow category of cases.
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- But mmm... the Judiciary plays a role...
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- To be sure, Judge Peterson....
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- ...in our system.
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- Yes Your Honor and we don't mean to diminish that.
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- You're asking us to abdicate that role
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- No, Your Honor,
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but it is a question of this court's discretion
whether to reach that issue.
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We do think that there is simply
no way for the litigation to proceed
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without risk of divulging
those very questions of privileged information
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that would cause,
as Director of National Intelligence
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has explained,
254
00:15:56,850 --> 00:15:59,450
exceptionally great damage to
National Security's disclose.
255
00:16:04,090 --> 00:16:05,270
Thanks for having me.
256
00:16:06,240 --> 00:16:08,370
Hum, if anybody has any questions,
like I said just..
257
00:16:08,560 --> 00:16:11,190
Basically just raise your hand
and I'll try to call on you
258
00:16:11,390 --> 00:16:12,700
as soon as I possibly can.
259
00:16:13,350 --> 00:16:16,290
So, who here actually feels like
they are under surveillance,
260
00:16:16,830 --> 00:16:18,220
pretty regularly?
261
00:16:20,830 --> 00:16:21,810
Everyone inside of Occupy.
262
00:16:22,100 --> 00:16:23,620
How many people here have been arrested
263
00:16:23,800 --> 00:16:26,710
and at their Court date had
their phone taken into the back room?
264
00:16:27,330 --> 00:16:29,290
How many people here
had their retina scanned?
265
00:16:30,470 --> 00:16:31,590
Wow.
266
00:16:34,120 --> 00:16:36,040
So you guys are actually, in a sense,
the canaries in the coal mine,
267
00:16:36,250 --> 00:16:36,990
right,
268
00:16:37,220 --> 00:16:38,960
because the incentives
are all lined up against you.
269
00:16:39,210 --> 00:16:42,020
Anybody see how the subway link
your metro card to your debit card,
270
00:16:43,110 --> 00:16:44,860
right? And, like, auto refill.
271
00:16:45,210 --> 00:16:47,470
This is a concept which is key
to everything we'll talk about today.
272
00:16:47,670 --> 00:16:48,960
And it's called linkability.
273
00:16:49,180 --> 00:16:52,000
Take one piece of data
and link it to another piece of data.
274
00:16:52,400 --> 00:16:53,420
So for example,
275
00:16:53,640 --> 00:16:55,790
if you have your metro card
and you have your debit card,
276
00:16:56,030 --> 00:16:57,890
you have those things
and you can draw a line between them right?
277
00:16:58,460 --> 00:17:00,860
So that's, like, not a scary thing.
278
00:17:01,080 --> 00:17:04,380
Except your bank card is tied
to everything else that you do during the day.
279
00:17:04,570 --> 00:17:07,560
So now they know where you're going,
when you make purchases.
280
00:17:08,220 --> 00:17:11,560
So when they decide to target you,
they can actually recreate your exact steps.
281
00:17:11,850 --> 00:17:13,910
With a metro card and with a credit card alone.
282
00:17:14,260 --> 00:17:15,950
Like literally where you go and what you buy
283
00:17:16,430 --> 00:17:18,940
and potentially by linking that data with other people
284
00:17:19,140 --> 00:17:21,150
on similar travel plans,
285
00:17:21,380 --> 00:17:23,460
they can figure out who you
talk to and who you met with.
286
00:17:23,980 --> 00:17:26,740
When you then take cellphone data,
which logs your location
287
00:17:27,330 --> 00:17:32,160
and you link up purchasing data,
metro card data and your debit card.
288
00:17:32,420 --> 00:17:34,660
You start to get what you could call metadata,
289
00:17:34,840 --> 00:17:36,690
an aggregate over a person's life.
290
00:17:36,930 --> 00:17:39,700
And metadata, an aggregate, is content.
291
00:17:39,910 --> 00:17:41,600
It tells a story about you,
292
00:17:41,850 --> 00:17:44,770
which is made up of facts,
but is not necessarily true.
293
00:17:44,930 --> 00:17:46,790
So for example, just because
you were on the corner,
294
00:17:47,120 --> 00:17:50,500
and all these data points point to it,
it doesn't mean you committed the crime.
295
00:17:50,850 --> 00:17:52,410
So it's important to note
296
00:17:52,700 --> 00:17:54,650
that if someone has a perception
of you having done a thing,
297
00:17:54,830 --> 00:17:57,230
it will now follow you
for the rest of your life.
298
00:17:57,590 --> 00:18:00,140
So just keep in mind that
what happens to you guys for example
299
00:18:00,370 --> 00:18:04,120
with fingerprints, and retinal scans, and photographs.
300
00:18:04,440 --> 00:18:06,410
That is what is going to happen
to people in the future
301
00:18:06,600 --> 00:18:08,550
when they resist policy changes
and when they try to protest
302
00:18:08,960 --> 00:18:12,220
in a totally constitutionally protected way.
303
00:18:12,780 --> 00:18:14,055
This is for you, Director Clapper, again on the surveillance front.
304
00:18:15,410 --> 00:18:18,020
And I hope we can do this in just a yes or no answer,
305
00:18:18,240 --> 00:18:20,320
because I know Senator Feinstein wants to move on.
306
00:18:20,790 --> 00:18:25,790
- So, does the NSA collect any type of data at all,
307
00:18:25,980 --> 00:18:29,000
on millions or hundreds of millions of Americans ?
308
00:18:30,180 --> 00:18:31,310
- No sir.
309
00:18:32,010 --> 00:18:33,010
- It does not?
310
00:18:34,540 --> 00:18:36,490
- Not wittingly.
311
00:18:36,880 --> 00:18:39,820
There are cases where they could inadvertently,
312
00:18:40,530 --> 00:18:43,900
perhaps, collect, but not wittingly.
313
00:18:59,640 --> 00:19:02,830
Email from April 2013
314
00:19:09,650 --> 00:19:10,610
The encrypted archive
315
00:19:10,770 --> 00:19:13,380
should be available to you within seven days.
316
00:19:13,560 --> 00:19:16,400
The key will follow when everything else is done.
317
00:19:18,080 --> 00:19:19,490
The material provided,
318
00:19:19,780 --> 00:19:23,590
and investigative effort required
will be too much for any one person.
319
00:19:23,820 --> 00:19:27,140
I recommend at a very minimum
you involve Glen Greenwald.
320
00:19:27,340 --> 00:19:29,290
I believe you know him.
321
00:19:31,280 --> 00:19:32,520
The plaintext of the payload
322
00:19:32,700 --> 00:19:35,550
will include my true name details
for the record.
323
00:19:36,330 --> 00:19:37,600
Though it will be your decision
324
00:19:37,830 --> 00:19:40,830
as to whether or how
to declare my involvement.
325
00:19:41,690 --> 00:19:46,280
My personal desire is that you
paint the target directly on my back.
326
00:19:46,520 --> 00:19:51,820
No one, not even my most trusted confidant,
is aware of my intentions
327
00:19:52,360 --> 00:19:55,750
and it would not be fair for them
to fall under suspicion for my actions.
328
00:19:55,990 --> 00:19:57,920
You may be the only one
who can prevent that,
329
00:19:58,360 --> 00:20:00,730
and that is by immediately
nailing me to the cross
330
00:20:00,960 --> 00:20:03,950
rather than trying
to protect me as a source.
331
00:20:06,330 --> 00:20:09,970
On timing, regarding
meeting up in Hong Kong,
332
00:20:10,230 --> 00:20:13,150
the first rendezvous attempt
will be at 10 A.M. local time
333
00:20:13,360 --> 00:20:15,280
on Monday.
334
00:20:15,590 --> 00:20:17,840
We will meet in the hallway outside of the restaurant
335
00:20:18,000 --> 00:20:19,590
in the Mira Hotel.
336
00:20:20,370 --> 00:20:21,770
I will be working on a Rubik's cube
337
00:20:21,950 --> 00:20:23,250
so that you can identify me.
338
00:20:24,530 --> 00:20:28,410
Approach me and ask if I know the hours of the restaurant.
339
00:20:28,590 --> 00:20:30,990
I'll respond by stating that I'm not sure
340
00:20:31,290 --> 00:20:33,810
and suggest you try the lounge instead.
341
00:20:33,980 --> 00:20:38,000
I'll offer to show you where it is, and at that point we're good.
342
00:20:38,380 --> 00:20:41,010
You simply need to follow naturally.
343
00:21:17,840 --> 00:21:19,250
As far as positioning I mean
344
00:21:19,420 --> 00:21:21,560
if you want us to sit in any particular way or whatever.
345
00:21:21,720 --> 00:21:24,590
You know, I'm gonna go there just like we get better light.
346
00:21:35,800 --> 00:21:37,540
There is, you know, so many different
347
00:21:37,850 --> 00:21:39,930
enormous stories
348
00:21:40,160 --> 00:21:42,370
just that are kind of standalone stories
349
00:21:43,690 --> 00:21:46,420
that, even like you know certain things on my individual document
350
00:21:46,600 --> 00:21:48,620
that can just be their own story
351
00:21:48,820 --> 00:21:50,930
and I just want to start turning those stories out.
352
00:21:51,090 --> 00:21:54,010
I basically woke up this morning and I already started writing stories
353
00:21:54,650 --> 00:21:56,530
hum so I'm hoping to, you know,
354
00:21:56,760 --> 00:21:59,080
start publishing within like a day or two days.
355
00:21:59,430 --> 00:22:00,140
- OK
356
00:22:00,280 --> 00:22:01,680
it's as long as you're good with that
357
00:22:01,850 --> 00:22:02,440
- Yeah
358
00:22:03,000 --> 00:22:04,320
and so as far as I...
359
00:22:04,490 --> 00:22:05,700
the stuff we have to talk about,
360
00:22:05,860 --> 00:22:07,010
I mean I'm kind of like
361
00:22:07,360 --> 00:22:10,580
dichotomizing it between,
362
00:22:11,310 --> 00:22:12,900
you know, stuff that I'd like
to talk you about,
363
00:22:13,060 --> 00:22:14,760
in terms of like the documents
and the content.
364
00:22:14,960 --> 00:22:16,500
Laura has a bunch of questions
about that as well.
365
00:22:16,740 --> 00:22:19,280
So while we're working through
the documents getting your take-on,
366
00:22:19,460 --> 00:22:21,110
a lot of the stuff that, you know,
367
00:22:21,330 --> 00:22:24,760
help me understand it better,
but then also the sort of You story, right...
368
00:22:25,030 --> 00:22:26,650
like the who you are>?
369
00:22:26,840 --> 00:22:27,320
- Yeah
370
00:22:27,580 --> 00:22:29,460
what you've done, why you've
done what you've done
371
00:22:29,610 --> 00:22:29,810
- Yeah
372
00:22:30,580 --> 00:22:31,520
and I'd love to do that first
373
00:22:31,680 --> 00:22:31,920
- OK
374
00:22:32,690 --> 00:22:35,020
in part because, you are
the only one who can do that
375
00:22:35,210 --> 00:22:35,700
- Yeah
376
00:22:35,910 --> 00:22:38,240
so I'd like to just get it done
so let it's done,
377
00:22:38,410 --> 00:22:42,150
and also because, you know,
it might be that you wanna do that early
378
00:22:42,390 --> 00:22:42,980
- Yeah
379
00:22:43,580 --> 00:22:46,990
because, it might be necessary,
we might choose to have that done early.
380
00:22:47,330 --> 00:22:50,070
What are you... tell me your thoughts,
just where you are with that?
381
00:22:50,340 --> 00:22:52,430
- So primary one on that,
I think I've expressed it
382
00:22:52,660 --> 00:22:53,780
a couple times online,
383
00:22:54,010 --> 00:22:58,730
is I feel the modern media
has a big focus on personalities.
384
00:22:58,930 --> 00:22:59,760
- Totally
385
00:23:00,020 --> 00:23:04,470
- And I'm a little concerned (that)
the more we focus on that
386
00:23:04,650 --> 00:23:06,560
the more they're going
to use that as a distraction.
387
00:23:07,580 --> 00:23:11,860
I don't necessarily want that to happen,
which is why I've consistently said, you know,
388
00:23:12,090 --> 00:23:16,090
I'm not the story here,
hum haha, nervous uh?
389
00:23:16,800 --> 00:23:20,970
- No it's a very very cheap pen, I just, the slider is broke,
go ahead.
390
00:23:21,940 --> 00:23:27,770
- Hum, but hum, yeah, anything I can do
to help you guys get this out,
391
00:23:28,190 --> 00:23:29,110
I will do,
392
00:23:29,400 --> 00:23:35,940
I don't have any experience
with media, with how this works
393
00:23:36,340 --> 00:23:39,110
so I'm kind of learning as I go.
394
00:23:39,560 --> 00:23:43,090
Right, so, I just want to get a sense of
why did you decide to do what you've done.
395
00:23:43,460 --> 00:23:48,660
So for me it all comes down to
State Power against the people's ability
396
00:23:48,910 --> 00:23:51,480
to meaningfully oppose that power.
397
00:23:51,730 --> 00:23:54,290
And I'm sitting there everyday,
398
00:23:54,490 --> 00:24:00,190
getting payed to design methods
to amplify that State Power.
399
00:24:01,090 --> 00:24:04,510
And I'm realizing that if, you know,
the policy switches,
400
00:24:04,970 --> 00:24:08,500
that there are the only things that restrains
these states, were changed,
401
00:24:09,830 --> 00:24:12,380
there, you couldn't meaningfully
oppose these.
402
00:24:12,620 --> 00:24:17,720
I mean, you have to be the most
incredibly sophisticated ta* col* actor in existence.
403
00:24:18,150 --> 00:24:22,650
I'm not sure there's anybody,
no matter how gifted you are,
404
00:24:22,900 --> 00:24:27,200
who could oppose all of the
offices and all the bright people
405
00:24:27,620 --> 00:24:32,000
even all the mediocre people out there
with all of their tools and all of their capabilities.
406
00:24:33,340 --> 00:24:36,360
And as I saw the promise
of the Obama administration
407
00:24:37,890 --> 00:24:41,770
be betrayed and walk away from it.
In fact, actually advance
408
00:24:42,720 --> 00:24:46,740
the things that had been promised
to be sort of curtailed and rained in
409
00:24:47,180 --> 00:24:48,580
and dialed back.
410
00:24:48,770 --> 00:24:51,120
It actually gets worse,
particularly drone strikes.
411
00:24:51,450 --> 00:24:52,600
Which I also learned in NSA,
412
00:24:52,860 --> 00:24:55,810
we could watch drone videos
from our desktops,
413
00:24:59,450 --> 00:25:01,620
as I saw that, that really hardened me to action.
414
00:25:01,910 --> 00:25:02,850
- In real time?
415
00:25:03,040 --> 00:25:04,230
- In real time, yeah,
416
00:25:04,490 --> 00:25:09,060
it'll stream a lower quality
of the video to your desktop,
417
00:25:09,540 --> 00:25:12,540
typically you'd be watching surveillance drones
as opposed to actually letting you know,
418
00:25:12,800 --> 00:25:15,570
murder drones really going out there
and bomb somebody.
419
00:25:16,510 --> 00:25:19,030
But you'll have a drone
that's just following somebody's house
420
00:25:19,220 --> 00:25:20,580
for hours and hours.
421
00:25:20,770 --> 00:25:22,590
And you won't know who it is because, you know,
422
00:25:22,880 --> 00:25:26,070
you don't have the context for that
but it's just a page
423
00:25:26,230 --> 00:25:29,320
where it's lists
and lists of drone feeds
424
00:25:29,520 --> 00:25:32,270
and all these different countries
with all these different code names
425
00:25:32,490 --> 00:25:35,680
and you can just click
on which one you want to see.
426
00:25:36,970 --> 00:25:40,370
- Right, so if your self interest
is to live in a world in which
427
00:25:40,580 --> 00:25:42,640
there's maximum privacy,
428
00:25:42,820 --> 00:25:45,370
doing something that could
put you into prison,
429
00:25:45,590 --> 00:25:49,470
in which your privacy is completely destroyed
is sort of the antithesis of that,
430
00:25:49,850 --> 00:25:53,720
how did you reach the point where
that was a worthwhile calculation for you?
431
00:25:54,680 --> 00:25:57,670
- I remember what the Internet was like
before it was being watched.
432
00:25:58,010 --> 00:26:00,710
And there has never been anything
in the history of man like it.
433
00:26:01,130 --> 00:26:05,420
I mean you could have children
from one part of the world
434
00:26:06,070 --> 00:26:07,790
having an equal discussion,
435
00:26:08,360 --> 00:26:10,370
where you know they were sort of granted
436
00:26:11,460 --> 00:26:14,370
the same respect
for their ideas and conversation,
437
00:26:14,970 --> 00:26:17,750
with experts in the field
from another part of the world
438
00:26:18,130 --> 00:26:21,320
on any topic, anywhere,
anytime, all the time.
439
00:26:23,650 --> 00:26:25,140
And it was free and unrestrained.
440
00:26:25,330 --> 00:26:29,410
And we've seen the chilling of that,
the cooling of that and the changing
441
00:26:29,600 --> 00:26:33,850
of that model towards something
which people self police their own views.
442
00:26:34,090 --> 00:26:36,920
And they literally make
their own jokes on ending up on the list
443
00:26:37,280 --> 00:26:42,390
if they donate to a political cause
or if they say something in a discussion.
444
00:26:42,700 --> 00:26:46,580
And it has become an expectation that we're being watched.
445
00:26:47,350 --> 00:26:50,120
Many people I've talked to have mentioned
that they're careful about what they type
446
00:26:50,450 --> 00:26:51,840
into search engines.
447
00:26:52,140 --> 00:26:53,740
Because they know that it's being recorded.
448
00:26:54,010 --> 00:26:57,910
And that limits the boundaries
of their intellectual exploration.
449
00:27:02,720 --> 00:27:07,520
And I'm more willing to risk
450
00:27:08,110 --> 00:27:09,160
imprisonment
451
00:27:09,370 --> 00:27:12,390
or any other negative outcome personally
452
00:27:12,750 --> 00:27:16,120
than I am willing to risk
453
00:27:16,550 --> 00:27:18,980
the curtailment of my intellectual freedom
454
00:27:19,770 --> 00:27:22,300
and that of those around me,
455
00:27:22,630 --> 00:27:26,270
whom I care for equally as I do for myself.
456
00:27:26,740 --> 00:27:29,470
And again that's not to say that I'm self sacrificing
457
00:27:32,020 --> 00:27:33,710
because it gives me, I feel good,
458
00:27:34,240 --> 00:27:35,660
in my human experience
459
00:27:35,940 --> 00:27:37,900
to know that I can contribute to the good of others.
460
00:27:54,770 --> 00:27:56,530
- Could you elaborate on that?
461
00:27:57,290 --> 00:28:01,740
- So, I don't know how much the programs
and the actual technical capacities
462
00:28:02,060 --> 00:28:05,350
everybody's talked to you about
but there is an infrastructure in place
463
00:28:05,580 --> 00:28:10,440
in the United States
and world wide that NSA has built
464
00:28:11,440 --> 00:28:16,120
in cooperation with
other governments as well,
465
00:28:17,060 --> 00:28:18,860
that intercepts
466
00:28:20,080 --> 00:28:21,220
basically every
467
00:28:21,490 --> 00:28:23,230
digital communication,
468
00:28:23,670 --> 00:28:25,550
every radio communication,
469
00:28:26,090 --> 00:28:27,800
every analog communication
470
00:28:28,160 --> 00:28:31,420
that it has sensors in place to detect.
471
00:28:31,760 --> 00:28:34,170
And with these capabilities,
472
00:28:34,610 --> 00:28:38,170
basically the vast majority
473
00:28:39,160 --> 00:28:39,930
of human
474
00:28:40,730 --> 00:28:42,860
and computer to computer communications,
475
00:28:43,190 --> 00:28:44,340
device-based communication,
476
00:28:44,690 --> 00:28:47,920
which that sort of then forms
the relationships between humans,
477
00:28:49,520 --> 00:28:52,150
are automatically ingested
without targeting.
478
00:28:53,220 --> 00:28:56,020
And that allows individuals
to retroactively
479
00:28:56,420 --> 00:29:00,400
search your communications
based on self certifications.
480
00:29:00,770 --> 00:29:04,330
So for example, if I wanted
to see the content
481
00:29:04,570 --> 00:29:06,580
of your email or,
482
00:29:07,110 --> 00:29:08,630
you know, your wife's phone calls
483
00:29:08,880 --> 00:29:10,510
or anything like that.
484
00:29:10,910 --> 00:29:14,810
All I have to do is use
what's called a selector.
485
00:29:15,060 --> 00:29:18,230
Any kind of thing
486
00:29:18,660 --> 00:29:20,520
in the communication's chain
487
00:29:21,410 --> 00:29:24,010
that might uniquely or almost uniquely
488
00:29:24,220 --> 00:29:24,980
identify you as an individual.
489
00:29:25,190 --> 00:29:27,080
And I'm talking about
things like email addresses,
490
00:29:27,450 --> 00:29:28,840
IP addresses, phone numbers,
491
00:29:29,060 --> 00:29:30,090
credit cards,
492
00:29:31,460 --> 00:29:32,920
even passwords
493
00:29:33,260 --> 00:29:35,710
that are unique to you,
that aren't used by anyone else.
494
00:29:36,900 --> 00:29:39,040
I can input those into the system
495
00:29:39,510 --> 00:29:41,530
and it will not only go
back through the database
496
00:29:42,130 --> 00:29:45,550
and go
"have I seen this anywhere in the past?",
497
00:29:46,970 --> 00:29:50,270
it will basically put an
additional level of scrutiny on it
498
00:29:50,880 --> 00:29:52,580
moving into the future that says
499
00:29:53,290 --> 00:29:55,530
"if this is detected now
or at anytime in the future,
500
00:29:57,270 --> 00:30:00,300
I want this to go to me immediately"
and alert me in real time
501
00:30:00,490 --> 00:30:02,080
that you're communicating
with someone,
502
00:30:02,260 --> 00:30:03,000
things like that.
503
00:30:07,590 --> 00:30:09,690
- So I don't know who you are
or anything about you.
504
00:30:11,360 --> 00:30:17,760
- Ok. I work for Booz Allen Hamilton,
defense contractor.
505
00:30:18,940 --> 00:30:22,360
I am sort of on loan to NSA,
I don't talk to Booz Allen boss,
506
00:30:22,610 --> 00:30:24,840
I don't get tasking from Booz Allen,
it's all from NSA.
507
00:30:25,610 --> 00:30:26,770
- So, I don't know your name.
508
00:30:27,080 --> 00:30:30,500
- Oh, sorry, my name is Edward Snowden,
509
00:30:30,850 --> 00:30:32,230
I go by Ed.
510
00:30:33,430 --> 00:30:35,720
Edward Joseph Snowden is the full name.
511
00:30:35,980 --> 00:30:39,080
(spelling) S. N. O. W. D. E. N..
512
00:30:39,420 --> 00:30:40,570
- And where are you from ?
513
00:30:41,030 --> 00:30:44,310
- I'm originally...
I was born in North Carolina,
514
00:30:44,690 --> 00:30:46,500
small town, Elizabeth City.
515
00:30:46,690 --> 00:30:47,660
There is a Coast Guard station there,
516
00:30:47,920 --> 00:30:49,200
I'm from a military family.
517
00:30:49,960 --> 00:30:54,130
But I spent most of my time
growing up around Fort Meade in Maryland.
518
00:30:56,940 --> 00:31:00,990
- And your family,
what's the consequences for them?
519
00:31:02,900 --> 00:31:05,580
- This is actually
what has made this hardest.
520
00:31:05,960 --> 00:31:11,460
My family doesn't know
what's happening, they're unaware.
521
00:31:14,710 --> 00:31:17,730
I don't think I'll be able
to keep the family ties
522
00:31:18,020 --> 00:31:21,920
that I've had for all my life
523
00:31:22,280 --> 00:31:25,580
because of the risk of
associating them with this.
524
00:31:26,940 --> 00:31:30,780
And I'll leave what to publish
and what not to publish to you guys,
525
00:31:31,410 --> 00:31:38,180
I trust you'll be responsible on this.
But basically, the closer I stay to my family,
526
00:31:40,160 --> 00:31:41,530
the more likely they are
to be leaned on.
527
00:31:41,780 --> 00:31:42,950
- So you don't want me to report this?
528
00:31:43,230 --> 00:31:45,040
- We dont have ... I mean,
we definitely want to do
529
00:31:45,250 --> 00:31:48,830
whatever we can not to
include them or bring them into the mix
530
00:31:49,310 --> 00:31:51,370
- Oh I'm sorry that's fine, I won't...
531
00:31:52,040 --> 00:31:53,070
- I'm sorry I'm going to interrupt you.
532
00:31:53,410 --> 00:31:55,930
Can we just stop for a second,
do the document and then go back to that?
533
00:31:56,960 --> 00:32:00,630
- What do I need? Do I need
an email address that we're using or...
534
00:32:00,920 --> 00:32:06,170
- Well you can send... Once you've encrypted it,
you can send it from whatever you think is appropriate.
535
00:32:06,650 --> 00:32:08,870
The main thing is
you've got to encapsulate all of this
536
00:32:09,320 --> 00:32:13,300
in a way that it can't be
decrypted and read
537
00:32:13,710 --> 00:32:18,260
once it's in transit across the
network or on either of the end points.
538
00:32:18,770 --> 00:32:21,000
- Ok I mean just so you know
these documents are basically all going
539
00:32:21,620 --> 00:32:23,490
to be uploaded within like 48 hours.
540
00:32:23,880 --> 00:32:25,170
- This is simply..
541
00:32:25,410 --> 00:32:27,600
You want to get in the process
of doing this for everything because
542
00:32:27,880 --> 00:32:30,870
it seems hard but it's not hard,
this is super easy.
543
00:32:31,210 --> 00:32:32,530
- Ok so just walk me through it.
544
00:32:32,770 --> 00:32:37,050
- Ok. Show me the actual folder structure
where these files are first.
545
00:32:41,410 --> 00:32:42,620
- How many documents
did you say there were?
546
00:32:42,990 --> 00:32:44,250
- Seven
547
00:32:44,460 --> 00:32:45,130
- Ok well, while you're working...
548
00:32:45,390 --> 00:32:47,060
- Ok go ahead
549
00:32:48,370 --> 00:32:49,520
- How many documents are we talking about?
550
00:32:49,970 --> 00:32:50,660
Because in The Guardian,
551
00:32:50,920 --> 00:32:52,670
that Wikileaks, technical people
552
00:32:52,850 --> 00:32:54,440
set up a system
553
00:32:54,690 --> 00:32:57,030
so that they were available
for anybody to see
554
00:32:58,140 --> 00:33:00,990
and I just wonder if it's
possible to do the same thing.
555
00:33:02,220 --> 00:33:03,910
- That would be the ideal end game.
556
00:33:06,000 --> 00:33:10,930
But because some of these documents
are legitimately classified
557
00:33:11,580 --> 00:33:14,900
in ways that could cause harm
to people and methods.
558
00:33:15,940 --> 00:33:19,100
I'm comfortable in my
technical ability to protect them.
559
00:33:19,380 --> 00:33:21,110
I mean you could literally
shoot me or torture me
560
00:33:21,700 --> 00:33:24,790
and I could not disclose
the password, if I wanted to.
561
00:33:26,500 --> 00:33:29,230
I have the sophistication to do that.
562
00:33:29,600 --> 00:33:32,490
There are some journalists
that I think could do that,
563
00:33:32,930 --> 00:33:34,840
but there are a number
of them that couldn't.
564
00:33:35,140 --> 00:33:37,020
But the question becomes,
565
00:33:37,260 --> 00:33:39,270
can an organization
566
00:33:39,580 --> 00:33:42,400
actually control that information
567
00:33:42,670 --> 00:33:43,970
in that manner
568
00:33:44,270 --> 00:33:47,050
without risking basically
an uncontrolled disclosure?
569
00:33:47,680 --> 00:33:49,300
But I do agree with that, honestly
570
00:33:49,930 --> 00:33:52,600
I don't want to be
the person making the decisions
571
00:33:52,940 --> 00:33:54,630
on what should be public
and what shouldn't.
572
00:33:54,980 --> 00:33:58,090
Which is why rather than
publishing these on my own,
573
00:33:58,720 --> 00:34:02,180
or putting them out openly,
I'm running them through journalists.
574
00:34:02,430 --> 00:34:04,920
So that my bias, and my things,
575
00:34:05,170 --> 00:34:07,700
because clearly
I have some strongly held views,
576
00:34:07,990 --> 00:34:09,960
are removed from that equation
577
00:34:10,520 --> 00:34:12,840
and the public interest is being
represented in the most responsible manner.
578
00:34:13,770 --> 00:34:14,600
- Yeah.
579
00:34:15,490 --> 00:34:22,250
- Actually given your sort of...
Geographic familiarity
580
00:34:22,610 --> 00:34:23,910
with the U.K and whatnot.
581
00:34:24,440 --> 00:34:32,360
I'd like to point out that
GCHQ has probably the most invasive...
582
00:34:32,650 --> 00:34:37,480
- I know
- network intercept program anywhere in the world.
583
00:34:38,030 --> 00:34:41,950
It's called TEMPORA,
(spelling) T. E. M. P. O. R. A.
584
00:34:43,360 --> 00:34:46,000
and it's the world's first "full take",
they call it, and that means
585
00:34:46,310 --> 00:34:47,600
content in addition to metadata
586
00:34:47,770 --> 00:34:49,230
on everything.
587
00:34:51,710 --> 00:34:54,430
- So this is what I'd like to do
just in term of scheduling
588
00:34:54,620 --> 00:34:58,190
if it's good with everybody else.
Are you feeling you're done?
589
00:34:58,420 --> 00:34:59,590
- Yeah yeah I'm done.
590
00:35:00,780 --> 00:35:02,770
- So, I'm anxious to go back,
591
00:35:03,050 --> 00:35:04,360
get those articles done
592
00:35:04,960 --> 00:35:06,510
and then there is a
bunch of documents
593
00:35:06,700 --> 00:35:09,480
that aren't about those first two or three stories
that I'd like to spend time with you...
594
00:35:09,700 --> 00:35:10,400
- Sure yeah
595
00:35:10,600 --> 00:35:11,510
- ...kinda going over.
596
00:35:12,260 --> 00:35:14,110
- I'm not going anywhere.
597
00:35:14,340 --> 00:35:16,660
- You're available?
You want to check your book first?
598
00:35:18,100 --> 00:35:19,450
- Let me check my schedule.
599
00:35:19,690 --> 00:35:20,540
- Is that good for you Laura?
You want to...
600
00:35:20,610 --> 00:35:22,770
- It's great.
- OK
601
00:35:37,790 --> 00:35:39,720
- Hello
602
00:35:39,960 --> 00:35:41,250
- Yes
603
00:35:41,450 --> 00:35:47,070
- My meal was great thank you very much
604
00:35:47,410 --> 00:35:50,440
- No I still have some left and I think
I'm gonna be eating it later
605
00:35:50,710 --> 00:35:54,430
so you can just leave me alone for now.
606
00:35:54,830 --> 00:35:57,940
- Ok great thank you so much, have a good one bye.
607
00:36:01,200 --> 00:36:03,440
Let's fix that real quick.
608
00:36:05,740 --> 00:36:07,380
So another fun thing I was telling
Laura about this:
609
00:36:07,770 --> 00:36:09,410
all these new VOIP phones
610
00:36:09,660 --> 00:36:10,900
they have little computers in them
611
00:36:11,180 --> 00:36:13,390
and you can hot mike these
over the network,
612
00:36:13,590 --> 00:36:15,700
all the time even when
the receiver's down so...
613
00:36:16,310 --> 00:36:17,340
as long as it's plugged in
614
00:36:17,610 --> 00:36:18,520
it can be listening on.
615
00:36:18,930 --> 00:36:21,510
And I haven't even considered
that earlier. But yeah...
616
00:36:21,700 --> 00:36:22,380
- OK.
617
00:36:22,560 --> 00:36:24,270
- There are so many ways... This could be...
618
00:36:25,170 --> 00:36:26,660
Everything that's in here
is pretty much gonna be
619
00:36:26,980 --> 00:36:28,360
on the public record at some point.
620
00:36:28,570 --> 00:36:29,830
We should operate on that.
621
00:36:30,060 --> 00:36:31,720
- Yeah. Yeah, I think...
I think we are...
622
00:36:32,320 --> 00:36:34,090
- So, do you have your
air gapped machine with you?
623
00:36:34,310 --> 00:36:35,230
- I do, I do.
624
00:36:35,420 --> 00:36:36,530
- Let me pop that out.
625
00:36:40,130 --> 00:36:41,550
- Do you have an
understanding or commitment on
626
00:36:41,840 --> 00:36:44,150
when you guys are gonna
to press for the first stories?
627
00:36:44,880 --> 00:36:47,050
- It's very seven or eight
in the morning in London.
628
00:36:47,670 --> 00:36:48,700
- Uh uh, OK.
629
00:36:50,720 --> 00:36:53,940
Oh, let's see here.
630
00:37:00,460 --> 00:37:02,330
Ok, hey look there's another one.
631
00:37:04,410 --> 00:37:09,760
Pro tip, let's not leave the same SD cards
in our laptops forever in the future.
632
00:37:14,850 --> 00:37:18,020
- Did you know this was still
kicking around in your laptop?
633
00:37:18,580 --> 00:37:19,140
- Yeah, I mean that was the... mmh...
634
00:37:19,360 --> 00:37:20,270
- OK, just to make it sure.
635
00:37:21,430 --> 00:37:22,770
- OK, yeah. This is it?
636
00:37:22,950 --> 00:37:23,180
- Yeah.
637
00:37:23,570 --> 00:37:23,910
- OK.
638
00:37:24,200 --> 00:37:24,760
- Right there.
639
00:37:25,430 --> 00:37:27,810
- Thanks. You will have a new one
who will look exactly identical
640
00:37:28,020 --> 00:37:30,340
but it's a different archive.
So you might want to take
641
00:37:32,590 --> 00:37:35,900
Could you pass me my
magic mantle of power?
642
00:37:36,120 --> 00:37:37,560
- Uh uh...
643
00:37:44,280 --> 00:37:47,030
Is that about possibility of overhead?
644
00:37:47,510 --> 00:37:53,450
- Visual. yes,
Visual collection.
645
00:37:55,790 --> 00:37:57,200
I don't think at this point
there is anything in this regards
646
00:37:57,460 --> 00:37:59,200
that would shock us.
647
00:38:00,080 --> 00:38:02,330
We become pretty...
Ewen you once said before,
648
00:38:02,560 --> 00:38:04,830
he's like, he's like:
I'm never leaving my room,
649
00:38:05,010 --> 00:38:06,990
I'm never leaving anything
in my room again.
650
00:38:07,190 --> 00:38:08,040
And the single machine...
I was like
651
00:38:08,260 --> 00:38:12,780
you've been infected by the paranoia bug,
happens to all of us.
652
00:38:13,000 --> 00:38:15,760
He was like...
I would never leave a single of these device,
653
00:38:15,990 --> 00:38:17,940
and I would never leave my and again alone.
654
00:38:18,470 --> 00:38:19,790
- My bag's getting heavier and heavier
655
00:38:20,000 --> 00:38:20,790
- Exactly
656
00:38:26,180 --> 00:38:27,340
Alright, I'm gonna need you to enter
657
00:38:27,660 --> 00:38:31,910
your root password 'cause
I don't know what it is.
658
00:38:32,390 --> 00:38:35,160
If you wanna use this
you're more than welcome, so uh ..
659
00:38:35,500 --> 00:38:38,160
- OK, looks like your root
password's not 4 caracters long anyway.
660
00:38:38,350 --> 00:38:41,470
- it's usually a lot longer
but that's just like a one time only thing, right?
661
00:38:41,760 --> 00:38:43,370
- So, it is uh...
662
00:38:43,610 --> 00:38:46,800
- It had been a lot longer but ever since
I knew is that it was a one time only session,
663
00:38:47,240 --> 00:38:49,290
I've been making it shorter. Is that not good?
664
00:38:49,670 --> 00:38:53,200
- It's actually not. I was expressing this
with Laura either.
665
00:38:53,920 --> 00:38:55,840
The issue is because of the fact
it's got a hardware MAC address
666
00:38:56,100 --> 00:38:56,870
and things like that,
667
00:38:57,170 --> 00:39:01,630
and if people are able to identify
your machine and they're able to...
668
00:39:01,800 --> 00:39:03,810
- This is the fact you're about
to break the most upsetting story?
669
00:39:04,060 --> 00:39:05,120
- Yeah, that's true.
670
00:39:05,550 --> 00:39:06,740
- So they might kinda prioritize
671
00:39:07,120 --> 00:39:10,100
- It's ten letters I type very quickly.
Actually it's ten letters but...
672
00:39:10,380 --> 00:39:15,170
- So ten letters would be good
if they had to bruteforce the entire key space.
673
00:39:16,390 --> 00:39:19,570
That would still probably only take
a couple of days for NSA. Uh...
674
00:39:22,590 --> 00:39:26,970
That's a fire alarm, OK...
675
00:39:27,870 --> 00:39:32,310
- hopefully this just sounds like a 3 seconds test
or is this...
676
00:39:32,530 --> 00:39:37,460
Do you wanna to call the desk and ask? It's fine.
677
00:39:37,730 --> 00:39:40,280
- Yeah, I don't think it's an issue,
but it's interesting that I just.
678
00:39:40,470 --> 00:39:41,570
- did that happen before?
679
00:39:41,770 --> 00:39:45,900
- Maybe they got mad cause they couldn't listen
into us through the phone anymore.
680
00:39:46,750 --> 00:39:49,380
- Has the fire alarm gone off before?
681
00:39:49,740 --> 00:39:59,540
- No that's the first time that has happened.
Let me... so just in case they have like an alert
682
00:40:01,800 --> 00:40:02,950
- We probably...
683
00:40:03,150 --> 00:40:04,770
- We might have to evacuate.
684
00:40:04,990 --> 00:40:07,400
- Should we ignore that, I don't know?
685
00:40:07,690 --> 00:40:09,150
- It's not continuous.
686
00:40:09,400 --> 00:40:13,660
- It's not continuous.
No, I'm just saying if it continues...
687
00:40:17,620 --> 00:40:19,610
- And then we come and
meet the guys down in the lobby.
688
00:40:20,290 --> 00:40:20,890
- Yeah, alright.
689
00:40:21,180 --> 00:40:22,360
- Yeah.
690
00:40:23,150 --> 00:40:29,040
- Yeah let's, let's leave for now
when we'll have finished this up.
691
00:40:40,240 --> 00:40:42,820
Not that they're gonna answer 'cause
they probably have seven thousands calls.
692
00:40:43,030 --> 00:40:44,190
- Yeah.
693
00:40:46,980 --> 00:40:49,690
- Hi, we hear a loud buzzing on the tenth flour.
694
00:40:49,960 --> 00:40:51,160
Can you tell us what that is?
695
00:40:53,600 --> 00:40:54,400
Ah, OK.
696
00:40:55,210 --> 00:40:56,000
OK, great.
697
00:40:56,180 --> 00:40:57,400
Thank you, bye.
698
00:40:58,930 --> 00:41:01,040
Fire alarm testing, maintenance.
699
00:41:01,290 --> 00:41:03,030
- Yes. that's good,
that's what I wanted to hear.
700
00:41:05,150 --> 00:41:11,140
- Nice of them to...
Nice of them to let us know
701
00:41:12,830 --> 00:41:14,930
Uhm, I just wanna give you
kind of a quick tour, uh..
702
00:41:15,200 --> 00:41:17,370
when Laura was looking at this
she was kind of salivating...
703
00:41:17,710 --> 00:41:19,650
and couldn't stop like
actually reading these documents
704
00:41:20,070 --> 00:41:21,760
- Right, right.
So we'll try and restrain ourselves
705
00:41:22,000 --> 00:41:23,410
although I don't promise
that it will succeed.
706
00:41:23,870 --> 00:41:26,010
- I just wanna kinda explain
a brief overview
707
00:41:26,710 --> 00:41:28,560
of what these are
and how they're organized.
708
00:41:28,890 --> 00:41:30,900
On the beginning of
document of interest,
709
00:41:31,210 --> 00:41:33,590
the primary purposes of the second archive
is to bring the focus over to
710
00:41:33,840 --> 00:41:36,900
SSO as opposed to PRISM.
711
00:41:37,140 --> 00:41:40,470
This is in general.
SSO are the Special Source Operations.
712
00:41:41,030 --> 00:41:45,250
This is the world wide
passive collection on networks
713
00:41:45,710 --> 00:41:49,110
they're both domestic to the US
and international.
714
00:41:49,540 --> 00:41:51,650
There's a lot of
different ways they do it
715
00:41:51,900 --> 00:41:54,710
but, uh corporate partnerships
are one of the primary things,
716
00:41:54,910 --> 00:41:57,060
they do domestically
they also do this for multinationals
717
00:41:57,270 --> 00:41:59,520
that might be headquarted
in the US so they can kinda coerce
718
00:41:59,720 --> 00:42:01,740
or just pay into giving them access.
719
00:42:02,090 --> 00:42:05,220
And they also do bilaterally
with the assistance of certain governments.
720
00:42:05,840 --> 00:42:07,430
And that's based on the premise that they go
721
00:42:07,690 --> 00:42:10,990
"All right, we'll help you set the system up
if you give us all the data from it".
722
00:42:12,090 --> 00:42:16,590
Hum, there's... there's a lot more here
723
00:42:16,910 --> 00:42:19,010
than any one person
or probably one team could do.
724
00:42:19,200 --> 00:42:20,160
- Right
725
00:42:20,400 --> 00:42:22,290
Hum, XKEYSCORE Deep Dive.
726
00:42:22,700 --> 00:42:26,000
XKEYSCORE in general, and there's
a huge folder of documentation
727
00:42:26,200 --> 00:42:28,000
on XKEYSCORE and how it works,
728
00:42:28,810 --> 00:42:30,990
is the front-end system
that analysts use
729
00:42:33,420 --> 00:42:34,330
for querying that sort of ocean of raw singing
that I was telling you about.
730
00:42:34,730 --> 00:42:37,670
All that stuff where you can sort of
do the retroactive searches,
731
00:42:38,020 --> 00:42:39,820
live searches, get flagging, what not.
732
00:42:40,560 --> 00:42:42,940
XKEYSCORE is the front-end for that.
733
00:42:44,650 --> 00:42:48,480
I'm just gonna show you one slide here,
'cause Laura thought it was valuable
734
00:42:48,690 --> 00:42:53,090
on this talk on kinda
how these capabilities ramp up
735
00:42:53,300 --> 00:42:55,760
in sophistication over time.
736
00:42:56,230 --> 00:42:57,520
This is kinda nice.
737
00:42:57,840 --> 00:42:59,730
As of fiscal year 2011, they could monitor
738
00:43:00,120 --> 00:43:04,540
1 billion telephones and internet sessions simultanously,
739
00:43:04,800 --> 00:43:06,370
per one of these devices,
740
00:43:06,840 --> 00:43:11,710
and they can collect at a rate of 125 Gigabytes a second,
741
00:43:13,590 --> 00:43:14,590
which is a Terabit per second.
742
00:43:15,000 --> 00:43:15,710
- That's for each one of these?
743
00:43:15,970 --> 00:43:17,290
- That's for each one of these, yeah.
744
00:43:17,520 --> 00:43:19,940
- How many TUMULT missions would that be then?
745
00:43:20,140 --> 00:43:22,480
- Part of this, back then there were 20 sites,
746
00:43:22,850 --> 00:43:25,750
there's ten at DOD installations.
747
00:43:25,970 --> 00:43:28,720
But these are all outdated, we've expanded pretty rapidly.
748
00:43:31,350 --> 00:43:33,460
But still 20 sites, that's at least 20 billion.
749
00:43:33,720 --> 00:43:36,950
- This all need to get out.
You know what I mean, it's like...
750
00:43:37,330 --> 00:43:43,010
Just in terms of understanding,
the capabilities, it's so opaque.
751
00:43:43,320 --> 00:43:45,540
- It's not science fiction.
This stuff is happening right now.
752
00:43:45,820 --> 00:43:47,920
- No, that's what I mean, it's like...
The magnitude of it,
753
00:43:48,770 --> 00:43:52,990
and like this a pretty inaccessible
technical document.
754
00:43:53,830 --> 00:43:56,690
But, even this it's really chilling,
you know what I mean?
755
00:43:57,100 --> 00:43:59,710
Yeah, I mean, we should be having debates
756
00:44:00,180 --> 00:44:01,910
about whether we want Government
757
00:44:02,260 --> 00:44:05,750
I mean this is massive and extraordinary.
It's amazing...
758
00:44:06,670 --> 00:44:08,340
Even though you know it...
Even though you know that...
759
00:44:08,880 --> 00:44:12,280
to see it like the physical blueprints of it
760
00:44:12,640 --> 00:44:14,430
and sort of the technical expressions of it,
761
00:44:15,350 --> 00:44:19,485
brutally hits home like...
in a super visceral way that is so needed.
762
00:44:25,350 --> 00:44:26,580
This is CNN Breaking news
763
00:44:26,880 --> 00:44:30,420
An explosive new report is
re-igniting the concerns
764
00:44:30,710 --> 00:44:34,550
that your privacy is being violated
to protect America's "security".
765
00:44:34,970 --> 00:44:38,760
It reveals a court order giving
the National Security Agency
766
00:44:39,460 --> 00:44:42,170
blanket access to millions of
Verizon customer's records
767
00:44:42,450 --> 00:44:43,850
on a daily basis.
768
00:44:44,080 --> 00:44:46,110
Earlier I had the chance to
conduct the first TV interview
769
00:44:46,350 --> 00:44:48,650
with the reporter
who broke this story wide open,
770
00:44:49,090 --> 00:44:51,420
Glenn Greenwald, of The Guardian.
771
00:44:52,260 --> 00:44:53,420
Congratulations on the scoop!
772
00:44:53,710 --> 00:44:56,690
Explain for our viewers
why this is important?
773
00:44:58,310 --> 00:45:00,010
It's important because people have understood
774
00:45:00,240 --> 00:45:02,780
that the law that this was done under,
which is the Patriot Act
775
00:45:03,010 --> 00:45:04,620
enacted in the wake of 9/11.
776
00:45:05,000 --> 00:45:08,480
Was a law that allowed the government
very broad powers to get records
777
00:45:08,710 --> 00:45:14,060
about people with a lower level of suspicion
and probable cause to traditional standards.
778
00:45:14,270 --> 00:45:16,430
So it has always been assumed
that under the Patriot Act,
779
00:45:16,600 --> 00:45:18,850
if the government had even any suspicion
that you where involved
780
00:45:19,000 --> 00:45:22,270
in a crime or terrorism,
they could get a lot of information about you.
781
00:45:22,600 --> 00:45:25,500
What this court order does
that makes it so striking
782
00:45:25,750 --> 00:45:30,420
is that it's not directed at any individuals
who they believe or have suspicion of
783
00:45:30,680 --> 00:45:32,950
committing crime or a part of
a terrorist organization.
784
00:45:33,270 --> 00:45:37,980
It's collecting the phone records of
every single customer of Verizon business
785
00:45:38,410 --> 00:45:41,500
and finding out every single call
that they've made internationally and locally.
786
00:45:41,970 --> 00:45:45,390
So it's indiscriminant and it's sweeping.
It's a Government program designed
787
00:45:45,680 --> 00:45:47,400
to collect information about all Americans
788
00:45:47,730 --> 00:45:49,960
not just people
where they believe there is reason to think
789
00:45:50,180 --> 00:45:51,240
they've done anything wrong.
790
00:46:53,340 --> 00:46:54,530
It's a tough situation
791
00:46:54,780 --> 00:46:55,990
You know hearing that
792
00:46:56,200 --> 00:46:59,060
the person that you love
that you've spent the decade with
793
00:46:59,540 --> 00:47:01,210
may not be coming back.
794
00:47:06,060 --> 00:47:07,280
- What did they ask her?
795
00:47:08,960 --> 00:47:10,910
- Hum... When was the last time she saw me?
796
00:47:11,080 --> 00:47:12,380
Where am I?
797
00:47:12,690 --> 00:47:14,160
What am I doing?
798
00:47:14,400 --> 00:47:15,240
Hum.. you know.
799
00:47:15,440 --> 00:47:17,300
What does she know about my illness?
800
00:47:17,750 --> 00:47:18,820
Things like that.
801
00:47:22,050 --> 00:47:27,080
So yeah they're pretty solidly aware.
802
00:47:27,450 --> 00:47:29,260
Cause she's...
803
00:47:29,570 --> 00:47:32,420
I'm clearly not at home ill.
804
00:47:53,240 --> 00:47:55,190
- Hello, hello
805
00:47:56,590 --> 00:47:59,600
- Hello, let me disconnect
from the Internet.
806
00:48:04,000 --> 00:48:05,650
- So there is some news?
807
00:48:06,210 --> 00:48:07,780
- Yes there was indeed some news.
808
00:48:09,410 --> 00:48:12,300
- I have config today, I think,
maybe just a few hours ago.
809
00:48:12,810 --> 00:48:16,030
- What kind of people does it...?
810
00:48:18,130 --> 00:48:23,420
- An HR lady I'm assuming from NSA
as opposed to Booz Allen.
811
00:48:23,900 --> 00:48:25,450
Because she has was accompanied by a police officer
812
00:48:25,740 --> 00:48:28,800
which mean the NSA police
and they're planning to break into my house
813
00:48:29,190 --> 00:48:31,640
which regular police don't do.
814
00:48:31,860 --> 00:48:33,340
- Does she lives there?
815
00:48:33,610 --> 00:48:36,700
- Yeah she lives there so I told her to cooperate fully
816
00:48:37,270 --> 00:48:38,760
I can't find my phone just one second.
817
00:48:39,040 --> 00:48:40,300
and don't worry about herself
818
00:48:40,570 --> 00:48:42,700
You know what I gonna do,
I'll just take out the stuff I want to use.
819
00:48:42,950 --> 00:48:43,930
- OK
820
00:48:44,670 --> 00:48:47,290
- OK well look I mean this is not a surprise at all.
821
00:48:47,540 --> 00:48:50,500
- Not yeah I know I planned for it but it's just you know
when it's impacting
822
00:48:50,830 --> 00:48:52,900
and when they're talking to you
it's a little bit different.
823
00:48:53,170 --> 00:48:53,850
- Absolutely
824
00:48:55,860 --> 00:48:59,140
- But it's possible that they just noticed
that you're missing
825
00:48:59,330 --> 00:49:00,640
I guess it's not really possible.
826
00:49:00,850 --> 00:49:05,760
- It is but yeah they're I mean
827
00:49:08,750 --> 00:49:10,840
Hum... let me just get rid of this.
828
00:49:12,840 --> 00:49:16,810
So I obviously was focused on other things
than appearance this morning.
829
00:49:19,010 --> 00:49:21,930
- How was she? How does she reacted?
Was she relatively calm about it?
830
00:49:22,110 --> 00:49:23,310
- She's relatively calm.
831
00:49:23,600 --> 00:49:25,180
- Does she know anything about what you're doing?
832
00:49:25,470 --> 00:49:27,510
- She has, she has no idea
833
00:49:27,970 --> 00:49:31,550
and that's I mean I feel badly about that
834
00:49:31,780 --> 00:49:33,590
but that's the only way I could think of where
835
00:49:33,920 --> 00:49:36,040
like she can't be in trouble.
836
00:49:36,240 --> 00:49:37,900
- Did you just basically do a
"I have to go somewhere for reasons
837
00:49:38,170 --> 00:49:39,750
that I can't tell you about" kind of thing?
838
00:49:39,980 --> 00:49:42,140
- I just disappeared when she was on vacation
839
00:49:42,550 --> 00:49:44,770
and I left a note saying
840
00:49:44,960 --> 00:49:47,020
"Hey I'm gonna be away for a while for work"
841
00:49:47,240 --> 00:49:49,260
which isn't unusual for me in my business
842
00:49:49,760 --> 00:49:50,320
- Right
843
00:49:50,570 --> 00:49:51,140
you know so
844
00:49:51,380 --> 00:49:53,620
- OK so let me ask a couple things just quickly.
845
00:49:53,840 --> 00:49:57,050
Are they gonna be able to go into your stuff
and figure out what you took?
846
00:49:59,940 --> 00:50:06,460
- Hum in some kind of some sort of like
peripheral sense but not necessarily
847
00:50:06,970 --> 00:50:10,610
- Yes because I cast such a wide net
848
00:50:10,850 --> 00:50:12,900
I they do that the only thing they're gonna do
is they're gonna have a heart attack
849
00:50:13,120 --> 00:50:14,960
because they're gonna go
"He had access to everything"
850
00:50:15,220 --> 00:50:15,680
- Yeah
851
00:50:15,940 --> 00:50:19,130
and they not gonna know what
specifically has been done.
852
00:50:19,410 --> 00:50:22,240
I think they're gonna start to actually feel a little better
853
00:50:22,540 --> 00:50:26,070
although they're not gonna be wild about this in any case.
854
00:50:26,530 --> 00:50:29,540
When they see that the stories are kind of cleaving to a trend
855
00:50:29,940 --> 00:50:30,730
you know it's not like
856
00:50:31,000 --> 00:50:32,940
"Here is the list of everybody who works everywhere"
857
00:50:33,170 --> 00:50:33,960
- Right
858
00:50:34,240 --> 00:50:36,870
- I also think you know there're gonna be
paranoid in the extreme
859
00:50:37,230 --> 00:50:39,020
and assuming all kind of
worst case scenarios
860
00:50:40,570 --> 00:50:42,010
which is gonna you know I think
861
00:50:42,310 --> 00:50:46,550
make them react in ways that probably aren't like
gonna be particularly
862
00:50:46,920 --> 00:50:48,880
rational on their part
863
00:50:49,960 --> 00:50:52,630
but at the same time there's...
I do think they're limited
864
00:50:52,830 --> 00:50:53,970
for the moment.
865
00:50:54,190 --> 00:50:58,440
- I agree and I mean,
I had kind of time to set a stage where
866
00:50:58,770 --> 00:51:00,920
we all enjoy at least a minimum
level of protection you know
867
00:51:01,150 --> 00:51:03,710
no matter who we are who's involved in this
you know you're either a journalist
868
00:51:03,960 --> 00:51:04,540
- Right
869
00:51:04,730 --> 00:51:06,030
or you're either out of jurisdiction
870
00:51:06,260 --> 00:51:08,740
so we have some time to play this
before they can really get nasty.
871
00:51:08,940 --> 00:51:11,230
I think it's over you know the weeks
when they have times to get lawyers,
872
00:51:11,670 --> 00:51:12,920
really sort of go
873
00:51:13,090 --> 00:51:16,790
"This is a special situation
how can we interpret this to our advantage?"
874
00:51:17,320 --> 00:51:18,710
like we seen them do this all the time you know
875
00:51:19,130 --> 00:51:21,480
whether it's drones or wiretapping
or whatever they'll go.
876
00:51:21,910 --> 00:51:24,960
Well according to this law
from the 1840's you know
877
00:51:25,310 --> 00:51:26,410
- Yeah yeah of course
878
00:51:26,610 --> 00:51:27,340
we can apply x, y to the Authority.
879
00:51:27,620 --> 00:51:29,540
But that takes time and that takes agreement.
880
00:51:29,770 --> 00:51:31,580
Yeah and also you know I mean I think
881
00:51:31,880 --> 00:51:34,290
the more public we are out there
to like as journalists
882
00:51:35,210 --> 00:51:37,560
and the more protection
it's gonna give as well.
883
00:51:38,670 --> 00:51:42,180
- Have you started to give thoughts
to when you're ready to come forward?
884
00:51:42,750 --> 00:51:48,430
- I'm ready whenever huh honestly
I think there is sort of an agreement
885
00:51:48,750 --> 00:51:51,100
that it's not going to bias
the reporting process.
886
00:51:51,400 --> 00:51:52,310
That's my primary concern at this point.
887
00:51:52,550 --> 00:51:56,090
I don't want to get myself into the issue
before it's gonna happen anyway
888
00:51:56,660 --> 00:51:59,110
and where it takes away
for the stories that are getting out.
889
00:52:38,040 --> 00:52:40,035
We're talking about tens of millions
of Americans
890
00:52:41,820 --> 00:52:43,060
who weren't suspected of doing anything
891
00:52:43,640 --> 00:52:45,190
who were surveilled in this way.
892
00:52:45,510 --> 00:52:47,780
...thoughts for a moment, I want to
continue this conversation,
893
00:52:48,030 --> 00:52:49,600
these are really important sensitive issues
894
00:52:50,090 --> 00:52:53,170
and the public out there has the right
to know what's going on... Stand by...
895
00:52:53,470 --> 00:52:56,020
This is CNN breaking news
896
00:52:56,570 --> 00:53:00,820
Another explosive article has just appeared
this time in the Washington Post
897
00:53:01,330 --> 00:53:06,380
it's breaking news and it reveals another
broad and secret US government surveillance program.
898
00:53:06,860 --> 00:53:11,650
The Washington Post and The Guardian in London
reporting that the NSA and the FBI
899
00:53:12,040 --> 00:53:17,070
are tapping directly into the
central servers of nine leading Internet companies
900
00:53:17,510 --> 00:53:23,120
including Microsoft, Yahoo, Google,
Facebook, AOL, Skype, YouTube and Apple.
901
00:53:23,420 --> 00:53:27,830
Reports says they're extracting audio,
video, photographs, e-mails, documents
902
00:53:28,370 --> 00:53:33,990
and connection logs that enable analysts
to track a person's movements and context over time.
903
00:53:35,570 --> 00:53:38,400
Let's discuss this latest revelation
that coming out fast,
904
00:53:38,790 --> 00:53:41,180
Bill Binney, the formal official of the NSA
905
00:53:41,420 --> 00:53:44,310
who quit back in 2001, you were angry about
what was going on
906
00:53:44,710 --> 00:53:46,410
you've been known as
a whistleblower right now.
907
00:53:46,720 --> 00:53:48,590
- Bill, what do you think about
this Washington Post story?
908
00:53:49,070 --> 00:53:52,060
- Well, I assume it's just the continuation
of what they've been doing all along.
909
00:53:52,340 --> 00:53:53,200
- So you're not surprised?
910
00:53:53,640 --> 00:53:54,260
- No
911
00:53:54,420 --> 00:53:55,990
- Do you have any idea who's leaking this information?
912
00:53:56,260 --> 00:53:58,090
- I don't know who leaked this,
913
00:53:58,400 --> 00:54:01,460
I have no doubt that the administration will
launch an investigation
914
00:54:02,460 --> 00:54:06,500
not into who approved these programs
but into who leaked the information.
915
00:54:07,240 --> 00:54:10,550
I'm not shocked they come to denying it, I don't assume that...
916
00:54:10,780 --> 00:54:11,770
- Do you believe it?
917
00:54:12,160 --> 00:54:15,100
- There're maybe some technical basis on which
they can say that we are not
918
00:54:15,470 --> 00:54:19,590
actively collaborating or they don't have
what we consider in our definition
919
00:54:19,890 --> 00:54:23,000
to be direct access to our servers
but what I do know is that I've talked to
920
00:54:23,500 --> 00:54:25,110
more that one person
921
00:54:25,460 --> 00:54:30,010
who has sat at a desk at a web portal
and typed out commands
922
00:54:30,390 --> 00:54:32,920
and reached into those servers
from a distance.
923
00:54:33,730 --> 00:54:35,690
So, whatever they want to call that,
that's what's happening.
924
00:54:36,120 --> 00:54:40,080
Hold on, what are we calling the
single biggest infringement on American civil liberties
925
00:54:40,490 --> 00:54:42,050
probably of all time, isn't it?
926
00:54:42,610 --> 00:54:46,530
- ...we already have the New York Times now today
saying that the Administration has lost all credibility.
927
00:54:47,320 --> 00:54:48,700
- The New York Times slammed
President Obama for this
928
00:54:49,100 --> 00:54:50,090
and frankly I was used to that
929
00:54:50,410 --> 00:54:53,560
the New York Times used to slam George Bush
for protecting the country for the steps he took.
930
00:54:53,960 --> 00:54:55,220
I don't want us to drop our guard.
931
00:54:55,620 --> 00:54:58,400
I don't want us to be struck again as we saw in Boston,
932
00:54:58,650 --> 00:54:59,660
I understand,
933
00:54:59,990 --> 00:55:03,790
people are willing to sacrifice their
civil liberties, people are sheltered inside which is enough...
934
00:55:04,050 --> 00:55:05,350
- How can you believe in freedom, do you see?
935
00:55:05,620 --> 00:55:08,420
I mean try and play the devil's advocate for me,
when you have secret courts,
936
00:55:08,810 --> 00:55:13,170
secret operations like PRISM, secret investigations which go into
937
00:55:13,560 --> 00:55:17,590
every spit and cough of every American's lives without any Member
of the American public
938
00:55:17,980 --> 00:55:19,590
knowing about it. That's not freedom is it?
939
00:55:19,800 --> 00:55:23,850
- In 2008, they eliminated the
warrant requirement for all conversations
940
00:55:24,190 --> 00:55:26,840
except ones that takes place
by and among Americans
941
00:55:27,250 --> 00:55:28,960
exclusively on America's soil.
942
00:55:29,280 --> 00:55:32,280
So they don't need warrants now for people
who are foreigners
943
00:55:32,680 --> 00:55:35,630
outside of the US but they also don't need
warrants for Americans
944
00:55:36,010 --> 00:55:37,980
who are in the United States
communicating with people
945
00:55:38,470 --> 00:55:40,550
reasonably believed to be
outside of the US.
946
00:55:40,990 --> 00:55:45,610
So again, the fact that there are no checks,
no oversight about who's looking over the NSA's shoulder,
947
00:55:45,930 --> 00:55:48,580
means that they can take whatever they want
and the fact that it's all behind a wall
948
00:55:48,850 --> 00:55:51,990
of secrecy and they threaten people
who want to expose it
949
00:55:52,330 --> 00:55:55,400
means that whatever they're doing
even violating the law
950
00:55:55,780 --> 00:55:58,330
is something we're unlikely to know
until we start having real investigations
951
00:55:58,760 --> 00:56:02,270
and real transparency into
what it is the government is doing.
952
00:56:02,640 --> 00:56:06,170
Glenn Greenwald, congratulations again
on exposing what is a true scandal,
953
00:56:06,450 --> 00:56:07,630
I appreciate you joining me.
954
00:56:56,350 --> 00:57:01,760
Hey I just heard from Lindsay and huh...
she's still alive, which is good and free.
955
00:57:03,160 --> 00:57:06,690
My rent checks apparently are no longer
getting through to my landlord
956
00:57:07,200 --> 00:57:11,200
so they said if we don't pay them
in five days we will be evicted,
957
00:57:12,000 --> 00:57:15,760
which is strange because I got a system
set up that automatically pays them.
958
00:57:18,060 --> 00:57:21,080
So there is that apparently there is
construction trucks all over the street
959
00:57:24,800 --> 00:57:30,750
of my house, so that's, I wonder
what they're looking for.
960
00:58:12,730 --> 00:58:17,680
It is... It is an unusual feeling
that's kind of hard to...
961
00:58:19,790 --> 00:58:23,260
hard to like, describe or convey in words
but not knowing what's gonna happen
962
00:58:23,960 --> 00:58:26,540
in the next days, the next hour
or the next week
963
00:58:27,850 --> 00:58:30,810
it's scary but at the same time
it's liberating, you know,
964
00:58:32,560 --> 00:58:34,460
the planning comes a lot easier
because you don't have
965
00:58:34,700 --> 00:58:37,760
that many variables to take into plate,
you can only act, and then act again.
966
00:58:39,180 --> 00:58:41,300
Now all these phone calls
are being recorded digitally
967
00:58:41,780 --> 00:58:44,170
not for content but
for origin and destination
968
00:58:44,550 --> 00:58:48,320
now word the government is going right into
the servers of these large Internet companies.
969
00:58:49,110 --> 00:58:53,080
- How does the government politically speaking
make the argument that this is essential
970
00:58:53,490 --> 00:58:55,920
to National Security and not
a dramatic overreach
971
00:58:56,650 --> 00:58:58,870
in terms of personal privacy?
972
00:58:59,150 --> 00:59:02,170
- It's difficult Matt, because
as Peter was pointing out, overnight
973
00:59:03,220 --> 00:59:05,970
we had an extraordinary late night
close to midnight announcement
974
00:59:06,240 --> 00:59:08,680
and a declassification from the
Director of National Intelligence.
975
00:59:09,240 --> 00:59:12,890
They are scrambling, the Administration is
already supported strongly by leaders
976
00:59:13,280 --> 00:59:15,260
in both parties from the
Intelligence Committees.
977
00:59:15,750 --> 00:59:21,120
GCHQ has an internal Wikipedia at the top secret
you know, super classified level
978
00:59:22,170 --> 00:59:24,350
where anybody working intelligence
can work on anything they want.
979
00:59:25,430 --> 00:59:29,900
That's what this is, I'm giving it to you,
you can make the decision on that what's appropriate what's not.
980
00:59:30,210 --> 00:59:32,050
Hum it's gonna be documents of,
you know, different types,
981
00:59:32,420 --> 00:59:35,240
pictures and Power Points and Word documents.
Stuff like that ...
982
00:59:35,790 --> 00:59:37,040
- Sorry can I take that seat?
983
00:59:37,290 --> 00:59:38,250
- Yeah
984
00:59:40,660 --> 00:59:44,360
- Sorry, I'm sorry I've got used to repeat,
so in these documents, they will show...
985
00:59:44,590 --> 00:59:46,290
- Yeah there will be
a couple more documents on that,
986
00:59:46,590 --> 00:59:49,490
that's only one part though,
like it talks about Tempora
987
00:59:49,750 --> 00:59:52,280
and a little more thing
that's the wiki article itself.
988
00:59:53,330 --> 00:59:59,250
It was also talking about a self-developed tool
called UDAQ U.D.A.Q. it's their search tool
989
00:59:59,490 --> 01:00:01,840
for all the stuff they collect
was what it looked like.
990
01:00:02,140 --> 01:00:02,530
- Yeah
991
01:00:02,980 --> 01:00:05,540
- Hum it's gonna be projects,
it's gonna be troubleshooting pages
992
01:00:05,750 --> 01:00:07,080
for a particular tool.
993
01:00:07,330 --> 01:00:08,010
- Thanks
994
01:00:08,700 --> 01:00:12,500
- And, the next step,
when do you think you'll go public?
995
01:00:13,180 --> 01:00:17,850
- Arh... I think it's pretty soon,
I mean, with the reaction, this escalated more quickly,
996
01:00:18,170 --> 01:00:20,900
I think pretty much as soon as they
start trying to make this about me
997
01:00:21,270 --> 01:00:22,630
which should be any day now.
998
01:00:22,850 --> 01:00:23,480
- Yeah
999
01:00:24,090 --> 01:00:29,160
- Hum I'll come out just to go hey,
you know, this is not a question of
1000
01:00:29,640 --> 01:00:32,500
somebody skulking around in the shadows.
These are public issues,
1001
01:00:32,890 --> 01:00:35,680
these are not my issues
you know these are everybody's issues,
1002
01:00:36,630 --> 01:00:39,650
I'm not afraid of you, you know,
you're not gonna bully me in the silence
1003
01:00:39,920 --> 01:00:41,680
like you've done to everybody else
1004
01:00:42,270 --> 01:00:43,730
and if no body else is gonna do it I will
1005
01:00:44,910 --> 01:00:47,000
and hopefully when I'm gone
whatever you do to me,
1006
01:00:47,390 --> 01:00:49,180
there will be somebody else
who will do the same thing.
1007
01:00:50,310 --> 01:00:52,410
It will be the sort of Internet principle
you know, of the Hydra:
1008
01:00:53,800 --> 01:00:56,360
you can stop one person
but there is gonna be seven more of us.
1009
01:00:56,630 --> 01:00:57,640
- Yeah
1010
01:01:00,700 --> 01:01:02,460
Are you getting more nervous?
1011
01:01:05,560 --> 01:01:11,180
- I mean... no. I think the way
I look at stress... particularly because
1012
01:01:12,400 --> 01:01:18,000
I sort of knew this was coming...
because I sort of volunteered to walk into it.
1013
01:01:21,790 --> 01:01:25,640
I'm already sort of familiar with the idea.
1014
01:01:25,830 --> 01:01:26,910
I'm not worried about it.
1015
01:01:27,230 --> 01:01:29,180
When somebody like
busts in the door suddenly
1016
01:01:29,380 --> 01:01:30,100
I'll get nervous and it'll affect me
but until they do, you know...
1017
01:01:31,010 --> 01:01:31,480
- Yeah, yeah.
1018
01:01:31,660 --> 01:01:34,130
But until they do umm... you know.
1019
01:01:34,340 --> 01:01:37,340
I'm eating a little less
that's the only difference I think.
1020
01:01:46,170 --> 01:01:48,640
- Let's talk about the issue with when we're gonna say
who you are.
1021
01:01:48,850 --> 01:01:49,400
- Yeah
1022
01:01:49,680 --> 01:01:54,420
- This is, you know, you have to talk me through this
because I have a big worry about this.
1023
01:01:54,610 --> 01:01:55,430
- OK tell me
1024
01:01:55,950 --> 01:01:59,010
- Which is that...
if we come out and
1025
01:02:00,190 --> 01:02:04,620
I know that you believe
that your detection is inevitable
1026
01:02:04,980 --> 01:02:06,740
and that it's inevitable imminently.
1027
01:02:07,570 --> 01:02:09,900
There is, you know, in the New York Times
today Charlie Savage the fascinating
1028
01:02:10,650 --> 01:02:13,150
Sherlock Holmes of political reporting deduced that
1029
01:02:14,330 --> 01:02:15,980
the fact that there has been these leaks in succession
1030
01:02:16,200 --> 01:02:18,610
probably means that there's some one person
that decided to leak...
1031
01:02:18,840 --> 01:02:20,970
- Somebody else quoted you saying
it was one of your readers
1032
01:02:21,280 --> 01:02:21,780
- Yeah
1033
01:02:22,320 --> 01:02:23,390
- And somebody else is putting on things
1034
01:02:23,670 --> 01:02:27,600
- Yeah so you know, I mean it's fine
I want people to, I wanted to be like
1035
01:02:27,970 --> 01:02:28,440
- Yeah
1036
01:02:28,690 --> 01:02:31,380
- You know like this is a person,
I want to start introducing the concept of
1037
01:02:31,600 --> 01:02:35,010
this is a person who has a particular set
of political objectives
1038
01:02:35,370 --> 01:02:37,270
about informing the world about
what's taking place.
1039
01:02:37,710 --> 01:02:40,980
Like you know,
I'm keeping it all anonymous totally
1040
01:02:41,200 --> 01:02:44,770
but I want to start introducing you
in that kind of incremental way.
1041
01:02:45,930 --> 01:02:47,110
But here's the thing.
1042
01:02:47,580 --> 01:02:50,290
What I'm concerned about it
that if come out and say
1043
01:02:50,570 --> 01:02:52,660
here's who this is, here's what he did
the whole thing
1044
01:02:52,890 --> 01:02:53,720
that we talked about.
1045
01:02:54,730 --> 01:02:56,170
Then we're gonna basically be doing
the government's work for them
1046
01:02:56,750 --> 01:02:59,570
and we're gonna basically be handing them
you know a confession
1047
01:03:01,600 --> 01:03:03,600
and helping them identify who find it.
1048
01:03:04,120 --> 01:03:06,890
I mean maybe you're right,
maybe they'll find out quickly
1049
01:03:07,140 --> 01:03:09,600
and maybe they'll know but is there
any possible idea that they won't?
1050
01:03:10,060 --> 01:03:13,170
Are we kind of giving them stuff
that we don't...? Or...
1051
01:03:14,470 --> 01:03:16,530
- It's possible that they already know
but they don't want to reveal
1052
01:03:16,880 --> 01:03:18,740
it because they don't know...
1053
01:03:19,020 --> 01:03:20,250
- Or that they don't know
and we're gonna be telling them like
1054
01:03:20,300 --> 01:03:23,700
is it a possibility that
they're gonna need like 2 3 months or uncertainty
1055
01:03:24,010 --> 01:03:25,710
and we're gonna be
solving their problem for them?
1056
01:03:26,120 --> 01:03:29,390
or let me just say the or part
maybe it doesn't matter to you,
1057
01:03:29,650 --> 01:03:32,370
maybe you want it, maybe, I mean,
1058
01:03:32,720 --> 01:03:34,430
you're not coming out because
1059
01:03:34,670 --> 01:03:36,530
you think inevitably
they're gonna catch you
1060
01:03:37,010 --> 01:03:38,110
and you want to do it first,
1061
01:03:38,710 --> 01:03:40,460
you're coming out because
you want to fucking come out and...
1062
01:03:40,820 --> 01:03:42,710
- Oh there is that,
I mean that's the thing,
1063
01:03:43,180 --> 01:03:45,140
I don't want to hide on this
and skulk around,
1064
01:03:45,610 --> 01:03:46,760
I don't think I should have to
1065
01:03:47,610 --> 01:03:49,190
obviously there is circumstances
that are saying that.
1066
01:03:49,980 --> 01:03:52,120
I think it is powerful
to come out and be like
1067
01:03:52,550 --> 01:03:56,050
look I'm not afraid and I don't think
other people should either,
1068
01:03:56,300 --> 01:03:59,090
you know, I was sitting
in the office right next to you last week,
1069
01:03:59,430 --> 01:04:01,900
we all have a stake in this,
this is our country
1070
01:04:02,810 --> 01:04:06,030
and the balance of power
between the citizenry and the government
1071
01:04:06,860 --> 01:04:08,950
is becoming that
of the ruling and the ruled
1072
01:04:09,270 --> 01:04:12,890
as opposed to actually, you know,
the elected and the electorate.
1073
01:04:13,380 --> 01:04:16,250
- OK so that's what I need to hear,
that this is not about...
1074
01:04:17,310 --> 01:04:20,520
- But I do want to say,
I don't think there is a case
1075
01:04:20,820 --> 01:04:23,870
that I'm not gonna be discovered,
in the fullness of time.
1076
01:04:24,360 --> 01:04:25,510
It's just a question of time for me.
1077
01:04:25,770 --> 01:04:27,230
You're right, it could take them
a long time, I don't think it will
1078
01:04:28,390 --> 01:04:31,870
but I didn't try to hide the footprint
because again I intended to come forward.
1079
01:04:32,410 --> 01:04:36,630
- OK I'm gonna post this morning
just a general defense of whistleblowers
1080
01:04:36,950 --> 01:04:40,070
and you in particular
without saying anything about you.
1081
01:04:40,410 --> 01:04:41,420
I'm gonna go post
that right when I get back
1082
01:04:42,120 --> 01:04:44,190
and I'm also doing like a big fuck you
to all the people who keep like talking
1083
01:04:44,580 --> 01:04:47,490
about investigations like that.
I want that to be like...
1084
01:04:48,480 --> 01:04:51,190
the fearlessness and the fuck you to like
the bullying tactics,
1085
01:04:52,890 --> 01:04:55,490
has go to be completely preventing
every thing we do.
1086
01:04:55,760 --> 01:04:58,350
- I think that's brilliant.
I mean your principles on this I love,
1087
01:04:58,650 --> 01:05:03,030
I can't support them enough because it is,
it's inverting the model
1088
01:05:03,450 --> 01:05:05,500
of the government has laid out
where people where trying to,
1089
01:05:06,020 --> 01:05:08,380
you know, say the truth, skulk around,
and then hide in the dark,
1090
01:05:08,840 --> 01:05:11,890
and then quote anonymously.
I say yes, fuck that, let's just...
1091
01:05:12,520 --> 01:05:15,930
- OK, so here is the plan then,
I mean, and this is a thing, it's like
1092
01:05:16,290 --> 01:05:19,470
once, I think we all just felt the fact
that this is the right way to do it.
1093
01:05:20,350 --> 01:05:23,030
You feel the power of your choice,
you know what I mean,
1094
01:05:23,390 --> 01:05:25,780
it's like I want that power
to be felt in the world.
1095
01:05:25,980 --> 01:05:26,580
- OK
1096
01:05:27,430 --> 01:05:30,000
- and it is the...
it's the ultimate standing up to them
1097
01:05:30,260 --> 01:05:33,390
right like I'm not gonna fucking hide
even for one second,
1098
01:05:34,570 --> 01:05:36,090
I'm gonna get right in your face,
1099
01:05:36,390 --> 01:05:38,790
you don't have to investigate,
there's nothing to investigate,
1100
01:05:39,020 --> 01:05:40,400
here I am!
1101
01:05:40,720 --> 01:05:44,050
You know, and I think that
is just incredibly powerful,
1102
01:05:44,810 --> 01:05:46,160
and then the question just becomes
1103
01:05:46,700 --> 01:05:48,750
how do we do this in the right,
you know the perfect way,
1104
01:05:49,060 --> 01:05:51,820
that's my burden and
that's what I'm gonna spend...
1105
01:05:52,280 --> 01:05:54,150
So today it's gonna be
this story in the morning,
1106
01:05:54,440 --> 01:05:56,380
assuming that
it doesn't change in The Guardian,
1107
01:05:56,620 --> 01:05:57,730
it's gonna be this story in the morning,
1108
01:05:57,890 --> 01:06:00,820
just to keep the mental going,
just to keep like the disclosures coming.
1109
01:06:01,240 --> 01:06:03,930
A big one at night, now it's becoming like
1110
01:06:04,280 --> 01:06:06,730
"OK, this is a major leak"
1111
01:06:06,970 --> 01:06:09,260
and after today when we post
the two stuff things that we're gonna post.
1112
01:06:10,050 --> 01:06:14,390
It's gonna be
"what the fuck is this leak and who did it?"
1113
01:06:14,660 --> 01:06:15,730
I guarantee you.
1114
01:06:25,530 --> 01:06:27,910
I just want to make sure,
move over slightly...
1115
01:06:28,160 --> 01:06:29,420
- Do you want me to move
a little move over...
1116
01:06:29,990 --> 01:06:31,200
- I just wanna move... all right
1117
01:06:32,460 --> 01:06:35,370
- OK
1118
01:06:35,600 --> 01:06:36,230
- We are ready
1119
01:06:36,450 --> 01:06:37,650
- So let's us begin with some basic
1120
01:06:37,850 --> 01:06:39,050
background information like
1121
01:06:39,510 --> 01:06:40,350
just state your name,
1122
01:06:40,920 --> 01:06:42,900
what position you held
in intelligence community
1123
01:06:43,170 --> 01:06:45,200
and how long you worked
within that community
1124
01:06:46,850 --> 01:06:50,120
- OK, uh... just some...
how are we going, like,
1125
01:06:50,600 --> 01:06:51,470
in depth or
are we going like in general,
1126
01:06:51,750 --> 01:06:53,530
like I'm currently
an infrastructure analyst, you know,
1127
01:06:53,830 --> 01:06:56,190
Booz Allen Hamilton,
not going through my whole back story
1128
01:06:56,630 --> 01:06:57,020
- Yes
1129
01:06:57,250 --> 01:06:57,830
- OK,
1130
01:06:58,050 --> 01:06:59,060
- Just like summary kind of
1131
01:06:59,290 --> 01:06:59,920
- OK
1132
01:07:00,170 --> 01:07:03,040
- My Name is Ed Snowden,
I'm 29 years old,
1133
01:07:03,950 --> 01:07:07,070
I work for Booz Allen Hamilton
as an infrastructure analyst
1134
01:07:07,290 --> 01:07:09,550
for NSA in Hawaii.
1135
01:07:10,920 --> 01:07:13,480
- And what are some of the positions
that you held previously
1136
01:07:13,880 --> 01:07:15,260
within the intelligence community?
1137
01:07:15,470 --> 01:07:18,870
- I've been a system engineer,
system administrator, uh...
1138
01:07:20,270 --> 01:07:25,240
senior advisor, uh...
for the, Central Intelligence Agency,
1139
01:07:25,550 --> 01:07:29,120
solutions consultant and a
telecommunications information
1140
01:07:29,330 --> 01:07:31,080
systems officer.
1141
01:07:32,080 --> 01:07:34,380
- And what kind of clearances have...
have you held,
1142
01:07:34,560 --> 01:07:35,780
what kinda classification?
1143
01:07:36,710 --> 01:07:38,770
- Uh... Top secret,
1144
01:07:42,010 --> 01:07:45,090
So, people in my levels of access
for systems administration
1145
01:07:45,730 --> 01:07:50,050
or as a infrastructure analyst
typically have higher accesses
1146
01:07:50,700 --> 01:07:53,600
than an NSA employee would normally have.
1147
01:07:54,050 --> 01:07:56,870
Normal NSA employees have a
combination of clearances called
1148
01:07:57,670 --> 01:08:01,080
TS SI TK and Gamma.
1149
01:08:02,560 --> 01:08:06,380
Uh, that's a Top Secret Signals
Intelligence Talent Keyhole
1150
01:08:06,800 --> 01:08:07,680
and Gamma.
1151
01:08:07,960 --> 01:08:11,580
And they all relate to certain things
that are sort of core to the NSA mission.
1152
01:08:12,610 --> 01:08:15,540
As a systems administrator
you get a special clearance
1153
01:08:15,870 --> 01:08:18,250
called PrivAcc
for Privileged Access,
1154
01:08:18,630 --> 01:08:22,440
which allows you to be exposed
to informations of any classification
1155
01:08:22,730 --> 01:08:25,560
regardless of what
your position actually needs.
1156
01:08:42,550 --> 01:08:48,180
Monday
1157
01:08:48,410 --> 01:08:51,090
June 10, 2013
1158
01:09:00,530 --> 01:09:02,380
Just before we go,
a remind of our top story,
1159
01:09:02,620 --> 01:09:05,740
and that's the full map,
CIA typically worked at Edward Snowden
1160
01:09:06,100 --> 01:09:11,360
says he's responsible for leaking information
that US authorities have been monitoring
1161
01:09:11,760 --> 01:09:13,750
phone and Internet data.
1162
01:09:14,340 --> 01:09:17,000
The US justice deparment confirmed
it is the first stages
1163
01:09:17,630 --> 01:09:19,510
of a criminal investigation.
1164
01:09:19,750 --> 01:09:22,060
- Leave it long or got it shorter,
what do you think?
1165
01:09:22,420 --> 01:09:25,270
As far as the video the people saw.
Am I less identifiable now?
1166
01:09:25,530 --> 01:09:26,050
- lose it?
1167
01:09:26,250 --> 01:09:29,740
- lose it? Cause I can't go
all the way down, it's still gonna be stubble.
1168
01:09:29,980 --> 01:09:32,230
I don't have the blade for closer.
1169
01:09:34,510 --> 01:09:36,890
- Will you be talking
to any other media about this story today?
1170
01:09:37,730 --> 01:09:38,430
- I am.
1171
01:09:39,780 --> 01:09:40,780
- Uh, will you be coming to our office
1172
01:09:41,250 --> 01:09:43,800
- ... about where is Snowden now, what his plans are?
1173
01:09:44,700 --> 01:09:47,010
- No, I won't talk about that,
so unless you have any other questions...
1174
01:09:47,250 --> 01:09:47,710
- OK
1175
01:09:48,130 --> 01:09:51,250
- What are you plans please?
Are you staying in Hong Kong
1176
01:09:51,450 --> 01:09:52,260
for a the time being?
1177
01:09:52,510 --> 01:09:53,240
- For a little while.
1178
01:09:53,470 --> 01:09:56,080
- And do you have any hopes
to write more about this story
1179
01:09:56,330 --> 01:09:58,480
or are you stopping
new writing about this story?
1180
01:09:58,690 --> 01:09:59,830
- No, I'm gonna continue
to write about it.
1181
01:10:00,260 --> 01:10:02,060
- Have you had any pressure
from the US Authorities
1182
01:10:02,280 --> 01:10:03,760
about continuing to report on this?
1183
01:10:03,940 --> 01:10:04,660
- No.
1184
01:10:05,190 --> 01:10:07,220
- And have you heard anything about
what could be...
1185
01:10:07,470 --> 01:10:11,250
asked you the Hong Kong Authorities
towards this case,
1186
01:10:11,520 --> 01:10:14,590
whether they contacted you or asked you
anything about the whereabouts of Snowden
1187
01:10:15,300 --> 01:10:16,540
and whether that's just another...
1188
01:10:17,070 --> 01:10:19,790
- I haven't heard about
the Authorities of any Government.
1189
01:10:21,000 --> 01:10:23,450
- And do, where do you think
this story is going then?
1190
01:10:23,780 --> 01:10:27,790
For you and of course for Snowden
and of course for the US media
1191
01:10:27,980 --> 01:10:29,410
and the US Administration in general?
1192
01:10:29,640 --> 01:10:31,110
- Uh, for me, I'm gonna continue to report.
1193
01:10:31,930 --> 01:10:36,240
Reporting on what the Government has been doing
and what I think people should know about.
1194
01:10:36,910 --> 01:10:38,810
As for him I don't think anyone knows
1195
01:10:39,680 --> 01:10:45,070
... people come after me or any of their third partners
you know they work closely with a number of other nations
1196
01:10:46,060 --> 01:10:51,080
or you know they could pay off the trial
you know any of their agents are assets ...
1197
01:11:25,380 --> 01:11:32,300
A criminal investigation the whistleblower...
monitoring phone calls and Internet data goes public...
1198
01:11:33,660 --> 01:11:37,600
Security forces in Afghanistan
say a number of...
1199
01:11:40,520 --> 01:11:43,940
Now it's time for our news paper review
and looking at what's making headlines
1200
01:11:44,390 --> 01:11:45,450
around the world.
1201
01:11:45,870 --> 01:11:51,310
Let's start with The Guardian our top story
which is revealing the identity of the former CIA employee.
1202
01:11:51,750 --> 01:11:57,130
The paper says he leaks information exposing the scale
of American's surveillance of the Internet.
1203
01:11:58,370 --> 01:12:00,630
Edward Snowden,
what a great story...
1204
01:12:01,940 --> 01:12:05,550
Well I think it's a fantastic story this could be
straight out from a John Le Carr� novel
1205
01:12:06,220 --> 01:12:08,420
I mean when you read what he did,
yes he got the material,
1206
01:12:09,110 --> 01:12:13,030
he then decided to go to a place he identified to be
very difficult for America to get at him
1207
01:12:13,240 --> 01:12:14,270
- God dammit
1208
01:12:14,820 --> 01:12:19,830
which is Hong Kong because of course technically inside China,
the one country two systems policy
1209
01:12:20,210 --> 01:12:23,040
there meaning he would get potentially some protection,
1210
01:12:23,290 --> 01:12:26,540
he thought, all very well planned,
could be just out of a spy novel.
1211
01:12:26,930 --> 01:12:28,320
But what about the details.
1212
01:12:32,490 --> 01:12:41,000
- That could make it worse.
But just the lower half of my face.
1213
01:13:15,040 --> 01:13:19,180
Snowden says he'd become increasingly
dismay by what he saw as the growing power
1214
01:13:19,550 --> 01:13:20,580
of the NSA.
1215
01:13:20,900 --> 01:13:24,030
And it's his decision to pass on
documents which is said to reveal
1216
01:13:24,550 --> 01:13:28,570
the organisation monitored
millions of phone calls
1217
01:13:28,810 --> 01:13:31,350
but that it had direct access
to some of the...
1218
01:13:31,650 --> 01:13:32,670
- How do you feel?
1219
01:13:32,940 --> 01:13:33,940
...Internet companies in the world.
1220
01:13:35,800 --> 01:13:38,500
- uuh what happens, happens.
We've uh we've talked about this
1221
01:13:38,710 --> 01:13:42,070
I knew what the risks and if I get arrested,
I get arrested,
1222
01:13:45,310 --> 01:13:49,360
we were able to get the information
that needed to get out, out.
1223
01:13:51,730 --> 01:13:56,670
And you and Glenn are able to keep reporting
regardless what happens to me.
1224
01:13:58,910 --> 01:14:04,080
Now 29 year old Edward Snowden says that US intelligence agencies
gathered millions of phone records
1225
01:14:04,750 --> 01:14:07,230
and monitored Internet data...
1226
01:14:13,130 --> 01:14:14,920
- Yes. I'm sorry who's asking?
1227
01:14:17,590 --> 01:14:22,550
- I'm afraid you have the wrong room thank you.
Wall Street Journal.
1228
01:14:38,500 --> 01:14:40,840
- Yes. I'm sorry say again?
1229
01:14:42,410 --> 01:14:43,940
Uh, no thank you. No calls.
1230
01:14:44,370 --> 01:14:45,960
I think they have the wrong number.
1231
01:14:47,440 --> 01:14:48,930
Yeah, no calls. Thank you.
1232
01:14:49,270 --> 01:14:55,620
Uh wait I'm sorry if it's two men from the front desk
they can call but no outside calls.
1233
01:14:56,150 --> 01:15:01,090
Wait actually just... let them through. Wait, wait m'am?
1234
01:15:01,550 --> 01:15:02,100
Fuck
1235
01:15:09,360 --> 01:15:19,550
- Yes. Wait is it a lawyer? Yeah, no no no I mean,
1236
01:15:20,940 --> 01:15:26,670
the people who are asking. Ask them if they are lawyers.
1237
01:15:32,720 --> 01:15:34,630
No tell her that she has the wrong number
and there is no Mr. Snowden here.
1238
01:16:15,040 --> 01:16:17,710
Would you mind to talk in speakerphone?
1239
01:16:19,120 --> 01:16:19,920
- Sorry
1240
01:16:24,600 --> 01:16:25,390
- Hi. I'm the client
1241
01:16:27,710 --> 01:16:29,700
- Pretty good. I'm doing well
1242
01:16:46,210 --> 01:16:46,450
- Ok
1243
01:16:52,240 --> 01:16:52,890
- Ok
1244
01:17:04,110 --> 01:17:09,770
- Ok, that's great. Is it OK if i bring equipment?
Because i'm just kind of going, so i can leave in any direction,
1245
01:17:10,040 --> 01:17:12,620
at any time, and not come back. If necessary.
1246
01:17:23,450 --> 01:17:24,640
- Ok, that sounds good.
1247
01:17:26,230 --> 01:17:27,890
- Thank you, thank you so much for helping us.
1248
01:18:10,750 --> 01:18:14,720
- Yeah... And so, is there a precedent for this
where Hong Kong would extradite someone
1249
01:18:14,980 --> 01:18:16,490
for political speech ?
1250
01:19:23,870 --> 01:19:26,120
"The President surely does not welcome
the way that this debate
1251
01:19:26,270 --> 01:19:28,030
has earned a greater attention
the last week,
1252
01:19:28,500 --> 01:19:31,710
the leaked classified information about
sensitive programs that are
1253
01:19:31,980 --> 01:19:33,690
important in our
fight against terrorists
1254
01:19:34,030 --> 01:19:36,450
who would do harm
to Americans is a problem,
1255
01:19:37,770 --> 01:19:41,320
but the debate itself is legitimate
and should be engaged.
1256
01:23:32,270 --> 01:23:34,570
- Right, so which one do we want here then.
1257
01:23:34,770 --> 01:23:37,260
This is operational stuff,
so we mustn't say any of this.
1258
01:23:37,510 --> 01:23:38,450
- So redact that.
1259
01:23:38,950 --> 01:23:40,270
- Go near the top
1260
01:23:40,500 --> 01:23:42,310
- What about the Alexander's quote,
is that something ...
1261
01:23:42,540 --> 01:23:46,320
- Yeah. That's in TARMAC.
"Why can't we collect all the signals all the times?
1262
01:23:46,520 --> 01:23:49,690
Sounds like a good
summer homework project for Menwith"
1263
01:23:49,930 --> 01:23:53,000
Keith Alexander the head of the NSA
on a visit to the UK. This one.
1264
01:23:53,410 --> 01:23:54,240
- Yeah.
1265
01:23:54,490 --> 01:23:57,870
- Yeah. It's a secret document
in that secret document.
1266
01:23:58,110 --> 01:24:01,820
We've got a stick here
that should just have three single slides on it.
1267
01:24:02,090 --> 01:24:05,650
If it's got more than three single slides,
we have to be extremely careful.
1268
01:24:08,660 --> 01:24:09,120
- Yeah?
1269
01:24:09,310 --> 01:24:10,360
- Yeah, that's it.
1270
01:24:10,900 --> 01:24:13,480
This is really dangerous stuff for us, Guardian
1271
01:24:13,750 --> 01:24:16,000
If we make mistakes, ...very angry.
1272
01:24:16,350 --> 01:24:19,680
We kept it all under lock and key
and no one knows. No, I'm not saying that.
1273
01:24:20,880 --> 01:24:21,450
- OK
1274
01:24:21,730 --> 01:24:24,360
- They will come in and snap the front door down
if we elaborate on that...
1275
01:24:25,480 --> 01:24:26,220
And he said...
1276
01:24:26,590 --> 01:24:29,220
The Prime Minister is extremely concerned about this.
1277
01:24:29,520 --> 01:24:31,530
And they kept saying, "this is from the very top."
1278
01:25:43,040 --> 01:25:45,530
As you can see on this map
the flight that probably has Snowden aboard,
1279
01:25:45,750 --> 01:25:48,605
has almost reached its destination here
in Moscow's scheduled plan,
1280
01:25:49,280 --> 01:25:51,150
in the Russian capital within minutes...
1281
01:25:52,730 --> 01:25:57,785
As you may have heard, there is a CIA agent
who has revealed a lot of information
1282
01:25:59,570 --> 01:26:00,720
and he is now trapped in the
1283
01:26:02,810 --> 01:26:03,960
airport in Moscow
1284
01:26:04,870 --> 01:26:06,380
We managed to get him out of Hong Kong,
1285
01:26:06,620 --> 01:26:08,540
but when he landed in the Moscow airport,
1286
01:26:09,240 --> 01:26:13,130
the American government had canceled his passport.
1287
01:26:13,530 --> 01:26:16,180
So formally he hasn't entered into Russian territory,
1288
01:26:16,510 --> 01:26:18,050
he is in the transit area of the airport
1289
01:26:19,900 --> 01:26:22,330
And one of our people is accompanying him
1290
01:26:22,660 --> 01:26:25,110
We are trying to arrange a private jet
1291
01:26:26,920 --> 01:26:31,490
to take him from Moscow
1292
01:26:32,450 --> 01:26:37,370
to Ecuador or perhaps maybe Venezuela
1293
01:26:37,620 --> 01:26:38,630
or maybe Iceland,
1294
01:26:39,490 --> 01:26:40,980
countries where he would be safe.
1295
01:30:11,710 --> 01:30:15,260
May I collect all the phones please?
1296
01:30:22,480 --> 01:30:24,400
I have everything in here
1297
01:30:26,550 --> 01:30:29,100
Put them in the refrigerator
1298
01:30:39,890 --> 01:30:42,150
- So, as you know, in June,
1299
01:30:42,560 --> 01:30:45,880
Snowden was in charge with 3
1300
01:30:46,270 --> 01:30:47,160
legal violations felonies
1301
01:30:48,940 --> 01:30:51,150
Principaly under a World War I era
1302
01:30:52,130 --> 01:30:53,780
criminal law called the Espionage Act
1303
01:30:55,510 --> 01:30:57,830
The Espionage Act is an extremely broad
1304
01:30:58,470 --> 01:30:59,610
criminal prohibition against
1305
01:31:00,870 --> 01:31:02,610
the sharing or dissemination
1306
01:31:03,220 --> 01:31:04,780
of what's called
"National Defense information"
1307
01:31:05,580 --> 01:31:08,140
it was only used to
1308
01:31:08,480 --> 01:31:10,580
prosecute people who had been accused of
1309
01:31:10,860 --> 01:31:14,030
acting with a foreign power,
spies not whistleblowers
1310
01:31:14,430 --> 01:31:16,550
and it's a very unusual legal
representation I think
1311
01:31:17,060 --> 01:31:19,740
not just for all of you,
but for me as well.
1312
01:31:20,570 --> 01:31:23,700
The Espionage Act has not
distinguished between
1313
01:31:24,120 --> 01:31:25,990
leaks to the press
and the public interest,
1314
01:31:26,480 --> 01:31:28,630
and selling secrets to foreign enemies
1315
01:31:29,200 --> 01:31:30,710
for personal profit.
1316
01:31:31,230 --> 01:31:32,720
So, under the Espionage Act
1317
01:31:32,960 --> 01:31:36,070
it's not a defense if the information that was disclosed
1318
01:31:36,340 --> 01:31:38,480
should not have been withheld
in the first place,
1319
01:31:38,720 --> 01:31:40,010
that it was improperly classified.
1320
01:31:40,420 --> 01:31:43,600
It's not a defense if the
dissemination was in the public interest
1321
01:31:44,030 --> 01:31:45,230
that it led to reforms.
1322
01:31:45,730 --> 01:31:49,240
Even if the court determines
that the programs that were revealed
1323
01:31:49,540 --> 01:31:51,170
were illegal or unconstitutional.
1324
01:31:51,430 --> 01:31:53,690
that's still not a defense under the Espionage Act,
1325
01:31:53,940 --> 01:31:56,730
the Government doesn't have
to defend the classification,
1326
01:31:57,050 --> 01:32:00,000
it doesn't have to demonstrate
harm from the release,
1327
01:32:00,440 --> 01:32:02,260
All this is irrelevant.
1328
01:32:02,750 --> 01:32:05,420
So when we say that
the trial wouldn't be fair,
1329
01:32:06,320 --> 01:32:08,590
we are not talking about
what human rights lawyers think
1330
01:32:08,870 --> 01:32:10,240
of this fair trial practices
1331
01:32:10,550 --> 01:32:12,240
We are saying the law, the statute itself,
1332
01:32:13,630 --> 01:32:15,980
eliminates any kind of defense
1333
01:32:16,330 --> 01:32:18,000
that Snowden might be able to make
1334
01:32:18,410 --> 01:32:20,700
and essentially will equate him with a spy.
1335
01:32:21,040 --> 01:32:25,350
And of course those three counts
could be increased to a hundreed or two hundreed
1336
01:32:25,650 --> 01:32:27,330
or three hundreed, they could charge him separately
1337
01:32:27,600 --> 01:32:30,720
for each document that has been
published by a journalist.
1338
01:32:31,240 --> 01:32:34,100
And I think that we all recognize,
even though we sit here as lawyers
1339
01:32:35,640 --> 01:32:36,520
in a lawyer's meeting
1340
01:32:37,320 --> 01:32:41,600
that it's propably
95% politics and 5% law.
1341
01:32:42,290 --> 01:32:44,290
How this would be resolved.
1342
01:33:16,080 --> 01:33:19,280
"Mr. Snowden has been charged with very serious crimes
1343
01:33:20,070 --> 01:33:23,140
and he should be returned to the United States
where he would be granted full due process
1344
01:33:23,700 --> 01:33:27,210
and every right available to him
as a United States citizen.
1345
01:33:28,470 --> 01:33:31,330
Facing our justice system
under the Constitution."
1346
01:34:22,510 --> 01:34:24,140
No, I don't think Mr. Snowden was a Patriot.
1347
01:34:24,380 --> 01:34:26,840
I called for a federal review
1348
01:34:27,630 --> 01:34:30,380
of our surveillance operations
1349
01:34:30,860 --> 01:34:33,330
before Mr. Snowden made these leaks.
1350
01:34:33,670 --> 01:34:35,260
My preference,
1351
01:34:36,930 --> 01:34:38,400
and I think the American people's preference,
1352
01:34:38,610 --> 01:34:42,130
would have been for a lawful, orderly
1353
01:34:42,470 --> 01:34:44,750
examination of these laws.
1354
01:34:45,440 --> 01:34:50,090
A thoughtful, fact based debate,
1355
01:34:50,580 --> 01:34:53,760
that would then lead us to a better place.
1356
01:35:35,290 --> 01:35:37,940
- Oh my God. David. Hello my baby.
1357
01:35:39,280 --> 01:35:39,860
- I'm OK.
1358
01:35:40,090 --> 01:35:41,310
- You're OK?
1359
01:35:46,040 --> 01:35:46,890
- I just wanna go home.
1360
01:35:47,520 --> 01:35:50,510
- OK, OK OK. You just have to walk...
1361
01:35:57,400 --> 01:35:58,470
- How are you?
1362
01:35:58,800 --> 01:36:01,170
- Good, good. I'm totally fine, I didn't sleep at all, I couldn't sleep.
1363
01:36:01,380 --> 01:36:02,370
- I know.
1364
01:36:02,620 --> 01:36:07,220
"Brazil Demands Explanation from UK Government"
1365
01:36:24,700 --> 01:36:28,770
Recent reports have revealed that the NSA
have access to encryption keys
1366
01:36:29,130 --> 01:36:32,390
and they paid tech companies to introduce
backdoors in encryption protocols
1367
01:36:33,170 --> 01:36:37,900
So we are going to talk about ways in which
we can defend ourselves against
1368
01:36:38,240 --> 01:36:40,270
governments spying on us.
1369
01:36:40,520 --> 01:36:44,160
So Mr. Jacob Appelbaum, as an encryption and
security software developper,
1370
01:36:44,370 --> 01:36:45,480
and journalist.
1371
01:36:45,840 --> 01:36:49,030
Ladar Levison, the founder of the
encrypted email service
1372
01:36:49,500 --> 01:36:50,850
Lavabit
1373
01:36:51,110 --> 01:36:52,170
used by Edward Snowden.
1374
01:36:52,350 --> 01:36:53,060
You have the floor.
1375
01:36:53,470 --> 01:36:54,380
Thank you
1376
01:36:54,530 --> 01:36:57,180
Lavabit is an email service
that hopefully one day
1377
01:36:57,430 --> 01:37:02,970
will be able to stand on its own
without any references to Snowden.
1378
01:37:03,280 --> 01:37:06,220
My service was designed to remove me
1379
01:37:06,500 --> 01:37:09,370
from the possibility of being forced
1380
01:37:09,610 --> 01:37:11,630
to violate a person's privacy.
1381
01:37:11,980 --> 01:37:12,870
Quite simply
1382
01:37:13,240 --> 01:37:15,400
Lavabit was designed to remove the service provider
1383
01:37:15,670 --> 01:37:16,920
from the equation,
1384
01:37:17,360 --> 01:37:19,390
by not having logs on my server
1385
01:37:19,750 --> 01:37:23,100
and not having access to
a person's emails on disk,
1386
01:37:23,380 --> 01:37:24,420
I wasn't elimitating
1387
01:37:24,690 --> 01:37:25,850
the possibility of surveillance,
1388
01:37:26,140 --> 01:37:29,200
I was simply removing myself
from that equation.
1389
01:37:30,480 --> 01:37:32,130
And that surveillance
would have to be conducted
1390
01:37:32,310 --> 01:37:33,730
on the target
1391
01:37:34,020 --> 01:37:35,120
either the sender
1392
01:37:35,320 --> 01:37:37,040
or the receiver of the messages.
1393
01:37:37,780 --> 01:37:41,190
But I was approached
by the FBI quite recently,
1394
01:37:41,390 --> 01:37:42,510
and told
1395
01:37:43,080 --> 01:37:45,190
that because I couldn't
turn over the information
1396
01:37:45,470 --> 01:37:47,180
from that one particular user,
1397
01:37:47,420 --> 01:37:49,490
I would be forced to
give up those SSL keys
1398
01:37:49,730 --> 01:37:51,640
and let the FBI
collect every communication
1399
01:37:51,890 --> 01:37:54,200
on my network without
any kind of transparency.
1400
01:37:55,580 --> 01:37:57,550
And of course,
1401
01:37:57,850 --> 01:37:59,420
I wasn't comfortable with that,
1402
01:37:59,910 --> 01:38:01,070
to say the least!
1403
01:38:01,810 --> 01:38:06,140
More disturbing was the fact that
I couldn't even tell anybody that it was going on.
1404
01:38:06,700 --> 01:38:08,370
So I decided:
1405
01:38:08,620 --> 01:38:11,440
"If I didn't win the fight to unseal my case,
1406
01:38:11,840 --> 01:38:13,070
if I didn't win the battle
1407
01:38:13,440 --> 01:38:15,970
to be able to tell people
what was going on,
1408
01:38:16,970 --> 01:38:19,630
then my only ethical choice left
was to shutdown".
1409
01:38:22,000 --> 01:38:24,120
Think about that.
1410
01:38:24,800 --> 01:38:29,100
I believe in the rule of law,
I believe in the need to conduct investigations,
1411
01:38:30,170 --> 01:38:33,890
but those investigations
are supposed to be difficult for a reason.
1412
01:38:34,260 --> 01:38:38,070
It's supposed to be difficult
to invade somebody's privacy.
1413
01:38:38,350 --> 01:38:40,730
Because of how intrusive it is,
1414
01:38:41,040 --> 01:38:43,310
because of how disruptive it is.
1415
01:38:43,750 --> 01:38:46,290
If we can't, if we don't have
a right to privacy,
1416
01:38:46,630 --> 01:38:49,390
how do we have
a free and open discussion?
1417
01:38:49,690 --> 01:38:51,960
What good is the right
to free speech,
1418
01:38:54,430 --> 01:38:56,740
if it's not protected,
1419
01:38:57,040 --> 01:38:59,230
in a sense that you can't have
a private discussion
1420
01:38:59,610 --> 01:39:02,250
with somebody else
about something you disagree with.
1421
01:39:02,990 --> 01:39:05,000
Think about the chilling effect
that that has.
1422
01:39:05,820 --> 01:39:07,300
Think about the chilling effect
it does have
1423
01:39:07,740 --> 01:39:10,760
on countries that don't have
a right to privacy.
1424
01:39:11,070 --> 01:39:13,130
I've noticed a really interesting
discussion point
1425
01:39:13,490 --> 01:39:15,720
which is that what people used to call
liberty and freedom
1426
01:39:15,990 --> 01:39:17,350
we now call privacy.
1427
01:39:18,380 --> 01:39:20,210
And we say in the same breath
1428
01:39:20,610 --> 01:39:22,130
that privacy is dead.
1429
01:39:22,670 --> 01:39:24,620
This is something
that really concerns me
1430
01:39:24,860 --> 01:39:25,900
about my generation
1431
01:39:26,180 --> 01:39:28,780
especially when we talk about
how we're not surprised by anything.
1432
01:39:29,090 --> 01:39:30,560
I think that we should consider that
1433
01:39:30,870 --> 01:39:32,840
when we lose privacy we lose agency,
1434
01:39:33,130 --> 01:39:34,270
we lose liberty itself
1435
01:39:34,550 --> 01:39:36,810
because we no longer feel free
to express what we think.
1436
01:39:37,520 --> 01:39:39,630
There is this myth of
the passive surveillance machine
1437
01:39:39,910 --> 01:39:42,580
but actually what is surveillance
except control?
1438
01:39:43,140 --> 01:39:44,760
This notion that the NSA are passive
1439
01:39:45,030 --> 01:39:45,840
this is nonsense
1440
01:39:46,100 --> 01:39:47,290
what we see is that they actively attack
1441
01:39:47,640 --> 01:39:49,350
European citizens, American citizens and,
1442
01:39:50,370 --> 01:39:51,740
in fact, anyone that they can
1443
01:39:51,980 --> 01:39:53,060
if they perceive an advantage.
1444
01:41:30,000 --> 01:41:31,970
- OK. Right.
1445
01:41:37,540 --> 01:41:39,890
- I have to give that in testimony.
1446
01:41:40,270 --> 01:41:41,630
- What are you going to tell?
1447
01:41:41,870 --> 01:41:45,130
- Everything I can truthfully.
1448
01:41:45,600 --> 01:41:47,550
- What will you talk about?
1449
01:41:47,880 --> 01:41:50,380
- Uh, whatever the questions they ask me.
1450
01:41:50,640 --> 01:41:51,540
- Yeah I think it's over there.
1451
01:41:51,770 --> 01:41:54,950
- Ok, it's alright. Thank you.
1452
01:42:01,450 --> 01:42:02,750
- Hey, how are you?
1453
01:42:02,890 --> 01:42:03,530
- Good.
1454
01:42:03,740 --> 01:42:04,230
- How are you?
1455
01:42:04,430 --> 01:42:04,990
- Good to see you again.
1456
01:42:05,160 --> 01:42:06,340
- Nice to meet you again, yes.
1457
01:42:07,860 --> 01:42:08,820
- Yeah
1458
01:43:37,710 --> 01:43:41,580
- What do you think they're doing to reporters,
those of us that are working directly with...
1459
01:43:42,190 --> 01:43:43,500
Snowden documents?
1460
01:43:43,750 --> 01:43:45,800
How do you think they would approach
dealing with people like us?
1461
01:43:46,080 --> 01:43:49,220
- You're.. You're on a cast iron cover list.
1462
01:43:49,870 --> 01:43:53,150
Which means any electronic device you use
1463
01:43:53,810 --> 01:43:56,275
that they can attach to you
they all record and capture all that data.
1464
01:43:57,510 --> 01:43:59,650
- And what do they do with that data?
They're just trying to figure out what we're doing?
1465
01:44:00,920 --> 01:44:02,750
- Uh, well the primary...
1466
01:44:02,930 --> 01:44:04,630
That's part of it. But the other part, primarily part,
1467
01:44:05,000 --> 01:44:07,140
is for them. I think it's to find the
sources of information you're getting.
1468
01:44:07,750 --> 01:44:11,540
- So if I have a confidential source
who's giving me information as a whistleblower,
1469
01:44:12,200 --> 01:44:14,930
and he works within the US Government,
and he's concerned about
1470
01:44:15,360 --> 01:44:18,180
what he perceives as
violation of the Constitution,
1471
01:44:18,710 --> 01:44:20,770
uhm... and he gets in touch with me,
they...
1472
01:44:21,030 --> 01:44:21,610
- Yeah...
1473
01:44:21,950 --> 01:44:22,710
- Go ahead. Yeah.
1474
01:44:22,970 --> 01:44:26,350
- Yeah. From there on, they would nail him
and start watching everything he did.
1475
01:44:28,210 --> 01:44:30,320
and if you start passing data,
I'm sure they'd take him off the street.
1476
01:44:30,590 --> 01:44:33,760
I mean, the way you have to do it
is like Deep Throat did, right?
1477
01:44:34,130 --> 01:44:37,610
In the Nixon years,
meet in a basement of a parking garage...
1478
01:44:38,390 --> 01:44:39,660
physically.
1479
01:45:20,620 --> 01:45:23,000
Let's disassociate our metadata one last time.
1480
01:45:23,340 --> 01:45:26,350
So we don't have a clear record of your true name
in our final communication chain.
1481
01:45:28,740 --> 01:45:31,300
This is obviously not to say
you can't claim your involvement,
1482
01:45:31,470 --> 01:45:33,820
but as every trick in the book
is likely to be used and looking into this,
1483
01:45:35,110 --> 01:45:37,500
I believe it's better,
that that particular disclosure
1484
01:45:37,700 --> 01:45:39,230
come on your own terms.
1485
01:45:39,680 --> 01:45:42,130
Thank you again for all you've done.
1486
01:45:42,390 --> 01:45:44,170
So sorry again for the multiple delays.
1487
01:45:44,350 --> 01:45:45,870
But we've been entering a territory
1488
01:45:46,280 --> 01:45:47,560
with no model to benefit from.
1489
01:45:49,110 --> 01:45:50,540
If all ends well,
1490
01:45:50,920 --> 01:45:53,060
perhaps the demonstration that our mess has worked
1491
01:45:53,570 --> 01:45:55,270
would embolden more to come forward
1492
01:45:56,220 --> 01:45:57,520
Citizen.
1493
01:46:02,510 --> 01:46:06,420
- So the update that I want to give you is about the new,
1494
01:46:08,330 --> 01:46:10,410
uh.. the new source that, that we...
1495
01:46:11,810 --> 01:46:12,870
- OK.
1496
01:46:15,610 --> 01:46:18,960
- that... uh, this is what... this is the...
1497
01:46:19,490 --> 01:46:23,120
you know this is the person who is doing
the... the most of the...
1498
01:46:23,290 --> 01:46:24,340
- Right, right, right.
1499
01:46:24,700 --> 01:46:28,320
- ...the work on it, uh...
And now... and now,
1500
01:46:28,500 --> 01:46:30,230
what basically, what happens is...
1501
01:46:33,200 --> 01:46:33,960
- and...
1502
01:46:34,800 --> 01:46:37,220
- That's actually...
That's really dangerous...
1503
01:46:38,870 --> 01:46:40,500
uh, on the source's side.
1504
01:46:40,820 --> 01:46:42,070
Do they know how to
take care of themselves...
1505
01:46:42,290 --> 01:46:43,290
- Well he knows...
1506
01:46:44,460 --> 01:46:44,960
- ...or do you know anything about...
1507
01:46:45,330 --> 01:46:46,290
- ...he means it's, uh...
1508
01:46:48,240 --> 01:46:49,810
It's all being done..
through this...
1509
01:46:50,040 --> 01:46:50,740
- OK.
1510
01:46:51,240 --> 01:46:54,370
- and they're all talking this way...
1511
01:46:54,690 --> 01:46:55,430
- OK.
1512
01:46:55,820 --> 01:46:56,660
- and, uh...
1513
01:46:56,950 --> 01:46:59,340
- I was gonna say
one of the big questions there is:
1514
01:46:59,670 --> 01:47:01,060
can they handle it?
You know with...
1515
01:47:01,290 --> 01:47:02,870
- Yeah, they're very careful...
1516
01:47:03,440 --> 01:47:04,460
even they're through that.
1517
01:47:04,690 --> 01:47:05,460
- OK
1518
01:47:05,730 --> 01:47:06,440
- Yeah.
1519
01:47:10,460 --> 01:47:11,920
- And...
1520
01:47:18,670 --> 01:47:21,300
- That's what that is.
1521
01:47:22,610 --> 01:47:24,100
- Wow, that's really something.
1522
01:47:28,510 --> 01:47:29,850
- Oh, oh...
1523
01:47:37,330 --> 01:47:38,390
- Did you know that?
1524
01:47:38,870 --> 01:47:45,860
One key thing: ALL drone strikes are done through
Ramstein Air Base in Germany - German govt has always
1525
01:47:46,090 --> 01:47:47,390
- It's not the actual plan.
1526
01:47:48,060 --> 01:47:49,450
- Right, right right. You mean the control.
1527
01:47:49,900 --> 01:47:51,310
- It's the process, who's sending the...
1528
01:47:51,550 --> 01:47:52,530
- Yeah.
1529
01:47:52,920 --> 01:47:57,170
- There's a... There's a chart.
You know, it goes like a whole layout in it
1530
01:47:57,380 --> 01:47:58,350
for everyone and it's...
1531
01:47:58,570 --> 01:47:59,890
- Yeah. It's really bold, but it's really risky.
1532
01:48:00,330 --> 01:48:01,880
But you know that... that's the thing if...
1533
01:48:02,090 --> 01:48:02,790
- There's more...
1534
01:48:03,020 --> 01:48:03,930
- ... if they understand what they're doing.
1535
01:48:04,420 --> 01:48:08,560
- There's this chart, it goes like this...
It shows the decision making chart.
1536
01:48:08,840 --> 01:48:15,180
It's a chart... It's, it's... it's shaped like this.
1537
01:48:18,130 --> 01:48:18,770
- Hum hum...
- So up here it says "POTUS" (President of the Uniteed States)
1538
01:48:19,040 --> 01:48:21,690
- That's the decision making chart for each... one.
1539
01:48:26,930 --> 01:48:27,330
- And...
1540
01:48:27,680 --> 01:48:29,160
- And it's so political...
1541
01:48:29,390 --> 01:48:33,310
- This is... This part's amazing.
1542
01:48:37,410 --> 01:48:38,460
- That's...
1543
01:48:38,800 --> 01:48:40,690
- That's fucking ridiculous.
1544
01:48:41,610 --> 01:48:43,270
- This... This is... it's so shocking.
1545
01:48:46,050 --> 01:48:48,430
- (laugh) That's...
1546
01:48:50,090 --> 01:48:50,490
- No, I know...
1547
01:48:50,800 --> 01:48:51,100
- That's...
1548
01:48:51,330 --> 01:48:51,730
- ... I know...
1549
01:48:52,550 --> 01:48:54,880
There are 1.2 m people on various stages
of their watch list.
1550
01:48:55,340 --> 01:48:57,140
- ... the population of an entire country.
1551
01:48:57,570 --> 01:48:58,410
- I know.
1552
01:48:58,720 --> 01:49:01,980
- That's... what we're working on.
1553
01:49:11,990 --> 01:49:14,650
- That person is incredibly bold, but, uh...
1554
01:49:15,530 --> 01:49:16,980
- But also very well aware.
1555
01:49:17,390 --> 01:49:19,050
- Right. I... You know, I just hope. I mean...
1556
01:49:19,910 --> 01:49:20,800
- No, I mean...
1557
01:49:21,260 --> 01:49:23,210
the boldness of it is shocking,
but I mean it was obviously..
1558
01:49:23,660 --> 01:49:25,350
- But the other thing is just...
1559
01:49:25,660 --> 01:49:26,760
- ...motivated by what you did,
I mean, it...
1560
01:49:27,450 --> 01:49:29,140
- This is going to... This is going to...
1561
01:49:29,790 --> 01:49:31,620
That could raise a profile
1562
01:49:32,530 --> 01:49:33,790
of this whole political situation
1563
01:49:34,100 --> 01:49:36,390
with whistleblowing
to a whole new level, because...
1564
01:49:36,700 --> 01:49:37,310
- exactly...
1565
01:49:37,660 --> 01:49:38,750
- It's gonna...
1566
01:49:39,000 --> 01:49:39,800
- Yeah, I mean...
1567
01:49:40,010 --> 01:49:41,390
I actually think
that's a great thing.
1568
01:49:41,700 --> 01:49:43,680
And I think people
are gonna see what's being hidden...
1569
01:49:44,430 --> 01:49:48,230
again, again..
by a totally different part
1570
01:49:50,940 --> 01:49:54,160
POTUS
137004
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