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These are the user uploaded subtitles that are being translated: 1 00:00:48,030 --> 00:00:49,470 "Laura, 2 00:00:49,690 --> 00:00:52,680 at this stage, I can offer nothing more than my word. 3 00:00:53,030 --> 00:00:56,930 I'm a senior government employee in the intelligence community 4 00:00:57,100 --> 00:01:00,210 I hope you understand that contacting you is extremely high risk 5 00:01:00,430 --> 00:01:02,630 and you are willing to agree to the following precautions 6 00:01:02,830 --> 00:01:04,280 before I share more. 7 00:01:04,860 --> 00:01:07,260 This will not be a waste of your time. 8 00:01:08,010 --> 00:01:09,560 The following sounds complex, 9 00:01:09,740 --> 00:01:13,010 but should only take minutes to complete for someone technical. 10 00:01:13,400 --> 00:01:17,200 I would like to confirm out of email that the keys we exchanged were not intercepted 11 00:01:17,610 --> 00:01:19,650 and replaced by your surveillants. 12 00:01:20,760 --> 00:01:24,030 Please confirm that no one has ever had a copy of your private key 13 00:01:24,200 --> 00:01:26,180 and that it uses a strong passphrase. 14 00:01:26,320 --> 00:01:29,850 Assume your adversary is capable of one trillion guesses per second. 15 00:01:31,090 --> 00:01:34,610 If the device you store the private key and enter your passphrase on 16 00:01:34,810 --> 00:01:35,950 has been hacked, 17 00:01:36,130 --> 00:01:38,310 it is trivial to decrypt our communications. 18 00:01:39,540 --> 00:01:41,870 Understand that the above steps are not bullet proof, 19 00:01:42,030 --> 00:01:44,200 and are intended only to give us breathing room. 20 00:01:44,420 --> 00:01:46,630 In the end if you publish the source material, 21 00:01:46,880 --> 00:01:48,630 I will likely be immediately implicated. 22 00:01:48,820 --> 00:01:52,360 This must not deter you from releasing the information I will provide. 23 00:01:53,830 --> 00:01:55,350 Thank you, and be careful. 24 00:01:57,010 --> 00:02:00,300 Citizen Four" 25 00:02:22,720 --> 00:02:25,710 Radio: ... surveillance means that there are facts 26 00:02:25,880 --> 00:02:27,460 under the law to apply to 27 00:02:27,670 --> 00:02:29,000 if we should take away the surveillance 28 00:02:29,230 --> 00:02:31,410 there are no facts the government could manufacture 29 00:02:31,830 --> 00:02:34,080 - Oh, that's right and it's all about creating an independent record 30 00:02:34,960 --> 00:02:38,800 - To me this goes to the question 31 00:02:39,500 --> 00:02:41,000 of independently verifying 32 00:02:41,340 --> 00:02:43,830 what the government is doing. 33 00:02:44,140 --> 00:02:45,540 That's why I keep going back to that question. 34 00:02:46,670 --> 00:02:51,650 - So, that was David Suruda. After CBS News traffic and weather... 35 00:02:59,220 --> 00:03:00,680 Hey, can you hear me? 36 00:03:01,480 --> 00:03:03,480 I am here David, how are you? 37 00:03:07,910 --> 00:03:09,060 Well, I would just point... 38 00:03:09,210 --> 00:03:12,220 start by pointing to (what) Barack Obama himself said about those questions 39 00:03:12,410 --> 00:03:15,130 when he was running for the office that he now occupies. 40 00:03:15,310 --> 00:03:18,690 On December 2007 he said "The president does not have 41 00:03:19,000 --> 00:03:22,910 the power under the Constitution to unilaterally authorize a military attack 42 00:03:23,210 --> 00:03:27,330 in a situation that does not involve stopping an actual or imminent threat to the nation". 43 00:03:27,650 --> 00:03:31,930 So by Obama's own words, the president doesn't have the power that he is now exercising 44 00:03:32,120 --> 00:03:33,630 under the Constitution. 45 00:03:33,890 --> 00:03:37,070 And as far of why it matters, in... on August 1st 2007 46 00:03:37,320 --> 00:03:40,630 when he laid out his reasons why he was running for office 47 00:03:40,860 --> 00:03:43,470 and why he thought it was so important to change the way we were doing things 48 00:03:43,880 --> 00:03:44,520 he said 49 00:03:44,730 --> 00:03:47,980 "No more ignoring the law when it's inconvenient, 50 00:03:48,180 --> 00:03:49,600 that is not who we are. 51 00:03:49,760 --> 00:03:53,570 We will again set an example for the world that the law is not subject 52 00:03:53,720 --> 00:03:55,060 to the whims of stubborn rulers." 53 00:03:55,300 --> 00:03:58,045 - So to allow presidents to simply start wars on their own without any... 54 00:04:38,580 --> 00:04:42,740 For now, know that every border you cross, every purchase you make, 55 00:04:43,080 --> 00:04:45,960 every call you dial, every cell phone tower you pass, 56 00:04:46,200 --> 00:04:48,370 friend you keep, article you write, 57 00:04:48,620 --> 00:04:51,030 site you visit, subject line you type, 58 00:04:51,510 --> 00:04:52,900 and packet you route, 59 00:04:53,280 --> 00:04:55,530 is in the hands of a system whose reach is unlimited 60 00:04:55,730 --> 00:04:57,760 but whose safeguards are not. 61 00:04:59,090 --> 00:05:01,950 Your victimisation by the NSA system means that you are well aware 62 00:05:02,140 --> 00:05:05,070 of the threat that unrestricted secret police pose 63 00:05:05,260 --> 00:05:07,100 for democracies. 64 00:05:07,280 --> 00:05:09,580 This is a story few, but you, can tell. 65 00:06:04,080 --> 00:06:05,400 Thank you for inviting me here, 66 00:06:05,830 --> 00:06:09,890 to give me the opportunity to express my story. 67 00:06:10,040 --> 00:06:11,660 But let me give you some of my background. 68 00:06:12,710 --> 00:06:16,240 I spent about 4 years in the military and then I went to NSA directly, so... 69 00:06:17,100 --> 00:06:21,360 so I ended up with about 37 years of service combined. 70 00:06:21,710 --> 00:06:24,110 Most of it was a lot of fun! I tell you, it was really a lot of fun, 71 00:06:24,290 --> 00:06:25,410 breaking these puzzles. 72 00:06:25,560 --> 00:06:27,250 You know, solving problems and things like that. 73 00:06:27,470 --> 00:06:29,320 So, and that's really what I did. 74 00:06:29,610 --> 00:06:32,740 Fundamentally started working with data, looking at data and datasystems 75 00:06:32,940 --> 00:06:33,990 and how you do that. 76 00:06:34,270 --> 00:06:39,100 I was developing this concept of analysis where you could lay it out in such a way 77 00:06:39,490 --> 00:06:44,350 that it could be coded and executed electronically. Meaning you could automate analysis. 78 00:06:44,660 --> 00:06:48,200 And it has to do with metadata and using metadata relationships. 79 00:06:48,400 --> 00:06:51,040 So that was the whole, that was my whole theme there at NSA 80 00:06:51,500 --> 00:06:54,450 that was eventually what I ended up to, I was the only one there doing that, by the way. 81 00:06:55,890 --> 00:06:57,970 So any rate, you know, 9/11 happened. 82 00:06:59,680 --> 00:07:02,130 And it must have been right after. 83 00:07:02,280 --> 00:07:04,680 A few days, no more than a week after 9/11 84 00:07:05,200 --> 00:07:10,610 that they decided to begin actively spying on everyone in this country. 85 00:07:10,990 --> 00:07:16,230 And they wanted that back part of our program to run all the spying. 86 00:07:16,890 --> 00:07:19,920 So that's that's exactly what they did. 87 00:07:20,660 --> 00:07:22,430 And then they started taking the telecom data, 88 00:07:22,640 --> 00:07:24,230 and expanded after that. 89 00:07:25,740 --> 00:07:27,600 So, I mean, the one I knew was AT&T, 90 00:07:27,820 --> 00:07:30,880 and that one provided 320 million records every day. 91 00:07:32,000 --> 00:07:34,820 That program was reauthorized every 45 days by the, 92 00:07:35,450 --> 00:07:36,930 what I call the "Yes Committee" 93 00:07:37,130 --> 00:07:40,830 which way Hayden, and Tenet, and the DOJ, 94 00:07:41,800 --> 00:07:43,990 that program was called STELLARWIND. 95 00:07:44,210 --> 00:07:46,990 So first I went to the House Intelligence Committee, 96 00:07:47,190 --> 00:07:49,060 and the staff member I personally knew there 97 00:07:49,790 --> 00:07:53,130 and she then went to the Chairman of that Committee, Nancy Pelosi, 98 00:07:53,370 --> 00:07:55,460 who was the Minority Rep. 99 00:07:56,060 --> 00:07:59,220 They were all briefed in to the program at the time, by the way, 100 00:07:59,510 --> 00:08:01,160 and all the other programs that were going on, 101 00:08:01,380 --> 00:08:04,000 including all those CIA programs. 102 00:08:04,280 --> 00:08:06,770 I wasn't alone in this, there were four others out of NSA, 103 00:08:07,050 --> 00:08:10,220 we were all trying to work interally in the government over these years 104 00:08:10,500 --> 00:08:14,150 trying to get them to come around, to being constitutionally acceptable, 105 00:08:14,430 --> 00:08:17,710 and take it in to the courts and have the courts' oversight of it too. 106 00:08:18,310 --> 00:08:22,560 So we na�vely kept thinking that that could, that could happen, 107 00:08:23,550 --> 00:08:25,140 and it never did. 108 00:08:25,930 --> 00:08:28,910 But any rate after that and all the stuff we were doing 109 00:08:29,610 --> 00:08:31,990 they decided to raid us to keep us quiet, 110 00:08:32,370 --> 00:08:33,490 threaten us, you know. 111 00:08:33,780 --> 00:08:36,490 So we were raided simultaneously, four of us. 112 00:08:36,700 --> 00:08:38,600 In my case they came in with guns drawn, 113 00:08:38,800 --> 00:08:41,720 I don't know why they did that, but they did. So.... 114 00:09:01,260 --> 00:09:02,300 "Laura, 115 00:09:03,030 --> 00:09:03,920 I will answer what I remember 116 00:09:04,150 --> 00:09:05,980 of your questions as best I can. 117 00:09:06,290 --> 00:09:08,570 Forgive the lack of structure, I am not a writer, 118 00:09:08,800 --> 00:09:10,820 and I have to draft this in a great hurry. 119 00:09:13,030 --> 00:09:14,780 What you know as STELLARWIND has grown, 120 00:09:16,100 --> 00:09:17,080 SSO, 121 00:09:17,240 --> 00:09:21,090 the expanded Special Source Operations that took over STELLARWIND's share 122 00:09:21,310 --> 00:09:22,330 of the pie 123 00:09:22,520 --> 00:09:24,060 has spread all over the world 124 00:09:24,260 --> 00:09:25,140 to practically include 125 00:09:25,450 --> 00:09:28,160 comprehensive coverage of the United States. 126 00:09:28,410 --> 00:09:31,100 Disturbingly, the amount of US communication 127 00:09:31,360 --> 00:09:34,300 ingested by NSA is still increasing. 128 00:09:34,810 --> 00:09:35,740 Publicly, 129 00:09:35,970 --> 00:09:37,500 we complain that things are going dark, 130 00:09:37,790 --> 00:09:40,760 but in fact our accesses are improving. 131 00:09:41,040 --> 00:09:42,870 The truth is that the NSA has never 132 00:09:43,050 --> 00:09:43,680 in its history 133 00:09:43,870 --> 00:09:47,060 collected more than it does now. 134 00:09:48,210 --> 00:09:51,230 I know the location of most domestic interception points, 135 00:09:51,660 --> 00:09:54,730 and that the largest telecommunication companies in the US 136 00:09:55,030 --> 00:09:56,880 are betraying the trust of their customers, 137 00:09:57,130 --> 00:09:58,480 which I can prove. 138 00:09:59,670 --> 00:10:03,030 We are building the greatest weapon for oppression in the history of Man. 139 00:10:03,230 --> 00:10:07,200 Yet its directors exempt themselves from accountability. 140 00:10:07,690 --> 00:10:11,040 NSA director Keith Alexander lied to Congress, 141 00:10:11,290 --> 00:10:12,730 which I can prove. 142 00:10:13,750 --> 00:10:17,360 Billions of US communications are being intercepted. 143 00:10:18,580 --> 00:10:20,220 In gathering evidence of wrongdoing 144 00:10:20,490 --> 00:10:23,010 I focused on the wronging of the American people, 145 00:10:23,190 --> 00:10:25,590 but believe me when I say that the surveillance we live under 146 00:10:25,800 --> 00:10:27,810 is the highest privilege compared to how we treat 147 00:10:28,030 --> 00:10:29,460 the rest of the world, 148 00:10:29,860 --> 00:10:31,910 this I can also prove. 149 00:10:33,570 --> 00:10:36,600 On cyberoperations the government's public position 150 00:10:36,900 --> 00:10:38,550 is that we still lack a policy framework. 151 00:10:38,750 --> 00:10:39,860 This too is a lie. 152 00:10:40,050 --> 00:10:41,680 There is a detailed policy framework, 153 00:10:42,000 --> 00:10:44,370 a kind of martial law for Cyber Operations 154 00:10:44,660 --> 00:10:46,240 created by the White House. 155 00:10:46,440 --> 00:10:48,600 It's called "Presidential Policy Directive 20" 156 00:10:48,760 --> 00:10:51,470 and was finalized at the end of last year. 157 00:10:51,680 --> 00:10:53,870 This I can also prove. 158 00:10:54,580 --> 00:10:56,750 I appreciate your concern for my safety, 159 00:10:57,030 --> 00:10:59,120 but I already know how this will end for me, 160 00:10:59,310 --> 00:11:00,780 and I accept the risk. 161 00:11:01,290 --> 00:11:03,050 If I have luck, and you are careful, 162 00:11:04,300 --> 00:11:05,770 you will have everything you need. 163 00:11:05,950 --> 00:11:07,160 I ask only that you ensure 164 00:11:07,350 --> 00:11:10,230 this information makes it home to the American public. 165 00:11:12,220 --> 00:11:16,100 Does the NSA routinely intercept American citizen's emails? 166 00:11:16,800 --> 00:11:17,585 No. 167 00:11:19,200 --> 00:11:25,330 Does the NSA intercept Americans' cell phone conversations. 168 00:11:25,660 --> 00:11:26,490 No. 169 00:11:26,740 --> 00:11:27,940 Google searches? 170 00:11:28,130 --> 00:11:28,940 No. 171 00:11:29,130 --> 00:11:30,350 Text messages? 172 00:11:30,530 --> 00:11:31,200 No. 173 00:11:31,410 --> 00:11:33,290 Amazon.com orders? 174 00:11:33,650 --> 00:11:34,530 Nope 175 00:11:34,750 --> 00:11:35,580 Bank records? 176 00:11:35,820 --> 00:11:36,380 No. 177 00:11:36,650 --> 00:11:39,750 What judicial consent is required for NSA 178 00:11:39,940 --> 00:11:41,630 to intercept communications 179 00:11:42,630 --> 00:11:46,080 and information involving American citizens? 180 00:11:46,410 --> 00:11:49,420 Within the United States that would be the FBI lead. 181 00:11:49,720 --> 00:11:51,550 If it was a foreign actor in the United states 182 00:11:51,740 --> 00:11:55,070 the FBI would still have the lead and could work that with NSA 183 00:11:55,280 --> 00:11:57,860 or other intelligence agencies as authorized. 184 00:11:58,340 --> 00:11:59,390 But to conduct that kind 185 00:12:00,300 --> 00:12:02,270 of collection within the United states 186 00:12:02,670 --> 00:12:04,450 it would have to go through a court order. 187 00:12:05,370 --> 00:12:07,020 And the court would have to authorize it. 188 00:12:07,270 --> 00:12:08,250 We are not authorized to do it, 189 00:12:08,460 --> 00:12:11,040 nor do we do it. 190 00:12:18,190 --> 00:12:19,980 All rise. 191 00:12:20,380 --> 00:12:21,530 The United States Court of Appeals 192 00:12:21,760 --> 00:12:23,700 for the Ninth Circuit is now in session. 193 00:12:25,200 --> 00:12:28,100 Please be seated. 194 00:12:36,640 --> 00:12:38,000 Good morning and welcome to the Ninth Circuit. 195 00:12:39,260 --> 00:12:43,810 The first case for argument is Jewell vs. National Security Agency. 196 00:12:44,400 --> 00:12:45,530 You may proceed. 197 00:12:48,750 --> 00:12:51,860 May it please the Court, Kevin Bankston for Carolyn Jewell 198 00:12:52,180 --> 00:12:54,950 and her fellow plaintiff appellants in Jewell vs. NSA. 199 00:12:55,190 --> 00:12:56,540 - Your Honors, 200 00:12:56,730 --> 00:13:00,430 plaintiffs have specifically alleged that their own communications 201 00:13:00,640 --> 00:13:03,670 and communications records have been acquired by the government. 202 00:13:03,930 --> 00:13:07,670 But the District Court found that we failed to allege facts 203 00:13:08,050 --> 00:13:11,010 that differentiated the injury of our plaintiffs sufferred 204 00:13:11,220 --> 00:13:14,590 from the injury suffered by every other AT&T user 205 00:13:14,950 --> 00:13:17,550 whose communications and records have been acquired by the government. 206 00:13:17,810 --> 00:13:21,080 Basically concluding that so long as every one is being surveilled, 207 00:13:21,570 --> 00:13:23,350 no one has standing to sue. 208 00:13:24,270 --> 00:13:26,500 However to deny standing to persons who are injured simply because 209 00:13:26,690 --> 00:13:29,370 many others are also injured would mean that the most injurious 210 00:13:29,780 --> 00:13:32,310 and widespread government actions could be questioned by nobody. 211 00:13:33,350 --> 00:13:38,140 - Do they have anything concrete that in fact a specific communication 212 00:13:38,510 --> 00:13:41,430 of your client was intercepted? 213 00:13:41,630 --> 00:13:43,760 - We have evidence that all the communications passing 214 00:13:43,950 --> 00:13:47,420 between AT&T's network and other networks in their Northern California facility 215 00:13:49,020 --> 00:13:51,880 have been intercepted, so that would necessarily include 216 00:13:52,110 --> 00:13:55,700 the Internet communications of our Northern California plaintiffs. 217 00:13:56,020 --> 00:13:57,370 - Okay, thank you. 218 00:13:57,950 --> 00:13:59,530 - Thank you, your honor 219 00:14:06,290 --> 00:14:06,960 - May it please the Court, 220 00:14:07,190 --> 00:14:08,990 I'm Thomas Byron from the Department of Justice 221 00:14:09,210 --> 00:14:10,970 here on behalf of the Government defendants. 222 00:14:11,590 --> 00:14:15,810 We think this litigation need not be resolved in Federal Court. 223 00:14:16,190 --> 00:14:19,090 In light of the oversight of the political branches 224 00:14:19,350 --> 00:14:21,150 both Legislative and Executive, 225 00:14:21,760 --> 00:14:26,480 which provides a better opportunity for oversight and resolution 226 00:14:27,280 --> 00:14:30,070 of the concerns raised concerning nationwide policies 227 00:14:30,580 --> 00:14:35,040 of alleged surveillance in these complaints. 228 00:14:35,540 --> 00:14:38,620 - Even if it's revealed that one or more of the plaintiffs 229 00:14:38,920 --> 00:14:43,280 had email or telephone conversations intercepted that had nothing to do 230 00:14:43,490 --> 00:14:44,980 with the national security? 231 00:14:45,260 --> 00:14:47,260 - Your honor, I don't know that anyone necessarily 232 00:14:47,600 --> 00:14:50,530 would have standing to raise the particular claims that issue 233 00:14:50,720 --> 00:14:52,330 in these 2 cases. 234 00:14:52,670 --> 00:14:58,260 We think instead that the kinds of claims that issue here against these defendants 235 00:14:58,510 --> 00:15:01,050 are those that are better suited to resolution 236 00:15:02,040 --> 00:15:03,940 before the representative branches of our government... 237 00:15:04,170 --> 00:15:10,340 - What role... would the Judiciary have if your.. approach is adopted... 238 00:15:10,600 --> 00:15:12,790 - Judge Peterson, I think the... 239 00:15:13,160 --> 00:15:16,260 - I mean, we just get out of the way, is that it? 240 00:15:16,550 --> 00:15:18,690 - Well, Judge Peterson, what I think is that there is a narrow category, 241 00:15:19,100 --> 00:15:23,180 subset of cases in which it may be appropriate 242 00:15:23,390 --> 00:15:26,940 to step aside for that narrow category of cases. 243 00:15:27,130 --> 00:15:29,570 - But mmm... the Judiciary plays a role... 244 00:15:29,740 --> 00:15:30,840 - To be sure, Judge Peterson.... 245 00:15:31,020 --> 00:15:32,220 - ...in our system. 246 00:15:32,380 --> 00:15:35,320 - Yes Your Honor and we don't mean to diminish that. 247 00:15:35,560 --> 00:15:38,010 - You're asking us to abdicate that role 248 00:15:38,410 --> 00:15:39,730 - No, Your Honor, 249 00:15:40,100 --> 00:15:43,610 but it is a question of this court's discretion whether to reach that issue. 250 00:15:44,150 --> 00:15:47,730 We do think that there is simply no way for the litigation to proceed 251 00:15:48,040 --> 00:15:52,250 without risk of divulging those very questions of privileged information 252 00:15:52,770 --> 00:15:54,910 that would cause, as Director of National Intelligence 253 00:15:55,080 --> 00:15:56,320 has explained, 254 00:15:56,850 --> 00:15:59,450 exceptionally great damage to National Security's disclose. 255 00:16:04,090 --> 00:16:05,270 Thanks for having me. 256 00:16:06,240 --> 00:16:08,370 Hum, if anybody has any questions, like I said just.. 257 00:16:08,560 --> 00:16:11,190 Basically just raise your hand and I'll try to call on you 258 00:16:11,390 --> 00:16:12,700 as soon as I possibly can. 259 00:16:13,350 --> 00:16:16,290 So, who here actually feels like they are under surveillance, 260 00:16:16,830 --> 00:16:18,220 pretty regularly? 261 00:16:20,830 --> 00:16:21,810 Everyone inside of Occupy. 262 00:16:22,100 --> 00:16:23,620 How many people here have been arrested 263 00:16:23,800 --> 00:16:26,710 and at their Court date had their phone taken into the back room? 264 00:16:27,330 --> 00:16:29,290 How many people here had their retina scanned? 265 00:16:30,470 --> 00:16:31,590 Wow. 266 00:16:34,120 --> 00:16:36,040 So you guys are actually, in a sense, the canaries in the coal mine, 267 00:16:36,250 --> 00:16:36,990 right, 268 00:16:37,220 --> 00:16:38,960 because the incentives are all lined up against you. 269 00:16:39,210 --> 00:16:42,020 Anybody see how the subway link your metro card to your debit card, 270 00:16:43,110 --> 00:16:44,860 right? And, like, auto refill. 271 00:16:45,210 --> 00:16:47,470 This is a concept which is key to everything we'll talk about today. 272 00:16:47,670 --> 00:16:48,960 And it's called linkability. 273 00:16:49,180 --> 00:16:52,000 Take one piece of data and link it to another piece of data. 274 00:16:52,400 --> 00:16:53,420 So for example, 275 00:16:53,640 --> 00:16:55,790 if you have your metro card and you have your debit card, 276 00:16:56,030 --> 00:16:57,890 you have those things and you can draw a line between them right? 277 00:16:58,460 --> 00:17:00,860 So that's, like, not a scary thing. 278 00:17:01,080 --> 00:17:04,380 Except your bank card is tied to everything else that you do during the day. 279 00:17:04,570 --> 00:17:07,560 So now they know where you're going, when you make purchases. 280 00:17:08,220 --> 00:17:11,560 So when they decide to target you, they can actually recreate your exact steps. 281 00:17:11,850 --> 00:17:13,910 With a metro card and with a credit card alone. 282 00:17:14,260 --> 00:17:15,950 Like literally where you go and what you buy 283 00:17:16,430 --> 00:17:18,940 and potentially by linking that data with other people 284 00:17:19,140 --> 00:17:21,150 on similar travel plans, 285 00:17:21,380 --> 00:17:23,460 they can figure out who you talk to and who you met with. 286 00:17:23,980 --> 00:17:26,740 When you then take cellphone data, which logs your location 287 00:17:27,330 --> 00:17:32,160 and you link up purchasing data, metro card data and your debit card. 288 00:17:32,420 --> 00:17:34,660 You start to get what you could call metadata, 289 00:17:34,840 --> 00:17:36,690 an aggregate over a person's life. 290 00:17:36,930 --> 00:17:39,700 And metadata, an aggregate, is content. 291 00:17:39,910 --> 00:17:41,600 It tells a story about you, 292 00:17:41,850 --> 00:17:44,770 which is made up of facts, but is not necessarily true. 293 00:17:44,930 --> 00:17:46,790 So for example, just because you were on the corner, 294 00:17:47,120 --> 00:17:50,500 and all these data points point to it, it doesn't mean you committed the crime. 295 00:17:50,850 --> 00:17:52,410 So it's important to note 296 00:17:52,700 --> 00:17:54,650 that if someone has a perception of you having done a thing, 297 00:17:54,830 --> 00:17:57,230 it will now follow you for the rest of your life. 298 00:17:57,590 --> 00:18:00,140 So just keep in mind that what happens to you guys for example 299 00:18:00,370 --> 00:18:04,120 with fingerprints, and retinal scans, and photographs. 300 00:18:04,440 --> 00:18:06,410 That is what is going to happen to people in the future 301 00:18:06,600 --> 00:18:08,550 when they resist policy changes and when they try to protest 302 00:18:08,960 --> 00:18:12,220 in a totally constitutionally protected way. 303 00:18:12,780 --> 00:18:14,055 This is for you, Director Clapper, again on the surveillance front. 304 00:18:15,410 --> 00:18:18,020 And I hope we can do this in just a yes or no answer, 305 00:18:18,240 --> 00:18:20,320 because I know Senator Feinstein wants to move on. 306 00:18:20,790 --> 00:18:25,790 - So, does the NSA collect any type of data at all, 307 00:18:25,980 --> 00:18:29,000 on millions or hundreds of millions of Americans ? 308 00:18:30,180 --> 00:18:31,310 - No sir. 309 00:18:32,010 --> 00:18:33,010 - It does not? 310 00:18:34,540 --> 00:18:36,490 - Not wittingly. 311 00:18:36,880 --> 00:18:39,820 There are cases where they could inadvertently, 312 00:18:40,530 --> 00:18:43,900 perhaps, collect, but not wittingly. 313 00:18:59,640 --> 00:19:02,830 Email from April 2013 314 00:19:09,650 --> 00:19:10,610 The encrypted archive 315 00:19:10,770 --> 00:19:13,380 should be available to you within seven days. 316 00:19:13,560 --> 00:19:16,400 The key will follow when everything else is done. 317 00:19:18,080 --> 00:19:19,490 The material provided, 318 00:19:19,780 --> 00:19:23,590 and investigative effort required will be too much for any one person. 319 00:19:23,820 --> 00:19:27,140 I recommend at a very minimum you involve Glen Greenwald. 320 00:19:27,340 --> 00:19:29,290 I believe you know him. 321 00:19:31,280 --> 00:19:32,520 The plaintext of the payload 322 00:19:32,700 --> 00:19:35,550 will include my true name details for the record. 323 00:19:36,330 --> 00:19:37,600 Though it will be your decision 324 00:19:37,830 --> 00:19:40,830 as to whether or how to declare my involvement. 325 00:19:41,690 --> 00:19:46,280 My personal desire is that you paint the target directly on my back. 326 00:19:46,520 --> 00:19:51,820 No one, not even my most trusted confidant, is aware of my intentions 327 00:19:52,360 --> 00:19:55,750 and it would not be fair for them to fall under suspicion for my actions. 328 00:19:55,990 --> 00:19:57,920 You may be the only one who can prevent that, 329 00:19:58,360 --> 00:20:00,730 and that is by immediately nailing me to the cross 330 00:20:00,960 --> 00:20:03,950 rather than trying to protect me as a source. 331 00:20:06,330 --> 00:20:09,970 On timing, regarding meeting up in Hong Kong, 332 00:20:10,230 --> 00:20:13,150 the first rendezvous attempt will be at 10 A.M. local time 333 00:20:13,360 --> 00:20:15,280 on Monday. 334 00:20:15,590 --> 00:20:17,840 We will meet in the hallway outside of the restaurant 335 00:20:18,000 --> 00:20:19,590 in the Mira Hotel. 336 00:20:20,370 --> 00:20:21,770 I will be working on a Rubik's cube 337 00:20:21,950 --> 00:20:23,250 so that you can identify me. 338 00:20:24,530 --> 00:20:28,410 Approach me and ask if I know the hours of the restaurant. 339 00:20:28,590 --> 00:20:30,990 I'll respond by stating that I'm not sure 340 00:20:31,290 --> 00:20:33,810 and suggest you try the lounge instead. 341 00:20:33,980 --> 00:20:38,000 I'll offer to show you where it is, and at that point we're good. 342 00:20:38,380 --> 00:20:41,010 You simply need to follow naturally. 343 00:21:17,840 --> 00:21:19,250 As far as positioning I mean 344 00:21:19,420 --> 00:21:21,560 if you want us to sit in any particular way or whatever. 345 00:21:21,720 --> 00:21:24,590 You know, I'm gonna go there just like we get better light. 346 00:21:35,800 --> 00:21:37,540 There is, you know, so many different 347 00:21:37,850 --> 00:21:39,930 enormous stories 348 00:21:40,160 --> 00:21:42,370 just that are kind of standalone stories 349 00:21:43,690 --> 00:21:46,420 that, even like you know certain things on my individual document 350 00:21:46,600 --> 00:21:48,620 that can just be their own story 351 00:21:48,820 --> 00:21:50,930 and I just want to start turning those stories out. 352 00:21:51,090 --> 00:21:54,010 I basically woke up this morning and I already started writing stories 353 00:21:54,650 --> 00:21:56,530 hum so I'm hoping to, you know, 354 00:21:56,760 --> 00:21:59,080 start publishing within like a day or two days. 355 00:21:59,430 --> 00:22:00,140 - OK 356 00:22:00,280 --> 00:22:01,680 it's as long as you're good with that 357 00:22:01,850 --> 00:22:02,440 - Yeah 358 00:22:03,000 --> 00:22:04,320 and so as far as I... 359 00:22:04,490 --> 00:22:05,700 the stuff we have to talk about, 360 00:22:05,860 --> 00:22:07,010 I mean I'm kind of like 361 00:22:07,360 --> 00:22:10,580 dichotomizing it between, 362 00:22:11,310 --> 00:22:12,900 you know, stuff that I'd like to talk you about, 363 00:22:13,060 --> 00:22:14,760 in terms of like the documents and the content. 364 00:22:14,960 --> 00:22:16,500 Laura has a bunch of questions about that as well. 365 00:22:16,740 --> 00:22:19,280 So while we're working through the documents getting your take-on, 366 00:22:19,460 --> 00:22:21,110 a lot of the stuff that, you know, 367 00:22:21,330 --> 00:22:24,760 help me understand it better, but then also the sort of You story, right... 368 00:22:25,030 --> 00:22:26,650 like the who you are? 369 00:22:26,840 --> 00:22:27,320 - Yeah 370 00:22:27,580 --> 00:22:29,460 what you've done, why you've done what you've done 371 00:22:29,610 --> 00:22:29,810 - Yeah 372 00:22:30,580 --> 00:22:31,520 and I'd love to do that first 373 00:22:31,680 --> 00:22:31,920 - OK 374 00:22:32,690 --> 00:22:35,020 in part because, you are the only one who can do that 375 00:22:35,210 --> 00:22:35,700 - Yeah 376 00:22:35,910 --> 00:22:38,240 so I'd like to just get it done so let it's done, 377 00:22:38,410 --> 00:22:42,150 and also because, you know, it might be that you wanna do that early 378 00:22:42,390 --> 00:22:42,980 - Yeah 379 00:22:43,580 --> 00:22:46,990 because, it might be necessary, we might choose to have that done early. 380 00:22:47,330 --> 00:22:50,070 What are you... tell me your thoughts, just where you are with that? 381 00:22:50,340 --> 00:22:52,430 - So primary one on that, I think I've expressed it 382 00:22:52,660 --> 00:22:53,780 a couple times online, 383 00:22:54,010 --> 00:22:58,730 is I feel the modern media has a big focus on personalities. 384 00:22:58,930 --> 00:22:59,760 - Totally 385 00:23:00,020 --> 00:23:04,470 - And I'm a little concerned (that) the more we focus on that 386 00:23:04,650 --> 00:23:06,560 the more they're going to use that as a distraction. 387 00:23:07,580 --> 00:23:11,860 I don't necessarily want that to happen, which is why I've consistently said, you know, 388 00:23:12,090 --> 00:23:16,090 I'm not the story here, hum haha, nervous uh? 389 00:23:16,800 --> 00:23:20,970 - No it's a very very cheap pen, I just, the slider is broke, go ahead. 390 00:23:21,940 --> 00:23:27,770 - Hum, but hum, yeah, anything I can do to help you guys get this out, 391 00:23:28,190 --> 00:23:29,110 I will do, 392 00:23:29,400 --> 00:23:35,940 I don't have any experience with media, with how this works 393 00:23:36,340 --> 00:23:39,110 so I'm kind of learning as I go. 394 00:23:39,560 --> 00:23:43,090 Right, so, I just want to get a sense of why did you decide to do what you've done. 395 00:23:43,460 --> 00:23:48,660 So for me it all comes down to State Power against the people's ability 396 00:23:48,910 --> 00:23:51,480 to meaningfully oppose that power. 397 00:23:51,730 --> 00:23:54,290 And I'm sitting there everyday, 398 00:23:54,490 --> 00:24:00,190 getting payed to design methods to amplify that State Power. 399 00:24:01,090 --> 00:24:04,510 And I'm realizing that if, you know, the policy switches, 400 00:24:04,970 --> 00:24:08,500 that there are the only things that restrains these states, were changed, 401 00:24:09,830 --> 00:24:12,380 there, you couldn't meaningfully oppose these. 402 00:24:12,620 --> 00:24:17,720 I mean, you have to be the most incredibly sophisticated ta* col* actor in existence. 403 00:24:18,150 --> 00:24:22,650 I'm not sure there's anybody, no matter how gifted you are, 404 00:24:22,900 --> 00:24:27,200 who could oppose all of the offices and all the bright people 405 00:24:27,620 --> 00:24:32,000 even all the mediocre people out there with all of their tools and all of their capabilities. 406 00:24:33,340 --> 00:24:36,360 And as I saw the promise of the Obama administration 407 00:24:37,890 --> 00:24:41,770 be betrayed and walk away from it. In fact, actually advance 408 00:24:42,720 --> 00:24:46,740 the things that had been promised to be sort of curtailed and rained in 409 00:24:47,180 --> 00:24:48,580 and dialed back. 410 00:24:48,770 --> 00:24:51,120 It actually gets worse, particularly drone strikes. 411 00:24:51,450 --> 00:24:52,600 Which I also learned in NSA, 412 00:24:52,860 --> 00:24:55,810 we could watch drone videos from our desktops, 413 00:24:59,450 --> 00:25:01,620 as I saw that, that really hardened me to action. 414 00:25:01,910 --> 00:25:02,850 - In real time? 415 00:25:03,040 --> 00:25:04,230 - In real time, yeah, 416 00:25:04,490 --> 00:25:09,060 it'll stream a lower quality of the video to your desktop, 417 00:25:09,540 --> 00:25:12,540 typically you'd be watching surveillance drones as opposed to actually letting you know, 418 00:25:12,800 --> 00:25:15,570 murder drones really going out there and bomb somebody. 419 00:25:16,510 --> 00:25:19,030 But you'll have a drone that's just following somebody's house 420 00:25:19,220 --> 00:25:20,580 for hours and hours. 421 00:25:20,770 --> 00:25:22,590 And you won't know who it is because, you know, 422 00:25:22,880 --> 00:25:26,070 you don't have the context for that but it's just a page 423 00:25:26,230 --> 00:25:29,320 where it's lists and lists of drone feeds 424 00:25:29,520 --> 00:25:32,270 and all these different countries with all these different code names 425 00:25:32,490 --> 00:25:35,680 and you can just click on which one you want to see. 426 00:25:36,970 --> 00:25:40,370 - Right, so if your self interest is to live in a world in which 427 00:25:40,580 --> 00:25:42,640 there's maximum privacy, 428 00:25:42,820 --> 00:25:45,370 doing something that could put you into prison, 429 00:25:45,590 --> 00:25:49,470 in which your privacy is completely destroyed is sort of the antithesis of that, 430 00:25:49,850 --> 00:25:53,720 how did you reach the point where that was a worthwhile calculation for you? 431 00:25:54,680 --> 00:25:57,670 - I remember what the Internet was like before it was being watched. 432 00:25:58,010 --> 00:26:00,710 And there has never been anything in the history of man like it. 433 00:26:01,130 --> 00:26:05,420 I mean you could have children from one part of the world 434 00:26:06,070 --> 00:26:07,790 having an equal discussion, 435 00:26:08,360 --> 00:26:10,370 where you know they were sort of granted 436 00:26:11,460 --> 00:26:14,370 the same respect for their ideas and conversation, 437 00:26:14,970 --> 00:26:17,750 with experts in the field from another part of the world 438 00:26:18,130 --> 00:26:21,320 on any topic, anywhere, anytime, all the time. 439 00:26:23,650 --> 00:26:25,140 And it was free and unrestrained. 440 00:26:25,330 --> 00:26:29,410 And we've seen the chilling of that, the cooling of that and the changing 441 00:26:29,600 --> 00:26:33,850 of that model towards something which people self police their own views. 442 00:26:34,090 --> 00:26:36,920 And they literally make their own jokes on ending up on the list 443 00:26:37,280 --> 00:26:42,390 if they donate to a political cause or if they say something in a discussion. 444 00:26:42,700 --> 00:26:46,580 And it has become an expectation that we're being watched. 445 00:26:47,350 --> 00:26:50,120 Many people I've talked to have mentioned that they're careful about what they type 446 00:26:50,450 --> 00:26:51,840 into search engines. 447 00:26:52,140 --> 00:26:53,740 Because they know that it's being recorded. 448 00:26:54,010 --> 00:26:57,910 And that limits the boundaries of their intellectual exploration. 449 00:27:02,720 --> 00:27:07,520 And I'm more willing to risk 450 00:27:08,110 --> 00:27:09,160 imprisonment 451 00:27:09,370 --> 00:27:12,390 or any other negative outcome personally 452 00:27:12,750 --> 00:27:16,120 than I am willing to risk 453 00:27:16,550 --> 00:27:18,980 the curtailment of my intellectual freedom 454 00:27:19,770 --> 00:27:22,300 and that of those around me, 455 00:27:22,630 --> 00:27:26,270 whom I care for equally as I do for myself. 456 00:27:26,740 --> 00:27:29,470 And again that's not to say that I'm self sacrificing 457 00:27:32,020 --> 00:27:33,710 because it gives me, I feel good, 458 00:27:34,240 --> 00:27:35,660 in my human experience 459 00:27:35,940 --> 00:27:37,900 to know that I can contribute to the good of others. 460 00:27:54,770 --> 00:27:56,530 - Could you elaborate on that? 461 00:27:57,290 --> 00:28:01,740 - So, I don't know how much the programs and the actual technical capacities 462 00:28:02,060 --> 00:28:05,350 everybody's talked to you about but there is an infrastructure in place 463 00:28:05,580 --> 00:28:10,440 in the United States and world wide that NSA has built 464 00:28:11,440 --> 00:28:16,120 in cooperation with other governments as well, 465 00:28:17,060 --> 00:28:18,860 that intercepts 466 00:28:20,080 --> 00:28:21,220 basically every 467 00:28:21,490 --> 00:28:23,230 digital communication, 468 00:28:23,670 --> 00:28:25,550 every radio communication, 469 00:28:26,090 --> 00:28:27,800 every analog communication 470 00:28:28,160 --> 00:28:31,420 that it has sensors in place to detect. 471 00:28:31,760 --> 00:28:34,170 And with these capabilities, 472 00:28:34,610 --> 00:28:38,170 basically the vast majority 473 00:28:39,160 --> 00:28:39,930 of human 474 00:28:40,730 --> 00:28:42,860 and computer to computer communications, 475 00:28:43,190 --> 00:28:44,340 device-based communication, 476 00:28:44,690 --> 00:28:47,920 which that sort of then forms the relationships between humans, 477 00:28:49,520 --> 00:28:52,150 are automatically ingested without targeting. 478 00:28:53,220 --> 00:28:56,020 And that allows individuals to retroactively 479 00:28:56,420 --> 00:29:00,400 search your communications based on self certifications. 480 00:29:00,770 --> 00:29:04,330 So for example, if I wanted to see the content 481 00:29:04,570 --> 00:29:06,580 of your email or, 482 00:29:07,110 --> 00:29:08,630 you know, your wife's phone calls 483 00:29:08,880 --> 00:29:10,510 or anything like that. 484 00:29:10,910 --> 00:29:14,810 All I have to do is use what's called a selector. 485 00:29:15,060 --> 00:29:18,230 Any kind of thing 486 00:29:18,660 --> 00:29:20,520 in the communication's chain 487 00:29:21,410 --> 00:29:24,010 that might uniquely or almost uniquely 488 00:29:24,220 --> 00:29:24,980 identify you as an individual. 489 00:29:25,190 --> 00:29:27,080 And I'm talking about things like email addresses, 490 00:29:27,450 --> 00:29:28,840 IP addresses, phone numbers, 491 00:29:29,060 --> 00:29:30,090 credit cards, 492 00:29:31,460 --> 00:29:32,920 even passwords 493 00:29:33,260 --> 00:29:35,710 that are unique to you, that aren't used by anyone else. 494 00:29:36,900 --> 00:29:39,040 I can input those into the system 495 00:29:39,510 --> 00:29:41,530 and it will not only go back through the database 496 00:29:42,130 --> 00:29:45,550 and go "have I seen this anywhere in the past?", 497 00:29:46,970 --> 00:29:50,270 it will basically put an additional level of scrutiny on it 498 00:29:50,880 --> 00:29:52,580 moving into the future that says 499 00:29:53,290 --> 00:29:55,530 "if this is detected now or at anytime in the future, 500 00:29:57,270 --> 00:30:00,300 I want this to go to me immediately" and alert me in real time 501 00:30:00,490 --> 00:30:02,080 that you're communicating with someone, 502 00:30:02,260 --> 00:30:03,000 things like that. 503 00:30:07,590 --> 00:30:09,690 - So I don't know who you are or anything about you. 504 00:30:11,360 --> 00:30:17,760 - Ok. I work for Booz Allen Hamilton, defense contractor. 505 00:30:18,940 --> 00:30:22,360 I am sort of on loan to NSA, I don't talk to Booz Allen boss, 506 00:30:22,610 --> 00:30:24,840 I don't get tasking from Booz Allen, it's all from NSA. 507 00:30:25,610 --> 00:30:26,770 - So, I don't know your name. 508 00:30:27,080 --> 00:30:30,500 - Oh, sorry, my name is Edward Snowden, 509 00:30:30,850 --> 00:30:32,230 I go by Ed. 510 00:30:33,430 --> 00:30:35,720 Edward Joseph Snowden is the full name. 511 00:30:35,980 --> 00:30:39,080 (spelling) S. N. O. W. D. E. N.. 512 00:30:39,420 --> 00:30:40,570 - And where are you from ? 513 00:30:41,030 --> 00:30:44,310 - I'm originally... I was born in North Carolina, 514 00:30:44,690 --> 00:30:46,500 small town, Elizabeth City. 515 00:30:46,690 --> 00:30:47,660 There is a Coast Guard station there, 516 00:30:47,920 --> 00:30:49,200 I'm from a military family. 517 00:30:49,960 --> 00:30:54,130 But I spent most of my time growing up around Fort Meade in Maryland. 518 00:30:56,940 --> 00:31:00,990 - And your family, what's the consequences for them? 519 00:31:02,900 --> 00:31:05,580 - This is actually what has made this hardest. 520 00:31:05,960 --> 00:31:11,460 My family doesn't know what's happening, they're unaware. 521 00:31:14,710 --> 00:31:17,730 I don't think I'll be able to keep the family ties 522 00:31:18,020 --> 00:31:21,920 that I've had for all my life 523 00:31:22,280 --> 00:31:25,580 because of the risk of associating them with this. 524 00:31:26,940 --> 00:31:30,780 And I'll leave what to publish and what not to publish to you guys, 525 00:31:31,410 --> 00:31:38,180 I trust you'll be responsible on this. But basically, the closer I stay to my family, 526 00:31:40,160 --> 00:31:41,530 the more likely they are to be leaned on. 527 00:31:41,780 --> 00:31:42,950 - So you don't want me to report this? 528 00:31:43,230 --> 00:31:45,040 - We dont have ... I mean, we definitely want to do 529 00:31:45,250 --> 00:31:48,830 whatever we can not to include them or bring them into the mix 530 00:31:49,310 --> 00:31:51,370 - Oh I'm sorry that's fine, I won't... 531 00:31:52,040 --> 00:31:53,070 - I'm sorry I'm going to interrupt you. 532 00:31:53,410 --> 00:31:55,930 Can we just stop for a second, do the document and then go back to that? 533 00:31:56,960 --> 00:32:00,630 - What do I need? Do I need an email address that we're using or... 534 00:32:00,920 --> 00:32:06,170 - Well you can send... Once you've encrypted it, you can send it from whatever you think is appropriate. 535 00:32:06,650 --> 00:32:08,870 The main thing is you've got to encapsulate all of this 536 00:32:09,320 --> 00:32:13,300 in a way that it can't be decrypted and read 537 00:32:13,710 --> 00:32:18,260 once it's in transit across the network or on either of the end points. 538 00:32:18,770 --> 00:32:21,000 - Ok I mean just so you know these documents are basically all going 539 00:32:21,620 --> 00:32:23,490 to be uploaded within like 48 hours. 540 00:32:23,880 --> 00:32:25,170 - This is simply.. 541 00:32:25,410 --> 00:32:27,600 You want to get in the process of doing this for everything because 542 00:32:27,880 --> 00:32:30,870 it seems hard but it's not hard, this is super easy. 543 00:32:31,210 --> 00:32:32,530 - Ok so just walk me through it. 544 00:32:32,770 --> 00:32:37,050 - Ok. Show me the actual folder structure where these files are first. 545 00:32:41,410 --> 00:32:42,620 - How many documents did you say there were? 546 00:32:42,990 --> 00:32:44,250 - Seven 547 00:32:44,460 --> 00:32:45,130 - Ok well, while you're working... 548 00:32:45,390 --> 00:32:47,060 - Ok go ahead 549 00:32:48,370 --> 00:32:49,520 - How many documents are we talking about? 550 00:32:49,970 --> 00:32:50,660 Because in The Guardian, 551 00:32:50,920 --> 00:32:52,670 that Wikileaks, technical people 552 00:32:52,850 --> 00:32:54,440 set up a system 553 00:32:54,690 --> 00:32:57,030 so that they were available for anybody to see 554 00:32:58,140 --> 00:33:00,990 and I just wonder if it's possible to do the same thing. 555 00:33:02,220 --> 00:33:03,910 - That would be the ideal end game. 556 00:33:06,000 --> 00:33:10,930 But because some of these documents are legitimately classified 557 00:33:11,580 --> 00:33:14,900 in ways that could cause harm to people and methods. 558 00:33:15,940 --> 00:33:19,100 I'm comfortable in my technical ability to protect them. 559 00:33:19,380 --> 00:33:21,110 I mean you could literally shoot me or torture me 560 00:33:21,700 --> 00:33:24,790 and I could not disclose the password, if I wanted to. 561 00:33:26,500 --> 00:33:29,230 I have the sophistication to do that. 562 00:33:29,600 --> 00:33:32,490 There are some journalists that I think could do that, 563 00:33:32,930 --> 00:33:34,840 but there are a number of them that couldn't. 564 00:33:35,140 --> 00:33:37,020 But the question becomes, 565 00:33:37,260 --> 00:33:39,270 can an organization 566 00:33:39,580 --> 00:33:42,400 actually control that information 567 00:33:42,670 --> 00:33:43,970 in that manner 568 00:33:44,270 --> 00:33:47,050 without risking basically an uncontrolled disclosure? 569 00:33:47,680 --> 00:33:49,300 But I do agree with that, honestly 570 00:33:49,930 --> 00:33:52,600 I don't want to be the person making the decisions 571 00:33:52,940 --> 00:33:54,630 on what should be public and what shouldn't. 572 00:33:54,980 --> 00:33:58,090 Which is why rather than publishing these on my own, 573 00:33:58,720 --> 00:34:02,180 or putting them out openly, I'm running them through journalists. 574 00:34:02,430 --> 00:34:04,920 So that my bias, and my things, 575 00:34:05,170 --> 00:34:07,700 because clearly I have some strongly held views, 576 00:34:07,990 --> 00:34:09,960 are removed from that equation 577 00:34:10,520 --> 00:34:12,840 and the public interest is being represented in the most responsible manner. 578 00:34:13,770 --> 00:34:14,600 - Yeah. 579 00:34:15,490 --> 00:34:22,250 - Actually given your sort of... Geographic familiarity 580 00:34:22,610 --> 00:34:23,910 with the U.K and whatnot. 581 00:34:24,440 --> 00:34:32,360 I'd like to point out that GCHQ has probably the most invasive... 582 00:34:32,650 --> 00:34:37,480 - I know - network intercept program anywhere in the world. 583 00:34:38,030 --> 00:34:41,950 It's called TEMPORA, (spelling) T. E. M. P. O. R. A. 584 00:34:43,360 --> 00:34:46,000 and it's the world's first "full take", they call it, and that means 585 00:34:46,310 --> 00:34:47,600 content in addition to metadata 586 00:34:47,770 --> 00:34:49,230 on everything. 587 00:34:51,710 --> 00:34:54,430 - So this is what I'd like to do just in term of scheduling 588 00:34:54,620 --> 00:34:58,190 if it's good with everybody else. Are you feeling you're done? 589 00:34:58,420 --> 00:34:59,590 - Yeah yeah I'm done. 590 00:35:00,780 --> 00:35:02,770 - So, I'm anxious to go back, 591 00:35:03,050 --> 00:35:04,360 get those articles done 592 00:35:04,960 --> 00:35:06,510 and then there is a bunch of documents 593 00:35:06,700 --> 00:35:09,480 that aren't about those first two or three stories that I'd like to spend time with you... 594 00:35:09,700 --> 00:35:10,400 - Sure yeah 595 00:35:10,600 --> 00:35:11,510 - ...kinda going over. 596 00:35:12,260 --> 00:35:14,110 - I'm not going anywhere. 597 00:35:14,340 --> 00:35:16,660 - You're available? You want to check your book first? 598 00:35:18,100 --> 00:35:19,450 - Let me check my schedule. 599 00:35:19,690 --> 00:35:20,540 - Is that good for you Laura? You want to... 600 00:35:20,610 --> 00:35:22,770 - It's great. - OK 601 00:35:37,790 --> 00:35:39,720 - Hello 602 00:35:39,960 --> 00:35:41,250 - Yes 603 00:35:41,450 --> 00:35:47,070 - My meal was great thank you very much 604 00:35:47,410 --> 00:35:50,440 - No I still have some left and I think I'm gonna be eating it later 605 00:35:50,710 --> 00:35:54,430 so you can just leave me alone for now. 606 00:35:54,830 --> 00:35:57,940 - Ok great thank you so much, have a good one bye. 607 00:36:01,200 --> 00:36:03,440 Let's fix that real quick. 608 00:36:05,740 --> 00:36:07,380 So another fun thing I was telling Laura about this: 609 00:36:07,770 --> 00:36:09,410 all these new VOIP phones 610 00:36:09,660 --> 00:36:10,900 they have little computers in them 611 00:36:11,180 --> 00:36:13,390 and you can hot mike these over the network, 612 00:36:13,590 --> 00:36:15,700 all the time even when the receiver's down so... 613 00:36:16,310 --> 00:36:17,340 as long as it's plugged in 614 00:36:17,610 --> 00:36:18,520 it can be listening on. 615 00:36:18,930 --> 00:36:21,510 And I haven't even considered that earlier. But yeah... 616 00:36:21,700 --> 00:36:22,380 - OK. 617 00:36:22,560 --> 00:36:24,270 - There are so many ways... This could be... 618 00:36:25,170 --> 00:36:26,660 Everything that's in here is pretty much gonna be 619 00:36:26,980 --> 00:36:28,360 on the public record at some point. 620 00:36:28,570 --> 00:36:29,830 We should operate on that. 621 00:36:30,060 --> 00:36:31,720 - Yeah. Yeah, I think... I think we are... 622 00:36:32,320 --> 00:36:34,090 - So, do you have your air gapped machine with you? 623 00:36:34,310 --> 00:36:35,230 - I do, I do. 624 00:36:35,420 --> 00:36:36,530 - Let me pop that out. 625 00:36:40,130 --> 00:36:41,550 - Do you have an understanding or commitment on 626 00:36:41,840 --> 00:36:44,150 when you guys are gonna to press for the first stories? 627 00:36:44,880 --> 00:36:47,050 - It's very seven or eight in the morning in London. 628 00:36:47,670 --> 00:36:48,700 - Uh uh, OK. 629 00:36:50,720 --> 00:36:53,940 Oh, let's see here. 630 00:37:00,460 --> 00:37:02,330 Ok, hey look there's another one. 631 00:37:04,410 --> 00:37:09,760 Pro tip, let's not leave the same SD cards in our laptops forever in the future. 632 00:37:14,850 --> 00:37:18,020 - Did you know this was still kicking around in your laptop? 633 00:37:18,580 --> 00:37:19,140 - Yeah, I mean that was the... mmh... 634 00:37:19,360 --> 00:37:20,270 - OK, just to make it sure. 635 00:37:21,430 --> 00:37:22,770 - OK, yeah. This is it? 636 00:37:22,950 --> 00:37:23,180 - Yeah. 637 00:37:23,570 --> 00:37:23,910 - OK. 638 00:37:24,200 --> 00:37:24,760 - Right there. 639 00:37:25,430 --> 00:37:27,810 - Thanks. You will have a new one who will look exactly identical 640 00:37:28,020 --> 00:37:30,340 but it's a different archive. So you might want to take 641 00:37:32,590 --> 00:37:35,900 Could you pass me my magic mantle of power? 642 00:37:36,120 --> 00:37:37,560 - Uh uh... 643 00:37:44,280 --> 00:37:47,030 Is that about possibility of overhead? 644 00:37:47,510 --> 00:37:53,450 - Visual. yes, Visual collection. 645 00:37:55,790 --> 00:37:57,200 I don't think at this point there is anything in this regards 646 00:37:57,460 --> 00:37:59,200 that would shock us. 647 00:38:00,080 --> 00:38:02,330 We become pretty... Ewen you once said before, 648 00:38:02,560 --> 00:38:04,830 he's like, he's like: I'm never leaving my room, 649 00:38:05,010 --> 00:38:06,990 I'm never leaving anything in my room again. 650 00:38:07,190 --> 00:38:08,040 And the single machine... I was like 651 00:38:08,260 --> 00:38:12,780 you've been infected by the paranoia bug, happens to all of us. 652 00:38:13,000 --> 00:38:15,760 He was like... I would never leave a single of these device, 653 00:38:15,990 --> 00:38:17,940 and I would never leave my and again alone. 654 00:38:18,470 --> 00:38:19,790 - My bag's getting heavier and heavier 655 00:38:20,000 --> 00:38:20,790 - Exactly 656 00:38:26,180 --> 00:38:27,340 Alright, I'm gonna need you to enter 657 00:38:27,660 --> 00:38:31,910 your root password 'cause I don't know what it is. 658 00:38:32,390 --> 00:38:35,160 If you wanna use this you're more than welcome, so uh .. 659 00:38:35,500 --> 00:38:38,160 - OK, looks like your root password's not 4 caracters long anyway. 660 00:38:38,350 --> 00:38:41,470 - it's usually a lot longer but that's just like a one time only thing, right? 661 00:38:41,760 --> 00:38:43,370 - So, it is uh... 662 00:38:43,610 --> 00:38:46,800 - It had been a lot longer but ever since I knew is that it was a one time only session, 663 00:38:47,240 --> 00:38:49,290 I've been making it shorter. Is that not good? 664 00:38:49,670 --> 00:38:53,200 - It's actually not. I was expressing this with Laura either. 665 00:38:53,920 --> 00:38:55,840 The issue is because of the fact it's got a hardware MAC address 666 00:38:56,100 --> 00:38:56,870 and things like that, 667 00:38:57,170 --> 00:39:01,630 and if people are able to identify your machine and they're able to... 668 00:39:01,800 --> 00:39:03,810 - This is the fact you're about to break the most upsetting story? 669 00:39:04,060 --> 00:39:05,120 - Yeah, that's true. 670 00:39:05,550 --> 00:39:06,740 - So they might kinda prioritize 671 00:39:07,120 --> 00:39:10,100 - It's ten letters I type very quickly. Actually it's ten letters but... 672 00:39:10,380 --> 00:39:15,170 - So ten letters would be good if they had to bruteforce the entire key space. 673 00:39:16,390 --> 00:39:19,570 That would still probably only take a couple of days for NSA. Uh... 674 00:39:22,590 --> 00:39:26,970 That's a fire alarm, OK... 675 00:39:27,870 --> 00:39:32,310 - hopefully this just sounds like a 3 seconds test or is this... 676 00:39:32,530 --> 00:39:37,460 Do you wanna to call the desk and ask? It's fine. 677 00:39:37,730 --> 00:39:40,280 - Yeah, I don't think it's an issue, but it's interesting that I just. 678 00:39:40,470 --> 00:39:41,570 - did that happen before? 679 00:39:41,770 --> 00:39:45,900 - Maybe they got mad cause they couldn't listen into us through the phone anymore. 680 00:39:46,750 --> 00:39:49,380 - Has the fire alarm gone off before? 681 00:39:49,740 --> 00:39:59,540 - No that's the first time that has happened. Let me... so just in case they have like an alert 682 00:40:01,800 --> 00:40:02,950 - We probably... 683 00:40:03,150 --> 00:40:04,770 - We might have to evacuate. 684 00:40:04,990 --> 00:40:07,400 - Should we ignore that, I don't know? 685 00:40:07,690 --> 00:40:09,150 - It's not continuous. 686 00:40:09,400 --> 00:40:13,660 - It's not continuous. No, I'm just saying if it continues... 687 00:40:17,620 --> 00:40:19,610 - And then we come and meet the guys down in the lobby. 688 00:40:20,290 --> 00:40:20,890 - Yeah, alright. 689 00:40:21,180 --> 00:40:22,360 - Yeah. 690 00:40:23,150 --> 00:40:29,040 - Yeah let's, let's leave for now when we'll have finished this up. 691 00:40:40,240 --> 00:40:42,820 Not that they're gonna answer 'cause they probably have seven thousands calls. 692 00:40:43,030 --> 00:40:44,190 - Yeah. 693 00:40:46,980 --> 00:40:49,690 - Hi, we hear a loud buzzing on the tenth flour. 694 00:40:49,960 --> 00:40:51,160 Can you tell us what that is? 695 00:40:53,600 --> 00:40:54,400 Ah, OK. 696 00:40:55,210 --> 00:40:56,000 OK, great. 697 00:40:56,180 --> 00:40:57,400 Thank you, bye. 698 00:40:58,930 --> 00:41:01,040 Fire alarm testing, maintenance. 699 00:41:01,290 --> 00:41:03,030 - Yes. that's good, that's what I wanted to hear. 700 00:41:05,150 --> 00:41:11,140 - Nice of them to... Nice of them to let us know 701 00:41:12,830 --> 00:41:14,930 Uhm, I just wanna give you kind of a quick tour, uh.. 702 00:41:15,200 --> 00:41:17,370 when Laura was looking at this she was kind of salivating... 703 00:41:17,710 --> 00:41:19,650 and couldn't stop like actually reading these documents 704 00:41:20,070 --> 00:41:21,760 - Right, right. So we'll try and restrain ourselves 705 00:41:22,000 --> 00:41:23,410 although I don't promise that it will succeed. 706 00:41:23,870 --> 00:41:26,010 - I just wanna kinda explain a brief overview 707 00:41:26,710 --> 00:41:28,560 of what these are and how they're organized. 708 00:41:28,890 --> 00:41:30,900 On the beginning of document of interest, 709 00:41:31,210 --> 00:41:33,590 the primary purposes of the second archive is to bring the focus over to 710 00:41:33,840 --> 00:41:36,900 SSO as opposed to PRISM. 711 00:41:37,140 --> 00:41:40,470 This is in general. SSO are the Special Source Operations. 712 00:41:41,030 --> 00:41:45,250 This is the world wide passive collection on networks 713 00:41:45,710 --> 00:41:49,110 they're both domestic to the US and international. 714 00:41:49,540 --> 00:41:51,650 There's a lot of different ways they do it 715 00:41:51,900 --> 00:41:54,710 but, uh corporate partnerships are one of the primary things, 716 00:41:54,910 --> 00:41:57,060 they do domestically they also do this for multinationals 717 00:41:57,270 --> 00:41:59,520 that might be headquarted in the US so they can kinda coerce 718 00:41:59,720 --> 00:42:01,740 or just pay into giving them access. 719 00:42:02,090 --> 00:42:05,220 And they also do bilaterally with the assistance of certain governments. 720 00:42:05,840 --> 00:42:07,430 And that's based on the premise that they go 721 00:42:07,690 --> 00:42:10,990 "All right, we'll help you set the system up if you give us all the data from it". 722 00:42:12,090 --> 00:42:16,590 Hum, there's... there's a lot more here 723 00:42:16,910 --> 00:42:19,010 than any one person or probably one team could do. 724 00:42:19,200 --> 00:42:20,160 - Right 725 00:42:20,400 --> 00:42:22,290 Hum, XKEYSCORE Deep Dive. 726 00:42:22,700 --> 00:42:26,000 XKEYSCORE in general, and there's a huge folder of documentation 727 00:42:26,200 --> 00:42:28,000 on XKEYSCORE and how it works, 728 00:42:28,810 --> 00:42:30,990 is the front-end system that analysts use 729 00:42:33,420 --> 00:42:34,330 for querying that sort of ocean of raw singing that I was telling you about. 730 00:42:34,730 --> 00:42:37,670 All that stuff where you can sort of do the retroactive searches, 731 00:42:38,020 --> 00:42:39,820 live searches, get flagging, what not. 732 00:42:40,560 --> 00:42:42,940 XKEYSCORE is the front-end for that. 733 00:42:44,650 --> 00:42:48,480 I'm just gonna show you one slide here, 'cause Laura thought it was valuable 734 00:42:48,690 --> 00:42:53,090 on this talk on kinda how these capabilities ramp up 735 00:42:53,300 --> 00:42:55,760 in sophistication over time. 736 00:42:56,230 --> 00:42:57,520 This is kinda nice. 737 00:42:57,840 --> 00:42:59,730 As of fiscal year 2011, they could monitor 738 00:43:00,120 --> 00:43:04,540 1 billion telephones and internet sessions simultanously, 739 00:43:04,800 --> 00:43:06,370 per one of these devices, 740 00:43:06,840 --> 00:43:11,710 and they can collect at a rate of 125 Gigabytes a second, 741 00:43:13,590 --> 00:43:14,590 which is a Terabit per second. 742 00:43:15,000 --> 00:43:15,710 - That's for each one of these? 743 00:43:15,970 --> 00:43:17,290 - That's for each one of these, yeah. 744 00:43:17,520 --> 00:43:19,940 - How many TUMULT missions would that be then? 745 00:43:20,140 --> 00:43:22,480 - Part of this, back then there were 20 sites, 746 00:43:22,850 --> 00:43:25,750 there's ten at DOD installations. 747 00:43:25,970 --> 00:43:28,720 But these are all outdated, we've expanded pretty rapidly. 748 00:43:31,350 --> 00:43:33,460 But still 20 sites, that's at least 20 billion. 749 00:43:33,720 --> 00:43:36,950 - This all need to get out. You know what I mean, it's like... 750 00:43:37,330 --> 00:43:43,010 Just in terms of understanding, the capabilities, it's so opaque. 751 00:43:43,320 --> 00:43:45,540 - It's not science fiction. This stuff is happening right now. 752 00:43:45,820 --> 00:43:47,920 - No, that's what I mean, it's like... The magnitude of it, 753 00:43:48,770 --> 00:43:52,990 and like this a pretty inaccessible technical document. 754 00:43:53,830 --> 00:43:56,690 But, even this it's really chilling, you know what I mean? 755 00:43:57,100 --> 00:43:59,710 Yeah, I mean, we should be having debates 756 00:44:00,180 --> 00:44:01,910 about whether we want Government 757 00:44:02,260 --> 00:44:05,750 I mean this is massive and extraordinary. It's amazing... 758 00:44:06,670 --> 00:44:08,340 Even though you know it... Even though you know that... 759 00:44:08,880 --> 00:44:12,280 to see it like the physical blueprints of it 760 00:44:12,640 --> 00:44:14,430 and sort of the technical expressions of it, 761 00:44:15,350 --> 00:44:19,485 brutally hits home like... in a super visceral way that is so needed. 762 00:44:25,350 --> 00:44:26,580 This is CNN Breaking news 763 00:44:26,880 --> 00:44:30,420 An explosive new report is re-igniting the concerns 764 00:44:30,710 --> 00:44:34,550 that your privacy is being violated to protect America's "security". 765 00:44:34,970 --> 00:44:38,760 It reveals a court order giving the National Security Agency 766 00:44:39,460 --> 00:44:42,170 blanket access to millions of Verizon customer's records 767 00:44:42,450 --> 00:44:43,850 on a daily basis. 768 00:44:44,080 --> 00:44:46,110 Earlier I had the chance to conduct the first TV interview 769 00:44:46,350 --> 00:44:48,650 with the reporter who broke this story wide open, 770 00:44:49,090 --> 00:44:51,420 Glenn Greenwald, of The Guardian. 771 00:44:52,260 --> 00:44:53,420 Congratulations on the scoop! 772 00:44:53,710 --> 00:44:56,690 Explain for our viewers why this is important? 773 00:44:58,310 --> 00:45:00,010 It's important because people have understood 774 00:45:00,240 --> 00:45:02,780 that the law that this was done under, which is the Patriot Act 775 00:45:03,010 --> 00:45:04,620 enacted in the wake of 9/11. 776 00:45:05,000 --> 00:45:08,480 Was a law that allowed the government very broad powers to get records 777 00:45:08,710 --> 00:45:14,060 about people with a lower level of suspicion and probable cause to traditional standards. 778 00:45:14,270 --> 00:45:16,430 So it has always been assumed that under the Patriot Act, 779 00:45:16,600 --> 00:45:18,850 if the government had even any suspicion that you where involved 780 00:45:19,000 --> 00:45:22,270 in a crime or terrorism, they could get a lot of information about you. 781 00:45:22,600 --> 00:45:25,500 What this court order does that makes it so striking 782 00:45:25,750 --> 00:45:30,420 is that it's not directed at any individuals who they believe or have suspicion of 783 00:45:30,680 --> 00:45:32,950 committing crime or a part of a terrorist organization. 784 00:45:33,270 --> 00:45:37,980 It's collecting the phone records of every single customer of Verizon business 785 00:45:38,410 --> 00:45:41,500 and finding out every single call that they've made internationally and locally. 786 00:45:41,970 --> 00:45:45,390 So it's indiscriminant and it's sweeping. It's a Government program designed 787 00:45:45,680 --> 00:45:47,400 to collect information about all Americans 788 00:45:47,730 --> 00:45:49,960 not just people where they believe there is reason to think 789 00:45:50,180 --> 00:45:51,240 they've done anything wrong. 790 00:46:53,340 --> 00:46:54,530 It's a tough situation 791 00:46:54,780 --> 00:46:55,990 You know hearing that 792 00:46:56,200 --> 00:46:59,060 the person that you love that you've spent the decade with 793 00:46:59,540 --> 00:47:01,210 may not be coming back. 794 00:47:06,060 --> 00:47:07,280 - What did they ask her? 795 00:47:08,960 --> 00:47:10,910 - Hum... When was the last time she saw me? 796 00:47:11,080 --> 00:47:12,380 Where am I? 797 00:47:12,690 --> 00:47:14,160 What am I doing? 798 00:47:14,400 --> 00:47:15,240 Hum.. you know. 799 00:47:15,440 --> 00:47:17,300 What does she know about my illness? 800 00:47:17,750 --> 00:47:18,820 Things like that. 801 00:47:22,050 --> 00:47:27,080 So yeah they're pretty solidly aware. 802 00:47:27,450 --> 00:47:29,260 Cause she's... 803 00:47:29,570 --> 00:47:32,420 I'm clearly not at home ill. 804 00:47:53,240 --> 00:47:55,190 - Hello, hello 805 00:47:56,590 --> 00:47:59,600 - Hello, let me disconnect from the Internet. 806 00:48:04,000 --> 00:48:05,650 - So there is some news? 807 00:48:06,210 --> 00:48:07,780 - Yes there was indeed some news. 808 00:48:09,410 --> 00:48:12,300 - I have config today, I think, maybe just a few hours ago. 809 00:48:12,810 --> 00:48:16,030 - What kind of people does it...? 810 00:48:18,130 --> 00:48:23,420 - An HR lady I'm assuming from NSA as opposed to Booz Allen. 811 00:48:23,900 --> 00:48:25,450 Because she has was accompanied by a police officer 812 00:48:25,740 --> 00:48:28,800 which mean the NSA police and they're planning to break into my house 813 00:48:29,190 --> 00:48:31,640 which regular police don't do. 814 00:48:31,860 --> 00:48:33,340 - Does she lives there? 815 00:48:33,610 --> 00:48:36,700 - Yeah she lives there so I told her to cooperate fully 816 00:48:37,270 --> 00:48:38,760 I can't find my phone just one second. 817 00:48:39,040 --> 00:48:40,300 and don't worry about herself 818 00:48:40,570 --> 00:48:42,700 You know what I gonna do, I'll just take out the stuff I want to use. 819 00:48:42,950 --> 00:48:43,930 - OK 820 00:48:44,670 --> 00:48:47,290 - OK well look I mean this is not a surprise at all. 821 00:48:47,540 --> 00:48:50,500 - Not yeah I know I planned for it but it's just you know when it's impacting 822 00:48:50,830 --> 00:48:52,900 and when they're talking to you it's a little bit different. 823 00:48:53,170 --> 00:48:53,850 - Absolutely 824 00:48:55,860 --> 00:48:59,140 - But it's possible that they just noticed that you're missing 825 00:48:59,330 --> 00:49:00,640 I guess it's not really possible. 826 00:49:00,850 --> 00:49:05,760 - It is but yeah they're I mean 827 00:49:08,750 --> 00:49:10,840 Hum... let me just get rid of this. 828 00:49:12,840 --> 00:49:16,810 So I obviously was focused on other things than appearance this morning. 829 00:49:19,010 --> 00:49:21,930 - How was she? How does she reacted? Was she relatively calm about it? 830 00:49:22,110 --> 00:49:23,310 - She's relatively calm. 831 00:49:23,600 --> 00:49:25,180 - Does she know anything about what you're doing? 832 00:49:25,470 --> 00:49:27,510 - She has, she has no idea 833 00:49:27,970 --> 00:49:31,550 and that's I mean I feel badly about that 834 00:49:31,780 --> 00:49:33,590 but that's the only way I could think of where 835 00:49:33,920 --> 00:49:36,040 like she can't be in trouble. 836 00:49:36,240 --> 00:49:37,900 - Did you just basically do a "I have to go somewhere for reasons 837 00:49:38,170 --> 00:49:39,750 that I can't tell you about" kind of thing? 838 00:49:39,980 --> 00:49:42,140 - I just disappeared when she was on vacation 839 00:49:42,550 --> 00:49:44,770 and I left a note saying 840 00:49:44,960 --> 00:49:47,020 "Hey I'm gonna be away for a while for work" 841 00:49:47,240 --> 00:49:49,260 which isn't unusual for me in my business 842 00:49:49,760 --> 00:49:50,320 - Right 843 00:49:50,570 --> 00:49:51,140 you know so 844 00:49:51,380 --> 00:49:53,620 - OK so let me ask a couple things just quickly. 845 00:49:53,840 --> 00:49:57,050 Are they gonna be able to go into your stuff and figure out what you took? 846 00:49:59,940 --> 00:50:06,460 - Hum in some kind of some sort of like peripheral sense but not necessarily 847 00:50:06,970 --> 00:50:10,610 - Yes because I cast such a wide net 848 00:50:10,850 --> 00:50:12,900 I they do that the only thing they're gonna do is they're gonna have a heart attack 849 00:50:13,120 --> 00:50:14,960 because they're gonna go "He had access to everything" 850 00:50:15,220 --> 00:50:15,680 - Yeah 851 00:50:15,940 --> 00:50:19,130 and they not gonna know what specifically has been done. 852 00:50:19,410 --> 00:50:22,240 I think they're gonna start to actually feel a little better 853 00:50:22,540 --> 00:50:26,070 although they're not gonna be wild about this in any case. 854 00:50:26,530 --> 00:50:29,540 When they see that the stories are kind of cleaving to a trend 855 00:50:29,940 --> 00:50:30,730 you know it's not like 856 00:50:31,000 --> 00:50:32,940 "Here is the list of everybody who works everywhere" 857 00:50:33,170 --> 00:50:33,960 - Right 858 00:50:34,240 --> 00:50:36,870 - I also think you know there're gonna be paranoid in the extreme 859 00:50:37,230 --> 00:50:39,020 and assuming all kind of worst case scenarios 860 00:50:40,570 --> 00:50:42,010 which is gonna you know I think 861 00:50:42,310 --> 00:50:46,550 make them react in ways that probably aren't like gonna be particularly 862 00:50:46,920 --> 00:50:48,880 rational on their part 863 00:50:49,960 --> 00:50:52,630 but at the same time there's... I do think they're limited 864 00:50:52,830 --> 00:50:53,970 for the moment. 865 00:50:54,190 --> 00:50:58,440 - I agree and I mean, I had kind of time to set a stage where 866 00:50:58,770 --> 00:51:00,920 we all enjoy at least a minimum level of protection you know 867 00:51:01,150 --> 00:51:03,710 no matter who we are who's involved in this you know you're either a journalist 868 00:51:03,960 --> 00:51:04,540 - Right 869 00:51:04,730 --> 00:51:06,030 or you're either out of jurisdiction 870 00:51:06,260 --> 00:51:08,740 so we have some time to play this before they can really get nasty. 871 00:51:08,940 --> 00:51:11,230 I think it's over you know the weeks when they have times to get lawyers, 872 00:51:11,670 --> 00:51:12,920 really sort of go 873 00:51:13,090 --> 00:51:16,790 "This is a special situation how can we interpret this to our advantage?" 874 00:51:17,320 --> 00:51:18,710 like we seen them do this all the time you know 875 00:51:19,130 --> 00:51:21,480 whether it's drones or wiretapping or whatever they'll go. 876 00:51:21,910 --> 00:51:24,960 Well according to this law from the 1840's you know 877 00:51:25,310 --> 00:51:26,410 - Yeah yeah of course 878 00:51:26,610 --> 00:51:27,340 we can apply x, y to the Authority. 879 00:51:27,620 --> 00:51:29,540 But that takes time and that takes agreement. 880 00:51:29,770 --> 00:51:31,580 Yeah and also you know I mean I think 881 00:51:31,880 --> 00:51:34,290 the more public we are out there to like as journalists 882 00:51:35,210 --> 00:51:37,560 and the more protection it's gonna give as well. 883 00:51:38,670 --> 00:51:42,180 - Have you started to give thoughts to when you're ready to come forward? 884 00:51:42,750 --> 00:51:48,430 - I'm ready whenever huh honestly I think there is sort of an agreement 885 00:51:48,750 --> 00:51:51,100 that it's not going to bias the reporting process. 886 00:51:51,400 --> 00:51:52,310 That's my primary concern at this point. 887 00:51:52,550 --> 00:51:56,090 I don't want to get myself into the issue before it's gonna happen anyway 888 00:51:56,660 --> 00:51:59,110 and where it takes away for the stories that are getting out. 889 00:52:38,040 --> 00:52:40,035 We're talking about tens of millions of Americans 890 00:52:41,820 --> 00:52:43,060 who weren't suspected of doing anything 891 00:52:43,640 --> 00:52:45,190 who were surveilled in this way. 892 00:52:45,510 --> 00:52:47,780 ...thoughts for a moment, I want to continue this conversation, 893 00:52:48,030 --> 00:52:49,600 these are really important sensitive issues 894 00:52:50,090 --> 00:52:53,170 and the public out there has the right to know what's going on... Stand by... 895 00:52:53,470 --> 00:52:56,020 This is CNN breaking news 896 00:52:56,570 --> 00:53:00,820 Another explosive article has just appeared this time in the Washington Post 897 00:53:01,330 --> 00:53:06,380 it's breaking news and it reveals another broad and secret US government surveillance program. 898 00:53:06,860 --> 00:53:11,650 The Washington Post and The Guardian in London reporting that the NSA and the FBI 899 00:53:12,040 --> 00:53:17,070 are tapping directly into the central servers of nine leading Internet companies 900 00:53:17,510 --> 00:53:23,120 including Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook, AOL, Skype, YouTube and Apple. 901 00:53:23,420 --> 00:53:27,830 Reports says they're extracting audio, video, photographs, e-mails, documents 902 00:53:28,370 --> 00:53:33,990 and connection logs that enable analysts to track a person's movements and context over time. 903 00:53:35,570 --> 00:53:38,400 Let's discuss this latest revelation that coming out fast, 904 00:53:38,790 --> 00:53:41,180 Bill Binney, the formal official of the NSA 905 00:53:41,420 --> 00:53:44,310 who quit back in 2001, you were angry about what was going on 906 00:53:44,710 --> 00:53:46,410 you've been known as a whistleblower right now. 907 00:53:46,720 --> 00:53:48,590 - Bill, what do you think about this Washington Post story? 908 00:53:49,070 --> 00:53:52,060 - Well, I assume it's just the continuation of what they've been doing all along. 909 00:53:52,340 --> 00:53:53,200 - So you're not surprised? 910 00:53:53,640 --> 00:53:54,260 - No 911 00:53:54,420 --> 00:53:55,990 - Do you have any idea who's leaking this information? 912 00:53:56,260 --> 00:53:58,090 - I don't know who leaked this, 913 00:53:58,400 --> 00:54:01,460 I have no doubt that the administration will launch an investigation 914 00:54:02,460 --> 00:54:06,500 not into who approved these programs but into who leaked the information. 915 00:54:07,240 --> 00:54:10,550 I'm not shocked they come to denying it, I don't assume that... 916 00:54:10,780 --> 00:54:11,770 - Do you believe it? 917 00:54:12,160 --> 00:54:15,100 - There're maybe some technical basis on which they can say that we are not 918 00:54:15,470 --> 00:54:19,590 actively collaborating or they don't have what we consider in our definition 919 00:54:19,890 --> 00:54:23,000 to be direct access to our servers but what I do know is that I've talked to 920 00:54:23,500 --> 00:54:25,110 more that one person 921 00:54:25,460 --> 00:54:30,010 who has sat at a desk at a web portal and typed out commands 922 00:54:30,390 --> 00:54:32,920 and reached into those servers from a distance. 923 00:54:33,730 --> 00:54:35,690 So, whatever they want to call that, that's what's happening. 924 00:54:36,120 --> 00:54:40,080 Hold on, what are we calling the single biggest infringement on American civil liberties 925 00:54:40,490 --> 00:54:42,050 probably of all time, isn't it? 926 00:54:42,610 --> 00:54:46,530 - ...we already have the New York Times now today saying that the Administration has lost all credibility. 927 00:54:47,320 --> 00:54:48,700 - The New York Times slammed President Obama for this 928 00:54:49,100 --> 00:54:50,090 and frankly I was used to that 929 00:54:50,410 --> 00:54:53,560 the New York Times used to slam George Bush for protecting the country for the steps he took. 930 00:54:53,960 --> 00:54:55,220 I don't want us to drop our guard. 931 00:54:55,620 --> 00:54:58,400 I don't want us to be struck again as we saw in Boston, 932 00:54:58,650 --> 00:54:59,660 I understand, 933 00:54:59,990 --> 00:55:03,790 people are willing to sacrifice their civil liberties, people are sheltered inside which is enough... 934 00:55:04,050 --> 00:55:05,350 - How can you believe in freedom, do you see? 935 00:55:05,620 --> 00:55:08,420 I mean try and play the devil's advocate for me, when you have secret courts, 936 00:55:08,810 --> 00:55:13,170 secret operations like PRISM, secret investigations which go into 937 00:55:13,560 --> 00:55:17,590 every spit and cough of every American's lives without any Member of the American public 938 00:55:17,980 --> 00:55:19,590 knowing about it. That's not freedom is it? 939 00:55:19,800 --> 00:55:23,850 - In 2008, they eliminated the warrant requirement for all conversations 940 00:55:24,190 --> 00:55:26,840 except ones that takes place by and among Americans 941 00:55:27,250 --> 00:55:28,960 exclusively on America's soil. 942 00:55:29,280 --> 00:55:32,280 So they don't need warrants now for people who are foreigners 943 00:55:32,680 --> 00:55:35,630 outside of the US but they also don't need warrants for Americans 944 00:55:36,010 --> 00:55:37,980 who are in the United States communicating with people 945 00:55:38,470 --> 00:55:40,550 reasonably believed to be outside of the US. 946 00:55:40,990 --> 00:55:45,610 So again, the fact that there are no checks, no oversight about who's looking over the NSA's shoulder, 947 00:55:45,930 --> 00:55:48,580 means that they can take whatever they want and the fact that it's all behind a wall 948 00:55:48,850 --> 00:55:51,990 of secrecy and they threaten people who want to expose it 949 00:55:52,330 --> 00:55:55,400 means that whatever they're doing even violating the law 950 00:55:55,780 --> 00:55:58,330 is something we're unlikely to know until we start having real investigations 951 00:55:58,760 --> 00:56:02,270 and real transparency into what it is the government is doing. 952 00:56:02,640 --> 00:56:06,170 Glenn Greenwald, congratulations again on exposing what is a true scandal, 953 00:56:06,450 --> 00:56:07,630 I appreciate you joining me. 954 00:56:56,350 --> 00:57:01,760 Hey I just heard from Lindsay and huh... she's still alive, which is good and free. 955 00:57:03,160 --> 00:57:06,690 My rent checks apparently are no longer getting through to my landlord 956 00:57:07,200 --> 00:57:11,200 so they said if we don't pay them in five days we will be evicted, 957 00:57:12,000 --> 00:57:15,760 which is strange because I got a system set up that automatically pays them. 958 00:57:18,060 --> 00:57:21,080 So there is that apparently there is construction trucks all over the street 959 00:57:24,800 --> 00:57:30,750 of my house, so that's, I wonder what they're looking for. 960 00:58:12,730 --> 00:58:17,680 It is... It is an unusual feeling that's kind of hard to... 961 00:58:19,790 --> 00:58:23,260 hard to like, describe or convey in words but not knowing what's gonna happen 962 00:58:23,960 --> 00:58:26,540 in the next days, the next hour or the next week 963 00:58:27,850 --> 00:58:30,810 it's scary but at the same time it's liberating, you know, 964 00:58:32,560 --> 00:58:34,460 the planning comes a lot easier because you don't have 965 00:58:34,700 --> 00:58:37,760 that many variables to take into plate, you can only act, and then act again. 966 00:58:39,180 --> 00:58:41,300 Now all these phone calls are being recorded digitally 967 00:58:41,780 --> 00:58:44,170 not for content but for origin and destination 968 00:58:44,550 --> 00:58:48,320 now word the government is going right into the servers of these large Internet companies. 969 00:58:49,110 --> 00:58:53,080 - How does the government politically speaking make the argument that this is essential 970 00:58:53,490 --> 00:58:55,920 to National Security and not a dramatic overreach 971 00:58:56,650 --> 00:58:58,870 in terms of personal privacy? 972 00:58:59,150 --> 00:59:02,170 - It's difficult Matt, because as Peter was pointing out, overnight 973 00:59:03,220 --> 00:59:05,970 we had an extraordinary late night close to midnight announcement 974 00:59:06,240 --> 00:59:08,680 and a declassification from the Director of National Intelligence. 975 00:59:09,240 --> 00:59:12,890 They are scrambling, the Administration is already supported strongly by leaders 976 00:59:13,280 --> 00:59:15,260 in both parties from the Intelligence Committees. 977 00:59:15,750 --> 00:59:21,120 GCHQ has an internal Wikipedia at the top secret you know, super classified level 978 00:59:22,170 --> 00:59:24,350 where anybody working intelligence can work on anything they want. 979 00:59:25,430 --> 00:59:29,900 That's what this is, I'm giving it to you, you can make the decision on that what's appropriate what's not. 980 00:59:30,210 --> 00:59:32,050 Hum it's gonna be documents of, you know, different types, 981 00:59:32,420 --> 00:59:35,240 pictures and Power Points and Word documents. Stuff like that ... 982 00:59:35,790 --> 00:59:37,040 - Sorry can I take that seat? 983 00:59:37,290 --> 00:59:38,250 - Yeah 984 00:59:40,660 --> 00:59:44,360 - Sorry, I'm sorry I've got used to repeat, so in these documents, they will show... 985 00:59:44,590 --> 00:59:46,290 - Yeah there will be a couple more documents on that, 986 00:59:46,590 --> 00:59:49,490 that's only one part though, like it talks about Tempora 987 00:59:49,750 --> 00:59:52,280 and a little more thing that's the wiki article itself. 988 00:59:53,330 --> 00:59:59,250 It was also talking about a self-developed tool called UDAQ U.D.A.Q. it's their search tool 989 00:59:59,490 --> 01:00:01,840 for all the stuff they collect was what it looked like. 990 01:00:02,140 --> 01:00:02,530 - Yeah 991 01:00:02,980 --> 01:00:05,540 - Hum it's gonna be projects, it's gonna be troubleshooting pages 992 01:00:05,750 --> 01:00:07,080 for a particular tool. 993 01:00:07,330 --> 01:00:08,010 - Thanks 994 01:00:08,700 --> 01:00:12,500 - And, the next step, when do you think you'll go public? 995 01:00:13,180 --> 01:00:17,850 - Arh... I think it's pretty soon, I mean, with the reaction, this escalated more quickly, 996 01:00:18,170 --> 01:00:20,900 I think pretty much as soon as they start trying to make this about me 997 01:00:21,270 --> 01:00:22,630 which should be any day now. 998 01:00:22,850 --> 01:00:23,480 - Yeah 999 01:00:24,090 --> 01:00:29,160 - Hum I'll come out just to go hey, you know, this is not a question of 1000 01:00:29,640 --> 01:00:32,500 somebody skulking around in the shadows. These are public issues, 1001 01:00:32,890 --> 01:00:35,680 these are not my issues you know these are everybody's issues, 1002 01:00:36,630 --> 01:00:39,650 I'm not afraid of you, you know, you're not gonna bully me in the silence 1003 01:00:39,920 --> 01:00:41,680 like you've done to everybody else 1004 01:00:42,270 --> 01:00:43,730 and if no body else is gonna do it I will 1005 01:00:44,910 --> 01:00:47,000 and hopefully when I'm gone whatever you do to me, 1006 01:00:47,390 --> 01:00:49,180 there will be somebody else who will do the same thing. 1007 01:00:50,310 --> 01:00:52,410 It will be the sort of Internet principle you know, of the Hydra: 1008 01:00:53,800 --> 01:00:56,360 you can stop one person but there is gonna be seven more of us. 1009 01:00:56,630 --> 01:00:57,640 - Yeah 1010 01:01:00,700 --> 01:01:02,460 Are you getting more nervous? 1011 01:01:05,560 --> 01:01:11,180 - I mean... no. I think the way I look at stress... particularly because 1012 01:01:12,400 --> 01:01:18,000 I sort of knew this was coming... because I sort of volunteered to walk into it. 1013 01:01:21,790 --> 01:01:25,640 I'm already sort of familiar with the idea. 1014 01:01:25,830 --> 01:01:26,910 I'm not worried about it. 1015 01:01:27,230 --> 01:01:29,180 When somebody like busts in the door suddenly 1016 01:01:29,380 --> 01:01:30,100 I'll get nervous and it'll affect me but until they do, you know... 1017 01:01:31,010 --> 01:01:31,480 - Yeah, yeah. 1018 01:01:31,660 --> 01:01:34,130 But until they do umm... you know. 1019 01:01:34,340 --> 01:01:37,340 I'm eating a little less that's the only difference I think. 1020 01:01:46,170 --> 01:01:48,640 - Let's talk about the issue with when we're gonna say who you are. 1021 01:01:48,850 --> 01:01:49,400 - Yeah 1022 01:01:49,680 --> 01:01:54,420 - This is, you know, you have to talk me through this because I have a big worry about this. 1023 01:01:54,610 --> 01:01:55,430 - OK tell me 1024 01:01:55,950 --> 01:01:59,010 - Which is that... if we come out and 1025 01:02:00,190 --> 01:02:04,620 I know that you believe that your detection is inevitable 1026 01:02:04,980 --> 01:02:06,740 and that it's inevitable imminently. 1027 01:02:07,570 --> 01:02:09,900 There is, you know, in the New York Times today Charlie Savage the fascinating 1028 01:02:10,650 --> 01:02:13,150 Sherlock Holmes of political reporting deduced that 1029 01:02:14,330 --> 01:02:15,980 the fact that there has been these leaks in succession 1030 01:02:16,200 --> 01:02:18,610 probably means that there's some one person that decided to leak... 1031 01:02:18,840 --> 01:02:20,970 - Somebody else quoted you saying it was one of your readers 1032 01:02:21,280 --> 01:02:21,780 - Yeah 1033 01:02:22,320 --> 01:02:23,390 - And somebody else is putting on things 1034 01:02:23,670 --> 01:02:27,600 - Yeah so you know, I mean it's fine I want people to, I wanted to be like 1035 01:02:27,970 --> 01:02:28,440 - Yeah 1036 01:02:28,690 --> 01:02:31,380 - You know like this is a person, I want to start introducing the concept of 1037 01:02:31,600 --> 01:02:35,010 this is a person who has a particular set of political objectives 1038 01:02:35,370 --> 01:02:37,270 about informing the world about what's taking place. 1039 01:02:37,710 --> 01:02:40,980 Like you know, I'm keeping it all anonymous totally 1040 01:02:41,200 --> 01:02:44,770 but I want to start introducing you in that kind of incremental way. 1041 01:02:45,930 --> 01:02:47,110 But here's the thing. 1042 01:02:47,580 --> 01:02:50,290 What I'm concerned about it that if come out and say 1043 01:02:50,570 --> 01:02:52,660 here's who this is, here's what he did the whole thing 1044 01:02:52,890 --> 01:02:53,720 that we talked about. 1045 01:02:54,730 --> 01:02:56,170 Then we're gonna basically be doing the government's work for them 1046 01:02:56,750 --> 01:02:59,570 and we're gonna basically be handing them you know a confession 1047 01:03:01,600 --> 01:03:03,600 and helping them identify who find it. 1048 01:03:04,120 --> 01:03:06,890 I mean maybe you're right, maybe they'll find out quickly 1049 01:03:07,140 --> 01:03:09,600 and maybe they'll know but is there any possible idea that they won't? 1050 01:03:10,060 --> 01:03:13,170 Are we kind of giving them stuff that we don't...? Or... 1051 01:03:14,470 --> 01:03:16,530 - It's possible that they already know but they don't want to reveal 1052 01:03:16,880 --> 01:03:18,740 it because they don't know... 1053 01:03:19,020 --> 01:03:20,250 - Or that they don't know and we're gonna be telling them like 1054 01:03:20,300 --> 01:03:23,700 is it a possibility that they're gonna need like 2 3 months or uncertainty 1055 01:03:24,010 --> 01:03:25,710 and we're gonna be solving their problem for them? 1056 01:03:26,120 --> 01:03:29,390 or let me just say the or part maybe it doesn't matter to you, 1057 01:03:29,650 --> 01:03:32,370 maybe you want it, maybe, I mean, 1058 01:03:32,720 --> 01:03:34,430 you're not coming out because 1059 01:03:34,670 --> 01:03:36,530 you think inevitably they're gonna catch you 1060 01:03:37,010 --> 01:03:38,110 and you want to do it first, 1061 01:03:38,710 --> 01:03:40,460 you're coming out because you want to fucking come out and... 1062 01:03:40,820 --> 01:03:42,710 - Oh there is that, I mean that's the thing, 1063 01:03:43,180 --> 01:03:45,140 I don't want to hide on this and skulk around, 1064 01:03:45,610 --> 01:03:46,760 I don't think I should have to 1065 01:03:47,610 --> 01:03:49,190 obviously there is circumstances that are saying that. 1066 01:03:49,980 --> 01:03:52,120 I think it is powerful to come out and be like 1067 01:03:52,550 --> 01:03:56,050 look I'm not afraid and I don't think other people should either, 1068 01:03:56,300 --> 01:03:59,090 you know, I was sitting in the office right next to you last week, 1069 01:03:59,430 --> 01:04:01,900 we all have a stake in this, this is our country 1070 01:04:02,810 --> 01:04:06,030 and the balance of power between the citizenry and the government 1071 01:04:06,860 --> 01:04:08,950 is becoming that of the ruling and the ruled 1072 01:04:09,270 --> 01:04:12,890 as opposed to actually, you know, the elected and the electorate. 1073 01:04:13,380 --> 01:04:16,250 - OK so that's what I need to hear, that this is not about... 1074 01:04:17,310 --> 01:04:20,520 - But I do want to say, I don't think there is a case 1075 01:04:20,820 --> 01:04:23,870 that I'm not gonna be discovered, in the fullness of time. 1076 01:04:24,360 --> 01:04:25,510 It's just a question of time for me. 1077 01:04:25,770 --> 01:04:27,230 You're right, it could take them a long time, I don't think it will 1078 01:04:28,390 --> 01:04:31,870 but I didn't try to hide the footprint because again I intended to come forward. 1079 01:04:32,410 --> 01:04:36,630 - OK I'm gonna post this morning just a general defense of whistleblowers 1080 01:04:36,950 --> 01:04:40,070 and you in particular without saying anything about you. 1081 01:04:40,410 --> 01:04:41,420 I'm gonna go post that right when I get back 1082 01:04:42,120 --> 01:04:44,190 and I'm also doing like a big fuck you to all the people who keep like talking 1083 01:04:44,580 --> 01:04:47,490 about investigations like that. I want that to be like... 1084 01:04:48,480 --> 01:04:51,190 the fearlessness and the fuck you to like the bullying tactics, 1085 01:04:52,890 --> 01:04:55,490 has go to be completely preventing every thing we do. 1086 01:04:55,760 --> 01:04:58,350 - I think that's brilliant. I mean your principles on this I love, 1087 01:04:58,650 --> 01:05:03,030 I can't support them enough because it is, it's inverting the model 1088 01:05:03,450 --> 01:05:05,500 of the government has laid out where people where trying to, 1089 01:05:06,020 --> 01:05:08,380 you know, say the truth, skulk around, and then hide in the dark, 1090 01:05:08,840 --> 01:05:11,890 and then quote anonymously. I say yes, fuck that, let's just... 1091 01:05:12,520 --> 01:05:15,930 - OK, so here is the plan then, I mean, and this is a thing, it's like 1092 01:05:16,290 --> 01:05:19,470 once, I think we all just felt the fact that this is the right way to do it. 1093 01:05:20,350 --> 01:05:23,030 You feel the power of your choice, you know what I mean, 1094 01:05:23,390 --> 01:05:25,780 it's like I want that power to be felt in the world. 1095 01:05:25,980 --> 01:05:26,580 - OK 1096 01:05:27,430 --> 01:05:30,000 - and it is the... it's the ultimate standing up to them 1097 01:05:30,260 --> 01:05:33,390 right like I'm not gonna fucking hide even for one second, 1098 01:05:34,570 --> 01:05:36,090 I'm gonna get right in your face, 1099 01:05:36,390 --> 01:05:38,790 you don't have to investigate, there's nothing to investigate, 1100 01:05:39,020 --> 01:05:40,400 here I am! 1101 01:05:40,720 --> 01:05:44,050 You know, and I think that is just incredibly powerful, 1102 01:05:44,810 --> 01:05:46,160 and then the question just becomes 1103 01:05:46,700 --> 01:05:48,750 how do we do this in the right, you know the perfect way, 1104 01:05:49,060 --> 01:05:51,820 that's my burden and that's what I'm gonna spend... 1105 01:05:52,280 --> 01:05:54,150 So today it's gonna be this story in the morning, 1106 01:05:54,440 --> 01:05:56,380 assuming that it doesn't change in The Guardian, 1107 01:05:56,620 --> 01:05:57,730 it's gonna be this story in the morning, 1108 01:05:57,890 --> 01:06:00,820 just to keep the mental going, just to keep like the disclosures coming. 1109 01:06:01,240 --> 01:06:03,930 A big one at night, now it's becoming like 1110 01:06:04,280 --> 01:06:06,730 "OK, this is a major leak" 1111 01:06:06,970 --> 01:06:09,260 and after today when we post the two stuff things that we're gonna post. 1112 01:06:10,050 --> 01:06:14,390 It's gonna be "what the fuck is this leak and who did it?" 1113 01:06:14,660 --> 01:06:15,730 I guarantee you. 1114 01:06:25,530 --> 01:06:27,910 I just want to make sure, move over slightly... 1115 01:06:28,160 --> 01:06:29,420 - Do you want me to move a little move over... 1116 01:06:29,990 --> 01:06:31,200 - I just wanna move... all right 1117 01:06:32,460 --> 01:06:35,370 - OK 1118 01:06:35,600 --> 01:06:36,230 - We are ready 1119 01:06:36,450 --> 01:06:37,650 - So let's us begin with some basic 1120 01:06:37,850 --> 01:06:39,050 background information like 1121 01:06:39,510 --> 01:06:40,350 just state your name, 1122 01:06:40,920 --> 01:06:42,900 what position you held in intelligence community 1123 01:06:43,170 --> 01:06:45,200 and how long you worked within that community 1124 01:06:46,850 --> 01:06:50,120 - OK, uh... just some... how are we going, like, 1125 01:06:50,600 --> 01:06:51,470 in depth or are we going like in general, 1126 01:06:51,750 --> 01:06:53,530 like I'm currently an infrastructure analyst, you know, 1127 01:06:53,830 --> 01:06:56,190 Booz Allen Hamilton, not going through my whole back story 1128 01:06:56,630 --> 01:06:57,020 - Yes 1129 01:06:57,250 --> 01:06:57,830 - OK, 1130 01:06:58,050 --> 01:06:59,060 - Just like summary kind of 1131 01:06:59,290 --> 01:06:59,920 - OK 1132 01:07:00,170 --> 01:07:03,040 - My Name is Ed Snowden, I'm 29 years old, 1133 01:07:03,950 --> 01:07:07,070 I work for Booz Allen Hamilton as an infrastructure analyst 1134 01:07:07,290 --> 01:07:09,550 for NSA in Hawaii. 1135 01:07:10,920 --> 01:07:13,480 - And what are some of the positions that you held previously 1136 01:07:13,880 --> 01:07:15,260 within the intelligence community? 1137 01:07:15,470 --> 01:07:18,870 - I've been a system engineer, system administrator, uh... 1138 01:07:20,270 --> 01:07:25,240 senior advisor, uh... for the, Central Intelligence Agency, 1139 01:07:25,550 --> 01:07:29,120 solutions consultant and a telecommunications information 1140 01:07:29,330 --> 01:07:31,080 systems officer. 1141 01:07:32,080 --> 01:07:34,380 - And what kind of clearances have... have you held, 1142 01:07:34,560 --> 01:07:35,780 what kinda classification? 1143 01:07:36,710 --> 01:07:38,770 - Uh... Top secret, 1144 01:07:42,010 --> 01:07:45,090 So, people in my levels of access for systems administration 1145 01:07:45,730 --> 01:07:50,050 or as a infrastructure analyst typically have higher accesses 1146 01:07:50,700 --> 01:07:53,600 than an NSA employee would normally have. 1147 01:07:54,050 --> 01:07:56,870 Normal NSA employees have a combination of clearances called 1148 01:07:57,670 --> 01:08:01,080 TS SI TK and Gamma. 1149 01:08:02,560 --> 01:08:06,380 Uh, that's a Top Secret Signals Intelligence Talent Keyhole 1150 01:08:06,800 --> 01:08:07,680 and Gamma. 1151 01:08:07,960 --> 01:08:11,580 And they all relate to certain things that are sort of core to the NSA mission. 1152 01:08:12,610 --> 01:08:15,540 As a systems administrator you get a special clearance 1153 01:08:15,870 --> 01:08:18,250 called PrivAcc for Privileged Access, 1154 01:08:18,630 --> 01:08:22,440 which allows you to be exposed to informations of any classification 1155 01:08:22,730 --> 01:08:25,560 regardless of what your position actually needs. 1156 01:08:42,550 --> 01:08:48,180 Monday 1157 01:08:48,410 --> 01:08:51,090 June 10, 2013 1158 01:09:00,530 --> 01:09:02,380 Just before we go, a remind of our top story, 1159 01:09:02,620 --> 01:09:05,740 and that's the full map, CIA typically worked at Edward Snowden 1160 01:09:06,100 --> 01:09:11,360 says he's responsible for leaking information that US authorities have been monitoring 1161 01:09:11,760 --> 01:09:13,750 phone and Internet data. 1162 01:09:14,340 --> 01:09:17,000 The US justice deparment confirmed it is the first stages 1163 01:09:17,630 --> 01:09:19,510 of a criminal investigation. 1164 01:09:19,750 --> 01:09:22,060 - Leave it long or got it shorter, what do you think? 1165 01:09:22,420 --> 01:09:25,270 As far as the video the people saw. Am I less identifiable now? 1166 01:09:25,530 --> 01:09:26,050 - lose it? 1167 01:09:26,250 --> 01:09:29,740 - lose it? Cause I can't go all the way down, it's still gonna be stubble. 1168 01:09:29,980 --> 01:09:32,230 I don't have the blade for closer. 1169 01:09:34,510 --> 01:09:36,890 - Will you be talking to any other media about this story today? 1170 01:09:37,730 --> 01:09:38,430 - I am. 1171 01:09:39,780 --> 01:09:40,780 - Uh, will you be coming to our office 1172 01:09:41,250 --> 01:09:43,800 - ... about where is Snowden now, what his plans are? 1173 01:09:44,700 --> 01:09:47,010 - No, I won't talk about that, so unless you have any other questions... 1174 01:09:47,250 --> 01:09:47,710 - OK 1175 01:09:48,130 --> 01:09:51,250 - What are you plans please? Are you staying in Hong Kong 1176 01:09:51,450 --> 01:09:52,260 for a the time being? 1177 01:09:52,510 --> 01:09:53,240 - For a little while. 1178 01:09:53,470 --> 01:09:56,080 - And do you have any hopes to write more about this story 1179 01:09:56,330 --> 01:09:58,480 or are you stopping new writing about this story? 1180 01:09:58,690 --> 01:09:59,830 - No, I'm gonna continue to write about it. 1181 01:10:00,260 --> 01:10:02,060 - Have you had any pressure from the US Authorities 1182 01:10:02,280 --> 01:10:03,760 about continuing to report on this? 1183 01:10:03,940 --> 01:10:04,660 - No. 1184 01:10:05,190 --> 01:10:07,220 - And have you heard anything about what could be... 1185 01:10:07,470 --> 01:10:11,250 asked you the Hong Kong Authorities towards this case, 1186 01:10:11,520 --> 01:10:14,590 whether they contacted you or asked you anything about the whereabouts of Snowden 1187 01:10:15,300 --> 01:10:16,540 and whether that's just another... 1188 01:10:17,070 --> 01:10:19,790 - I haven't heard about the Authorities of any Government. 1189 01:10:21,000 --> 01:10:23,450 - And do, where do you think this story is going then? 1190 01:10:23,780 --> 01:10:27,790 For you and of course for Snowden and of course for the US media 1191 01:10:27,980 --> 01:10:29,410 and the US Administration in general? 1192 01:10:29,640 --> 01:10:31,110 - Uh, for me, I'm gonna continue to report. 1193 01:10:31,930 --> 01:10:36,240 Reporting on what the Government has been doing and what I think people should know about. 1194 01:10:36,910 --> 01:10:38,810 As for him I don't think anyone knows 1195 01:10:39,680 --> 01:10:45,070 ... people come after me or any of their third partners you know they work closely with a number of other nations 1196 01:10:46,060 --> 01:10:51,080 or you know they could pay off the trial you know any of their agents are assets ... 1197 01:11:25,380 --> 01:11:32,300 A criminal investigation the whistleblower... monitoring phone calls and Internet data goes public... 1198 01:11:33,660 --> 01:11:37,600 Security forces in Afghanistan say a number of... 1199 01:11:40,520 --> 01:11:43,940 Now it's time for our news paper review and looking at what's making headlines 1200 01:11:44,390 --> 01:11:45,450 around the world. 1201 01:11:45,870 --> 01:11:51,310 Let's start with The Guardian our top story which is revealing the identity of the former CIA employee. 1202 01:11:51,750 --> 01:11:57,130 The paper says he leaks information exposing the scale of American's surveillance of the Internet. 1203 01:11:58,370 --> 01:12:00,630 Edward Snowden, what a great story... 1204 01:12:01,940 --> 01:12:05,550 Well I think it's a fantastic story this could be straight out from a John Le Carr� novel 1205 01:12:06,220 --> 01:12:08,420 I mean when you read what he did, yes he got the material, 1206 01:12:09,110 --> 01:12:13,030 he then decided to go to a place he identified to be very difficult for America to get at him 1207 01:12:13,240 --> 01:12:14,270 - God dammit 1208 01:12:14,820 --> 01:12:19,830 which is Hong Kong because of course technically inside China, the one country two systems policy 1209 01:12:20,210 --> 01:12:23,040 there meaning he would get potentially some protection, 1210 01:12:23,290 --> 01:12:26,540 he thought, all very well planned, could be just out of a spy novel. 1211 01:12:26,930 --> 01:12:28,320 But what about the details. 1212 01:12:32,490 --> 01:12:41,000 - That could make it worse. But just the lower half of my face. 1213 01:13:15,040 --> 01:13:19,180 Snowden says he'd become increasingly dismay by what he saw as the growing power 1214 01:13:19,550 --> 01:13:20,580 of the NSA. 1215 01:13:20,900 --> 01:13:24,030 And it's his decision to pass on documents which is said to reveal 1216 01:13:24,550 --> 01:13:28,570 the organisation monitored millions of phone calls 1217 01:13:28,810 --> 01:13:31,350 but that it had direct access to some of the... 1218 01:13:31,650 --> 01:13:32,670 - How do you feel? 1219 01:13:32,940 --> 01:13:33,940 ...Internet companies in the world. 1220 01:13:35,800 --> 01:13:38,500 - uuh what happens, happens. We've uh we've talked about this 1221 01:13:38,710 --> 01:13:42,070 I knew what the risks and if I get arrested, I get arrested, 1222 01:13:45,310 --> 01:13:49,360 we were able to get the information that needed to get out, out. 1223 01:13:51,730 --> 01:13:56,670 And you and Glenn are able to keep reporting regardless what happens to me. 1224 01:13:58,910 --> 01:14:04,080 Now 29 year old Edward Snowden says that US intelligence agencies gathered millions of phone records 1225 01:14:04,750 --> 01:14:07,230 and monitored Internet data... 1226 01:14:13,130 --> 01:14:14,920 - Yes. I'm sorry who's asking? 1227 01:14:17,590 --> 01:14:22,550 - I'm afraid you have the wrong room thank you. Wall Street Journal. 1228 01:14:38,500 --> 01:14:40,840 - Yes. I'm sorry say again? 1229 01:14:42,410 --> 01:14:43,940 Uh, no thank you. No calls. 1230 01:14:44,370 --> 01:14:45,960 I think they have the wrong number. 1231 01:14:47,440 --> 01:14:48,930 Yeah, no calls. Thank you. 1232 01:14:49,270 --> 01:14:55,620 Uh wait I'm sorry if it's two men from the front desk they can call but no outside calls. 1233 01:14:56,150 --> 01:15:01,090 Wait actually just... let them through. Wait, wait m'am? 1234 01:15:01,550 --> 01:15:02,100 Fuck 1235 01:15:09,360 --> 01:15:19,550 - Yes. Wait is it a lawyer? Yeah, no no no I mean, 1236 01:15:20,940 --> 01:15:26,670 the people who are asking. Ask them if they are lawyers. 1237 01:15:32,720 --> 01:15:34,630 No tell her that she has the wrong number and there is no Mr. Snowden here. 1238 01:16:15,040 --> 01:16:17,710 Would you mind to talk in speakerphone? 1239 01:16:19,120 --> 01:16:19,920 - Sorry 1240 01:16:24,600 --> 01:16:25,390 - Hi. I'm the client 1241 01:16:27,710 --> 01:16:29,700 - Pretty good. I'm doing well 1242 01:16:46,210 --> 01:16:46,450 - Ok 1243 01:16:52,240 --> 01:16:52,890 - Ok 1244 01:17:04,110 --> 01:17:09,770 - Ok, that's great. Is it OK if i bring equipment? Because i'm just kind of going, so i can leave in any direction, 1245 01:17:10,040 --> 01:17:12,620 at any time, and not come back. If necessary. 1246 01:17:23,450 --> 01:17:24,640 - Ok, that sounds good. 1247 01:17:26,230 --> 01:17:27,890 - Thank you, thank you so much for helping us. 1248 01:18:10,750 --> 01:18:14,720 - Yeah... And so, is there a precedent for this where Hong Kong would extradite someone 1249 01:18:14,980 --> 01:18:16,490 for political speech ? 1250 01:19:23,870 --> 01:19:26,120 "The President surely does not welcome the way that this debate 1251 01:19:26,270 --> 01:19:28,030 has earned a greater attention the last week, 1252 01:19:28,500 --> 01:19:31,710 the leaked classified information about sensitive programs that are 1253 01:19:31,980 --> 01:19:33,690 important in our fight against terrorists 1254 01:19:34,030 --> 01:19:36,450 who would do harm to Americans is a problem, 1255 01:19:37,770 --> 01:19:41,320 but the debate itself is legitimate and should be engaged. 1256 01:23:32,270 --> 01:23:34,570 - Right, so which one do we want here then. 1257 01:23:34,770 --> 01:23:37,260 This is operational stuff, so we mustn't say any of this. 1258 01:23:37,510 --> 01:23:38,450 - So redact that. 1259 01:23:38,950 --> 01:23:40,270 - Go near the top 1260 01:23:40,500 --> 01:23:42,310 - What about the Alexander's quote, is that something ... 1261 01:23:42,540 --> 01:23:46,320 - Yeah. That's in TARMAC. "Why can't we collect all the signals all the times? 1262 01:23:46,520 --> 01:23:49,690 Sounds like a good summer homework project for Menwith" 1263 01:23:49,930 --> 01:23:53,000 Keith Alexander the head of the NSA on a visit to the UK. This one. 1264 01:23:53,410 --> 01:23:54,240 - Yeah. 1265 01:23:54,490 --> 01:23:57,870 - Yeah. It's a secret document in that secret document. 1266 01:23:58,110 --> 01:24:01,820 We've got a stick here that should just have three single slides on it. 1267 01:24:02,090 --> 01:24:05,650 If it's got more than three single slides, we have to be extremely careful. 1268 01:24:08,660 --> 01:24:09,120 - Yeah? 1269 01:24:09,310 --> 01:24:10,360 - Yeah, that's it. 1270 01:24:10,900 --> 01:24:13,480 This is really dangerous stuff for us, Guardian 1271 01:24:13,750 --> 01:24:16,000 If we make mistakes, ...very angry. 1272 01:24:16,350 --> 01:24:19,680 We kept it all under lock and key and no one knows. No, I'm not saying that. 1273 01:24:20,880 --> 01:24:21,450 - OK 1274 01:24:21,730 --> 01:24:24,360 - They will come in and snap the front door down if we elaborate on that... 1275 01:24:25,480 --> 01:24:26,220 And he said... 1276 01:24:26,590 --> 01:24:29,220 The Prime Minister is extremely concerned about this. 1277 01:24:29,520 --> 01:24:31,530 And they kept saying, "this is from the very top." 1278 01:25:43,040 --> 01:25:45,530 As you can see on this map the flight that probably has Snowden aboard, 1279 01:25:45,750 --> 01:25:48,605 has almost reached its destination here in Moscow's scheduled plan, 1280 01:25:49,280 --> 01:25:51,150 in the Russian capital within minutes... 1281 01:25:52,730 --> 01:25:57,785 As you may have heard, there is a CIA agent who has revealed a lot of information 1282 01:25:59,570 --> 01:26:00,720 and he is now trapped in the 1283 01:26:02,810 --> 01:26:03,960 airport in Moscow 1284 01:26:04,870 --> 01:26:06,380 We managed to get him out of Hong Kong, 1285 01:26:06,620 --> 01:26:08,540 but when he landed in the Moscow airport, 1286 01:26:09,240 --> 01:26:13,130 the American government had canceled his passport. 1287 01:26:13,530 --> 01:26:16,180 So formally he hasn't entered into Russian territory, 1288 01:26:16,510 --> 01:26:18,050 he is in the transit area of the airport 1289 01:26:19,900 --> 01:26:22,330 And one of our people is accompanying him 1290 01:26:22,660 --> 01:26:25,110 We are trying to arrange a private jet 1291 01:26:26,920 --> 01:26:31,490 to take him from Moscow 1292 01:26:32,450 --> 01:26:37,370 to Ecuador or perhaps maybe Venezuela 1293 01:26:37,620 --> 01:26:38,630 or maybe Iceland, 1294 01:26:39,490 --> 01:26:40,980 countries where he would be safe. 1295 01:30:11,710 --> 01:30:15,260 May I collect all the phones please? 1296 01:30:22,480 --> 01:30:24,400 I have everything in here 1297 01:30:26,550 --> 01:30:29,100 Put them in the refrigerator 1298 01:30:39,890 --> 01:30:42,150 - So, as you know, in June, 1299 01:30:42,560 --> 01:30:45,880 Snowden was in charge with 3 1300 01:30:46,270 --> 01:30:47,160 legal violations felonies 1301 01:30:48,940 --> 01:30:51,150 Principaly under a World War I era 1302 01:30:52,130 --> 01:30:53,780 criminal law called the Espionage Act 1303 01:30:55,510 --> 01:30:57,830 The Espionage Act is an extremely broad 1304 01:30:58,470 --> 01:30:59,610 criminal prohibition against 1305 01:31:00,870 --> 01:31:02,610 the sharing or dissemination 1306 01:31:03,220 --> 01:31:04,780 of what's called "National Defense information" 1307 01:31:05,580 --> 01:31:08,140 it was only used to 1308 01:31:08,480 --> 01:31:10,580 prosecute people who had been accused of 1309 01:31:10,860 --> 01:31:14,030 acting with a foreign power, spies not whistleblowers 1310 01:31:14,430 --> 01:31:16,550 and it's a very unusual legal representation I think 1311 01:31:17,060 --> 01:31:19,740 not just for all of you, but for me as well. 1312 01:31:20,570 --> 01:31:23,700 The Espionage Act has not distinguished between 1313 01:31:24,120 --> 01:31:25,990 leaks to the press and the public interest, 1314 01:31:26,480 --> 01:31:28,630 and selling secrets to foreign enemies 1315 01:31:29,200 --> 01:31:30,710 for personal profit. 1316 01:31:31,230 --> 01:31:32,720 So, under the Espionage Act 1317 01:31:32,960 --> 01:31:36,070 it's not a defense if the information that was disclosed 1318 01:31:36,340 --> 01:31:38,480 should not have been withheld in the first place, 1319 01:31:38,720 --> 01:31:40,010 that it was improperly classified. 1320 01:31:40,420 --> 01:31:43,600 It's not a defense if the dissemination was in the public interest 1321 01:31:44,030 --> 01:31:45,230 that it led to reforms. 1322 01:31:45,730 --> 01:31:49,240 Even if the court determines that the programs that were revealed 1323 01:31:49,540 --> 01:31:51,170 were illegal or unconstitutional. 1324 01:31:51,430 --> 01:31:53,690 that's still not a defense under the Espionage Act, 1325 01:31:53,940 --> 01:31:56,730 the Government doesn't have to defend the classification, 1326 01:31:57,050 --> 01:32:00,000 it doesn't have to demonstrate harm from the release, 1327 01:32:00,440 --> 01:32:02,260 All this is irrelevant. 1328 01:32:02,750 --> 01:32:05,420 So when we say that the trial wouldn't be fair, 1329 01:32:06,320 --> 01:32:08,590 we are not talking about what human rights lawyers think 1330 01:32:08,870 --> 01:32:10,240 of this fair trial practices 1331 01:32:10,550 --> 01:32:12,240 We are saying the law, the statute itself, 1332 01:32:13,630 --> 01:32:15,980 eliminates any kind of defense 1333 01:32:16,330 --> 01:32:18,000 that Snowden might be able to make 1334 01:32:18,410 --> 01:32:20,700 and essentially will equate him with a spy. 1335 01:32:21,040 --> 01:32:25,350 And of course those three counts could be increased to a hundreed or two hundreed 1336 01:32:25,650 --> 01:32:27,330 or three hundreed, they could charge him separately 1337 01:32:27,600 --> 01:32:30,720 for each document that has been published by a journalist. 1338 01:32:31,240 --> 01:32:34,100 And I think that we all recognize, even though we sit here as lawyers 1339 01:32:35,640 --> 01:32:36,520 in a lawyer's meeting 1340 01:32:37,320 --> 01:32:41,600 that it's propably 95% politics and 5% law. 1341 01:32:42,290 --> 01:32:44,290 How this would be resolved. 1342 01:33:16,080 --> 01:33:19,280 "Mr. Snowden has been charged with very serious crimes 1343 01:33:20,070 --> 01:33:23,140 and he should be returned to the United States where he would be granted full due process 1344 01:33:23,700 --> 01:33:27,210 and every right available to him as a United States citizen. 1345 01:33:28,470 --> 01:33:31,330 Facing our justice system under the Constitution." 1346 01:34:22,510 --> 01:34:24,140 No, I don't think Mr. Snowden was a Patriot. 1347 01:34:24,380 --> 01:34:26,840 I called for a federal review 1348 01:34:27,630 --> 01:34:30,380 of our surveillance operations 1349 01:34:30,860 --> 01:34:33,330 before Mr. Snowden made these leaks. 1350 01:34:33,670 --> 01:34:35,260 My preference, 1351 01:34:36,930 --> 01:34:38,400 and I think the American people's preference, 1352 01:34:38,610 --> 01:34:42,130 would have been for a lawful, orderly 1353 01:34:42,470 --> 01:34:44,750 examination of these laws. 1354 01:34:45,440 --> 01:34:50,090 A thoughtful, fact based debate, 1355 01:34:50,580 --> 01:34:53,760 that would then lead us to a better place. 1356 01:35:35,290 --> 01:35:37,940 - Oh my God. David. Hello my baby. 1357 01:35:39,280 --> 01:35:39,860 - I'm OK. 1358 01:35:40,090 --> 01:35:41,310 - You're OK? 1359 01:35:46,040 --> 01:35:46,890 - I just wanna go home. 1360 01:35:47,520 --> 01:35:50,510 - OK, OK OK. You just have to walk... 1361 01:35:57,400 --> 01:35:58,470 - How are you? 1362 01:35:58,800 --> 01:36:01,170 - Good, good. I'm totally fine, I didn't sleep at all, I couldn't sleep. 1363 01:36:01,380 --> 01:36:02,370 - I know. 1364 01:36:02,620 --> 01:36:07,220 "Brazil Demands Explanation from UK Government" 1365 01:36:24,700 --> 01:36:28,770 Recent reports have revealed that the NSA have access to encryption keys 1366 01:36:29,130 --> 01:36:32,390 and they paid tech companies to introduce backdoors in encryption protocols 1367 01:36:33,170 --> 01:36:37,900 So we are going to talk about ways in which we can defend ourselves against 1368 01:36:38,240 --> 01:36:40,270 governments spying on us. 1369 01:36:40,520 --> 01:36:44,160 So Mr. Jacob Appelbaum, as an encryption and security software developper, 1370 01:36:44,370 --> 01:36:45,480 and journalist. 1371 01:36:45,840 --> 01:36:49,030 Ladar Levison, the founder of the encrypted email service 1372 01:36:49,500 --> 01:36:50,850 Lavabit 1373 01:36:51,110 --> 01:36:52,170 used by Edward Snowden. 1374 01:36:52,350 --> 01:36:53,060 You have the floor. 1375 01:36:53,470 --> 01:36:54,380 Thank you 1376 01:36:54,530 --> 01:36:57,180 Lavabit is an email service that hopefully one day 1377 01:36:57,430 --> 01:37:02,970 will be able to stand on its own without any references to Snowden. 1378 01:37:03,280 --> 01:37:06,220 My service was designed to remove me 1379 01:37:06,500 --> 01:37:09,370 from the possibility of being forced 1380 01:37:09,610 --> 01:37:11,630 to violate a person's privacy. 1381 01:37:11,980 --> 01:37:12,870 Quite simply 1382 01:37:13,240 --> 01:37:15,400 Lavabit was designed to remove the service provider 1383 01:37:15,670 --> 01:37:16,920 from the equation, 1384 01:37:17,360 --> 01:37:19,390 by not having logs on my server 1385 01:37:19,750 --> 01:37:23,100 and not having access to a person's emails on disk, 1386 01:37:23,380 --> 01:37:24,420 I wasn't elimitating 1387 01:37:24,690 --> 01:37:25,850 the possibility of surveillance, 1388 01:37:26,140 --> 01:37:29,200 I was simply removing myself from that equation. 1389 01:37:30,480 --> 01:37:32,130 And that surveillance would have to be conducted 1390 01:37:32,310 --> 01:37:33,730 on the target 1391 01:37:34,020 --> 01:37:35,120 either the sender 1392 01:37:35,320 --> 01:37:37,040 or the receiver of the messages. 1393 01:37:37,780 --> 01:37:41,190 But I was approached by the FBI quite recently, 1394 01:37:41,390 --> 01:37:42,510 and told 1395 01:37:43,080 --> 01:37:45,190 that because I couldn't turn over the information 1396 01:37:45,470 --> 01:37:47,180 from that one particular user, 1397 01:37:47,420 --> 01:37:49,490 I would be forced to give up those SSL keys 1398 01:37:49,730 --> 01:37:51,640 and let the FBI collect every communication 1399 01:37:51,890 --> 01:37:54,200 on my network without any kind of transparency. 1400 01:37:55,580 --> 01:37:57,550 And of course, 1401 01:37:57,850 --> 01:37:59,420 I wasn't comfortable with that, 1402 01:37:59,910 --> 01:38:01,070 to say the least! 1403 01:38:01,810 --> 01:38:06,140 More disturbing was the fact that I couldn't even tell anybody that it was going on. 1404 01:38:06,700 --> 01:38:08,370 So I decided: 1405 01:38:08,620 --> 01:38:11,440 "If I didn't win the fight to unseal my case, 1406 01:38:11,840 --> 01:38:13,070 if I didn't win the battle 1407 01:38:13,440 --> 01:38:15,970 to be able to tell people what was going on, 1408 01:38:16,970 --> 01:38:19,630 then my only ethical choice left was to shutdown". 1409 01:38:22,000 --> 01:38:24,120 Think about that. 1410 01:38:24,800 --> 01:38:29,100 I believe in the rule of law, I believe in the need to conduct investigations, 1411 01:38:30,170 --> 01:38:33,890 but those investigations are supposed to be difficult for a reason. 1412 01:38:34,260 --> 01:38:38,070 It's supposed to be difficult to invade somebody's privacy. 1413 01:38:38,350 --> 01:38:40,730 Because of how intrusive it is, 1414 01:38:41,040 --> 01:38:43,310 because of how disruptive it is. 1415 01:38:43,750 --> 01:38:46,290 If we can't, if we don't have a right to privacy, 1416 01:38:46,630 --> 01:38:49,390 how do we have a free and open discussion? 1417 01:38:49,690 --> 01:38:51,960 What good is the right to free speech, 1418 01:38:54,430 --> 01:38:56,740 if it's not protected, 1419 01:38:57,040 --> 01:38:59,230 in a sense that you can't have a private discussion 1420 01:38:59,610 --> 01:39:02,250 with somebody else about something you disagree with. 1421 01:39:02,990 --> 01:39:05,000 Think about the chilling effect that that has. 1422 01:39:05,820 --> 01:39:07,300 Think about the chilling effect it does have 1423 01:39:07,740 --> 01:39:10,760 on countries that don't have a right to privacy. 1424 01:39:11,070 --> 01:39:13,130 I've noticed a really interesting discussion point 1425 01:39:13,490 --> 01:39:15,720 which is that what people used to call liberty and freedom 1426 01:39:15,990 --> 01:39:17,350 we now call privacy. 1427 01:39:18,380 --> 01:39:20,210 And we say in the same breath 1428 01:39:20,610 --> 01:39:22,130 that privacy is dead. 1429 01:39:22,670 --> 01:39:24,620 This is something that really concerns me 1430 01:39:24,860 --> 01:39:25,900 about my generation 1431 01:39:26,180 --> 01:39:28,780 especially when we talk about how we're not surprised by anything. 1432 01:39:29,090 --> 01:39:30,560 I think that we should consider that 1433 01:39:30,870 --> 01:39:32,840 when we lose privacy we lose agency, 1434 01:39:33,130 --> 01:39:34,270 we lose liberty itself 1435 01:39:34,550 --> 01:39:36,810 because we no longer feel free to express what we think. 1436 01:39:37,520 --> 01:39:39,630 There is this myth of the passive surveillance machine 1437 01:39:39,910 --> 01:39:42,580 but actually what is surveillance except control? 1438 01:39:43,140 --> 01:39:44,760 This notion that the NSA are passive 1439 01:39:45,030 --> 01:39:45,840 this is nonsense 1440 01:39:46,100 --> 01:39:47,290 what we see is that they actively attack 1441 01:39:47,640 --> 01:39:49,350 European citizens, American citizens and, 1442 01:39:50,370 --> 01:39:51,740 in fact, anyone that they can 1443 01:39:51,980 --> 01:39:53,060 if they perceive an advantage. 1444 01:41:30,000 --> 01:41:31,970 - OK. Right. 1445 01:41:37,540 --> 01:41:39,890 - I have to give that in testimony. 1446 01:41:40,270 --> 01:41:41,630 - What are you going to tell? 1447 01:41:41,870 --> 01:41:45,130 - Everything I can truthfully. 1448 01:41:45,600 --> 01:41:47,550 - What will you talk about? 1449 01:41:47,880 --> 01:41:50,380 - Uh, whatever the questions they ask me. 1450 01:41:50,640 --> 01:41:51,540 - Yeah I think it's over there. 1451 01:41:51,770 --> 01:41:54,950 - Ok, it's alright. Thank you. 1452 01:42:01,450 --> 01:42:02,750 - Hey, how are you? 1453 01:42:02,890 --> 01:42:03,530 - Good. 1454 01:42:03,740 --> 01:42:04,230 - How are you? 1455 01:42:04,430 --> 01:42:04,990 - Good to see you again. 1456 01:42:05,160 --> 01:42:06,340 - Nice to meet you again, yes. 1457 01:42:07,860 --> 01:42:08,820 - Yeah 1458 01:43:37,710 --> 01:43:41,580 - What do you think they're doing to reporters, those of us that are working directly with... 1459 01:43:42,190 --> 01:43:43,500 Snowden documents? 1460 01:43:43,750 --> 01:43:45,800 How do you think they would approach dealing with people like us? 1461 01:43:46,080 --> 01:43:49,220 - You're.. You're on a cast iron cover list. 1462 01:43:49,870 --> 01:43:53,150 Which means any electronic device you use 1463 01:43:53,810 --> 01:43:56,275 that they can attach to you they all record and capture all that data. 1464 01:43:57,510 --> 01:43:59,650 - And what do they do with that data? They're just trying to figure out what we're doing? 1465 01:44:00,920 --> 01:44:02,750 - Uh, well the primary... 1466 01:44:02,930 --> 01:44:04,630 That's part of it. But the other part, primarily part, 1467 01:44:05,000 --> 01:44:07,140 is for them. I think it's to find the sources of information you're getting. 1468 01:44:07,750 --> 01:44:11,540 - So if I have a confidential source who's giving me information as a whistleblower, 1469 01:44:12,200 --> 01:44:14,930 and he works within the US Government, and he's concerned about 1470 01:44:15,360 --> 01:44:18,180 what he perceives as violation of the Constitution, 1471 01:44:18,710 --> 01:44:20,770 uhm... and he gets in touch with me, they... 1472 01:44:21,030 --> 01:44:21,610 - Yeah... 1473 01:44:21,950 --> 01:44:22,710 - Go ahead. Yeah. 1474 01:44:22,970 --> 01:44:26,350 - Yeah. From there on, they would nail him and start watching everything he did. 1475 01:44:28,210 --> 01:44:30,320 and if you start passing data, I'm sure they'd take him off the street. 1476 01:44:30,590 --> 01:44:33,760 I mean, the way you have to do it is like Deep Throat did, right? 1477 01:44:34,130 --> 01:44:37,610 In the Nixon years, meet in a basement of a parking garage... 1478 01:44:38,390 --> 01:44:39,660 physically. 1479 01:45:20,620 --> 01:45:23,000 Let's disassociate our metadata one last time. 1480 01:45:23,340 --> 01:45:26,350 So we don't have a clear record of your true name in our final communication chain. 1481 01:45:28,740 --> 01:45:31,300 This is obviously not to say you can't claim your involvement, 1482 01:45:31,470 --> 01:45:33,820 but as every trick in the book is likely to be used and looking into this, 1483 01:45:35,110 --> 01:45:37,500 I believe it's better, that that particular disclosure 1484 01:45:37,700 --> 01:45:39,230 come on your own terms. 1485 01:45:39,680 --> 01:45:42,130 Thank you again for all you've done. 1486 01:45:42,390 --> 01:45:44,170 So sorry again for the multiple delays. 1487 01:45:44,350 --> 01:45:45,870 But we've been entering a territory 1488 01:45:46,280 --> 01:45:47,560 with no model to benefit from. 1489 01:45:49,110 --> 01:45:50,540 If all ends well, 1490 01:45:50,920 --> 01:45:53,060 perhaps the demonstration that our mess has worked 1491 01:45:53,570 --> 01:45:55,270 would embolden more to come forward 1492 01:45:56,220 --> 01:45:57,520 Citizen. 1493 01:46:02,510 --> 01:46:06,420 - So the update that I want to give you is about the new, 1494 01:46:08,330 --> 01:46:10,410 uh.. the new source that, that we... 1495 01:46:11,810 --> 01:46:12,870 - OK. 1496 01:46:15,610 --> 01:46:18,960 - that... uh, this is what... this is the... 1497 01:46:19,490 --> 01:46:23,120 you know this is the person who is doing the... the most of the... 1498 01:46:23,290 --> 01:46:24,340 - Right, right, right. 1499 01:46:24,700 --> 01:46:28,320 - ...the work on it, uh... And now... and now, 1500 01:46:28,500 --> 01:46:30,230 what basically, what happens is... 1501 01:46:33,200 --> 01:46:33,960 - and... 1502 01:46:34,800 --> 01:46:37,220 - That's actually... That's really dangerous... 1503 01:46:38,870 --> 01:46:40,500 uh, on the source's side. 1504 01:46:40,820 --> 01:46:42,070 Do they know how to take care of themselves... 1505 01:46:42,290 --> 01:46:43,290 - Well he knows... 1506 01:46:44,460 --> 01:46:44,960 - ...or do you know anything about... 1507 01:46:45,330 --> 01:46:46,290 - ...he means it's, uh... 1508 01:46:48,240 --> 01:46:49,810 It's all being done.. through this... 1509 01:46:50,040 --> 01:46:50,740 - OK. 1510 01:46:51,240 --> 01:46:54,370 - and they're all talking this way... 1511 01:46:54,690 --> 01:46:55,430 - OK. 1512 01:46:55,820 --> 01:46:56,660 - and, uh... 1513 01:46:56,950 --> 01:46:59,340 - I was gonna say one of the big questions there is: 1514 01:46:59,670 --> 01:47:01,060 can they handle it? You know with... 1515 01:47:01,290 --> 01:47:02,870 - Yeah, they're very careful... 1516 01:47:03,440 --> 01:47:04,460 even they're through that. 1517 01:47:04,690 --> 01:47:05,460 - OK 1518 01:47:05,730 --> 01:47:06,440 - Yeah. 1519 01:47:10,460 --> 01:47:11,920 - And... 1520 01:47:18,670 --> 01:47:21,300 - That's what that is. 1521 01:47:22,610 --> 01:47:24,100 - Wow, that's really something. 1522 01:47:28,510 --> 01:47:29,850 - Oh, oh... 1523 01:47:37,330 --> 01:47:38,390 - Did you know that? 1524 01:47:38,870 --> 01:47:45,860 One key thing: ALL drone strikes are done through Ramstein Air Base in Germany - German govt has always 1525 01:47:46,090 --> 01:47:47,390 - It's not the actual plan. 1526 01:47:48,060 --> 01:47:49,450 - Right, right right. You mean the control. 1527 01:47:49,900 --> 01:47:51,310 - It's the process, who's sending the... 1528 01:47:51,550 --> 01:47:52,530 - Yeah. 1529 01:47:52,920 --> 01:47:57,170 - There's a... There's a chart. You know, it goes like a whole layout in it 1530 01:47:57,380 --> 01:47:58,350 for everyone and it's... 1531 01:47:58,570 --> 01:47:59,890 - Yeah. It's really bold, but it's really risky. 1532 01:48:00,330 --> 01:48:01,880 But you know that... that's the thing if... 1533 01:48:02,090 --> 01:48:02,790 - There's more... 1534 01:48:03,020 --> 01:48:03,930 - ... if they understand what they're doing. 1535 01:48:04,420 --> 01:48:08,560 - There's this chart, it goes like this... It shows the decision making chart. 1536 01:48:08,840 --> 01:48:15,180 It's a chart... It's, it's... it's shaped like this. 1537 01:48:18,130 --> 01:48:18,770 - Hum hum... - So up here it says "POTUS" (President of the Uniteed States) 1538 01:48:19,040 --> 01:48:21,690 - That's the decision making chart for each... one. 1539 01:48:26,930 --> 01:48:27,330 - And... 1540 01:48:27,680 --> 01:48:29,160 - And it's so political... 1541 01:48:29,390 --> 01:48:33,310 - This is... This part's amazing. 1542 01:48:37,410 --> 01:48:38,460 - That's... 1543 01:48:38,800 --> 01:48:40,690 - That's fucking ridiculous. 1544 01:48:41,610 --> 01:48:43,270 - This... This is... it's so shocking. 1545 01:48:46,050 --> 01:48:48,430 - (laugh) That's... 1546 01:48:50,090 --> 01:48:50,490 - No, I know... 1547 01:48:50,800 --> 01:48:51,100 - That's... 1548 01:48:51,330 --> 01:48:51,730 - ... I know... 1549 01:48:52,550 --> 01:48:54,880 There are 1.2 m people on various stages of their watch list. 1550 01:48:55,340 --> 01:48:57,140 - ... the population of an entire country. 1551 01:48:57,570 --> 01:48:58,410 - I know. 1552 01:48:58,720 --> 01:49:01,980 - That's... what we're working on. 1553 01:49:11,990 --> 01:49:14,650 - That person is incredibly bold, but, uh... 1554 01:49:15,530 --> 01:49:16,980 - But also very well aware. 1555 01:49:17,390 --> 01:49:19,050 - Right. I... You know, I just hope. I mean... 1556 01:49:19,910 --> 01:49:20,800 - No, I mean... 1557 01:49:21,260 --> 01:49:23,210 the boldness of it is shocking, but I mean it was obviously.. 1558 01:49:23,660 --> 01:49:25,350 - But the other thing is just... 1559 01:49:25,660 --> 01:49:26,760 - ...motivated by what you did, I mean, it... 1560 01:49:27,450 --> 01:49:29,140 - This is going to... This is going to... 1561 01:49:29,790 --> 01:49:31,620 That could raise a profile 1562 01:49:32,530 --> 01:49:33,790 of this whole political situation 1563 01:49:34,100 --> 01:49:36,390 with whistleblowing to a whole new level, because... 1564 01:49:36,700 --> 01:49:37,310 - exactly... 1565 01:49:37,660 --> 01:49:38,750 - It's gonna... 1566 01:49:39,000 --> 01:49:39,800 - Yeah, I mean... 1567 01:49:40,010 --> 01:49:41,390 I actually think that's a great thing. 1568 01:49:41,700 --> 01:49:43,680 And I think people are gonna see what's being hidden... 1569 01:49:44,430 --> 01:49:48,230 again, again.. by a totally different part 1570 01:49:50,940 --> 01:49:54,160 POTUS 137004

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