All language subtitles for A.Chip.Odyssey.2025.720p.WEBRip.x264.AAC.eng

As this fragile island democracy

fights to fend off...

Are you willing to get involved
militarily to defend Taiwan

if it comes to that?

U.S. President Biden:
Yes, it's the commitment we made.

Japanese PM Kishida:
Peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait

are vital to our country.

Macronix Chairperson Miin Wu:

Why has Taiwan become
such a sensitive topic?

Besides its geopolitical importance,

Taiwan happens to produce

the world's most advanced semiconductors.

That's why everyone is
paying such close attention.

And there's one reason behind it all:
National Security.

U.S. President Trump:

Right now everything's
made in Taiwan, practically.

Almost all.

A little bit in South Korea.

But everything, almost all
of it is made in Taiwan.

We may have studied different fields,

but somehow we all

gravitated toward semiconductors.

Setting up semiconductor schools

at four top universities

feels like both a hint
and an encouragement:

This is the future.

My understanding is that
as long as you have a skill,

TSMC will always have a place for you.

Young people today worry about
the broader environment,

about money or about their futures.

Taiwan doesn't have it as
easy as other countries.

Even simple interactions
with others can be hard.

So we know we've got to work harder.

We try to do something

for Taiwan whenever we can.

Taiwan, an island that makes up

just 0.02% of the world's landmass,

commands global AI chip production

and leads in advanced
semiconductor manufacturing.

TSMC put Taiwan in the global spotlight,

yet media call it
"the most dangerous place on Earth."

I'd like to get your priorities
to mitigate the risks to

your most critical industry,

semiconductors.

How do you help mitigate the risk,

that increasing tension with China?

Semiconductors are undoubtedly

Taiwan's strength,

but they're also

our responsibility to the world.

The semiconductor industry

can only thrive through

global collaboration.

We hope the global community

will work with us

to cherish it.

Taiwan is surrounded by the sea.

Its coastal and political boundaries

feel like riddles of fate,

challenging all who live here.

In recent years,

the semiconductor industry

has been hailed as

Taiwan's "Silicon Shield"

or the "National Guardian Mountain."

But when Professor Wu,

a longtime scholar of
Taiwan's industrial history,

asked me in 2017 about
making a film on this subject,

I turned him down.

I felt technology was too cold

and this legend too distant.

It wasn't until I met this group of people

that I gladly picked up the camera.

I spent my 30th birthday in the U.S.

while leading the team in Ohio.

(The RCA project?)

(Why would they trust you?)

- (You were so young, in your 20s or 30s.)
- Yeah.

We still don't know.

In 1976,

Taiwan signed an agreement with RCA.

A group of engineers, most under 30,

were sent to the United States
for training,

where RCA licensed
semiconductor technology to Taiwan.

Dr. Shih Chin-tay,

former president of ITRI
(Industrial Technology Research Institute),

was one of the team leaders.

We just wanted to do
something interesting.

We never expected it

to become a hotspot

for global politics and economics.

We truly didn't see it coming.

In hindsight,

we took a gamble on semiconductors.

The odds of success

were honestly extremely low.

Even today,

only Japan, Korea, Taiwan and the U.S.

can produce at this level.

That tells you how difficult it is.

For half a century,

Taiwan has risen from a low-income country

to a most-watched global tech hub.

This transformation
has long sparked curiosity.

In history,

success stories are always celebrated,

sometimes even becoming legend.

Taiwan's semiconductor industry
has one such tale.

In 1974, seven people had breakfast

at "Little Hsin-Hsin"
soymilk shop in Taipei.

There, Taiwan's national
semiconductor plan was born.

As Taiwan's semiconductors
gained global attention,

the media began telling
that breakfast story.

Many just picked a random soymilk shop,

slapping a "Little Hsin-Hsin" sign on it.

There have been several versions.

Some said it was on Huaining Street,

some said Nanchang Street,

and others said elsewhere.

Mr. Lu Shyue-ching,

former Chairman of Chunghwa Telecom (CHT),

said that back in the 1970s,

CHT published a phonebook every year.

He asked his former colleagues

to check the warehouse.

There really was
a Little Hsin-Hsin... restaurant,

not a soymilk shop.

Little Hsin-Hsin Restaurant.

No. 40, Nanyang Street.

No. 40, Nanyang Street.

Lane 38.

No. 50.

Where is No. 40?

Excuse me.

Do you know where
No. 40, Nanyang Street is?

This is No. 36 and
the next building is No. 50.

So you've never heard of No. 40?

No.

No, I'm not sure.

Not sure?

No. 40? I've no idea.

We've been here for years
but never heard of it.

Actually, I couldn't verify it.

I kept looking,

but couldn't find Little Hsin-Hsin's

true location.

So, we offered a reward of NT$50,000

to whoever could find
the original photo and location.

No one ever came forward.

Is this the Land Office?

No. 40, Nanyang Street?

Yes.

No records.

I may have to ask
the archives to help you look.

This is a map from
the Japanese colonial era.

This is Nanyang Street.

This is Lane 38, Nanyang Street.

Having compared them,

we know this is where No. 38 was.

So, the No. 40 and 42 you're looking for

were roughly in this area.

This is the current map.

The buildings were demolished in 1987

and rebuilt as the "Merica Building."

Once we confirmed the location,

we visited Teresa Chen,

chairwoman of Merica Education Group.

Her memories helped reveal

the mystery of Little Hsin-Hsin.

They had breakfast meetings around

a big table with many people.

It wasn't a typical soymilk shop.

Usually, a soymilk shop
just served crullers.

But that place wasn't like that at all.

I used to live in
the Nanyang Street neighborhood.

Those breakfast meetings

affected our lives quite a lot

because there would be traffic controls.

These were high-ranking
government officials

like the Premier and
the Minister of Economic Affairs.

And it wasn't occasional.

It happened all the time.

Some wondered why I insisted
on finding the exact spot.

Wouldn't a reference photo be enough?

But I believe we can't face history
relying only on imagination.

Each piece of evidence
bears witness of its time.

Finally, we found out
that this legendary soymilk shop

was managed by the
Veterans Affairs Council.

Originally, it was run by

the Suao-Yuanshan branch.

Then it was handed over to
our production and sales center.

That would be the Nanyang St. location.

When I saw the contract,

a clearer picture emerged.

Little Hsin-Hsin was run by veterans.

The soymilk shop was on the first floor.

Legendary for its rich soymilk,

large crullers, and crispy flatbread,

they purportedly were the best in Taipei.

The second floor was where
President Chiang Ching-kuo

had breakfast meetings
with top government officials.

Yeh Wan-an, a former government official.

He is now in his 90s and confirmed

this was where the pivotal
seven people meeting took place.

Sun Yun-suan,
then economic affairs minister,

Henry Kao,
then transport and communications minister,

the head of
Chunghwa Telecom Laboratories and others.

Seven of them had breakfast
at Little Hsin-Hsin on Nanyang Street,

and listened to Pan Wen-yuan's report.

Minister Sun was very impressed afterwards.

He asked Pan to draft

an integrated circuit (IC) project proposal

for the government's consideration.

Minister Sun asked
how much funding was needed

and Pan said US$10 million.

That was a huge sum
at the time, NT$400 million.

Sun said, "No problem. Leave it to me."

This history shouldn't be forgotten.

Pan already thought that this was

a very important project for Taiwan.

Looking back,

it was beyond anyone's imagination.

Sun asked Pan to submit a proposal

to the Ministry of Economic Affairs.

So, Pan secluded himself in Room 508

of the Grand Hotel Taipei

for nearly two weeks

to write his IC project proposal.

An old journal from Pan

led us back to Room 508 at the Grand Hotel.

We got to witness

the pressures and
challenges they once shouldered.

July 10, 1974.

Mrs. Pan and I received

a dinner invitation from Minister Sun.

Minister Sun kept us till 11 p.m.

to discuss how to strengthen

Taiwan's electronics industry.

I didn't know I was about to make

a commitment to him which compelled me to:

First,

organize a Technical Advisory Committee

in the U.S.

Second, retire early from RCA Corporation.

Fight an uphill battle

to overcome obstacles for Taiwan.

Today, I come here and feel

as if it happened only yesterday.

Like walking into a dream.

Pan once told me he had
two rules for serving his country:

First, never take a government post,

which he never did.

Right?

Second, no salary.

He came back to Taiwan to serve,

to contribute.

It was to do something

good for the country.

Not for fame or money.

Pan gave up his pension.

His wife gave up her teaching job.

He returned without pay to lead
Taiwan's semiconductor mission.

He said it was all for the country.

What kind of era elicited such sacrifice?

Since 1949, Taiwan has lived
in wartime readiness.

Real battles were once fought
just 5 km from China,

on the island of Kinmen.

On August 23,

our frontline forces fought back with resolve.

Powerful U.S. and R.O.C.
fleets and squadrons

provided armed escort.

From the Battle of Guningtou
to the 823 Bombardment,

followed by 21 years of periodic conflict.

It wasn't until 1979,

when the U.S. established
diplomatic relations with China,

that the war finally ended.

Taiwan's situation seemed
to be on a balance of terror.

Looking back,
when the Korean War erupted in 1950,

seeking to contain communism,

the U.S. provided military and economic
aid to Taiwan for 15 years.

the U.S. provided military and economic
aid to Taiwan for 15 years.

The U.S.-China power plays
have always strained

the fragile thread between war and peace.

Taiwan's economy in
the 1950s was in dire shape.

High unemployment, runaway inflation, etc.

When the U.S. aid arrived,

they said that when they
supported a country,

stabilizing the economy took priority.

The U.S. aid came in two parts:

military and economic.

The military aid was slightly larger

than the economic aid.

Mostly as weapons and equipment.

The economic aid

focused on infrastructure,

roads, electricity grids

and other essentials.

The U.S. gave Taiwan

US$100 million a year.

It was about

6% of Taiwan's GDP.

When that aid suddenly stopped,

it hit Taiwan hard.

This phone call opened a door
for Taiwan's path to technology.

The following year,

the first METS
(Modern Engineering and Technology Seminar)

was held.

Engineers from abroad brought back
new industry knowledge and ideas.

They planted the seeds of change.

Telecom, computing,
civil engineering, management

and even film were discussed.

Most important of all was
the semiconductor

technology and knowledge.

Fei and Pan knew each other

from their days at Chiao Tung University.

They hoped those engineers in the U.S.,

back then, Taiwan felt like the homeland.

They hoped to come back and help.

They had advanced technology,

a global perspective,

and the will to build an industry.

In hindsight,

I'm deeply grateful to

the scholars and experts who joined.

Together with local specialists,

they carefully documented everything

brought back from overseas.

It was clear, thorough and precise.

They were top professors in the U.S.,

highly accomplished

if you looked at their resumes.

Yet when Taiwan called,

they came home.

I wrote the first report.

We documented things like this.

"An introduction to IC technology."

"Translated and organized by S.N. Yeh."

I took Pan through factory after factory,

they all looked the same.

The most advanced work

was assembling digital watches.

It strained the eyes terribly.

All women, all straining their eyes.

We couldn't help but wonder,

just to pay for a Boeing plane

from the U.S.,

how many workers would

it take to earn that back?

Mr. Pan would come by often.

One afternoon, he stopped by the office

and we had a long talk.

What stayed with me was this:

"Taiwan's IC development

must not crawl on the ground."

That one line

changed the course

of Taiwan's development.

In an era when technology was
called upon to save the nation,

National Chiao Tung University (NCTU)

established Taiwan's
first semiconductor research lab,

becoming the cradle
for semiconductor talent.

When I was a junior in college,

I took a course in semiconductors.

I remember it was

a semiconductor engineering class.

It had a profound impact on

the college students at the time.

Back then, we'd chat and wonder

when Taiwan would be like the U.S.,

with a strong semiconductor industry

and many great semiconductor companies.

Everyone was hoping one day

we'd have an industry like that.

Six,

five,

four,

three,

two,

one,

zero.

All engines running.

Liftoff. We have a liftoff.

I was walking on the street in Taipei,

a shop had TVs in the window,

with the screens facing the street.

Wow! Man has made it to the Moon.

The moon landing had commenced.

I felt science was advancing so rapidly

that we couldn't catch up with it.

I'm going to step off the LM now.

That's one small step for a man,

one giant leap for mankind.

One small step for tech,
one giant leap for mankind.

In 1971, Intel launched
the world's first microprocessor —

Intel 4004.

At the same time,

Taiwan suffered a major blow

when it lost its seat at the UN.

The delegation of
Republic of China has now decided

not to take part in any further proceedings

of this General Assembly.

In 1971, we were expelled from the UN.

It was an impactful event.

It meant other countries
wouldn't acknowledge us.

At the time, people felt that

Taiwan's withdrawal from the UN,

coupled with the loss of
strong U.S. backing,

meant Taiwan was doomed.

There were many Taiwanese
grad students at Princeton.

I often sat and chatted with

Yang Ding-yuan and Chang Ching-chu.

At some point, we started asking ourselves:

What are we doing in the U.S.?

Just watching fires burn back home?

Just making it something to talk about?

Or is there something we can actually do?

In those turbulent times,

a wave of mass emigration erupted.

To calm people down, the government

even made a series of patriotic films,

hoping to boost morale
and inspire patriotism.

But more trouble came.

The subsequent global oil crisis

made the situation worse for Taiwan,
which lacks mineral resources.

October 1973,

the oil price rose from NT$2-plus
to over NT$4 dollars a barrel.

By January 1, 1974,
it went up another NT$11.

High oil prices were not conducive

to the development of the
heavy chemical industry.

The fact that Taiwan had
no minerals was devastating.

If Taiwan had minerals, it'd be different.

So I told Minister Sun that

we must develop high tech.

We had no choice.

The U.S. launched a rocket in 1969.

It signaled a bright future

for semiconductors.

Finally, I persuaded Minister Sun.

He took a team to visit
then Premier Chiang Ching-kuo

and persuaded Premier Chiang.

In 1973, the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) was founded.

Having accepted Pan's plan

for developing semiconductors in Taiwan,

Minister Sun began recruiting.

Professor Hu Ding-hua

stepped up and volunteered
to lead the project.

In 1976, ITRI sent

more than 40 young engineers in batches

to the RCA Corporation in the U.S.

to study in its semiconductor division.

RCA's technology was incomplete.

It wasn't even top-tier.

Among the 30-plus early candidates,

RCA was the only company willing

to offer ten spots for IC designers.

It was the one and only.

What they learned from RCA

not only created Taiwan's
semiconductor industry from scratch

but also laid the technological
foundation for its future.

There are many aspects
to any historical event.

From a technology history perspective,

we must acknowledge the groundwork
laid by those before us

and never forget the way they paved.

I think they fought to do what was right.

You probably have no idea about

the magnitude of your
contribution to Taiwan.

Had it not been for you,

Taiwan's economic and industrial path

would've been completely different.

Most of Taiwan's college graduates used to

go abroad for their graduate studies.

We used to say,

"Come, come, come to NTU...
Go, go, go to America."

Those who stayed or came back from the U.S.

joined this project with one goal

to reach a higher level.

Around December 1975,

in China Times and United Daily News,

there was an ad in English.

It was pretty big.

It said ITRI was recruiting young talent

to train in IC technology in the U.S.

When I saw it,

I quietly signed up,

I didn't even tell my wife.

I had finished my master's.

There was a small ad

in Central Daily News saying

ITRI was launching an IC project.

I thought, "Nice," and applied for it.

Before we left for RCA,

Minister Sun met with the whole team,

and encouraged us to complete
the mission successfully.

He stressed how critical the mission was.

We had to succeed.

Failure was not an option.

Minister Sun spoke to us all

before we left.

It felt like a true mission to everyone.

He told us,

"We must succeed.
Failure is not an option."

(So the Minister had
high hopes for you all.)

As the chief project lead,

I stood up and said,
"Yes, we will succeed."

The first group of 19
was dispatched to RCA.

Hu stayed in Taiwan as project director.

In the U.S., Yang, Shih, Chang and Shu

led the design, process, testing
and equipment teams.

Arriving in the U.S.,

I saw highways everywhere.

Everyone, even a gatekeeper,

had a nice house, A/C and a fridge.

Our daily allowance

including food, rent,

insurance and everything

was just US$18.

So, when we passed McDonald's or KFC,

we'd take a whiff and quietly walk away.

We couldn't afford it.

It was a shock,

a deep, unforgettable shock.

Then we thought,

someday,

we would catch up.

We were determined to
accomplish the mission.

We pulled out all the stops
to get it done.

Not just to learn from them,

but to show we could match them,

maybe even surpass them.

I asked them to write down everything,

every detail they saw in the fab.

Having been on a design team
in a U.S. factory,

I knew even the tiniest detail

could make or break production.

So I told them to

document everything carefully,

even the smallest,

seemingly trivial details.

While in Ohio,

I often printed out their
process specs so that we could

bring back all the settings
and processes shared with us.

They thought we printed so much

that we were driving up their costs.

They even complained to Shih about it.

The technicians in our department

saw how hard we worked and joked,

"We'll lose our jobs
as soon as you guys go home."

Incidentally...

one of them, a good friend of mine,

typed out "Made in Taiwan"

and stuck it on his phone.

He said, "Someday, all this
will be made by you guys in Taiwan."

Most of these factory workers

were no more than high school graduates.

I often said our team was

like using a sledgehammer to crack a nut.

We got more education than they did.

But could we do as well or even better?

That was our real challenge.

We spent nearly

all our time in the factory.

Tseng was the first to learn to drive.

Once, he drove us to

Cedar Point in northern Ohio.

It was an amusement park.

We went there

and had a blast.

We stayed out way too late.

When we got back, Shih was furious.

He said, "If something happened,

the whole project would've collapsed!"

"No more trips like that."

There were no cell phones back then.

He was worried sick.

These photos are real treasures.

Here we are, out on a boat trip.

These are...

Shih, Tseng and me.

At that time, we cut each other's hair.

We'd make a hole in the newspaper,

drape it over like a cape, and snip away.

My child was born in 1977,

after I returned from RCA.

He was born after you came back?

He was born after I came back.

You got your driver's license in the U.S.?

I got my driver's license in the U.S.

They all worked hard

to get a driver's license there.

Just to...

Just to go out and explore.

During Thanksgiving break,

the holiday was three or four days.

I drove from Ohio to Huntsville, Alabama.

Then down to New Orleans, Louisiana.

Their trip sounded crazy to me.

Why would anyone drive like that?

You just sat...

and drove without checking anything out.

(Three straight days behind the wheel?)

Yes, all the way south and back up.

(Did you think of taking him along)

(just so he couldn't pull the rank on you?)

No, he wouldn't go with us.

I had to write the reports.

The real stress came every weekend.

On Sunday evenings,

I'd get a call from Hu.

Taiwan had finished Monday's meeting,

so instructions came pouring in.

In those two to three years,

my heart skipped a beat

whenever I heard the phone ring.

Back then, the RCA team had to learn

not just IC design and processing,

but also U.S. management systems.

The only female member on the team was

Chang Jing-yue, who was
responsible for accounting.

I took pride in contributing

to the success of the program.

I believed I helped push it

toward a more perfect execution.

I think, back then... it was Mr. Hu.

They were incredibly wise.

Why was cost accounting
included in the project?

They knew it wasn't just about tech.

They wanted to turn it into a product,

to commercialize what we learned.

And that meant knowing the costs.

As soon as we arrived,

they gave me

lots of these notepads.

(Did everyone have them?)

Yes. They gave us these
as soon as we arrived.

Dating back to 1977...
they are more than 40 years old.

This was our appointment letter.

(You still have these.)

Yes, I kept them at home.

These engineers not only
had to work hard in the U.S.,

they also had to take on
assignments from Taiwan,

including designing Taiwan's
first IC, the CIC-0001 chip.

The purpose was to provide
better positioning for the balloons

used in the psychological
warfare against China.

The aid sent to China via balloons

includes cured meat,
rice and daily goods.

We also send countless flyers in color,

calling on compatriots
to rise against communism.

In Kinmen, they'd launch balloons

carrying flyers and small goods

to float across the strait.

Each balloon had a timer

set according to the weather,

wind and temperature.

The old system wasn't that reliable.

Ours was digital.

Much more accurate.
The timing was precise.

But...

later, a bunch of problems came up.

Our IC couldn't handle

the temperatures at high altitude.

Though this project didn't succeed,

it was vital for ITRI.

From designing, manufacturing,
testing and packaging,

we went over the entire process.

Although this homegrown chip

couldn't cope with the temperature
difference at high altitude

and failed,

it seemed to witness
the intertwining relationship between

tech advancement and national strategy.

Before the RCA team left for the U.S.,

Minister Sun formally assigned
the task to them.

He met with them and
encouraged them in person.

It was a gesture full of hope and purpose.

To the outside world, they were engineers

pursuing cutting-edge technology.

But their true fuel wasn't science.

It was love for their home country.

So we have to see the bigger picture

to understand why

they gave it everything they had,

and what truly drove them.

Geopolitical shifts are felt most deeply

by those carrying out
national missions abroad.

In 1976, the Summer Olympics
was held in Montreal.

Taiwan was banned from
entering as Team R.O.C.

as Canada established
diplomatic relations with China.

This incident shocked Taiwan

and sent the RCA team's
motivation into overdrive.

The Olympics happened to take place

while we were in the U.S.

The Taiwanese team was banned

and wasn't allowed to participate.

We came to learn about what happened.

But there was nothing we could do.

We were engineers

we weren't considering politics.

The most important thing was
we had to do our job well.

If Taiwan isn't strong, nothing we say

will matter much.

In 1977, a pilot fab was founded,

symbolizing the seeds of semiconductors
carried across the ocean

about to take root in Taiwan.

There was fierce resistance.

Lawmakers questioned Minister Sun.

Why invest so much in
something so uncertain?

The economy was struggling.
Times were tough.

Why take such a gamble?

I knew Minister Sun
was having a hard time.

Even within the government,
he stood alone.

The National Assembly opposed it.
Ditto the Ministry of Finance.

Even his own ministry pushed back.

He was the Minister of Economic Affairs

and still, his ministry opposed him.

Some old lawmaker friends
even scolded him over dinner,

saying he was out of
his mind for betting on chips.

He told me all this.

I said, "Ignore them.
They just don't see it yet."

"Six months ago, Singapore's
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew

visited our semiconductor lab.

Lee asked, 'Who made this bold decision?'

Sun stayed silent.

So, I (Fang Hien-chee) spoke up,

'It was Mr. Sun.'"

The hardest part about decision-making

is acting in an unfamiliar field.

It's dangerous to lead when
you don't know the terrain.

But I believe Minister Sun
had done his homework.

He'd heard from Fang and Pan

and received advice from Simon M. Sze.

He knew exactly what he was doing.

That's why he didn't hesitate
pulling the trigger.

By then, Minister Sun

had become Premier Sun.

At the pilot fab opening,

we issued him a guest badge.

You know what he did?

He tossed the badge aside and said,

"I'm not a guest. I'm the owner."

"This is my project."

The biggest challenge the pilot fab
faced after it opened

was to find business orders

to keep operations running.

Shih turned to his college
roommate Chu for help

and successfully secured our first order

from Hong Kong for digital watches.

That was huge for us because in Taiwan,

people thought imports were better

for products like these.

Nobody thought we could
make them in Taiwan.

I remember it was
an order of 100,000 chips.

What we had in mind lacked ambition.

We never imagined

a watch would have this much impact.

I heard that later Chang Ching-chu

ran into RCA's CEO,

who told Chang that RCA's

biggest miscalculation

was transferring the technology to Taiwan,

because they were no match for us.

If memory serves,

they promised a yield of

40% in the contract.

But on our first cut,

we hit over 90%.

By the second or third year,

RCA tried to buy the pilot fab back.

Some officials thought we should sell...

just cash out and move on.

Hu Ding-hua, along with
the director of the center

and other top officials
like Premier Sun said,

"This must take root. We're not selling."

So we kept the pilot fab.

Hu was like a squad leader
to those young engineers at ITRI.

He led the mission forward

and always had their back in tough times.

I didn't know until later

that when Pan Wen-yuan

was about to launch the project,

Hu called Pan and said

he was willing to lead the project.

That took courage because

Pan barely knew him then.

Hu said someone had to step up, so he did.

The sense of mission

this generation of pioneers had

came from a deep sense of identity,

and a looming crisis.

In the 1970s,

whether the place was called Taiwan,

the Republic of China or China,

the challenge was clear:

How to carve out a future

through relentless industrial

and technological advancement.

I remember when the U.S.

broke off diplomatic relations
with Taiwan.

We were on our way back
to the office after lunch.

In front of the first ITRI building,

we sat down and chatted.

Now that the U.S. had severed

diplomatic relations with Taiwan,

the competition between Taiwan

and China would get even tougher.

Hu broke down in tears.

We stood there,

but had no idea how to comfort him.

We met each other in 1976.

I was 29, and Hu was 33.

He never thought Taiwan's chip industry

would scale up so much that

it'd play a pivotal role in the world.

President Hu never sought credit

and was eager to promote young talent.

He often urged young people

to hold fast to what's right,

and dare to innovate.

I learned three things from him:

honesty,

discipline,

and a vision that proved

vital to Macronix's growth.

Hu, your life was a gift

to Taiwan's tech industry.

You truly lived a life worth living.

At the memorial service,

I witnessed their camaraderie
from the old days

and the true emotions these
tech pioneers rarely displayed.

At that moment, I thought,
if this history isn't recorded,

it would be Taiwan's loss.

That very thought

sparked the making of this documentary.

What did the RCA project prove?

It proved that Taiwan,

this environment, these people

could indeed build ICs. Any IC.

The pilot fab made the chips,

but that wasn't enough.

Small scale doesn't make an industry.

Scaling up, that's the real test.

And that test was

United Microelectronics Corporation (UMC).

In 1980, ITRI transferred
the technology and talents

to the company it founded, UMC.

It was Taiwan's first homegrown company

to design and manufacture
integrated circuits.

And with that, it carried the weight
of industrializing semiconductors.

Starting this industry

took real courage from the government.

Back then, it felt incredibly lonely.

So very lonely.

But you could feel the officials

in charge genuinely cared.

They took on huge pressure

and never gave up.

They really wanted to make it work.

In the early days of UMC,

we got a lot of help from the government.

But we lagged in technology.

We lacked talent. Our funding was limited.

How could we use our limited resources

to make money first,

that was the only goal.

Back then,

there was no room for pride

when it came to sales.

We had to hustle hard for every deal.

If you'd asked

the public opinion back then

whether Taiwan should do ICs,

it would've been a resounding no.

No one would've applauded us.

When UMC started,

CommonWealth Magazine said

we were a crippled industry
heading for certain death.

We barely scraped by until 1983

when a golden opportunity appeared.

In 1983, telephones were exported.

Previously in the U.S., all home phones

had to be installed

by the phone companies.

That year, phones became deregulated.

People could install
their own phones at home.

So we thought,

this is big.

Let's make ICs for telephones.

Demand exploded.

We worked nonstop for 9 months,

even on the weekends.

It was a massive opportunity.

Our revenue jumped 500% by the next year.

Our profit margin was over 30%,

second only to the tobacco monopoly.

From ITRI to UMC,

with John Hsuan,
Robert Hsing-cheng Tsao and I.D. Liu.

We all thought

this was something we could fight for.

Taiwan's startup spirit

could rival Silicon Valley's.

Once you've explained
the kind of help you need,

the computer expert will show you
the system that's right for you,

show you how simple it is to get started.

And library of business
and management software

can help you solve your problems.

And give you a tool of modern times.

Another key to UMC's success

was the rise of the PC era,
heralded by IBM in 1981.

Taiwan's PC and chip industries

are uniquely positioned.

We were ready.

All we needed was a spark.

In the '80s, Taiwan's economy took off.

In the '80s, Taiwan's economy took off.

It not only gave
semiconductors a cluster effect

but also caught the wave
of global silicon tech.

Today, areas around Hsinchu Science Park

boast Taiwan's youngest
and richest population.

When they were scouting

for the site for the science park,

President Chiang Ching-kuo

was eyeing the old airfield in Taoyuan.

No one dared to advise or object,

except for Minister Shu Shien-siu.

Shu spoke up and insisted on Hsinchu.

He argued Hsinchu had the right ecosystem.

Tsing Hua and Chiao Tung Universities,

and ITRI were all there.

So, he went to see President Chiang.

He told me later on,

"Actually, it's because I was

the president of Tsing Hua University

and I love Hsinchu."

The science park was on 2,100 hectares.

Three things were abundant there:

Temples, cemeteries and military troops.

Hsinchu Science Park began from zero.

Our old house was as old as I was.

When it was taken,

it was very hard to let go.
Truly, very hard.

This used to be our old family home.

There were rice paddies out front.

Across the street were more fields

and a sugarcane farm.

There was a shooting range just past TSMC.

We used to run after the soldiers,

trying to sell them guavas or soda.

Life was hard.

Now it's all high-tech factories.

Our family was poor

so I started working

at UMC before I graduated.

We had to start from scratch.

They trained us from the ground up.

We learned our work mattered.

Chips are used in cars and factories,

in planes and even space shuttles.

We were repeatedly told

to be super, super careful.

When a chip wafer broke,

we all panicked.

We were terrified.

Yeah, it happened a lot.

The sound of a chip breaking

scared us to death.

"Who was it? Who did that?"

"There goes your bonus this month!"

Eight hours under a microscope

was total eye strain.

The light was so bright

we didn't even realize tears were falling.

The company infirmary
gave us cod liver oil.

We were all poor back then.

But the nurse was generous.

She gave us as much as we wanted.

Sometimes I'd take two.

One for me, and one for my mom.

We didn't understand stocks back then.

Later we learned they could be cashed in.

I still remember I sold a few UMC shares,

and bought myself a car.

I thought, well, stocks are great.

They were all responsible

and very cooperative.

They worked overtime whenever asked.

So the management

was actually pretty easy.

These two trees were gifts
from my coworkers at UMC.

They were two tiny seedlings
when I got them.

In 10 years, they've grown into big trees.

I worked in Fab 2; she was in Fab 1.

It was normal for us

to meet a future spouse on the job.

The engineers were friendly

and always quick to help.

That was pretty nice.

I suppose that's how
a lot of sparks flew.

To keep the fabs running smoothly,

the machines cannot stop running.

Line workers and engineers have to

work three shifts and be on call 24/7.

When a problem occurs,
even in the middle of the night

or on a typhoon day,
they have to rush back to work.

Taiwan's living conditions

weren't exactly great back then.

People grasped any job opportunity tight.

A lasting memory is not having a car.

Then a typhoon hit.

The worse the situation,
the more people they needed.

So, I left home despite the storm.

No one asked how I'd get there.

You just found a way to show up.

You could say, Taiwanese workers
are simply more willing.

We're willing to take on the jobs

others don't want to do.

That's how, from the labor-intensive
to tech-intensive industries,

Taiwan was able to level up.

Taiwan's advantage is in manufacturing.

Our engineers work hard.

Honestly, our salaries aren't high.

Compared to global standards,

Taiwanese engineers earn only

a third of that from Silicon Valley.

But they're willing to work overtime

with long hours,

even to get called back

in the middle of the night.

That's the culture that built

Taiwan's strength in manufacturing.

Today, we're here to witness

the inaugural KT Li Award presentation.

First, congratulations
to its first recipient,

TSMC Founder Morris Chang.

Later this month,

Mr. Chang will represent me

at the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting

for the sixth time,

once again showing the world that

Taiwan is a capable and trusted partner.

I'd also like to introduce a special guest.

Welcome to Nvidia's
Mr. Jensen Huang and his wife.

TSMC makes chips for every industry today.

No company today or in history

has ever had the reach and impact of TSMC.

Elephants can dance.

Morris raised one
that jumps through hoops.

And without TSMC,

the entire world's technology industries
today would not be possible.

In 1976, I was invited by METS

to give a speech in Taiwan.

I was at the peak of my career

at Texas Instruments.

Mr. KT Li was in the audience.

After the speech, he came right over

to shake my hand and invited me to dinner.

The first time KT
invited Morris Chang over,

I was asked to show him around.

The whole industry in Taiwan

was smaller than Hewlett-Packard.

But still, I took him to see

what Taiwan's electronics
industry looked like.

After the visit, I also wrote a report.

Taiwan's industry wasn't
very flattering at the time.

But the report itself was immaterial.

It was not even that important

because I think

KT's true intention was

to get me to come to Taiwan.

None of my recommendations were adopted.

In Taiwan's early development,

we often struggled with self-doubt,

wondering when

a truly capable leader would emerge.

Morris Chang stood out early on

as a leading figure

in the global semiconductor industry,

someone Taiwan's government could trust.

In 1985, I was at General Instrument.

That's when Shu Shien-siu

came to recruit me.

My first task was to lead ITRI.

But the real mission was

to establish a semiconductor company.

KT asked to see me

three weeks after

I started my job at ITRI.

From 1985 until the founding of TSMC.

Indeed, TSMC wouldn't be here without KT.

To keep up with global silicon technology,

ITRI launched

the VLSI (Very-Large-Scale Integration)
Development Project.

In a decade, Taiwan invited Morris Chang
back three times.

Behind this eagerness and urgency

was a nation grappling with its fate.

In 1985, Chang finally returned

and became the President of ITRI.

He asked Hu Ding-hua

to draw up a TSMC proposal.

They submitted it to the Executive Yuan

and presented it to

then Premier Yu Kuo-hwa.

On September 10, 1985,

Chang presented Taiwan's VLSI roadmap

to top government officials

from the Executive Yuan and

the Council for Economic
Planning and Development.

At that time, Taiwan was just

beginning to consider investing in VLSI.

But the proposal mentions that

the U.S., Western Europe and Japan

were already deep in the race.

There wouldn't be short-term profit.

For Taiwan, also known as

the Republic of China (R.O.C.),

VLSI was a long-term gamble

with high stakes.

It was a gamble that demanded

serious consideration.

Building a transistor
is like building a house.

But you will slowly realize that

to build houses into a community,

that community takes

infrastructure and design.

Today,

the Very-Large-Scale Integration (VLSI)

isn't just a house.

It's the making of a city.

Why did the government get involved?

Why not leave it to private companies?

We wanted the technology
to take root in Taiwan.

Self-developed and under our control.

That's why they did it.

Otherwise, we could've just relied

on technology transfer forever.

Buying or building, they both cost money.

What you buy is tried and true.

What you build comes with risks,

but you'll own it forever.

So yes, the government gave us money.

But we carried the flag
to build homegrown technology.

It's a future we could own.

Presidential Decree: Taiwan Area,

Martial law lifted
effective July 15, 1987, at 00:00.

ITRI's second major
tech transfer plan succeeded.

Led by Morris Chang,
then President of ITRI,

TSMC was born.

Looking back at 1987,

it was a pivotal year
for Taiwan's political,

economic and social transformation.

The funding wasn't raised

entirely by Morris Chang.

He had just gotten back.
How could he have done it?

It was KT Li who got the money

from the government.

He brought in Chiao Tung Bank

and persuaded Philips

to invest in 27% of the company.

He even convinced

business tycoon Wang Yung-ching.

Wang said, "Mr. Li,

I don't know what a semiconductor is,

but I'll invest if you ask me to."

Rumor has it that

Wang regretted that

he sold the stocks too soon.

He told his people

that he lost the equivalent of

a billion-dollar company.

In Silicon Valley, we say:

You either win big or lose it all.

Winner takes all.

Whoever wins takes it all.

Whoever wins takes the whole game.

Morris had the guts to go all in.

And KT Li dared to back

TSMC and UMC with massive funding.

It was unheard of.

Having listened to the talk in 1987,

my boss at IBM said,

"Taiwan thinks it can catch up

by manufacturing chips

without original design?"

He laughed and said, "That's crazy."

Crazy.

Even the industrial sector
was not optimistic

about TSMC's bold move
into pure-play foundry.

At the time,
contract manufacturing and OEM

was seen as low-tech and low-margin.

In 1987, "Made in Taiwan"

was even the butt of a joke
in a Hollywood film.

Come on, come on.

Is it made in Taiwan?

Yeah. These are tough to find.

If you're truly brilliant,

will you choose to be an OEM?

Wouldn't you rather create something new?

Foundry work means vanishing

into someone else's machine,

blending in with someone else's products.

You'd always be an unsung hero.

In the late 1990s, we were OEMs.

I believe many looked down on Taiwan.

How could OEMs be great?

That's just impossible.

I think the amazing thing about Taiwan is

it never let the stigma of OEM

limit its imagination of

what foundry could become.

The decision to start TSMC
was a big gamble for Taiwan.

At ITRI, Hu and Shih

did their best to talk Tseng Fan-cheng into

leading the R&D team at TSMC.

Tseng became TSMC's first local hire.

(You came back and found
Shih and Hu waiting for you.)

(What was that like?)

Shih asked me to take the job.

They said if I didn't,

there'd be no one to lead the team.

So, I said yes.

We'd have been done for if he had refused.

(But how did you manage to persuade him?)

I said if he didn't do it, we'd be doomed.

He was the one who
understood IC production,

including R&D operations.

I said, "If you don't accept the job,

starting this company will be pointless."

He couldn't name anyone else
to take the job, either.

Then Hu told me,

"You're driving on the highway.

You can't get off until the next exit.

You can't jump out of the car halfway."

Situated at ITRI,

this unassuming office building

was leased to TSMC back in the days.

It became TSMC Fab 1.

Now, this landmark quietly
stands as a witness to history.

The winter of 1990 was bitterly cold.

I was the R&D manager.

I had 23 people

who were driving process R&D.

I was called a manager,

but in reality I was the head of R&D.

I remember that one day,

I spent all morning trying

to talk people out of leaving.

Many were headed to Macronix.

I asked them why.

"Isn't TSMC a nice place?"

They said, "TSMC has no products.

An OEM has no future."

In just a few days,

I lost a third of my team. Seven quit.

Only 16 or 17 remained.

Nobody expected us to do well,

not even ourselves.

Morris Chang knew from the start

that we had to reach the global market.

If we only served

local design houses in Taiwan

we were bound to fail.

So even at the company's founding,

he approached Intel and Philips

for a technology agreement.

When I first reported to Mr. Chang,

he said we had to lead in technology.

I thought I did my best

to gently inform Mr. Chang that,

if we wanted to be the leader,

it would cost us dearly.

Second place is safer.

You need only one third of the R&D cost,

and you won't trail far behind.

Maybe by only six months to a year.

You'll be drafting off the leader.

I laid out the case for being second.

But he looked me straight

in the eye and said strictly:

"We should never think that way."

TSMC's rise to No. 1 in chip foundry

was built on in-house R&D
and relentless yield improvement.

Launching the "Five Mountains Plan"
in 1998

and refusing to collaborate
with IBM in 2000

were two turning points
that anchored its future trajectory.

We couldn't name
the clients aloud due to NDAs.

So, I named the plan after
Taiwan's five sacred mountains,

each mountain stood for one company.

They were Mt. Snow, Mt. Jade, Mt. Nanhu,

Mt. Xiuguluan and Mt. Beidawu.

The "Five Mountains Plan"
involved partnering with

five global IDMs to manufacture
chips in parallel.

TSMC aimed to elevate
its technology through collaboration.

When I proposed this idea,
the team had doubts,

worrying that there'd be too many
types of clients to handle.

I said if we couldn't beat them now,

we would never be able to scale up.

That's why I fought to win IDM customers.

That's why I launched

the Five Mountains Plan.

Pushing for self-reliant R&D wasn't easy.

In 2000,

a senior VP of IBM came to Taiwan.

He said, "We have the tech.

We could teach you.

Just send your team to New York.

We can teach you and
you'll get to bring it home.

You just need to pay the license fee."

IBM was a giant at that time.

In 1999, IBM invited us

into a joint R&D project.

But IBM's terms and conditions
were absurd.

TSMC had to shut down its own R&D.

I said I can't stop TSMC's R&D.

But UMC joined IBM.

Chang was a bit annoyed

with me at the time.

"Why didn't you run this by me?"

I said, "I did ask you once.

But if giving up R&D is the price,
I won't pay it."

That was my line.

I never backed down.

Tseng's resolve

led TSMC down a difficult R&D path,

but it proved to be the road to success.

To stay competitive,

UMC also turned into a foundry.

It briefly became TSMC's biggest rival,

but in just two years
TSMC pulled ahead of IBM,

while UMC's partnership
with IBM fell apart.

Many industries in Taiwan

rely on licensed tech.

In the end, they never grow big.

DRAM and panels, same story.

I think this is the key,

not only to TSMC,

but also when it comes to

Taiwan's industrial upgrade.

It's not just about making money.

Making more money isn't the priority.

What matters is staying in the game.

I believe TSMC decided at the time

to build its own R&D capability.

I guess that's why they hired me.

You can look at it this way.
It's easier to shoot.

I used to use this 8mm camera a lot.

I studied optics.

I never dreamed of working

on optics in a chip company.

But it turns out that
optics is very critical

and not many people understand it.

They knew semiconductors well,
but not as much for optics.

Dr. Burn J. Lin's immersion lithography

Dr. Burn J. Lin's immersion lithography

broke Moore's Law

and let TSMC shape industry
standards for the very first time.

I saw some young people from church once.

They also worked at TSMC.

They said Mr. Lin seemed

to be under a lot of stress.

I said, "Really? I can't tell."

They told me the decision he made

would affect TSMC for the next 5 years.

It was only the beginning.

They said the stress was enormous

because he had to succeed.

I asked him after I got home.

He said he'd take it one step at a time.

It was alright.

She's right. Usually, I show

no ups or downs

because I believe in God.

Someone at work once asked me,

"If your idea's so good,

why hasn't Intel done it?"

I said, "If we wait for Intel to do it,

how will we ever lead?"

In the global arena of
high-tech competition,

only by relying on tech self-reliance

can one secure a leading position.

Looking back at where we came from,

for these seed engineers,

wasn't this the future
they had always hoped for?

Turn right ahead.
I think it's the second right.

We're navigating by memory now.

Every summer when mangoes were in season,

my father would send me a box.

After I ate them, I buried the pits,

and a tree grew out of them.

You said it was over 40 years ago?

When I moved here, it was 1983.

So you've never tasted one?

None from this tree.

They should save one or two
for you when they harvest.

It's like a tech transfer.

I brought it here, and it grew.

I didn't think it would bear fruit,

but it did the very next year.

I haven't been back to the dorm in years.

And now, look how tall it's grown.

(Do you often come here to exercise?)

Yes, the sight of ducks is relaxing.

Walking with MediaTek Chairman
Tsai by the lake,

we talked about Taiwan's tech industry

and the rapid business cycles it survives.

Suddenly he saw the lake
full of lotus in bloom.

He turned and asked me, "What's next?"

Look at all these blossoms.

They remind me of our products.

When they bloom, they bloom big.

Millions are sold every year.

When it rains,

it's like a financial crisis.

These cycles come every year.

So when I see this,

I wonder, "What's next?"

"What's next?" is not only
a test of business cycle,

but also a question of
national direction and survival.

Taiwan was really poor back then.

We had no money, no technology, no talent.

At the time, everything was hard.

Another thing is, no one knew who we were.

What's Taiwan? What's ITRI?

No one had heard of it.

That was the hardest part.

I remember that after each project,

my team would ask, "Was the mission done?

Could we stop now?"

But we realized we couldn't,

because the world kept changing.

Every round of industrial competition
is a high-stakes gamble.

Success is never guaranteed.

For example, after establishing TSMC,

ITRI launched the Submicron Project,

hoping Taiwan could become
the world's fourth

to produce advanced DRAM
with self-developed tech.

But the project suffered a brutal setback.

Around 1990, Taiwan's PC boom,

led by Acer and MiTAC, had begun.

Suddenly we found ourselves
missing two critical components:

CPU and memory.

Pressure mounted on ITRI

to develop CPU

as well as memory.

ICs are now the key
rising industry in Taiwan

and the crucial parts with
the widest application.

The Submicron Lab,

co-funded by 13 companies including TSMC,

was renamed
Vanguard International Semiconductor (VIS).

Every seven years,

ITRI launched a new venture.

UMC was set up in 1980.

TSMC in 1987.

VIS was in 1994.

Again, 7 years.

Something new was

rolled out every 7 years.

VIS made huge profits

in its first two years,

our net margin hit 40%.

Even today, TSMC doesn't come close.

Their profit margin is only
around 20 to 30%.

But the good times didn't last.

At first, we were making big money.

Two years later, the global crash hit.

Even among Japan's "Big Ten" DRAM makers,

only one survived.

Taiwan had just stepped onto the stage,

and was knocked down with everyone else.

Then came the question:

Who was Vanguard's largest shareholder?

TSMC.

So, should we keep going or give up?

Mr. Chang met with us every day,

asking what we should do next.

He knew the answer.

This venture needed money.

As I said, it needed capital.

And we were up against Korea.

Their banks backed the industry

with debt ratios up to 400%.

In Taiwan, we were capped at 50%.

Actually this industry

requires one more thing:

Willpower.

When you're knocked down,

you get up and fight again.

Even if you're covered in blood and mud,

you must get up and keep fighting.

That's how you win in the end.

But if one punch

makes you quit, it's over.

Vanguard took a punch

and walked away.

Mr. Chang decided not to keep fighting.

VIS was essentially shut down

and shifted to contract manufacturing.

He announced the decision,

saying he'd cry with us,
heads in our hands.

Was it the right call?

Or should we have kept going?

But history cannot be undone, or replayed.

A tearful declaration

marked the end of Taiwan's
dream for DRAM self-reliance.

Yet it also signaled the dawn
of the foundry era.

But the wheel of technology
never slows for anyone,

a greater challenge was just ahead.

In 2007, the iPhone was born.

The world believed spring
had come for the digital age.

But the global financial crisis struck

like a sudden blizzard.

Morris Chang had retired in 2005,

but returned to face the headwinds.

Back as CEO, he once again took the helm

guiding one of Taiwan's most vital

tech companies through crisis.

Chang continued
to inspire investor confidence.

Facing the possibility of losses,

Chairman Chang's first move

wasn't cutting costs.

Chang doubled down on capital expenditures

because he saw the coming
boom in smartphones.

The year after, TSMC's capex

more than doubled.

Before 2009,

TSMC thrived on fab efficiency,

yield and cost control.

It became a profitable

and well-run company.

From 2010 to 2015, things changed.

Morris stockpiled cash

and slammed it into R&D.

Investing US$2 billion a year.

In a short time, the R&D team grew

from 700 to 3,000 people.

Apple is about to launch its iPhone 6,

powered by TSMC's new 20nm chip.

All eyes are on the market.

TSMC beat Samsung for Apple's order.

Among the world's top three chipmakers,

two were also Apple's competitors:

Samsung and Intel.

They made chips and

built their own brands,

eventually becoming a threat to Apple.

Apple and Samsung became direct rivals,

so Apple could no longer rely on Samsung.

And TSMC was ready.

That's when things took off.

From 2015 onwards,

heavyweight companies like Apple

became TSMC's clients.

That marked TSMC's final leap forward.

In truth, Apple was pulling us ahead.

We just sprinted at full speed

to keep up their pace.

That phase wasn't about TSMC's own ideas.

The client was simply too big.

All we could do was give it our all

and follow their lead.

As long as they won,

we won as well.

There's a consortium in
the U.S. called SEMATECH.

At dinner one time

someone asked,

"It takes us two years
to build a new generation node.

Why can TSMC do it in
a year or a year and a half?"

I said, "Let me tell you why.

We have three shifts of R&D engineers.

The graveyard shift,
the night shift and the day shift.

Our machines run 24/7.

Yours run only eight hours a day.

That makes us three times faster.

Even if you're twice as smart,
we still beat you."

In the U.S.,
if a machine breaks down at midnight,

it sits until the next morning.

At 8 a.m.,

the maintenance engineers arrive at work.

They grab a coffee and chat

before starting to fix it.

It'll probably be noon when they're done.

At TSMC,

if a machine breaks down at midnight,

we immediately call the engineers.

They come in right away.

And it's fixed by 1 or 2 a.m.

TSMC's revenue over the years (in NT$100M)

TSMC is a deeply focused company.

We never set out to do everything,

and we know we're not great at everything.

But we strive to do this one thing

and do it to perfection.

As the company grew,

so did the temptations.

With more money came more questions:

"Should we diversify?

Should we invest here or there?"

But we've always been clear
those are not the things we do.

We believe the foundry

is a beautiful business model.

No matter how the economy shifts

or society evolves,

the world will always need chips.

If we can be the best at this one thing,

we'll always have our place.

After 25 years,

the Speaker of the U.S. House

finally visits Taiwan again.

As Taiwanese,

let's give a warm round
of applause to welcome...

I think that, as a matter of
national strategic priority,

Taiwan becomes more important
to the U.S. for that reason.

The reliance on Taiwan is quite serious.

The likelihood is that
that would produce an economic crisis

that could affect, quite literally,
the entire world.

Geopolitics is at once opportunity,
challenge and destiny.

The U.S.-China trade war in recent years

at its core, is a technology war,

and behind that,
a race in military technology.

I'd like to share that in recent years,

I've received many guests from abroad.

Though they come from

different countries and different fields,

they are all very interested in one thing

Taiwan's semiconductor industry.

This is the only Taiwanese manufacturer

founded after World War II

capable of competing among

the world's core economies.

This gave Taiwan a seat

at the Global North's table.

It means everything for

Taiwan's economic growth

and international standing.

Beijing's live-fire drills near Taiwan

are a provocative act

that challenges global norms

and destabilizes the Taiwan Strait.

In 2024, over 5,000 PLA sorties
circled Taiwan.

Geopolitics is like a double-edged sword,

raising the stakes for both
Taiwan's global standing

and its chip industry.

We're going to become more reliant

on semiconductors over the next decade.

And when you look at the chips

that are training AI systems,

there are just a couple of companies

that design chips for training AI systems.

And just one company that

produces the most important of them.

That is TSMC.

That's where there's worries,

that Taiwan has been so successful,

concentration has grown at such a degree,

that the concern is,

in case something bad happens,

does the entire world have

the ability to react to that?

Once that awareness sets in,

everything we see now is preparation.

If something happens to Taiwan,

the economic fallout

for the U.S. and others

could be devastating.

Every country is trying

to reshape a supply chain

that's secure and shielded

from geopolitical risk.

In this global climate,

is it a challenge for Taiwan?

Is it a challenge for TSMC? Absolutely.

But when there's unrest in the world

as it is today,

TSMC becomes

a key battleground

for geopolitical strategists.

When you become the key battleground

in a global power struggle,

it puts you in a difficult position.

Our success doesn't lie

in threatening others.

We serve our clients' interests

through partnership,

through shared risks.

That's what truly matters,

and we must keep reminding
the world of that.

I think the U.S. government has,

in the last couple of decades,

not been very focused on

where chips are manufactured.

And that's really what's changed.

For Taiwan, Taiwan finds itself

impacted dramatically by that relationship.

Both in terms of restrictions on

what Taiwanese companies are able to sell,

but also in terms of the risks

that increased tensions could

disrupt Taiwan's ability

to export semiconductors.

Viewed through a political lens,

the spotlight has shifted.

It's no longer just Taiwan vs. China

but Taiwan vs. Washington.

America's struggle
to rebuild its chip industry

isn't just a matter of will,

but of talent and cost.

In the U.S., fabs are expensive to build,

and engineers are costly to hire.

In Taiwan, labor is more affordable,

and within 200 kilometers
you can find an entire supply chain.

That kind of ecosystem is almost impossible
to replicate in the U.S.

That's how the Silicon Shield
was built in Taiwan.

To this day,
TSMC never speaks of the Silicon Shield.

But everyone in Taiwan knows that

to keep the island safe,
to stay seen by the world,

the entire nation must rally

to keep TSMC's cutting-edge tech

rooted on this island.

Some have expressed concerns,

wondering if TSMC

has shifted its focus abroad,

and if all the momentum

we built in Taiwan has started

to slow or move elsewhere.

We just want to say this loud and clear:

TSMC is here to stay.

This 2-nanometer TSMC site

sits on 120 hectares

acquired by Hsinchu Science Park for TSMC.

It once held green hills

and the century-old Hakka village of Daqi.

Daqi Village is a Hakka settlement

tracing back to

the Qing empire's Xianfeng era.

This temple is part of the village.

Hakka people have

lived here for generations,

turning barren land into fertile soil.

The toil spanned 100 to 200 years.

The plant must take
local sentiments into account.

TSMC sent senior managers
to Baosheng Temple in Daqi Village.

After four rounds of divination,

they finally got the god's permission
to relocate the temple.

The media reported that

even the gods had to make way
for TSMC's expansion.

Look, someone just left their sofa behind.

They tore the houses apart,

so they could get the money.

These are empty.

They took out the doors and windows.

While the country develops,

could there be a third option for us?

When designing the science park,

could we choose to include

people, land, environment,

culture and history at the same time?

Is it possible to preserve some memories?

Economic development and cultural values

have always been in a tug-of-war.

After ChatGPT kicked off
the global AI wave in 2023,

the importance of TSMC
became the focus of superpowers.

When the distribution of talent
and resources clashes

with national security,

how should we choose?

TSMC now ranks among the world's

ten most valuable companies (as of 2024).

Seven out of these ten are AI-driven.

In the age of AI,

a few companies shape humanity's course.

How fortunate is it for Taiwan.

But here lies a paradox.

TSMC's market cap

has surpassed Taiwan's annual GDP.

When a nation ties its fate

to one company, one industry,

the writing is already on the wall.

For the next 20 to 30 years,

based on industry changes in the world,

especially since the rise of AI,

developed countries,
including the OECD, are all pondering over

the talent we'll see in the future.

The semiconductor bigwigs
keep saying we need talent.

But the problem is Taiwan's development

needs talent across all industries.

Declining birth rates mean the talent

shortage in all walks of life is dire.

Taiwan needs to think more carefully about

what our talent policy should be like.

Taiwan is small and densely populated.

That puts huge pressure

on land and energy.

As an export-driven economy,

we must produce.

And production needs power.

In 2020, TSMC used

15.6 billion kWh of electricity.

That's the same as the entire Taipei City.

At this pace,

it's projected to reach

45 billion kWh by 2028.

The amount of electricity TSMC consumes

will be around 80% of

Taiwan's residential usage.

As Taiwan faces a mounting power crunch,

besides the overall electricity supply,

demands for a green transition
are also accelerating.

The RE100 initiative

urges companies

to run on 100% renewable energy by 2050.

To stay competitive globally,

Taiwanese firms are signing on.

But green energy supply and
distribution pose a new hurdle.

In the past, you needed land,

electricity, water and labor

to produce goods.

In the future, without green energy,

reclaimed water, or zero-carbon solutions,

companies may be forced to relocate.

When Apple commits to

a zero-carbon iPhone,

its entire supply chain must follow.

If not today, it'll happen soon.

I'm both hopeful and worried.

The entire island can only give so much.

Our water, power and talent

are all finite.

If we wish to grow beyond it,

we must lead our people

into the wider world.

To lead your people to explore the world,

you must pair ambition with resilience

to face the harsh realities
of the global stage.

During the making of this documentary,

geopolitical shifts came so fast
they nearly threw us off balance.

But they also forced us to face

the reality of living in Taiwan.

It's as if Taiwan's hope for safety

and the superpowers' idea of security

clash in the ruthless arena.

Chips and TSMC have
become the quiet pieces

in a high-stakes game.

I arrived alone at TSMC's future
Dresden site in Germany,

surrounded by desolation and silence.

Walking, observing.

Just then, a news alert lit up my phone.

Global chip protectionism rising.

Tensions around Taiwan escalating.

People outside this industry don't get it.

We're constantly up against

global competition.

Few companies in Taiwan are like that.

It's hard to tell people that,

to love Taiwan,

you have to compete on a global stage.

That's how you truly make Taiwan stronger.

This is a tremendous move

by the most powerful company in the world.

It's a matter of economic security.

It's also a matter of
national security for us.

Lately,

life has been somewhat

tense for certain.

Meeting two presidents

in such a short time,

meeting with friends in the media

and answering questions.

President Lai told me just yesterday:

"Be sure to speak openly

with our friends in the press

and explain why we're going to the U.S.,

and why we've committed

to this US$100 billion investment."

Over the past five years,

we were once seen as

a key battleground.

But now, we have truly become

the bona fide battleground.

Especially when it comes to

the most advanced semiconductors.

Globalization is dead.

Free trade is also dead.

In this new world,

our challenge is clear

we must keep growing.

I believe we will rise to this challenge.

We will succeed.

Accept the challenge.
Keep pushing forward.

Perhaps it's not just TSMC being tested.

It's another gamble on Taiwan's survival.

We must succeed. Failure is not an option.

Half a century ago,
in those stormy days of uncertainty

a group of young engineers
planted the seeds of Taiwan's tech.

What sprouted wasn't just chips,

but also a quiet resolve,

a promise to protect the place
they called home.

Once passionate youths,

they've grown into wise elders
with silver hair.

Yet the wine circle that Hu started

still lives on.