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Would you like to inspect the original subtitles? These are the user uploaded subtitles that are being translated: 1 00:00:00,240 --> 00:00:04,319 Apollo 13 was supposed to be the third 2 00:00:02,480 --> 00:00:06,319 manned moon landing to gather important 3 00:00:04,319 --> 00:00:08,320 science on a unique part of the moon. 4 00:00:06,319 --> 00:00:10,240 What NASA got instead was a life and 5 00:00:08,320 --> 00:00:11,759 death rescue mission, forcing them to 6 00:00:10,240 --> 00:00:14,320 attempt to save three astronauts 7 00:00:11,759 --> 00:00:16,480 stranded in a heavily damaged spacecraft 8 00:00:14,320 --> 00:00:22,680 on a trajectory that would miss Earth by 9 00:00:16,480 --> 00:00:22,680 thousands of miles. This is Apollo 13. 10 00:00:27,199 --> 00:00:31,399 We've got one more item for you when you 11 00:00:28,720 --> 00:00:35,559 got a chance. like 12 00:00:31,399 --> 00:00:38,200 it tried to reset and 13 00:00:35,559 --> 00:00:41,120 field problems like a lot of 14 00:00:38,200 --> 00:00:43,360 instrumentation. Go ahead. Oh, here's a 15 00:00:41,120 --> 00:00:45,520 problem. Apollo 11 had proven that we 16 00:00:43,360 --> 00:00:47,920 can put people on the moon and Apollo 12 17 00:00:45,520 --> 00:00:49,600 had done so accurately. Apollo 13's 18 00:00:47,920 --> 00:00:51,600 mission was to use those lessons learned 19 00:00:49,600 --> 00:00:54,879 to put astronauts on a specific region 20 00:00:51,600 --> 00:00:56,320 of the moon, the Fra Maro crater. This 21 00:00:54,879 --> 00:00:57,840 mission would have significantly more 22 00:00:56,320 --> 00:00:59,680 emphasis on gathering science and 23 00:00:57,840 --> 00:01:01,520 geological samples than the previous 24 00:00:59,680 --> 00:01:03,440 missions as the crew's training could 25 00:01:01,520 --> 00:01:05,119 focus more heavily on gathering science 26 00:01:03,440 --> 00:01:07,439 rather than just largely focusing on 27 00:01:05,119 --> 00:01:09,119 flying the spacecraft to the moon. 28 00:01:07,439 --> 00:01:10,720 Because of this, the selection of the 29 00:01:09,119 --> 00:01:12,640 landing site on the moon would be more 30 00:01:10,720 --> 00:01:14,560 important than the last two missions. 31 00:01:12,640 --> 00:01:16,320 Apollo 11's selection of landing sites 32 00:01:14,560 --> 00:01:18,000 had to be heavily restricted in order to 33 00:01:16,320 --> 00:01:20,000 keep the spacecraft in a free return 34 00:01:18,000 --> 00:01:21,680 trajectory. This was desirable because 35 00:01:20,000 --> 00:01:23,280 the spacecraft would already be on a 36 00:01:21,680 --> 00:01:25,840 path towards Earth if anything went 37 00:01:23,280 --> 00:01:27,360 wrong. Apollo 12 was the first to step 38 00:01:25,840 --> 00:01:29,520 out of this free return trajectory, 39 00:01:27,360 --> 00:01:32,000 which opened up more landing sites. 40 00:01:29,520 --> 00:01:34,240 Apollo 13's goal was to do that maneuver 41 00:01:32,000 --> 00:01:35,920 sooner. This would open up the Fromaro 42 00:01:34,240 --> 00:01:37,439 landing site, but at the cost of making 43 00:01:35,920 --> 00:01:39,759 this mission considerably more 44 00:01:37,439 --> 00:01:41,680 dangerous. The primary crew for this 45 00:01:39,759 --> 00:01:43,920 mission was supposed to be Jim Lovel, 46 00:01:41,680 --> 00:01:45,439 Fred Hayes, and Ken Mattingley. Plans 47 00:01:43,920 --> 00:01:47,439 would have to change fast, though, as 48 00:01:45,439 --> 00:01:49,759 just 6 days before the launch, one of 49 00:01:47,439 --> 00:01:52,159 the backup crew, Charles M. Duke, would 50 00:01:49,759 --> 00:01:54,320 fall ill to the Reubella virus. This 51 00:01:52,159 --> 00:01:56,399 would also expose both the primary and 52 00:01:54,320 --> 00:01:58,000 the backup crews to the virus. Blood 53 00:01:56,399 --> 00:01:59,680 samples from the astronauts would show 54 00:01:58,000 --> 00:02:01,759 that both Loville and Hayes had an 55 00:01:59,680 --> 00:02:03,600 immunity to Reubella, likely from being 56 00:02:01,759 --> 00:02:06,079 previously exposed, so they were not at 57 00:02:03,600 --> 00:02:08,080 risk of falling ill. John Young and Jack 58 00:02:06,079 --> 00:02:11,599 Swagert of the backup crew also had this 59 00:02:08,080 --> 00:02:13,440 immunity. Mattingly, however, did not. 60 00:02:11,599 --> 00:02:14,879 The incubation time of Reubella meant 61 00:02:13,440 --> 00:02:16,239 that if he did come down with the 62 00:02:14,879 --> 00:02:18,400 disease, it would be when they were 63 00:02:16,239 --> 00:02:20,239 scheduled to be in lunar orbit above the 64 00:02:18,400 --> 00:02:22,280 moon, possibly when Mattingly was 65 00:02:20,239 --> 00:02:24,720 supposed to be alone in the command 66 00:02:22,280 --> 00:02:26,400 module. Replacing the entire primary 67 00:02:24,720 --> 00:02:27,760 crew with the backup crew wasn't an 68 00:02:26,400 --> 00:02:30,400 option, as Duke would have still been 69 00:02:27,760 --> 00:02:32,560 symptomatic at launch. Delaying the 70 00:02:30,400 --> 00:02:34,560 mission until the next launch window 28 71 00:02:32,560 --> 00:02:37,120 days later also wasn't an option because 72 00:02:34,560 --> 00:02:38,959 of the expense involved. With a rapidly 73 00:02:37,120 --> 00:02:41,120 upcoming launch window, the decision was 74 00:02:38,959 --> 00:02:43,519 made just 3 days before launch to 75 00:02:41,120 --> 00:02:44,800 replace Maddingley with Jack Swagard. 76 00:02:43,519 --> 00:02:46,720 The crew would be launching on the 77 00:02:44,800 --> 00:02:48,480 Saturn 5 rocket, a design that had 78 00:02:46,720 --> 00:02:50,640 proven itself over the last two 79 00:02:48,480 --> 00:02:53,120 successful moon landings. This one, 80 00:02:50,640 --> 00:02:56,160 designated AS508, would have a weight 81 00:02:53,120 --> 00:02:58,720 just over 6.5 million pounds, making 82 00:02:56,160 --> 00:03:00,959 this at the time the heaviest spacecraft 83 00:02:58,720 --> 00:03:03,599 ever launched. 5 million of those pounds 84 00:03:00,959 --> 00:03:06,000 are just in the first stage alone. On 85 00:03:03,599 --> 00:03:08,560 the 11th of April, 1970, the crew would 86 00:03:06,000 --> 00:03:11,040 enter the rocket on pad 39A at Florida's 87 00:03:08,560 --> 00:03:12,959 Kennedy Space Center for its 2:13 p.m. 88 00:03:11,040 --> 00:03:17,599 launch, unaware that they would not 89 00:03:12,959 --> 00:03:25,440 reach their destination. 10 9 8 Ignition 90 00:03:17,599 --> 00:03:29,000 sequence has started. 6 5 4 3 2 1 zero. 91 00:03:25,440 --> 00:03:32,400 We have commit and we have liftoff at 92 00:03:29,000 --> 00:03:34,319 213. The Saturn 5 building up to 7.6 6 93 00:03:32,400 --> 00:03:36,319 million pounds of thrust and it is clear 94 00:03:34,319 --> 00:03:37,920 the tower. This is mission control 95 00:03:36,319 --> 00:03:41,360 Houston. We appear to have a good first 96 00:03:37,920 --> 00:03:45,280 stage at this point. 97 00:03:41,360 --> 00:03:48,159 13 Houston go at 30 seconds. 98 00:03:45,280 --> 00:03:50,920 Roll complete and we're pitching. Roger 99 00:03:48,159 --> 00:03:55,200 that. Standby for mode one 100 00:03:50,920 --> 00:03:56,720 bravo. Mark one bravo command. And the 101 00:03:55,200 --> 00:03:58,239 booster engineer reports we're now 102 00:03:56,720 --> 00:04:00,480 through the region of maximum dynamic 103 00:03:58,239 --> 00:04:03,439 pressure and we'll go. 104 00:04:00,480 --> 00:04:06,480 13 Houston standby for mode one Charlie. 105 00:04:03,439 --> 00:04:08,959 Mark your one Charlie. Mark one Charlie 106 00:04:06,480 --> 00:04:12,239 and 13 you're go for staging. Go for 107 00:04:08,959 --> 00:04:12,239 staging for EDS 108 00:04:20,050 --> 00:04:23,319 [Music] 109 00:04:24,440 --> 00:04:28,890 manual. There's no ignition. 110 00:04:27,759 --> 00:04:33,330 Roger. 111 00:04:28,890 --> 00:04:33,330 [Music] 112 00:04:52,320 --> 00:04:57,199 Power. The Saturn 5's first and second 113 00:04:55,040 --> 00:04:58,720 stages are powered by five liquidfueled 114 00:04:57,199 --> 00:05:00,720 engines, which gives the rocket some 115 00:04:58,720 --> 00:05:02,000 redundancy if one of them were to fail. 116 00:05:00,720 --> 00:05:03,919 This would be the first significant 117 00:05:02,000 --> 00:05:05,360 malfunction Apollo 13 would have to 118 00:05:03,919 --> 00:05:07,840 endure as the central engine 119 00:05:05,360 --> 00:05:09,520 unexpectedly shuts down. Even though an 120 00:05:07,840 --> 00:05:11,759 engine had failed on the second stage of 121 00:05:09,520 --> 00:05:14,080 the rocket, the mission was still a go. 122 00:05:11,759 --> 00:05:16,960 13 Houston, trajectory is good, thrust 123 00:05:14,080 --> 00:05:18,639 is good. Roger. The remaining engines 124 00:05:16,960 --> 00:05:20,080 could still use all the fuel left in the 125 00:05:18,639 --> 00:05:21,600 tanks, but they would be dragging around 126 00:05:20,080 --> 00:05:23,280 a dead engine. So, they would be 127 00:05:21,600 --> 00:05:25,280 slightly short of their expected speed 128 00:05:23,280 --> 00:05:27,120 once the stage finished its burn. And 129 00:05:25,280 --> 00:05:30,080 Level reports that the guidance system 130 00:05:27,120 --> 00:05:33,479 is correcting the small errors and for 131 00:05:30,080 --> 00:05:33,479 ignition Houston. 132 00:05:34,000 --> 00:05:38,639 Roger that, Jim. Thrust looks good. The 133 00:05:36,720 --> 00:05:40,479 second stage did its job by burning for 134 00:05:38,639 --> 00:05:42,639 34 seconds longer than planned to 135 00:05:40,479 --> 00:05:44,320 account for the lost engine. It's now up 136 00:05:42,639 --> 00:05:46,240 to the third stage to make up the rest 137 00:05:44,320 --> 00:05:48,240 of the velocity and put the spacecraft 138 00:05:46,240 --> 00:05:50,639 into orbit. The third stage would burn 139 00:05:48,240 --> 00:05:52,639 for around 2 minutes and 40 seconds, 9 140 00:05:50,639 --> 00:05:54,560 seconds longer than originally planned. 141 00:05:52,639 --> 00:05:56,400 The longer burns on both stages were 142 00:05:54,560 --> 00:05:58,560 enough to overcome the lost energy from 143 00:05:56,400 --> 00:06:01,759 the engine failure. After reading the 144 00:05:58,560 --> 00:06:03,199 velocity, Apollo 13 was just 1.9 ft per 145 00:06:01,759 --> 00:06:04,720 second slower than expected. And the 146 00:06:03,199 --> 00:06:06,319 flight dynamics officer says at first 147 00:06:04,720 --> 00:06:08,240 glance, we look good on the orbit. The 148 00:06:06,319 --> 00:06:10,319 spacecraft had entered its planned orbit 149 00:06:08,240 --> 00:06:12,120 around Earth at 100 nautical miles, 150 00:06:10,319 --> 00:06:15,600 traveling 151 00:06:12,120 --> 00:06:18,400 25,566 ft per second. Apollo 13 is now 152 00:06:15,600 --> 00:06:20,160 traveling 21 times faster than a bullet. 153 00:06:18,400 --> 00:06:22,000 The astronauts will use this opportunity 154 00:06:20,160 --> 00:06:23,680 to calibrate their navigational and 155 00:06:22,000 --> 00:06:26,080 scientific instruments to their new 156 00:06:23,680 --> 00:06:27,919 environment in space in zero gravity. 157 00:06:26,080 --> 00:06:29,440 This also gives the third stage engine a 158 00:06:27,919 --> 00:06:31,039 chance to cool down and regain the 159 00:06:29,440 --> 00:06:33,680 pressure on its tanks before its next 160 00:06:31,039 --> 00:06:36,240 firing to get it to the moon. After one 161 00:06:33,680 --> 00:06:38,960 and a half orbits, Apollo 13 begins its 162 00:06:36,240 --> 00:06:40,880 trans lunar injection burn. You are go 163 00:06:38,960 --> 00:06:43,039 for TLI. 164 00:06:40,880 --> 00:06:45,360 Understand. And just out of curiosity, 165 00:06:43,039 --> 00:06:48,080 uh was that engine out uh to be some 166 00:06:45,360 --> 00:06:50,319 more S4B fuel? 167 00:06:48,080 --> 00:06:53,600 Uh the engine out did cause you to use 168 00:06:50,319 --> 00:06:56,240 uh more S4B fuel. Uh about a 10-second 169 00:06:53,600 --> 00:06:57,919 longer burn, but you're still going. 170 00:06:56,240 --> 00:06:59,680 Okay. Thank you. This burn would bring 171 00:06:57,919 --> 00:07:01,759 the spacecraft out of Earth's orbit and 172 00:06:59,680 --> 00:07:03,360 put it in front of the path of the moon. 173 00:07:01,759 --> 00:07:04,960 The trajectory was aimed at where the 174 00:07:03,360 --> 00:07:07,560 moon would be in 3 days when the 175 00:07:04,960 --> 00:07:10,080 spacecraft was planned to get 176 00:07:07,560 --> 00:07:11,759 there. The spacecraft would be flown in 177 00:07:10,080 --> 00:07:13,440 front of the moon and the moon's gravity 178 00:07:11,759 --> 00:07:15,840 would swing the spacecraft back towards 179 00:07:13,440 --> 00:07:17,840 Earth. This maneuver is known as a free 180 00:07:15,840 --> 00:07:19,199 return trajectory. It's a free return 181 00:07:17,840 --> 00:07:20,880 because they don't have to spend any 182 00:07:19,199 --> 00:07:22,560 fuel to get back to Earth. This 183 00:07:20,880 --> 00:07:24,560 trajectory was chosen for safety 184 00:07:22,560 --> 00:07:26,319 reasons. Even if the spacecraft's main 185 00:07:24,560 --> 00:07:28,720 engine was lost, the astronauts would 186 00:07:26,319 --> 00:07:30,080 still return home. This decision would 187 00:07:28,720 --> 00:07:32,199 become incredibly important in 188 00:07:30,080 --> 00:07:34,240 determining the future survival of the 189 00:07:32,199 --> 00:07:35,919 astronauts. The third stage would 190 00:07:34,240 --> 00:07:38,000 continue its second and final burn, 191 00:07:35,919 --> 00:07:39,599 launching the spacecraft to the moon. It 192 00:07:38,000 --> 00:07:41,120 was mission critical that this stage 193 00:07:39,599 --> 00:07:43,280 burned for just the right amount of 194 00:07:41,120 --> 00:07:44,800 time. If they were too slow, the moon 195 00:07:43,280 --> 00:07:46,479 would have too much influence on the 196 00:07:44,800 --> 00:07:48,880 spacecraft once it got there, bringing 197 00:07:46,479 --> 00:07:50,880 it too far from Earth to be captured. If 198 00:07:48,880 --> 00:07:52,720 the spacecraft was too fast, it would 199 00:07:50,880 --> 00:07:54,240 fly past the moon too quickly and not 200 00:07:52,720 --> 00:07:56,080 allow it to point the spacecraft's 201 00:07:54,240 --> 00:07:58,479 trajectory completely back towards Earth 202 00:07:56,080 --> 00:08:00,160 once it leaves its influence. After the 203 00:07:58,479 --> 00:08:01,680 burn was completed, the astronauts 204 00:08:00,160 --> 00:08:04,240 measured how far off they were from 205 00:08:01,680 --> 00:08:07,120 their planned speed and trajectory. And 206 00:08:04,240 --> 00:08:09,599 13 Houston, the booster reports uh that 207 00:08:07,120 --> 00:08:12,080 everything looks good with the S4. 208 00:08:09,599 --> 00:08:14,240 Sounds good, Houston. Uh the ride was uh 209 00:08:12,080 --> 00:08:16,639 very nominal. We had a little vibration 210 00:08:14,240 --> 00:08:20,240 though during most of the run. 211 00:08:16,639 --> 00:08:25,080 Okay, we copied your call on that, Jim. 212 00:08:20,240 --> 00:08:29,280 Okay, uh Joe, uh the discy read uh 213 00:08:25,080 --> 00:08:31,399 35560 and delta VC was minus 3.0. 214 00:08:29,280 --> 00:08:34,640 They're now traveling 215 00:08:31,399 --> 00:08:36,959 35,560 ft per second, just 3 ft per 216 00:08:34,640 --> 00:08:39,039 second higher than anticipated. Oh, 217 00:08:36,959 --> 00:08:40,880 Roger. You can't ask for much better 218 00:08:39,039 --> 00:08:43,200 than that. Uh they had just entered 219 00:08:40,880 --> 00:08:44,959 their free return trajectory. They would 220 00:08:43,200 --> 00:08:47,680 now prepare for a maneuver that needed 221 00:08:44,959 --> 00:08:49,680 to be just as precise as the last. This 222 00:08:47,680 --> 00:08:52,640 is mission control. We're now at 2 hours 223 00:08:49,680 --> 00:08:54,880 54 minutes with the crew preparing for 224 00:08:52,640 --> 00:08:57,680 the CSM 225 00:08:54,880 --> 00:08:59,920 uh separation from the S4B, the 226 00:08:57,680 --> 00:09:02,959 subsequent docking with the lunar module 227 00:08:59,920 --> 00:09:06,080 and the ejection of the uh LMAN command 228 00:09:02,959 --> 00:09:10,440 module from the Saturn third stage. Jack 229 00:09:06,080 --> 00:09:15,440 Swagger would be flying this by hand. 230 00:09:10,440 --> 00:09:17,200 [Music] 231 00:09:15,440 --> 00:09:19,040 Telemetry data here on the ground 232 00:09:17,200 --> 00:09:21,480 indicates that the spacecraft has 233 00:09:19,040 --> 00:09:24,480 separated from the 234 00:09:21,480 --> 00:09:27,120 S4B. Astronaut Jack Swagert at this time 235 00:09:24,480 --> 00:09:29,360 would be in the commander's couch, the 236 00:09:27,120 --> 00:09:31,519 lefth hand couch at the controls of the 237 00:09:29,360 --> 00:09:33,360 spacecraft during the transposition and 238 00:09:31,519 --> 00:09:35,120 docking maneuvers. Swagert now needs to 239 00:09:33,360 --> 00:09:39,080 flip the command module around to line 240 00:09:35,120 --> 00:09:39,080 it up with the lunar module. 241 00:09:39,360 --> 00:09:42,800 That's quite a bang, Joe. We're 242 00:09:40,720 --> 00:09:45,839 separated. We've pitched around about 243 00:09:42,800 --> 00:09:48,560 60° now. 244 00:09:45,839 --> 00:09:51,200 Okay, we got the uh flaw panels. One of 245 00:09:48,560 --> 00:09:53,680 them's out front now. 246 00:09:51,200 --> 00:09:57,519 Awesome. Swagger then uses the hand 247 00:09:53,680 --> 00:09:57,519 controllers to bring the two spacecraft 248 00:09:58,839 --> 00:10:03,200 together. A target is visible on the 249 00:10:01,279 --> 00:10:05,120 lunar module that can be lined up with a 250 00:10:03,200 --> 00:10:08,080 reticle inside of the command module, 251 00:10:05,120 --> 00:10:11,600 similar to a red dot site. This way both 252 00:10:08,080 --> 00:10:11,600 vehicles can be easily lined 253 00:10:22,200 --> 00:10:26,399 up. A probe on the top of the command 254 00:10:24,720 --> 00:10:29,680 module will lock inside of the lunar 255 00:10:26,399 --> 00:10:29,680 module once they're properly 256 00:10:30,279 --> 00:10:34,320 docked. The probe will bring the two 257 00:10:32,480 --> 00:10:37,959 spacecraft together and automatically 258 00:10:34,320 --> 00:10:37,959 secure them with latches. 259 00:10:38,740 --> 00:10:41,869 [Music] 260 00:10:42,240 --> 00:10:46,160 Now, preloaded springs would separate 261 00:10:44,240 --> 00:10:47,920 the lunar module from the third stage, 262 00:10:46,160 --> 00:10:49,839 and reaction control thrusters would 263 00:10:47,920 --> 00:10:51,200 continue to pull them apart. The crew 264 00:10:49,839 --> 00:10:53,040 would wait to see the third stage 265 00:10:51,200 --> 00:10:54,800 floating away, and then they would radio 266 00:10:53,040 --> 00:10:56,480 mission control to send signals to the 267 00:10:54,800 --> 00:10:58,240 stage, which would fire thrusters and 268 00:10:56,480 --> 00:11:00,320 remotely move it further away from the 269 00:10:58,240 --> 00:11:01,680 crude modules. Mission control would 270 00:11:00,320 --> 00:11:03,120 command the third stage into a 271 00:11:01,680 --> 00:11:05,360 trajectory that would crash into the 272 00:11:03,120 --> 00:11:07,040 moon. This was done on purpose so that 273 00:11:05,360 --> 00:11:08,640 probes already landed on the moon could 274 00:11:07,040 --> 00:11:10,560 detect the impact from the stage and 275 00:11:08,640 --> 00:11:12,880 collect data from a known mass hitting a 276 00:11:10,560 --> 00:11:14,560 known place at a known speed. This would 277 00:11:12,880 --> 00:11:16,240 provide valuable information about the 278 00:11:14,560 --> 00:11:18,640 moon's composition and what's underneath 279 00:11:16,240 --> 00:11:20,720 its surface. The crew was now prepared 280 00:11:18,640 --> 00:11:22,399 for their 3-day journey to the moon. 281 00:11:20,720 --> 00:11:24,320 This break in the action gave the crew 282 00:11:22,399 --> 00:11:26,240 that time to focus on slightly less 283 00:11:24,320 --> 00:11:28,880 immediately life-threatening tasks like 284 00:11:26,240 --> 00:11:30,480 Earth photography. Roger. We're at that 285 00:11:28,880 --> 00:11:32,560 stage now where we're going to take some 286 00:11:30,480 --> 00:11:34,959 Earth weather photography. If you're 287 00:11:32,560 --> 00:11:36,160 standing by, I have the camera aimed at 288 00:11:34,959 --> 00:11:39,279 the Earth right now and I'll give you a 289 00:11:36,160 --> 00:11:41,440 mark uh when I take this first picture. 290 00:11:39,279 --> 00:11:44,720 Roger. Uh we copy, Jim. We'll be 291 00:11:41,440 --> 00:11:50,160 standing by for the mark. Okay, Houston. 292 00:11:44,720 --> 00:11:52,880 3 2 1 Mark. 293 00:11:50,160 --> 00:11:54,640 Roger. Copy. A photograph of Earth would 294 00:11:52,880 --> 00:11:56,160 be taken every 20 minutes so that the 295 00:11:54,640 --> 00:11:57,760 movement of the weather can be observed 296 00:11:56,160 --> 00:12:01,360 when the images are stacked on top of 297 00:11:57,760 --> 00:12:03,279 each other. 11 would be taken in total. 298 00:12:01,360 --> 00:12:05,519 The command service module will use its 299 00:12:03,279 --> 00:12:07,760 RCS thrusters to force the spacecraft 300 00:12:05,519 --> 00:12:09,600 into a slow roll. This is so that no 301 00:12:07,760 --> 00:12:11,360 part of the spacecraft is exposed to the 302 00:12:09,600 --> 00:12:12,839 sun for too long and it would even out 303 00:12:11,360 --> 00:12:14,880 the heating effects over the whole 304 00:12:12,839 --> 00:12:18,320 spacecraft. This maneuver was called 305 00:12:14,880 --> 00:12:19,839 passive thermal control or PTC. With the 306 00:12:18,320 --> 00:12:21,360 spacecraft set up for its three-day 307 00:12:19,839 --> 00:12:25,639 journey to the moon, the crew could 308 00:12:21,360 --> 00:12:25,639 catch up in some much needed sleep. 309 00:12:26,079 --> 00:12:31,200 Hello, Houston. Houston 13. Good 310 00:12:29,440 --> 00:12:36,680 morning, 13. This is Houston. How are 311 00:12:31,200 --> 00:12:36,680 you? Radio Mountain clearly. 312 00:12:37,920 --> 00:12:42,639 And I have a small flight plan update 313 00:12:40,560 --> 00:12:44,880 for you sometime a little later on when 314 00:12:42,639 --> 00:12:48,639 you're ready to copy. There's uh no big 315 00:12:44,880 --> 00:12:51,760 deals in it. and uh 13 Houston, we'd 316 00:12:48,639 --> 00:12:53,839 like to verify that you cycle the O2 317 00:12:51,760 --> 00:12:56,959 cryofans. We saw the H2, but we didn't 318 00:12:53,839 --> 00:12:58,880 see the O2 get stirred up. In zero 319 00:12:56,959 --> 00:13:00,720 gravity, the contents of superc critical 320 00:12:58,880 --> 00:13:02,720 tanks would sometimes separate out into 321 00:13:00,720 --> 00:13:04,560 portions of different density. If a 322 00:13:02,720 --> 00:13:06,240 region of high or low density was picked 323 00:13:04,560 --> 00:13:08,000 up by the sensor in the tank, it would 324 00:13:06,240 --> 00:13:10,320 give off a false reading and set off 325 00:13:08,000 --> 00:13:11,920 alarms. Because of this, the contents of 326 00:13:10,320 --> 00:13:13,680 the super critical tanks had to be 327 00:13:11,920 --> 00:13:15,279 stirred with fans in order to get an 328 00:13:13,680 --> 00:13:17,519 accurate reading of the tank's real 329 00:13:15,279 --> 00:13:20,720 pressure. 330 00:13:17,519 --> 00:13:21,839 Uh yeah, Joe, we did. And uh kind of 331 00:13:20,720 --> 00:13:23,920 looked like we might have had a little 332 00:13:21,839 --> 00:13:27,839 stratification cuz right after we put 333 00:13:23,920 --> 00:13:30,000 them on, we had a a cryop press light. 334 00:13:27,839 --> 00:13:31,720 Okay. ECOM told me that might happen and 335 00:13:30,000 --> 00:13:37,120 he was 336 00:13:31,720 --> 00:13:40,519 right. Okay. At uh 23 hours, the total 337 00:13:37,120 --> 00:13:44,000 RCS is one 338 00:13:40,519 --> 00:13:47,000 121. Uh and the cryoss are as follows. 339 00:13:44,000 --> 00:13:50,680 H2 tank 1 340 00:13:47,000 --> 00:13:54,680 83%. H2 tank 2 341 00:13:50,680 --> 00:13:58,519 86%. O2 tank 1 342 00:13:54,680 --> 00:14:02,519 87%. O2 tank 2 343 00:13:58,519 --> 00:14:02,519 87%. Over. 344 00:14:04,079 --> 00:14:08,160 You forgot. We'd like to hear what the 345 00:14:05,680 --> 00:14:12,720 news is. Okay. There's not a whole lot 346 00:14:08,160 --> 00:14:14,000 to it. Um, okay. Let's see. The Beatles 347 00:14:12,720 --> 00:14:16,720 have announced they will no longer 348 00:14:14,000 --> 00:14:18,480 perform as a group. The quartet is 349 00:14:16,720 --> 00:14:20,320 reported to have made in excess of a 350 00:14:18,480 --> 00:14:23,360 half billion dollars during their short 351 00:14:20,320 --> 00:14:24,959 musical career. However, rumors that 352 00:14:23,360 --> 00:14:29,279 they will use this money to start their 353 00:14:24,959 --> 00:14:33,519 own space program uh are false. 354 00:14:29,279 --> 00:14:35,040 Hey, we can borrow some. Okay. Uh some 355 00:14:33,519 --> 00:14:36,800 truck lines are being struck in the 356 00:14:35,040 --> 00:14:38,360 Midwest and the school teachers have 357 00:14:36,800 --> 00:14:41,680 walked off the job in 358 00:14:38,360 --> 00:14:43,760 Minneapolis. Uh, today's favorite 359 00:14:41,680 --> 00:14:47,090 pastime across the U. Uh-oh. Have you 360 00:14:43,760 --> 00:14:49,680 guys completed your income tax? 361 00:14:47,090 --> 00:14:51,519 [Applause] 362 00:14:49,680 --> 00:14:53,040 How do I apply for an extension? 363 00:14:51,519 --> 00:14:54,639 Louisville makes a joke about forgetting 364 00:14:53,040 --> 00:14:56,560 to file his taxes and needing an 365 00:14:54,639 --> 00:14:58,720 extension, not realizing that that is 366 00:14:56,560 --> 00:15:00,800 the exact situation that Jack Swagard is 367 00:14:58,720 --> 00:15:05,199 actually in. 368 00:15:00,800 --> 00:15:06,639 Uh, I got a Hey, this that ain't a funny 369 00:15:05,199 --> 00:15:08,480 kind of things kind of happened real 370 00:15:06,639 --> 00:15:12,519 fast down there. 371 00:15:08,480 --> 00:15:12,519 I I do need an extension. 372 00:15:12,560 --> 00:15:17,040 I didn't get mine filed. I'm really 373 00:15:14,720 --> 00:15:20,639 serious. Would you You're breaking up 374 00:15:17,040 --> 00:15:23,440 the room time in a We'll I may be 375 00:15:20,639 --> 00:15:25,440 spending time in I may be spending time 376 00:15:23,440 --> 00:15:28,560 in another quarantine besides the one 377 00:15:25,440 --> 00:15:30,399 that they they're planning for me. We'll 378 00:15:28,560 --> 00:15:32,480 see what we can do, Jack. We'll get with 379 00:15:30,399 --> 00:15:34,399 recovery and see if we can get the uh 380 00:15:32,480 --> 00:15:38,560 the agent out there in the Pacific when 381 00:15:34,399 --> 00:15:41,279 you come back. Uh uh Houston, this is 382 00:15:38,560 --> 00:15:43,199 13. Is it is it true that Jack's income 383 00:15:41,279 --> 00:15:46,399 tax return was going to be used to buy 384 00:15:43,199 --> 00:15:48,160 the asset fuel for the Well, considering 385 00:15:46,399 --> 00:15:51,360 that he's a bachelor and hasn't got that 386 00:15:48,160 --> 00:15:52,880 deduction to take. Yeah. Hey Joe, I'm 387 00:15:51,360 --> 00:15:55,360 glad you brought that up because I was 388 00:15:52,880 --> 00:15:57,440 really serious about that. And Jim 389 00:15:55,360 --> 00:15:59,800 McDivet says, "Yeah, now that you 390 00:15:57,440 --> 00:16:02,000 mentioned he forgot to fill the asset 391 00:15:59,800 --> 00:16:04,560 stage, should give you very good 392 00:16:02,000 --> 00:16:06,560 performance on descent. You should have 393 00:16:04,560 --> 00:16:08,160 a lot more hover time, huh? That's 394 00:16:06,560 --> 00:16:09,959 right. 395 00:16:08,160 --> 00:16:12,720 This is Apollo 396 00:16:09,959 --> 00:16:15,360 control. 27 hours 20 minutes ground 397 00:16:12,720 --> 00:16:17,839 elapse time. The crew rather quiet 398 00:16:15,360 --> 00:16:22,160 during this period. Still in the passive 399 00:16:17,839 --> 00:16:22,160 thermal control barbecue 400 00:16:22,199 --> 00:16:28,040 mode. Velocity now 401 00:16:25,399 --> 00:16:32,000 4,991 ft per 402 00:16:28,040 --> 00:16:36,680 second. coming up in uh slightly over 20 403 00:16:32,000 --> 00:16:39,600 seconds on uh the midpoint in 404 00:16:36,680 --> 00:16:42,480 distance and at which time the uh 405 00:16:39,600 --> 00:16:45,440 spacecraft will be equally far from the 406 00:16:42,480 --> 00:16:45,440 earth and from the 407 00:16:45,560 --> 00:16:52,079 moon. The distance at this time will be 408 00:16:49,079 --> 00:16:52,079 uh 409 00:16:52,440 --> 00:17:00,120 128,880.5 statute miles coming up Mark. 410 00:16:57,440 --> 00:17:03,199 continuing to leave the circuit 411 00:17:00,120 --> 00:17:05,199 live as we anticipate uh further 412 00:17:03,199 --> 00:17:07,559 discussions and later on today the 413 00:17:05,199 --> 00:17:10,799 midcourse correction burn number 414 00:17:07,559 --> 00:17:12,120 two which will take Apollo 13 out of the 415 00:17:10,799 --> 00:17:15,480 free return 416 00:17:12,120 --> 00:17:18,000 trajectory into the so-called hybrid 417 00:17:15,480 --> 00:17:20,400 trajectory which would not necessarily 418 00:17:18,000 --> 00:17:22,240 return to the vicinity of the Earth. The 419 00:17:20,400 --> 00:17:25,439 closest approach would be something in 420 00:17:22,240 --> 00:17:28,520 the nature of 40,000 miles coming back 421 00:17:25,439 --> 00:17:30,960 from the non-free return 422 00:17:28,520 --> 00:17:34,400 trajectory. Just passing comment Joe. 423 00:17:30,960 --> 00:17:37,320 We're having lunch right now and I just 424 00:17:34,400 --> 00:17:40,160 made myself a hot dog sandwich with 425 00:17:37,320 --> 00:17:44,160 ketchup. Very tasty and almost unheard 426 00:17:40,160 --> 00:17:46,400 of in the old days. Uh that's correct. 427 00:17:44,160 --> 00:17:48,240 13. As I recall the flight plan, you're 428 00:17:46,400 --> 00:17:50,320 supposed to put mustard on the hot dogs 429 00:17:48,240 --> 00:17:53,040 and not ketchup, but uh I guess we'll 430 00:17:50,320 --> 00:17:54,919 overlook that. 431 00:17:53,040 --> 00:17:59,679 [Applause] 432 00:17:54,919 --> 00:18:01,600 Right. Apollo 13, Houston. 433 00:17:59,679 --> 00:18:04,000 Go ahead, Joe. 434 00:18:01,600 --> 00:18:06,480 Hey, uh you got a new Capcom on now with 435 00:18:04,000 --> 00:18:09,760 the black crew and we have about three 436 00:18:06,480 --> 00:18:12,799 items to give you, Jack. 437 00:18:09,760 --> 00:18:16,320 Uh, I'm going to give you uh some high 438 00:18:12,799 --> 00:18:20,080 gain antenna angles for TV and the rest 439 00:18:16,320 --> 00:18:25,039 is just information. Uh, and uh the last 440 00:18:20,080 --> 00:18:27,120 items for Jack. Jack, uh, preliminary 441 00:18:25,039 --> 00:18:30,400 indications are that you can get a 442 00:18:27,120 --> 00:18:34,080 60-day extension on your filing your 443 00:18:30,400 --> 00:18:37,679 income tax if you're out of the country. 444 00:18:34,080 --> 00:18:39,360 That's good news. I guess I qualify. 445 00:18:37,679 --> 00:18:41,160 Yeah, we were just looking at the map 446 00:18:39,360 --> 00:18:44,480 and you're south of Florida, 447 00:18:41,160 --> 00:18:46,559 so you're not in the country now. Jim, 448 00:18:44,480 --> 00:18:49,200 Houston, you're looking good down here. 449 00:18:46,559 --> 00:18:50,559 Go for the burn. The crew had just 450 00:18:49,200 --> 00:18:52,799 received the go message for their 451 00:18:50,559 --> 00:18:54,240 midcourse correction 2 burn. This burn 452 00:18:52,799 --> 00:18:56,320 would bring the spacecraft out of its 453 00:18:54,240 --> 00:18:58,240 safe pre-return trajectory and put it 454 00:18:56,320 --> 00:19:00,559 into a hybrid trajectory closer to the 455 00:18:58,240 --> 00:19:02,559 moon's surface. If the spacecraft were 456 00:19:00,559 --> 00:19:04,320 to not make any burns after this one, it 457 00:19:02,559 --> 00:19:06,020 would miss Earth by thousands of miles 458 00:19:04,320 --> 00:19:13,540 on its return. 459 00:19:06,020 --> 00:19:13,540 [Music] 460 00:19:13,919 --> 00:19:17,760 After their short burn, they were now on 461 00:19:15,679 --> 00:19:20,640 the correct trajectory towards the Fraro 462 00:19:17,760 --> 00:19:22,160 crater and away from Earth. With this 463 00:19:20,640 --> 00:19:23,760 day of work complete, they could now 464 00:19:22,160 --> 00:19:27,120 begin their second rest period of the 465 00:19:23,760 --> 00:19:31,120 mission to regain some sleep. 466 00:19:27,120 --> 00:19:34,240 Houston, Houston, fin. 467 00:19:31,120 --> 00:19:36,480 Good morning, 13. You're early. 468 00:19:34,240 --> 00:19:39,919 Uh, so I just thought we'd wake you up 469 00:19:36,480 --> 00:19:43,400 and uh we're uh we're awake and uh 470 00:19:39,919 --> 00:19:46,240 getting the uh spacecraft ship shape and 471 00:19:43,400 --> 00:19:47,840 see uh roger. Spacecraft's in real good 472 00:19:46,240 --> 00:19:50,799 shape as far as we're concerned, Jim. 473 00:19:47,840 --> 00:19:53,080 We're board to tears down here. Uh we do 474 00:19:50,799 --> 00:19:56,559 have a few little items for you like a 475 00:19:53,080 --> 00:19:58,480 P37 update and a couple of flight plan 476 00:19:56,559 --> 00:20:01,520 updates. Uh but there's no rush about 477 00:19:58,480 --> 00:20:03,039 them. Over. And it might be interesting 478 00:20:01,520 --> 00:20:05,840 that just after we went to sleep last 479 00:20:03,039 --> 00:20:08,080 night, we had a master alarm and uh it 480 00:20:05,840 --> 00:20:10,640 really scared us and we rolled over the 481 00:20:08,080 --> 00:20:12,080 cockpit like a wet noodle. 482 00:20:10,640 --> 00:20:15,360 Sorry, it wasn't something more 483 00:20:12,080 --> 00:20:18,400 significant. Uh uh I've also got a a 484 00:20:15,360 --> 00:20:20,240 procedure for you on that H2 tank. Uh 485 00:20:18,400 --> 00:20:22,480 simple thing after you get done stirring 486 00:20:20,240 --> 00:20:24,640 up the cryos. The pressure inside of the 487 00:20:22,480 --> 00:20:26,640 spacecraft super critical hydrogen tank 488 00:20:24,640 --> 00:20:28,960 2 had been fluctuating enough to set off 489 00:20:26,640 --> 00:20:30,480 pressure alarms and startle the crew. 490 00:20:28,960 --> 00:20:33,360 This was an issue they would begin to 491 00:20:30,480 --> 00:20:35,120 troubleshoot when a new issue arose. 492 00:20:33,360 --> 00:20:37,840 I've got a consumables update for you, 493 00:20:35,120 --> 00:20:41,640 Jim, if you're ready for that. 494 00:20:37,840 --> 00:20:46,280 Ready to copy. Okay. As of 47 495 00:20:41,640 --> 00:20:50,960 hours, RCS total 10 niner 496 00:20:46,280 --> 00:20:53,039 6 and the H2 uh they gave me the H2s in 497 00:20:50,960 --> 00:20:56,960 percent 498 00:20:53,039 --> 00:21:00,200 uh 76%. 499 00:20:56,960 --> 00:21:03,200 And on the O2 we have 500 00:21:00,200 --> 00:21:05,200 81%. However, we show the O2 Tank 2 501 00:21:03,200 --> 00:21:07,120 reading offscale high. Now, we're quite 502 00:21:05,200 --> 00:21:08,480 sure it's a uh it's a sensor failure. 503 00:21:07,120 --> 00:21:10,480 We'd like you to verify it with your 504 00:21:08,480 --> 00:21:12,200 onboard reading. 505 00:21:10,480 --> 00:21:16,320 Okay, stand 506 00:21:12,200 --> 00:21:19,520 by. Uh Joe, we confirm uh our gauge 507 00:21:16,320 --> 00:21:21,679 reading is uh the number two attack is 508 00:21:19,520 --> 00:21:23,840 no scale high now, but that just tells 509 00:21:21,679 --> 00:21:26,960 me that uh it was okay when you first 510 00:21:23,840 --> 00:21:30,039 went this morning. Uh we we verify that 511 00:21:26,960 --> 00:21:34,000 at uh 4645 we had 512 00:21:30,039 --> 00:21:36,600 82%. And uh apparently uh uh when he 513 00:21:34,000 --> 00:21:40,240 stirred the uh the cryos 514 00:21:36,600 --> 00:21:41,520 uh the sensor broke. Now not only is 515 00:21:40,240 --> 00:21:43,679 their hydrogen tanks pressure 516 00:21:41,520 --> 00:21:46,559 fluctuating, but the quantity sensor for 517 00:21:43,679 --> 00:21:48,480 oxygen tank 2 was reading offscale high. 518 00:21:46,559 --> 00:21:49,840 Oxygen tank one sensor seemed to be 519 00:21:48,480 --> 00:21:51,520 working. So that one could be used to 520 00:21:49,840 --> 00:21:53,600 get a general idea of the pressure in 521 00:21:51,520 --> 00:21:55,440 tank 2 as long as they're used evenly. 522 00:21:53,600 --> 00:21:57,600 This moon landing is still very much a 523 00:21:55,440 --> 00:22:00,600 go. 524 00:21:57,600 --> 00:22:00,600 13. 525 00:22:01,919 --> 00:22:07,440 Go ahead. All right, Jack. Uh, one uh 526 00:22:04,880 --> 00:22:10,080 one thing we'd like to have done uh 527 00:22:07,440 --> 00:22:12,720 sometime soon is to have you cycle the 528 00:22:10,080 --> 00:22:14,000 cryo fans in O2 tank 2 one more time. We 529 00:22:12,720 --> 00:22:17,000 like to see if we can get that sensor 530 00:22:14,000 --> 00:22:17,000 back. 531 00:22:17,520 --> 00:22:24,720 Okay. Go on. O2 tank two fan on down. 532 00:22:22,000 --> 00:22:24,720 Roger. 533 00:22:34,799 --> 00:22:38,600 follow 13 Houston. 534 00:22:38,640 --> 00:22:44,240 Go ahead, Joe. We're ready to have the 535 00:22:40,400 --> 00:22:44,240 O2 tank to fan off it. Thank 536 00:22:45,159 --> 00:22:53,520 you. Okay. Doesn't look like it got it 537 00:22:48,400 --> 00:22:53,520 back, huh? Uh, no it doesn't, Jack. 538 00:22:53,559 --> 00:23:02,880 Apollo 13, Houston. Go ahead. Uh, roger 539 00:22:58,720 --> 00:23:06,640 13. Uh, because of the, uh, O2 take 2 540 00:23:02,880 --> 00:23:08,480 quantity sensor dropout, u, uh, ECOM 541 00:23:06,640 --> 00:23:11,120 wants to keep a little closer track of 542 00:23:08,480 --> 00:23:14,880 the, uh, of the cryo quantities. And 543 00:23:11,120 --> 00:23:17,120 he's going to be asking you to stir all 544 00:23:14,880 --> 00:23:19,200 the cryotanks at slightly more frequent 545 00:23:17,120 --> 00:23:21,919 intervals than um, than have been 546 00:23:19,200 --> 00:23:23,520 planned. And the first time is now. And 547 00:23:21,919 --> 00:23:25,520 we'll be calling you probably every five 548 00:23:23,520 --> 00:23:28,400 or six hours except during sleep periods 549 00:23:25,520 --> 00:23:30,580 and uh and high activity periods. We'd 550 00:23:28,400 --> 00:23:32,480 like you to do it now. Over. 551 00:23:30,580 --> 00:23:37,200 [Music] 552 00:23:32,480 --> 00:23:37,200 Okay. We'll start a stir now. Thank 553 00:23:37,320 --> 00:23:42,159 you. And 13 Houston for your 554 00:23:40,159 --> 00:23:44,240 information. A normal 1 minute or so 555 00:23:42,159 --> 00:23:46,400 stir would be They would begin to 556 00:23:44,240 --> 00:23:48,080 regularly stir both of the oxygen tanks 557 00:23:46,400 --> 00:23:50,240 to get a more accurate read on what was 558 00:23:48,080 --> 00:23:52,120 left in them. This would help them infer 559 00:23:50,240 --> 00:23:54,799 how much was in the tank with a broken 560 00:23:52,120 --> 00:23:57,039 sensor. The command module wasn't alone 561 00:23:54,799 --> 00:23:58,880 in its super critical tank issues. The 562 00:23:57,039 --> 00:24:00,640 lunar module's helium tanks had been 563 00:23:58,880 --> 00:24:03,200 tested on the ground and had shown some 564 00:24:00,640 --> 00:24:04,880 signs of poor insulation. Ground control 565 00:24:03,200 --> 00:24:06,799 wanted a reading of the pressures on 566 00:24:04,880 --> 00:24:08,640 board inside of the lunar module. So, 567 00:24:06,799 --> 00:24:11,679 they radioed the crew to enter the lunar 568 00:24:08,640 --> 00:24:14,960 module 3 hours earlier than planned. 569 00:24:11,679 --> 00:24:17,440 Okay. Uh, the LMP is entered. 570 00:24:14,960 --> 00:24:20,240 Roger. 571 00:24:17,440 --> 00:24:22,400 Okay. And it just flickered down to 710. 572 00:24:20,240 --> 00:24:23,919 It's going to flickering between 710 and 573 00:24:22,400 --> 00:24:27,200 720. 574 00:24:23,919 --> 00:24:29,760 Roger. 710 to 720. 575 00:24:27,200 --> 00:24:33,279 Our super critical helium pressure 576 00:24:29,760 --> 00:24:36,039 reading was 720 lb per square inch. Uh, 577 00:24:33,279 --> 00:24:39,679 a very desirable 578 00:24:36,039 --> 00:24:42,080 number. We're at 54 hours 53 minutes now 579 00:24:39,679 --> 00:24:45,400 into the flight. 580 00:24:42,080 --> 00:24:48,720 Apollo 13 at 581 00:24:45,400 --> 00:24:51,279 176,171 nautical miles away from Earth. 582 00:24:48,720 --> 00:24:53,840 We're standing by now for receipt of 583 00:24:51,279 --> 00:24:55,840 television. The crew deploys the high 584 00:24:53,840 --> 00:24:57,600 gain antenna in order to send over a 585 00:24:55,840 --> 00:24:59,520 video signal that would be broadcasted 586 00:24:57,600 --> 00:25:00,960 to people's televisions. The crew would 587 00:24:59,520 --> 00:25:02,640 need to stop their passive thermal 588 00:25:00,960 --> 00:25:04,799 control role in order to line up their 589 00:25:02,640 --> 00:25:06,480 antenna with Earth. The success of the 590 00:25:04,799 --> 00:25:08,000 previous two moon landings gave the 591 00:25:06,480 --> 00:25:09,600 public a false impression that these 592 00:25:08,000 --> 00:25:11,159 missions were now routine and didn't 593 00:25:09,600 --> 00:25:13,600 pose a significant risk to the 594 00:25:11,159 --> 00:25:15,039 astronauts. As such, the media largely 595 00:25:13,600 --> 00:25:17,520 felt it wasn't in their interest to 596 00:25:15,039 --> 00:25:20,080 cover this mission. No TV networks would 597 00:25:17,520 --> 00:25:21,520 show Apollo 13's broadcast. The crew 598 00:25:20,080 --> 00:25:23,039 would attempt to give a good show 599 00:25:21,520 --> 00:25:24,640 regardless of the public's apparent 600 00:25:23,039 --> 00:25:26,240 disinterest. 601 00:25:24,640 --> 00:25:28,159 Okay, Houston, we'll try to pick you up 602 00:25:26,240 --> 00:25:30,640 on high gain. 603 00:25:28,159 --> 00:25:34,310 Apollo control Houston standing by now 604 00:25:30,640 --> 00:25:36,960 for receipt of television transmission. 605 00:25:34,310 --> 00:25:39,279 [Applause] 606 00:25:36,960 --> 00:25:42,240 We're now re receiving a transmission, 607 00:25:39,279 --> 00:25:47,320 television transmission. 608 00:25:42,240 --> 00:25:47,320 Okay. 13. We got on TV. 609 00:25:49,440 --> 00:25:52,880 Uh the limb, as you can see, it uh 610 00:25:51,440 --> 00:25:55,559 looked pretty clean. And I found a 611 00:25:52,880 --> 00:25:58,480 couple of loose washers about it. And 612 00:25:55,559 --> 00:26:00,320 the a little plastic cap off the 613 00:25:58,480 --> 00:26:05,520 sequence camera had come loose. And I 614 00:26:00,320 --> 00:26:05,520 found it uh lodged over by the ED 615 00:26:06,840 --> 00:26:12,159 panel right under uh Jeff. Now he's 616 00:26:10,080 --> 00:26:15,840 actually standing on a what looks to be 617 00:26:12,159 --> 00:26:18,559 a can here. And uh for the sake of all 618 00:26:15,840 --> 00:26:22,480 the people back there uh housed inside 619 00:26:18,559 --> 00:26:25,039 this can is the u the lamb mass engine 620 00:26:22,480 --> 00:26:26,360 or hopefully you can see my hand resting 621 00:26:25,039 --> 00:26:29,279 on top of right 622 00:26:26,360 --> 00:26:31,840 now. The engine that uh we used to get 623 00:26:29,279 --> 00:26:31,840 off of the 624 00:26:31,880 --> 00:26:37,679 moon and I guess this uh an app 625 00:26:34,960 --> 00:26:39,080 description for this device would be a 626 00:26:37,679 --> 00:26:41,600 fish 627 00:26:39,080 --> 00:26:44,720 scale. And you can see I'm weighing 628 00:26:41,600 --> 00:26:47,120 myself right now. and uh says a way 629 00:26:44,720 --> 00:26:49,679 actually less than zero right now. Guess 630 00:26:47,120 --> 00:26:52,480 it's calibration in too good. That'll be 631 00:26:49,679 --> 00:26:56,400 the day. 632 00:26:52,480 --> 00:26:59,360 Okay. What I have out now, Jack, is 633 00:26:56,400 --> 00:27:02,400 uh Levo, which is also been shown 634 00:26:59,360 --> 00:27:03,880 before. It's a head garment uh for 635 00:27:02,400 --> 00:27:06,640 wearing out on the 636 00:27:03,880 --> 00:27:09,360 surface. And I I'm bringing gems out 637 00:27:06,640 --> 00:27:11,919 here to show a couple of mods. 638 00:27:09,360 --> 00:27:14,080 One problem before is that uh the cast 639 00:27:11,919 --> 00:27:17,320 of characters out on the surface haven't 640 00:27:14,080 --> 00:27:20,559 been able to be distinguished apart very 641 00:27:17,320 --> 00:27:23,520 well. So, not only Jim Suit has some red 642 00:27:20,559 --> 00:27:28,400 stripes on it, but as you can see, his 643 00:27:23,520 --> 00:27:28,400 lema also has a a red 644 00:27:29,080 --> 00:27:33,520 stripe. And uh now you can see one other 645 00:27:31,919 --> 00:27:38,320 mod too here, Jack, which I hadn't 646 00:27:33,520 --> 00:27:42,039 really seen myself before. Uh I guess on 647 00:27:38,320 --> 00:27:44,640 12 Pete now had uh commented about the 648 00:27:42,039 --> 00:27:47,279 uh commented about having trouble with 649 00:27:44,640 --> 00:27:49,679 sunlight in the eyes. So on our levers 650 00:27:47,279 --> 00:27:52,080 they have put on a new center section uh 651 00:27:49,679 --> 00:27:54,919 which you can pull down and use uh sort 652 00:27:52,080 --> 00:28:00,279 of like a baseball 653 00:27:54,919 --> 00:28:00,279 cap. Okay, Jackson fixed up on 654 00:28:07,919 --> 00:28:11,279 What uh Fred is opening 655 00:28:13,159 --> 00:28:19,200 up is a drink bag that we place inside 656 00:28:16,240 --> 00:28:20,840 of our neck ring that uh will allow us 657 00:28:19,200 --> 00:28:24,159 to drink while we're on the lunar 658 00:28:20,840 --> 00:28:27,919 surface. Uh they feed an Al did not have 659 00:28:24,159 --> 00:28:30,399 that in Apollo 12 and they consequently 660 00:28:27,919 --> 00:28:33,120 got very thirsty. Uh but we hope to 661 00:28:30,399 --> 00:28:36,559 alleiate that situation by having uh our 662 00:28:33,120 --> 00:28:38,880 own little uh bag of water which uh with 663 00:28:36,559 --> 00:28:41,279 very little effort we can uh have a sip 664 00:28:38,880 --> 00:28:45,159 or two while we're looking around and uh 665 00:28:41,279 --> 00:28:45,159 doing our geology work. 666 00:28:49,440 --> 00:28:56,080 So, uh, if you hear any funny noises, 667 00:28:53,399 --> 00:28:59,080 uh, it's just, uh, probably the drink 668 00:28:56,080 --> 00:28:59,080 bag. 669 00:29:06,159 --> 00:29:12,480 Okay, Jack. I'm looking out the uh right 670 00:29:09,120 --> 00:29:17,240 window now and uh not too far off in the 671 00:29:12,480 --> 00:29:19,600 distance now. You can see the uh the 672 00:29:17,240 --> 00:29:22,520 objective. And I'll zoom in on it here a 673 00:29:19,600 --> 00:29:25,200 little and see if it brings it in 674 00:29:22,520 --> 00:29:28,080 better. It's actually beginning to look 675 00:29:25,200 --> 00:29:30,159 a little bigger now. Uh you can see 676 00:29:28,080 --> 00:29:31,799 quite distinctly some of the features 677 00:29:30,159 --> 00:29:35,039 with the naked 678 00:29:31,799 --> 00:29:38,080 eye. And uh so far I guess I have to 679 00:29:35,039 --> 00:29:40,799 even agree with Jim that it's uh still 680 00:29:38,080 --> 00:29:43,799 looking pretty gray uh with a white 681 00:29:40,799 --> 00:29:43,799 spot. 682 00:29:44,880 --> 00:29:50,520 Okay, Fred, we're getting a good uh 683 00:29:46,480 --> 00:29:50,520 picture of your destination there. 684 00:30:01,600 --> 00:30:07,600 You're looking now at our uh probe that 685 00:30:03,840 --> 00:30:09,760 we place uh on the nose of uh Odyssey. 686 00:30:07,600 --> 00:30:12,799 Uh it's a very heavy thing, but of 687 00:30:09,760 --> 00:30:14,760 course in zero gravity, it uh weighs 688 00:30:12,799 --> 00:30:18,159 nothing and it's much easier to move 689 00:30:14,760 --> 00:30:20,000 around. As a matter of fact, both uh 690 00:30:18,159 --> 00:30:23,039 Fred and Jack commented as many people 691 00:30:20,000 --> 00:30:25,760 in the past have of how much bigger the 692 00:30:23,039 --> 00:30:28,240 spacecraft appears. uh in actual flight. 693 00:30:25,760 --> 00:30:30,720 Uh when you have such ease of movement 694 00:30:28,240 --> 00:30:33,279 compared to our simulators which make 695 00:30:30,720 --> 00:30:33,279 training rather 696 00:30:45,960 --> 00:30:51,039 difficult. Okay, we're seeing a good 697 00:30:48,000 --> 00:30:53,279 picture of the probe there, Jim. And uh 698 00:30:51,039 --> 00:30:55,600 looks like the characters shaved before 699 00:30:53,279 --> 00:30:57,360 the show this time. 700 00:30:55,600 --> 00:30:59,279 Well, Fred said he had to keep up his 701 00:30:57,360 --> 00:31:01,600 TV. 702 00:30:59,279 --> 00:31:04,880 Yeah, that may be uh my first and last 703 00:31:01,600 --> 00:31:07,880 time. Now, Jack, it took Fred 1 hour to 704 00:31:04,880 --> 00:31:07,880 shave. 705 00:31:08,799 --> 00:31:13,120 Okay, Jim, we're seeing a tape recorder 706 00:31:10,799 --> 00:31:14,559 now. And uh just by the way, how long 707 00:31:13,120 --> 00:31:17,559 you expect to keep the TV on this 708 00:31:14,559 --> 00:31:17,559 evening? 709 00:31:18,880 --> 00:31:25,440 Well, whenever 710 00:31:20,840 --> 00:31:27,919 you stand by one. 711 00:31:25,440 --> 00:31:29,159 Yeah, I got him with the uh Kevin Reaper 712 00:31:27,919 --> 00:31:31,520 valve in there, 713 00:31:29,159 --> 00:31:35,960 Jack. Every time he does that, our 714 00:31:31,520 --> 00:31:35,960 hearts our hearts jump in our mouth. 715 00:31:36,480 --> 00:31:42,000 Okay, Jim. Uh it's been a real good TV 716 00:31:39,279 --> 00:31:46,679 show. Uh we think we ought to conclude 717 00:31:42,000 --> 00:31:46,679 it from here now. Uh, what do you think? 718 00:31:46,880 --> 00:31:52,600 Roger sounds good. And this is the crew 719 00:31:49,519 --> 00:31:56,080 of Apollo 13. Wishing everybody there 720 00:31:52,600 --> 00:31:58,000 a nice evening. And uh, we're just about 721 00:31:56,080 --> 00:32:00,720 ready to close out our inspection of 722 00:31:58,000 --> 00:32:05,080 Aquarius and get back for a pleasant 723 00:32:00,720 --> 00:32:05,080 evening at Odyssey. Good night. 724 00:32:05,120 --> 00:32:08,519 Thank you. 13. 725 00:32:08,880 --> 00:32:12,640 13, we've got one more item for you when 726 00:32:10,720 --> 00:32:13,880 you get a chance. We'd like you to uh 727 00:32:12,640 --> 00:32:16,399 stir up your 728 00:32:13,880 --> 00:32:18,480 cryotanks. In addition, I have shaft and 729 00:32:16,399 --> 00:32:22,000 trion okay for a look at the comet 730 00:32:18,480 --> 00:32:25,960 Bennett if you need it. 731 00:32:22,000 --> 00:32:25,960 Okay, stand by. 732 00:32:36,390 --> 00:32:38,680 [Applause] 733 00:32:38,560 --> 00:32:42,009 [Music] 734 00:32:38,680 --> 00:32:42,009 [Applause] 735 00:32:44,159 --> 00:32:49,600 Gohead. We've had a hardware. I don't 736 00:32:46,880 --> 00:32:52,640 know what it was. Okay, Houston, we've 737 00:32:49,600 --> 00:32:55,519 had a problem here. 738 00:32:52,640 --> 00:32:57,880 This is Houston. Say again, please. 739 00:32:55,519 --> 00:33:02,000 Yes, sir. Uh, Houston, we've had a 740 00:32:57,880 --> 00:33:04,320 problem. We've had a main Bus. 741 00:33:02,000 --> 00:33:05,919 Roger. Main B undervolt. We got a main B 742 00:33:04,320 --> 00:33:07,679 undervolt. Okay, Flight, we've got some 743 00:33:05,919 --> 00:33:10,559 instrumentation finds. Let me Let me add 744 00:33:07,679 --> 00:33:11,760 them up. Roj. Okay, stand by 13. We're 745 00:33:10,559 --> 00:33:15,360 looking at it. We may have had an 746 00:33:11,760 --> 00:33:18,240 instrumentation problem. Roj. 55 hours, 747 00:33:15,360 --> 00:33:21,279 54 minutes, and 53 seconds into Apollo 748 00:33:18,240 --> 00:33:23,039 13, Oxygen Tank 2 explodes, ripping off 749 00:33:21,279 --> 00:33:25,519 the side panel of the spacecraft and 750 00:33:23,039 --> 00:33:27,360 severely damaging the equipment inside. 751 00:33:25,519 --> 00:33:28,799 Ground control could only see the radio 752 00:33:27,360 --> 00:33:30,640 telemetry coming down from the 753 00:33:28,799 --> 00:33:32,440 spacecraft and had no idea of the 754 00:33:30,640 --> 00:33:34,960 immediate damage that was caused by the 755 00:33:32,440 --> 00:33:37,279 explosion. What they could see, however, 756 00:33:34,960 --> 00:33:38,960 only gave them questions. The numerous 757 00:33:37,279 --> 00:33:40,960 warnings and alarms that ground control 758 00:33:38,960 --> 00:33:42,799 was seeing to them might be a false 759 00:33:40,960 --> 00:33:44,399 alarm caused by erroneous sensor 760 00:33:42,799 --> 00:33:46,960 readings, just like the pressure sensor 761 00:33:44,399 --> 00:33:48,799 earlier in oxygen tank 2. This is why an 762 00:33:46,960 --> 00:33:50,640 instrumentation problem is called out as 763 00:33:48,799 --> 00:33:52,640 the first possible explanation to the 764 00:33:50,640 --> 00:33:54,399 alarms. They would begin to put together 765 00:33:52,640 --> 00:33:56,320 the pieces to figure out what really 766 00:33:54,399 --> 00:33:58,240 just happened. The spacecraft's 767 00:33:56,320 --> 00:34:00,640 electrical system is connected to fuel 768 00:33:58,240 --> 00:34:02,480 cells. These fuel cells take in oxygen 769 00:34:00,640 --> 00:34:04,559 and hydrogen from the spacecraft's tanks 770 00:34:02,480 --> 00:34:06,320 and react them together. This would 771 00:34:04,559 --> 00:34:08,000 generate the electricity needed for the 772 00:34:06,320 --> 00:34:09,520 spacecraft and the astronauts could use 773 00:34:08,000 --> 00:34:11,919 the water that was a product of the 774 00:34:09,520 --> 00:34:13,520 reaction. The astronauts needed to rely 775 00:34:11,919 --> 00:34:15,119 on these fuel cells to generate 776 00:34:13,520 --> 00:34:16,879 electricity and water throughout the 777 00:34:15,119 --> 00:34:18,159 flight as carrying a separate water 778 00:34:16,879 --> 00:34:20,000 supply and batteries would have 779 00:34:18,159 --> 00:34:21,839 significantly increased weight. The 780 00:34:20,000 --> 00:34:24,079 service module is equipped with three of 781 00:34:21,839 --> 00:34:25,679 them. The fuel cells are connected to 782 00:34:24,079 --> 00:34:27,119 the spacecraft's electrical system 783 00:34:25,679 --> 00:34:28,879 through electrical buses which 784 00:34:27,119 --> 00:34:30,960 distribute the power to the other parts 785 00:34:28,879 --> 00:34:32,960 of the spacecraft. The fuel cells 786 00:34:30,960 --> 00:34:35,520 generate a direct current which go into 787 00:34:32,960 --> 00:34:36,960 two direct current main buses. Both 788 00:34:35,520 --> 00:34:38,480 buses are connected to their own 789 00:34:36,960 --> 00:34:40,399 inverters which power separate 790 00:34:38,480 --> 00:34:42,399 alternating current buses, allowing 791 00:34:40,399 --> 00:34:44,639 alternating current devices to also be 792 00:34:42,399 --> 00:34:46,399 powered. This is a redundant system that 793 00:34:44,639 --> 00:34:49,119 the crew will now need to take advantage 794 00:34:46,399 --> 00:34:50,879 of. Fuel cells one and three, which were 795 00:34:49,119 --> 00:34:53,200 taking oxygen from the now destroyed 796 00:34:50,879 --> 00:34:55,679 oxygen tank 2, significantly drop in 797 00:34:53,200 --> 00:34:57,520 voltage. Main bus B at the time of the 798 00:34:55,679 --> 00:34:59,400 explosion was only connected to fuel 799 00:34:57,520 --> 00:35:01,920 cell 3 which is now not producing 800 00:34:59,400 --> 00:35:03,520 electricity. This throws up a main bus B 801 00:35:01,920 --> 00:35:05,599 undervolt warning which the crew and 802 00:35:03,520 --> 00:35:07,839 ground control can see. Right now the 803 00:35:05,599 --> 00:35:10,079 astronauts are relying on one dying fuel 804 00:35:07,839 --> 00:35:12,480 cell fuel cell 2 in order to generate 805 00:35:10,079 --> 00:35:15,359 the entire spacecraft's electricity. It 806 00:35:12,480 --> 00:35:17,359 won't last long. A hardware restart 807 00:35:15,359 --> 00:35:19,040 followed by a main bus B undervolt are 808 00:35:17,359 --> 00:35:21,680 the first indications to ground control 809 00:35:19,040 --> 00:35:24,160 that something had gone wrong. And we 810 00:35:21,680 --> 00:35:27,240 hit a pretty large bang. associated with 811 00:35:24,160 --> 00:35:29,839 the caution and warning there and the 812 00:35:27,240 --> 00:35:32,480 interior. We're starting to go ahead and 813 00:35:29,839 --> 00:35:34,560 button up the tunnel again. The fuel 814 00:35:32,480 --> 00:35:37,119 cells drop in voltage started a cascade 815 00:35:34,560 --> 00:35:38,960 of events alongside the explosion. 816 00:35:37,119 --> 00:35:40,720 Multiple sensors, including the ones 817 00:35:38,960 --> 00:35:42,800 inside of the cryogenic tanks, were 818 00:35:40,720 --> 00:35:45,040 being powered by the now dead main bus 819 00:35:42,800 --> 00:35:47,280 B. These sensors would lose power and 820 00:35:45,040 --> 00:35:48,960 drop out as a result. The spacecraft's 821 00:35:47,280 --> 00:35:51,760 guidance control system and computers 822 00:35:48,960 --> 00:35:53,440 would also restart. And uh Houston, we 823 00:35:51,760 --> 00:35:57,599 had a restart on our computer. We have 824 00:35:53,440 --> 00:36:00,800 pings light and uh and restart. Reset. 825 00:35:57,599 --> 00:36:03,040 Roger. Restart and ping light. Restart 826 00:36:00,800 --> 00:36:05,200 on reset. 827 00:36:03,040 --> 00:36:08,400 Okay. AC2 is showing zip. I'm going to 828 00:36:05,200 --> 00:36:10,320 try to reconfigure on that. Jack 829 00:36:08,400 --> 00:36:12,079 Ecom, you were seeing any AC problems. 830 00:36:10,320 --> 00:36:14,480 Looks like a lot of instrumentation 831 00:36:12,079 --> 00:36:16,560 problems there. Go ahead. That's for 832 00:36:14,480 --> 00:36:17,920 flipping the fuel cells around flight. 833 00:36:16,560 --> 00:36:20,160 Well, let's get some recommendation 834 00:36:17,920 --> 00:36:23,119 here. S if you got any better ideas. 835 00:36:20,160 --> 00:36:25,760 Yeah, we got a uh main bus a undervolt 836 00:36:23,119 --> 00:36:28,000 now too. Sean, main A undervolt. The 837 00:36:25,760 --> 00:36:29,680 spacecraft's other bus, main bus A, 838 00:36:28,000 --> 00:36:31,680 start showing signs of weakening from 839 00:36:29,680 --> 00:36:33,480 losing one of its fuel cells. It's 840 00:36:31,680 --> 00:36:36,800 reading about 25 and a 841 00:36:33,480 --> 00:36:40,480 half. Main B is rating zip right now. 842 00:36:36,800 --> 00:36:43,760 Flight econ. Go ahead. He's got U fuel 843 00:36:40,480 --> 00:36:45,520 cells one and three are offline. We've 844 00:36:43,760 --> 00:36:48,880 got main A volts. We have no main B 845 00:36:45,520 --> 00:36:51,599 volts. have an attempt to re uh 846 00:36:48,880 --> 00:36:54,079 reconnect the fuel cells. Fuel cell one 847 00:36:51,599 --> 00:36:57,359 to main A, fuel cell 848 00:36:54,079 --> 00:37:00,000 uh three to main B. Okay. Now, is there 849 00:36:57,359 --> 00:37:02,240 do we have instrumentation problems? 850 00:37:00,000 --> 00:37:06,200 Well, we lost a It does appear we've 851 00:37:02,240 --> 00:37:09,680 lost AC bus 2 voltage. Main B is reading 852 00:37:06,200 --> 00:37:13,040 uh 4 volts and that effectively takes 853 00:37:09,680 --> 00:37:15,119 AC2 away from us. Okay. 13, Houston, 854 00:37:13,040 --> 00:37:18,320 we'd like you to attempt to reconnect 855 00:37:15,119 --> 00:37:21,839 fuel cell one to main A and fuel cell 3 856 00:37:18,320 --> 00:37:24,720 to main B. Okay, Houston, I'm showing I 857 00:37:21,839 --> 00:37:27,880 tried to reset and uh fuel cell one and 858 00:37:24,720 --> 00:37:30,240 three are both showing uh gray 859 00:37:27,880 --> 00:37:32,240 flags, but they're both showing zip on 860 00:37:30,240 --> 00:37:33,680 the flows. The crew attempts to reset 861 00:37:32,240 --> 00:37:35,440 the fuel cells into the same 862 00:37:33,680 --> 00:37:37,760 configuration, which results in no 863 00:37:35,440 --> 00:37:39,839 changes. Roger. Flight ECOM. Go ECOM. 864 00:37:37,760 --> 00:37:41,359 Let's reverse a configuration request. 865 00:37:39,839 --> 00:37:42,880 Okay, but wait a minute. We got a good 866 00:37:41,359 --> 00:37:45,119 main A bus. Let's make sure that 867 00:37:42,880 --> 00:37:47,359 whatever we do doesn't screw up main A. 868 00:37:45,119 --> 00:37:49,040 Fuel cell 2 is on main A flight. I'm not 869 00:37:47,359 --> 00:37:50,960 going to ask to change that. Okay. What 870 00:37:49,040 --> 00:37:53,839 do you want to do? Let's try to put fuel 871 00:37:50,960 --> 00:37:56,320 cell one on main B, fuel cell three on 872 00:37:53,839 --> 00:37:58,480 main A. We use the other uh sensing 873 00:37:56,320 --> 00:38:00,480 circuitry. We're not going to touch fuel 874 00:37:58,480 --> 00:38:02,560 cell two flight. 875 00:38:00,480 --> 00:38:03,920 Okay. But if we got any problems in the 876 00:38:02,560 --> 00:38:06,960 system, I want to make sure that we 877 00:38:03,920 --> 00:38:08,079 don't blow the voltage off main A. Then 878 00:38:06,960 --> 00:38:10,640 we're not going to be able to see 879 00:38:08,079 --> 00:38:12,720 anything. You got can we review our 880 00:38:10,640 --> 00:38:14,400 status here sigh and see what we've got 881 00:38:12,720 --> 00:38:15,920 from a standpoint of status. What do you 882 00:38:14,400 --> 00:38:20,000 think we got in a spacecraft that's 883 00:38:15,920 --> 00:38:22,520 good? Main bus A is reading 25 volts. 884 00:38:20,000 --> 00:38:26,640 Okay. Main A and that's reflected by the 885 00:38:22,520 --> 00:38:28,400 fact uh fuel cell 2 is putting out uh 53 886 00:38:26,640 --> 00:38:30,640 amps which is just about the most it can 887 00:38:28,400 --> 00:38:33,760 and keep our voltage up. Okay. So that's 888 00:38:30,640 --> 00:38:36,880 bonafide. AC bus 2 is zero which is 889 00:38:33,760 --> 00:38:39,680 reflected by the fact we lost main B. 890 00:38:36,880 --> 00:38:41,760 Flight econom go ecom. Okay, let's get a 891 00:38:39,680 --> 00:38:45,160 read out on a couple fuel cell pressures 892 00:38:41,760 --> 00:38:48,160 here. Okay. Uh, fuel cell one, N2 893 00:38:45,160 --> 00:38:51,000 pressure, fuel cell 302 pressure. We're 894 00:38:48,160 --> 00:38:55,040 reading uh 0 N2 pressure and fuel cell 895 00:38:51,000 --> 00:38:57,599 one and 13 PSI on fuel cell 302 896 00:38:55,040 --> 00:38:59,440 pressure. 13 Houston, we'd like you to 897 00:38:57,599 --> 00:39:02,520 verify a couple readings for us. We'd 898 00:38:59,440 --> 00:39:05,359 like the nitrogen pressure on fuel cell 899 00:39:02,520 --> 00:39:06,720 one. We need the oxygen pressure on fuel 900 00:39:05,359 --> 00:39:09,760 cell two. 901 00:39:06,720 --> 00:39:11,839 Okay. Nitrogen on one and oxygen on two. 902 00:39:09,760 --> 00:39:15,200 Is that correct? Negative. Oxygen on 903 00:39:11,839 --> 00:39:16,480 three. Okay. Now, are we using RCS now? 904 00:39:15,200 --> 00:39:18,560 That's affirmative. We're going to have 905 00:39:16,480 --> 00:39:22,960 to switch them thrusters over to main A 906 00:39:18,560 --> 00:39:27,119 to hold the attitude here. Okay. Uh, how 907 00:39:22,960 --> 00:39:29,520 much RCS we using? Oh, we've used um Oh, 908 00:39:27,119 --> 00:39:31,440 yes. 25 lb. 909 00:39:29,520 --> 00:39:33,839 Okay. Give me a minimum fuel usage 910 00:39:31,440 --> 00:39:35,920 configuration that'll keep me out of the 911 00:39:33,839 --> 00:39:37,839 garage. The RCS thrusters have been 912 00:39:35,920 --> 00:39:39,599 firing since the explosion, attempting 913 00:39:37,839 --> 00:39:41,359 to keep the spacecraft in an attitude 914 00:39:39,599 --> 00:39:43,599 that has radial contact with Earth and 915 00:39:41,359 --> 00:39:45,280 that could avoid gimbal lock. This would 916 00:39:43,599 --> 00:39:47,200 eventually give the spacecraft enough 917 00:39:45,280 --> 00:39:50,560 velocity to begin deviating from its 918 00:39:47,200 --> 00:39:52,240 planned trajectory. I tell you, go tell 919 00:39:50,560 --> 00:39:55,520 me the limb heater currents become 920 00:39:52,240 --> 00:39:56,960 essentially static. Roj, let's solve one 921 00:39:55,520 --> 00:39:58,880 problem at a time. come back to me later 922 00:39:56,960 --> 00:40:02,800 on in a 923 00:39:58,880 --> 00:40:05,200 and uh two Baker which is three oxygen 924 00:40:02,800 --> 00:40:08,000 says 6 925 00:40:05,200 --> 00:40:13,119 two Baker says 6 and say again the other 926 00:40:08,000 --> 00:40:15,440 one uh fuel cell one nitrogen reads zero 927 00:40:13,119 --> 00:40:17,520 roger zero both fuel cells are well 928 00:40:15,440 --> 00:40:19,040 under their normal operating pressures 929 00:40:17,520 --> 00:40:20,320 this is a hint to ground control that 930 00:40:19,040 --> 00:40:22,240 something might have gone wrong with the 931 00:40:20,320 --> 00:40:24,440 super critical tanks providing the gas 932 00:40:22,240 --> 00:40:27,400 but it might also just be another sensor 933 00:40:24,440 --> 00:40:31,359 error go ahead 934 00:40:27,400 --> 00:40:33,359 Uh why don't we try leave fuel cell 2 935 00:40:31,359 --> 00:40:36,079 alone and just make sure that one and 936 00:40:33,359 --> 00:40:37,760 three are disconnected from both buses 937 00:40:36,079 --> 00:40:40,160 and make sure that there's abs won't be 938 00:40:37,760 --> 00:40:42,040 any load on them at all and let's see 939 00:40:40,160 --> 00:40:44,160 what happens to those 940 00:40:42,040 --> 00:40:45,760 cells. Okay, very what do you want to 941 00:40:44,160 --> 00:40:48,440 do? Open circuit fuel cell one and 942 00:40:45,760 --> 00:40:51,920 three. That's very important. 943 00:40:48,440 --> 00:40:54,320 Okay, Capcom, let's recommend we open 944 00:40:51,920 --> 00:40:56,640 circuit fuel cell number one and number 945 00:40:54,320 --> 00:40:58,240 three and leave fuel cell number two as 946 00:40:56,640 --> 00:41:00,160 is. 947 00:40:58,240 --> 00:41:02,400 Okay, one and three. Open circuit two as 948 00:41:00,160 --> 00:41:05,280 is. And earlier got a report from them 949 00:41:02,400 --> 00:41:07,680 that uh one and three were reading gray 950 00:41:05,280 --> 00:41:10,400 but zero flow. Yeah, Capcom, let's amend 951 00:41:07,680 --> 00:41:12,079 that. ECOM from flight ecom. Why don't 952 00:41:10,400 --> 00:41:13,440 we just open circuit one and make sure 953 00:41:12,079 --> 00:41:15,200 that we don't have any problems getting 954 00:41:13,440 --> 00:41:16,960 that back onto the bus. Okay, just watch 955 00:41:15,200 --> 00:41:18,960 it for a while before we make any 956 00:41:16,960 --> 00:41:20,720 further moves with three. Roger. Okay, 957 00:41:18,960 --> 00:41:23,760 Capcom, let's just open circuit one of 958 00:41:20,720 --> 00:41:27,599 those right now. 13 Houston, we'd like 959 00:41:23,760 --> 00:41:30,240 you to open circuit fuel cell one. Leave 960 00:41:27,599 --> 00:41:32,000 two and three as is. 961 00:41:30,240 --> 00:41:33,920 Okay, I'll get to work on that. Ground 962 00:41:32,000 --> 00:41:35,520 control hopes to alleviate any problems 963 00:41:33,920 --> 00:41:37,040 the fuel cells might be having by 964 00:41:35,520 --> 00:41:39,280 disconnecting them from the rest of the 965 00:41:37,040 --> 00:41:40,720 spacecraft's electrical systems. Right 966 00:41:39,280 --> 00:41:42,560 now they don't know what's going on with 967 00:41:40,720 --> 00:41:44,319 the spacecraft and out of caution decide 968 00:41:42,560 --> 00:41:46,480 to only disconnect one in case they 969 00:41:44,319 --> 00:41:50,560 start getting more issues from them. And 970 00:41:46,480 --> 00:41:53,760 uh Jack uh our O2 uh quantity number two 971 00:41:50,560 --> 00:41:56,400 tank is zero. Did you get that? O2 972 00:41:53,760 --> 00:41:58,640 quantity number two is zero. That's AC. 973 00:41:56,400 --> 00:42:00,480 Okay. The gauge that was previously 974 00:41:58,640 --> 00:42:02,560 acting up now shows there's nothing in 975 00:42:00,480 --> 00:42:04,319 the tank. Louisville realizes that the 976 00:42:02,560 --> 00:42:06,560 gauge is being powered by the now dead 977 00:42:04,319 --> 00:42:08,400 AC bus 2. So he disregards that reading 978 00:42:06,560 --> 00:42:10,480 and then immediately makes a startling 979 00:42:08,400 --> 00:42:12,000 discovery. Yeah, that's that's a good 980 00:42:10,480 --> 00:42:14,400 thing to see. And it looks to me looking 981 00:42:12,000 --> 00:42:16,720 out the hatch that we are venting 982 00:42:14,400 --> 00:42:18,400 something. Crew thinks they're venting 983 00:42:16,720 --> 00:42:20,640 something. 984 00:42:18,400 --> 00:42:23,440 We are we are venting something out into 985 00:42:20,640 --> 00:42:25,839 the uh into space. Roger. We copy your 986 00:42:23,440 --> 00:42:28,319 venting. The spacecraft had been venting 987 00:42:25,839 --> 00:42:29,760 something since the explosion. Okay, 988 00:42:28,319 --> 00:42:31,760 let's everybody think of the kind of 989 00:42:29,760 --> 00:42:33,280 things we'd be venting. GNC, you got 990 00:42:31,760 --> 00:42:36,240 anything that looks abnormal in your 991 00:42:33,280 --> 00:42:37,839 system? Negative light. Okay, fuel cell 992 00:42:36,240 --> 00:42:40,160 one, you just wanted to off the line 993 00:42:37,839 --> 00:42:44,800 now, Jack. Is that right? We just wanted 994 00:42:40,160 --> 00:42:47,280 you to open one. 995 00:42:44,800 --> 00:42:49,599 Okay, she's off the line. Okay, now 996 00:42:47,280 --> 00:42:51,359 let's everybody keep cool. We got the 997 00:42:49,599 --> 00:42:54,319 limb still attached. The limb 998 00:42:51,359 --> 00:42:56,079 spacecraft's good. So, if we need uh to 999 00:42:54,319 --> 00:42:58,640 get back home, we got a limb to do a 1000 00:42:56,079 --> 00:43:00,079 good portion of it with. Okay, let's 1001 00:42:58,640 --> 00:43:03,280 make sure that we don't do anything 1002 00:43:00,079 --> 00:43:05,119 that's going to blow our CSM electrical 1003 00:43:03,280 --> 00:43:07,839 power with the batteries or that will 1004 00:43:05,119 --> 00:43:09,240 cause us to lose the main or the fuel 1005 00:43:07,839 --> 00:43:12,000 cell number 1006 00:43:09,240 --> 00:43:13,520 two. Okay, we want to keep the O2 and 1007 00:43:12,000 --> 00:43:16,319 that kind of stuff working. We'd like to 1008 00:43:13,520 --> 00:43:18,720 have RCS, but we got the command module 1009 00:43:16,319 --> 00:43:20,240 system, so we're in good shape. If we 1010 00:43:18,720 --> 00:43:21,920 need to get home, let's solve the 1011 00:43:20,240 --> 00:43:24,800 problem, but let's not make it any worse 1012 00:43:21,920 --> 00:43:28,400 by guessing. 1013 00:43:24,800 --> 00:43:31,280 Apollo control Houston. Um this rapid 1014 00:43:28,400 --> 00:43:34,200 exchange of conversation you've heard u 1015 00:43:31,280 --> 00:43:38,160 may the main B bus uh is off the 1016 00:43:34,200 --> 00:43:40,720 line. Uh fuel cells one and three also 1017 00:43:38,160 --> 00:43:43,920 off the line. Uh fuel cell 2 is 1018 00:43:40,720 --> 00:43:47,160 presently on the line. We now show 13 at 1019 00:43:43,920 --> 00:43:49,560 an altitude of 1020 00:43:47,160 --> 00:43:52,800 178,643 nautical 1021 00:43:49,560 --> 00:43:54,720 miles. We're at 56 hours 12 minutes into 1022 00:43:52,800 --> 00:43:56,480 the flight. Okay. Can you tell us 1023 00:43:54,720 --> 00:43:58,079 anything about the venting? Uh, okay. 1024 00:43:56,480 --> 00:43:59,920 Where it's coming from. Uh, what window 1025 00:43:58,079 --> 00:44:02,880 do you see it at? It's coming out of 1026 00:43:59,920 --> 00:44:05,599 window one right now, Jack. Flight. Go 1027 00:44:02,880 --> 00:44:07,839 ahead. Uh, I think the best thing we can 1028 00:44:05,599 --> 00:44:11,200 do right now is start a power down. 1029 00:44:07,839 --> 00:44:14,720 Okay. Uh, let's go down uh the emergency 1030 00:44:11,200 --> 00:44:17,599 1-5. Okay. What do you want to go to? 1031 00:44:14,720 --> 00:44:20,400 Uh, power down. Give me the page. Uh, 1032 00:44:17,599 --> 00:44:23,599 emergency 1-5 flight. We'll go down uh 1033 00:44:20,400 --> 00:44:24,800 try to get a delta of 10 amps reduction. 1034 00:44:23,599 --> 00:44:26,000 Ecom, do you want to go through that 1035 00:44:24,800 --> 00:44:28,240 again? What do you want to power down 1036 00:44:26,000 --> 00:44:31,040 to? I want to power down uh a total of 1037 00:44:28,240 --> 00:44:34,480 10 amps. White, a total of 10 amps. 1038 00:44:31,040 --> 00:44:37,440 That's fine. Okay. Capcom, we'd 1039 00:44:34,480 --> 00:44:40,319 recommend emergency power down checklist 1040 00:44:37,440 --> 00:44:42,400 1-5. We want a power down a total or a 1041 00:44:40,319 --> 00:44:44,640 delta of 10 amps from where we are now. 1042 00:44:42,400 --> 00:44:46,800 Flight GNC. Go GNC. Can we afford to do 1043 00:44:44,640 --> 00:44:50,000 a PTC first and then we shut off all of 1044 00:44:46,800 --> 00:44:51,040 that stuff with no problems? Uh why you 1045 00:44:50,000 --> 00:44:53,280 think you're going to have a thermal 1046 00:44:51,040 --> 00:44:56,000 problem here? Well, we could have uh if 1047 00:44:53,280 --> 00:44:57,760 we stay there too long. Okay, we'll run 1048 00:44:56,000 --> 00:45:00,319 into that one later, Buck. Okay, I want 1049 00:44:57,760 --> 00:45:03,280 to get our major problem sorted out now. 1050 00:45:00,319 --> 00:45:06,560 You want I still want 1-5 down to 1-5 1051 00:45:03,280 --> 00:45:09,040 powered down delta 10 amps. Scap. Okay, 1052 00:45:06,560 --> 00:45:12,520 13, this is Houston. We'd like you to go 1053 00:45:09,040 --> 00:45:15,680 to your GNC checklist. The pink pages 1054 00:45:12,520 --> 00:45:19,119 1-5. Do power down until we get a delta 1055 00:45:15,680 --> 00:45:20,560 of 10 amps. Over flight econ. 1056 00:45:19,119 --> 00:45:22,880 Okay, I need one thing right now. He's 1057 00:45:20,560 --> 00:45:26,480 powering down. hangs down to 401 amps 1058 00:45:22,880 --> 00:45:29,680 total spacecraft. I'd like to get uh my 1059 00:45:26,480 --> 00:45:33,040 AC2 bus back so I can look at O2 tank 2 1060 00:45:29,680 --> 00:45:36,160 pressure. I I have no insight into that. 1061 00:45:33,040 --> 00:45:38,000 Okay, let's get uh I guess we can put 1062 00:45:36,160 --> 00:45:41,440 inverter 1063 00:45:38,000 --> 00:45:41,440 uh three to main 1064 00:45:42,280 --> 00:45:46,800 A2 and let me ask you before you do 1065 00:45:45,440 --> 00:45:49,119 that, would you like to make sure you 1066 00:45:46,800 --> 00:45:51,200 got all AC load you don't need isolated 1067 00:45:49,119 --> 00:45:52,960 from the bus? 1068 00:45:51,200 --> 00:45:54,720 Nah, let's not do that right now. 1069 00:45:52,960 --> 00:45:57,040 Flight, I think we're in good shape that 1070 00:45:54,720 --> 00:45:58,880 way. The main is up high enough where it 1071 00:45:57,040 --> 00:46:00,720 can handle the inverter. Thing that 1072 00:45:58,880 --> 00:46:02,880 concerns me is starting is throwing 1073 00:46:00,720 --> 00:46:04,880 equipment. We We had a problem. We don't 1074 00:46:02,880 --> 00:46:07,000 know the cause of the problem, right? I 1075 00:46:04,880 --> 00:46:10,960 I've got a feeling we've lost two fuel 1076 00:46:07,000 --> 00:46:12,960 cells. I hate to put it that way, but uh 1077 00:46:10,960 --> 00:46:14,720 I don't know why we've lost them. It 1078 00:46:12,960 --> 00:46:16,640 doesn't all tag up, and it's not an 1079 00:46:14,720 --> 00:46:18,800 instrumentation problem, the best I can 1080 00:46:16,640 --> 00:46:22,160 tell right now. 1081 00:46:18,800 --> 00:46:27,040 Okay. And uh something is uh giving us a 1082 00:46:22,160 --> 00:46:28,640 rates jack both in pitch and roll. So I 1083 00:46:27,040 --> 00:46:31,280 suspecting that maybe it's whatever it 1084 00:46:28,640 --> 00:46:34,800 is that's vending back there. I've had 1085 00:46:31,280 --> 00:46:36,160 to use uh direct in order to stabilize 1086 00:46:34,800 --> 00:46:37,760 this. And as soon as I do, we're 1087 00:46:36,160 --> 00:46:40,800 starting to pick up rates again. Can you 1088 00:46:37,760 --> 00:46:42,319 pick up any jet? Sorry. Standby. 1089 00:46:40,800 --> 00:46:44,319 Whatever was venting seemed to be 1090 00:46:42,319 --> 00:46:46,319 actively pushing the spacecraft around, 1091 00:46:44,319 --> 00:46:48,079 explaining the constant RCS thruster 1092 00:46:46,319 --> 00:46:50,000 firing. Swagger would have to use the 1093 00:46:48,079 --> 00:46:51,920 manual controls multiple times in order 1094 00:46:50,000 --> 00:46:54,640 to counteract the venting. What 1095 00:46:51,920 --> 00:46:58,720 direction are your rates in Jack? 1096 00:46:54,640 --> 00:47:01,760 It's negative pitch and negative roll. 1097 00:46:58,720 --> 00:47:04,000 That's further. What's firing now? You 1098 00:47:01,760 --> 00:47:06,400 got something firing? Well, we've seen 1099 00:47:04,000 --> 00:47:08,480 quite a bit of thruster activity. Okay, 1100 00:47:06,400 --> 00:47:10,000 I guess this kills a PTC, too, because 1101 00:47:08,480 --> 00:47:11,599 we're not going to get into PTC as long 1102 00:47:10,000 --> 00:47:12,880 as we got something venting. The gauges 1103 00:47:11,599 --> 00:47:14,640 that were knocked out by the power 1104 00:47:12,880 --> 00:47:17,040 outage are now a concern for the ground 1105 00:47:14,640 --> 00:47:18,720 crew. They could see the main bus B that 1106 00:47:17,040 --> 00:47:20,960 was powering them is now offline, but 1107 00:47:18,720 --> 00:47:22,480 main A still works. They would need to 1108 00:47:20,960 --> 00:47:25,200 connect the working bus with the now 1109 00:47:22,480 --> 00:47:26,560 offline sensors. Flight econom. Go ECOM. 1110 00:47:25,200 --> 00:47:29,920 Uh, I got a little correction. Let's put 1111 00:47:26,560 --> 00:47:33,280 inverter one on both AC buses, please. 1112 00:47:29,920 --> 00:47:35,760 One on both AC. Confirm. So, I can get 1113 00:47:33,280 --> 00:47:38,160 some uh AC bus power back so I can have 1114 00:47:35,760 --> 00:47:40,640 some insight into my uh AC bus 2 1115 00:47:38,160 --> 00:47:42,640 telemetry, especially my crows. Maybe 1116 00:47:40,640 --> 00:47:44,640 the vending may be coming from that. You 1117 00:47:42,640 --> 00:47:47,599 want to put inverter one in both AC 1118 00:47:44,640 --> 00:47:49,440 buses, ECOM and Capcom, let's do it. The 1119 00:47:47,599 --> 00:47:51,119 idea was simple. One inverter could 1120 00:47:49,440 --> 00:47:53,200 power both buses, and they could use 1121 00:47:51,119 --> 00:47:55,280 that to power the gauges on AC bus 2 1122 00:47:53,200 --> 00:47:56,800 that are now offline. This would supply 1123 00:47:55,280 --> 00:47:58,480 power to the gauges inside of the 1124 00:47:56,800 --> 00:48:00,800 cryotanks, and that would allow the crew 1125 00:47:58,480 --> 00:48:02,720 to read the tank's real pressures. 13 1126 00:48:00,800 --> 00:48:04,880 Houston, uh, we need to get some more 1127 00:48:02,720 --> 00:48:07,920 instrumentation up. We'd like you to put 1128 00:48:04,880 --> 00:48:10,880 inverter one on both AC buses. Over. 1129 00:48:07,920 --> 00:48:13,440 Okay, you got inverter one on both AC 1130 00:48:10,880 --> 00:48:15,760 buses now. Telmu and control from 1131 00:48:13,440 --> 00:48:17,440 flight. Go flight. Will you take a look 1132 00:48:15,760 --> 00:48:18,720 at your pre-launch data and go through 1133 00:48:17,440 --> 00:48:20,400 your system? See if there's anything 1134 00:48:18,720 --> 00:48:23,280 you've got that may have started vending 1135 00:48:20,400 --> 00:48:24,800 here. Roger. Flat. Okay. And I want to 1136 00:48:23,280 --> 00:48:28,720 report in that in about the next 15 1137 00:48:24,800 --> 00:48:30,559 minutes. Quick look type stuff. Okay. 1138 00:48:28,720 --> 00:48:33,520 Flight photo. Go photo. We're definitely 1139 00:48:30,559 --> 00:48:36,079 seeing a vent in the data. Okay. And 1140 00:48:33,520 --> 00:48:38,240 have you got any thrusters firing? We're 1141 00:48:36,079 --> 00:48:40,400 looking at that C3 thruster flight that 1142 00:48:38,240 --> 00:48:42,960 looks like it stays on most of the time. 1143 00:48:40,400 --> 00:48:44,480 Well, can we turn them all off and see 1144 00:48:42,960 --> 00:48:46,079 if we still got the rates or any build 1145 00:48:44,480 --> 00:48:47,599 up in rates? Well, the rate that we're 1146 00:48:46,079 --> 00:48:49,359 seeing is opposite to the direction of 1147 00:48:47,599 --> 00:48:51,280 that thruster. So, if anything, it's 1148 00:48:49,359 --> 00:48:53,359 just trying to hold and not quite up to 1149 00:48:51,280 --> 00:48:55,800 it. Okay. But he's been trying to 1150 00:48:53,359 --> 00:48:58,880 counteract the rates with 1151 00:48:55,800 --> 00:49:02,079 direct. He's been getting a negative 1152 00:48:58,880 --> 00:49:03,839 pitch and a negative roll. Okay. But he 1153 00:49:02,079 --> 00:49:06,880 asked if we were getting some thruster 1154 00:49:03,839 --> 00:49:10,880 firings that were not being made by him. 1155 00:49:06,880 --> 00:49:12,559 I'll tell you what, uh, GNC, can you get 1156 00:49:10,880 --> 00:49:14,400 somebody in the back room to try to 1157 00:49:12,559 --> 00:49:17,359 figure out what the equivalent delta V 1158 00:49:14,400 --> 00:49:19,599 is we're getting so that we can see if 1159 00:49:17,359 --> 00:49:21,359 we can backtrack to see if we can figure 1160 00:49:19,599 --> 00:49:23,839 out what's venting. You come from 1161 00:49:21,359 --> 00:49:25,599 flight. What did uh, okay, you got two 1162 00:49:23,839 --> 00:49:29,000 good AC buses. What did all that tell 1163 00:49:25,599 --> 00:49:31,599 you now? It it tells me that 1164 00:49:29,000 --> 00:49:34,000 uh, well, just give me about two more 1165 00:49:31,599 --> 00:49:36,240 minutes, fly. Okay, take your time. 1166 00:49:34,000 --> 00:49:37,520 Okay, 13. Uh we've got lots and lots of 1167 00:49:36,240 --> 00:49:40,079 people working on this. We'll get you 1168 00:49:37,520 --> 00:49:42,240 some uh dope as soon as we have it and 1169 00:49:40,079 --> 00:49:45,040 you'll be the first one to know. Yeah, 1170 00:49:42,240 --> 00:49:46,960 the uh crew did report they removed fuel 1171 00:49:45,040 --> 00:49:48,880 cell 3. They open circuited it also, 1172 00:49:46,960 --> 00:49:50,640 didn't they? I don't believe so. Fuel 1173 00:49:48,880 --> 00:49:52,800 cell one and fuel cell 3 should be open 1174 00:49:50,640 --> 00:49:55,680 circuited. Uh we just had our last call 1175 00:49:52,800 --> 00:49:57,760 for fuel cell one open circuit and uh we 1176 00:49:55,680 --> 00:49:59,119 left fuel cell 3 as it was. Well, let's 1177 00:49:57,760 --> 00:50:01,200 take this open circuit fuel cell three. 1178 00:49:59,119 --> 00:50:03,280 Open circuit fuel cell 3. Get it off the 1179 00:50:01,200 --> 00:50:04,720 bus. We got to worry about getting some 1180 00:50:03,280 --> 00:50:07,119 power on main B to get the pressure back 1181 00:50:04,720 --> 00:50:08,400 up. No two tank one. Roger. Flight ECOM. 1182 00:50:07,119 --> 00:50:10,000 Go ECOM. Let's have him isol isolate the 1183 00:50:08,400 --> 00:50:12,559 search tank also and save it. We use the 1184 00:50:10,000 --> 00:50:15,359 cryo as much as we can. Uh, say that 1185 00:50:12,559 --> 00:50:17,920 again. Let's isolate the surge tank 1186 00:50:15,359 --> 00:50:19,359 command module. I don't understand that 1187 00:50:17,920 --> 00:50:21,599 sign. I don't want to I want to use the 1188 00:50:19,359 --> 00:50:23,119 cryo as much as possible. But that would 1189 00:50:21,599 --> 00:50:25,200 seem to be the opposite. If you want to 1190 00:50:23,119 --> 00:50:27,520 keep the fuel cell going, the surge tank 1191 00:50:25,200 --> 00:50:29,599 is an oxygen tank located inside of the 1192 00:50:27,520 --> 00:50:31,359 command module. The crew needs to use 1193 00:50:29,599 --> 00:50:33,440 this for re-entry with Earth after 1194 00:50:31,359 --> 00:50:35,280 separation from the service module. In 1195 00:50:33,440 --> 00:50:36,880 emergency cases like this one, it can 1196 00:50:35,280 --> 00:50:38,640 supply oxygen to other parts of the 1197 00:50:36,880 --> 00:50:40,960 spacecraft, like the fuel cells to keep 1198 00:50:38,640 --> 00:50:42,720 them alive, which is currently doing. An 1199 00:50:40,960 --> 00:50:44,559 incredible amount of foresight is used 1200 00:50:42,720 --> 00:50:46,480 to make the call to isolate the tank in 1201 00:50:44,559 --> 00:50:48,319 order to save the oxygen for re-entry, 1202 00:50:46,480 --> 00:50:50,160 but ensuring the imminent death of the 1203 00:50:48,319 --> 00:50:52,240 spacecraft's only remaining source of 1204 00:50:50,160 --> 00:50:54,559 electricity. The fuel cells are fed off 1205 00:50:52,240 --> 00:50:56,079 the uh the tanks in the service module 1206 00:50:54,559 --> 00:50:58,640 flight. The search tank is in the 1207 00:50:56,079 --> 00:51:00,400 command module. 1208 00:50:58,640 --> 00:51:03,280 We want to save the surge tank and which 1209 00:51:00,400 --> 00:51:06,319 we need for entry. Okay, I'm with you. 1210 00:51:03,280 --> 00:51:09,040 I'm with you. Roger. Capcom, let's also 1211 00:51:06,319 --> 00:51:11,920 isolate the surge tank. Okay, you want 1212 00:51:09,040 --> 00:51:13,040 to isolate the surge tank. Yeah, O2 1213 00:51:11,920 --> 00:51:14,800 surge tank. Right. Yeah. What we're 1214 00:51:13,040 --> 00:51:17,839 really doing is securing our entry 1215 00:51:14,800 --> 00:51:21,359 systems right now. 13 Houston, we'd like 1216 00:51:17,839 --> 00:51:24,000 you to isolate your O2 surge tank. Over. 1217 00:51:21,359 --> 00:51:26,160 Surge tank off now. Jack, flight econom. 1218 00:51:24,000 --> 00:51:28,160 Go. Ecom. Okay, since O2 tank one 1219 00:51:26,160 --> 00:51:30,640 heaters are on main A and we've got them 1220 00:51:28,160 --> 00:51:34,359 off now, uh we'll be able to stay in the 1221 00:51:30,640 --> 00:51:37,440 5 amps uh temporarily uh for a manual 1222 00:51:34,359 --> 00:51:40,800 pressurization, let's uh have them turn 1223 00:51:37,440 --> 00:51:43,280 the heaters on manually. O2 tank one and 1224 00:51:40,800 --> 00:51:45,119 we'll watch the pressure tank one. A 1225 00:51:43,280 --> 00:51:46,720 heater is activated inside of oxygen 1226 00:51:45,119 --> 00:51:48,720 tank one in hopes of raising its 1227 00:51:46,720 --> 00:51:51,280 pressures and helping the fuel cells. 1228 00:51:48,720 --> 00:51:53,839 Capcom, we want to get cryo2 tank number 1229 00:51:51,280 --> 00:51:56,000 one heater on. Roger. We copy them and 1230 00:51:53,839 --> 00:51:58,640 uh we'd like to build up the pressure in 1231 00:51:56,000 --> 00:52:00,000 O2 tank one. So uh turn the heaters on 1232 00:51:58,640 --> 00:52:03,040 manually. We'll watch the pressure for 1233 00:52:00,000 --> 00:52:07,760 you. You can stand the 5 amps on main A. 1234 00:52:03,040 --> 00:52:09,440 That's we think so. Flight. Okay. Uh 1235 00:52:07,760 --> 00:52:11,760 we're going to get a main bus under 1236 00:52:09,440 --> 00:52:13,599 probably. Roger. Uh we realize that uh 1237 00:52:11,760 --> 00:52:18,079 we feel we can stand five more amps on 1238 00:52:13,599 --> 00:52:20,800 it. Okay. Uh he tanks on. Did you see 1239 00:52:18,079 --> 00:52:23,680 your 5 amp increase in current? That's 1240 00:52:20,800 --> 00:52:26,559 firm flight. Okay. 26.7 volts. Looks 1241 00:52:23,680 --> 00:52:29,280 good. We'll watch the pressure. 1242 00:52:26,559 --> 00:52:31,839 Flight ECOM. Go ahead. Ecom. Uh, I want 1243 00:52:29,280 --> 00:52:33,839 the fans on and uh O2 tank one. We're 1244 00:52:31,839 --> 00:52:36,079 not seeing a pressure increase. We can 1245 00:52:33,839 --> 00:52:37,920 stand it. You can stand it. That's fair. 1246 00:52:36,079 --> 00:52:39,280 Ground control can see the power is 1247 00:52:37,920 --> 00:52:40,800 being used by the heaters, but the 1248 00:52:39,280 --> 00:52:43,119 pressure doesn't increase in the tanks 1249 00:52:40,800 --> 00:52:44,559 like they were expecting. The cryofans 1250 00:52:43,119 --> 00:52:47,280 are activated to try to get a better 1251 00:52:44,559 --> 00:52:49,200 reading on that tank. 13 Houston. Uh, 1252 00:52:47,280 --> 00:52:52,559 we'd like you to additionally bring on 1253 00:52:49,200 --> 00:52:54,559 the fans in O2 tank one. And uh we can 1254 00:52:52,559 --> 00:52:56,880 stand the additional amperage on that. 1255 00:52:54,559 --> 00:52:58,559 Okay. Flight ECOM. Go ahead. Ecom. The 1256 00:52:56,880 --> 00:53:00,319 pressure in O2 tank one is all the way 1257 00:52:58,559 --> 00:53:01,960 down to 297. You better think about 1258 00:53:00,319 --> 00:53:04,240 getting in the limb or using the limb 1259 00:53:01,960 --> 00:53:05,440 systems. I'm going to have to power way 1260 00:53:04,240 --> 00:53:07,200 down. I don't know if I'm going to be 1261 00:53:05,440 --> 00:53:09,760 able to save the O2 for the third fuel 1262 00:53:07,200 --> 00:53:12,160 cell for fuel cell 2 rather. Tell me you 1263 00:53:09,760 --> 00:53:13,520 from flight. Go ahead. Flight. I want 1264 00:53:12,160 --> 00:53:16,040 you to get some guys figuring out 1265 00:53:13,520 --> 00:53:19,040 minimum power in the limb to sustain 1266 00:53:16,040 --> 00:53:20,480 life. Roger. Okay. Everything that 1267 00:53:19,040 --> 00:53:22,240 ground control tries to raise the 1268 00:53:20,480 --> 00:53:24,480 pressure in the working oxygen tank 1269 00:53:22,240 --> 00:53:26,000 fails. The gauges that they had powered 1270 00:53:24,480 --> 00:53:27,440 up in that tank are reading that it has 1271 00:53:26,000 --> 00:53:29,760 been rapidly draining since the 1272 00:53:27,440 --> 00:53:31,599 explosion. They begin to calculate how 1273 00:53:29,760 --> 00:53:34,040 long their oxygen supply will last under 1274 00:53:31,599 --> 00:53:37,280 these conditions. Uh Jack, looking 1275 00:53:34,040 --> 00:53:39,760 outside, the number of particles has 1276 00:53:37,280 --> 00:53:42,160 diminished greatly almost ceased now, 1277 00:53:39,760 --> 00:53:44,880 which indicates maybe what it was ving 1278 00:53:42,160 --> 00:53:47,359 has almost stopped. 1279 00:53:44,880 --> 00:53:49,280 Roger Jack. Thank you. We copy. Any more 1280 00:53:47,359 --> 00:53:52,480 suggestions on trying to pump up O2 tank 1281 00:53:49,280 --> 00:53:54,960 one pressure? No. 1282 00:53:52,480 --> 00:53:58,960 Uh, flight, we're going to hit 100 PSI 1283 00:53:54,960 --> 00:54:00,960 in an hour and 54 minutes. 1284 00:53:58,960 --> 00:54:03,200 That's the end right there. The command 1285 00:54:00,960 --> 00:54:05,440 service module's oxygen system requires 1286 00:54:03,200 --> 00:54:07,440 a pressure of at least 100 PSI to 1287 00:54:05,440 --> 00:54:09,359 function properly. If the oxygen 1288 00:54:07,440 --> 00:54:11,280 pressure goes below that threshold, the 1289 00:54:09,359 --> 00:54:12,960 fuel cells stop working altogether. 1290 00:54:11,280 --> 00:54:15,599 Flight from flight. Go ahead, slide. 1291 00:54:12,960 --> 00:54:17,200 Whatever planning you do, I want to do 1292 00:54:15,599 --> 00:54:19,359 assuming that we're going around the 1293 00:54:17,200 --> 00:54:21,359 moon and we're using the limb for 1294 00:54:19,359 --> 00:54:22,880 performing the maneuver because in the 1295 00:54:21,359 --> 00:54:24,160 present configuration, unless we get a 1296 00:54:22,880 --> 00:54:26,359 heck of a lot smarter, I think we're 1297 00:54:24,160 --> 00:54:29,680 wasting our time planning and using the 1298 00:54:26,359 --> 00:54:32,079 SPS. Okay, flight. So, I think all of 1299 00:54:29,680 --> 00:54:36,160 our return to Earth type planning should 1300 00:54:32,079 --> 00:54:37,480 be assuming the uh use of the lamb dips 1301 00:54:36,160 --> 00:54:40,319 and or 1302 00:54:37,480 --> 00:54:42,480 RCS and I think third priority down the 1303 00:54:40,319 --> 00:54:44,640 line should be CSM RCS. Okay. And I'm 1304 00:54:42,480 --> 00:54:46,720 assuming you'd want fastest possible 1305 00:54:44,640 --> 00:54:49,200 return. 1306 00:54:46,720 --> 00:54:50,720 Uh yeah, I think that's the case. Okay, 1307 00:54:49,200 --> 00:54:52,559 we'll we'll work on it from that 1308 00:54:50,720 --> 00:54:54,319 sideline flight. Should be no problem. 1309 00:54:52,559 --> 00:54:56,559 The flight director does not like the 1310 00:54:54,319 --> 00:54:58,400 idea of firing the service module's main 1311 00:54:56,559 --> 00:54:59,839 engine. They could tell whatever was 1312 00:54:58,400 --> 00:55:01,359 causing these issues came from the 1313 00:54:59,839 --> 00:55:03,119 service module, and its effects were 1314 00:55:01,359 --> 00:55:05,280 severe enough that firing the engine in 1315 00:55:03,119 --> 00:55:07,680 a now unknown state carried significant 1316 00:55:05,280 --> 00:55:09,440 risk. If the engine or parts of its 1317 00:55:07,680 --> 00:55:11,040 nozzle were punctured, the main engine 1318 00:55:09,440 --> 00:55:13,040 could now be another bomb just waiting 1319 00:55:11,040 --> 00:55:14,800 to go off. The difficulty of starting 1320 00:55:13,040 --> 00:55:16,720 the service module's engine and guidance 1321 00:55:14,800 --> 00:55:19,119 system in a now powered down state added 1322 00:55:16,720 --> 00:55:20,800 to the uncertainty. The safest possible 1323 00:55:19,119 --> 00:55:23,280 option was switching entirely to using 1324 00:55:20,800 --> 00:55:25,040 the lunar module. It has its own oxygen, 1325 00:55:23,280 --> 00:55:27,680 electrical, and guidance systems, and 1326 00:55:25,040 --> 00:55:29,200 most importantly, its own engine. Ground 1327 00:55:27,680 --> 00:55:30,880 control's new task was to use an 1328 00:55:29,200 --> 00:55:32,640 emergency protocol designed for the 1329 00:55:30,880 --> 00:55:34,240 failure of the service propulsion system 1330 00:55:32,640 --> 00:55:35,920 engine as a guide to power up and 1331 00:55:34,240 --> 00:55:38,079 maneuver the lunar module with the 1332 00:55:35,920 --> 00:55:40,559 command service module still attached. 1333 00:55:38,079 --> 00:55:43,720 Flight Ecom, go ahead. Ecom. Okay, 1334 00:55:40,559 --> 00:55:48,160 listen. There is a possibility that we 1335 00:55:43,720 --> 00:55:50,160 blew a O2 line in one of the fuel cells 1336 00:55:48,160 --> 00:55:54,720 and it's effectively manifolded there. 1337 00:55:50,160 --> 00:55:56,559 Of course, now I'm I want to shut off 1338 00:55:54,720 --> 00:55:58,640 one of the re the reactant valves to one 1339 00:55:56,559 --> 00:56:02,079 of the fuel cells, and that would be 1340 00:55:58,640 --> 00:56:05,839 fuel cell 3 since its O2 pressure is 1341 00:56:02,079 --> 00:56:09,040 gone. Now, fuel cell one's O2 pressure 1342 00:56:05,839 --> 00:56:13,640 is trying to stay up there at 45 PSI. 1343 00:56:09,040 --> 00:56:14,880 Maybe the problem is in fuel cell 3. 1344 00:56:13,640 --> 00:56:16,559 [Music] 1345 00:56:14,880 --> 00:56:18,720 That sounds like a good assumption right 1346 00:56:16,559 --> 00:56:21,520 there. Yeah, fuel cell 3 is lost anyway 1347 00:56:18,720 --> 00:56:23,440 as far as flight GNC. Go GNC. Turn 1348 00:56:21,520 --> 00:56:25,200 Charlie one thruster off. You want to 1349 00:56:23,440 --> 00:56:26,400 turn Charlie one off? Why? Well, it 1350 00:56:25,200 --> 00:56:30,040 looks like we're getting a lot of firing 1351 00:56:26,400 --> 00:56:34,079 out of for no reason. Okay, Capcom, 1352 00:56:30,040 --> 00:56:35,839 recommend thruster C12 off. Excuse me, 1353 00:56:34,079 --> 00:56:39,040 Fred. I'd like to butt in here a minute. 1354 00:56:35,839 --> 00:56:41,119 We'd like to have thruster C1 off. C1 is 1355 00:56:39,040 --> 00:56:43,280 off. ECOM from flight. You want to shut 1356 00:56:41,119 --> 00:56:45,680 off both reactant valves to fuel cell 1357 00:56:43,280 --> 00:56:47,760 number anyway. Flight. Okay. and the 1358 00:56:45,680 --> 00:56:50,400 inline heaters off in fuel cells one and 1359 00:56:47,760 --> 00:56:53,040 three, please. What we're proposing 1360 00:56:50,400 --> 00:56:54,960 supposing here, Capcom, is we may have a 1361 00:56:53,040 --> 00:56:56,160 had some problem in fuel cell number 1362 00:56:54,960 --> 00:56:58,799 three since that's the one that's 1363 00:56:56,160 --> 00:57:02,799 reading no O2 right now and we may be 1364 00:56:58,799 --> 00:57:04,799 losing our O2 through fuel cell uh 1365 00:57:02,799 --> 00:57:06,839 number three, the O2 manifold and as 1366 00:57:04,799 --> 00:57:11,079 much as they're manifolded together 1367 00:57:06,839 --> 00:57:13,760 commonly. Uh looks like the O2 and fuel 1368 00:57:11,079 --> 00:57:15,200 cell one and two seem to be trying to 1369 00:57:13,760 --> 00:57:17,040 stay up there. 1370 00:57:15,200 --> 00:57:19,760 and fuel cell three looks like it's the 1371 00:57:17,040 --> 00:57:22,799 oddball here. Capcom, let's close the 1372 00:57:19,760 --> 00:57:25,599 reactant valve to fuel cell number 1373 00:57:22,799 --> 00:57:29,040 three. Okay, close reactant valve to 1374 00:57:25,599 --> 00:57:31,599 fuel cell number three. And um you're 1375 00:57:29,040 --> 00:57:32,960 saying that one and two look okay? Well, 1376 00:57:31,599 --> 00:57:34,319 what it looks like looks like the 1377 00:57:32,960 --> 00:57:35,680 pressure is trying to stay up there. And 1378 00:57:34,319 --> 00:57:38,000 this is the best guess we've got right 1379 00:57:35,680 --> 00:57:39,680 now because we got to stop this O2 flow. 1380 00:57:38,000 --> 00:57:42,160 Okay, 13, this is Houston. And it 1381 00:57:39,680 --> 00:57:45,839 appears to us that we're losing O2 flow 1382 00:57:42,160 --> 00:57:48,000 through uh fuel cell 3. So uh we want 1383 00:57:45,839 --> 00:57:49,920 you to close the react valve on fuel 1384 00:57:48,000 --> 00:57:51,839 cell 3. It looks like fuel cell one and 1385 00:57:49,920 --> 00:57:53,680 two are trying to hold up. Okay. Most of 1386 00:57:51,839 --> 00:57:55,280 ground control's attention is focused on 1387 00:57:53,680 --> 00:57:57,440 stopping the remaining tank from losing 1388 00:57:55,280 --> 00:57:58,960 the rest of its breathable oxygen. They 1389 00:57:57,440 --> 00:58:00,880 tried shutting off the valves that lead 1390 00:57:58,960 --> 00:58:02,319 to the fuel cells in case the oxygen had 1391 00:58:00,880 --> 00:58:04,319 been leaking through them, among other 1392 00:58:02,319 --> 00:58:06,160 measures. What they didn't know is that 1393 00:58:04,319 --> 00:58:08,079 these attempts would be entirely futile 1394 00:58:06,160 --> 00:58:10,240 in stopping the remaining oxygen tank 1395 00:58:08,079 --> 00:58:12,319 from completely draining. The tank that 1396 00:58:10,240 --> 00:58:14,000 had exploded was located right next to 1397 00:58:12,319 --> 00:58:15,599 the now draining tank. And somewhere 1398 00:58:14,000 --> 00:58:17,440 within the pipe work leaning from that 1399 00:58:15,599 --> 00:58:19,760 tank, something had been jolted far 1400 00:58:17,440 --> 00:58:21,520 enough to break a seal or a pipe open. 1401 00:58:19,760 --> 00:58:23,839 The venting was the crew seeing their 1402 00:58:21,520 --> 00:58:26,880 own oxygen from the only tank left in 1403 00:58:23,839 --> 00:58:28,640 the service module. Flight GNC. Go DNC. 1404 00:58:26,880 --> 00:58:31,040 More jet reconfiguration to see if we 1405 00:58:28,640 --> 00:58:32,640 can hold the attitude. Okay. Like to 1406 00:58:31,040 --> 00:58:33,920 turn Charlie 2 off. Why are we 1407 00:58:32,640 --> 00:58:35,520 interested in holding attitude? If we're 1408 00:58:33,920 --> 00:58:36,640 not venting, why not drift for a while? 1409 00:58:35,520 --> 00:58:38,079 It'd probably be better from a 1410 00:58:36,640 --> 00:58:39,520 standpoint of thermal control anyway, 1411 00:58:38,079 --> 00:58:41,119 wouldn't it? Well, I think we'd like to 1412 00:58:39,520 --> 00:58:42,960 get into a control drift rather than 1413 00:58:41,119 --> 00:58:45,040 just some random thing like that. ECOM, 1414 00:58:42,960 --> 00:58:47,839 have you deduced anything? Have you seen 1415 00:58:45,040 --> 00:58:50,000 your uh reactant valves go off? Have you 1416 00:58:47,839 --> 00:58:51,599 seen flow cease? 1417 00:58:50,000 --> 00:58:57,000 You can't tell. Flight knew they were 1418 00:58:51,599 --> 00:58:57,000 open circuited and the pressure uh 1419 00:58:57,200 --> 00:59:02,160 still appears to be going down. Yeah. 1420 00:59:00,400 --> 00:59:04,160 Okay, flight, we have our checkpoint. 1421 00:59:02,160 --> 00:59:06,480 Okay, all flight controllers, I'd 1422 00:59:04,160 --> 00:59:07,920 suggest you start handing over because I 1423 00:59:06,480 --> 00:59:10,000 think a fresh team is probably going to 1424 00:59:07,920 --> 00:59:12,000 be thinking clearer. I think the rest of 1425 00:59:10,000 --> 00:59:13,839 us can continue working in some other 1426 00:59:12,000 --> 00:59:16,720 function in support of the new team 1427 00:59:13,839 --> 00:59:18,720 coming on. Okay. Uh, let me go back over 1428 00:59:16,720 --> 00:59:21,680 this again. We're heading over to Glenn. 1429 00:59:18,720 --> 00:59:23,520 I'd suggest the white team goes back and 1430 00:59:21,680 --> 00:59:24,799 starts going through the Dlog of the 1431 00:59:23,520 --> 00:59:26,160 data. In other words, let's see if we 1432 00:59:24,799 --> 00:59:27,680 can go back to the initial conditions 1433 00:59:26,160 --> 00:59:28,960 and work in that problem to see if we 1434 00:59:27,680 --> 00:59:30,480 can find out what happened and we may 1435 00:59:28,960 --> 00:59:32,480 find some better clues as to what to do 1436 00:59:30,480 --> 00:59:33,920 and let the French guys come on and try 1437 00:59:32,480 --> 00:59:35,359 to figure out where do we go from here. 1438 00:59:33,920 --> 00:59:37,520 The scheduled time for the ground 1439 00:59:35,359 --> 00:59:39,119 control crew switch over had arrived. 1440 00:59:37,520 --> 00:59:40,480 Although the currently serving white 1441 00:59:39,119 --> 00:59:42,400 team would have to run the incoming 1442 00:59:40,480 --> 00:59:44,000 black team through a lot of information, 1443 00:59:42,400 --> 00:59:45,520 having a fresh pair of eyes look over 1444 00:59:44,000 --> 00:59:47,280 the problems could help reveal other 1445 00:59:45,520 --> 00:59:48,799 issues they had missed. The white team 1446 00:59:47,280 --> 00:59:50,480 would continue to help troubleshoot in 1447 00:59:48,799 --> 00:59:52,160 the background. Ecom, I don't like the 1448 00:59:50,480 --> 00:59:53,200 way that O2 pressure is going down. If 1449 00:59:52,160 --> 00:59:54,799 you want to do something about these 1450 00:59:53,200 --> 00:59:56,400 other reactant valves, let's make up our 1451 00:59:54,799 --> 00:59:59,040 mind. 1452 00:59:56,400 --> 01:00:01,760 Go ahead. Okay. On the reaction for fuel 1453 00:59:59,040 --> 01:00:03,200 cell one, uh seems to me we have no 1454 01:00:01,760 --> 01:00:05,440 choice but to go ahead and do it. The 1455 01:00:03,200 --> 01:00:07,520 pressure continues to drop. Uh we're not 1456 01:00:05,440 --> 01:00:10,000 going to have anything left soon anyway. 1457 01:00:07,520 --> 01:00:12,240 So, uh it looks like the next best thing 1458 01:00:10,000 --> 01:00:15,200 to try is to go ahead and uh turn the 1459 01:00:12,240 --> 01:00:18,240 reactions off on fuel cell one. And 1460 01:00:15,200 --> 01:00:20,880 Houston 132 tank pressure number one is 1461 01:00:18,240 --> 01:00:22,240 less than 300 now. 1462 01:00:20,880 --> 01:00:24,079 Roger. Are we seeing that? We confirm 1463 01:00:22,240 --> 01:00:25,920 it. Yeah, we copy that. Tell them we're 1464 01:00:24,079 --> 01:00:28,240 debating shutting off the reactants on 1465 01:00:25,920 --> 01:00:29,920 one flight. Go ahead. The temperature is 1466 01:00:28,240 --> 01:00:32,480 the only thing we have. And is it 1467 01:00:29,920 --> 01:00:33,760 correlate? Pretty closely. You're saying 1468 01:00:32,480 --> 01:00:35,040 then that I'm looking at a valid 1469 01:00:33,760 --> 01:00:36,720 pressure in that tank and it's still 1470 01:00:35,040 --> 01:00:38,880 going down. That's what it looks like. 1471 01:00:36,720 --> 01:00:41,200 Therefore, therefore, we need to go to 1472 01:00:38,880 --> 01:00:43,040 fuel cell one and uh turn off the 1473 01:00:41,200 --> 01:00:46,400 reactants. Capcom, fuel cell one 1474 01:00:43,040 --> 01:00:48,720 reactants because because the tank one 1475 01:00:46,400 --> 01:00:50,000 is still going down. Pressure and temp 1476 01:00:48,720 --> 01:00:54,079 pressure going down. Temperature 1477 01:00:50,000 --> 01:00:55,680 confirms it. Okay. 13 Houston, we're 1478 01:00:54,079 --> 01:00:58,400 going to have to have you uh go through 1479 01:00:55,680 --> 01:01:02,640 the shutdown procedure on fuel cell one. 1480 01:00:58,400 --> 01:01:05,440 Our O2 uh pressure is going down as you 1481 01:01:02,640 --> 01:01:07,280 note and the temperature confirms it. 1482 01:01:05,440 --> 01:01:09,520 Okay, Jack. We're proceeding with a 1483 01:01:07,280 --> 01:01:11,040 shutdown procedure for fuel cell one 1484 01:01:09,520 --> 01:01:12,960 flight. Go ahead. Fine. Does the 1485 01:01:11,040 --> 01:01:14,640 temperature in tank 2 correspond to the 1486 01:01:12,960 --> 01:01:18,160 pressure reading? Let me see how close 1487 01:01:14,640 --> 01:01:20,720 it is. Fine. Fight. Go. temperature and 1488 01:01:18,160 --> 01:01:22,400 the pressure correspond. They're 1489 01:01:20,720 --> 01:01:24,640 verifying that the pressure is reading 1490 01:01:22,400 --> 01:01:26,880 right in tank two. That's right. Fine. 1491 01:01:24,640 --> 01:01:29,680 Tank two. Okay. Now, is it possible that 1492 01:01:26,880 --> 01:01:32,079 we still have that tank and it's good 1493 01:01:29,680 --> 01:01:35,359 and we could somehow get power on B and 1494 01:01:32,079 --> 01:01:36,880 use it? It's not likely. Flight not. 1495 01:01:35,359 --> 01:01:39,280 What's not likely, Clint? It's not 1496 01:01:36,880 --> 01:01:41,920 likely to be able to uh actually have 1497 01:01:39,280 --> 01:01:44,000 anything left in the tank. 1498 01:01:41,920 --> 01:01:46,079 You don't think so? I don't think so. 1499 01:01:44,000 --> 01:01:47,599 But let's we'll pulse that one, too. All 1500 01:01:46,079 --> 01:01:49,200 right. Let me get you a time. It look 1501 01:01:47,599 --> 01:01:52,720 like we've got on tank one here. All 1502 01:01:49,200 --> 01:01:54,960 right. Uh tell me your flight. Go fly. 1503 01:01:52,720 --> 01:01:57,920 Is there anything uh simple that we can 1504 01:01:54,960 --> 01:01:59,839 refer the crew to uh to get them 1505 01:01:57,920 --> 01:02:01,720 thinking about using the limb here? Have 1506 01:01:59,839 --> 01:02:04,240 you got anything in the checklist 1507 01:02:01,720 --> 01:02:06,400 paperwork to describe to them what your 1508 01:02:04,240 --> 01:02:08,319 intentions are? Negative. There's 1509 01:02:06,400 --> 01:02:09,520 nothing documented in contingency. We're 1510 01:02:08,319 --> 01:02:12,000 thinking about using the limb as 1511 01:02:09,520 --> 01:02:13,839 lifeboat. We have some procedures here 1512 01:02:12,000 --> 01:02:15,280 on the ground though. I'm sure you do. 1513 01:02:13,839 --> 01:02:18,559 What do they amount to? flying with the 1514 01:02:15,280 --> 01:02:20,640 tunnel open. Uh, roj. Uh, just a limb, 1515 01:02:18,559 --> 01:02:22,240 low power load supplying power to the 1516 01:02:20,640 --> 01:02:25,280 CSM. 1517 01:02:22,240 --> 01:02:30,480 Supplying power to the CSM. Yes. About 5 1518 01:02:25,280 --> 01:02:33,480 amps. Uh, to what? To their main bus. 1519 01:02:30,480 --> 01:02:35,839 Okay. Where? Well, main B is in bad 1520 01:02:33,480 --> 01:02:37,760 shape. We don't have anything on main B 1521 01:02:35,839 --> 01:02:40,720 right now. What's that power for? Tell 1522 01:02:37,760 --> 01:02:43,599 me. Just anything they might need for 1523 01:02:40,720 --> 01:02:47,359 Okay, Jack. It looks like O2 tank one 1524 01:02:43,599 --> 01:02:49,040 pressure is just a hair over 200. We 1525 01:02:47,359 --> 01:02:51,119 confirm that here. And the temperature 1526 01:02:49,040 --> 01:02:53,280 also confirms it. Okay. Does it look 1527 01:02:51,119 --> 01:02:56,079 like it's still going down? It's uh 1528 01:02:53,280 --> 01:02:59,440 slowly going to zero and uh we're 1529 01:02:56,079 --> 01:03:01,520 starting to think about lamb lifeboat. 1530 01:02:59,440 --> 01:03:03,040 Go ahead. Okay. Got an update on the 1531 01:03:01,520 --> 01:03:05,040 time. Look like we got about 18 minutes 1532 01:03:03,040 --> 01:03:06,640 until we get down to 100 PSI and that's 1533 01:03:05,040 --> 01:03:08,720 sort of the cut off point. All right. 1534 01:03:06,640 --> 01:03:10,240 But we're charging battery A. Well, that 1535 01:03:08,720 --> 01:03:11,920 doesn't mean much in 18 minutes though, 1536 01:03:10,240 --> 01:03:14,880 but we're doing all we can do. All 1537 01:03:11,920 --> 01:03:17,280 right. Uh, econ flight. Quite fine. Let 1538 01:03:14,880 --> 01:03:19,760 me try one more time. Is it possible 1539 01:03:17,280 --> 01:03:23,760 that if we got power to main B that we 1540 01:03:19,760 --> 01:03:25,960 could get tank 2 powered up and up in 1541 01:03:23,760 --> 01:03:29,680 pressure? We don't feel like that's a 1542 01:03:25,960 --> 01:03:31,440 possibility. We might conceive power. We 1543 01:03:29,680 --> 01:03:33,520 don't feel like we can get anything out 1544 01:03:31,440 --> 01:03:35,760 of tank two. Okay. Now, why is that? 1545 01:03:33,520 --> 01:03:37,359 Tell me why. I'm just because the 1546 01:03:35,760 --> 01:03:40,880 numbers we're looking at indicate that 1547 01:03:37,359 --> 01:03:44,400 it's essentially uh uh ambient. All 1548 01:03:40,880 --> 01:03:46,559 gone. Uh econ flight go. How long have 1549 01:03:44,400 --> 01:03:48,160 we got now on the cell? Last count had 1550 01:03:46,559 --> 01:03:50,079 18 minutes. Let me get an update. Okay. 1551 01:03:48,160 --> 01:03:52,559 Tell me what do we got to do to power up 1552 01:03:50,079 --> 01:03:54,480 to get some comm. Okay. We got a 1553 01:03:52,559 --> 01:03:56,240 procedure here that gets power first on 1554 01:03:54,480 --> 01:03:57,440 the limb. We figure we've got about 15 1555 01:03:56,240 --> 01:03:59,680 minutes worth of power left in the 1556 01:03:57,440 --> 01:04:01,440 command module. So we want you to start 1557 01:03:59,680 --> 01:04:04,319 uh getting over in the limb and getting 1558 01:04:01,440 --> 01:04:06,960 some power on that. This is Apollo 1559 01:04:04,319 --> 01:04:07,960 control at 57 hours 46 minutes ground 1560 01:04:06,960 --> 01:04:10,160 elapse 1561 01:04:07,960 --> 01:04:12,799 time. The black team of flight 1562 01:04:10,160 --> 01:04:14,480 controllers is now on station in mission 1563 01:04:12,799 --> 01:04:17,200 control center looking at possible 1564 01:04:14,480 --> 01:04:19,440 alternate missions as we have an 1565 01:04:17,200 --> 01:04:21,960 apparent serious oxygen leak in the 1566 01:04:19,440 --> 01:04:24,400 cryogenic oxygen in the service 1567 01:04:21,960 --> 01:04:27,520 module. And now in the process of 1568 01:04:24,400 --> 01:04:30,480 powering down the command module. Less 1569 01:04:27,520 --> 01:04:32,920 than 15 minutes remaining of uh 1570 01:04:30,480 --> 01:04:36,160 electrical power to the 1571 01:04:32,920 --> 01:04:38,079 CSM. Sometime later in the mission uh it 1572 01:04:36,160 --> 01:04:40,640 is expected that they would return to 1573 01:04:38,079 --> 01:04:42,160 the free return trajectory which they 1574 01:04:40,640 --> 01:04:45,599 left yesterday in the midcourse 1575 01:04:42,160 --> 01:04:49,039 correction burn number two. 1576 01:04:45,599 --> 01:04:52,559 returning to the uh alternate mission 1577 01:04:49,039 --> 01:04:56,200 now being considered at this point uh in 1578 01:04:52,559 --> 01:04:59,599 the trans lunar coast. It is 1579 01:04:56,200 --> 01:05:01,280 cheaper and swifter to coast on around 1580 01:04:59,599 --> 01:05:04,559 the moon and come back to Earth than it 1581 01:05:01,280 --> 01:05:08,079 is to do a deep space abort. Continuing 1582 01:05:04,559 --> 01:05:10,079 to monitor air ground from Apollo 13. 1583 01:05:08,079 --> 01:05:11,760 This is Apollo control. Both oxygen 1584 01:05:10,079 --> 01:05:13,599 tanks failing in the service module 1585 01:05:11,760 --> 01:05:16,240 meant the death of all three of its fuel 1586 01:05:13,599 --> 01:05:18,000 cells as well. With less than 15 minutes 1587 01:05:16,240 --> 01:05:20,640 of electricity remaining, the decision 1588 01:05:18,000 --> 01:05:22,640 is made to power up the lunar module. 1589 01:05:20,640 --> 01:05:24,559 The crew would tap into the oxygen tanks 1590 01:05:22,640 --> 01:05:26,480 and batteries inside of the lunar module 1591 01:05:24,559 --> 01:05:28,319 intended to keep a crew of two people 1592 01:05:26,480 --> 01:05:30,559 alive on the surface of the moon for 2 1593 01:05:28,319 --> 01:05:33,280 days. It now needed to keep a crew of 1594 01:05:30,559 --> 01:05:34,960 three alive for four. All three fuel 1595 01:05:33,280 --> 01:05:36,559 cells failing meant that the crew would 1596 01:05:34,960 --> 01:05:38,240 have significantly less water and 1597 01:05:36,559 --> 01:05:40,240 electricity than planned for the rest of 1598 01:05:38,240 --> 01:05:41,760 the mission. The crew would soon begin 1599 01:05:40,240 --> 01:05:44,319 to struggle with their short supply of 1600 01:05:41,760 --> 01:05:46,720 both of these resources as a result. And 1601 01:05:44,319 --> 01:05:48,559 uh Jack, have you all got good limb data 1602 01:05:46,720 --> 01:05:50,319 down there now? That's affirmative, 1603 01:05:48,559 --> 01:05:51,920 Fred. We're getting good LEM data. Okay, 1604 01:05:50,319 --> 01:05:53,920 everybody. Look, we got a number of long 1605 01:05:51,920 --> 01:05:56,400 range problems right now. We have the 1606 01:05:53,920 --> 01:05:59,520 burn to do, which is at about 79 hours, 1607 01:05:56,400 --> 01:06:00,880 28 hours from now. But right now, I want 1608 01:05:59,520 --> 01:06:02,559 the guys here in the room to concentrate 1609 01:06:00,880 --> 01:06:04,000 on keeping this thing right now going 1610 01:06:02,559 --> 01:06:07,680 along. All right. And watch it. This is 1611 01:06:04,000 --> 01:06:10,559 Apollo control. 58 hours 46 minutes 1612 01:06:07,680 --> 01:06:12,960 ground elapse time. Love and haze still 1613 01:06:10,559 --> 01:06:16,000 powering up the lunar module in 1614 01:06:12,960 --> 01:06:20,079 preparation for uh what turns out to be 1615 01:06:16,000 --> 01:06:23,280 an alternate mission in which no lunar 1616 01:06:20,079 --> 01:06:25,039 landing will be possible. In about 20 1617 01:06:23,280 --> 01:06:26,880 minutes in the Houston news center, 1618 01:06:25,039 --> 01:06:28,400 there will be a press conference in the 1619 01:06:26,880 --> 01:06:30,319 small briefing room. A press conference 1620 01:06:28,400 --> 01:06:32,960 is held in order to inform the media of 1621 01:06:30,319 --> 01:06:34,160 the developing situation. The explosion 1622 01:06:32,960 --> 01:06:36,799 had turned this mission from a 1623 01:06:34,160 --> 01:06:38,640 littleknown event into a major fiasco. 1624 01:06:36,799 --> 01:06:40,480 The media and public would begin to tune 1625 01:06:38,640 --> 01:06:42,319 in and find out about the precarious 1626 01:06:40,480 --> 01:06:44,480 situation the crew now find themselves 1627 01:06:42,319 --> 01:06:46,559 in. Participants in the forthcoming 1628 01:06:44,480 --> 01:06:50,960 press conference uh within the next 15 1629 01:06:46,559 --> 01:06:53,359 minutes or so will be uh man spacecraft 1630 01:06:50,960 --> 01:06:56,400 center deputy director Christopher Craft 1631 01:06:53,359 --> 01:06:57,960 Jr. Apollo spacecraft program office 1632 01:06:56,400 --> 01:07:00,880 manager James A. 1633 01:06:57,960 --> 01:07:03,000 McDivet and MSC Director of Flight 1634 01:07:00,880 --> 01:07:04,960 Operations Sigard 1635 01:07:03,000 --> 01:07:06,880 Schoberg. This will be in the small 1636 01:07:04,960 --> 01:07:08,559 briefing room in the Houston News 1637 01:07:06,880 --> 01:07:10,640 Center. 1638 01:07:08,559 --> 01:07:11,680 I guess I I really there are a lot of 1639 01:07:10,640 --> 01:07:13,839 things that could have happened. It 1640 01:07:11,680 --> 01:07:15,200 would be just pure conjecture. Anything 1641 01:07:13,839 --> 01:07:16,240 that's down there that's pressurized 1642 01:07:15,200 --> 01:07:17,599 could have let go and there are all 1643 01:07:16,240 --> 01:07:19,920 kinds of pressurized things or 1644 01:07:17,599 --> 01:07:23,039 pressurized hydrogen, nitrogen, oxygen 1645 01:07:19,920 --> 01:07:25,760 fuel cells. A it's a very complicated 1646 01:07:23,039 --> 01:07:28,559 bay that that this happened in. Can you 1647 01:07:25,760 --> 01:07:30,799 get them back? Taking in consideration 1648 01:07:28,559 --> 01:07:32,880 all the imponderables, the the power, 1649 01:07:30,799 --> 01:07:34,559 the oxygen, the landing area and all 1650 01:07:32,880 --> 01:07:37,440 this sort of thing. Is this if the 1651 01:07:34,559 --> 01:07:39,440 situation remains stable as it is at the 1652 01:07:37,440 --> 01:07:42,000 moment, there's no question. But what we 1653 01:07:39,440 --> 01:07:43,920 have the thing under control and we can 1654 01:07:42,000 --> 01:07:45,200 return the crew safely to the Earth. 1655 01:07:43,920 --> 01:07:47,440 Now, we're going to have to make some 1656 01:07:45,200 --> 01:07:51,520 compromises and procedures as how you do 1657 01:07:47,440 --> 01:07:54,240 that. If everything remains as is uh we 1658 01:07:51,520 --> 01:07:56,960 can get them back successfully. Now if 1659 01:07:54,240 --> 01:07:59,359 there was some change in the status of 1660 01:07:56,960 --> 01:08:00,960 the lunar module then that might that 1661 01:07:59,359 --> 01:08:03,760 might mean something else and we will 1662 01:08:00,960 --> 01:08:05,760 keep you appraised of that situation. Uh 1663 01:08:03,760 --> 01:08:08,000 Jim, I'm not clear on what the vetting 1664 01:08:05,760 --> 01:08:10,799 did to the uh spacecraft's attitude and 1665 01:08:08,000 --> 01:08:13,680 pitch roll in your 1666 01:08:10,799 --> 01:08:16,719 Well, he had a negative pitch and a 1667 01:08:13,680 --> 01:08:17,920 negative roll and uh that's one of the 1668 01:08:16,719 --> 01:08:19,839 clues that we had that something 1669 01:08:17,920 --> 01:08:21,600 happened in bay 4 in addition to the 1670 01:08:19,839 --> 01:08:23,359 fact that we had all these other 1671 01:08:21,600 --> 01:08:24,960 anomalies to the equipment that's in 1672 01:08:23,359 --> 01:08:26,560 there. It meant that it was pitching 1673 01:08:24,960 --> 01:08:28,400 nose down and it was rolling to the 1674 01:08:26,560 --> 01:08:31,640 left. I think the other thing you have 1675 01:08:28,400 --> 01:08:34,400 to remember is that uh we have certain 1676 01:08:31,640 --> 01:08:36,480 instrumentation that uh we can believe 1677 01:08:34,400 --> 01:08:38,719 or not believe. I mean by that that when 1678 01:08:36,480 --> 01:08:41,120 you have something like this happen you 1679 01:08:38,719 --> 01:08:42,560 don't know that you're not reading false 1680 01:08:41,120 --> 01:08:44,400 information from some of the 1681 01:08:42,560 --> 01:08:47,440 instruments. So you have to look at 1682 01:08:44,400 --> 01:08:49,199 those and see how they failed etc and 1683 01:08:47,440 --> 01:08:50,799 see what the measurements are see which 1684 01:08:49,199 --> 01:08:52,640 direction they went when they began to 1685 01:08:50,799 --> 01:08:54,960 fail to see whether that you're reading 1686 01:08:52,640 --> 01:08:56,239 true information. 1687 01:08:54,960 --> 01:08:57,920 All right, this one and then we're going 1688 01:08:56,239 --> 01:09:00,319 to come back. All right. Uh Chris, could 1689 01:08:57,920 --> 01:09:03,359 you uh put this in a a somewhat larger 1690 01:09:00,319 --> 01:09:05,040 perspective? Uh it seems obviously that 1691 01:09:03,359 --> 01:09:07,679 if this happened on the way back, the 1692 01:09:05,040 --> 01:09:10,759 the situation would be critical. I mean, 1693 01:09:07,679 --> 01:09:12,880 would be fatal. Indeed, it would. You 1694 01:09:10,759 --> 01:09:16,040 discuss this thing from the standpoint 1695 01:09:12,880 --> 01:09:18,960 of uh the resources you're left 1696 01:09:16,040 --> 01:09:22,159 with when it fails at this point in the 1697 01:09:18,960 --> 01:09:23,679 mission. Well, and anytime uh that you 1698 01:09:22,159 --> 01:09:25,040 still have the lunar module in the 1699 01:09:23,679 --> 01:09:27,199 condition that we have it in in this 1700 01:09:25,040 --> 01:09:28,960 case where we've not used any of its 1701 01:09:27,199 --> 01:09:32,319 consumables, 1702 01:09:28,960 --> 01:09:33,839 uh then we're in a very good situation. 1703 01:09:32,319 --> 01:09:36,480 We've always called the lamb a good 1704 01:09:33,839 --> 01:09:38,640 lifeboat under those circumstances. If 1705 01:09:36,480 --> 01:09:41,279 at any time in the mission, however, the 1706 01:09:38,640 --> 01:09:44,719 limb had separated and we had gotten 1707 01:09:41,279 --> 01:09:47,600 ourselves into a rendevous situation or 1708 01:09:44,719 --> 01:09:50,000 uh the the command module being around 1709 01:09:47,600 --> 01:09:52,319 the moon, then what you state is 1710 01:09:50,000 --> 01:09:55,679 absolutely true. It would it would be a 1711 01:09:52,319 --> 01:09:57,440 fatal situation. 1712 01:09:55,679 --> 01:09:59,760 Um, I know it's probably a little 1713 01:09:57,440 --> 01:10:02,480 premature, but um, seeing they have had 1714 01:09:59,760 --> 01:10:06,239 a a rough time, have you worked out um, 1715 01:10:02,480 --> 01:10:09,040 any schedules for um, a sleep period for 1716 01:10:06,239 --> 01:10:10,640 any of the astronauts? 1717 01:10:09,040 --> 01:10:12,719 I think this is a little premature for 1718 01:10:10,640 --> 01:10:14,239 that. 1719 01:10:12,719 --> 01:10:16,640 Forgive me if I put you on the spot, but 1720 01:10:14,239 --> 01:10:18,239 how would you classify this situation as 1721 01:10:16,640 --> 01:10:19,920 regards to these that we are familiar 1722 01:10:18,239 --> 01:10:22,880 with a little Well, I' I'd say this is 1723 01:10:19,920 --> 01:10:27,239 as serious uh situation as we we have 1724 01:10:22,880 --> 01:10:27,239 ever had in man space flight. 1725 01:10:28,239 --> 01:10:32,320 Did the fact that you went into a hybrid 1726 01:10:30,159 --> 01:10:34,000 trajectory yesterday pulling you out of 1727 01:10:32,320 --> 01:10:35,920 free free return, is that going to cause 1728 01:10:34,000 --> 01:10:38,640 you any troubles in trying to get back 1729 01:10:35,920 --> 01:10:40,480 around the moon? 1730 01:10:38,640 --> 01:10:42,719 No. As I said earlier, we're not on a 1731 01:10:40,480 --> 01:10:44,320 free return right now, but it it it 1732 01:10:42,719 --> 01:10:46,239 would only take a maneuver of about 20 1733 01:10:44,320 --> 01:10:47,920 to 40 feet per second to get you back on 1734 01:10:46,239 --> 01:10:50,480 a free return. And that could be done in 1735 01:10:47,920 --> 01:10:52,239 say 5 or 10 hours from now. We're going 1736 01:10:50,480 --> 01:10:53,760 to continue to schedule these briefings 1737 01:10:52,239 --> 01:10:55,679 throughout the mission whenever there's 1738 01:10:53,760 --> 01:10:57,600 a point where we think interpretation 1739 01:10:55,679 --> 01:10:58,640 would help and uh we'll be back again. 1740 01:10:57,600 --> 01:10:59,500 But I think we ought to get back to 1741 01:10:58,640 --> 01:11:02,400 mission control. 1742 01:10:59,500 --> 01:11:04,340 [Music] 1743 01:11:02,400 --> 01:11:07,480 personal 1744 01:11:04,340 --> 01:11:12,000 [Music] 1745 01:11:07,480 --> 01:11:16,080 com to back up and recap the earlier 1746 01:11:12,000 --> 01:11:19,040 maneuver pad or information regarding a 1747 01:11:16,080 --> 01:11:21,679 descent propulsion system abort for a 1748 01:11:19,040 --> 01:11:24,239 minimum return time. 1749 01:11:21,679 --> 01:11:27,679 This maneuver, should it be done, would 1750 01:11:24,239 --> 01:11:30,960 come at 79 hours 25 minutes 26 seconds 1751 01:11:27,679 --> 01:11:35,280 ground elapse time at an altitude above 1752 01:11:30,960 --> 01:11:39,400 the moon at 205 nautical miles. 1753 01:11:35,280 --> 01:11:43,000 The maneuver would be uh 1754 01:11:39,400 --> 01:11:47,000 1,797.7 ft per second. Pausing 1755 01:11:43,000 --> 01:11:50,480 rate, burn time of 8 minutes 35 1756 01:11:47,000 --> 01:11:54,760 seconds would produce entry interface at 1757 01:11:50,480 --> 01:11:59,239 about uh 133 hours ground elapse 1758 01:11:54,760 --> 01:12:03,120 time. Apollo 13 is now 1759 01:11:59,239 --> 01:12:05,679 185,455 nautical miles out from Earth. 1760 01:12:03,120 --> 01:12:06,600 Velocity showing on the display here in 1761 01:12:05,679 --> 01:12:08,440 mission 1762 01:12:06,600 --> 01:12:12,239 control 1763 01:12:08,440 --> 01:12:15,120 3,118 ft pers. We're continuing to stand 1764 01:12:12,239 --> 01:12:17,120 by at 59 hours 53 minutes ground elapse 1765 01:12:15,120 --> 01:12:19,040 time. This is Apollo control. Ground 1766 01:12:17,120 --> 01:12:20,480 control begins calculating a single burn 1767 01:12:19,040 --> 01:12:22,239 that will speed up the spacecraft's 1768 01:12:20,480 --> 01:12:24,719 return journey and put it onto a free 1769 01:12:22,239 --> 01:12:26,800 return trajectory. The burn is planned 1770 01:12:24,719 --> 01:12:29,360 for 2 hours past the closest approach to 1771 01:12:26,800 --> 01:12:31,199 the moon. Okay, Houston and Aquarius, 1772 01:12:29,360 --> 01:12:33,760 how do you read? Hello there, Aquarius. 1773 01:12:31,199 --> 01:12:34,960 Loud and clear. Uh, how do you read me? 1774 01:12:33,760 --> 01:12:36,960 There's an awful lot of background. 1775 01:12:34,960 --> 01:12:39,120 Okay, we got a lot of background uh 1776 01:12:36,960 --> 01:12:41,600 static. Jack, you're down in the mud. 1777 01:12:39,120 --> 01:12:44,239 You having a ground problems? Uh, you're 1778 01:12:41,600 --> 01:12:46,480 unreadable, Jack. Uh, we got a signal 1779 01:12:44,239 --> 01:12:48,320 meter right now. It keeps wavering up 1780 01:12:46,480 --> 01:12:51,199 and down. The best I'm getting is about 1781 01:12:48,320 --> 01:12:53,679 2.4 AGC. The crew begins experiencing 1782 01:12:51,199 --> 01:12:55,679 another unexpected challenge. The lunar 1783 01:12:53,679 --> 01:12:57,520 module's communication systems use the 1784 01:12:55,679 --> 01:12:59,840 same frequency as the third stage, which 1785 01:12:57,520 --> 01:13:01,199 had been ejected earlier in the mission. 1786 01:12:59,840 --> 01:13:03,199 The third stage had the same 1787 01:13:01,199 --> 01:13:04,880 communication system as the lunar module 1788 01:13:03,199 --> 01:13:07,280 so that ground control could measure its 1789 01:13:04,880 --> 01:13:09,040 position in space. It had been intended 1790 01:13:07,280 --> 01:13:10,640 that the lunar module wouldn't have been 1791 01:13:09,040 --> 01:13:12,400 powered up before the crew got to the 1792 01:13:10,640 --> 01:13:14,360 moon, giving the third stage time to 1793 01:13:12,400 --> 01:13:16,640 crash into the moon and avoiding any 1794 01:13:14,360 --> 01:13:18,560 interference. The unexpected change in 1795 01:13:16,640 --> 01:13:20,640 plans, however, had the crew power up 1796 01:13:18,560 --> 01:13:22,320 the lunar module onto the same frequency 1797 01:13:20,640 --> 01:13:24,480 that the third stage had already been 1798 01:13:22,320 --> 01:13:25,840 using. This gave the crew great 1799 01:13:24,480 --> 01:13:28,159 difficulty in hearing the ground 1800 01:13:25,840 --> 01:13:30,880 control, although it was not impossible. 1801 01:13:28,159 --> 01:13:32,800 Flighting go. Go ahead. They're having 1802 01:13:30,880 --> 01:13:34,159 trouble grabbing a hold of the S4B to 1803 01:13:32,800 --> 01:13:35,920 push it out of the way is what the 1804 01:13:34,159 --> 01:13:37,440 problem is. Okay. Well, we had comm 1805 01:13:35,920 --> 01:13:38,560 before. Can we get back to there? What 1806 01:13:37,440 --> 01:13:40,960 we're trying to do, and we're not having 1807 01:13:38,560 --> 01:13:42,960 any luck, there is one suggestion we can 1808 01:13:40,960 --> 01:13:45,679 do. We can turn the limb transceiver 1809 01:13:42,960 --> 01:13:47,840 completely off for about 2 to 3 minutes 1810 01:13:45,679 --> 01:13:49,679 and let them grab a hold of the S4B, 1811 01:13:47,840 --> 01:13:52,880 push it out of the way, and then bring 1812 01:13:49,679 --> 01:13:54,800 it back up. 1813 01:13:52,880 --> 01:13:56,159 Is that what we have to do now? We can't 1814 01:13:54,800 --> 01:13:58,640 talk to them to tell them to do that. 1815 01:13:56,159 --> 01:14:00,800 That's right. But if we can get up for a 1816 01:13:58,640 --> 01:14:03,920 lap in here, just say turn your 1817 01:14:00,800 --> 01:14:07,440 transceiver off for 3 minutes, 1818 01:14:03,920 --> 01:14:09,199 then turn it back on and go flight. Go 1819 01:14:07,440 --> 01:14:11,280 ahead. Is that our best step now to get 1820 01:14:09,199 --> 01:14:12,880 combat? That's our best step, right? 1821 01:14:11,280 --> 01:14:14,320 Capcom, give him that. We'll try. He's 1822 01:14:12,880 --> 01:14:15,679 not going to hear your flight right now. 1823 01:14:14,320 --> 01:14:17,760 Ground control came up with an 1824 01:14:15,679 --> 01:14:19,600 interesting solution to this problem. 1825 01:14:17,760 --> 01:14:21,600 The frequency that the lunar module and 1826 01:14:19,600 --> 01:14:24,080 third stage used was not fixed like a 1827 01:14:21,600 --> 01:14:26,080 standard radio station. Instead, the 1828 01:14:24,080 --> 01:14:27,840 communication systems read the incoming 1829 01:14:26,080 --> 01:14:29,520 frequency from the ground stations on 1830 01:14:27,840 --> 01:14:32,600 Earth and transmitted a matching 1831 01:14:29,520 --> 01:14:35,120 frequency at a ratio of 240 to 1832 01:14:32,600 --> 01:14:36,800 221. This is done because the spacecraft 1833 01:14:35,120 --> 01:14:38,640 is moving away from the ground stations 1834 01:14:36,800 --> 01:14:40,239 with enough velocity that the Doppler 1835 01:14:38,640 --> 01:14:42,080 effect of the spacecraft's radio 1836 01:14:40,239 --> 01:14:44,480 transmissions can be used to measure its 1837 01:14:42,080 --> 01:14:46,560 velocity and distance. The ground 1838 01:14:44,480 --> 01:14:48,159 stations transmit a known frequency, and 1839 01:14:46,560 --> 01:14:50,159 the return frequency will differ 1840 01:14:48,159 --> 01:14:51,920 depending on how fast the spacecraft is 1841 01:14:50,159 --> 01:14:53,920 traveling. Ground control can measure 1842 01:14:51,920 --> 01:14:55,840 how far off the return frequency is to 1843 01:14:53,920 --> 01:14:58,000 Earth's transmitted frequency and gather 1844 01:14:55,840 --> 01:14:59,679 this useful information. By matching the 1845 01:14:58,000 --> 01:15:01,120 frequency that the spacecraft sees from 1846 01:14:59,679 --> 01:15:02,640 ground control, they can double the 1847 01:15:01,120 --> 01:15:04,080 effective distance of the Doppler 1848 01:15:02,640 --> 01:15:06,239 effect, giving them a more accurate 1849 01:15:04,080 --> 01:15:07,920 reading of the spacecraft's velocity. 1850 01:15:06,239 --> 01:15:09,840 They will use this feature to send a 1851 01:15:07,920 --> 01:15:12,239 signal to the third stage, dragging its 1852 01:15:09,840 --> 01:15:13,760 frequency away from the lunar modules. 1853 01:15:12,239 --> 01:15:15,600 In order for the lunar module's 1854 01:15:13,760 --> 01:15:17,520 communication systems to not also be 1855 01:15:15,600 --> 01:15:19,120 altered by this frequency change, ground 1856 01:15:17,520 --> 01:15:20,880 control asked the crew to switch off 1857 01:15:19,120 --> 01:15:23,040 their communication system for 3 1858 01:15:20,880 --> 01:15:24,080 minutes. Ground control knew the crew 1859 01:15:23,040 --> 01:15:26,239 got their message when their 1860 01:15:24,080 --> 01:15:27,600 communications turned off moments later. 1861 01:15:26,239 --> 01:15:29,440 This gave ground control their 1862 01:15:27,600 --> 01:15:31,440 opportunity to drag the frequency of the 1863 01:15:29,440 --> 01:15:33,840 third stage away and then lock back onto 1864 01:15:31,440 --> 01:15:35,600 the lunar module. With the radio 1865 01:15:33,840 --> 01:15:37,280 frequencies now far enough apart to 1866 01:15:35,600 --> 01:15:39,360 avoid interference, the important 1867 01:15:37,280 --> 01:15:41,440 communication issue was resolved. 1868 01:15:39,360 --> 01:15:43,520 Flighting go. 1869 01:15:41,440 --> 01:15:46,080 Go ahead. It looks like you got it. 1870 01:15:43,520 --> 01:15:48,000 Calm, Jack. Okay, everybody, let's be 1871 01:15:46,080 --> 01:15:49,520 quiet. We have calm. Hello there, 1872 01:15:48,000 --> 01:15:51,920 Aquarius. We got a lot of business to 1873 01:15:49,520 --> 01:15:53,600 do. Hello, Houston. Aquarius, how do you 1874 01:15:51,920 --> 01:15:56,000 read? Hello there, Aquarius. Loud and 1875 01:15:53,600 --> 01:15:57,520 clear. Help me now. Okay, we're reading 1876 01:15:56,000 --> 01:15:59,520 you loud and clear, Jack. I hope it 1877 01:15:57,520 --> 01:16:01,199 stays this time. Ground control had been 1878 01:15:59,520 --> 01:16:02,880 calculating the resources they would 1879 01:16:01,199 --> 01:16:05,679 have on the return journey given their 1880 01:16:02,880 --> 01:16:08,400 single plan burn at 79 hours. The 1881 01:16:05,679 --> 01:16:10,480 numbers that come back do not look good. 1882 01:16:08,400 --> 01:16:13,120 Unless major changes are made, the crew 1883 01:16:10,480 --> 01:16:14,640 will run out of water in 31 hours. With 1884 01:16:13,120 --> 01:16:17,280 their planned trajectory, it will take 1885 01:16:14,640 --> 01:16:19,040 over 70 to return to Earth. The decision 1886 01:16:17,280 --> 01:16:21,199 is made to shut down the primary 1887 01:16:19,040 --> 01:16:23,440 guidance and navigation system, a 1888 01:16:21,199 --> 01:16:25,120 computer that uses water to cool itself. 1889 01:16:23,440 --> 01:16:27,040 By shutting down the guidance computer, 1890 01:16:25,120 --> 01:16:28,800 the spacecraft will lose its orientation 1891 01:16:27,040 --> 01:16:30,800 in space, but conserve that crucial 1892 01:16:28,800 --> 01:16:32,640 water. Because of this, ground control 1893 01:16:30,800 --> 01:16:34,239 wants the crew to get into a free return 1894 01:16:32,640 --> 01:16:36,320 trajectory. Now, while the guidance 1895 01:16:34,239 --> 01:16:37,920 computer is still powered up, they plan 1896 01:16:36,320 --> 01:16:39,679 to shut off the computer after they 1897 01:16:37,920 --> 01:16:41,360 enter a free return trajectory, and they 1898 01:16:39,679 --> 01:16:42,800 will do a secondary burn after they've 1899 01:16:41,360 --> 01:16:44,960 rounded the moon to speed up their 1900 01:16:42,800 --> 01:16:47,199 return home. This new trajectory plan 1901 01:16:44,960 --> 01:16:49,120 was not without its own challenges. The 1902 01:16:47,199 --> 01:16:51,520 descent propulsion system on the lunar 1903 01:16:49,120 --> 01:16:54,000 module was only designed to be fired one 1904 01:16:51,520 --> 01:16:55,679 time. Now, they were planning two burns, 1905 01:16:54,000 --> 01:16:57,600 carrying significantly more weight, and 1906 01:16:55,679 --> 01:17:00,000 in a configuration that the lunar module 1907 01:16:57,600 --> 01:17:01,520 had not been designed for. The crew 1908 01:17:00,000 --> 01:17:03,280 would also be without their primary 1909 01:17:01,520 --> 01:17:05,280 guidance and navigation system during 1910 01:17:03,280 --> 01:17:06,880 their second burn. Plans were considered 1911 01:17:05,280 --> 01:17:08,719 in which the crew would eject their now 1912 01:17:06,880 --> 01:17:10,080 dead service module to save weight and 1913 01:17:08,719 --> 01:17:11,840 speed up the return, but this would 1914 01:17:10,080 --> 01:17:13,440 involve exposing the command module's 1915 01:17:11,840 --> 01:17:15,520 heat shield to deep space for an 1916 01:17:13,440 --> 01:17:17,840 extended period of time. Something it 1917 01:17:15,520 --> 01:17:19,880 had not been designed to do. Okay, we'd 1918 01:17:17,840 --> 01:17:23,440 like to brief you on uh what our plan 1919 01:17:19,880 --> 01:17:25,199 is. Uh we're at this time water critical 1920 01:17:23,440 --> 01:17:26,960 in the limb, so we'd like to use as 1921 01:17:25,199 --> 01:17:30,800 little as possible. To do this, we're 1922 01:17:26,960 --> 01:17:34,000 going to plan to make a free return uh 1923 01:17:30,800 --> 01:17:37,199 maneuver of 16 ft per second at 61 1924 01:17:34,000 --> 01:17:38,480 hours, which is 37 minutes from now. 1925 01:17:37,199 --> 01:17:41,600 Then we're going to power down the 1926 01:17:38,480 --> 01:17:44,000 pings. At 79 hours, we'll go ahead and 1927 01:17:41,600 --> 01:17:45,760 uh make another abort maneuver to kick 1928 01:17:44,000 --> 01:17:48,480 what we got. But we'd like to get that 1929 01:17:45,760 --> 01:17:50,960 pings powered down as soon as possible. 1930 01:17:48,480 --> 01:17:53,280 Okay, the only item on page 10 is to 1931 01:17:50,960 --> 01:17:55,600 deploy the landing gear. Okay, we'll do 1932 01:17:53,280 --> 01:17:57,920 that now. control. You want that done, 1933 01:17:55,600 --> 01:18:00,800 right? Affirmative. Okay, stand by for 1934 01:17:57,920 --> 01:18:03,840 landing gear. Okay, let's watch the pyro 1935 01:18:00,800 --> 01:18:07,120 and the landing gear there, gentlemen. 1936 01:18:03,840 --> 01:18:08,719 Okay, power firing. 1937 01:18:07,120 --> 01:18:10,320 Hey, looks like landing gear depart from 1938 01:18:08,719 --> 01:18:11,760 here. 1939 01:18:10,320 --> 01:18:14,760 Roger, Aquarius, and your go for the 1940 01:18:11,760 --> 01:18:14,760 burn. 1941 01:18:24,480 --> 01:18:27,679 Okay, Corish, you're looking 1942 01:18:29,480 --> 01:18:34,040 good. All shut down. 1943 01:18:35,040 --> 01:18:40,040 And Aquarius, for your information, uh, 1944 01:18:37,600 --> 01:18:44,719 we now have 136 mile 1945 01:18:40,040 --> 01:18:48,400 perigee confirmed by Doppler. Okay, 136 1946 01:18:44,719 --> 01:18:50,640 mile perigee now. That's very nice. Oh, 1947 01:18:48,400 --> 01:18:54,560 wait a minute. Uh, Jack, did you say uh 1948 01:18:50,640 --> 01:18:56,880 Parisian or Parisian? Parisian. 1949 01:18:54,560 --> 01:18:58,480 Ah, that's better. The emergency plan to 1950 01:18:56,880 --> 01:19:00,640 use the lunar module's engine had 1951 01:18:58,480 --> 01:19:02,560 worked. They're now on a free return to 1952 01:19:00,640 --> 01:19:04,239 trajectory. The crew shuts off the 1953 01:19:02,560 --> 01:19:05,920 guidance and navigation computer that 1954 01:19:04,239 --> 01:19:09,199 had been consuming their limited supply 1955 01:19:05,920 --> 01:19:12,000 of water. Okay, Jim. And uh looks like 1956 01:19:09,199 --> 01:19:15,520 what we have to do is uh in order to 1957 01:19:12,000 --> 01:19:19,040 maintain uh even heating, we just have 1958 01:19:15,520 --> 01:19:20,840 to yaw the whole machine about 90° per 1959 01:19:19,040 --> 01:19:22,800 hour in 1960 01:19:20,840 --> 01:19:24,800 increments. So we'll give you a call 1961 01:19:22,800 --> 01:19:26,400 when it's time to yaw 90°. Ground 1962 01:19:24,800 --> 01:19:28,159 control came up with a compromise for 1963 01:19:26,400 --> 01:19:30,000 the passive thermal control. The lunar 1964 01:19:28,159 --> 01:19:31,840 module had no procedures to be able to 1965 01:19:30,000 --> 01:19:33,040 set up a passive thermal control role, 1966 01:19:31,840 --> 01:19:34,800 but they could still orient the 1967 01:19:33,040 --> 01:19:37,040 spacecraft using the reaction control 1968 01:19:34,800 --> 01:19:38,960 thrusters. The plan was to periodically 1969 01:19:37,040 --> 01:19:40,800 rotate the entire spacecraft and then 1970 01:19:38,960 --> 01:19:42,400 hold that new attitude until their next 1971 01:19:40,800 --> 01:19:44,560 thermal control maneuver where they 1972 01:19:42,400 --> 01:19:46,159 would rotate again. It wouldn't be as 1973 01:19:44,560 --> 01:19:48,159 smooth as a normal passive thermal 1974 01:19:46,159 --> 01:19:49,840 control roll, but manually rotating the 1975 01:19:48,159 --> 01:19:51,840 spacecraft every once in a while would 1976 01:19:49,840 --> 01:19:55,199 have the same effect. To recap briefly 1977 01:19:51,840 --> 01:19:59,040 the situation with Apollo 13, uh the 1978 01:19:55,199 --> 01:20:01,840 crew in the last hour was uh passed up a 1979 01:19:59,040 --> 01:20:04,320 paracinthian plus 2 hours maneuver, 1980 01:20:01,840 --> 01:20:07,440 which actually is primarily a speed up 1981 01:20:04,320 --> 01:20:09,440 maneuver to uh get them back to Earth 1982 01:20:07,440 --> 01:20:11,440 somewhat earlier than the normal free 1983 01:20:09,440 --> 01:20:13,280 return would bring them. Although a free 1984 01:20:11,440 --> 01:20:15,280 return trajectory had been successfully 1985 01:20:13,280 --> 01:20:17,600 established, the crew was not out of the 1986 01:20:15,280 --> 01:20:19,360 woods. They still had one more burn 1987 01:20:17,600 --> 01:20:21,440 planned for two hours past the closest 1988 01:20:19,360 --> 01:20:23,440 approach to the moon. Right now, they're 1989 01:20:21,440 --> 01:20:26,320 on a trajectory to land in the Indian 1990 01:20:23,440 --> 01:20:28,159 Ocean 76 hours from now. This posed 1991 01:20:26,320 --> 01:20:29,920 complications with recovery considering 1992 01:20:28,159 --> 01:20:31,840 the intended landing site was planned to 1993 01:20:29,920 --> 01:20:34,000 be the Pacific Ocean on the opposite 1994 01:20:31,840 --> 01:20:35,920 side of the planet. With water 1995 01:20:34,000 --> 01:20:37,600 consumption at an absolute minimum, the 1996 01:20:35,920 --> 01:20:40,239 crew was still projected to run out of 1997 01:20:37,600 --> 01:20:42,159 water 5 hours before landing. This burn 1998 01:20:40,239 --> 01:20:44,159 would speed up their return, landing 10 1999 01:20:42,159 --> 01:20:45,679 hours sooner. Landing sooner would help 2000 01:20:44,159 --> 01:20:47,120 their water supply issue and meant that 2001 01:20:45,679 --> 01:20:48,960 the Earth would be in a different point 2002 01:20:47,120 --> 01:20:51,199 in its rotation, placing the landing 2003 01:20:48,960 --> 01:20:53,120 point for Apollo 13 conveniently right 2004 01:20:51,199 --> 01:20:54,800 back in the Pacific Ocean. They would 2005 01:20:53,120 --> 01:20:57,280 spend most of their time preparing for 2006 01:20:54,800 --> 01:20:58,880 this burn. Extreme measures are taken in 2007 01:20:57,280 --> 01:21:01,199 order to conserve the lunar module's 2008 01:20:58,880 --> 01:21:03,040 limited resources. One of those measures 2009 01:21:01,199 --> 01:21:05,520 is to switch off the lunar module's 2010 01:21:03,040 --> 01:21:07,280 radio amplifier. This helps conserve 2011 01:21:05,520 --> 01:21:09,600 electricity at the cost of making their 2012 01:21:07,280 --> 01:21:11,600 communications with Earth far noisier. 2013 01:21:09,600 --> 01:21:13,679 Under usual circumstances, each crew 2014 01:21:11,600 --> 01:21:15,679 member would be drinking about 30 ounces 2015 01:21:13,679 --> 01:21:18,960 of water per day. They would need to 2016 01:21:15,679 --> 01:21:21,440 reduce their intake to just six, 1/5 of 2017 01:21:18,960 --> 01:21:23,440 their normal amount. The moon is tidily 2018 01:21:21,440 --> 01:21:25,920 locked with Earth, meaning only one side 2019 01:21:23,440 --> 01:21:28,560 will ever be shown to us. Today, the 2020 01:21:25,920 --> 01:21:30,320 crew of Apollo 13 will join an extremely 2021 01:21:28,560 --> 01:21:32,159 small group of people who have seen the 2022 01:21:30,320 --> 01:21:34,560 far side of the moon with their own 2023 01:21:32,159 --> 01:21:37,520 eyes. They will also be able to see the 2024 01:21:34,560 --> 01:21:39,520 moon surface in detail from just 164 mi 2025 01:21:37,520 --> 01:21:42,080 away. The crew prepares their film and 2026 01:21:39,520 --> 01:21:44,159 color cameras to capture this flyby. The 2027 01:21:42,080 --> 01:21:46,560 spacecraft is now well within the moon's 2028 01:21:44,159 --> 01:21:48,400 sphere of influence. The film 2029 01:21:46,560 --> 01:21:50,159 photographs the crew manages to capture 2030 01:21:48,400 --> 01:21:52,400 from the far side of the moon show its 2031 01:21:50,159 --> 01:21:53,840 craters in incredible detail. This is 2032 01:21:52,400 --> 01:21:55,280 only tempered by the fact they'd be 2033 01:21:53,840 --> 01:21:57,840 preparing to land there had the 2034 01:21:55,280 --> 01:21:59,920 explosion not happened yet. 2035 01:21:57,840 --> 01:22:02,000 Because of the unusual situation and 2036 01:21:59,920 --> 01:22:03,679 trajectory of this mission, Apollo 13 2037 01:22:02,000 --> 01:22:05,560 would set the record for the furthest 2038 01:22:03,679 --> 01:22:08,199 distance humans have ever been from 2039 01:22:05,560 --> 01:22:11,679 Earth. 2040 01:22:08,199 --> 01:22:15,120 249,25 mi, a record that still stands to 2041 01:22:11,679 --> 01:22:17,760 this day. Apollo control Houston, 77 2042 01:22:15,120 --> 01:22:21,040 hours 38 minutes into the flight, Apollo 2043 01:22:17,760 --> 01:22:22,800 13 uh has now rounded the corner, headed 2044 01:22:21,040 --> 01:22:26,040 back towards Earth. Uh we show a 2045 01:22:22,800 --> 01:22:29,760 velocity of a velocity of 2046 01:22:26,040 --> 01:22:30,840 7,62 ft/s and a distance from the moon 2047 01:22:29,760 --> 01:22:33,159 of 2048 01:22:30,840 --> 01:22:37,360 566 nautical 2049 01:22:33,159 --> 01:22:40,639 miles. We presently show Apollo 13 1,7 2050 01:22:37,360 --> 01:22:42,719 nautical miles away from the moon. Its 2051 01:22:40,639 --> 01:22:46,719 velocity slowing down now relative to 2052 01:22:42,719 --> 01:22:50,080 the moon now reading 6399 ft per second. 2053 01:22:46,719 --> 01:22:52,080 Apollo control Houston 77 hours 52 2054 01:22:50,080 --> 01:22:54,239 minutes now into the flight. We show 5 2055 01:22:52,080 --> 01:22:56,560 minutes away now from time of predicted 2056 01:22:54,239 --> 01:22:58,080 impact of the S4B. The third stage's 2057 01:22:56,560 --> 01:23:00,199 collision course with the moon ends with 2058 01:22:58,080 --> 01:23:03,159 an impact on the lunar surface traveling 2059 01:23:00,199 --> 01:23:06,239 2.58 km per 2060 01:23:03,159 --> 01:23:07,400 second. This leaves a 30 m wide crater 2061 01:23:06,239 --> 01:23:09,760 in the lunar 2062 01:23:07,400 --> 01:23:11,840 surface. The energy from this impact 2063 01:23:09,760 --> 01:23:14,000 rings the moon like a bell. A 2064 01:23:11,840 --> 01:23:16,080 seismometer placed 5 months earlier by 2065 01:23:14,000 --> 01:23:19,520 Apollo 12 picks up the seismic waves 2066 01:23:16,080 --> 01:23:21,360 from the impact 85 m away. This provides 2067 01:23:19,520 --> 01:23:23,840 data about both the moon's composition 2068 01:23:21,360 --> 01:23:25,360 and calibration of the seismometer. This 2069 01:23:23,840 --> 01:23:27,920 is one of the few scientific goals 2070 01:23:25,360 --> 01:23:29,679 Apollo 13 would be able to accomplish. 2071 01:23:27,920 --> 01:23:32,679 Oh yeah. 2072 01:23:29,679 --> 01:23:36,920 Yeah. We're no longer 135 2073 01:23:32,679 --> 01:23:36,920 miles. We're leaving. 2074 01:23:37,360 --> 01:23:42,000 It is now 2 hours past the closest 2075 01:23:39,520 --> 01:23:44,400 approach to the moon. The time for the 2076 01:23:42,000 --> 01:23:47,280 second lunar module burn had arrived. 2077 01:23:44,400 --> 01:23:49,280 The first burn lasted for 14 seconds. 2078 01:23:47,280 --> 01:23:52,159 This one will last for 4 and a half 2079 01:23:49,280 --> 01:23:54,000 minutes. Speeding up by a planned 861 ft 2080 01:23:52,159 --> 01:23:57,040 per second. Jim, you are go for the 2081 01:23:54,000 --> 01:23:58,639 burn. Go for the burn. Roger. Go for the 2082 01:23:57,040 --> 01:24:01,280 burn. 2083 01:23:58,639 --> 01:24:04,080 Less than 30 seconds away. The engine is 2084 01:24:01,280 --> 01:24:04,080 armed. Standing 2085 01:24:05,480 --> 01:24:11,840 by. Ground confirms ignition. 2086 01:24:09,840 --> 01:24:12,610 40%. 2087 01:24:11,840 --> 01:24:14,360 Houston 2088 01:24:12,610 --> 01:24:16,920 [Music] 2089 01:24:14,360 --> 01:24:20,840 copies. Attitude looks good at this 2090 01:24:16,920 --> 01:24:22,760 point. Brethren, Houston, you're looking 2091 01:24:20,840 --> 01:24:26,840 good. 2092 01:24:22,760 --> 01:24:29,520 Rider, one minute now into the 2093 01:24:26,840 --> 01:24:30,920 burn. Yips is looking good. 2 minutes 2094 01:24:29,520 --> 01:24:33,639 into the 2095 01:24:30,920 --> 01:24:35,960 burn. Fresh. You were looking good at 2 2096 01:24:33,639 --> 01:24:39,520 minutes. Still looking 2097 01:24:35,960 --> 01:24:42,880 good. Roger. Velocity building up. Uh, 2098 01:24:39,520 --> 01:24:45,360 disc shows we've gained 451 ft per 2099 01:24:42,880 --> 01:24:47,520 second at this time. 2100 01:24:45,360 --> 01:24:50,639 The on board display shows less than a 2101 01:24:47,520 --> 01:24:50,639 minute to go in the burn 2102 01:24:50,920 --> 01:24:56,600 now. Coming up on four minutes into the 2103 01:24:53,600 --> 01:24:56,600 burn. 2104 01:24:57,360 --> 01:25:02,320 Shut down. Roger. Shutdown. 2105 01:25:00,480 --> 01:25:04,880 That was Commander Jim Levelville 2106 01:25:02,320 --> 01:25:07,360 reporting shutdown. The engine is off. 2107 01:25:04,880 --> 01:25:10,159 We're at 79 hours 32 minutes into the 2108 01:25:07,360 --> 01:25:12,239 flight. I say that was a good burn. The 2109 01:25:10,159 --> 01:25:14,159 second burn was successful. The return 2110 01:25:12,239 --> 01:25:16,560 to Earth will now be 10 hours sooner. 2111 01:25:14,159 --> 01:25:18,320 and in a much better place for recovery. 2112 01:25:16,560 --> 01:25:20,000 Although the crew had enough oxygen to 2113 01:25:18,320 --> 01:25:22,080 breathe in, what they were breathing out 2114 01:25:20,000 --> 01:25:24,400 would start to be more of a concern. The 2115 01:25:22,080 --> 01:25:26,159 lunar module's smaller lithium hydroxide 2116 01:25:24,400 --> 01:25:28,639 canisters were designed to scrub the 2117 01:25:26,159 --> 01:25:30,480 carbon dioxide of two people. With 2118 01:25:28,639 --> 01:25:32,320 three, the levels of carbon dioxide 2119 01:25:30,480 --> 01:25:34,000 slowly rise within the spacecraft and 2120 01:25:32,320 --> 01:25:35,920 would reach dangerous levels if nothing 2121 01:25:34,000 --> 01:25:37,440 is changed. Ground control had been 2122 01:25:35,920 --> 01:25:39,280 aware of this issue since they had shut 2123 01:25:37,440 --> 01:25:40,719 down the larger CO2 scrubbers in the 2124 01:25:39,280 --> 01:25:43,360 command module, which were designed to 2125 01:25:40,719 --> 01:25:45,520 support three people. Fortunately, both 2126 01:25:43,360 --> 01:25:47,360 scrubbers worked in the same way. By 2127 01:25:45,520 --> 01:25:49,520 dragging carbon dioxide over lithium 2128 01:25:47,360 --> 01:25:51,760 hydroxide canisters, the chemicals would 2129 01:25:49,520 --> 01:25:54,080 react with the CO2, trapping it, letting 2130 01:25:51,760 --> 01:25:55,760 cleaner air pass through. This would 2131 01:25:54,080 --> 01:25:57,520 gradually scrub the CO2 from the 2132 01:25:55,760 --> 01:26:00,239 spacecraft's atmosphere, making it safe 2133 01:25:57,520 --> 01:26:02,320 to breathe. Unfortunately, the canisters 2134 01:26:00,239 --> 01:26:04,239 are different shapes. The command 2135 01:26:02,320 --> 01:26:05,920 module's canisters are large cubes, 2136 01:26:04,239 --> 01:26:08,159 while the canisters on the lunar module 2137 01:26:05,920 --> 01:26:10,400 are cylindrical and smaller. They are 2138 01:26:08,159 --> 01:26:11,920 not compatible with each other. Ground 2139 01:26:10,400 --> 01:26:13,520 control knew this would be an issue and 2140 01:26:11,920 --> 01:26:15,440 had been working on a solution to be 2141 01:26:13,520 --> 01:26:17,360 able to use the command module's larger 2142 01:26:15,440 --> 01:26:19,440 CO2 scrubber in place of the lunar 2143 01:26:17,360 --> 01:26:21,760 module's smaller one. They would need to 2144 01:26:19,440 --> 01:26:24,159 build an airtight adapter using only the 2145 01:26:21,760 --> 01:26:28,000 resources on board to fit a square peg 2146 01:26:24,159 --> 01:26:31,280 into a round hole. Okay, Houston, we 2147 01:26:28,000 --> 01:26:34,639 just got a mass alarm and ECS light. I 2148 01:26:31,280 --> 01:26:37,040 take it the partial pressure CO2 is 2149 01:26:34,639 --> 01:26:41,280 Yeah, that's what tripped it. Uh, chorus 2150 01:26:37,040 --> 01:26:43,120 Houston, say again. CO2. The CO2 inside 2151 01:26:41,280 --> 01:26:44,719 the spacecraft has reached a high enough 2152 01:26:43,120 --> 01:26:47,520 concentration to start setting off 2153 01:26:44,719 --> 01:26:50,400 alarms. The master alarm on the CO2 2154 01:26:47,520 --> 01:26:53,040 canister was expected to occur at some 2155 01:26:50,400 --> 01:26:56,440 point in the flight, the return flight. 2156 01:26:53,040 --> 01:26:56,440 There she goes. 2157 01:26:59,199 --> 01:27:03,120 This is Apollo control at 83 hours 11 2158 01:27:01,840 --> 01:27:05,679 minutes. 2159 01:27:03,120 --> 01:27:08,840 A change of shift press briefing is 2160 01:27:05,679 --> 01:27:12,400 being planned uh to begin in about 10 2161 01:27:08,840 --> 01:27:15,120 minutes at 12:35 a.m. in the main 2162 01:27:12,400 --> 01:27:16,800 auditorium at the Houston News Center. 2163 01:27:15,120 --> 01:27:19,600 The participants in the press conference 2164 01:27:16,800 --> 01:27:22,719 will be flight team flight director Jean 2165 01:27:19,600 --> 01:27:24,800 Cray and astronaut Tony England. Could 2166 01:27:22,719 --> 01:27:27,280 we have a rather detailed explanation of 2167 01:27:24,800 --> 01:27:29,679 the tests that were run in the 2168 01:27:27,280 --> 01:27:33,000 simulations with the lithium hydroxide 2169 01:27:29,679 --> 01:27:37,360 canisters and a description of 2170 01:27:33,000 --> 01:27:40,159 how this hose is being attached or will 2171 01:27:37,360 --> 01:27:42,000 be attached to a canister and 2172 01:27:40,159 --> 01:27:43,440 particularly what hose that is, where 2173 01:27:42,000 --> 01:27:45,360 does it come from and what's going 2174 01:27:43,440 --> 01:27:46,800 through it. 2175 01:27:45,360 --> 01:27:48,320 He brought you over one of our 2176 01:27:46,800 --> 01:27:50,679 canisters. 2177 01:27:48,320 --> 01:27:53,120 This is our 2178 01:27:50,679 --> 01:27:57,280 mailbox. As you know, we use the lithium 2179 01:27:53,120 --> 01:27:59,719 hydroxide to scrub CO2 out of the 2180 01:27:57,280 --> 01:28:02,480 spacecraft 2181 01:27:59,719 --> 01:28:05,080 atmosphere. Okay, I'll uh talk more 2182 01:28:02,480 --> 01:28:07,760 directly into it. 2183 01:28:05,080 --> 01:28:11,679 Uh we have a limited amount of lithium 2184 01:28:07,760 --> 01:28:14,159 hydroxide in the limb and uh it would 2185 01:28:11,679 --> 01:28:15,920 relieve a lot of the pressure on the 2186 01:28:14,159 --> 01:28:17,840 environmental control system if we could 2187 01:28:15,920 --> 01:28:19,480 use some of the canisters lithium 2188 01:28:17,840 --> 01:28:23,520 hydroxide canisters from the command 2189 01:28:19,480 --> 01:28:26,000 module. So we actually Jim Corelli over 2190 01:28:23,520 --> 01:28:28,239 in uh crew support division who designed 2191 01:28:26,000 --> 01:28:30,400 this thing and I it does an excellent 2192 01:28:28,239 --> 01:28:32,800 job. 2193 01:28:30,400 --> 01:28:35,520 What we do is we use the suit loop in 2194 01:28:32,800 --> 01:28:38,480 the limb and this is the scavenging 2195 01:28:35,520 --> 01:28:41,520 hose, the uh the exhaust hose if you 2196 01:28:38,480 --> 01:28:43,600 will from the suit and we just put the 2197 01:28:41,520 --> 01:28:45,600 lithium hydroxide canister on the end of 2198 01:28:43,600 --> 01:28:50,159 it. And it's not so easy to fasten on 2199 01:28:45,600 --> 01:28:51,560 there. Uh we've used a a data card out 2200 01:28:50,159 --> 01:28:55,440 of the flight 2201 01:28:51,560 --> 01:28:58,159 plan to make a structure so that the the 2202 01:28:55,440 --> 01:29:01,040 the plastic cover here won't collapse on 2203 01:28:58,159 --> 01:29:02,719 the end of the hose. The canister itself 2204 01:29:01,040 --> 01:29:05,199 is coated with Teflon and none of our 2205 01:29:02,719 --> 01:29:08,239 flight tape would stick to it. So, he 2206 01:29:05,199 --> 01:29:11,199 designed sort of a a a grid system that 2207 01:29:08,239 --> 01:29:14,480 goes around it uh that uh allows us to 2208 01:29:11,199 --> 01:29:16,400 fasten things to it. And we've had one 2209 01:29:14,480 --> 01:29:18,800 of these running for about 3 hours over 2210 01:29:16,400 --> 01:29:20,960 in the 11T chamber and crew systems. And 2211 01:29:18,800 --> 01:29:23,120 it uh all indications are that it's 2212 01:29:20,960 --> 01:29:25,520 doing the job. 2213 01:29:23,120 --> 01:29:27,280 I understand that we have about 16 2214 01:29:25,520 --> 01:29:28,960 cartridges in the command module and 2215 01:29:27,280 --> 01:29:31,040 each one will have a lifetime about 12 2216 01:29:28,960 --> 01:29:32,880 hours and we'll be running two at a 2217 01:29:31,040 --> 01:29:35,920 time, one on each of the suit loops in 2218 01:29:32,880 --> 01:29:39,360 the limb. Uh we were told before the 2219 01:29:35,920 --> 01:29:41,840 burn that uh uh two people would be in 2220 01:29:39,360 --> 01:29:45,199 the uh limb and one would be in the 2221 01:29:41,840 --> 01:29:47,040 command module. And later on I got a u 2222 01:29:45,199 --> 01:29:48,480 part of a quote which seems to indicate 2223 01:29:47,040 --> 01:29:50,800 that maybe that wasn't the case. His 2224 01:29:48,480 --> 01:29:52,480 quote was, "He's the only CMP that's 2225 01:29:50,800 --> 01:29:54,800 ever witnessed a dips burn sitting on 2226 01:29:52,480 --> 01:29:57,440 the ascent engine can," which would lead 2227 01:29:54,800 --> 01:29:58,960 one to believe that uh all three of them 2228 01:29:57,440 --> 01:30:01,440 were in the limb at the time of the 2229 01:29:58,960 --> 01:30:03,679 burn. Yeah, this is a uh interesting 2230 01:30:01,440 --> 01:30:06,480 item. Uh yeah, all three crew members 2231 01:30:03,679 --> 01:30:10,880 were in the LM at the time of the burn 2232 01:30:06,480 --> 01:30:16,080 and we had uh computed our dips gimbal 2233 01:30:10,880 --> 01:30:17,520 trim position for the uh uh man in the 2234 01:30:16,080 --> 01:30:21,400 command and service module spacecraft 2235 01:30:17,520 --> 01:30:24,560 which caused a center of gravity 2236 01:30:21,400 --> 01:30:26,639 uh movement that caused the engine 2237 01:30:24,560 --> 01:30:29,120 gimbals to compensate for the fact he 2238 01:30:26,639 --> 01:30:31,199 was in there. So, we saw that excursion 2239 01:30:29,120 --> 01:30:34,880 and then once we found out that uh yeah, 2240 01:30:31,199 --> 01:30:37,760 we had a CMP in the uh LEM spacecraft, 2241 01:30:34,880 --> 01:30:41,040 we knew why the excursion. 2242 01:30:37,760 --> 01:30:42,880 Okay, let's take ArchN. Oh, yeah. 2243 01:30:41,040 --> 01:30:45,679 Followed up with one car. Would you care 2244 01:30:42,880 --> 01:30:49,600 to speculate uh why all three of them 2245 01:30:45,679 --> 01:30:51,760 got together in the limb at that time? 2246 01:30:49,600 --> 01:30:53,960 I think the third man wanted to see what 2247 01:30:51,760 --> 01:30:57,880 was going 2248 01:30:53,960 --> 01:31:00,719 on. From the sounds of all the 2249 01:30:57,880 --> 01:31:03,600 uh work that has gone on and is still 2250 01:31:00,719 --> 01:31:07,040 going on, this flight's uh probably a 2251 01:31:03,600 --> 01:31:10,000 lot bigger test of the uh system on the 2252 01:31:07,040 --> 01:31:11,520 ground than up here. Yeah, you've been 2253 01:31:10,000 --> 01:31:14,400 uh you've been working it out a little 2254 01:31:11,520 --> 01:31:16,480 bit. Well, everybody down here is 100% 2255 01:31:14,400 --> 01:31:18,239 optimistic. Uh looks like we're on the 2256 01:31:16,480 --> 01:31:19,920 upside of the whole thing. No, ground 2257 01:31:18,239 --> 01:31:21,760 control passes up a procedure that will 2258 01:31:19,920 --> 01:31:23,600 allow the crew to use the lunar module 2259 01:31:21,760 --> 01:31:25,440 to set up a proper passive thermal 2260 01:31:23,600 --> 01:31:28,080 control roll rather than relying on the 2261 01:31:25,440 --> 01:31:29,679 manual 90° turn. How'd you like to spend 2262 01:31:28,080 --> 01:31:32,800 a week on an aircraft carrier getting 2263 01:31:29,679 --> 01:31:35,280 back? If I can uh get on an aircraft 2264 01:31:32,800 --> 01:31:37,280 carrier and I'm sure how long it takes 2265 01:31:35,280 --> 01:31:38,719 today. Ground control must verbally 2266 01:31:37,280 --> 01:31:41,040 guide the crew through building the 2267 01:31:38,719 --> 01:31:42,960 adapter to fit the command module CO2 2268 01:31:41,040 --> 01:31:45,760 scrubber into the lunar module's air 2269 01:31:42,960 --> 01:31:47,400 intake. Okay. Uh, I think the equipment 2270 01:31:45,760 --> 01:31:50,880 you'll need will 2271 01:31:47,400 --> 01:31:53,040 be two command module lithium hydroxide 2272 01:31:50,880 --> 01:31:55,040 canisters. The crew constructs two 2273 01:31:53,040 --> 01:31:57,199 adapters using ground controls verbal 2274 01:31:55,040 --> 01:31:59,600 guidance. This improvised solution would 2275 01:31:57,199 --> 01:32:01,199 be known as the mailbox from its shape. 2276 01:31:59,600 --> 01:32:03,440 The crew no longer had to rely on the 2277 01:32:01,199 --> 01:32:05,520 lunar module's limited CO2 scrubbing 2278 01:32:03,440 --> 01:32:07,440 capabilities and now had access to more 2279 01:32:05,520 --> 01:32:09,440 than enough lithium hydroxide canisters 2280 01:32:07,440 --> 01:32:11,920 to last them the rest of the journey. 2281 01:32:09,440 --> 01:32:14,960 Okay. When I was upstairs just a minute 2282 01:32:11,920 --> 01:32:17,760 ago, I uh I noticed appear what appeared 2283 01:32:14,960 --> 01:32:21,040 to be some new binning from down the 2284 01:32:17,760 --> 01:32:25,120 service module way. Uh I noticed it out 2285 01:32:21,040 --> 01:32:28,880 window one and also saw one chunk of uh 2286 01:32:25,120 --> 01:32:33,159 metal, loose metal about uh 4 in square 2287 01:32:28,880 --> 01:32:35,679 that was tumbling around uh silver in 2288 01:32:33,159 --> 01:32:37,840 color. It looked like it had come from 2289 01:32:35,679 --> 01:32:40,239 somewhere down in the service module. 2290 01:32:37,840 --> 01:32:42,560 I'm looking out the limb window now and 2291 01:32:40,239 --> 01:32:44,840 I see a good part of the new starfield 2292 01:32:42,560 --> 01:32:47,199 that's created 2293 01:32:44,840 --> 01:32:49,360 first and about a thousand little 2294 01:32:47,199 --> 01:32:50,800 sparkls out here. Fred Hayes looks out 2295 01:32:49,360 --> 01:32:53,040 of the windows and notices something 2296 01:32:50,800 --> 01:32:55,400 venting coming from the same area as the 2297 01:32:53,040 --> 01:32:59,080 initial accident. Think of any 2298 01:32:55,400 --> 01:33:02,400 normal phenomena that might occur like 2299 01:32:59,080 --> 01:33:05,400 maybe a hydrogen tank that's over 2300 01:33:02,400 --> 01:33:05,400 pressurized. 2301 01:33:05,520 --> 01:33:09,520 Yeah, we thought of that, Jim. We heated 2302 01:33:08,000 --> 01:33:11,520 up that tank and we haven't been using 2303 01:33:09,520 --> 01:33:14,080 any hydrogen and therefore it couldn't 2304 01:33:11,520 --> 01:33:15,679 be venting any overboard relief. It's 2305 01:33:14,080 --> 01:33:17,760 believed that with the side panel of the 2306 01:33:15,679 --> 01:33:19,600 service module blown off, the nearly 2307 01:33:17,760 --> 01:33:21,360 full hydrogen tanks would be directly 2308 01:33:19,600 --> 01:33:23,120 exposed to the sun for long enough that 2309 01:33:21,360 --> 01:33:24,960 they would start to pressurize and vent 2310 01:33:23,120 --> 01:33:26,800 through a relief valve. Given the 2311 01:33:24,960 --> 01:33:28,400 electrically dead service module, the 2312 01:33:26,800 --> 01:33:30,320 sensors and telemetry that would help 2313 01:33:28,400 --> 01:33:32,639 diagnose an event like this would also 2314 01:33:30,320 --> 01:33:34,239 be dead. The crew and ground control are 2315 01:33:32,639 --> 01:33:35,920 completely blind to the true state of 2316 01:33:34,239 --> 01:33:37,600 the command service module and would 2317 01:33:35,920 --> 01:33:39,360 have very little information to find out 2318 01:33:37,600 --> 01:33:43,639 what's venting. 2319 01:33:39,360 --> 01:33:46,639 may attack. But I think our PC 2320 01:33:43,639 --> 01:33:46,639 is 2321 01:33:47,050 --> 01:33:53,140 [Applause] 2322 01:33:56,199 --> 01:34:02,960 officially higher. Okay. Understand PTC. 2323 01:34:00,480 --> 01:34:05,280 Earth is coming by lower and moon is 2324 01:34:02,960 --> 01:34:06,800 coming by higher. Whatever seemed to be 2325 01:34:05,280 --> 01:34:08,800 venting would start to throw off their 2326 01:34:06,800 --> 01:34:10,800 passive thermal control role, slowly 2327 01:34:08,800 --> 01:34:14,159 adding its own wobble and procession. 2328 01:34:10,800 --> 01:34:16,800 Okay. Uh we're considering a midcourse 2329 01:34:14,159 --> 01:34:19,520 correction at 104 hours. Uh about 20 2330 01:34:16,800 --> 01:34:21,199 hours from now, 18 hours from now. 2331 01:34:19,520 --> 01:34:22,560 Ground control notices the trajectory 2332 01:34:21,199 --> 01:34:25,040 they're on would have them re-enter 2333 01:34:22,560 --> 01:34:26,800 Earth at a slightly shallow angle. They 2334 01:34:25,040 --> 01:34:28,480 plan another midcourse correction burn 2335 01:34:26,800 --> 01:34:30,080 to bring their re-entry angle back to 2336 01:34:28,480 --> 01:34:32,560 levels they're comfortable with. Uh 2337 01:34:30,080 --> 01:34:36,560 we're looking at the sheet tank pressure 2338 01:34:32,560 --> 01:34:39,040 rising. Uh we expect it to uh to blow. 2339 01:34:36,560 --> 01:34:41,520 Uh we don't know exactly what time it'll 2340 01:34:39,040 --> 01:34:44,800 go. Somewhere around 105 hours or 2341 01:34:41,520 --> 01:34:47,360 perhaps later than that. Uh we we've got 2342 01:34:44,800 --> 01:34:49,040 plenty of blowown capability and we we 2343 01:34:47,360 --> 01:34:51,520 just uh thought you ought to be 2344 01:34:49,040 --> 01:34:53,840 informed. The lunar module's engine 2345 01:34:51,520 --> 01:34:56,400 works by using helium to force fuel from 2346 01:34:53,840 --> 01:34:57,920 its tanks into its engine. This helium 2347 01:34:56,400 --> 01:35:00,400 was supplied from a super critical 2348 01:34:57,920 --> 01:35:02,159 helium tank inside of the lunar module. 2349 01:35:00,400 --> 01:35:04,000 As the tank would be warmed by sunlight 2350 01:35:02,159 --> 01:35:06,159 inside of the spacecraft, the pressure 2351 01:35:04,000 --> 01:35:07,840 would slowly rise during the mission. To 2352 01:35:06,159 --> 01:35:09,600 fix that, the tank was purposefully 2353 01:35:07,840 --> 01:35:11,440 underfilled on the ground so that as the 2354 01:35:09,600 --> 01:35:13,360 temperature rose inside the tank during 2355 01:35:11,440 --> 01:35:14,960 the mission, the helium would be at the 2356 01:35:13,360 --> 01:35:16,880 correct pressure to use the engine when 2357 01:35:14,960 --> 01:35:18,800 they got to the moon. Under usual 2358 01:35:16,880 --> 01:35:20,960 circumstances, the lunar module would 2359 01:35:18,800 --> 01:35:22,880 land on the moon and vent this helium, 2360 01:35:20,960 --> 01:35:24,960 stopping any possibility of an over 2361 01:35:22,880 --> 01:35:26,719 pressure. Apollo 13's unplanned 2362 01:35:24,960 --> 01:35:28,320 excursion meant that the lunar module's 2363 01:35:26,719 --> 01:35:30,159 helium tanks would be consistently 2364 01:35:28,320 --> 01:35:32,639 rising in temperature and pressure until 2365 01:35:30,159 --> 01:35:34,639 a burst disc breaks. Fortunately, the 2366 01:35:32,639 --> 01:35:36,480 lunar module's engine can still be used 2367 01:35:34,639 --> 01:35:38,320 even after this helium burst disc 2368 01:35:36,480 --> 01:35:40,480 breaks. Since the crew had already fired 2369 01:35:38,320 --> 01:35:41,920 the lunar module's engine, helium would 2370 01:35:40,480 --> 01:35:43,520 be trapped within the engine's fuel 2371 01:35:41,920 --> 01:35:45,679 tanks that could be used to start it up 2372 01:35:43,520 --> 01:35:47,679 again for a limited time. This feature 2373 01:35:45,679 --> 01:35:49,679 is called blowdown. With the dead 2374 01:35:47,679 --> 01:35:51,760 command service module, the lives of the 2375 01:35:49,679 --> 01:35:54,159 crew are entirely reliant on the lunar 2376 01:35:51,760 --> 01:35:56,000 module and its batteries. They need all 2377 01:35:54,159 --> 01:35:57,719 of its systems to work and are in no 2378 01:35:56,000 --> 01:36:00,080 position to deal with more unexpected 2379 01:35:57,719 --> 01:36:03,080 challenges. The crew would not be so 2380 01:36:00,080 --> 01:36:03,080 lucky. 2381 01:36:03,520 --> 01:36:08,400 Okay, man. Uh, I just heard a little 2382 01:36:06,239 --> 01:36:09,800 pump sounded like down in the descent 2383 01:36:08,400 --> 01:36:14,159 stage and 2384 01:36:09,800 --> 01:36:16,080 uh saw a new uh shower snowflakes go up 2385 01:36:14,159 --> 01:36:18,560 that looked like they were a minute down 2386 01:36:16,080 --> 01:36:20,880 that way. We don't see anything wrong. 2387 01:36:18,560 --> 01:36:23,920 For example, your sheet tank appears to 2388 01:36:20,880 --> 01:36:25,920 be okay as far as we can see. Whatever 2389 01:36:23,920 --> 01:36:28,320 blew in the lunar module's descent stage 2390 01:36:25,920 --> 01:36:30,159 was not the helium tank. It would be a 2391 01:36:28,320 --> 01:36:32,000 few hours earlier than expected and the 2392 01:36:30,159 --> 01:36:34,080 telemetry they could see told them the 2393 01:36:32,000 --> 01:36:36,080 tank was still pressurized. The lunar 2394 01:36:34,080 --> 01:36:37,639 module's descent stage contains four 2395 01:36:36,080 --> 01:36:39,840 large batteries which power the 2396 01:36:37,639 --> 01:36:41,600 spacecraft. It is believed that battery 2397 01:36:39,840 --> 01:36:43,199 2's electrolyte leaked inside of the 2398 01:36:41,600 --> 01:36:46,080 battery, creating a short circuit with 2399 01:36:43,199 --> 01:36:47,440 itself in the magnesium battery casing. 2400 01:36:46,080 --> 01:36:49,360 This short circuit through the 2401 01:36:47,440 --> 01:36:50,800 electrolyte released oxygen and hydrogen 2402 01:36:49,360 --> 01:36:52,800 gas from the electrolyte which 2403 01:36:50,800 --> 01:36:55,119 accumulated around the battery and then 2404 01:36:52,800 --> 01:36:56,960 ignited. This created a large enough 2405 01:36:55,119 --> 01:36:58,560 explosion for the crew to hear it, but 2406 01:36:56,960 --> 01:37:01,280 it wasn't destructive enough to knock 2407 01:36:58,560 --> 01:37:03,119 battery 2 off the line. The snowflakes 2408 01:37:01,280 --> 01:37:05,199 Fred Hayes were seeing were parts of his 2409 01:37:03,119 --> 01:37:06,800 own spacecraft mixed with leaked battery 2410 01:37:05,199 --> 01:37:10,360 electrolyte. 2411 01:37:06,800 --> 01:37:13,199 And Houston looks like service module 2412 01:37:10,360 --> 01:37:16,239 via at least momentarily. How about the 2413 01:37:13,199 --> 01:37:18,159 descent stage? Does uh Fred reported 2414 01:37:16,239 --> 01:37:20,719 venting down there? Uh do you still see 2415 01:37:18,159 --> 01:37:22,800 that? No. Fred hasn't seen anything else 2416 01:37:20,719 --> 01:37:24,400 in the descent stage. Fortunately, the 2417 01:37:22,800 --> 01:37:26,000 batteries would continue to function and 2418 01:37:24,400 --> 01:37:28,239 the short circuit didn't seem to have 2419 01:37:26,000 --> 01:37:29,840 any serious effects on them. How does it 2420 01:37:28,239 --> 01:37:32,600 feel, Jack? 2421 01:37:29,840 --> 01:37:34,480 I tell you, Dee, it's cold up in 2422 01:37:32,600 --> 01:37:36,239 there. I don't know whether we'll be 2423 01:37:34,480 --> 01:37:40,480 able to sleep up there tonight. It must 2424 01:37:36,239 --> 01:37:41,920 be about 35 or 40°. 2425 01:37:40,480 --> 01:37:44,159 Ro, that's what I was worried about. The 2426 01:37:41,920 --> 01:37:45,760 emergency situation the spacecraft is in 2427 01:37:44,159 --> 01:37:47,760 does not provide the crew with much 2428 01:37:45,760 --> 01:37:49,360 comfort. Usually, part of the 2429 01:37:47,760 --> 01:37:50,960 electricity the spacecraft would be 2430 01:37:49,360 --> 01:37:53,119 using would warm up the spacecraft and 2431 01:37:50,960 --> 01:37:54,960 make it comfortable to be in. With 2432 01:37:53,119 --> 01:37:57,040 electricity usage at an absolute 2433 01:37:54,960 --> 01:37:59,600 minimum, the spacecraft would plummet to 2434 01:37:57,040 --> 01:38:02,800 temperatures as low as 40° Fahrenheit or 2435 01:37:59,600 --> 01:38:05,040 4 C. Many of the water-based foods like 2436 01:38:02,800 --> 01:38:06,560 hot dogs have frozen solid. Water 2437 01:38:05,040 --> 01:38:08,480 droplets from the astronaut's breath 2438 01:38:06,560 --> 01:38:10,239 condense onto every surface, including 2439 01:38:08,480 --> 01:38:12,560 the ones behind the control panels and 2440 01:38:10,239 --> 01:38:14,800 in its wiring. The third midcourse 2441 01:38:12,560 --> 01:38:16,239 correction burn is here. This one is a 2442 01:38:14,800 --> 01:38:18,880 short burn that will help trim their 2443 01:38:16,239 --> 01:38:21,880 re-entry angle into better margins. 2444 01:38:18,880 --> 01:38:21,880 College 2445 01:38:25,560 --> 01:38:30,280 Ignition. Thrust looks good. 2446 01:38:32,159 --> 01:38:37,600 Shut down. 470. 2447 01:38:35,600 --> 01:38:39,760 Got some other information. Uh we should 2448 01:38:37,600 --> 01:38:41,920 have some good dope on your trajectory 2449 01:38:39,760 --> 01:38:44,639 in about 2 hours. Looked like to us that 2450 01:38:41,920 --> 01:38:46,080 the burn was real good, however, and uh 2451 01:38:44,639 --> 01:38:47,840 we're taking a close look at it and 2452 01:38:46,080 --> 01:38:50,800 we'll get back with you on that in about 2453 01:38:47,840 --> 01:38:53,920 2 hours. Now, another thing that we're 2454 01:38:50,800 --> 01:38:55,440 expecting to have happen uh is that uh 2455 01:38:53,920 --> 01:38:58,239 the sheet tank is going to reach its 2456 01:38:55,440 --> 01:39:00,560 burst limit. And this is uh supposed to 2457 01:38:58,239 --> 01:39:02,880 be a non-propulsive event, but you might 2458 01:39:00,560 --> 01:39:04,639 hear it and you might see something. We 2459 01:39:02,880 --> 01:39:07,760 are still watching the superc critical 2460 01:39:04,639 --> 01:39:10,400 helium pressure aboard the LM descent 2461 01:39:07,760 --> 01:39:12,679 stage increase gradually. The pressure 2462 01:39:10,400 --> 01:39:15,400 is now reading 2463 01:39:12,679 --> 01:39:18,400 1,937 lbs per square 2464 01:39:15,400 --> 01:39:20,560 in. And uh we see the pressure dropping 2465 01:39:18,400 --> 01:39:22,639 at this time. The control officer 2466 01:39:20,560 --> 01:39:24,639 reports that the burst disc has 2467 01:39:22,639 --> 01:39:27,590 ruptured. We just uh as we were making 2468 01:39:24,639 --> 01:39:30,000 this announcement. Anything? 2469 01:39:27,590 --> 01:39:31,920 [Applause] 2470 01:39:30,000 --> 01:39:34,280 Yeah, Jack, I just about ready to call 2471 01:39:31,920 --> 01:39:37,000 you. Underneath quad 2472 01:39:34,280 --> 01:39:40,639 four. I noticed a lot of 2473 01:39:37,000 --> 01:39:43,199 uh sparkly coming out. 2474 01:39:40,639 --> 01:39:45,920 Did you hear or feel anything? 2475 01:39:43,199 --> 01:39:49,800 I sure can. But, uh, I think it changed 2476 01:39:45,920 --> 01:39:51,760 our, uh, it changed our our, uh, 2477 01:39:49,800 --> 01:39:53,960 PTC. I think we're probably going to 2478 01:39:51,760 --> 01:39:57,360 have to reestablish 2479 01:39:53,960 --> 01:39:59,410 PTC. Yeah, I was in a right jaw and now 2480 01:39:57,360 --> 01:40:01,159 I'm in a left 2481 01:39:59,410 --> 01:40:05,520 [Applause] 2482 01:40:01,159 --> 01:40:05,520 jaw at a much faster rate 2483 01:40:05,560 --> 01:40:10,080 than the burst disc finally gives and 2484 01:40:08,159 --> 01:40:12,159 vents the super critical helium tank 2485 01:40:10,080 --> 01:40:14,000 into space. This event pushes the 2486 01:40:12,159 --> 01:40:15,760 spacecraft with enough force that not 2487 01:40:14,000 --> 01:40:18,000 only does it stop the passive thermal 2488 01:40:15,760 --> 01:40:19,280 control roll, but then reverses it at a 2489 01:40:18,000 --> 01:40:21,679 much faster rate than they were 2490 01:40:19,280 --> 01:40:24,080 originally spinning. Roger. Uh, have you 2491 01:40:21,679 --> 01:40:27,520 effectively established PTC in the 2492 01:40:24,080 --> 01:40:29,840 opposite direction then? Well, you can 2493 01:40:27,520 --> 01:40:31,600 say that. I I'm not too sure just what 2494 01:40:29,840 --> 01:40:34,239 kind of picture roll I got coming up 2495 01:40:31,600 --> 01:40:36,400 with for y'all. Is that what they call a 2496 01:40:34,239 --> 01:40:39,760 nonpropul? 2497 01:40:36,400 --> 01:40:42,400 Right. I'd hate to see a propulsive one. 2498 01:40:39,760 --> 01:40:45,119 Give me both. Meanwhile, back to the 2499 01:40:42,400 --> 01:40:48,480 drawing board for a non-reul. 2500 01:40:45,119 --> 01:40:51,440 The uh super critical helium burst disc 2501 01:40:48,480 --> 01:40:54,600 ruptured at about 108 hours 54 minutes 2502 01:40:51,440 --> 01:40:58,880 40 seconds after reaching a pressure of 2503 01:40:54,600 --> 01:41:00,880 1937 lb per square in. The uh pressure 2504 01:40:58,880 --> 01:41:03,600 of the escaping gas, which was thought 2505 01:41:00,880 --> 01:41:05,520 ahead of time to be a was predicted to 2506 01:41:03,600 --> 01:41:08,800 be a non-propulsive vent, turned out to 2507 01:41:05,520 --> 01:41:11,520 be uh very much a propulsive vent. Uh 2508 01:41:08,800 --> 01:41:13,679 this rotational rate was stopped by the 2509 01:41:11,520 --> 01:41:14,600 vent and uh started up again in the 2510 01:41:13,679 --> 01:41:18,320 opposite 2511 01:41:14,600 --> 01:41:19,480 direction and it is now rotating about 2512 01:41:18,320 --> 01:41:22,800 one 2513 01:41:19,480 --> 01:41:25,040 revolution every uh 2 minutes. One 2514 01:41:22,800 --> 01:41:27,199 revolution a little less than every 2 2515 01:41:25,040 --> 01:41:29,600 minutes as compared with a revolution 2516 01:41:27,199 --> 01:41:31,600 every 18 or 19 minutes in the opposite 2517 01:41:29,600 --> 01:41:33,040 direction prior to the vent. How's the 2518 01:41:31,600 --> 01:41:35,600 temperature up there, Jack? You guys 2519 01:41:33,040 --> 01:41:40,000 chopping wood to keep warm? 2520 01:41:35,600 --> 01:41:44,320 Uh Jee, it's about uh 51, I think, or 50 2521 01:41:40,000 --> 01:41:47,280 in the uh lamb, and it's about uh I 2522 01:41:44,320 --> 01:41:49,440 don't know, 45 or or a little bit less 2523 01:41:47,280 --> 01:41:52,159 in the command module. Do you believe 2524 01:41:49,440 --> 01:41:54,080 it's cold up there? Yes, we we used to 2525 01:41:52,159 --> 01:41:55,679 call the command module the bedroom, and 2526 01:41:54,080 --> 01:41:57,199 it's now the refrigerator. The near 2527 01:41:55,679 --> 01:41:58,800 freezing temperatures inside of the 2528 01:41:57,199 --> 01:42:00,480 spacecraft, combined with one crew 2529 01:41:58,800 --> 01:42:02,320 member on watch out at all times, would 2530 01:42:00,480 --> 01:42:04,560 make it near impossible to get any 2531 01:42:02,320 --> 01:42:06,480 meaningful amount of rest. By this 2532 01:42:04,560 --> 01:42:08,480 point, three full days after the 2533 01:42:06,480 --> 01:42:10,880 explosion, all crew members are 2534 01:42:08,480 --> 01:42:12,080 exhausted and dehydrated. The rationing 2535 01:42:10,880 --> 01:42:13,920 of water that the crew had been 2536 01:42:12,080 --> 01:42:15,840 undergoing had its own ill effects as 2537 01:42:13,920 --> 01:42:18,239 well. By the end of the mission, Fred 2538 01:42:15,840 --> 01:42:20,719 Hayes would lose 6 lb of body weight. 2539 01:42:18,239 --> 01:42:23,600 Jack Swagger would lose 11 lb and Jim 2540 01:42:20,719 --> 01:42:25,440 Lovel would lose 14. Fred Hayes would 2541 01:42:23,600 --> 01:42:26,880 discover he developed a urinary tract 2542 01:42:25,440 --> 01:42:28,880 infection that would later become a 2543 01:42:26,880 --> 01:42:30,480 kidney infection. He would start feeling 2544 01:42:28,880 --> 01:42:32,719 the chills in an already frozen 2545 01:42:30,480 --> 01:42:34,639 spacecraft. A small burn with the 2546 01:42:32,719 --> 01:42:36,239 reaction control thrusters is planned to 2547 01:42:34,639 --> 01:42:38,159 bring the spacecraft into the best 2548 01:42:36,239 --> 01:42:39,679 re-entry angle they could try to get. 2549 01:42:38,159 --> 01:42:43,119 Less than 2 minutes away now from 2550 01:42:39,679 --> 01:42:45,920 scheduled time of ignition. 2551 01:42:43,119 --> 01:42:50,000 Okay, it looks like we had a minus2 bias 2552 01:42:45,920 --> 01:42:51,880 47. We're burning. Copy that, Fred. Fred 2553 01:42:50,000 --> 01:42:55,040 Hayes reporting that the burn is 2554 01:42:51,880 --> 01:42:56,440 underway. We're at 137 hours 40 minutes 2555 01:42:55,040 --> 01:43:00,080 into the 2556 01:42:56,440 --> 01:43:02,239 flight. Wave shut down. Re-entry is fast 2557 01:43:00,080 --> 01:43:04,480 approaching. The service module will be 2558 01:43:02,239 --> 01:43:06,719 jettisoned before the lunar module, a 2559 01:43:04,480 --> 01:43:08,880 first in the Apollo missions. Ejecting 2560 01:43:06,719 --> 01:43:11,280 the service module will expose its true 2561 01:43:08,880 --> 01:43:13,040 damage to the crew for the first time. 2562 01:43:11,280 --> 01:43:16,159 The crew is prepared to capture this 2563 01:43:13,040 --> 01:43:18,639 event on their cameras. 2564 01:43:16,159 --> 01:43:20,960 Copy that. 2565 01:43:18,639 --> 01:43:22,880 We copied that report uh from Jim 2566 01:43:20,960 --> 01:43:28,639 Levelville of service module separation 2567 01:43:22,880 --> 01:43:32,119 at 138 hours. Uh 2 minutes 8 seconds. 2568 01:43:28,639 --> 01:43:32,119 You're being Jack. 2569 01:43:32,159 --> 01:43:37,119 And there's one whole side of that 2570 01:43:34,000 --> 01:43:40,520 spacecraft missing. 2571 01:43:37,119 --> 01:43:40,520 Is that right? 2572 01:43:40,719 --> 01:43:46,480 Right by the uh look out there. 2573 01:43:44,639 --> 01:43:48,480 Right by the high gate antenna. The 2574 01:43:46,480 --> 01:43:52,080 whole panel is blown out almost from the 2575 01:43:48,480 --> 01:43:54,800 uh base to the engine. 2576 01:43:52,080 --> 01:43:57,119 Copy that. 2577 01:43:54,800 --> 01:44:00,520 Yeah, it looks like it got to the SPS 2578 01:43:57,119 --> 01:44:00,520 bell, too. 2579 01:44:00,800 --> 01:44:07,840 You can ding the SPS engine bell, huh? 2580 01:44:04,320 --> 01:44:11,320 Way look that's just dark brown streak. 2581 01:44:07,840 --> 01:44:11,320 It's really a mess. 2582 01:44:11,840 --> 01:44:17,760 Was the belt deformed on the outside or 2583 01:44:14,239 --> 01:44:19,440 just uh nicked or what? 2584 01:44:17,760 --> 01:44:22,560 I think the explosion from what I can 2585 01:44:19,440 --> 01:44:23,920 see, Joe, had uh had fainted. I don't 2586 01:44:22,560 --> 01:44:26,760 know whether it did any actual 2587 01:44:23,920 --> 01:44:30,000 transformation or not. 2588 01:44:26,760 --> 01:44:32,800 Okay, man. That's unbelievable. 2589 01:44:30,000 --> 01:44:35,360 [Music] 2590 01:44:32,800 --> 01:44:37,280 Yeah, and Joe, looks like a lot of uh a 2591 01:44:35,360 --> 01:44:41,280 lot of debris is just hanging out to the 2592 01:44:37,280 --> 01:44:44,080 side uh near the SP antenna. 2593 01:44:41,280 --> 01:44:45,920 Roger, Jim. The crew spends the next 3 2594 01:44:44,080 --> 01:44:48,480 hours preparing to jettison their lunar 2595 01:44:45,920 --> 01:44:50,960 module. They will do so 1 hour before 2596 01:44:48,480 --> 01:44:53,199 re-entry. And uh you are go for fire 2597 01:44:50,960 --> 01:44:54,880 alarm. 2598 01:44:53,199 --> 01:44:56,719 The damaged service module and their 2599 01:44:54,880 --> 01:44:59,600 lunar module would burn up in Earth's 2600 01:44:56,719 --> 01:45:02,719 atmosphere. 2601 01:44:59,600 --> 01:45:05,520 Okay, copy that. 2602 01:45:02,719 --> 01:45:08,880 Farewell Aquarius and we thank you. This 2603 01:45:05,520 --> 01:45:10,960 is Apollo Control Houston at 141 hours 2604 01:45:08,880 --> 01:45:13,280 31 minutes into the flight. We've had 2605 01:45:10,960 --> 01:45:15,119 lunar module jettison. You're looking 2606 01:45:13,280 --> 01:45:16,960 good. We're real happy with the 2607 01:45:15,119 --> 01:45:20,000 trajectory. And a minute ago, we just 2608 01:45:16,960 --> 01:45:23,199 lost contact with your friend Aquarius. 2609 01:45:20,000 --> 01:45:25,520 Okay. Where did she go? Oh, I know. 2610 01:45:23,199 --> 01:45:27,840 She's up there somewhere. She sure was 2611 01:45:25,520 --> 01:45:29,600 good. Hey, just as I said that, we got 2612 01:45:27,840 --> 01:45:32,239 another burst of lamb data, so I guess 2613 01:45:29,600 --> 01:45:34,639 it's still ticking. Less than 7 minutes 2614 01:45:32,239 --> 01:45:37,520 now from time of entry into the Earth's 2615 01:45:34,639 --> 01:45:39,360 atmosphere. Okay, we just had one last 2616 01:45:37,520 --> 01:45:41,280 uh time around the room and everybody 2617 01:45:39,360 --> 01:45:44,080 says you're looking great. Thank you. 2618 01:45:41,280 --> 01:45:46,480 Okay, los in uh a minute or a minute and 2619 01:45:44,080 --> 01:45:49,040 a half. Uh at entry attitude, we like on 2620 01:45:46,480 --> 01:45:51,280 me, Charlie, and welcome home. Thank 2621 01:45:49,040 --> 01:45:53,280 you. During re-entry, the spacecraft 2622 01:45:51,280 --> 01:45:55,119 hits the atmosphere with enough velocity 2623 01:45:53,280 --> 01:45:57,679 that it turns the surrounding air into 2624 01:45:55,119 --> 01:45:59,199 plasma, which blocks any radio signals. 2625 01:45:57,679 --> 01:46:01,520 This is a known event that will cause 2626 01:45:59,199 --> 01:46:03,679 Apollo 13 to lose communications during 2627 01:46:01,520 --> 01:46:06,480 their most intense phase of re-entry. 2628 01:46:03,679 --> 01:46:08,719 This is known as loss of signal or loss. 2629 01:46:06,480 --> 01:46:11,159 Apollo Control Houston. We've just had 2630 01:46:08,719 --> 01:46:14,480 loss of signal from 2631 01:46:11,159 --> 01:46:16,840 Honeysuckle with Apollo 13. Our last 2632 01:46:14,480 --> 01:46:19,960 velocity reading was 2633 01:46:16,840 --> 01:46:21,719 35,837 ft per second with a range to go 2634 01:46:19,960 --> 01:46:24,040 of 2635 01:46:21,719 --> 01:46:28,239 1791 nautical 2636 01:46:24,040 --> 01:46:31,920 miles. The period of blackout for the 2637 01:46:28,239 --> 01:46:34,960 spacecraft uh should have begun about 20 2638 01:46:31,920 --> 01:46:38,119 some odd seconds ago. We have about 1 2639 01:46:34,960 --> 01:46:41,119 minute to go now from time of end to 2640 01:46:38,119 --> 01:46:44,639 blackout. Less than 10 seconds now. We 2641 01:46:41,119 --> 01:46:46,520 will attempt to contact Apollo 13 2642 01:46:44,639 --> 01:46:48,719 through one of the Oria 2643 01:46:46,520 --> 01:46:51,520 aircraft. Continuing to monitor this 2644 01:46:48,719 --> 01:46:53,920 Apollo control Houston. We've had a 2645 01:46:51,520 --> 01:46:57,639 report that Aria 4 aircraft has 2646 01:46:53,920 --> 01:46:57,639 acquisition of signal. 2647 01:46:58,400 --> 01:47:02,719 Odyssey Houston. We show you on the 2648 01:47:00,239 --> 01:47:05,840 mains. It really looks great. An 2649 01:47:02,719 --> 01:47:07,920 extremely loud applause as Apollo 13 on 2650 01:47:05,840 --> 01:47:10,000 main shoots comes through loud and clear 2651 01:47:07,920 --> 01:47:12,080 on the television display here. The 2652 01:47:10,000 --> 01:47:14,000 three exhausted astronauts land in the 2653 01:47:12,080 --> 01:47:17,520 Pacific Ocean and get picked up by the 2654 01:47:14,000 --> 01:47:20,000 helicopter carrier USS Eoima. They will 2655 01:47:17,520 --> 01:47:21,600 be going home safe. The emergency 2656 01:47:20,000 --> 01:47:23,840 measures taken to save the crew of 2657 01:47:21,600 --> 01:47:26,480 Apollo 13 after the accident were a 2658 01:47:23,840 --> 01:47:29,119 success. The moon landing on the Fromaro 2659 01:47:26,480 --> 01:47:30,960 crater, however, remained out of reach. 2660 01:47:29,119 --> 01:47:33,600 With the spectacle of the rescue now 2661 01:47:30,960 --> 01:47:37,679 concluded, focus shifted entirely to one 2662 01:47:33,600 --> 01:47:39,760 lingering question. Why did this happen? 2663 01:47:37,679 --> 01:47:42,480 A review board is assembled in order to 2664 01:47:39,760 --> 01:47:44,400 investigate the origin of the explosion. 2665 01:47:42,480 --> 01:47:46,239 Looking back at the telemetry, oxygen 2666 01:47:44,400 --> 01:47:48,560 tank 2 was showing some very strange 2667 01:47:46,239 --> 01:47:50,639 readings right before the explosion. 1 2668 01:47:48,560 --> 01:47:52,239 and 1/2 minutes before the accident, the 2669 01:47:50,639 --> 01:47:55,119 pressure within oxygen tank 2 2670 01:47:52,239 --> 01:47:58,320 unexpectedly rose extremely high. The 2671 01:47:55,119 --> 01:47:59,920 pressure maxed out at 1,08 PSI, at which 2672 01:47:58,320 --> 01:48:02,639 point a relief valve opened, which 2673 01:47:59,920 --> 01:48:04,480 lowered the pressure to 996 psi before 2674 01:48:02,639 --> 01:48:06,800 the telemetry suddenly dropped out from 2675 01:48:04,480 --> 01:48:08,800 the explosion. This unexpected pressure 2676 01:48:06,800 --> 01:48:10,800 rise could not be accounted for by any 2677 01:48:08,800 --> 01:48:13,360 of the energy entering the tank from its 2678 01:48:10,800 --> 01:48:14,960 heaters, fans, or sensors. The crew was 2679 01:48:13,360 --> 01:48:16,800 not made aware of the sudden pressure 2680 01:48:14,960 --> 01:48:19,040 rise because of previous issues around 2681 01:48:16,800 --> 01:48:20,639 the hydrogen tank. The hydrogen tank's 2682 01:48:19,040 --> 01:48:22,719 low pressure warning light happened to 2683 01:48:20,639 --> 01:48:24,560 be activated before the oxygen tank's 2684 01:48:22,719 --> 01:48:26,679 high pressure warning light. Both were 2685 01:48:24,560 --> 01:48:29,040 part of the same cryogenic warning light 2686 01:48:26,679 --> 01:48:30,320 subsystem. Since the system could not 2687 01:48:29,040 --> 01:48:32,400 display both of these errors 2688 01:48:30,320 --> 01:48:34,080 simultaneously, the hydrogen tank's 2689 01:48:32,400 --> 01:48:35,360 mundane low pressure reading had 2690 01:48:34,080 --> 01:48:36,960 overwritten the immediately 2691 01:48:35,360 --> 01:48:39,360 life-threatening oxygen tank 2692 01:48:36,960 --> 01:48:41,440 high-pressure warning. The temperature 2693 01:48:39,360 --> 01:48:43,280 probe inside of that tank also showed a 2694 01:48:41,440 --> 01:48:45,440 rapid and unexpected rise in its 2695 01:48:43,280 --> 01:48:47,360 temperature a mere 20 seconds before the 2696 01:48:45,440 --> 01:48:49,040 explosion. In addition to the 2697 01:48:47,360 --> 01:48:51,119 temperature and pressurizing before the 2698 01:48:49,040 --> 01:48:52,719 explosion, the energy usage indicated 2699 01:48:51,119 --> 01:48:55,679 electrical arcing was happening 2700 01:48:52,719 --> 01:48:57,440 somewhere inside of that tank. About 2.7 2701 01:48:55,679 --> 01:49:00,560 seconds after the cryopans were turned 2702 01:48:57,440 --> 01:49:02,320 on, an unexpected 11.1 amp spike and a 2703 01:49:00,560 --> 01:49:04,239 matching voltage drop were recorded on 2704 01:49:02,320 --> 01:49:06,400 the telemetry for that tank's electrical 2705 01:49:04,239 --> 01:49:08,560 system. Materials used inside of the 2706 01:49:06,400 --> 01:49:10,880 oxygen tank, like the Teflon insulation 2707 01:49:08,560 --> 01:49:13,119 for the wiring, are not flammable under 2708 01:49:10,880 --> 01:49:15,199 normal conditions. In an environment of 2709 01:49:13,119 --> 01:49:17,360 pure superc critical oxygen, however, 2710 01:49:15,199 --> 01:49:19,760 teflon would be able to propagate a 2711 01:49:17,360 --> 01:49:21,600 flame. The board looks into the specific 2712 01:49:19,760 --> 01:49:24,159 oxygen tank's history, which reveals 2713 01:49:21,600 --> 01:49:26,320 some alarming details. This tank was 2714 01:49:24,159 --> 01:49:28,199 intended to be flown on Apollo 10 and 2715 01:49:26,320 --> 01:49:31,119 had completed its acceptance testing 2716 01:49:28,199 --> 01:49:33,040 beforehand. It showed no issues then. 2717 01:49:31,119 --> 01:49:34,639 Due to previous Apollo flights showing 2718 01:49:33,040 --> 01:49:36,480 some issues with electromagnetic 2719 01:49:34,639 --> 01:49:38,560 interference around the vacuum pumps on 2720 01:49:36,480 --> 01:49:40,400 the cryogenic tanks, the decision was 2721 01:49:38,560 --> 01:49:42,719 made to remove and modify the shelf 2722 01:49:40,400 --> 01:49:44,639 containing the oxygen tanks. In order to 2723 01:49:42,719 --> 01:49:46,719 remove the shelf for modification, the 2724 01:49:44,639 --> 01:49:49,600 11 screws that hold the shelf onto the 2725 01:49:46,719 --> 01:49:52,080 service module had to be taken out. One 2726 01:49:49,600 --> 01:49:53,760 was forgotten. The ground crew, having 2727 01:49:52,080 --> 01:49:55,360 believed all screws were removed and 2728 01:49:53,760 --> 01:49:57,760 that the shelf was separated from the 2729 01:49:55,360 --> 01:49:59,760 service module, attempted to remove it. 2730 01:49:57,760 --> 01:50:01,520 The remaining crew pivoted the entire 2731 01:49:59,760 --> 01:50:03,760 assembly upwards, hitting the shelf 2732 01:50:01,520 --> 01:50:06,000 above it before dropping 2 in back down 2733 01:50:03,760 --> 01:50:07,920 into place. At this point, the ground 2734 01:50:06,000 --> 01:50:09,920 crew had noticed their mistake, reported 2735 01:50:07,920 --> 01:50:12,159 this incident, and properly removed the 2736 01:50:09,920 --> 01:50:13,840 shelf. Testing would have to be done in 2737 01:50:12,159 --> 01:50:15,679 order to verify that this tank drop 2738 01:50:13,840 --> 01:50:17,520 didn't damage them. With the soon 2739 01:50:15,679 --> 01:50:19,199 upcoming launch of Apollo 10 and the 2740 01:50:17,520 --> 01:50:20,800 time it would take to test, it was 2741 01:50:19,199 --> 01:50:22,800 decided that a new tank would be brought 2742 01:50:20,800 --> 01:50:25,040 in and used instead of the dropped one. 2743 01:50:22,800 --> 01:50:27,600 This decision spared Apollo 10 from this 2744 01:50:25,040 --> 01:50:29,440 oxygen tank. The tank would later be 2745 01:50:27,600 --> 01:50:31,360 tested and would verify that all of its 2746 01:50:29,440 --> 01:50:33,040 components worked. It passed these tests 2747 01:50:31,360 --> 01:50:36,320 and was installed inside of the service 2748 01:50:33,040 --> 01:50:38,239 module slated for Apollo 13. The service 2749 01:50:36,320 --> 01:50:40,080 module was moved to Kennedy Space Center 2750 01:50:38,239 --> 01:50:42,400 where the rest of the Saturn 5 was being 2751 01:50:40,080 --> 01:50:44,159 put together. The Saturn 5 was assembled 2752 01:50:42,400 --> 01:50:45,440 and then moved onto the launchpad in 2753 01:50:44,159 --> 01:50:47,760 order to complete the countdown 2754 01:50:45,440 --> 01:50:49,600 demonstration test. This was a rehearsal 2755 01:50:47,760 --> 01:50:51,840 of activating and pressurizing all of 2756 01:50:49,600 --> 01:50:53,199 the rocket systems up until launch. This 2757 01:50:51,840 --> 01:50:54,800 would verify that everything worked 2758 01:50:53,199 --> 01:50:56,960 correctly when it came time to actually 2759 01:50:54,800 --> 01:50:59,119 launch. The oxygen tanks inside of the 2760 01:50:56,960 --> 01:51:01,119 service module were part of this test. 2761 01:50:59,119 --> 01:51:02,960 They would be pressurized, tested, and 2762 01:51:01,119 --> 01:51:05,159 then depressurized. Both tanks 2763 01:51:02,960 --> 01:51:07,920 pressurized and worked normally. During 2764 01:51:05,159 --> 01:51:10,080 depressurization, however, oxygen tank 2 2765 01:51:07,920 --> 01:51:12,800 would not drain all of the way. It was 2766 01:51:10,080 --> 01:51:14,320 stuck at 65% and could not be made to 2767 01:51:12,800 --> 01:51:16,239 drain more than that. Normal 2768 01:51:14,320 --> 01:51:18,400 depressurization procedures involved 2769 01:51:16,239 --> 01:51:20,400 blowing gaseous oxygen through the vent 2770 01:51:18,400 --> 01:51:22,000 line, which would push on the oxygen and 2771 01:51:20,400 --> 01:51:23,520 force it up through a tube in the center 2772 01:51:22,000 --> 01:51:25,760 of the tank, which would then drain 2773 01:51:23,520 --> 01:51:28,000 through the fill line. It was known that 2774 01:51:25,760 --> 01:51:29,760 manufacturing tolerances around one 2775 01:51:28,000 --> 01:51:32,400 section of this fill tube, called the 2776 01:51:29,760 --> 01:51:34,480 dog's leg, were not particularly tight. 2777 01:51:32,400 --> 01:51:36,639 With manufacturing tolerances stacked 2778 01:51:34,480 --> 01:51:38,400 up, a particularly loose fill tube could 2779 01:51:36,639 --> 01:51:40,480 be jolted open from something like the 2780 01:51:38,400 --> 01:51:42,080 tank drop. This is believed to be the 2781 01:51:40,480 --> 01:51:44,719 main cause of failure to drain 2782 01:51:42,080 --> 01:51:46,719 completely. The gaseous oxygen intended 2783 01:51:44,719 --> 01:51:48,639 to push the denser oxygen up through the 2784 01:51:46,719 --> 01:51:50,400 fill tube was simply leaking back 2785 01:51:48,639 --> 01:51:52,239 through the jolted open fill tube, 2786 01:51:50,400 --> 01:51:54,080 leaving the rest of the oxygen in the 2787 01:51:52,239 --> 01:51:55,440 tank. The technicians on the ground were 2788 01:51:54,080 --> 01:51:57,599 aware of this issue and were not 2789 01:51:55,440 --> 01:51:59,119 concerned by it. The failure to drain 2790 01:51:57,599 --> 01:52:00,880 completely was not considered a problem 2791 01:51:59,119 --> 01:52:02,480 for flight as the spacecraft systems 2792 01:52:00,880 --> 01:52:04,639 would be supplied by a separate tube 2793 01:52:02,480 --> 01:52:06,239 which works fine. It was decided that 2794 01:52:04,639 --> 01:52:08,000 they would power the heaters inside of 2795 01:52:06,239 --> 01:52:10,560 that tank in order to boil off the 2796 01:52:08,000 --> 01:52:13,119 oxygen and drain it that way. The 2797 01:52:10,560 --> 01:52:15,119 technicians used the 65V ground power 2798 01:52:13,119 --> 01:52:18,400 supply to power the heater inside of 2799 01:52:15,119 --> 01:52:20,800 oxygen tank 2. Unbeknownst to the ground 2800 01:52:18,400 --> 01:52:22,639 crew, a crucial piece of information was 2801 01:52:20,800 --> 01:52:25,520 not passed up the line to the company 2802 01:52:22,639 --> 01:52:27,360 responsible for manufacturing the tank. 2803 01:52:25,520 --> 01:52:29,760 Originally, the ground power systems 2804 01:52:27,360 --> 01:52:31,760 used 28vt power and so the tank's 2805 01:52:29,760 --> 01:52:34,480 temperature limit switch was only rated 2806 01:52:31,760 --> 01:52:37,520 for 28 volt. The ground power supply 2807 01:52:34,480 --> 01:52:39,520 system was later upgraded to 65 volts. 2808 01:52:37,520 --> 01:52:41,440 The heaters rely on a thermal limit 2809 01:52:39,520 --> 01:52:43,760 switch in order to separate the circuit 2810 01:52:41,440 --> 01:52:46,239 if it gets too hot. With the upgraded 2811 01:52:43,760 --> 01:52:48,000 ground power, testing showed that the 65 2812 01:52:46,239 --> 01:52:50,080 volts flowing through the thermal limit 2813 01:52:48,000 --> 01:52:52,679 switch rated for less than half that 2814 01:52:50,080 --> 01:52:55,520 welded the switch shut, rendering it 2815 01:52:52,679 --> 01:52:57,920 useless. The heaters on that tank from 2816 01:52:55,520 --> 01:52:59,599 that moment onwards had absolutely no 2817 01:52:57,920 --> 01:53:01,599 thermal limits it could reach before 2818 01:52:59,599 --> 01:53:03,119 shutting off. Ground control was 2819 01:53:01,599 --> 01:53:04,480 watching the temperature sensor inside 2820 01:53:03,119 --> 01:53:06,239 of that tank to make sure it didn't 2821 01:53:04,480 --> 01:53:08,320 reach temperatures too high. But since 2822 01:53:06,239 --> 01:53:10,320 that sensor was not designed to display 2823 01:53:08,320 --> 01:53:12,320 temperatures higher than 84 degrees 2824 01:53:10,320 --> 01:53:14,239 Fahrenheit, they would not be aware that 2825 01:53:12,320 --> 01:53:16,239 the heaters were being operated well 2826 01:53:14,239 --> 01:53:18,800 beyond their safe temperatures. To 2827 01:53:16,239 --> 01:53:20,080 ground control, the tank was only 84° 2828 01:53:18,800 --> 01:53:21,599 and anything beyond that would be 2829 01:53:20,080 --> 01:53:24,239 stopped by the temperature limit switch 2830 01:53:21,599 --> 01:53:26,719 opening. Both assumptions were wrong. 2831 01:53:24,239 --> 01:53:28,400 The heaters, now unbound by the disabled 2832 01:53:26,719 --> 01:53:31,840 temperature limit switch, would reach an 2833 01:53:28,400 --> 01:53:34,639 estimated 1,000° F, hot enough to make 2834 01:53:31,840 --> 01:53:37,040 steel visibly glow red. The tank would 2835 01:53:34,639 --> 01:53:40,320 sit like this, cooking its own internals 2836 01:53:37,040 --> 01:53:42,239 for the next 8 hours. The extreme heat 2837 01:53:40,320 --> 01:53:44,159 inside of the tank damaged the Teflon 2838 01:53:42,239 --> 01:53:46,480 insulation for the cryofan wires, 2839 01:53:44,159 --> 01:53:48,080 exposing bare metal. Now, this meant 2840 01:53:46,480 --> 01:53:50,080 that anytime the cryofans were 2841 01:53:48,080 --> 01:53:52,480 activated, it risked creating a short 2842 01:53:50,080 --> 01:53:54,400 within the oxygen tank. Ground control, 2843 01:53:52,480 --> 01:53:56,080 unaware of the dangerous situation the 2844 01:53:54,400 --> 01:53:57,920 tank is now in, and wanting to make sure 2845 01:53:56,080 --> 01:54:00,159 that tank wouldn't act up during launch 2846 01:53:57,920 --> 01:54:02,159 procedures, decided to test the tank 2847 01:54:00,159 --> 01:54:03,679 again. The tank didn't show any other 2848 01:54:02,159 --> 01:54:05,760 issues during testing and so it was 2849 01:54:03,679 --> 01:54:07,360 decided that it would be good to launch. 2850 01:54:05,760 --> 01:54:09,040 The tank would also fail to drain 2851 01:54:07,360 --> 01:54:11,280 completely on this occasion, prompting 2852 01:54:09,040 --> 01:54:13,920 the ground crew to repeat the heating. 2853 01:54:11,280 --> 01:54:15,840 The same mistake had been made twice. 2854 01:54:13,920 --> 01:54:17,679 This tank would undergo another round of 2855 01:54:15,840 --> 01:54:19,360 extreme overheating, which continued to 2856 01:54:17,679 --> 01:54:22,080 burn off the insulation around the wires 2857 01:54:19,360 --> 01:54:23,840 for the cryopans. With the now severely 2858 01:54:22,080 --> 01:54:25,840 damaged Teflon insulation around the 2859 01:54:23,840 --> 01:54:28,000 cryofan wires and a ground crew 2860 01:54:25,840 --> 01:54:30,080 oblivious to the severe damage inside of 2861 01:54:28,000 --> 01:54:32,800 that tank, it was certified as good to 2862 01:54:30,080 --> 01:54:34,880 go and then launched into space. This 2863 01:54:32,800 --> 01:54:36,480 set the stage for the explosion. When 2864 01:54:34,880 --> 01:54:38,159 the astronauts were up in space, the 2865 01:54:36,480 --> 01:54:39,920 cryopans were activated and an 2866 01:54:38,159 --> 01:54:42,800 electrical arc was formed across the 2867 01:54:39,920 --> 01:54:44,800 wires. The teflon insulation, severely 2868 01:54:42,800 --> 01:54:46,800 degraded and sitting in a pure superc 2869 01:54:44,800 --> 01:54:49,280 critical oxygen environment, ignited 2870 01:54:46,800 --> 01:54:51,599 from the electrical spark like the fuse 2871 01:54:49,280 --> 01:54:53,599 to a bomb. This teflon insulation burned 2872 01:54:51,599 --> 01:54:55,199 for a minute and a half. The fire 2873 01:54:53,599 --> 01:54:56,639 created extra pressure inside of the 2874 01:54:55,199 --> 01:54:58,800 superc critical tank which began 2875 01:54:56,639 --> 01:55:00,239 venting. It reached the temperature 2876 01:54:58,800 --> 01:55:02,080 sensor and then the point where the 2877 01:55:00,239 --> 01:55:03,920 wires entered the superc critical oxygen 2878 01:55:02,080 --> 01:55:05,280 tank. This also happened to be the 2879 01:55:03,920 --> 01:55:06,480 weakest point in the tank where the 2880 01:55:05,280 --> 01:55:08,480 wires passed through into the 2881 01:55:06,480 --> 01:55:10,000 pressurized environment. This is the 2882 01:55:08,480 --> 01:55:12,639 part of the tank that gave out and 2883 01:55:10,000 --> 01:55:12,639 triggered the 2884 01:55:13,320 --> 01:55:17,679 explosion. It was incredibly lucky for 2885 01:55:15,760 --> 01:55:19,760 the crew that the tank exploded when it 2886 01:55:17,679 --> 01:55:21,360 did. If it were sooner, it would have 2887 01:55:19,760 --> 01:55:23,280 left the crew stranded with the same 2888 01:55:21,360 --> 01:55:25,520 resources, but a far longer journey 2889 01:55:23,280 --> 01:55:27,119 ahead of them. If it had happened later 2890 01:55:25,520 --> 01:55:28,719 and the crew had entered lunar orbit 2891 01:55:27,119 --> 01:55:31,119 like they were planned to, it would have 2892 01:55:28,719 --> 01:55:32,880 also been fatal. The service propulsion 2893 01:55:31,119 --> 01:55:35,199 system was not made to send the entire 2894 01:55:32,880 --> 01:55:36,960 Apollo stack back to Earth. If they had 2895 01:55:35,199 --> 01:55:38,960 separated, Jack Swiger would have been 2896 01:55:36,960 --> 01:55:41,840 the only one aboard the command service 2897 01:55:38,960 --> 01:55:43,679 module in lunar orbit. With the moon 2898 01:55:41,840 --> 01:55:45,119 blocking radio communications for one 2899 01:55:43,679 --> 01:55:46,719 half of that orbit, he would have 2900 01:55:45,119 --> 01:55:48,560 possibly had to deal with all of the 2901 01:55:46,719 --> 01:55:51,679 consequences of the tank's explosion 2902 01:55:48,560 --> 01:55:53,520 completely and entirely alone. Even if 2903 01:55:51,679 --> 01:55:54,960 the crew on the lunar surface managed to 2904 01:55:53,520 --> 01:55:56,639 hear about this and abort their moon 2905 01:55:54,960 --> 01:55:57,960 mission, there still would have been no 2906 01:55:56,639 --> 01:56:00,719 way to save the 2907 01:55:57,960 --> 01:56:03,199 astronauts. The descent stage containing 2908 01:56:00,719 --> 01:56:05,040 the oxygen they now needed to get home 2909 01:56:03,199 --> 01:56:07,199 would have been left on the surface of 2910 01:56:05,040 --> 01:56:09,199 the moon. 2911 01:56:07,199 --> 01:56:11,440 The wires had not ignited the first two 2912 01:56:09,199 --> 01:56:13,440 times the cryofans were stirred. It was 2913 01:56:11,440 --> 01:56:15,440 on the third stir that the wires floated 2914 01:56:13,440 --> 01:56:16,960 close enough together to arc. The rate 2915 01:56:15,440 --> 01:56:19,040 that they were stirring these fans was 2916 01:56:16,960 --> 01:56:20,719 changed from their original plans. 2917 01:56:19,040 --> 01:56:22,880 Because of that tank's quantity gauge 2918 01:56:20,719 --> 01:56:24,719 failing offscale high, ground control 2919 01:56:22,880 --> 01:56:28,560 wanted these cryotanks to be stirred at 2920 01:56:24,719 --> 01:56:32,480 a much higher rate. because of the uh O2 2921 01:56:28,560 --> 01:56:34,560 tank 2 quantity sensor dropout. Uh uh 2922 01:56:32,480 --> 01:56:37,520 ECOM wants to keep a little closer track 2923 01:56:34,560 --> 01:56:41,199 of the uh of the cryo quantities and 2924 01:56:37,520 --> 01:56:43,520 he's going to be asking you to stir all 2925 01:56:41,199 --> 01:56:45,719 the cryo tanks at slightly more frequent 2926 01:56:43,520 --> 01:56:48,719 intervals than um than have been 2927 01:56:45,719 --> 01:56:50,400 planned. And the first time is now. This 2928 01:56:48,719 --> 01:56:52,639 decision placed the third stir of the 2929 01:56:50,400 --> 01:56:54,080 oxygen tank within the only survivable 2930 01:56:52,639 --> 01:56:56,159 section of this mission where this 2931 01:56:54,080 --> 01:56:58,000 incident could happen. If this gauge 2932 01:56:56,159 --> 01:56:59,520 worked as intended, the cryos would have 2933 01:56:58,000 --> 01:57:01,599 been stirred at their normal rates, 2934 01:56:59,520 --> 01:57:04,000 placing the third stir of that cryopan 2935 01:57:01,599 --> 01:57:06,159 in lunar orbit with no way to return 2936 01:57:04,000 --> 01:57:08,000 home. During the explosion, the 2937 01:57:06,159 --> 01:57:09,920 telemetry indicated that the reactant 2938 01:57:08,000 --> 01:57:12,639 valves were just the oxygen on fuel 2939 01:57:09,920 --> 01:57:14,320 cells one and three were jolted closed. 2940 01:57:12,639 --> 01:57:15,920 The crew was not made aware of this 2941 01:57:14,320 --> 01:57:17,599 issue because the system on the service 2942 01:57:15,920 --> 01:57:19,760 module only reported if both the 2943 01:57:17,599 --> 01:57:21,679 hydrogen and oxygen reactant valves 2944 01:57:19,760 --> 01:57:23,520 closed. The hydrogen reactant valve 2945 01:57:21,679 --> 01:57:25,440 remained open and so the system showed 2946 01:57:23,520 --> 01:57:27,040 that they should still work. If the crew 2947 01:57:25,440 --> 01:57:28,560 had been made aware of this issue, they 2948 01:57:27,040 --> 01:57:30,400 could have opened those reactant valves 2949 01:57:28,560 --> 01:57:32,239 and sent oxygen from the still working 2950 01:57:30,400 --> 01:57:34,400 tank into those fuel cells to keep them 2951 01:57:32,239 --> 01:57:36,239 running. Because of this oversight, the 2952 01:57:34,400 --> 01:57:38,320 service module was stuck with a far 2953 01:57:36,239 --> 01:57:40,719 lower power output immediately following 2954 01:57:38,320 --> 01:57:42,159 the explosion. It also left mission 2955 01:57:40,719 --> 01:57:44,159 control in a position where they needed 2956 01:57:42,159 --> 01:57:46,159 to reroute their limited power onto the 2957 01:57:44,159 --> 01:57:47,599 dead AC bus 2 in order to start up 2958 01:57:46,159 --> 01:57:50,159 sensors just so they could figure out 2959 01:57:47,599 --> 01:57:51,840 what was going on. These findings along 2960 01:57:50,159 --> 01:57:53,679 with many others were used to issue 2961 01:57:51,840 --> 01:57:55,760 changes to procedure and upgrades to the 2962 01:57:53,679 --> 01:57:58,000 Saturn 5 rocket planned for future moon 2963 01:57:55,760 --> 01:57:59,599 landings. The oxygen tank would be 2964 01:57:58,000 --> 01:58:01,599 completely redesigned, removing the 2965 01:57:59,599 --> 01:58:03,520 teflon insulation and replacing it with 2966 01:58:01,599 --> 01:58:05,280 magnesium oxide, as well as sheathing 2967 01:58:03,520 --> 01:58:07,679 all of the wires together in stainless 2968 01:58:05,280 --> 01:58:09,360 steel. Now that NASA had more knowledge 2969 01:58:07,679 --> 01:58:11,280 about how superc critical oxygen moves 2970 01:58:09,360 --> 01:58:12,960 in a zeroravity environment, it was 2971 01:58:11,280 --> 01:58:15,520 decided that the cryopans could be 2972 01:58:12,960 --> 01:58:17,679 removed altogether. The quantity gauge 2973 01:58:15,520 --> 01:58:19,360 was redesigned. An emergency battery and 2974 01:58:17,679 --> 01:58:21,280 oxygen tank were added to the service 2975 01:58:19,360 --> 01:58:23,040 module. The warning alarm system was 2976 01:58:21,280 --> 01:58:24,800 redesigned and procedures for the lunar 2977 01:58:23,040 --> 01:58:27,119 module's lifeboat mode were dramatically 2978 01:58:24,800 --> 01:58:28,880 improved along with many other upgrades. 2979 01:58:27,119 --> 01:58:30,320 With the cause of the explosion tracked 2980 01:58:28,880 --> 01:58:31,920 down, the board closes their 2981 01:58:30,320 --> 01:58:34,080 investigation with this statement made 2982 01:58:31,920 --> 01:58:36,639 to the House of Representatives. The 2983 01:58:34,080 --> 01:58:38,400 Apollo 13 accident, which aborted man's 2984 01:58:36,639 --> 01:58:40,400 third mission to explore the surface of 2985 01:58:38,400 --> 01:58:42,800 the moon, is a harsh reminder of the 2986 01:58:40,400 --> 01:58:44,639 immense difficulty of this undertaking. 2987 01:58:42,800 --> 01:58:46,159 The total Apollo system of ground 2988 01:58:44,639 --> 01:58:48,000 complexes, launch vehicle, and 2989 01:58:46,159 --> 01:58:49,920 spacecraft constitutes the most 2990 01:58:48,000 --> 01:58:52,480 ambitious and demanding engineering 2991 01:58:49,920 --> 01:58:54,639 development ever undertaken by man. For 2992 01:58:52,480 --> 01:58:56,400 these missions to succeed, both men and 2993 01:58:54,639 --> 01:58:58,639 equipment must perform to near 2994 01:58:56,400 --> 01:59:00,880 perfection. That this system has already 2995 01:58:58,639 --> 01:59:02,880 resulted in two successful lunar surface 2996 01:59:00,880 --> 01:59:04,639 explorations is a tribute to those men 2997 01:59:02,880 --> 01:59:06,960 and women who conceived, designed, 2998 01:59:04,639 --> 01:59:08,800 built, and flew it. Perfection is not 2999 01:59:06,960 --> 01:59:11,520 only difficult to achieve, but difficult 3000 01:59:08,800 --> 01:59:14,320 to maintain. The imperfection in Apollo 3001 01:59:11,520 --> 01:59:16,320 13 constituted a near disaster, averted 3002 01:59:14,320 --> 01:59:17,760 only by outstanding performance on the 3003 01:59:16,320 --> 01:59:19,760 part of the crew and the ground control 3004 01:59:17,760 --> 01:59:22,080 team which supported them. The board 3005 01:59:19,760 --> 01:59:24,000 feels that the Apollo 13 accident holds 3006 01:59:22,080 --> 01:59:26,239 important lessons which when applied to 3007 01:59:24,000 --> 01:59:28,239 future missions will contribute to the 3008 01:59:26,239 --> 01:59:30,960 safety and effectiveness of man space 3009 01:59:28,239 --> 01:59:34,440 flight. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my 3010 01:59:30,960 --> 01:59:34,440 prepared statement. 3011 01:59:48,080 --> 01:59:51,679 Thanks for watching. Remember to 3012 01:59:49,520 --> 01:59:53,199 subscribe if you want to see more. I 3013 01:59:51,679 --> 01:59:54,639 also have a Blue Sky account and a 3014 01:59:53,199 --> 01:59:56,239 Discord server if you want to follow 3015 01:59:54,639 --> 01:59:58,639 those and see behind the scenes of these 3016 01:59:56,239 --> 02:00:00,159 videos. If you want some of the Blender 3017 01:59:58,639 --> 02:00:02,239 files I used in my videos, like the 3018 02:00:00,159 --> 02:00:03,920 Saturn 5 rocket I modeled for this one, 3019 02:00:02,239 --> 02:00:06,320 I'll have them up on my Patreon page 3020 02:00:03,920 --> 02:00:07,840 soon after this video is uploaded. Any 3021 02:00:06,320 --> 02:00:09,520 donations made through there or the 3022 02:00:07,840 --> 02:00:10,960 YouTube donation comment feature will 3023 02:00:09,520 --> 02:00:13,520 get a shout out at the end of my next 3024 02:00:10,960 --> 02:00:15,040 video as a thanks. Feel free to email or 3025 02:00:13,520 --> 02:00:17,920 message me on Discord for commission 3026 02:00:15,040 --> 02:00:19,599 work. I also make music videos and such. 3027 02:00:17,920 --> 02:00:21,040 If you like this video, you'll also like 3028 02:00:19,599 --> 02:00:25,320 the one I made on the Hubble Space 3029 02:00:21,040 --> 02:00:25,320 Telescope on screen now. 229354

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