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Apollo 13 was supposed to be the third
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manned moon landing to gather important
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science on a unique part of the moon.
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What NASA got instead was a life and
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death rescue mission, forcing them to
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attempt to save three astronauts
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stranded in a heavily damaged spacecraft
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on a trajectory that would miss Earth by
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thousands of miles. This is Apollo 13.
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We've got one more item for you when you
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got a chance. like
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it tried to reset and
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field problems like a lot of
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instrumentation. Go ahead. Oh, here's a
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problem. Apollo 11 had proven that we
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can put people on the moon and Apollo 12
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had done so accurately. Apollo 13's
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mission was to use those lessons learned
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to put astronauts on a specific region
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of the moon, the Fra Maro crater. This
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mission would have significantly more
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emphasis on gathering science and
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geological samples than the previous
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missions as the crew's training could
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focus more heavily on gathering science
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rather than just largely focusing on
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flying the spacecraft to the moon.
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Because of this, the selection of the
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landing site on the moon would be more
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important than the last two missions.
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Apollo 11's selection of landing sites
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had to be heavily restricted in order to
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keep the spacecraft in a free return
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trajectory. This was desirable because
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the spacecraft would already be on a
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path towards Earth if anything went
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wrong. Apollo 12 was the first to step
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out of this free return trajectory,
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which opened up more landing sites.
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Apollo 13's goal was to do that maneuver
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sooner. This would open up the Fromaro
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landing site, but at the cost of making
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this mission considerably more
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dangerous. The primary crew for this
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mission was supposed to be Jim Lovel,
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Fred Hayes, and Ken Mattingley. Plans
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would have to change fast, though, as
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just 6 days before the launch, one of
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the backup crew, Charles M. Duke, would
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fall ill to the Reubella virus. This
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would also expose both the primary and
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the backup crews to the virus. Blood
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samples from the astronauts would show
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that both Loville and Hayes had an
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immunity to Reubella, likely from being
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previously exposed, so they were not at
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risk of falling ill. John Young and Jack
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Swagert of the backup crew also had this
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immunity. Mattingly, however, did not.
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The incubation time of Reubella meant
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that if he did come down with the
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disease, it would be when they were
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scheduled to be in lunar orbit above the
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moon, possibly when Mattingly was
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supposed to be alone in the command
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module. Replacing the entire primary
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crew with the backup crew wasn't an
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option, as Duke would have still been
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symptomatic at launch. Delaying the
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mission until the next launch window 28
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days later also wasn't an option because
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of the expense involved. With a rapidly
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upcoming launch window, the decision was
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made just 3 days before launch to
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replace Maddingley with Jack Swagard.
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The crew would be launching on the
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Saturn 5 rocket, a design that had
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proven itself over the last two
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successful moon landings. This one,
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designated AS508, would have a weight
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just over 6.5 million pounds, making
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this at the time the heaviest spacecraft
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ever launched. 5 million of those pounds
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are just in the first stage alone. On
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the 11th of April, 1970, the crew would
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enter the rocket on pad 39A at Florida's
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Kennedy Space Center for its 2:13 p.m.
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launch, unaware that they would not
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reach their destination. 10 9 8 Ignition
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sequence has started. 6 5 4 3 2 1 zero.
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We have commit and we have liftoff at
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213. The Saturn 5 building up to 7.6 6
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million pounds of thrust and it is clear
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the tower. This is mission control
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Houston. We appear to have a good first
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stage at this point.
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13 Houston go at 30 seconds.
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Roll complete and we're pitching. Roger
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that. Standby for mode one
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bravo. Mark one bravo command. And the
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booster engineer reports we're now
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through the region of maximum dynamic
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pressure and we'll go.
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13 Houston standby for mode one Charlie.
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Mark your one Charlie. Mark one Charlie
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and 13 you're go for staging. Go for
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staging for EDS
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[Music]
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manual. There's no ignition.
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Roger.
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[Music]
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Power. The Saturn 5's first and second
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stages are powered by five liquidfueled
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engines, which gives the rocket some
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redundancy if one of them were to fail.
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This would be the first significant
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malfunction Apollo 13 would have to
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endure as the central engine
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unexpectedly shuts down. Even though an
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engine had failed on the second stage of
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the rocket, the mission was still a go.
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13 Houston, trajectory is good, thrust
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is good. Roger. The remaining engines
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could still use all the fuel left in the
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tanks, but they would be dragging around
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a dead engine. So, they would be
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slightly short of their expected speed
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once the stage finished its burn. And
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Level reports that the guidance system
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is correcting the small errors and for
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ignition Houston.
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Roger that, Jim. Thrust looks good. The
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second stage did its job by burning for
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34 seconds longer than planned to
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account for the lost engine. It's now up
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to the third stage to make up the rest
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of the velocity and put the spacecraft
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into orbit. The third stage would burn
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for around 2 minutes and 40 seconds, 9
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seconds longer than originally planned.
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The longer burns on both stages were
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enough to overcome the lost energy from
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the engine failure. After reading the
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velocity, Apollo 13 was just 1.9 ft per
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second slower than expected. And the
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flight dynamics officer says at first
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glance, we look good on the orbit. The
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spacecraft had entered its planned orbit
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around Earth at 100 nautical miles,
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traveling
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25,566 ft per second. Apollo 13 is now
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traveling 21 times faster than a bullet.
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The astronauts will use this opportunity
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to calibrate their navigational and
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scientific instruments to their new
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environment in space in zero gravity.
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This also gives the third stage engine a
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chance to cool down and regain the
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pressure on its tanks before its next
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firing to get it to the moon. After one
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and a half orbits, Apollo 13 begins its
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trans lunar injection burn. You are go
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for TLI.
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Understand. And just out of curiosity,
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uh was that engine out uh to be some
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more S4B fuel?
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Uh the engine out did cause you to use
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uh more S4B fuel. Uh about a 10-second
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longer burn, but you're still going.
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Okay. Thank you. This burn would bring
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the spacecraft out of Earth's orbit and
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put it in front of the path of the moon.
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The trajectory was aimed at where the
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moon would be in 3 days when the
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spacecraft was planned to get
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there. The spacecraft would be flown in
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front of the moon and the moon's gravity
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would swing the spacecraft back towards
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Earth. This maneuver is known as a free
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return trajectory. It's a free return
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because they don't have to spend any
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fuel to get back to Earth. This
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trajectory was chosen for safety
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reasons. Even if the spacecraft's main
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engine was lost, the astronauts would
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still return home. This decision would
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become incredibly important in
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determining the future survival of the
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astronauts. The third stage would
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continue its second and final burn,
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launching the spacecraft to the moon. It
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was mission critical that this stage
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burned for just the right amount of
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time. If they were too slow, the moon
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would have too much influence on the
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spacecraft once it got there, bringing
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it too far from Earth to be captured. If
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the spacecraft was too fast, it would
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fly past the moon too quickly and not
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allow it to point the spacecraft's
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trajectory completely back towards Earth
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once it leaves its influence. After the
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burn was completed, the astronauts
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measured how far off they were from
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their planned speed and trajectory. And
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13 Houston, the booster reports uh that
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everything looks good with the S4.
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Sounds good, Houston. Uh the ride was uh
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very nominal. We had a little vibration
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though during most of the run.
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Okay, we copied your call on that, Jim.
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Okay, uh Joe, uh the discy read uh
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35560 and delta VC was minus 3.0.
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They're now traveling
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35,560 ft per second, just 3 ft per
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second higher than anticipated. Oh,
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Roger. You can't ask for much better
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than that. Uh they had just entered
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their free return trajectory. They would
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now prepare for a maneuver that needed
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to be just as precise as the last. This
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is mission control. We're now at 2 hours
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54 minutes with the crew preparing for
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the CSM
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uh separation from the S4B, the
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subsequent docking with the lunar module
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and the ejection of the uh LMAN command
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module from the Saturn third stage. Jack
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Swagger would be flying this by hand.
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[Music]
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Telemetry data here on the ground
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indicates that the spacecraft has
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separated from the
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S4B. Astronaut Jack Swagert at this time
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would be in the commander's couch, the
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lefth hand couch at the controls of the
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spacecraft during the transposition and
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docking maneuvers. Swagert now needs to
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flip the command module around to line
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it up with the lunar module.
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That's quite a bang, Joe. We're
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separated. We've pitched around about
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60° now.
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Okay, we got the uh flaw panels. One of
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them's out front now.
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Awesome. Swagger then uses the hand
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controllers to bring the two spacecraft
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together. A target is visible on the
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lunar module that can be lined up with a
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reticle inside of the command module,
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similar to a red dot site. This way both
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vehicles can be easily lined
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up. A probe on the top of the command
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module will lock inside of the lunar
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module once they're properly
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docked. The probe will bring the two
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spacecraft together and automatically
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secure them with latches.
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[Music]
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Now, preloaded springs would separate
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the lunar module from the third stage,
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and reaction control thrusters would
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continue to pull them apart. The crew
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would wait to see the third stage
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floating away, and then they would radio
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mission control to send signals to the
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stage, which would fire thrusters and
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remotely move it further away from the
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crude modules. Mission control would
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command the third stage into a
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trajectory that would crash into the
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moon. This was done on purpose so that
273
00:11:05,360 --> 00:11:08,640
probes already landed on the moon could
274
00:11:07,040 --> 00:11:10,560
detect the impact from the stage and
275
00:11:08,640 --> 00:11:12,880
collect data from a known mass hitting a
276
00:11:10,560 --> 00:11:14,560
known place at a known speed. This would
277
00:11:12,880 --> 00:11:16,240
provide valuable information about the
278
00:11:14,560 --> 00:11:18,640
moon's composition and what's underneath
279
00:11:16,240 --> 00:11:20,720
its surface. The crew was now prepared
280
00:11:18,640 --> 00:11:22,399
for their 3-day journey to the moon.
281
00:11:20,720 --> 00:11:24,320
This break in the action gave the crew
282
00:11:22,399 --> 00:11:26,240
that time to focus on slightly less
283
00:11:24,320 --> 00:11:28,880
immediately life-threatening tasks like
284
00:11:26,240 --> 00:11:30,480
Earth photography. Roger. We're at that
285
00:11:28,880 --> 00:11:32,560
stage now where we're going to take some
286
00:11:30,480 --> 00:11:34,959
Earth weather photography. If you're
287
00:11:32,560 --> 00:11:36,160
standing by, I have the camera aimed at
288
00:11:34,959 --> 00:11:39,279
the Earth right now and I'll give you a
289
00:11:36,160 --> 00:11:41,440
mark uh when I take this first picture.
290
00:11:39,279 --> 00:11:44,720
Roger. Uh we copy, Jim. We'll be
291
00:11:41,440 --> 00:11:50,160
standing by for the mark. Okay, Houston.
292
00:11:44,720 --> 00:11:52,880
3 2 1 Mark.
293
00:11:50,160 --> 00:11:54,640
Roger. Copy. A photograph of Earth would
294
00:11:52,880 --> 00:11:56,160
be taken every 20 minutes so that the
295
00:11:54,640 --> 00:11:57,760
movement of the weather can be observed
296
00:11:56,160 --> 00:12:01,360
when the images are stacked on top of
297
00:11:57,760 --> 00:12:03,279
each other. 11 would be taken in total.
298
00:12:01,360 --> 00:12:05,519
The command service module will use its
299
00:12:03,279 --> 00:12:07,760
RCS thrusters to force the spacecraft
300
00:12:05,519 --> 00:12:09,600
into a slow roll. This is so that no
301
00:12:07,760 --> 00:12:11,360
part of the spacecraft is exposed to the
302
00:12:09,600 --> 00:12:12,839
sun for too long and it would even out
303
00:12:11,360 --> 00:12:14,880
the heating effects over the whole
304
00:12:12,839 --> 00:12:18,320
spacecraft. This maneuver was called
305
00:12:14,880 --> 00:12:19,839
passive thermal control or PTC. With the
306
00:12:18,320 --> 00:12:21,360
spacecraft set up for its three-day
307
00:12:19,839 --> 00:12:25,639
journey to the moon, the crew could
308
00:12:21,360 --> 00:12:25,639
catch up in some much needed sleep.
309
00:12:26,079 --> 00:12:31,200
Hello, Houston. Houston 13. Good
310
00:12:29,440 --> 00:12:36,680
morning, 13. This is Houston. How are
311
00:12:31,200 --> 00:12:36,680
you? Radio Mountain clearly.
312
00:12:37,920 --> 00:12:42,639
And I have a small flight plan update
313
00:12:40,560 --> 00:12:44,880
for you sometime a little later on when
314
00:12:42,639 --> 00:12:48,639
you're ready to copy. There's uh no big
315
00:12:44,880 --> 00:12:51,760
deals in it. and uh 13 Houston, we'd
316
00:12:48,639 --> 00:12:53,839
like to verify that you cycle the O2
317
00:12:51,760 --> 00:12:56,959
cryofans. We saw the H2, but we didn't
318
00:12:53,839 --> 00:12:58,880
see the O2 get stirred up. In zero
319
00:12:56,959 --> 00:13:00,720
gravity, the contents of superc critical
320
00:12:58,880 --> 00:13:02,720
tanks would sometimes separate out into
321
00:13:00,720 --> 00:13:04,560
portions of different density. If a
322
00:13:02,720 --> 00:13:06,240
region of high or low density was picked
323
00:13:04,560 --> 00:13:08,000
up by the sensor in the tank, it would
324
00:13:06,240 --> 00:13:10,320
give off a false reading and set off
325
00:13:08,000 --> 00:13:11,920
alarms. Because of this, the contents of
326
00:13:10,320 --> 00:13:13,680
the super critical tanks had to be
327
00:13:11,920 --> 00:13:15,279
stirred with fans in order to get an
328
00:13:13,680 --> 00:13:17,519
accurate reading of the tank's real
329
00:13:15,279 --> 00:13:20,720
pressure.
330
00:13:17,519 --> 00:13:21,839
Uh yeah, Joe, we did. And uh kind of
331
00:13:20,720 --> 00:13:23,920
looked like we might have had a little
332
00:13:21,839 --> 00:13:27,839
stratification cuz right after we put
333
00:13:23,920 --> 00:13:30,000
them on, we had a a cryop press light.
334
00:13:27,839 --> 00:13:31,720
Okay. ECOM told me that might happen and
335
00:13:30,000 --> 00:13:37,120
he was
336
00:13:31,720 --> 00:13:40,519
right. Okay. At uh 23 hours, the total
337
00:13:37,120 --> 00:13:44,000
RCS is one
338
00:13:40,519 --> 00:13:47,000
121. Uh and the cryoss are as follows.
339
00:13:44,000 --> 00:13:50,680
H2 tank 1
340
00:13:47,000 --> 00:13:54,680
83%. H2 tank 2
341
00:13:50,680 --> 00:13:58,519
86%. O2 tank 1
342
00:13:54,680 --> 00:14:02,519
87%. O2 tank 2
343
00:13:58,519 --> 00:14:02,519
87%. Over.
344
00:14:04,079 --> 00:14:08,160
You forgot. We'd like to hear what the
345
00:14:05,680 --> 00:14:12,720
news is. Okay. There's not a whole lot
346
00:14:08,160 --> 00:14:14,000
to it. Um, okay. Let's see. The Beatles
347
00:14:12,720 --> 00:14:16,720
have announced they will no longer
348
00:14:14,000 --> 00:14:18,480
perform as a group. The quartet is
349
00:14:16,720 --> 00:14:20,320
reported to have made in excess of a
350
00:14:18,480 --> 00:14:23,360
half billion dollars during their short
351
00:14:20,320 --> 00:14:24,959
musical career. However, rumors that
352
00:14:23,360 --> 00:14:29,279
they will use this money to start their
353
00:14:24,959 --> 00:14:33,519
own space program uh are false.
354
00:14:29,279 --> 00:14:35,040
Hey, we can borrow some. Okay. Uh some
355
00:14:33,519 --> 00:14:36,800
truck lines are being struck in the
356
00:14:35,040 --> 00:14:38,360
Midwest and the school teachers have
357
00:14:36,800 --> 00:14:41,680
walked off the job in
358
00:14:38,360 --> 00:14:43,760
Minneapolis. Uh, today's favorite
359
00:14:41,680 --> 00:14:47,090
pastime across the U. Uh-oh. Have you
360
00:14:43,760 --> 00:14:49,680
guys completed your income tax?
361
00:14:47,090 --> 00:14:51,519
[Applause]
362
00:14:49,680 --> 00:14:53,040
How do I apply for an extension?
363
00:14:51,519 --> 00:14:54,639
Louisville makes a joke about forgetting
364
00:14:53,040 --> 00:14:56,560
to file his taxes and needing an
365
00:14:54,639 --> 00:14:58,720
extension, not realizing that that is
366
00:14:56,560 --> 00:15:00,800
the exact situation that Jack Swagard is
367
00:14:58,720 --> 00:15:05,199
actually in.
368
00:15:00,800 --> 00:15:06,639
Uh, I got a Hey, this that ain't a funny
369
00:15:05,199 --> 00:15:08,480
kind of things kind of happened real
370
00:15:06,639 --> 00:15:12,519
fast down there.
371
00:15:08,480 --> 00:15:12,519
I I do need an extension.
372
00:15:12,560 --> 00:15:17,040
I didn't get mine filed. I'm really
373
00:15:14,720 --> 00:15:20,639
serious. Would you You're breaking up
374
00:15:17,040 --> 00:15:23,440
the room time in a We'll I may be
375
00:15:20,639 --> 00:15:25,440
spending time in I may be spending time
376
00:15:23,440 --> 00:15:28,560
in another quarantine besides the one
377
00:15:25,440 --> 00:15:30,399
that they they're planning for me. We'll
378
00:15:28,560 --> 00:15:32,480
see what we can do, Jack. We'll get with
379
00:15:30,399 --> 00:15:34,399
recovery and see if we can get the uh
380
00:15:32,480 --> 00:15:38,560
the agent out there in the Pacific when
381
00:15:34,399 --> 00:15:41,279
you come back. Uh uh Houston, this is
382
00:15:38,560 --> 00:15:43,199
13. Is it is it true that Jack's income
383
00:15:41,279 --> 00:15:46,399
tax return was going to be used to buy
384
00:15:43,199 --> 00:15:48,160
the asset fuel for the Well, considering
385
00:15:46,399 --> 00:15:51,360
that he's a bachelor and hasn't got that
386
00:15:48,160 --> 00:15:52,880
deduction to take. Yeah. Hey Joe, I'm
387
00:15:51,360 --> 00:15:55,360
glad you brought that up because I was
388
00:15:52,880 --> 00:15:57,440
really serious about that. And Jim
389
00:15:55,360 --> 00:15:59,800
McDivet says, "Yeah, now that you
390
00:15:57,440 --> 00:16:02,000
mentioned he forgot to fill the asset
391
00:15:59,800 --> 00:16:04,560
stage, should give you very good
392
00:16:02,000 --> 00:16:06,560
performance on descent. You should have
393
00:16:04,560 --> 00:16:08,160
a lot more hover time, huh? That's
394
00:16:06,560 --> 00:16:09,959
right.
395
00:16:08,160 --> 00:16:12,720
This is Apollo
396
00:16:09,959 --> 00:16:15,360
control. 27 hours 20 minutes ground
397
00:16:12,720 --> 00:16:17,839
elapse time. The crew rather quiet
398
00:16:15,360 --> 00:16:22,160
during this period. Still in the passive
399
00:16:17,839 --> 00:16:22,160
thermal control barbecue
400
00:16:22,199 --> 00:16:28,040
mode. Velocity now
401
00:16:25,399 --> 00:16:32,000
4,991 ft per
402
00:16:28,040 --> 00:16:36,680
second. coming up in uh slightly over 20
403
00:16:32,000 --> 00:16:39,600
seconds on uh the midpoint in
404
00:16:36,680 --> 00:16:42,480
distance and at which time the uh
405
00:16:39,600 --> 00:16:45,440
spacecraft will be equally far from the
406
00:16:42,480 --> 00:16:45,440
earth and from the
407
00:16:45,560 --> 00:16:52,079
moon. The distance at this time will be
408
00:16:49,079 --> 00:16:52,079
uh
409
00:16:52,440 --> 00:17:00,120
128,880.5 statute miles coming up Mark.
410
00:16:57,440 --> 00:17:03,199
continuing to leave the circuit
411
00:17:00,120 --> 00:17:05,199
live as we anticipate uh further
412
00:17:03,199 --> 00:17:07,559
discussions and later on today the
413
00:17:05,199 --> 00:17:10,799
midcourse correction burn number
414
00:17:07,559 --> 00:17:12,120
two which will take Apollo 13 out of the
415
00:17:10,799 --> 00:17:15,480
free return
416
00:17:12,120 --> 00:17:18,000
trajectory into the so-called hybrid
417
00:17:15,480 --> 00:17:20,400
trajectory which would not necessarily
418
00:17:18,000 --> 00:17:22,240
return to the vicinity of the Earth. The
419
00:17:20,400 --> 00:17:25,439
closest approach would be something in
420
00:17:22,240 --> 00:17:28,520
the nature of 40,000 miles coming back
421
00:17:25,439 --> 00:17:30,960
from the non-free return
422
00:17:28,520 --> 00:17:34,400
trajectory. Just passing comment Joe.
423
00:17:30,960 --> 00:17:37,320
We're having lunch right now and I just
424
00:17:34,400 --> 00:17:40,160
made myself a hot dog sandwich with
425
00:17:37,320 --> 00:17:44,160
ketchup. Very tasty and almost unheard
426
00:17:40,160 --> 00:17:46,400
of in the old days. Uh that's correct.
427
00:17:44,160 --> 00:17:48,240
13. As I recall the flight plan, you're
428
00:17:46,400 --> 00:17:50,320
supposed to put mustard on the hot dogs
429
00:17:48,240 --> 00:17:53,040
and not ketchup, but uh I guess we'll
430
00:17:50,320 --> 00:17:54,919
overlook that.
431
00:17:53,040 --> 00:17:59,679
[Applause]
432
00:17:54,919 --> 00:18:01,600
Right. Apollo 13, Houston.
433
00:17:59,679 --> 00:18:04,000
Go ahead, Joe.
434
00:18:01,600 --> 00:18:06,480
Hey, uh you got a new Capcom on now with
435
00:18:04,000 --> 00:18:09,760
the black crew and we have about three
436
00:18:06,480 --> 00:18:12,799
items to give you, Jack.
437
00:18:09,760 --> 00:18:16,320
Uh, I'm going to give you uh some high
438
00:18:12,799 --> 00:18:20,080
gain antenna angles for TV and the rest
439
00:18:16,320 --> 00:18:25,039
is just information. Uh, and uh the last
440
00:18:20,080 --> 00:18:27,120
items for Jack. Jack, uh, preliminary
441
00:18:25,039 --> 00:18:30,400
indications are that you can get a
442
00:18:27,120 --> 00:18:34,080
60-day extension on your filing your
443
00:18:30,400 --> 00:18:37,679
income tax if you're out of the country.
444
00:18:34,080 --> 00:18:39,360
That's good news. I guess I qualify.
445
00:18:37,679 --> 00:18:41,160
Yeah, we were just looking at the map
446
00:18:39,360 --> 00:18:44,480
and you're south of Florida,
447
00:18:41,160 --> 00:18:46,559
so you're not in the country now. Jim,
448
00:18:44,480 --> 00:18:49,200
Houston, you're looking good down here.
449
00:18:46,559 --> 00:18:50,559
Go for the burn. The crew had just
450
00:18:49,200 --> 00:18:52,799
received the go message for their
451
00:18:50,559 --> 00:18:54,240
midcourse correction 2 burn. This burn
452
00:18:52,799 --> 00:18:56,320
would bring the spacecraft out of its
453
00:18:54,240 --> 00:18:58,240
safe pre-return trajectory and put it
454
00:18:56,320 --> 00:19:00,559
into a hybrid trajectory closer to the
455
00:18:58,240 --> 00:19:02,559
moon's surface. If the spacecraft were
456
00:19:00,559 --> 00:19:04,320
to not make any burns after this one, it
457
00:19:02,559 --> 00:19:06,020
would miss Earth by thousands of miles
458
00:19:04,320 --> 00:19:13,540
on its return.
459
00:19:06,020 --> 00:19:13,540
[Music]
460
00:19:13,919 --> 00:19:17,760
After their short burn, they were now on
461
00:19:15,679 --> 00:19:20,640
the correct trajectory towards the Fraro
462
00:19:17,760 --> 00:19:22,160
crater and away from Earth. With this
463
00:19:20,640 --> 00:19:23,760
day of work complete, they could now
464
00:19:22,160 --> 00:19:27,120
begin their second rest period of the
465
00:19:23,760 --> 00:19:31,120
mission to regain some sleep.
466
00:19:27,120 --> 00:19:34,240
Houston, Houston, fin.
467
00:19:31,120 --> 00:19:36,480
Good morning, 13. You're early.
468
00:19:34,240 --> 00:19:39,919
Uh, so I just thought we'd wake you up
469
00:19:36,480 --> 00:19:43,400
and uh we're uh we're awake and uh
470
00:19:39,919 --> 00:19:46,240
getting the uh spacecraft ship shape and
471
00:19:43,400 --> 00:19:47,840
see uh roger. Spacecraft's in real good
472
00:19:46,240 --> 00:19:50,799
shape as far as we're concerned, Jim.
473
00:19:47,840 --> 00:19:53,080
We're board to tears down here. Uh we do
474
00:19:50,799 --> 00:19:56,559
have a few little items for you like a
475
00:19:53,080 --> 00:19:58,480
P37 update and a couple of flight plan
476
00:19:56,559 --> 00:20:01,520
updates. Uh but there's no rush about
477
00:19:58,480 --> 00:20:03,039
them. Over. And it might be interesting
478
00:20:01,520 --> 00:20:05,840
that just after we went to sleep last
479
00:20:03,039 --> 00:20:08,080
night, we had a master alarm and uh it
480
00:20:05,840 --> 00:20:10,640
really scared us and we rolled over the
481
00:20:08,080 --> 00:20:12,080
cockpit like a wet noodle.
482
00:20:10,640 --> 00:20:15,360
Sorry, it wasn't something more
483
00:20:12,080 --> 00:20:18,400
significant. Uh uh I've also got a a
484
00:20:15,360 --> 00:20:20,240
procedure for you on that H2 tank. Uh
485
00:20:18,400 --> 00:20:22,480
simple thing after you get done stirring
486
00:20:20,240 --> 00:20:24,640
up the cryos. The pressure inside of the
487
00:20:22,480 --> 00:20:26,640
spacecraft super critical hydrogen tank
488
00:20:24,640 --> 00:20:28,960
2 had been fluctuating enough to set off
489
00:20:26,640 --> 00:20:30,480
pressure alarms and startle the crew.
490
00:20:28,960 --> 00:20:33,360
This was an issue they would begin to
491
00:20:30,480 --> 00:20:35,120
troubleshoot when a new issue arose.
492
00:20:33,360 --> 00:20:37,840
I've got a consumables update for you,
493
00:20:35,120 --> 00:20:41,640
Jim, if you're ready for that.
494
00:20:37,840 --> 00:20:46,280
Ready to copy. Okay. As of 47
495
00:20:41,640 --> 00:20:50,960
hours, RCS total 10 niner
496
00:20:46,280 --> 00:20:53,039
6 and the H2 uh they gave me the H2s in
497
00:20:50,960 --> 00:20:56,960
percent
498
00:20:53,039 --> 00:21:00,200
uh 76%.
499
00:20:56,960 --> 00:21:03,200
And on the O2 we have
500
00:21:00,200 --> 00:21:05,200
81%. However, we show the O2 Tank 2
501
00:21:03,200 --> 00:21:07,120
reading offscale high. Now, we're quite
502
00:21:05,200 --> 00:21:08,480
sure it's a uh it's a sensor failure.
503
00:21:07,120 --> 00:21:10,480
We'd like you to verify it with your
504
00:21:08,480 --> 00:21:12,200
onboard reading.
505
00:21:10,480 --> 00:21:16,320
Okay, stand
506
00:21:12,200 --> 00:21:19,520
by. Uh Joe, we confirm uh our gauge
507
00:21:16,320 --> 00:21:21,679
reading is uh the number two attack is
508
00:21:19,520 --> 00:21:23,840
no scale high now, but that just tells
509
00:21:21,679 --> 00:21:26,960
me that uh it was okay when you first
510
00:21:23,840 --> 00:21:30,039
went this morning. Uh we we verify that
511
00:21:26,960 --> 00:21:34,000
at uh 4645 we had
512
00:21:30,039 --> 00:21:36,600
82%. And uh apparently uh uh when he
513
00:21:34,000 --> 00:21:40,240
stirred the uh the cryos
514
00:21:36,600 --> 00:21:41,520
uh the sensor broke. Now not only is
515
00:21:40,240 --> 00:21:43,679
their hydrogen tanks pressure
516
00:21:41,520 --> 00:21:46,559
fluctuating, but the quantity sensor for
517
00:21:43,679 --> 00:21:48,480
oxygen tank 2 was reading offscale high.
518
00:21:46,559 --> 00:21:49,840
Oxygen tank one sensor seemed to be
519
00:21:48,480 --> 00:21:51,520
working. So that one could be used to
520
00:21:49,840 --> 00:21:53,600
get a general idea of the pressure in
521
00:21:51,520 --> 00:21:55,440
tank 2 as long as they're used evenly.
522
00:21:53,600 --> 00:21:57,600
This moon landing is still very much a
523
00:21:55,440 --> 00:22:00,600
go.
524
00:21:57,600 --> 00:22:00,600
13.
525
00:22:01,919 --> 00:22:07,440
Go ahead. All right, Jack. Uh, one uh
526
00:22:04,880 --> 00:22:10,080
one thing we'd like to have done uh
527
00:22:07,440 --> 00:22:12,720
sometime soon is to have you cycle the
528
00:22:10,080 --> 00:22:14,000
cryo fans in O2 tank 2 one more time. We
529
00:22:12,720 --> 00:22:17,000
like to see if we can get that sensor
530
00:22:14,000 --> 00:22:17,000
back.
531
00:22:17,520 --> 00:22:24,720
Okay. Go on. O2 tank two fan on down.
532
00:22:22,000 --> 00:22:24,720
Roger.
533
00:22:34,799 --> 00:22:38,600
follow 13 Houston.
534
00:22:38,640 --> 00:22:44,240
Go ahead, Joe. We're ready to have the
535
00:22:40,400 --> 00:22:44,240
O2 tank to fan off it. Thank
536
00:22:45,159 --> 00:22:53,520
you. Okay. Doesn't look like it got it
537
00:22:48,400 --> 00:22:53,520
back, huh? Uh, no it doesn't, Jack.
538
00:22:53,559 --> 00:23:02,880
Apollo 13, Houston. Go ahead. Uh, roger
539
00:22:58,720 --> 00:23:06,640
13. Uh, because of the, uh, O2 take 2
540
00:23:02,880 --> 00:23:08,480
quantity sensor dropout, u, uh, ECOM
541
00:23:06,640 --> 00:23:11,120
wants to keep a little closer track of
542
00:23:08,480 --> 00:23:14,880
the, uh, of the cryo quantities. And
543
00:23:11,120 --> 00:23:17,120
he's going to be asking you to stir all
544
00:23:14,880 --> 00:23:19,200
the cryotanks at slightly more frequent
545
00:23:17,120 --> 00:23:21,919
intervals than um, than have been
546
00:23:19,200 --> 00:23:23,520
planned. And the first time is now. And
547
00:23:21,919 --> 00:23:25,520
we'll be calling you probably every five
548
00:23:23,520 --> 00:23:28,400
or six hours except during sleep periods
549
00:23:25,520 --> 00:23:30,580
and uh and high activity periods. We'd
550
00:23:28,400 --> 00:23:32,480
like you to do it now. Over.
551
00:23:30,580 --> 00:23:37,200
[Music]
552
00:23:32,480 --> 00:23:37,200
Okay. We'll start a stir now. Thank
553
00:23:37,320 --> 00:23:42,159
you. And 13 Houston for your
554
00:23:40,159 --> 00:23:44,240
information. A normal 1 minute or so
555
00:23:42,159 --> 00:23:46,400
stir would be They would begin to
556
00:23:44,240 --> 00:23:48,080
regularly stir both of the oxygen tanks
557
00:23:46,400 --> 00:23:50,240
to get a more accurate read on what was
558
00:23:48,080 --> 00:23:52,120
left in them. This would help them infer
559
00:23:50,240 --> 00:23:54,799
how much was in the tank with a broken
560
00:23:52,120 --> 00:23:57,039
sensor. The command module wasn't alone
561
00:23:54,799 --> 00:23:58,880
in its super critical tank issues. The
562
00:23:57,039 --> 00:24:00,640
lunar module's helium tanks had been
563
00:23:58,880 --> 00:24:03,200
tested on the ground and had shown some
564
00:24:00,640 --> 00:24:04,880
signs of poor insulation. Ground control
565
00:24:03,200 --> 00:24:06,799
wanted a reading of the pressures on
566
00:24:04,880 --> 00:24:08,640
board inside of the lunar module. So,
567
00:24:06,799 --> 00:24:11,679
they radioed the crew to enter the lunar
568
00:24:08,640 --> 00:24:14,960
module 3 hours earlier than planned.
569
00:24:11,679 --> 00:24:17,440
Okay. Uh, the LMP is entered.
570
00:24:14,960 --> 00:24:20,240
Roger.
571
00:24:17,440 --> 00:24:22,400
Okay. And it just flickered down to 710.
572
00:24:20,240 --> 00:24:23,919
It's going to flickering between 710 and
573
00:24:22,400 --> 00:24:27,200
720.
574
00:24:23,919 --> 00:24:29,760
Roger. 710 to 720.
575
00:24:27,200 --> 00:24:33,279
Our super critical helium pressure
576
00:24:29,760 --> 00:24:36,039
reading was 720 lb per square inch. Uh,
577
00:24:33,279 --> 00:24:39,679
a very desirable
578
00:24:36,039 --> 00:24:42,080
number. We're at 54 hours 53 minutes now
579
00:24:39,679 --> 00:24:45,400
into the flight.
580
00:24:42,080 --> 00:24:48,720
Apollo 13 at
581
00:24:45,400 --> 00:24:51,279
176,171 nautical miles away from Earth.
582
00:24:48,720 --> 00:24:53,840
We're standing by now for receipt of
583
00:24:51,279 --> 00:24:55,840
television. The crew deploys the high
584
00:24:53,840 --> 00:24:57,600
gain antenna in order to send over a
585
00:24:55,840 --> 00:24:59,520
video signal that would be broadcasted
586
00:24:57,600 --> 00:25:00,960
to people's televisions. The crew would
587
00:24:59,520 --> 00:25:02,640
need to stop their passive thermal
588
00:25:00,960 --> 00:25:04,799
control role in order to line up their
589
00:25:02,640 --> 00:25:06,480
antenna with Earth. The success of the
590
00:25:04,799 --> 00:25:08,000
previous two moon landings gave the
591
00:25:06,480 --> 00:25:09,600
public a false impression that these
592
00:25:08,000 --> 00:25:11,159
missions were now routine and didn't
593
00:25:09,600 --> 00:25:13,600
pose a significant risk to the
594
00:25:11,159 --> 00:25:15,039
astronauts. As such, the media largely
595
00:25:13,600 --> 00:25:17,520
felt it wasn't in their interest to
596
00:25:15,039 --> 00:25:20,080
cover this mission. No TV networks would
597
00:25:17,520 --> 00:25:21,520
show Apollo 13's broadcast. The crew
598
00:25:20,080 --> 00:25:23,039
would attempt to give a good show
599
00:25:21,520 --> 00:25:24,640
regardless of the public's apparent
600
00:25:23,039 --> 00:25:26,240
disinterest.
601
00:25:24,640 --> 00:25:28,159
Okay, Houston, we'll try to pick you up
602
00:25:26,240 --> 00:25:30,640
on high gain.
603
00:25:28,159 --> 00:25:34,310
Apollo control Houston standing by now
604
00:25:30,640 --> 00:25:36,960
for receipt of television transmission.
605
00:25:34,310 --> 00:25:39,279
[Applause]
606
00:25:36,960 --> 00:25:42,240
We're now re receiving a transmission,
607
00:25:39,279 --> 00:25:47,320
television transmission.
608
00:25:42,240 --> 00:25:47,320
Okay. 13. We got on TV.
609
00:25:49,440 --> 00:25:52,880
Uh the limb, as you can see, it uh
610
00:25:51,440 --> 00:25:55,559
looked pretty clean. And I found a
611
00:25:52,880 --> 00:25:58,480
couple of loose washers about it. And
612
00:25:55,559 --> 00:26:00,320
the a little plastic cap off the
613
00:25:58,480 --> 00:26:05,520
sequence camera had come loose. And I
614
00:26:00,320 --> 00:26:05,520
found it uh lodged over by the ED
615
00:26:06,840 --> 00:26:12,159
panel right under uh Jeff. Now he's
616
00:26:10,080 --> 00:26:15,840
actually standing on a what looks to be
617
00:26:12,159 --> 00:26:18,559
a can here. And uh for the sake of all
618
00:26:15,840 --> 00:26:22,480
the people back there uh housed inside
619
00:26:18,559 --> 00:26:25,039
this can is the u the lamb mass engine
620
00:26:22,480 --> 00:26:26,360
or hopefully you can see my hand resting
621
00:26:25,039 --> 00:26:29,279
on top of right
622
00:26:26,360 --> 00:26:31,840
now. The engine that uh we used to get
623
00:26:29,279 --> 00:26:31,840
off of the
624
00:26:31,880 --> 00:26:37,679
moon and I guess this uh an app
625
00:26:34,960 --> 00:26:39,080
description for this device would be a
626
00:26:37,679 --> 00:26:41,600
fish
627
00:26:39,080 --> 00:26:44,720
scale. And you can see I'm weighing
628
00:26:41,600 --> 00:26:47,120
myself right now. and uh says a way
629
00:26:44,720 --> 00:26:49,679
actually less than zero right now. Guess
630
00:26:47,120 --> 00:26:52,480
it's calibration in too good. That'll be
631
00:26:49,679 --> 00:26:56,400
the day.
632
00:26:52,480 --> 00:26:59,360
Okay. What I have out now, Jack, is
633
00:26:56,400 --> 00:27:02,400
uh Levo, which is also been shown
634
00:26:59,360 --> 00:27:03,880
before. It's a head garment uh for
635
00:27:02,400 --> 00:27:06,640
wearing out on the
636
00:27:03,880 --> 00:27:09,360
surface. And I I'm bringing gems out
637
00:27:06,640 --> 00:27:11,919
here to show a couple of mods.
638
00:27:09,360 --> 00:27:14,080
One problem before is that uh the cast
639
00:27:11,919 --> 00:27:17,320
of characters out on the surface haven't
640
00:27:14,080 --> 00:27:20,559
been able to be distinguished apart very
641
00:27:17,320 --> 00:27:23,520
well. So, not only Jim Suit has some red
642
00:27:20,559 --> 00:27:28,400
stripes on it, but as you can see, his
643
00:27:23,520 --> 00:27:28,400
lema also has a a red
644
00:27:29,080 --> 00:27:33,520
stripe. And uh now you can see one other
645
00:27:31,919 --> 00:27:38,320
mod too here, Jack, which I hadn't
646
00:27:33,520 --> 00:27:42,039
really seen myself before. Uh I guess on
647
00:27:38,320 --> 00:27:44,640
12 Pete now had uh commented about the
648
00:27:42,039 --> 00:27:47,279
uh commented about having trouble with
649
00:27:44,640 --> 00:27:49,679
sunlight in the eyes. So on our levers
650
00:27:47,279 --> 00:27:52,080
they have put on a new center section uh
651
00:27:49,679 --> 00:27:54,919
which you can pull down and use uh sort
652
00:27:52,080 --> 00:28:00,279
of like a baseball
653
00:27:54,919 --> 00:28:00,279
cap. Okay, Jackson fixed up on
654
00:28:07,919 --> 00:28:11,279
What uh Fred is opening
655
00:28:13,159 --> 00:28:19,200
up is a drink bag that we place inside
656
00:28:16,240 --> 00:28:20,840
of our neck ring that uh will allow us
657
00:28:19,200 --> 00:28:24,159
to drink while we're on the lunar
658
00:28:20,840 --> 00:28:27,919
surface. Uh they feed an Al did not have
659
00:28:24,159 --> 00:28:30,399
that in Apollo 12 and they consequently
660
00:28:27,919 --> 00:28:33,120
got very thirsty. Uh but we hope to
661
00:28:30,399 --> 00:28:36,559
alleiate that situation by having uh our
662
00:28:33,120 --> 00:28:38,880
own little uh bag of water which uh with
663
00:28:36,559 --> 00:28:41,279
very little effort we can uh have a sip
664
00:28:38,880 --> 00:28:45,159
or two while we're looking around and uh
665
00:28:41,279 --> 00:28:45,159
doing our geology work.
666
00:28:49,440 --> 00:28:56,080
So, uh, if you hear any funny noises,
667
00:28:53,399 --> 00:28:59,080
uh, it's just, uh, probably the drink
668
00:28:56,080 --> 00:28:59,080
bag.
669
00:29:06,159 --> 00:29:12,480
Okay, Jack. I'm looking out the uh right
670
00:29:09,120 --> 00:29:17,240
window now and uh not too far off in the
671
00:29:12,480 --> 00:29:19,600
distance now. You can see the uh the
672
00:29:17,240 --> 00:29:22,520
objective. And I'll zoom in on it here a
673
00:29:19,600 --> 00:29:25,200
little and see if it brings it in
674
00:29:22,520 --> 00:29:28,080
better. It's actually beginning to look
675
00:29:25,200 --> 00:29:30,159
a little bigger now. Uh you can see
676
00:29:28,080 --> 00:29:31,799
quite distinctly some of the features
677
00:29:30,159 --> 00:29:35,039
with the naked
678
00:29:31,799 --> 00:29:38,080
eye. And uh so far I guess I have to
679
00:29:35,039 --> 00:29:40,799
even agree with Jim that it's uh still
680
00:29:38,080 --> 00:29:43,799
looking pretty gray uh with a white
681
00:29:40,799 --> 00:29:43,799
spot.
682
00:29:44,880 --> 00:29:50,520
Okay, Fred, we're getting a good uh
683
00:29:46,480 --> 00:29:50,520
picture of your destination there.
684
00:30:01,600 --> 00:30:07,600
You're looking now at our uh probe that
685
00:30:03,840 --> 00:30:09,760
we place uh on the nose of uh Odyssey.
686
00:30:07,600 --> 00:30:12,799
Uh it's a very heavy thing, but of
687
00:30:09,760 --> 00:30:14,760
course in zero gravity, it uh weighs
688
00:30:12,799 --> 00:30:18,159
nothing and it's much easier to move
689
00:30:14,760 --> 00:30:20,000
around. As a matter of fact, both uh
690
00:30:18,159 --> 00:30:23,039
Fred and Jack commented as many people
691
00:30:20,000 --> 00:30:25,760
in the past have of how much bigger the
692
00:30:23,039 --> 00:30:28,240
spacecraft appears. uh in actual flight.
693
00:30:25,760 --> 00:30:30,720
Uh when you have such ease of movement
694
00:30:28,240 --> 00:30:33,279
compared to our simulators which make
695
00:30:30,720 --> 00:30:33,279
training rather
696
00:30:45,960 --> 00:30:51,039
difficult. Okay, we're seeing a good
697
00:30:48,000 --> 00:30:53,279
picture of the probe there, Jim. And uh
698
00:30:51,039 --> 00:30:55,600
looks like the characters shaved before
699
00:30:53,279 --> 00:30:57,360
the show this time.
700
00:30:55,600 --> 00:30:59,279
Well, Fred said he had to keep up his
701
00:30:57,360 --> 00:31:01,600
TV.
702
00:30:59,279 --> 00:31:04,880
Yeah, that may be uh my first and last
703
00:31:01,600 --> 00:31:07,880
time. Now, Jack, it took Fred 1 hour to
704
00:31:04,880 --> 00:31:07,880
shave.
705
00:31:08,799 --> 00:31:13,120
Okay, Jim, we're seeing a tape recorder
706
00:31:10,799 --> 00:31:14,559
now. And uh just by the way, how long
707
00:31:13,120 --> 00:31:17,559
you expect to keep the TV on this
708
00:31:14,559 --> 00:31:17,559
evening?
709
00:31:18,880 --> 00:31:25,440
Well, whenever
710
00:31:20,840 --> 00:31:27,919
you stand by one.
711
00:31:25,440 --> 00:31:29,159
Yeah, I got him with the uh Kevin Reaper
712
00:31:27,919 --> 00:31:31,520
valve in there,
713
00:31:29,159 --> 00:31:35,960
Jack. Every time he does that, our
714
00:31:31,520 --> 00:31:35,960
hearts our hearts jump in our mouth.
715
00:31:36,480 --> 00:31:42,000
Okay, Jim. Uh it's been a real good TV
716
00:31:39,279 --> 00:31:46,679
show. Uh we think we ought to conclude
717
00:31:42,000 --> 00:31:46,679
it from here now. Uh, what do you think?
718
00:31:46,880 --> 00:31:52,600
Roger sounds good. And this is the crew
719
00:31:49,519 --> 00:31:56,080
of Apollo 13. Wishing everybody there
720
00:31:52,600 --> 00:31:58,000
a nice evening. And uh, we're just about
721
00:31:56,080 --> 00:32:00,720
ready to close out our inspection of
722
00:31:58,000 --> 00:32:05,080
Aquarius and get back for a pleasant
723
00:32:00,720 --> 00:32:05,080
evening at Odyssey. Good night.
724
00:32:05,120 --> 00:32:08,519
Thank you. 13.
725
00:32:08,880 --> 00:32:12,640
13, we've got one more item for you when
726
00:32:10,720 --> 00:32:13,880
you get a chance. We'd like you to uh
727
00:32:12,640 --> 00:32:16,399
stir up your
728
00:32:13,880 --> 00:32:18,480
cryotanks. In addition, I have shaft and
729
00:32:16,399 --> 00:32:22,000
trion okay for a look at the comet
730
00:32:18,480 --> 00:32:25,960
Bennett if you need it.
731
00:32:22,000 --> 00:32:25,960
Okay, stand by.
732
00:32:36,390 --> 00:32:38,680
[Applause]
733
00:32:38,560 --> 00:32:42,009
[Music]
734
00:32:38,680 --> 00:32:42,009
[Applause]
735
00:32:44,159 --> 00:32:49,600
Gohead. We've had a hardware. I don't
736
00:32:46,880 --> 00:32:52,640
know what it was. Okay, Houston, we've
737
00:32:49,600 --> 00:32:55,519
had a problem here.
738
00:32:52,640 --> 00:32:57,880
This is Houston. Say again, please.
739
00:32:55,519 --> 00:33:02,000
Yes, sir. Uh, Houston, we've had a
740
00:32:57,880 --> 00:33:04,320
problem. We've had a main Bus.
741
00:33:02,000 --> 00:33:05,919
Roger. Main B undervolt. We got a main B
742
00:33:04,320 --> 00:33:07,679
undervolt. Okay, Flight, we've got some
743
00:33:05,919 --> 00:33:10,559
instrumentation finds. Let me Let me add
744
00:33:07,679 --> 00:33:11,760
them up. Roj. Okay, stand by 13. We're
745
00:33:10,559 --> 00:33:15,360
looking at it. We may have had an
746
00:33:11,760 --> 00:33:18,240
instrumentation problem. Roj. 55 hours,
747
00:33:15,360 --> 00:33:21,279
54 minutes, and 53 seconds into Apollo
748
00:33:18,240 --> 00:33:23,039
13, Oxygen Tank 2 explodes, ripping off
749
00:33:21,279 --> 00:33:25,519
the side panel of the spacecraft and
750
00:33:23,039 --> 00:33:27,360
severely damaging the equipment inside.
751
00:33:25,519 --> 00:33:28,799
Ground control could only see the radio
752
00:33:27,360 --> 00:33:30,640
telemetry coming down from the
753
00:33:28,799 --> 00:33:32,440
spacecraft and had no idea of the
754
00:33:30,640 --> 00:33:34,960
immediate damage that was caused by the
755
00:33:32,440 --> 00:33:37,279
explosion. What they could see, however,
756
00:33:34,960 --> 00:33:38,960
only gave them questions. The numerous
757
00:33:37,279 --> 00:33:40,960
warnings and alarms that ground control
758
00:33:38,960 --> 00:33:42,799
was seeing to them might be a false
759
00:33:40,960 --> 00:33:44,399
alarm caused by erroneous sensor
760
00:33:42,799 --> 00:33:46,960
readings, just like the pressure sensor
761
00:33:44,399 --> 00:33:48,799
earlier in oxygen tank 2. This is why an
762
00:33:46,960 --> 00:33:50,640
instrumentation problem is called out as
763
00:33:48,799 --> 00:33:52,640
the first possible explanation to the
764
00:33:50,640 --> 00:33:54,399
alarms. They would begin to put together
765
00:33:52,640 --> 00:33:56,320
the pieces to figure out what really
766
00:33:54,399 --> 00:33:58,240
just happened. The spacecraft's
767
00:33:56,320 --> 00:34:00,640
electrical system is connected to fuel
768
00:33:58,240 --> 00:34:02,480
cells. These fuel cells take in oxygen
769
00:34:00,640 --> 00:34:04,559
and hydrogen from the spacecraft's tanks
770
00:34:02,480 --> 00:34:06,320
and react them together. This would
771
00:34:04,559 --> 00:34:08,000
generate the electricity needed for the
772
00:34:06,320 --> 00:34:09,520
spacecraft and the astronauts could use
773
00:34:08,000 --> 00:34:11,919
the water that was a product of the
774
00:34:09,520 --> 00:34:13,520
reaction. The astronauts needed to rely
775
00:34:11,919 --> 00:34:15,119
on these fuel cells to generate
776
00:34:13,520 --> 00:34:16,879
electricity and water throughout the
777
00:34:15,119 --> 00:34:18,159
flight as carrying a separate water
778
00:34:16,879 --> 00:34:20,000
supply and batteries would have
779
00:34:18,159 --> 00:34:21,839
significantly increased weight. The
780
00:34:20,000 --> 00:34:24,079
service module is equipped with three of
781
00:34:21,839 --> 00:34:25,679
them. The fuel cells are connected to
782
00:34:24,079 --> 00:34:27,119
the spacecraft's electrical system
783
00:34:25,679 --> 00:34:28,879
through electrical buses which
784
00:34:27,119 --> 00:34:30,960
distribute the power to the other parts
785
00:34:28,879 --> 00:34:32,960
of the spacecraft. The fuel cells
786
00:34:30,960 --> 00:34:35,520
generate a direct current which go into
787
00:34:32,960 --> 00:34:36,960
two direct current main buses. Both
788
00:34:35,520 --> 00:34:38,480
buses are connected to their own
789
00:34:36,960 --> 00:34:40,399
inverters which power separate
790
00:34:38,480 --> 00:34:42,399
alternating current buses, allowing
791
00:34:40,399 --> 00:34:44,639
alternating current devices to also be
792
00:34:42,399 --> 00:34:46,399
powered. This is a redundant system that
793
00:34:44,639 --> 00:34:49,119
the crew will now need to take advantage
794
00:34:46,399 --> 00:34:50,879
of. Fuel cells one and three, which were
795
00:34:49,119 --> 00:34:53,200
taking oxygen from the now destroyed
796
00:34:50,879 --> 00:34:55,679
oxygen tank 2, significantly drop in
797
00:34:53,200 --> 00:34:57,520
voltage. Main bus B at the time of the
798
00:34:55,679 --> 00:34:59,400
explosion was only connected to fuel
799
00:34:57,520 --> 00:35:01,920
cell 3 which is now not producing
800
00:34:59,400 --> 00:35:03,520
electricity. This throws up a main bus B
801
00:35:01,920 --> 00:35:05,599
undervolt warning which the crew and
802
00:35:03,520 --> 00:35:07,839
ground control can see. Right now the
803
00:35:05,599 --> 00:35:10,079
astronauts are relying on one dying fuel
804
00:35:07,839 --> 00:35:12,480
cell fuel cell 2 in order to generate
805
00:35:10,079 --> 00:35:15,359
the entire spacecraft's electricity. It
806
00:35:12,480 --> 00:35:17,359
won't last long. A hardware restart
807
00:35:15,359 --> 00:35:19,040
followed by a main bus B undervolt are
808
00:35:17,359 --> 00:35:21,680
the first indications to ground control
809
00:35:19,040 --> 00:35:24,160
that something had gone wrong. And we
810
00:35:21,680 --> 00:35:27,240
hit a pretty large bang. associated with
811
00:35:24,160 --> 00:35:29,839
the caution and warning there and the
812
00:35:27,240 --> 00:35:32,480
interior. We're starting to go ahead and
813
00:35:29,839 --> 00:35:34,560
button up the tunnel again. The fuel
814
00:35:32,480 --> 00:35:37,119
cells drop in voltage started a cascade
815
00:35:34,560 --> 00:35:38,960
of events alongside the explosion.
816
00:35:37,119 --> 00:35:40,720
Multiple sensors, including the ones
817
00:35:38,960 --> 00:35:42,800
inside of the cryogenic tanks, were
818
00:35:40,720 --> 00:35:45,040
being powered by the now dead main bus
819
00:35:42,800 --> 00:35:47,280
B. These sensors would lose power and
820
00:35:45,040 --> 00:35:48,960
drop out as a result. The spacecraft's
821
00:35:47,280 --> 00:35:51,760
guidance control system and computers
822
00:35:48,960 --> 00:35:53,440
would also restart. And uh Houston, we
823
00:35:51,760 --> 00:35:57,599
had a restart on our computer. We have
824
00:35:53,440 --> 00:36:00,800
pings light and uh and restart. Reset.
825
00:35:57,599 --> 00:36:03,040
Roger. Restart and ping light. Restart
826
00:36:00,800 --> 00:36:05,200
on reset.
827
00:36:03,040 --> 00:36:08,400
Okay. AC2 is showing zip. I'm going to
828
00:36:05,200 --> 00:36:10,320
try to reconfigure on that. Jack
829
00:36:08,400 --> 00:36:12,079
Ecom, you were seeing any AC problems.
830
00:36:10,320 --> 00:36:14,480
Looks like a lot of instrumentation
831
00:36:12,079 --> 00:36:16,560
problems there. Go ahead. That's for
832
00:36:14,480 --> 00:36:17,920
flipping the fuel cells around flight.
833
00:36:16,560 --> 00:36:20,160
Well, let's get some recommendation
834
00:36:17,920 --> 00:36:23,119
here. S if you got any better ideas.
835
00:36:20,160 --> 00:36:25,760
Yeah, we got a uh main bus a undervolt
836
00:36:23,119 --> 00:36:28,000
now too. Sean, main A undervolt. The
837
00:36:25,760 --> 00:36:29,680
spacecraft's other bus, main bus A,
838
00:36:28,000 --> 00:36:31,680
start showing signs of weakening from
839
00:36:29,680 --> 00:36:33,480
losing one of its fuel cells. It's
840
00:36:31,680 --> 00:36:36,800
reading about 25 and a
841
00:36:33,480 --> 00:36:40,480
half. Main B is rating zip right now.
842
00:36:36,800 --> 00:36:43,760
Flight econ. Go ahead. He's got U fuel
843
00:36:40,480 --> 00:36:45,520
cells one and three are offline. We've
844
00:36:43,760 --> 00:36:48,880
got main A volts. We have no main B
845
00:36:45,520 --> 00:36:51,599
volts. have an attempt to re uh
846
00:36:48,880 --> 00:36:54,079
reconnect the fuel cells. Fuel cell one
847
00:36:51,599 --> 00:36:57,359
to main A, fuel cell
848
00:36:54,079 --> 00:37:00,000
uh three to main B. Okay. Now, is there
849
00:36:57,359 --> 00:37:02,240
do we have instrumentation problems?
850
00:37:00,000 --> 00:37:06,200
Well, we lost a It does appear we've
851
00:37:02,240 --> 00:37:09,680
lost AC bus 2 voltage. Main B is reading
852
00:37:06,200 --> 00:37:13,040
uh 4 volts and that effectively takes
853
00:37:09,680 --> 00:37:15,119
AC2 away from us. Okay. 13, Houston,
854
00:37:13,040 --> 00:37:18,320
we'd like you to attempt to reconnect
855
00:37:15,119 --> 00:37:21,839
fuel cell one to main A and fuel cell 3
856
00:37:18,320 --> 00:37:24,720
to main B. Okay, Houston, I'm showing I
857
00:37:21,839 --> 00:37:27,880
tried to reset and uh fuel cell one and
858
00:37:24,720 --> 00:37:30,240
three are both showing uh gray
859
00:37:27,880 --> 00:37:32,240
flags, but they're both showing zip on
860
00:37:30,240 --> 00:37:33,680
the flows. The crew attempts to reset
861
00:37:32,240 --> 00:37:35,440
the fuel cells into the same
862
00:37:33,680 --> 00:37:37,760
configuration, which results in no
863
00:37:35,440 --> 00:37:39,839
changes. Roger. Flight ECOM. Go ECOM.
864
00:37:37,760 --> 00:37:41,359
Let's reverse a configuration request.
865
00:37:39,839 --> 00:37:42,880
Okay, but wait a minute. We got a good
866
00:37:41,359 --> 00:37:45,119
main A bus. Let's make sure that
867
00:37:42,880 --> 00:37:47,359
whatever we do doesn't screw up main A.
868
00:37:45,119 --> 00:37:49,040
Fuel cell 2 is on main A flight. I'm not
869
00:37:47,359 --> 00:37:50,960
going to ask to change that. Okay. What
870
00:37:49,040 --> 00:37:53,839
do you want to do? Let's try to put fuel
871
00:37:50,960 --> 00:37:56,320
cell one on main B, fuel cell three on
872
00:37:53,839 --> 00:37:58,480
main A. We use the other uh sensing
873
00:37:56,320 --> 00:38:00,480
circuitry. We're not going to touch fuel
874
00:37:58,480 --> 00:38:02,560
cell two flight.
875
00:38:00,480 --> 00:38:03,920
Okay. But if we got any problems in the
876
00:38:02,560 --> 00:38:06,960
system, I want to make sure that we
877
00:38:03,920 --> 00:38:08,079
don't blow the voltage off main A. Then
878
00:38:06,960 --> 00:38:10,640
we're not going to be able to see
879
00:38:08,079 --> 00:38:12,720
anything. You got can we review our
880
00:38:10,640 --> 00:38:14,400
status here sigh and see what we've got
881
00:38:12,720 --> 00:38:15,920
from a standpoint of status. What do you
882
00:38:14,400 --> 00:38:20,000
think we got in a spacecraft that's
883
00:38:15,920 --> 00:38:22,520
good? Main bus A is reading 25 volts.
884
00:38:20,000 --> 00:38:26,640
Okay. Main A and that's reflected by the
885
00:38:22,520 --> 00:38:28,400
fact uh fuel cell 2 is putting out uh 53
886
00:38:26,640 --> 00:38:30,640
amps which is just about the most it can
887
00:38:28,400 --> 00:38:33,760
and keep our voltage up. Okay. So that's
888
00:38:30,640 --> 00:38:36,880
bonafide. AC bus 2 is zero which is
889
00:38:33,760 --> 00:38:39,680
reflected by the fact we lost main B.
890
00:38:36,880 --> 00:38:41,760
Flight econom go ecom. Okay, let's get a
891
00:38:39,680 --> 00:38:45,160
read out on a couple fuel cell pressures
892
00:38:41,760 --> 00:38:48,160
here. Okay. Uh, fuel cell one, N2
893
00:38:45,160 --> 00:38:51,000
pressure, fuel cell 302 pressure. We're
894
00:38:48,160 --> 00:38:55,040
reading uh 0 N2 pressure and fuel cell
895
00:38:51,000 --> 00:38:57,599
one and 13 PSI on fuel cell 302
896
00:38:55,040 --> 00:38:59,440
pressure. 13 Houston, we'd like you to
897
00:38:57,599 --> 00:39:02,520
verify a couple readings for us. We'd
898
00:38:59,440 --> 00:39:05,359
like the nitrogen pressure on fuel cell
899
00:39:02,520 --> 00:39:06,720
one. We need the oxygen pressure on fuel
900
00:39:05,359 --> 00:39:09,760
cell two.
901
00:39:06,720 --> 00:39:11,839
Okay. Nitrogen on one and oxygen on two.
902
00:39:09,760 --> 00:39:15,200
Is that correct? Negative. Oxygen on
903
00:39:11,839 --> 00:39:16,480
three. Okay. Now, are we using RCS now?
904
00:39:15,200 --> 00:39:18,560
That's affirmative. We're going to have
905
00:39:16,480 --> 00:39:22,960
to switch them thrusters over to main A
906
00:39:18,560 --> 00:39:27,119
to hold the attitude here. Okay. Uh, how
907
00:39:22,960 --> 00:39:29,520
much RCS we using? Oh, we've used um Oh,
908
00:39:27,119 --> 00:39:31,440
yes. 25 lb.
909
00:39:29,520 --> 00:39:33,839
Okay. Give me a minimum fuel usage
910
00:39:31,440 --> 00:39:35,920
configuration that'll keep me out of the
911
00:39:33,839 --> 00:39:37,839
garage. The RCS thrusters have been
912
00:39:35,920 --> 00:39:39,599
firing since the explosion, attempting
913
00:39:37,839 --> 00:39:41,359
to keep the spacecraft in an attitude
914
00:39:39,599 --> 00:39:43,599
that has radial contact with Earth and
915
00:39:41,359 --> 00:39:45,280
that could avoid gimbal lock. This would
916
00:39:43,599 --> 00:39:47,200
eventually give the spacecraft enough
917
00:39:45,280 --> 00:39:50,560
velocity to begin deviating from its
918
00:39:47,200 --> 00:39:52,240
planned trajectory. I tell you, go tell
919
00:39:50,560 --> 00:39:55,520
me the limb heater currents become
920
00:39:52,240 --> 00:39:56,960
essentially static. Roj, let's solve one
921
00:39:55,520 --> 00:39:58,880
problem at a time. come back to me later
922
00:39:56,960 --> 00:40:02,800
on in a
923
00:39:58,880 --> 00:40:05,200
and uh two Baker which is three oxygen
924
00:40:02,800 --> 00:40:08,000
says 6
925
00:40:05,200 --> 00:40:13,119
two Baker says 6 and say again the other
926
00:40:08,000 --> 00:40:15,440
one uh fuel cell one nitrogen reads zero
927
00:40:13,119 --> 00:40:17,520
roger zero both fuel cells are well
928
00:40:15,440 --> 00:40:19,040
under their normal operating pressures
929
00:40:17,520 --> 00:40:20,320
this is a hint to ground control that
930
00:40:19,040 --> 00:40:22,240
something might have gone wrong with the
931
00:40:20,320 --> 00:40:24,440
super critical tanks providing the gas
932
00:40:22,240 --> 00:40:27,400
but it might also just be another sensor
933
00:40:24,440 --> 00:40:31,359
error go ahead
934
00:40:27,400 --> 00:40:33,359
Uh why don't we try leave fuel cell 2
935
00:40:31,359 --> 00:40:36,079
alone and just make sure that one and
936
00:40:33,359 --> 00:40:37,760
three are disconnected from both buses
937
00:40:36,079 --> 00:40:40,160
and make sure that there's abs won't be
938
00:40:37,760 --> 00:40:42,040
any load on them at all and let's see
939
00:40:40,160 --> 00:40:44,160
what happens to those
940
00:40:42,040 --> 00:40:45,760
cells. Okay, very what do you want to
941
00:40:44,160 --> 00:40:48,440
do? Open circuit fuel cell one and
942
00:40:45,760 --> 00:40:51,920
three. That's very important.
943
00:40:48,440 --> 00:40:54,320
Okay, Capcom, let's recommend we open
944
00:40:51,920 --> 00:40:56,640
circuit fuel cell number one and number
945
00:40:54,320 --> 00:40:58,240
three and leave fuel cell number two as
946
00:40:56,640 --> 00:41:00,160
is.
947
00:40:58,240 --> 00:41:02,400
Okay, one and three. Open circuit two as
948
00:41:00,160 --> 00:41:05,280
is. And earlier got a report from them
949
00:41:02,400 --> 00:41:07,680
that uh one and three were reading gray
950
00:41:05,280 --> 00:41:10,400
but zero flow. Yeah, Capcom, let's amend
951
00:41:07,680 --> 00:41:12,079
that. ECOM from flight ecom. Why don't
952
00:41:10,400 --> 00:41:13,440
we just open circuit one and make sure
953
00:41:12,079 --> 00:41:15,200
that we don't have any problems getting
954
00:41:13,440 --> 00:41:16,960
that back onto the bus. Okay, just watch
955
00:41:15,200 --> 00:41:18,960
it for a while before we make any
956
00:41:16,960 --> 00:41:20,720
further moves with three. Roger. Okay,
957
00:41:18,960 --> 00:41:23,760
Capcom, let's just open circuit one of
958
00:41:20,720 --> 00:41:27,599
those right now. 13 Houston, we'd like
959
00:41:23,760 --> 00:41:30,240
you to open circuit fuel cell one. Leave
960
00:41:27,599 --> 00:41:32,000
two and three as is.
961
00:41:30,240 --> 00:41:33,920
Okay, I'll get to work on that. Ground
962
00:41:32,000 --> 00:41:35,520
control hopes to alleviate any problems
963
00:41:33,920 --> 00:41:37,040
the fuel cells might be having by
964
00:41:35,520 --> 00:41:39,280
disconnecting them from the rest of the
965
00:41:37,040 --> 00:41:40,720
spacecraft's electrical systems. Right
966
00:41:39,280 --> 00:41:42,560
now they don't know what's going on with
967
00:41:40,720 --> 00:41:44,319
the spacecraft and out of caution decide
968
00:41:42,560 --> 00:41:46,480
to only disconnect one in case they
969
00:41:44,319 --> 00:41:50,560
start getting more issues from them. And
970
00:41:46,480 --> 00:41:53,760
uh Jack uh our O2 uh quantity number two
971
00:41:50,560 --> 00:41:56,400
tank is zero. Did you get that? O2
972
00:41:53,760 --> 00:41:58,640
quantity number two is zero. That's AC.
973
00:41:56,400 --> 00:42:00,480
Okay. The gauge that was previously
974
00:41:58,640 --> 00:42:02,560
acting up now shows there's nothing in
975
00:42:00,480 --> 00:42:04,319
the tank. Louisville realizes that the
976
00:42:02,560 --> 00:42:06,560
gauge is being powered by the now dead
977
00:42:04,319 --> 00:42:08,400
AC bus 2. So he disregards that reading
978
00:42:06,560 --> 00:42:10,480
and then immediately makes a startling
979
00:42:08,400 --> 00:42:12,000
discovery. Yeah, that's that's a good
980
00:42:10,480 --> 00:42:14,400
thing to see. And it looks to me looking
981
00:42:12,000 --> 00:42:16,720
out the hatch that we are venting
982
00:42:14,400 --> 00:42:18,400
something. Crew thinks they're venting
983
00:42:16,720 --> 00:42:20,640
something.
984
00:42:18,400 --> 00:42:23,440
We are we are venting something out into
985
00:42:20,640 --> 00:42:25,839
the uh into space. Roger. We copy your
986
00:42:23,440 --> 00:42:28,319
venting. The spacecraft had been venting
987
00:42:25,839 --> 00:42:29,760
something since the explosion. Okay,
988
00:42:28,319 --> 00:42:31,760
let's everybody think of the kind of
989
00:42:29,760 --> 00:42:33,280
things we'd be venting. GNC, you got
990
00:42:31,760 --> 00:42:36,240
anything that looks abnormal in your
991
00:42:33,280 --> 00:42:37,839
system? Negative light. Okay, fuel cell
992
00:42:36,240 --> 00:42:40,160
one, you just wanted to off the line
993
00:42:37,839 --> 00:42:44,800
now, Jack. Is that right? We just wanted
994
00:42:40,160 --> 00:42:47,280
you to open one.
995
00:42:44,800 --> 00:42:49,599
Okay, she's off the line. Okay, now
996
00:42:47,280 --> 00:42:51,359
let's everybody keep cool. We got the
997
00:42:49,599 --> 00:42:54,319
limb still attached. The limb
998
00:42:51,359 --> 00:42:56,079
spacecraft's good. So, if we need uh to
999
00:42:54,319 --> 00:42:58,640
get back home, we got a limb to do a
1000
00:42:56,079 --> 00:43:00,079
good portion of it with. Okay, let's
1001
00:42:58,640 --> 00:43:03,280
make sure that we don't do anything
1002
00:43:00,079 --> 00:43:05,119
that's going to blow our CSM electrical
1003
00:43:03,280 --> 00:43:07,839
power with the batteries or that will
1004
00:43:05,119 --> 00:43:09,240
cause us to lose the main or the fuel
1005
00:43:07,839 --> 00:43:12,000
cell number
1006
00:43:09,240 --> 00:43:13,520
two. Okay, we want to keep the O2 and
1007
00:43:12,000 --> 00:43:16,319
that kind of stuff working. We'd like to
1008
00:43:13,520 --> 00:43:18,720
have RCS, but we got the command module
1009
00:43:16,319 --> 00:43:20,240
system, so we're in good shape. If we
1010
00:43:18,720 --> 00:43:21,920
need to get home, let's solve the
1011
00:43:20,240 --> 00:43:24,800
problem, but let's not make it any worse
1012
00:43:21,920 --> 00:43:28,400
by guessing.
1013
00:43:24,800 --> 00:43:31,280
Apollo control Houston. Um this rapid
1014
00:43:28,400 --> 00:43:34,200
exchange of conversation you've heard u
1015
00:43:31,280 --> 00:43:38,160
may the main B bus uh is off the
1016
00:43:34,200 --> 00:43:40,720
line. Uh fuel cells one and three also
1017
00:43:38,160 --> 00:43:43,920
off the line. Uh fuel cell 2 is
1018
00:43:40,720 --> 00:43:47,160
presently on the line. We now show 13 at
1019
00:43:43,920 --> 00:43:49,560
an altitude of
1020
00:43:47,160 --> 00:43:52,800
178,643 nautical
1021
00:43:49,560 --> 00:43:54,720
miles. We're at 56 hours 12 minutes into
1022
00:43:52,800 --> 00:43:56,480
the flight. Okay. Can you tell us
1023
00:43:54,720 --> 00:43:58,079
anything about the venting? Uh, okay.
1024
00:43:56,480 --> 00:43:59,920
Where it's coming from. Uh, what window
1025
00:43:58,079 --> 00:44:02,880
do you see it at? It's coming out of
1026
00:43:59,920 --> 00:44:05,599
window one right now, Jack. Flight. Go
1027
00:44:02,880 --> 00:44:07,839
ahead. Uh, I think the best thing we can
1028
00:44:05,599 --> 00:44:11,200
do right now is start a power down.
1029
00:44:07,839 --> 00:44:14,720
Okay. Uh, let's go down uh the emergency
1030
00:44:11,200 --> 00:44:17,599
1-5. Okay. What do you want to go to?
1031
00:44:14,720 --> 00:44:20,400
Uh, power down. Give me the page. Uh,
1032
00:44:17,599 --> 00:44:23,599
emergency 1-5 flight. We'll go down uh
1033
00:44:20,400 --> 00:44:24,800
try to get a delta of 10 amps reduction.
1034
00:44:23,599 --> 00:44:26,000
Ecom, do you want to go through that
1035
00:44:24,800 --> 00:44:28,240
again? What do you want to power down
1036
00:44:26,000 --> 00:44:31,040
to? I want to power down uh a total of
1037
00:44:28,240 --> 00:44:34,480
10 amps. White, a total of 10 amps.
1038
00:44:31,040 --> 00:44:37,440
That's fine. Okay. Capcom, we'd
1039
00:44:34,480 --> 00:44:40,319
recommend emergency power down checklist
1040
00:44:37,440 --> 00:44:42,400
1-5. We want a power down a total or a
1041
00:44:40,319 --> 00:44:44,640
delta of 10 amps from where we are now.
1042
00:44:42,400 --> 00:44:46,800
Flight GNC. Go GNC. Can we afford to do
1043
00:44:44,640 --> 00:44:50,000
a PTC first and then we shut off all of
1044
00:44:46,800 --> 00:44:51,040
that stuff with no problems? Uh why you
1045
00:44:50,000 --> 00:44:53,280
think you're going to have a thermal
1046
00:44:51,040 --> 00:44:56,000
problem here? Well, we could have uh if
1047
00:44:53,280 --> 00:44:57,760
we stay there too long. Okay, we'll run
1048
00:44:56,000 --> 00:45:00,319
into that one later, Buck. Okay, I want
1049
00:44:57,760 --> 00:45:03,280
to get our major problem sorted out now.
1050
00:45:00,319 --> 00:45:06,560
You want I still want 1-5 down to 1-5
1051
00:45:03,280 --> 00:45:09,040
powered down delta 10 amps. Scap. Okay,
1052
00:45:06,560 --> 00:45:12,520
13, this is Houston. We'd like you to go
1053
00:45:09,040 --> 00:45:15,680
to your GNC checklist. The pink pages
1054
00:45:12,520 --> 00:45:19,119
1-5. Do power down until we get a delta
1055
00:45:15,680 --> 00:45:20,560
of 10 amps. Over flight econ.
1056
00:45:19,119 --> 00:45:22,880
Okay, I need one thing right now. He's
1057
00:45:20,560 --> 00:45:26,480
powering down. hangs down to 401 amps
1058
00:45:22,880 --> 00:45:29,680
total spacecraft. I'd like to get uh my
1059
00:45:26,480 --> 00:45:33,040
AC2 bus back so I can look at O2 tank 2
1060
00:45:29,680 --> 00:45:36,160
pressure. I I have no insight into that.
1061
00:45:33,040 --> 00:45:38,000
Okay, let's get uh I guess we can put
1062
00:45:36,160 --> 00:45:41,440
inverter
1063
00:45:38,000 --> 00:45:41,440
uh three to main
1064
00:45:42,280 --> 00:45:46,800
A2 and let me ask you before you do
1065
00:45:45,440 --> 00:45:49,119
that, would you like to make sure you
1066
00:45:46,800 --> 00:45:51,200
got all AC load you don't need isolated
1067
00:45:49,119 --> 00:45:52,960
from the bus?
1068
00:45:51,200 --> 00:45:54,720
Nah, let's not do that right now.
1069
00:45:52,960 --> 00:45:57,040
Flight, I think we're in good shape that
1070
00:45:54,720 --> 00:45:58,880
way. The main is up high enough where it
1071
00:45:57,040 --> 00:46:00,720
can handle the inverter. Thing that
1072
00:45:58,880 --> 00:46:02,880
concerns me is starting is throwing
1073
00:46:00,720 --> 00:46:04,880
equipment. We We had a problem. We don't
1074
00:46:02,880 --> 00:46:07,000
know the cause of the problem, right? I
1075
00:46:04,880 --> 00:46:10,960
I've got a feeling we've lost two fuel
1076
00:46:07,000 --> 00:46:12,960
cells. I hate to put it that way, but uh
1077
00:46:10,960 --> 00:46:14,720
I don't know why we've lost them. It
1078
00:46:12,960 --> 00:46:16,640
doesn't all tag up, and it's not an
1079
00:46:14,720 --> 00:46:18,800
instrumentation problem, the best I can
1080
00:46:16,640 --> 00:46:22,160
tell right now.
1081
00:46:18,800 --> 00:46:27,040
Okay. And uh something is uh giving us a
1082
00:46:22,160 --> 00:46:28,640
rates jack both in pitch and roll. So I
1083
00:46:27,040 --> 00:46:31,280
suspecting that maybe it's whatever it
1084
00:46:28,640 --> 00:46:34,800
is that's vending back there. I've had
1085
00:46:31,280 --> 00:46:36,160
to use uh direct in order to stabilize
1086
00:46:34,800 --> 00:46:37,760
this. And as soon as I do, we're
1087
00:46:36,160 --> 00:46:40,800
starting to pick up rates again. Can you
1088
00:46:37,760 --> 00:46:42,319
pick up any jet? Sorry. Standby.
1089
00:46:40,800 --> 00:46:44,319
Whatever was venting seemed to be
1090
00:46:42,319 --> 00:46:46,319
actively pushing the spacecraft around,
1091
00:46:44,319 --> 00:46:48,079
explaining the constant RCS thruster
1092
00:46:46,319 --> 00:46:50,000
firing. Swagger would have to use the
1093
00:46:48,079 --> 00:46:51,920
manual controls multiple times in order
1094
00:46:50,000 --> 00:46:54,640
to counteract the venting. What
1095
00:46:51,920 --> 00:46:58,720
direction are your rates in Jack?
1096
00:46:54,640 --> 00:47:01,760
It's negative pitch and negative roll.
1097
00:46:58,720 --> 00:47:04,000
That's further. What's firing now? You
1098
00:47:01,760 --> 00:47:06,400
got something firing? Well, we've seen
1099
00:47:04,000 --> 00:47:08,480
quite a bit of thruster activity. Okay,
1100
00:47:06,400 --> 00:47:10,000
I guess this kills a PTC, too, because
1101
00:47:08,480 --> 00:47:11,599
we're not going to get into PTC as long
1102
00:47:10,000 --> 00:47:12,880
as we got something venting. The gauges
1103
00:47:11,599 --> 00:47:14,640
that were knocked out by the power
1104
00:47:12,880 --> 00:47:17,040
outage are now a concern for the ground
1105
00:47:14,640 --> 00:47:18,720
crew. They could see the main bus B that
1106
00:47:17,040 --> 00:47:20,960
was powering them is now offline, but
1107
00:47:18,720 --> 00:47:22,480
main A still works. They would need to
1108
00:47:20,960 --> 00:47:25,200
connect the working bus with the now
1109
00:47:22,480 --> 00:47:26,560
offline sensors. Flight econom. Go ECOM.
1110
00:47:25,200 --> 00:47:29,920
Uh, I got a little correction. Let's put
1111
00:47:26,560 --> 00:47:33,280
inverter one on both AC buses, please.
1112
00:47:29,920 --> 00:47:35,760
One on both AC. Confirm. So, I can get
1113
00:47:33,280 --> 00:47:38,160
some uh AC bus power back so I can have
1114
00:47:35,760 --> 00:47:40,640
some insight into my uh AC bus 2
1115
00:47:38,160 --> 00:47:42,640
telemetry, especially my crows. Maybe
1116
00:47:40,640 --> 00:47:44,640
the vending may be coming from that. You
1117
00:47:42,640 --> 00:47:47,599
want to put inverter one in both AC
1118
00:47:44,640 --> 00:47:49,440
buses, ECOM and Capcom, let's do it. The
1119
00:47:47,599 --> 00:47:51,119
idea was simple. One inverter could
1120
00:47:49,440 --> 00:47:53,200
power both buses, and they could use
1121
00:47:51,119 --> 00:47:55,280
that to power the gauges on AC bus 2
1122
00:47:53,200 --> 00:47:56,800
that are now offline. This would supply
1123
00:47:55,280 --> 00:47:58,480
power to the gauges inside of the
1124
00:47:56,800 --> 00:48:00,800
cryotanks, and that would allow the crew
1125
00:47:58,480 --> 00:48:02,720
to read the tank's real pressures. 13
1126
00:48:00,800 --> 00:48:04,880
Houston, uh, we need to get some more
1127
00:48:02,720 --> 00:48:07,920
instrumentation up. We'd like you to put
1128
00:48:04,880 --> 00:48:10,880
inverter one on both AC buses. Over.
1129
00:48:07,920 --> 00:48:13,440
Okay, you got inverter one on both AC
1130
00:48:10,880 --> 00:48:15,760
buses now. Telmu and control from
1131
00:48:13,440 --> 00:48:17,440
flight. Go flight. Will you take a look
1132
00:48:15,760 --> 00:48:18,720
at your pre-launch data and go through
1133
00:48:17,440 --> 00:48:20,400
your system? See if there's anything
1134
00:48:18,720 --> 00:48:23,280
you've got that may have started vending
1135
00:48:20,400 --> 00:48:24,800
here. Roger. Flat. Okay. And I want to
1136
00:48:23,280 --> 00:48:28,720
report in that in about the next 15
1137
00:48:24,800 --> 00:48:30,559
minutes. Quick look type stuff. Okay.
1138
00:48:28,720 --> 00:48:33,520
Flight photo. Go photo. We're definitely
1139
00:48:30,559 --> 00:48:36,079
seeing a vent in the data. Okay. And
1140
00:48:33,520 --> 00:48:38,240
have you got any thrusters firing? We're
1141
00:48:36,079 --> 00:48:40,400
looking at that C3 thruster flight that
1142
00:48:38,240 --> 00:48:42,960
looks like it stays on most of the time.
1143
00:48:40,400 --> 00:48:44,480
Well, can we turn them all off and see
1144
00:48:42,960 --> 00:48:46,079
if we still got the rates or any build
1145
00:48:44,480 --> 00:48:47,599
up in rates? Well, the rate that we're
1146
00:48:46,079 --> 00:48:49,359
seeing is opposite to the direction of
1147
00:48:47,599 --> 00:48:51,280
that thruster. So, if anything, it's
1148
00:48:49,359 --> 00:48:53,359
just trying to hold and not quite up to
1149
00:48:51,280 --> 00:48:55,800
it. Okay. But he's been trying to
1150
00:48:53,359 --> 00:48:58,880
counteract the rates with
1151
00:48:55,800 --> 00:49:02,079
direct. He's been getting a negative
1152
00:48:58,880 --> 00:49:03,839
pitch and a negative roll. Okay. But he
1153
00:49:02,079 --> 00:49:06,880
asked if we were getting some thruster
1154
00:49:03,839 --> 00:49:10,880
firings that were not being made by him.
1155
00:49:06,880 --> 00:49:12,559
I'll tell you what, uh, GNC, can you get
1156
00:49:10,880 --> 00:49:14,400
somebody in the back room to try to
1157
00:49:12,559 --> 00:49:17,359
figure out what the equivalent delta V
1158
00:49:14,400 --> 00:49:19,599
is we're getting so that we can see if
1159
00:49:17,359 --> 00:49:21,359
we can backtrack to see if we can figure
1160
00:49:19,599 --> 00:49:23,839
out what's venting. You come from
1161
00:49:21,359 --> 00:49:25,599
flight. What did uh, okay, you got two
1162
00:49:23,839 --> 00:49:29,000
good AC buses. What did all that tell
1163
00:49:25,599 --> 00:49:31,599
you now? It it tells me that
1164
00:49:29,000 --> 00:49:34,000
uh, well, just give me about two more
1165
00:49:31,599 --> 00:49:36,240
minutes, fly. Okay, take your time.
1166
00:49:34,000 --> 00:49:37,520
Okay, 13. Uh we've got lots and lots of
1167
00:49:36,240 --> 00:49:40,079
people working on this. We'll get you
1168
00:49:37,520 --> 00:49:42,240
some uh dope as soon as we have it and
1169
00:49:40,079 --> 00:49:45,040
you'll be the first one to know. Yeah,
1170
00:49:42,240 --> 00:49:46,960
the uh crew did report they removed fuel
1171
00:49:45,040 --> 00:49:48,880
cell 3. They open circuited it also,
1172
00:49:46,960 --> 00:49:50,640
didn't they? I don't believe so. Fuel
1173
00:49:48,880 --> 00:49:52,800
cell one and fuel cell 3 should be open
1174
00:49:50,640 --> 00:49:55,680
circuited. Uh we just had our last call
1175
00:49:52,800 --> 00:49:57,760
for fuel cell one open circuit and uh we
1176
00:49:55,680 --> 00:49:59,119
left fuel cell 3 as it was. Well, let's
1177
00:49:57,760 --> 00:50:01,200
take this open circuit fuel cell three.
1178
00:49:59,119 --> 00:50:03,280
Open circuit fuel cell 3. Get it off the
1179
00:50:01,200 --> 00:50:04,720
bus. We got to worry about getting some
1180
00:50:03,280 --> 00:50:07,119
power on main B to get the pressure back
1181
00:50:04,720 --> 00:50:08,400
up. No two tank one. Roger. Flight ECOM.
1182
00:50:07,119 --> 00:50:10,000
Go ECOM. Let's have him isol isolate the
1183
00:50:08,400 --> 00:50:12,559
search tank also and save it. We use the
1184
00:50:10,000 --> 00:50:15,359
cryo as much as we can. Uh, say that
1185
00:50:12,559 --> 00:50:17,920
again. Let's isolate the surge tank
1186
00:50:15,359 --> 00:50:19,359
command module. I don't understand that
1187
00:50:17,920 --> 00:50:21,599
sign. I don't want to I want to use the
1188
00:50:19,359 --> 00:50:23,119
cryo as much as possible. But that would
1189
00:50:21,599 --> 00:50:25,200
seem to be the opposite. If you want to
1190
00:50:23,119 --> 00:50:27,520
keep the fuel cell going, the surge tank
1191
00:50:25,200 --> 00:50:29,599
is an oxygen tank located inside of the
1192
00:50:27,520 --> 00:50:31,359
command module. The crew needs to use
1193
00:50:29,599 --> 00:50:33,440
this for re-entry with Earth after
1194
00:50:31,359 --> 00:50:35,280
separation from the service module. In
1195
00:50:33,440 --> 00:50:36,880
emergency cases like this one, it can
1196
00:50:35,280 --> 00:50:38,640
supply oxygen to other parts of the
1197
00:50:36,880 --> 00:50:40,960
spacecraft, like the fuel cells to keep
1198
00:50:38,640 --> 00:50:42,720
them alive, which is currently doing. An
1199
00:50:40,960 --> 00:50:44,559
incredible amount of foresight is used
1200
00:50:42,720 --> 00:50:46,480
to make the call to isolate the tank in
1201
00:50:44,559 --> 00:50:48,319
order to save the oxygen for re-entry,
1202
00:50:46,480 --> 00:50:50,160
but ensuring the imminent death of the
1203
00:50:48,319 --> 00:50:52,240
spacecraft's only remaining source of
1204
00:50:50,160 --> 00:50:54,559
electricity. The fuel cells are fed off
1205
00:50:52,240 --> 00:50:56,079
the uh the tanks in the service module
1206
00:50:54,559 --> 00:50:58,640
flight. The search tank is in the
1207
00:50:56,079 --> 00:51:00,400
command module.
1208
00:50:58,640 --> 00:51:03,280
We want to save the surge tank and which
1209
00:51:00,400 --> 00:51:06,319
we need for entry. Okay, I'm with you.
1210
00:51:03,280 --> 00:51:09,040
I'm with you. Roger. Capcom, let's also
1211
00:51:06,319 --> 00:51:11,920
isolate the surge tank. Okay, you want
1212
00:51:09,040 --> 00:51:13,040
to isolate the surge tank. Yeah, O2
1213
00:51:11,920 --> 00:51:14,800
surge tank. Right. Yeah. What we're
1214
00:51:13,040 --> 00:51:17,839
really doing is securing our entry
1215
00:51:14,800 --> 00:51:21,359
systems right now. 13 Houston, we'd like
1216
00:51:17,839 --> 00:51:24,000
you to isolate your O2 surge tank. Over.
1217
00:51:21,359 --> 00:51:26,160
Surge tank off now. Jack, flight econom.
1218
00:51:24,000 --> 00:51:28,160
Go. Ecom. Okay, since O2 tank one
1219
00:51:26,160 --> 00:51:30,640
heaters are on main A and we've got them
1220
00:51:28,160 --> 00:51:34,359
off now, uh we'll be able to stay in the
1221
00:51:30,640 --> 00:51:37,440
5 amps uh temporarily uh for a manual
1222
00:51:34,359 --> 00:51:40,800
pressurization, let's uh have them turn
1223
00:51:37,440 --> 00:51:43,280
the heaters on manually. O2 tank one and
1224
00:51:40,800 --> 00:51:45,119
we'll watch the pressure tank one. A
1225
00:51:43,280 --> 00:51:46,720
heater is activated inside of oxygen
1226
00:51:45,119 --> 00:51:48,720
tank one in hopes of raising its
1227
00:51:46,720 --> 00:51:51,280
pressures and helping the fuel cells.
1228
00:51:48,720 --> 00:51:53,839
Capcom, we want to get cryo2 tank number
1229
00:51:51,280 --> 00:51:56,000
one heater on. Roger. We copy them and
1230
00:51:53,839 --> 00:51:58,640
uh we'd like to build up the pressure in
1231
00:51:56,000 --> 00:52:00,000
O2 tank one. So uh turn the heaters on
1232
00:51:58,640 --> 00:52:03,040
manually. We'll watch the pressure for
1233
00:52:00,000 --> 00:52:07,760
you. You can stand the 5 amps on main A.
1234
00:52:03,040 --> 00:52:09,440
That's we think so. Flight. Okay. Uh
1235
00:52:07,760 --> 00:52:11,760
we're going to get a main bus under
1236
00:52:09,440 --> 00:52:13,599
probably. Roger. Uh we realize that uh
1237
00:52:11,760 --> 00:52:18,079
we feel we can stand five more amps on
1238
00:52:13,599 --> 00:52:20,800
it. Okay. Uh he tanks on. Did you see
1239
00:52:18,079 --> 00:52:23,680
your 5 amp increase in current? That's
1240
00:52:20,800 --> 00:52:26,559
firm flight. Okay. 26.7 volts. Looks
1241
00:52:23,680 --> 00:52:29,280
good. We'll watch the pressure.
1242
00:52:26,559 --> 00:52:31,839
Flight ECOM. Go ahead. Ecom. Uh, I want
1243
00:52:29,280 --> 00:52:33,839
the fans on and uh O2 tank one. We're
1244
00:52:31,839 --> 00:52:36,079
not seeing a pressure increase. We can
1245
00:52:33,839 --> 00:52:37,920
stand it. You can stand it. That's fair.
1246
00:52:36,079 --> 00:52:39,280
Ground control can see the power is
1247
00:52:37,920 --> 00:52:40,800
being used by the heaters, but the
1248
00:52:39,280 --> 00:52:43,119
pressure doesn't increase in the tanks
1249
00:52:40,800 --> 00:52:44,559
like they were expecting. The cryofans
1250
00:52:43,119 --> 00:52:47,280
are activated to try to get a better
1251
00:52:44,559 --> 00:52:49,200
reading on that tank. 13 Houston. Uh,
1252
00:52:47,280 --> 00:52:52,559
we'd like you to additionally bring on
1253
00:52:49,200 --> 00:52:54,559
the fans in O2 tank one. And uh we can
1254
00:52:52,559 --> 00:52:56,880
stand the additional amperage on that.
1255
00:52:54,559 --> 00:52:58,559
Okay. Flight ECOM. Go ahead. Ecom. The
1256
00:52:56,880 --> 00:53:00,319
pressure in O2 tank one is all the way
1257
00:52:58,559 --> 00:53:01,960
down to 297. You better think about
1258
00:53:00,319 --> 00:53:04,240
getting in the limb or using the limb
1259
00:53:01,960 --> 00:53:05,440
systems. I'm going to have to power way
1260
00:53:04,240 --> 00:53:07,200
down. I don't know if I'm going to be
1261
00:53:05,440 --> 00:53:09,760
able to save the O2 for the third fuel
1262
00:53:07,200 --> 00:53:12,160
cell for fuel cell 2 rather. Tell me you
1263
00:53:09,760 --> 00:53:13,520
from flight. Go ahead. Flight. I want
1264
00:53:12,160 --> 00:53:16,040
you to get some guys figuring out
1265
00:53:13,520 --> 00:53:19,040
minimum power in the limb to sustain
1266
00:53:16,040 --> 00:53:20,480
life. Roger. Okay. Everything that
1267
00:53:19,040 --> 00:53:22,240
ground control tries to raise the
1268
00:53:20,480 --> 00:53:24,480
pressure in the working oxygen tank
1269
00:53:22,240 --> 00:53:26,000
fails. The gauges that they had powered
1270
00:53:24,480 --> 00:53:27,440
up in that tank are reading that it has
1271
00:53:26,000 --> 00:53:29,760
been rapidly draining since the
1272
00:53:27,440 --> 00:53:31,599
explosion. They begin to calculate how
1273
00:53:29,760 --> 00:53:34,040
long their oxygen supply will last under
1274
00:53:31,599 --> 00:53:37,280
these conditions. Uh Jack, looking
1275
00:53:34,040 --> 00:53:39,760
outside, the number of particles has
1276
00:53:37,280 --> 00:53:42,160
diminished greatly almost ceased now,
1277
00:53:39,760 --> 00:53:44,880
which indicates maybe what it was ving
1278
00:53:42,160 --> 00:53:47,359
has almost stopped.
1279
00:53:44,880 --> 00:53:49,280
Roger Jack. Thank you. We copy. Any more
1280
00:53:47,359 --> 00:53:52,480
suggestions on trying to pump up O2 tank
1281
00:53:49,280 --> 00:53:54,960
one pressure? No.
1282
00:53:52,480 --> 00:53:58,960
Uh, flight, we're going to hit 100 PSI
1283
00:53:54,960 --> 00:54:00,960
in an hour and 54 minutes.
1284
00:53:58,960 --> 00:54:03,200
That's the end right there. The command
1285
00:54:00,960 --> 00:54:05,440
service module's oxygen system requires
1286
00:54:03,200 --> 00:54:07,440
a pressure of at least 100 PSI to
1287
00:54:05,440 --> 00:54:09,359
function properly. If the oxygen
1288
00:54:07,440 --> 00:54:11,280
pressure goes below that threshold, the
1289
00:54:09,359 --> 00:54:12,960
fuel cells stop working altogether.
1290
00:54:11,280 --> 00:54:15,599
Flight from flight. Go ahead, slide.
1291
00:54:12,960 --> 00:54:17,200
Whatever planning you do, I want to do
1292
00:54:15,599 --> 00:54:19,359
assuming that we're going around the
1293
00:54:17,200 --> 00:54:21,359
moon and we're using the limb for
1294
00:54:19,359 --> 00:54:22,880
performing the maneuver because in the
1295
00:54:21,359 --> 00:54:24,160
present configuration, unless we get a
1296
00:54:22,880 --> 00:54:26,359
heck of a lot smarter, I think we're
1297
00:54:24,160 --> 00:54:29,680
wasting our time planning and using the
1298
00:54:26,359 --> 00:54:32,079
SPS. Okay, flight. So, I think all of
1299
00:54:29,680 --> 00:54:36,160
our return to Earth type planning should
1300
00:54:32,079 --> 00:54:37,480
be assuming the uh use of the lamb dips
1301
00:54:36,160 --> 00:54:40,319
and or
1302
00:54:37,480 --> 00:54:42,480
RCS and I think third priority down the
1303
00:54:40,319 --> 00:54:44,640
line should be CSM RCS. Okay. And I'm
1304
00:54:42,480 --> 00:54:46,720
assuming you'd want fastest possible
1305
00:54:44,640 --> 00:54:49,200
return.
1306
00:54:46,720 --> 00:54:50,720
Uh yeah, I think that's the case. Okay,
1307
00:54:49,200 --> 00:54:52,559
we'll we'll work on it from that
1308
00:54:50,720 --> 00:54:54,319
sideline flight. Should be no problem.
1309
00:54:52,559 --> 00:54:56,559
The flight director does not like the
1310
00:54:54,319 --> 00:54:58,400
idea of firing the service module's main
1311
00:54:56,559 --> 00:54:59,839
engine. They could tell whatever was
1312
00:54:58,400 --> 00:55:01,359
causing these issues came from the
1313
00:54:59,839 --> 00:55:03,119
service module, and its effects were
1314
00:55:01,359 --> 00:55:05,280
severe enough that firing the engine in
1315
00:55:03,119 --> 00:55:07,680
a now unknown state carried significant
1316
00:55:05,280 --> 00:55:09,440
risk. If the engine or parts of its
1317
00:55:07,680 --> 00:55:11,040
nozzle were punctured, the main engine
1318
00:55:09,440 --> 00:55:13,040
could now be another bomb just waiting
1319
00:55:11,040 --> 00:55:14,800
to go off. The difficulty of starting
1320
00:55:13,040 --> 00:55:16,720
the service module's engine and guidance
1321
00:55:14,800 --> 00:55:19,119
system in a now powered down state added
1322
00:55:16,720 --> 00:55:20,800
to the uncertainty. The safest possible
1323
00:55:19,119 --> 00:55:23,280
option was switching entirely to using
1324
00:55:20,800 --> 00:55:25,040
the lunar module. It has its own oxygen,
1325
00:55:23,280 --> 00:55:27,680
electrical, and guidance systems, and
1326
00:55:25,040 --> 00:55:29,200
most importantly, its own engine. Ground
1327
00:55:27,680 --> 00:55:30,880
control's new task was to use an
1328
00:55:29,200 --> 00:55:32,640
emergency protocol designed for the
1329
00:55:30,880 --> 00:55:34,240
failure of the service propulsion system
1330
00:55:32,640 --> 00:55:35,920
engine as a guide to power up and
1331
00:55:34,240 --> 00:55:38,079
maneuver the lunar module with the
1332
00:55:35,920 --> 00:55:40,559
command service module still attached.
1333
00:55:38,079 --> 00:55:43,720
Flight Ecom, go ahead. Ecom. Okay,
1334
00:55:40,559 --> 00:55:48,160
listen. There is a possibility that we
1335
00:55:43,720 --> 00:55:50,160
blew a O2 line in one of the fuel cells
1336
00:55:48,160 --> 00:55:54,720
and it's effectively manifolded there.
1337
00:55:50,160 --> 00:55:56,559
Of course, now I'm I want to shut off
1338
00:55:54,720 --> 00:55:58,640
one of the re the reactant valves to one
1339
00:55:56,559 --> 00:56:02,079
of the fuel cells, and that would be
1340
00:55:58,640 --> 00:56:05,839
fuel cell 3 since its O2 pressure is
1341
00:56:02,079 --> 00:56:09,040
gone. Now, fuel cell one's O2 pressure
1342
00:56:05,839 --> 00:56:13,640
is trying to stay up there at 45 PSI.
1343
00:56:09,040 --> 00:56:14,880
Maybe the problem is in fuel cell 3.
1344
00:56:13,640 --> 00:56:16,559
[Music]
1345
00:56:14,880 --> 00:56:18,720
That sounds like a good assumption right
1346
00:56:16,559 --> 00:56:21,520
there. Yeah, fuel cell 3 is lost anyway
1347
00:56:18,720 --> 00:56:23,440
as far as flight GNC. Go GNC. Turn
1348
00:56:21,520 --> 00:56:25,200
Charlie one thruster off. You want to
1349
00:56:23,440 --> 00:56:26,400
turn Charlie one off? Why? Well, it
1350
00:56:25,200 --> 00:56:30,040
looks like we're getting a lot of firing
1351
00:56:26,400 --> 00:56:34,079
out of for no reason. Okay, Capcom,
1352
00:56:30,040 --> 00:56:35,839
recommend thruster C12 off. Excuse me,
1353
00:56:34,079 --> 00:56:39,040
Fred. I'd like to butt in here a minute.
1354
00:56:35,839 --> 00:56:41,119
We'd like to have thruster C1 off. C1 is
1355
00:56:39,040 --> 00:56:43,280
off. ECOM from flight. You want to shut
1356
00:56:41,119 --> 00:56:45,680
off both reactant valves to fuel cell
1357
00:56:43,280 --> 00:56:47,760
number anyway. Flight. Okay. and the
1358
00:56:45,680 --> 00:56:50,400
inline heaters off in fuel cells one and
1359
00:56:47,760 --> 00:56:53,040
three, please. What we're proposing
1360
00:56:50,400 --> 00:56:54,960
supposing here, Capcom, is we may have a
1361
00:56:53,040 --> 00:56:56,160
had some problem in fuel cell number
1362
00:56:54,960 --> 00:56:58,799
three since that's the one that's
1363
00:56:56,160 --> 00:57:02,799
reading no O2 right now and we may be
1364
00:56:58,799 --> 00:57:04,799
losing our O2 through fuel cell uh
1365
00:57:02,799 --> 00:57:06,839
number three, the O2 manifold and as
1366
00:57:04,799 --> 00:57:11,079
much as they're manifolded together
1367
00:57:06,839 --> 00:57:13,760
commonly. Uh looks like the O2 and fuel
1368
00:57:11,079 --> 00:57:15,200
cell one and two seem to be trying to
1369
00:57:13,760 --> 00:57:17,040
stay up there.
1370
00:57:15,200 --> 00:57:19,760
and fuel cell three looks like it's the
1371
00:57:17,040 --> 00:57:22,799
oddball here. Capcom, let's close the
1372
00:57:19,760 --> 00:57:25,599
reactant valve to fuel cell number
1373
00:57:22,799 --> 00:57:29,040
three. Okay, close reactant valve to
1374
00:57:25,599 --> 00:57:31,599
fuel cell number three. And um you're
1375
00:57:29,040 --> 00:57:32,960
saying that one and two look okay? Well,
1376
00:57:31,599 --> 00:57:34,319
what it looks like looks like the
1377
00:57:32,960 --> 00:57:35,680
pressure is trying to stay up there. And
1378
00:57:34,319 --> 00:57:38,000
this is the best guess we've got right
1379
00:57:35,680 --> 00:57:39,680
now because we got to stop this O2 flow.
1380
00:57:38,000 --> 00:57:42,160
Okay, 13, this is Houston. And it
1381
00:57:39,680 --> 00:57:45,839
appears to us that we're losing O2 flow
1382
00:57:42,160 --> 00:57:48,000
through uh fuel cell 3. So uh we want
1383
00:57:45,839 --> 00:57:49,920
you to close the react valve on fuel
1384
00:57:48,000 --> 00:57:51,839
cell 3. It looks like fuel cell one and
1385
00:57:49,920 --> 00:57:53,680
two are trying to hold up. Okay. Most of
1386
00:57:51,839 --> 00:57:55,280
ground control's attention is focused on
1387
00:57:53,680 --> 00:57:57,440
stopping the remaining tank from losing
1388
00:57:55,280 --> 00:57:58,960
the rest of its breathable oxygen. They
1389
00:57:57,440 --> 00:58:00,880
tried shutting off the valves that lead
1390
00:57:58,960 --> 00:58:02,319
to the fuel cells in case the oxygen had
1391
00:58:00,880 --> 00:58:04,319
been leaking through them, among other
1392
00:58:02,319 --> 00:58:06,160
measures. What they didn't know is that
1393
00:58:04,319 --> 00:58:08,079
these attempts would be entirely futile
1394
00:58:06,160 --> 00:58:10,240
in stopping the remaining oxygen tank
1395
00:58:08,079 --> 00:58:12,319
from completely draining. The tank that
1396
00:58:10,240 --> 00:58:14,000
had exploded was located right next to
1397
00:58:12,319 --> 00:58:15,599
the now draining tank. And somewhere
1398
00:58:14,000 --> 00:58:17,440
within the pipe work leaning from that
1399
00:58:15,599 --> 00:58:19,760
tank, something had been jolted far
1400
00:58:17,440 --> 00:58:21,520
enough to break a seal or a pipe open.
1401
00:58:19,760 --> 00:58:23,839
The venting was the crew seeing their
1402
00:58:21,520 --> 00:58:26,880
own oxygen from the only tank left in
1403
00:58:23,839 --> 00:58:28,640
the service module. Flight GNC. Go DNC.
1404
00:58:26,880 --> 00:58:31,040
More jet reconfiguration to see if we
1405
00:58:28,640 --> 00:58:32,640
can hold the attitude. Okay. Like to
1406
00:58:31,040 --> 00:58:33,920
turn Charlie 2 off. Why are we
1407
00:58:32,640 --> 00:58:35,520
interested in holding attitude? If we're
1408
00:58:33,920 --> 00:58:36,640
not venting, why not drift for a while?
1409
00:58:35,520 --> 00:58:38,079
It'd probably be better from a
1410
00:58:36,640 --> 00:58:39,520
standpoint of thermal control anyway,
1411
00:58:38,079 --> 00:58:41,119
wouldn't it? Well, I think we'd like to
1412
00:58:39,520 --> 00:58:42,960
get into a control drift rather than
1413
00:58:41,119 --> 00:58:45,040
just some random thing like that. ECOM,
1414
00:58:42,960 --> 00:58:47,839
have you deduced anything? Have you seen
1415
00:58:45,040 --> 00:58:50,000
your uh reactant valves go off? Have you
1416
00:58:47,839 --> 00:58:51,599
seen flow cease?
1417
00:58:50,000 --> 00:58:57,000
You can't tell. Flight knew they were
1418
00:58:51,599 --> 00:58:57,000
open circuited and the pressure uh
1419
00:58:57,200 --> 00:59:02,160
still appears to be going down. Yeah.
1420
00:59:00,400 --> 00:59:04,160
Okay, flight, we have our checkpoint.
1421
00:59:02,160 --> 00:59:06,480
Okay, all flight controllers, I'd
1422
00:59:04,160 --> 00:59:07,920
suggest you start handing over because I
1423
00:59:06,480 --> 00:59:10,000
think a fresh team is probably going to
1424
00:59:07,920 --> 00:59:12,000
be thinking clearer. I think the rest of
1425
00:59:10,000 --> 00:59:13,839
us can continue working in some other
1426
00:59:12,000 --> 00:59:16,720
function in support of the new team
1427
00:59:13,839 --> 00:59:18,720
coming on. Okay. Uh, let me go back over
1428
00:59:16,720 --> 00:59:21,680
this again. We're heading over to Glenn.
1429
00:59:18,720 --> 00:59:23,520
I'd suggest the white team goes back and
1430
00:59:21,680 --> 00:59:24,799
starts going through the Dlog of the
1431
00:59:23,520 --> 00:59:26,160
data. In other words, let's see if we
1432
00:59:24,799 --> 00:59:27,680
can go back to the initial conditions
1433
00:59:26,160 --> 00:59:28,960
and work in that problem to see if we
1434
00:59:27,680 --> 00:59:30,480
can find out what happened and we may
1435
00:59:28,960 --> 00:59:32,480
find some better clues as to what to do
1436
00:59:30,480 --> 00:59:33,920
and let the French guys come on and try
1437
00:59:32,480 --> 00:59:35,359
to figure out where do we go from here.
1438
00:59:33,920 --> 00:59:37,520
The scheduled time for the ground
1439
00:59:35,359 --> 00:59:39,119
control crew switch over had arrived.
1440
00:59:37,520 --> 00:59:40,480
Although the currently serving white
1441
00:59:39,119 --> 00:59:42,400
team would have to run the incoming
1442
00:59:40,480 --> 00:59:44,000
black team through a lot of information,
1443
00:59:42,400 --> 00:59:45,520
having a fresh pair of eyes look over
1444
00:59:44,000 --> 00:59:47,280
the problems could help reveal other
1445
00:59:45,520 --> 00:59:48,799
issues they had missed. The white team
1446
00:59:47,280 --> 00:59:50,480
would continue to help troubleshoot in
1447
00:59:48,799 --> 00:59:52,160
the background. Ecom, I don't like the
1448
00:59:50,480 --> 00:59:53,200
way that O2 pressure is going down. If
1449
00:59:52,160 --> 00:59:54,799
you want to do something about these
1450
00:59:53,200 --> 00:59:56,400
other reactant valves, let's make up our
1451
00:59:54,799 --> 00:59:59,040
mind.
1452
00:59:56,400 --> 01:00:01,760
Go ahead. Okay. On the reaction for fuel
1453
00:59:59,040 --> 01:00:03,200
cell one, uh seems to me we have no
1454
01:00:01,760 --> 01:00:05,440
choice but to go ahead and do it. The
1455
01:00:03,200 --> 01:00:07,520
pressure continues to drop. Uh we're not
1456
01:00:05,440 --> 01:00:10,000
going to have anything left soon anyway.
1457
01:00:07,520 --> 01:00:12,240
So, uh it looks like the next best thing
1458
01:00:10,000 --> 01:00:15,200
to try is to go ahead and uh turn the
1459
01:00:12,240 --> 01:00:18,240
reactions off on fuel cell one. And
1460
01:00:15,200 --> 01:00:20,880
Houston 132 tank pressure number one is
1461
01:00:18,240 --> 01:00:22,240
less than 300 now.
1462
01:00:20,880 --> 01:00:24,079
Roger. Are we seeing that? We confirm
1463
01:00:22,240 --> 01:00:25,920
it. Yeah, we copy that. Tell them we're
1464
01:00:24,079 --> 01:00:28,240
debating shutting off the reactants on
1465
01:00:25,920 --> 01:00:29,920
one flight. Go ahead. The temperature is
1466
01:00:28,240 --> 01:00:32,480
the only thing we have. And is it
1467
01:00:29,920 --> 01:00:33,760
correlate? Pretty closely. You're saying
1468
01:00:32,480 --> 01:00:35,040
then that I'm looking at a valid
1469
01:00:33,760 --> 01:00:36,720
pressure in that tank and it's still
1470
01:00:35,040 --> 01:00:38,880
going down. That's what it looks like.
1471
01:00:36,720 --> 01:00:41,200
Therefore, therefore, we need to go to
1472
01:00:38,880 --> 01:00:43,040
fuel cell one and uh turn off the
1473
01:00:41,200 --> 01:00:46,400
reactants. Capcom, fuel cell one
1474
01:00:43,040 --> 01:00:48,720
reactants because because the tank one
1475
01:00:46,400 --> 01:00:50,000
is still going down. Pressure and temp
1476
01:00:48,720 --> 01:00:54,079
pressure going down. Temperature
1477
01:00:50,000 --> 01:00:55,680
confirms it. Okay. 13 Houston, we're
1478
01:00:54,079 --> 01:00:58,400
going to have to have you uh go through
1479
01:00:55,680 --> 01:01:02,640
the shutdown procedure on fuel cell one.
1480
01:00:58,400 --> 01:01:05,440
Our O2 uh pressure is going down as you
1481
01:01:02,640 --> 01:01:07,280
note and the temperature confirms it.
1482
01:01:05,440 --> 01:01:09,520
Okay, Jack. We're proceeding with a
1483
01:01:07,280 --> 01:01:11,040
shutdown procedure for fuel cell one
1484
01:01:09,520 --> 01:01:12,960
flight. Go ahead. Fine. Does the
1485
01:01:11,040 --> 01:01:14,640
temperature in tank 2 correspond to the
1486
01:01:12,960 --> 01:01:18,160
pressure reading? Let me see how close
1487
01:01:14,640 --> 01:01:20,720
it is. Fine. Fight. Go. temperature and
1488
01:01:18,160 --> 01:01:22,400
the pressure correspond. They're
1489
01:01:20,720 --> 01:01:24,640
verifying that the pressure is reading
1490
01:01:22,400 --> 01:01:26,880
right in tank two. That's right. Fine.
1491
01:01:24,640 --> 01:01:29,680
Tank two. Okay. Now, is it possible that
1492
01:01:26,880 --> 01:01:32,079
we still have that tank and it's good
1493
01:01:29,680 --> 01:01:35,359
and we could somehow get power on B and
1494
01:01:32,079 --> 01:01:36,880
use it? It's not likely. Flight not.
1495
01:01:35,359 --> 01:01:39,280
What's not likely, Clint? It's not
1496
01:01:36,880 --> 01:01:41,920
likely to be able to uh actually have
1497
01:01:39,280 --> 01:01:44,000
anything left in the tank.
1498
01:01:41,920 --> 01:01:46,079
You don't think so? I don't think so.
1499
01:01:44,000 --> 01:01:47,599
But let's we'll pulse that one, too. All
1500
01:01:46,079 --> 01:01:49,200
right. Let me get you a time. It look
1501
01:01:47,599 --> 01:01:52,720
like we've got on tank one here. All
1502
01:01:49,200 --> 01:01:54,960
right. Uh tell me your flight. Go fly.
1503
01:01:52,720 --> 01:01:57,920
Is there anything uh simple that we can
1504
01:01:54,960 --> 01:01:59,839
refer the crew to uh to get them
1505
01:01:57,920 --> 01:02:01,720
thinking about using the limb here? Have
1506
01:01:59,839 --> 01:02:04,240
you got anything in the checklist
1507
01:02:01,720 --> 01:02:06,400
paperwork to describe to them what your
1508
01:02:04,240 --> 01:02:08,319
intentions are? Negative. There's
1509
01:02:06,400 --> 01:02:09,520
nothing documented in contingency. We're
1510
01:02:08,319 --> 01:02:12,000
thinking about using the limb as
1511
01:02:09,520 --> 01:02:13,839
lifeboat. We have some procedures here
1512
01:02:12,000 --> 01:02:15,280
on the ground though. I'm sure you do.
1513
01:02:13,839 --> 01:02:18,559
What do they amount to? flying with the
1514
01:02:15,280 --> 01:02:20,640
tunnel open. Uh, roj. Uh, just a limb,
1515
01:02:18,559 --> 01:02:22,240
low power load supplying power to the
1516
01:02:20,640 --> 01:02:25,280
CSM.
1517
01:02:22,240 --> 01:02:30,480
Supplying power to the CSM. Yes. About 5
1518
01:02:25,280 --> 01:02:33,480
amps. Uh, to what? To their main bus.
1519
01:02:30,480 --> 01:02:35,839
Okay. Where? Well, main B is in bad
1520
01:02:33,480 --> 01:02:37,760
shape. We don't have anything on main B
1521
01:02:35,839 --> 01:02:40,720
right now. What's that power for? Tell
1522
01:02:37,760 --> 01:02:43,599
me. Just anything they might need for
1523
01:02:40,720 --> 01:02:47,359
Okay, Jack. It looks like O2 tank one
1524
01:02:43,599 --> 01:02:49,040
pressure is just a hair over 200. We
1525
01:02:47,359 --> 01:02:51,119
confirm that here. And the temperature
1526
01:02:49,040 --> 01:02:53,280
also confirms it. Okay. Does it look
1527
01:02:51,119 --> 01:02:56,079
like it's still going down? It's uh
1528
01:02:53,280 --> 01:02:59,440
slowly going to zero and uh we're
1529
01:02:56,079 --> 01:03:01,520
starting to think about lamb lifeboat.
1530
01:02:59,440 --> 01:03:03,040
Go ahead. Okay. Got an update on the
1531
01:03:01,520 --> 01:03:05,040
time. Look like we got about 18 minutes
1532
01:03:03,040 --> 01:03:06,640
until we get down to 100 PSI and that's
1533
01:03:05,040 --> 01:03:08,720
sort of the cut off point. All right.
1534
01:03:06,640 --> 01:03:10,240
But we're charging battery A. Well, that
1535
01:03:08,720 --> 01:03:11,920
doesn't mean much in 18 minutes though,
1536
01:03:10,240 --> 01:03:14,880
but we're doing all we can do. All
1537
01:03:11,920 --> 01:03:17,280
right. Uh, econ flight. Quite fine. Let
1538
01:03:14,880 --> 01:03:19,760
me try one more time. Is it possible
1539
01:03:17,280 --> 01:03:23,760
that if we got power to main B that we
1540
01:03:19,760 --> 01:03:25,960
could get tank 2 powered up and up in
1541
01:03:23,760 --> 01:03:29,680
pressure? We don't feel like that's a
1542
01:03:25,960 --> 01:03:31,440
possibility. We might conceive power. We
1543
01:03:29,680 --> 01:03:33,520
don't feel like we can get anything out
1544
01:03:31,440 --> 01:03:35,760
of tank two. Okay. Now, why is that?
1545
01:03:33,520 --> 01:03:37,359
Tell me why. I'm just because the
1546
01:03:35,760 --> 01:03:40,880
numbers we're looking at indicate that
1547
01:03:37,359 --> 01:03:44,400
it's essentially uh uh ambient. All
1548
01:03:40,880 --> 01:03:46,559
gone. Uh econ flight go. How long have
1549
01:03:44,400 --> 01:03:48,160
we got now on the cell? Last count had
1550
01:03:46,559 --> 01:03:50,079
18 minutes. Let me get an update. Okay.
1551
01:03:48,160 --> 01:03:52,559
Tell me what do we got to do to power up
1552
01:03:50,079 --> 01:03:54,480
to get some comm. Okay. We got a
1553
01:03:52,559 --> 01:03:56,240
procedure here that gets power first on
1554
01:03:54,480 --> 01:03:57,440
the limb. We figure we've got about 15
1555
01:03:56,240 --> 01:03:59,680
minutes worth of power left in the
1556
01:03:57,440 --> 01:04:01,440
command module. So we want you to start
1557
01:03:59,680 --> 01:04:04,319
uh getting over in the limb and getting
1558
01:04:01,440 --> 01:04:06,960
some power on that. This is Apollo
1559
01:04:04,319 --> 01:04:07,960
control at 57 hours 46 minutes ground
1560
01:04:06,960 --> 01:04:10,160
elapse
1561
01:04:07,960 --> 01:04:12,799
time. The black team of flight
1562
01:04:10,160 --> 01:04:14,480
controllers is now on station in mission
1563
01:04:12,799 --> 01:04:17,200
control center looking at possible
1564
01:04:14,480 --> 01:04:19,440
alternate missions as we have an
1565
01:04:17,200 --> 01:04:21,960
apparent serious oxygen leak in the
1566
01:04:19,440 --> 01:04:24,400
cryogenic oxygen in the service
1567
01:04:21,960 --> 01:04:27,520
module. And now in the process of
1568
01:04:24,400 --> 01:04:30,480
powering down the command module. Less
1569
01:04:27,520 --> 01:04:32,920
than 15 minutes remaining of uh
1570
01:04:30,480 --> 01:04:36,160
electrical power to the
1571
01:04:32,920 --> 01:04:38,079
CSM. Sometime later in the mission uh it
1572
01:04:36,160 --> 01:04:40,640
is expected that they would return to
1573
01:04:38,079 --> 01:04:42,160
the free return trajectory which they
1574
01:04:40,640 --> 01:04:45,599
left yesterday in the midcourse
1575
01:04:42,160 --> 01:04:49,039
correction burn number two.
1576
01:04:45,599 --> 01:04:52,559
returning to the uh alternate mission
1577
01:04:49,039 --> 01:04:56,200
now being considered at this point uh in
1578
01:04:52,559 --> 01:04:59,599
the trans lunar coast. It is
1579
01:04:56,200 --> 01:05:01,280
cheaper and swifter to coast on around
1580
01:04:59,599 --> 01:05:04,559
the moon and come back to Earth than it
1581
01:05:01,280 --> 01:05:08,079
is to do a deep space abort. Continuing
1582
01:05:04,559 --> 01:05:10,079
to monitor air ground from Apollo 13.
1583
01:05:08,079 --> 01:05:11,760
This is Apollo control. Both oxygen
1584
01:05:10,079 --> 01:05:13,599
tanks failing in the service module
1585
01:05:11,760 --> 01:05:16,240
meant the death of all three of its fuel
1586
01:05:13,599 --> 01:05:18,000
cells as well. With less than 15 minutes
1587
01:05:16,240 --> 01:05:20,640
of electricity remaining, the decision
1588
01:05:18,000 --> 01:05:22,640
is made to power up the lunar module.
1589
01:05:20,640 --> 01:05:24,559
The crew would tap into the oxygen tanks
1590
01:05:22,640 --> 01:05:26,480
and batteries inside of the lunar module
1591
01:05:24,559 --> 01:05:28,319
intended to keep a crew of two people
1592
01:05:26,480 --> 01:05:30,559
alive on the surface of the moon for 2
1593
01:05:28,319 --> 01:05:33,280
days. It now needed to keep a crew of
1594
01:05:30,559 --> 01:05:34,960
three alive for four. All three fuel
1595
01:05:33,280 --> 01:05:36,559
cells failing meant that the crew would
1596
01:05:34,960 --> 01:05:38,240
have significantly less water and
1597
01:05:36,559 --> 01:05:40,240
electricity than planned for the rest of
1598
01:05:38,240 --> 01:05:41,760
the mission. The crew would soon begin
1599
01:05:40,240 --> 01:05:44,319
to struggle with their short supply of
1600
01:05:41,760 --> 01:05:46,720
both of these resources as a result. And
1601
01:05:44,319 --> 01:05:48,559
uh Jack, have you all got good limb data
1602
01:05:46,720 --> 01:05:50,319
down there now? That's affirmative,
1603
01:05:48,559 --> 01:05:51,920
Fred. We're getting good LEM data. Okay,
1604
01:05:50,319 --> 01:05:53,920
everybody. Look, we got a number of long
1605
01:05:51,920 --> 01:05:56,400
range problems right now. We have the
1606
01:05:53,920 --> 01:05:59,520
burn to do, which is at about 79 hours,
1607
01:05:56,400 --> 01:06:00,880
28 hours from now. But right now, I want
1608
01:05:59,520 --> 01:06:02,559
the guys here in the room to concentrate
1609
01:06:00,880 --> 01:06:04,000
on keeping this thing right now going
1610
01:06:02,559 --> 01:06:07,680
along. All right. And watch it. This is
1611
01:06:04,000 --> 01:06:10,559
Apollo control. 58 hours 46 minutes
1612
01:06:07,680 --> 01:06:12,960
ground elapse time. Love and haze still
1613
01:06:10,559 --> 01:06:16,000
powering up the lunar module in
1614
01:06:12,960 --> 01:06:20,079
preparation for uh what turns out to be
1615
01:06:16,000 --> 01:06:23,280
an alternate mission in which no lunar
1616
01:06:20,079 --> 01:06:25,039
landing will be possible. In about 20
1617
01:06:23,280 --> 01:06:26,880
minutes in the Houston news center,
1618
01:06:25,039 --> 01:06:28,400
there will be a press conference in the
1619
01:06:26,880 --> 01:06:30,319
small briefing room. A press conference
1620
01:06:28,400 --> 01:06:32,960
is held in order to inform the media of
1621
01:06:30,319 --> 01:06:34,160
the developing situation. The explosion
1622
01:06:32,960 --> 01:06:36,799
had turned this mission from a
1623
01:06:34,160 --> 01:06:38,640
littleknown event into a major fiasco.
1624
01:06:36,799 --> 01:06:40,480
The media and public would begin to tune
1625
01:06:38,640 --> 01:06:42,319
in and find out about the precarious
1626
01:06:40,480 --> 01:06:44,480
situation the crew now find themselves
1627
01:06:42,319 --> 01:06:46,559
in. Participants in the forthcoming
1628
01:06:44,480 --> 01:06:50,960
press conference uh within the next 15
1629
01:06:46,559 --> 01:06:53,359
minutes or so will be uh man spacecraft
1630
01:06:50,960 --> 01:06:56,400
center deputy director Christopher Craft
1631
01:06:53,359 --> 01:06:57,960
Jr. Apollo spacecraft program office
1632
01:06:56,400 --> 01:07:00,880
manager James A.
1633
01:06:57,960 --> 01:07:03,000
McDivet and MSC Director of Flight
1634
01:07:00,880 --> 01:07:04,960
Operations Sigard
1635
01:07:03,000 --> 01:07:06,880
Schoberg. This will be in the small
1636
01:07:04,960 --> 01:07:08,559
briefing room in the Houston News
1637
01:07:06,880 --> 01:07:10,640
Center.
1638
01:07:08,559 --> 01:07:11,680
I guess I I really there are a lot of
1639
01:07:10,640 --> 01:07:13,839
things that could have happened. It
1640
01:07:11,680 --> 01:07:15,200
would be just pure conjecture. Anything
1641
01:07:13,839 --> 01:07:16,240
that's down there that's pressurized
1642
01:07:15,200 --> 01:07:17,599
could have let go and there are all
1643
01:07:16,240 --> 01:07:19,920
kinds of pressurized things or
1644
01:07:17,599 --> 01:07:23,039
pressurized hydrogen, nitrogen, oxygen
1645
01:07:19,920 --> 01:07:25,760
fuel cells. A it's a very complicated
1646
01:07:23,039 --> 01:07:28,559
bay that that this happened in. Can you
1647
01:07:25,760 --> 01:07:30,799
get them back? Taking in consideration
1648
01:07:28,559 --> 01:07:32,880
all the imponderables, the the power,
1649
01:07:30,799 --> 01:07:34,559
the oxygen, the landing area and all
1650
01:07:32,880 --> 01:07:37,440
this sort of thing. Is this if the
1651
01:07:34,559 --> 01:07:39,440
situation remains stable as it is at the
1652
01:07:37,440 --> 01:07:42,000
moment, there's no question. But what we
1653
01:07:39,440 --> 01:07:43,920
have the thing under control and we can
1654
01:07:42,000 --> 01:07:45,200
return the crew safely to the Earth.
1655
01:07:43,920 --> 01:07:47,440
Now, we're going to have to make some
1656
01:07:45,200 --> 01:07:51,520
compromises and procedures as how you do
1657
01:07:47,440 --> 01:07:54,240
that. If everything remains as is uh we
1658
01:07:51,520 --> 01:07:56,960
can get them back successfully. Now if
1659
01:07:54,240 --> 01:07:59,359
there was some change in the status of
1660
01:07:56,960 --> 01:08:00,960
the lunar module then that might that
1661
01:07:59,359 --> 01:08:03,760
might mean something else and we will
1662
01:08:00,960 --> 01:08:05,760
keep you appraised of that situation. Uh
1663
01:08:03,760 --> 01:08:08,000
Jim, I'm not clear on what the vetting
1664
01:08:05,760 --> 01:08:10,799
did to the uh spacecraft's attitude and
1665
01:08:08,000 --> 01:08:13,680
pitch roll in your
1666
01:08:10,799 --> 01:08:16,719
Well, he had a negative pitch and a
1667
01:08:13,680 --> 01:08:17,920
negative roll and uh that's one of the
1668
01:08:16,719 --> 01:08:19,839
clues that we had that something
1669
01:08:17,920 --> 01:08:21,600
happened in bay 4 in addition to the
1670
01:08:19,839 --> 01:08:23,359
fact that we had all these other
1671
01:08:21,600 --> 01:08:24,960
anomalies to the equipment that's in
1672
01:08:23,359 --> 01:08:26,560
there. It meant that it was pitching
1673
01:08:24,960 --> 01:08:28,400
nose down and it was rolling to the
1674
01:08:26,560 --> 01:08:31,640
left. I think the other thing you have
1675
01:08:28,400 --> 01:08:34,400
to remember is that uh we have certain
1676
01:08:31,640 --> 01:08:36,480
instrumentation that uh we can believe
1677
01:08:34,400 --> 01:08:38,719
or not believe. I mean by that that when
1678
01:08:36,480 --> 01:08:41,120
you have something like this happen you
1679
01:08:38,719 --> 01:08:42,560
don't know that you're not reading false
1680
01:08:41,120 --> 01:08:44,400
information from some of the
1681
01:08:42,560 --> 01:08:47,440
instruments. So you have to look at
1682
01:08:44,400 --> 01:08:49,199
those and see how they failed etc and
1683
01:08:47,440 --> 01:08:50,799
see what the measurements are see which
1684
01:08:49,199 --> 01:08:52,640
direction they went when they began to
1685
01:08:50,799 --> 01:08:54,960
fail to see whether that you're reading
1686
01:08:52,640 --> 01:08:56,239
true information.
1687
01:08:54,960 --> 01:08:57,920
All right, this one and then we're going
1688
01:08:56,239 --> 01:09:00,319
to come back. All right. Uh Chris, could
1689
01:08:57,920 --> 01:09:03,359
you uh put this in a a somewhat larger
1690
01:09:00,319 --> 01:09:05,040
perspective? Uh it seems obviously that
1691
01:09:03,359 --> 01:09:07,679
if this happened on the way back, the
1692
01:09:05,040 --> 01:09:10,759
the situation would be critical. I mean,
1693
01:09:07,679 --> 01:09:12,880
would be fatal. Indeed, it would. You
1694
01:09:10,759 --> 01:09:16,040
discuss this thing from the standpoint
1695
01:09:12,880 --> 01:09:18,960
of uh the resources you're left
1696
01:09:16,040 --> 01:09:22,159
with when it fails at this point in the
1697
01:09:18,960 --> 01:09:23,679
mission. Well, and anytime uh that you
1698
01:09:22,159 --> 01:09:25,040
still have the lunar module in the
1699
01:09:23,679 --> 01:09:27,199
condition that we have it in in this
1700
01:09:25,040 --> 01:09:28,960
case where we've not used any of its
1701
01:09:27,199 --> 01:09:32,319
consumables,
1702
01:09:28,960 --> 01:09:33,839
uh then we're in a very good situation.
1703
01:09:32,319 --> 01:09:36,480
We've always called the lamb a good
1704
01:09:33,839 --> 01:09:38,640
lifeboat under those circumstances. If
1705
01:09:36,480 --> 01:09:41,279
at any time in the mission, however, the
1706
01:09:38,640 --> 01:09:44,719
limb had separated and we had gotten
1707
01:09:41,279 --> 01:09:47,600
ourselves into a rendevous situation or
1708
01:09:44,719 --> 01:09:50,000
uh the the command module being around
1709
01:09:47,600 --> 01:09:52,319
the moon, then what you state is
1710
01:09:50,000 --> 01:09:55,679
absolutely true. It would it would be a
1711
01:09:52,319 --> 01:09:57,440
fatal situation.
1712
01:09:55,679 --> 01:09:59,760
Um, I know it's probably a little
1713
01:09:57,440 --> 01:10:02,480
premature, but um, seeing they have had
1714
01:09:59,760 --> 01:10:06,239
a a rough time, have you worked out um,
1715
01:10:02,480 --> 01:10:09,040
any schedules for um, a sleep period for
1716
01:10:06,239 --> 01:10:10,640
any of the astronauts?
1717
01:10:09,040 --> 01:10:12,719
I think this is a little premature for
1718
01:10:10,640 --> 01:10:14,239
that.
1719
01:10:12,719 --> 01:10:16,640
Forgive me if I put you on the spot, but
1720
01:10:14,239 --> 01:10:18,239
how would you classify this situation as
1721
01:10:16,640 --> 01:10:19,920
regards to these that we are familiar
1722
01:10:18,239 --> 01:10:22,880
with a little Well, I' I'd say this is
1723
01:10:19,920 --> 01:10:27,239
as serious uh situation as we we have
1724
01:10:22,880 --> 01:10:27,239
ever had in man space flight.
1725
01:10:28,239 --> 01:10:32,320
Did the fact that you went into a hybrid
1726
01:10:30,159 --> 01:10:34,000
trajectory yesterday pulling you out of
1727
01:10:32,320 --> 01:10:35,920
free free return, is that going to cause
1728
01:10:34,000 --> 01:10:38,640
you any troubles in trying to get back
1729
01:10:35,920 --> 01:10:40,480
around the moon?
1730
01:10:38,640 --> 01:10:42,719
No. As I said earlier, we're not on a
1731
01:10:40,480 --> 01:10:44,320
free return right now, but it it it
1732
01:10:42,719 --> 01:10:46,239
would only take a maneuver of about 20
1733
01:10:44,320 --> 01:10:47,920
to 40 feet per second to get you back on
1734
01:10:46,239 --> 01:10:50,480
a free return. And that could be done in
1735
01:10:47,920 --> 01:10:52,239
say 5 or 10 hours from now. We're going
1736
01:10:50,480 --> 01:10:53,760
to continue to schedule these briefings
1737
01:10:52,239 --> 01:10:55,679
throughout the mission whenever there's
1738
01:10:53,760 --> 01:10:57,600
a point where we think interpretation
1739
01:10:55,679 --> 01:10:58,640
would help and uh we'll be back again.
1740
01:10:57,600 --> 01:10:59,500
But I think we ought to get back to
1741
01:10:58,640 --> 01:11:02,400
mission control.
1742
01:10:59,500 --> 01:11:04,340
[Music]
1743
01:11:02,400 --> 01:11:07,480
personal
1744
01:11:04,340 --> 01:11:12,000
[Music]
1745
01:11:07,480 --> 01:11:16,080
com to back up and recap the earlier
1746
01:11:12,000 --> 01:11:19,040
maneuver pad or information regarding a
1747
01:11:16,080 --> 01:11:21,679
descent propulsion system abort for a
1748
01:11:19,040 --> 01:11:24,239
minimum return time.
1749
01:11:21,679 --> 01:11:27,679
This maneuver, should it be done, would
1750
01:11:24,239 --> 01:11:30,960
come at 79 hours 25 minutes 26 seconds
1751
01:11:27,679 --> 01:11:35,280
ground elapse time at an altitude above
1752
01:11:30,960 --> 01:11:39,400
the moon at 205 nautical miles.
1753
01:11:35,280 --> 01:11:43,000
The maneuver would be uh
1754
01:11:39,400 --> 01:11:47,000
1,797.7 ft per second. Pausing
1755
01:11:43,000 --> 01:11:50,480
rate, burn time of 8 minutes 35
1756
01:11:47,000 --> 01:11:54,760
seconds would produce entry interface at
1757
01:11:50,480 --> 01:11:59,239
about uh 133 hours ground elapse
1758
01:11:54,760 --> 01:12:03,120
time. Apollo 13 is now
1759
01:11:59,239 --> 01:12:05,679
185,455 nautical miles out from Earth.
1760
01:12:03,120 --> 01:12:06,600
Velocity showing on the display here in
1761
01:12:05,679 --> 01:12:08,440
mission
1762
01:12:06,600 --> 01:12:12,239
control
1763
01:12:08,440 --> 01:12:15,120
3,118 ft pers. We're continuing to stand
1764
01:12:12,239 --> 01:12:17,120
by at 59 hours 53 minutes ground elapse
1765
01:12:15,120 --> 01:12:19,040
time. This is Apollo control. Ground
1766
01:12:17,120 --> 01:12:20,480
control begins calculating a single burn
1767
01:12:19,040 --> 01:12:22,239
that will speed up the spacecraft's
1768
01:12:20,480 --> 01:12:24,719
return journey and put it onto a free
1769
01:12:22,239 --> 01:12:26,800
return trajectory. The burn is planned
1770
01:12:24,719 --> 01:12:29,360
for 2 hours past the closest approach to
1771
01:12:26,800 --> 01:12:31,199
the moon. Okay, Houston and Aquarius,
1772
01:12:29,360 --> 01:12:33,760
how do you read? Hello there, Aquarius.
1773
01:12:31,199 --> 01:12:34,960
Loud and clear. Uh, how do you read me?
1774
01:12:33,760 --> 01:12:36,960
There's an awful lot of background.
1775
01:12:34,960 --> 01:12:39,120
Okay, we got a lot of background uh
1776
01:12:36,960 --> 01:12:41,600
static. Jack, you're down in the mud.
1777
01:12:39,120 --> 01:12:44,239
You having a ground problems? Uh, you're
1778
01:12:41,600 --> 01:12:46,480
unreadable, Jack. Uh, we got a signal
1779
01:12:44,239 --> 01:12:48,320
meter right now. It keeps wavering up
1780
01:12:46,480 --> 01:12:51,199
and down. The best I'm getting is about
1781
01:12:48,320 --> 01:12:53,679
2.4 AGC. The crew begins experiencing
1782
01:12:51,199 --> 01:12:55,679
another unexpected challenge. The lunar
1783
01:12:53,679 --> 01:12:57,520
module's communication systems use the
1784
01:12:55,679 --> 01:12:59,840
same frequency as the third stage, which
1785
01:12:57,520 --> 01:13:01,199
had been ejected earlier in the mission.
1786
01:12:59,840 --> 01:13:03,199
The third stage had the same
1787
01:13:01,199 --> 01:13:04,880
communication system as the lunar module
1788
01:13:03,199 --> 01:13:07,280
so that ground control could measure its
1789
01:13:04,880 --> 01:13:09,040
position in space. It had been intended
1790
01:13:07,280 --> 01:13:10,640
that the lunar module wouldn't have been
1791
01:13:09,040 --> 01:13:12,400
powered up before the crew got to the
1792
01:13:10,640 --> 01:13:14,360
moon, giving the third stage time to
1793
01:13:12,400 --> 01:13:16,640
crash into the moon and avoiding any
1794
01:13:14,360 --> 01:13:18,560
interference. The unexpected change in
1795
01:13:16,640 --> 01:13:20,640
plans, however, had the crew power up
1796
01:13:18,560 --> 01:13:22,320
the lunar module onto the same frequency
1797
01:13:20,640 --> 01:13:24,480
that the third stage had already been
1798
01:13:22,320 --> 01:13:25,840
using. This gave the crew great
1799
01:13:24,480 --> 01:13:28,159
difficulty in hearing the ground
1800
01:13:25,840 --> 01:13:30,880
control, although it was not impossible.
1801
01:13:28,159 --> 01:13:32,800
Flighting go. Go ahead. They're having
1802
01:13:30,880 --> 01:13:34,159
trouble grabbing a hold of the S4B to
1803
01:13:32,800 --> 01:13:35,920
push it out of the way is what the
1804
01:13:34,159 --> 01:13:37,440
problem is. Okay. Well, we had comm
1805
01:13:35,920 --> 01:13:38,560
before. Can we get back to there? What
1806
01:13:37,440 --> 01:13:40,960
we're trying to do, and we're not having
1807
01:13:38,560 --> 01:13:42,960
any luck, there is one suggestion we can
1808
01:13:40,960 --> 01:13:45,679
do. We can turn the limb transceiver
1809
01:13:42,960 --> 01:13:47,840
completely off for about 2 to 3 minutes
1810
01:13:45,679 --> 01:13:49,679
and let them grab a hold of the S4B,
1811
01:13:47,840 --> 01:13:52,880
push it out of the way, and then bring
1812
01:13:49,679 --> 01:13:54,800
it back up.
1813
01:13:52,880 --> 01:13:56,159
Is that what we have to do now? We can't
1814
01:13:54,800 --> 01:13:58,640
talk to them to tell them to do that.
1815
01:13:56,159 --> 01:14:00,800
That's right. But if we can get up for a
1816
01:13:58,640 --> 01:14:03,920
lap in here, just say turn your
1817
01:14:00,800 --> 01:14:07,440
transceiver off for 3 minutes,
1818
01:14:03,920 --> 01:14:09,199
then turn it back on and go flight. Go
1819
01:14:07,440 --> 01:14:11,280
ahead. Is that our best step now to get
1820
01:14:09,199 --> 01:14:12,880
combat? That's our best step, right?
1821
01:14:11,280 --> 01:14:14,320
Capcom, give him that. We'll try. He's
1822
01:14:12,880 --> 01:14:15,679
not going to hear your flight right now.
1823
01:14:14,320 --> 01:14:17,760
Ground control came up with an
1824
01:14:15,679 --> 01:14:19,600
interesting solution to this problem.
1825
01:14:17,760 --> 01:14:21,600
The frequency that the lunar module and
1826
01:14:19,600 --> 01:14:24,080
third stage used was not fixed like a
1827
01:14:21,600 --> 01:14:26,080
standard radio station. Instead, the
1828
01:14:24,080 --> 01:14:27,840
communication systems read the incoming
1829
01:14:26,080 --> 01:14:29,520
frequency from the ground stations on
1830
01:14:27,840 --> 01:14:32,600
Earth and transmitted a matching
1831
01:14:29,520 --> 01:14:35,120
frequency at a ratio of 240 to
1832
01:14:32,600 --> 01:14:36,800
221. This is done because the spacecraft
1833
01:14:35,120 --> 01:14:38,640
is moving away from the ground stations
1834
01:14:36,800 --> 01:14:40,239
with enough velocity that the Doppler
1835
01:14:38,640 --> 01:14:42,080
effect of the spacecraft's radio
1836
01:14:40,239 --> 01:14:44,480
transmissions can be used to measure its
1837
01:14:42,080 --> 01:14:46,560
velocity and distance. The ground
1838
01:14:44,480 --> 01:14:48,159
stations transmit a known frequency, and
1839
01:14:46,560 --> 01:14:50,159
the return frequency will differ
1840
01:14:48,159 --> 01:14:51,920
depending on how fast the spacecraft is
1841
01:14:50,159 --> 01:14:53,920
traveling. Ground control can measure
1842
01:14:51,920 --> 01:14:55,840
how far off the return frequency is to
1843
01:14:53,920 --> 01:14:58,000
Earth's transmitted frequency and gather
1844
01:14:55,840 --> 01:14:59,679
this useful information. By matching the
1845
01:14:58,000 --> 01:15:01,120
frequency that the spacecraft sees from
1846
01:14:59,679 --> 01:15:02,640
ground control, they can double the
1847
01:15:01,120 --> 01:15:04,080
effective distance of the Doppler
1848
01:15:02,640 --> 01:15:06,239
effect, giving them a more accurate
1849
01:15:04,080 --> 01:15:07,920
reading of the spacecraft's velocity.
1850
01:15:06,239 --> 01:15:09,840
They will use this feature to send a
1851
01:15:07,920 --> 01:15:12,239
signal to the third stage, dragging its
1852
01:15:09,840 --> 01:15:13,760
frequency away from the lunar modules.
1853
01:15:12,239 --> 01:15:15,600
In order for the lunar module's
1854
01:15:13,760 --> 01:15:17,520
communication systems to not also be
1855
01:15:15,600 --> 01:15:19,120
altered by this frequency change, ground
1856
01:15:17,520 --> 01:15:20,880
control asked the crew to switch off
1857
01:15:19,120 --> 01:15:23,040
their communication system for 3
1858
01:15:20,880 --> 01:15:24,080
minutes. Ground control knew the crew
1859
01:15:23,040 --> 01:15:26,239
got their message when their
1860
01:15:24,080 --> 01:15:27,600
communications turned off moments later.
1861
01:15:26,239 --> 01:15:29,440
This gave ground control their
1862
01:15:27,600 --> 01:15:31,440
opportunity to drag the frequency of the
1863
01:15:29,440 --> 01:15:33,840
third stage away and then lock back onto
1864
01:15:31,440 --> 01:15:35,600
the lunar module. With the radio
1865
01:15:33,840 --> 01:15:37,280
frequencies now far enough apart to
1866
01:15:35,600 --> 01:15:39,360
avoid interference, the important
1867
01:15:37,280 --> 01:15:41,440
communication issue was resolved.
1868
01:15:39,360 --> 01:15:43,520
Flighting go.
1869
01:15:41,440 --> 01:15:46,080
Go ahead. It looks like you got it.
1870
01:15:43,520 --> 01:15:48,000
Calm, Jack. Okay, everybody, let's be
1871
01:15:46,080 --> 01:15:49,520
quiet. We have calm. Hello there,
1872
01:15:48,000 --> 01:15:51,920
Aquarius. We got a lot of business to
1873
01:15:49,520 --> 01:15:53,600
do. Hello, Houston. Aquarius, how do you
1874
01:15:51,920 --> 01:15:56,000
read? Hello there, Aquarius. Loud and
1875
01:15:53,600 --> 01:15:57,520
clear. Help me now. Okay, we're reading
1876
01:15:56,000 --> 01:15:59,520
you loud and clear, Jack. I hope it
1877
01:15:57,520 --> 01:16:01,199
stays this time. Ground control had been
1878
01:15:59,520 --> 01:16:02,880
calculating the resources they would
1879
01:16:01,199 --> 01:16:05,679
have on the return journey given their
1880
01:16:02,880 --> 01:16:08,400
single plan burn at 79 hours. The
1881
01:16:05,679 --> 01:16:10,480
numbers that come back do not look good.
1882
01:16:08,400 --> 01:16:13,120
Unless major changes are made, the crew
1883
01:16:10,480 --> 01:16:14,640
will run out of water in 31 hours. With
1884
01:16:13,120 --> 01:16:17,280
their planned trajectory, it will take
1885
01:16:14,640 --> 01:16:19,040
over 70 to return to Earth. The decision
1886
01:16:17,280 --> 01:16:21,199
is made to shut down the primary
1887
01:16:19,040 --> 01:16:23,440
guidance and navigation system, a
1888
01:16:21,199 --> 01:16:25,120
computer that uses water to cool itself.
1889
01:16:23,440 --> 01:16:27,040
By shutting down the guidance computer,
1890
01:16:25,120 --> 01:16:28,800
the spacecraft will lose its orientation
1891
01:16:27,040 --> 01:16:30,800
in space, but conserve that crucial
1892
01:16:28,800 --> 01:16:32,640
water. Because of this, ground control
1893
01:16:30,800 --> 01:16:34,239
wants the crew to get into a free return
1894
01:16:32,640 --> 01:16:36,320
trajectory. Now, while the guidance
1895
01:16:34,239 --> 01:16:37,920
computer is still powered up, they plan
1896
01:16:36,320 --> 01:16:39,679
to shut off the computer after they
1897
01:16:37,920 --> 01:16:41,360
enter a free return trajectory, and they
1898
01:16:39,679 --> 01:16:42,800
will do a secondary burn after they've
1899
01:16:41,360 --> 01:16:44,960
rounded the moon to speed up their
1900
01:16:42,800 --> 01:16:47,199
return home. This new trajectory plan
1901
01:16:44,960 --> 01:16:49,120
was not without its own challenges. The
1902
01:16:47,199 --> 01:16:51,520
descent propulsion system on the lunar
1903
01:16:49,120 --> 01:16:54,000
module was only designed to be fired one
1904
01:16:51,520 --> 01:16:55,679
time. Now, they were planning two burns,
1905
01:16:54,000 --> 01:16:57,600
carrying significantly more weight, and
1906
01:16:55,679 --> 01:17:00,000
in a configuration that the lunar module
1907
01:16:57,600 --> 01:17:01,520
had not been designed for. The crew
1908
01:17:00,000 --> 01:17:03,280
would also be without their primary
1909
01:17:01,520 --> 01:17:05,280
guidance and navigation system during
1910
01:17:03,280 --> 01:17:06,880
their second burn. Plans were considered
1911
01:17:05,280 --> 01:17:08,719
in which the crew would eject their now
1912
01:17:06,880 --> 01:17:10,080
dead service module to save weight and
1913
01:17:08,719 --> 01:17:11,840
speed up the return, but this would
1914
01:17:10,080 --> 01:17:13,440
involve exposing the command module's
1915
01:17:11,840 --> 01:17:15,520
heat shield to deep space for an
1916
01:17:13,440 --> 01:17:17,840
extended period of time. Something it
1917
01:17:15,520 --> 01:17:19,880
had not been designed to do. Okay, we'd
1918
01:17:17,840 --> 01:17:23,440
like to brief you on uh what our plan
1919
01:17:19,880 --> 01:17:25,199
is. Uh we're at this time water critical
1920
01:17:23,440 --> 01:17:26,960
in the limb, so we'd like to use as
1921
01:17:25,199 --> 01:17:30,800
little as possible. To do this, we're
1922
01:17:26,960 --> 01:17:34,000
going to plan to make a free return uh
1923
01:17:30,800 --> 01:17:37,199
maneuver of 16 ft per second at 61
1924
01:17:34,000 --> 01:17:38,480
hours, which is 37 minutes from now.
1925
01:17:37,199 --> 01:17:41,600
Then we're going to power down the
1926
01:17:38,480 --> 01:17:44,000
pings. At 79 hours, we'll go ahead and
1927
01:17:41,600 --> 01:17:45,760
uh make another abort maneuver to kick
1928
01:17:44,000 --> 01:17:48,480
what we got. But we'd like to get that
1929
01:17:45,760 --> 01:17:50,960
pings powered down as soon as possible.
1930
01:17:48,480 --> 01:17:53,280
Okay, the only item on page 10 is to
1931
01:17:50,960 --> 01:17:55,600
deploy the landing gear. Okay, we'll do
1932
01:17:53,280 --> 01:17:57,920
that now. control. You want that done,
1933
01:17:55,600 --> 01:18:00,800
right? Affirmative. Okay, stand by for
1934
01:17:57,920 --> 01:18:03,840
landing gear. Okay, let's watch the pyro
1935
01:18:00,800 --> 01:18:07,120
and the landing gear there, gentlemen.
1936
01:18:03,840 --> 01:18:08,719
Okay, power firing.
1937
01:18:07,120 --> 01:18:10,320
Hey, looks like landing gear depart from
1938
01:18:08,719 --> 01:18:11,760
here.
1939
01:18:10,320 --> 01:18:14,760
Roger, Aquarius, and your go for the
1940
01:18:11,760 --> 01:18:14,760
burn.
1941
01:18:24,480 --> 01:18:27,679
Okay, Corish, you're looking
1942
01:18:29,480 --> 01:18:34,040
good. All shut down.
1943
01:18:35,040 --> 01:18:40,040
And Aquarius, for your information, uh,
1944
01:18:37,600 --> 01:18:44,719
we now have 136 mile
1945
01:18:40,040 --> 01:18:48,400
perigee confirmed by Doppler. Okay, 136
1946
01:18:44,719 --> 01:18:50,640
mile perigee now. That's very nice. Oh,
1947
01:18:48,400 --> 01:18:54,560
wait a minute. Uh, Jack, did you say uh
1948
01:18:50,640 --> 01:18:56,880
Parisian or Parisian? Parisian.
1949
01:18:54,560 --> 01:18:58,480
Ah, that's better. The emergency plan to
1950
01:18:56,880 --> 01:19:00,640
use the lunar module's engine had
1951
01:18:58,480 --> 01:19:02,560
worked. They're now on a free return to
1952
01:19:00,640 --> 01:19:04,239
trajectory. The crew shuts off the
1953
01:19:02,560 --> 01:19:05,920
guidance and navigation computer that
1954
01:19:04,239 --> 01:19:09,199
had been consuming their limited supply
1955
01:19:05,920 --> 01:19:12,000
of water. Okay, Jim. And uh looks like
1956
01:19:09,199 --> 01:19:15,520
what we have to do is uh in order to
1957
01:19:12,000 --> 01:19:19,040
maintain uh even heating, we just have
1958
01:19:15,520 --> 01:19:20,840
to yaw the whole machine about 90° per
1959
01:19:19,040 --> 01:19:22,800
hour in
1960
01:19:20,840 --> 01:19:24,800
increments. So we'll give you a call
1961
01:19:22,800 --> 01:19:26,400
when it's time to yaw 90°. Ground
1962
01:19:24,800 --> 01:19:28,159
control came up with a compromise for
1963
01:19:26,400 --> 01:19:30,000
the passive thermal control. The lunar
1964
01:19:28,159 --> 01:19:31,840
module had no procedures to be able to
1965
01:19:30,000 --> 01:19:33,040
set up a passive thermal control role,
1966
01:19:31,840 --> 01:19:34,800
but they could still orient the
1967
01:19:33,040 --> 01:19:37,040
spacecraft using the reaction control
1968
01:19:34,800 --> 01:19:38,960
thrusters. The plan was to periodically
1969
01:19:37,040 --> 01:19:40,800
rotate the entire spacecraft and then
1970
01:19:38,960 --> 01:19:42,400
hold that new attitude until their next
1971
01:19:40,800 --> 01:19:44,560
thermal control maneuver where they
1972
01:19:42,400 --> 01:19:46,159
would rotate again. It wouldn't be as
1973
01:19:44,560 --> 01:19:48,159
smooth as a normal passive thermal
1974
01:19:46,159 --> 01:19:49,840
control roll, but manually rotating the
1975
01:19:48,159 --> 01:19:51,840
spacecraft every once in a while would
1976
01:19:49,840 --> 01:19:55,199
have the same effect. To recap briefly
1977
01:19:51,840 --> 01:19:59,040
the situation with Apollo 13, uh the
1978
01:19:55,199 --> 01:20:01,840
crew in the last hour was uh passed up a
1979
01:19:59,040 --> 01:20:04,320
paracinthian plus 2 hours maneuver,
1980
01:20:01,840 --> 01:20:07,440
which actually is primarily a speed up
1981
01:20:04,320 --> 01:20:09,440
maneuver to uh get them back to Earth
1982
01:20:07,440 --> 01:20:11,440
somewhat earlier than the normal free
1983
01:20:09,440 --> 01:20:13,280
return would bring them. Although a free
1984
01:20:11,440 --> 01:20:15,280
return trajectory had been successfully
1985
01:20:13,280 --> 01:20:17,600
established, the crew was not out of the
1986
01:20:15,280 --> 01:20:19,360
woods. They still had one more burn
1987
01:20:17,600 --> 01:20:21,440
planned for two hours past the closest
1988
01:20:19,360 --> 01:20:23,440
approach to the moon. Right now, they're
1989
01:20:21,440 --> 01:20:26,320
on a trajectory to land in the Indian
1990
01:20:23,440 --> 01:20:28,159
Ocean 76 hours from now. This posed
1991
01:20:26,320 --> 01:20:29,920
complications with recovery considering
1992
01:20:28,159 --> 01:20:31,840
the intended landing site was planned to
1993
01:20:29,920 --> 01:20:34,000
be the Pacific Ocean on the opposite
1994
01:20:31,840 --> 01:20:35,920
side of the planet. With water
1995
01:20:34,000 --> 01:20:37,600
consumption at an absolute minimum, the
1996
01:20:35,920 --> 01:20:40,239
crew was still projected to run out of
1997
01:20:37,600 --> 01:20:42,159
water 5 hours before landing. This burn
1998
01:20:40,239 --> 01:20:44,159
would speed up their return, landing 10
1999
01:20:42,159 --> 01:20:45,679
hours sooner. Landing sooner would help
2000
01:20:44,159 --> 01:20:47,120
their water supply issue and meant that
2001
01:20:45,679 --> 01:20:48,960
the Earth would be in a different point
2002
01:20:47,120 --> 01:20:51,199
in its rotation, placing the landing
2003
01:20:48,960 --> 01:20:53,120
point for Apollo 13 conveniently right
2004
01:20:51,199 --> 01:20:54,800
back in the Pacific Ocean. They would
2005
01:20:53,120 --> 01:20:57,280
spend most of their time preparing for
2006
01:20:54,800 --> 01:20:58,880
this burn. Extreme measures are taken in
2007
01:20:57,280 --> 01:21:01,199
order to conserve the lunar module's
2008
01:20:58,880 --> 01:21:03,040
limited resources. One of those measures
2009
01:21:01,199 --> 01:21:05,520
is to switch off the lunar module's
2010
01:21:03,040 --> 01:21:07,280
radio amplifier. This helps conserve
2011
01:21:05,520 --> 01:21:09,600
electricity at the cost of making their
2012
01:21:07,280 --> 01:21:11,600
communications with Earth far noisier.
2013
01:21:09,600 --> 01:21:13,679
Under usual circumstances, each crew
2014
01:21:11,600 --> 01:21:15,679
member would be drinking about 30 ounces
2015
01:21:13,679 --> 01:21:18,960
of water per day. They would need to
2016
01:21:15,679 --> 01:21:21,440
reduce their intake to just six, 1/5 of
2017
01:21:18,960 --> 01:21:23,440
their normal amount. The moon is tidily
2018
01:21:21,440 --> 01:21:25,920
locked with Earth, meaning only one side
2019
01:21:23,440 --> 01:21:28,560
will ever be shown to us. Today, the
2020
01:21:25,920 --> 01:21:30,320
crew of Apollo 13 will join an extremely
2021
01:21:28,560 --> 01:21:32,159
small group of people who have seen the
2022
01:21:30,320 --> 01:21:34,560
far side of the moon with their own
2023
01:21:32,159 --> 01:21:37,520
eyes. They will also be able to see the
2024
01:21:34,560 --> 01:21:39,520
moon surface in detail from just 164 mi
2025
01:21:37,520 --> 01:21:42,080
away. The crew prepares their film and
2026
01:21:39,520 --> 01:21:44,159
color cameras to capture this flyby. The
2027
01:21:42,080 --> 01:21:46,560
spacecraft is now well within the moon's
2028
01:21:44,159 --> 01:21:48,400
sphere of influence. The film
2029
01:21:46,560 --> 01:21:50,159
photographs the crew manages to capture
2030
01:21:48,400 --> 01:21:52,400
from the far side of the moon show its
2031
01:21:50,159 --> 01:21:53,840
craters in incredible detail. This is
2032
01:21:52,400 --> 01:21:55,280
only tempered by the fact they'd be
2033
01:21:53,840 --> 01:21:57,840
preparing to land there had the
2034
01:21:55,280 --> 01:21:59,920
explosion not happened yet.
2035
01:21:57,840 --> 01:22:02,000
Because of the unusual situation and
2036
01:21:59,920 --> 01:22:03,679
trajectory of this mission, Apollo 13
2037
01:22:02,000 --> 01:22:05,560
would set the record for the furthest
2038
01:22:03,679 --> 01:22:08,199
distance humans have ever been from
2039
01:22:05,560 --> 01:22:11,679
Earth.
2040
01:22:08,199 --> 01:22:15,120
249,25 mi, a record that still stands to
2041
01:22:11,679 --> 01:22:17,760
this day. Apollo control Houston, 77
2042
01:22:15,120 --> 01:22:21,040
hours 38 minutes into the flight, Apollo
2043
01:22:17,760 --> 01:22:22,800
13 uh has now rounded the corner, headed
2044
01:22:21,040 --> 01:22:26,040
back towards Earth. Uh we show a
2045
01:22:22,800 --> 01:22:29,760
velocity of a velocity of
2046
01:22:26,040 --> 01:22:30,840
7,62 ft/s and a distance from the moon
2047
01:22:29,760 --> 01:22:33,159
of
2048
01:22:30,840 --> 01:22:37,360
566 nautical
2049
01:22:33,159 --> 01:22:40,639
miles. We presently show Apollo 13 1,7
2050
01:22:37,360 --> 01:22:42,719
nautical miles away from the moon. Its
2051
01:22:40,639 --> 01:22:46,719
velocity slowing down now relative to
2052
01:22:42,719 --> 01:22:50,080
the moon now reading 6399 ft per second.
2053
01:22:46,719 --> 01:22:52,080
Apollo control Houston 77 hours 52
2054
01:22:50,080 --> 01:22:54,239
minutes now into the flight. We show 5
2055
01:22:52,080 --> 01:22:56,560
minutes away now from time of predicted
2056
01:22:54,239 --> 01:22:58,080
impact of the S4B. The third stage's
2057
01:22:56,560 --> 01:23:00,199
collision course with the moon ends with
2058
01:22:58,080 --> 01:23:03,159
an impact on the lunar surface traveling
2059
01:23:00,199 --> 01:23:06,239
2.58 km per
2060
01:23:03,159 --> 01:23:07,400
second. This leaves a 30 m wide crater
2061
01:23:06,239 --> 01:23:09,760
in the lunar
2062
01:23:07,400 --> 01:23:11,840
surface. The energy from this impact
2063
01:23:09,760 --> 01:23:14,000
rings the moon like a bell. A
2064
01:23:11,840 --> 01:23:16,080
seismometer placed 5 months earlier by
2065
01:23:14,000 --> 01:23:19,520
Apollo 12 picks up the seismic waves
2066
01:23:16,080 --> 01:23:21,360
from the impact 85 m away. This provides
2067
01:23:19,520 --> 01:23:23,840
data about both the moon's composition
2068
01:23:21,360 --> 01:23:25,360
and calibration of the seismometer. This
2069
01:23:23,840 --> 01:23:27,920
is one of the few scientific goals
2070
01:23:25,360 --> 01:23:29,679
Apollo 13 would be able to accomplish.
2071
01:23:27,920 --> 01:23:32,679
Oh yeah.
2072
01:23:29,679 --> 01:23:36,920
Yeah. We're no longer 135
2073
01:23:32,679 --> 01:23:36,920
miles. We're leaving.
2074
01:23:37,360 --> 01:23:42,000
It is now 2 hours past the closest
2075
01:23:39,520 --> 01:23:44,400
approach to the moon. The time for the
2076
01:23:42,000 --> 01:23:47,280
second lunar module burn had arrived.
2077
01:23:44,400 --> 01:23:49,280
The first burn lasted for 14 seconds.
2078
01:23:47,280 --> 01:23:52,159
This one will last for 4 and a half
2079
01:23:49,280 --> 01:23:54,000
minutes. Speeding up by a planned 861 ft
2080
01:23:52,159 --> 01:23:57,040
per second. Jim, you are go for the
2081
01:23:54,000 --> 01:23:58,639
burn. Go for the burn. Roger. Go for the
2082
01:23:57,040 --> 01:24:01,280
burn.
2083
01:23:58,639 --> 01:24:04,080
Less than 30 seconds away. The engine is
2084
01:24:01,280 --> 01:24:04,080
armed. Standing
2085
01:24:05,480 --> 01:24:11,840
by. Ground confirms ignition.
2086
01:24:09,840 --> 01:24:12,610
40%.
2087
01:24:11,840 --> 01:24:14,360
Houston
2088
01:24:12,610 --> 01:24:16,920
[Music]
2089
01:24:14,360 --> 01:24:20,840
copies. Attitude looks good at this
2090
01:24:16,920 --> 01:24:22,760
point. Brethren, Houston, you're looking
2091
01:24:20,840 --> 01:24:26,840
good.
2092
01:24:22,760 --> 01:24:29,520
Rider, one minute now into the
2093
01:24:26,840 --> 01:24:30,920
burn. Yips is looking good. 2 minutes
2094
01:24:29,520 --> 01:24:33,639
into the
2095
01:24:30,920 --> 01:24:35,960
burn. Fresh. You were looking good at 2
2096
01:24:33,639 --> 01:24:39,520
minutes. Still looking
2097
01:24:35,960 --> 01:24:42,880
good. Roger. Velocity building up. Uh,
2098
01:24:39,520 --> 01:24:45,360
disc shows we've gained 451 ft per
2099
01:24:42,880 --> 01:24:47,520
second at this time.
2100
01:24:45,360 --> 01:24:50,639
The on board display shows less than a
2101
01:24:47,520 --> 01:24:50,639
minute to go in the burn
2102
01:24:50,920 --> 01:24:56,600
now. Coming up on four minutes into the
2103
01:24:53,600 --> 01:24:56,600
burn.
2104
01:24:57,360 --> 01:25:02,320
Shut down. Roger. Shutdown.
2105
01:25:00,480 --> 01:25:04,880
That was Commander Jim Levelville
2106
01:25:02,320 --> 01:25:07,360
reporting shutdown. The engine is off.
2107
01:25:04,880 --> 01:25:10,159
We're at 79 hours 32 minutes into the
2108
01:25:07,360 --> 01:25:12,239
flight. I say that was a good burn. The
2109
01:25:10,159 --> 01:25:14,159
second burn was successful. The return
2110
01:25:12,239 --> 01:25:16,560
to Earth will now be 10 hours sooner.
2111
01:25:14,159 --> 01:25:18,320
and in a much better place for recovery.
2112
01:25:16,560 --> 01:25:20,000
Although the crew had enough oxygen to
2113
01:25:18,320 --> 01:25:22,080
breathe in, what they were breathing out
2114
01:25:20,000 --> 01:25:24,400
would start to be more of a concern. The
2115
01:25:22,080 --> 01:25:26,159
lunar module's smaller lithium hydroxide
2116
01:25:24,400 --> 01:25:28,639
canisters were designed to scrub the
2117
01:25:26,159 --> 01:25:30,480
carbon dioxide of two people. With
2118
01:25:28,639 --> 01:25:32,320
three, the levels of carbon dioxide
2119
01:25:30,480 --> 01:25:34,000
slowly rise within the spacecraft and
2120
01:25:32,320 --> 01:25:35,920
would reach dangerous levels if nothing
2121
01:25:34,000 --> 01:25:37,440
is changed. Ground control had been
2122
01:25:35,920 --> 01:25:39,280
aware of this issue since they had shut
2123
01:25:37,440 --> 01:25:40,719
down the larger CO2 scrubbers in the
2124
01:25:39,280 --> 01:25:43,360
command module, which were designed to
2125
01:25:40,719 --> 01:25:45,520
support three people. Fortunately, both
2126
01:25:43,360 --> 01:25:47,360
scrubbers worked in the same way. By
2127
01:25:45,520 --> 01:25:49,520
dragging carbon dioxide over lithium
2128
01:25:47,360 --> 01:25:51,760
hydroxide canisters, the chemicals would
2129
01:25:49,520 --> 01:25:54,080
react with the CO2, trapping it, letting
2130
01:25:51,760 --> 01:25:55,760
cleaner air pass through. This would
2131
01:25:54,080 --> 01:25:57,520
gradually scrub the CO2 from the
2132
01:25:55,760 --> 01:26:00,239
spacecraft's atmosphere, making it safe
2133
01:25:57,520 --> 01:26:02,320
to breathe. Unfortunately, the canisters
2134
01:26:00,239 --> 01:26:04,239
are different shapes. The command
2135
01:26:02,320 --> 01:26:05,920
module's canisters are large cubes,
2136
01:26:04,239 --> 01:26:08,159
while the canisters on the lunar module
2137
01:26:05,920 --> 01:26:10,400
are cylindrical and smaller. They are
2138
01:26:08,159 --> 01:26:11,920
not compatible with each other. Ground
2139
01:26:10,400 --> 01:26:13,520
control knew this would be an issue and
2140
01:26:11,920 --> 01:26:15,440
had been working on a solution to be
2141
01:26:13,520 --> 01:26:17,360
able to use the command module's larger
2142
01:26:15,440 --> 01:26:19,440
CO2 scrubber in place of the lunar
2143
01:26:17,360 --> 01:26:21,760
module's smaller one. They would need to
2144
01:26:19,440 --> 01:26:24,159
build an airtight adapter using only the
2145
01:26:21,760 --> 01:26:28,000
resources on board to fit a square peg
2146
01:26:24,159 --> 01:26:31,280
into a round hole. Okay, Houston, we
2147
01:26:28,000 --> 01:26:34,639
just got a mass alarm and ECS light. I
2148
01:26:31,280 --> 01:26:37,040
take it the partial pressure CO2 is
2149
01:26:34,639 --> 01:26:41,280
Yeah, that's what tripped it. Uh, chorus
2150
01:26:37,040 --> 01:26:43,120
Houston, say again. CO2. The CO2 inside
2151
01:26:41,280 --> 01:26:44,719
the spacecraft has reached a high enough
2152
01:26:43,120 --> 01:26:47,520
concentration to start setting off
2153
01:26:44,719 --> 01:26:50,400
alarms. The master alarm on the CO2
2154
01:26:47,520 --> 01:26:53,040
canister was expected to occur at some
2155
01:26:50,400 --> 01:26:56,440
point in the flight, the return flight.
2156
01:26:53,040 --> 01:26:56,440
There she goes.
2157
01:26:59,199 --> 01:27:03,120
This is Apollo control at 83 hours 11
2158
01:27:01,840 --> 01:27:05,679
minutes.
2159
01:27:03,120 --> 01:27:08,840
A change of shift press briefing is
2160
01:27:05,679 --> 01:27:12,400
being planned uh to begin in about 10
2161
01:27:08,840 --> 01:27:15,120
minutes at 12:35 a.m. in the main
2162
01:27:12,400 --> 01:27:16,800
auditorium at the Houston News Center.
2163
01:27:15,120 --> 01:27:19,600
The participants in the press conference
2164
01:27:16,800 --> 01:27:22,719
will be flight team flight director Jean
2165
01:27:19,600 --> 01:27:24,800
Cray and astronaut Tony England. Could
2166
01:27:22,719 --> 01:27:27,280
we have a rather detailed explanation of
2167
01:27:24,800 --> 01:27:29,679
the tests that were run in the
2168
01:27:27,280 --> 01:27:33,000
simulations with the lithium hydroxide
2169
01:27:29,679 --> 01:27:37,360
canisters and a description of
2170
01:27:33,000 --> 01:27:40,159
how this hose is being attached or will
2171
01:27:37,360 --> 01:27:42,000
be attached to a canister and
2172
01:27:40,159 --> 01:27:43,440
particularly what hose that is, where
2173
01:27:42,000 --> 01:27:45,360
does it come from and what's going
2174
01:27:43,440 --> 01:27:46,800
through it.
2175
01:27:45,360 --> 01:27:48,320
He brought you over one of our
2176
01:27:46,800 --> 01:27:50,679
canisters.
2177
01:27:48,320 --> 01:27:53,120
This is our
2178
01:27:50,679 --> 01:27:57,280
mailbox. As you know, we use the lithium
2179
01:27:53,120 --> 01:27:59,719
hydroxide to scrub CO2 out of the
2180
01:27:57,280 --> 01:28:02,480
spacecraft
2181
01:27:59,719 --> 01:28:05,080
atmosphere. Okay, I'll uh talk more
2182
01:28:02,480 --> 01:28:07,760
directly into it.
2183
01:28:05,080 --> 01:28:11,679
Uh we have a limited amount of lithium
2184
01:28:07,760 --> 01:28:14,159
hydroxide in the limb and uh it would
2185
01:28:11,679 --> 01:28:15,920
relieve a lot of the pressure on the
2186
01:28:14,159 --> 01:28:17,840
environmental control system if we could
2187
01:28:15,920 --> 01:28:19,480
use some of the canisters lithium
2188
01:28:17,840 --> 01:28:23,520
hydroxide canisters from the command
2189
01:28:19,480 --> 01:28:26,000
module. So we actually Jim Corelli over
2190
01:28:23,520 --> 01:28:28,239
in uh crew support division who designed
2191
01:28:26,000 --> 01:28:30,400
this thing and I it does an excellent
2192
01:28:28,239 --> 01:28:32,800
job.
2193
01:28:30,400 --> 01:28:35,520
What we do is we use the suit loop in
2194
01:28:32,800 --> 01:28:38,480
the limb and this is the scavenging
2195
01:28:35,520 --> 01:28:41,520
hose, the uh the exhaust hose if you
2196
01:28:38,480 --> 01:28:43,600
will from the suit and we just put the
2197
01:28:41,520 --> 01:28:45,600
lithium hydroxide canister on the end of
2198
01:28:43,600 --> 01:28:50,159
it. And it's not so easy to fasten on
2199
01:28:45,600 --> 01:28:51,560
there. Uh we've used a a data card out
2200
01:28:50,159 --> 01:28:55,440
of the flight
2201
01:28:51,560 --> 01:28:58,159
plan to make a structure so that the the
2202
01:28:55,440 --> 01:29:01,040
the plastic cover here won't collapse on
2203
01:28:58,159 --> 01:29:02,719
the end of the hose. The canister itself
2204
01:29:01,040 --> 01:29:05,199
is coated with Teflon and none of our
2205
01:29:02,719 --> 01:29:08,239
flight tape would stick to it. So, he
2206
01:29:05,199 --> 01:29:11,199
designed sort of a a a grid system that
2207
01:29:08,239 --> 01:29:14,480
goes around it uh that uh allows us to
2208
01:29:11,199 --> 01:29:16,400
fasten things to it. And we've had one
2209
01:29:14,480 --> 01:29:18,800
of these running for about 3 hours over
2210
01:29:16,400 --> 01:29:20,960
in the 11T chamber and crew systems. And
2211
01:29:18,800 --> 01:29:23,120
it uh all indications are that it's
2212
01:29:20,960 --> 01:29:25,520
doing the job.
2213
01:29:23,120 --> 01:29:27,280
I understand that we have about 16
2214
01:29:25,520 --> 01:29:28,960
cartridges in the command module and
2215
01:29:27,280 --> 01:29:31,040
each one will have a lifetime about 12
2216
01:29:28,960 --> 01:29:32,880
hours and we'll be running two at a
2217
01:29:31,040 --> 01:29:35,920
time, one on each of the suit loops in
2218
01:29:32,880 --> 01:29:39,360
the limb. Uh we were told before the
2219
01:29:35,920 --> 01:29:41,840
burn that uh uh two people would be in
2220
01:29:39,360 --> 01:29:45,199
the uh limb and one would be in the
2221
01:29:41,840 --> 01:29:47,040
command module. And later on I got a u
2222
01:29:45,199 --> 01:29:48,480
part of a quote which seems to indicate
2223
01:29:47,040 --> 01:29:50,800
that maybe that wasn't the case. His
2224
01:29:48,480 --> 01:29:52,480
quote was, "He's the only CMP that's
2225
01:29:50,800 --> 01:29:54,800
ever witnessed a dips burn sitting on
2226
01:29:52,480 --> 01:29:57,440
the ascent engine can," which would lead
2227
01:29:54,800 --> 01:29:58,960
one to believe that uh all three of them
2228
01:29:57,440 --> 01:30:01,440
were in the limb at the time of the
2229
01:29:58,960 --> 01:30:03,679
burn. Yeah, this is a uh interesting
2230
01:30:01,440 --> 01:30:06,480
item. Uh yeah, all three crew members
2231
01:30:03,679 --> 01:30:10,880
were in the LM at the time of the burn
2232
01:30:06,480 --> 01:30:16,080
and we had uh computed our dips gimbal
2233
01:30:10,880 --> 01:30:17,520
trim position for the uh uh man in the
2234
01:30:16,080 --> 01:30:21,400
command and service module spacecraft
2235
01:30:17,520 --> 01:30:24,560
which caused a center of gravity
2236
01:30:21,400 --> 01:30:26,639
uh movement that caused the engine
2237
01:30:24,560 --> 01:30:29,120
gimbals to compensate for the fact he
2238
01:30:26,639 --> 01:30:31,199
was in there. So, we saw that excursion
2239
01:30:29,120 --> 01:30:34,880
and then once we found out that uh yeah,
2240
01:30:31,199 --> 01:30:37,760
we had a CMP in the uh LEM spacecraft,
2241
01:30:34,880 --> 01:30:41,040
we knew why the excursion.
2242
01:30:37,760 --> 01:30:42,880
Okay, let's take ArchN. Oh, yeah.
2243
01:30:41,040 --> 01:30:45,679
Followed up with one car. Would you care
2244
01:30:42,880 --> 01:30:49,600
to speculate uh why all three of them
2245
01:30:45,679 --> 01:30:51,760
got together in the limb at that time?
2246
01:30:49,600 --> 01:30:53,960
I think the third man wanted to see what
2247
01:30:51,760 --> 01:30:57,880
was going
2248
01:30:53,960 --> 01:31:00,719
on. From the sounds of all the
2249
01:30:57,880 --> 01:31:03,600
uh work that has gone on and is still
2250
01:31:00,719 --> 01:31:07,040
going on, this flight's uh probably a
2251
01:31:03,600 --> 01:31:10,000
lot bigger test of the uh system on the
2252
01:31:07,040 --> 01:31:11,520
ground than up here. Yeah, you've been
2253
01:31:10,000 --> 01:31:14,400
uh you've been working it out a little
2254
01:31:11,520 --> 01:31:16,480
bit. Well, everybody down here is 100%
2255
01:31:14,400 --> 01:31:18,239
optimistic. Uh looks like we're on the
2256
01:31:16,480 --> 01:31:19,920
upside of the whole thing. No, ground
2257
01:31:18,239 --> 01:31:21,760
control passes up a procedure that will
2258
01:31:19,920 --> 01:31:23,600
allow the crew to use the lunar module
2259
01:31:21,760 --> 01:31:25,440
to set up a proper passive thermal
2260
01:31:23,600 --> 01:31:28,080
control roll rather than relying on the
2261
01:31:25,440 --> 01:31:29,679
manual 90° turn. How'd you like to spend
2262
01:31:28,080 --> 01:31:32,800
a week on an aircraft carrier getting
2263
01:31:29,679 --> 01:31:35,280
back? If I can uh get on an aircraft
2264
01:31:32,800 --> 01:31:37,280
carrier and I'm sure how long it takes
2265
01:31:35,280 --> 01:31:38,719
today. Ground control must verbally
2266
01:31:37,280 --> 01:31:41,040
guide the crew through building the
2267
01:31:38,719 --> 01:31:42,960
adapter to fit the command module CO2
2268
01:31:41,040 --> 01:31:45,760
scrubber into the lunar module's air
2269
01:31:42,960 --> 01:31:47,400
intake. Okay. Uh, I think the equipment
2270
01:31:45,760 --> 01:31:50,880
you'll need will
2271
01:31:47,400 --> 01:31:53,040
be two command module lithium hydroxide
2272
01:31:50,880 --> 01:31:55,040
canisters. The crew constructs two
2273
01:31:53,040 --> 01:31:57,199
adapters using ground controls verbal
2274
01:31:55,040 --> 01:31:59,600
guidance. This improvised solution would
2275
01:31:57,199 --> 01:32:01,199
be known as the mailbox from its shape.
2276
01:31:59,600 --> 01:32:03,440
The crew no longer had to rely on the
2277
01:32:01,199 --> 01:32:05,520
lunar module's limited CO2 scrubbing
2278
01:32:03,440 --> 01:32:07,440
capabilities and now had access to more
2279
01:32:05,520 --> 01:32:09,440
than enough lithium hydroxide canisters
2280
01:32:07,440 --> 01:32:11,920
to last them the rest of the journey.
2281
01:32:09,440 --> 01:32:14,960
Okay. When I was upstairs just a minute
2282
01:32:11,920 --> 01:32:17,760
ago, I uh I noticed appear what appeared
2283
01:32:14,960 --> 01:32:21,040
to be some new binning from down the
2284
01:32:17,760 --> 01:32:25,120
service module way. Uh I noticed it out
2285
01:32:21,040 --> 01:32:28,880
window one and also saw one chunk of uh
2286
01:32:25,120 --> 01:32:33,159
metal, loose metal about uh 4 in square
2287
01:32:28,880 --> 01:32:35,679
that was tumbling around uh silver in
2288
01:32:33,159 --> 01:32:37,840
color. It looked like it had come from
2289
01:32:35,679 --> 01:32:40,239
somewhere down in the service module.
2290
01:32:37,840 --> 01:32:42,560
I'm looking out the limb window now and
2291
01:32:40,239 --> 01:32:44,840
I see a good part of the new starfield
2292
01:32:42,560 --> 01:32:47,199
that's created
2293
01:32:44,840 --> 01:32:49,360
first and about a thousand little
2294
01:32:47,199 --> 01:32:50,800
sparkls out here. Fred Hayes looks out
2295
01:32:49,360 --> 01:32:53,040
of the windows and notices something
2296
01:32:50,800 --> 01:32:55,400
venting coming from the same area as the
2297
01:32:53,040 --> 01:32:59,080
initial accident. Think of any
2298
01:32:55,400 --> 01:33:02,400
normal phenomena that might occur like
2299
01:32:59,080 --> 01:33:05,400
maybe a hydrogen tank that's over
2300
01:33:02,400 --> 01:33:05,400
pressurized.
2301
01:33:05,520 --> 01:33:09,520
Yeah, we thought of that, Jim. We heated
2302
01:33:08,000 --> 01:33:11,520
up that tank and we haven't been using
2303
01:33:09,520 --> 01:33:14,080
any hydrogen and therefore it couldn't
2304
01:33:11,520 --> 01:33:15,679
be venting any overboard relief. It's
2305
01:33:14,080 --> 01:33:17,760
believed that with the side panel of the
2306
01:33:15,679 --> 01:33:19,600
service module blown off, the nearly
2307
01:33:17,760 --> 01:33:21,360
full hydrogen tanks would be directly
2308
01:33:19,600 --> 01:33:23,120
exposed to the sun for long enough that
2309
01:33:21,360 --> 01:33:24,960
they would start to pressurize and vent
2310
01:33:23,120 --> 01:33:26,800
through a relief valve. Given the
2311
01:33:24,960 --> 01:33:28,400
electrically dead service module, the
2312
01:33:26,800 --> 01:33:30,320
sensors and telemetry that would help
2313
01:33:28,400 --> 01:33:32,639
diagnose an event like this would also
2314
01:33:30,320 --> 01:33:34,239
be dead. The crew and ground control are
2315
01:33:32,639 --> 01:33:35,920
completely blind to the true state of
2316
01:33:34,239 --> 01:33:37,600
the command service module and would
2317
01:33:35,920 --> 01:33:39,360
have very little information to find out
2318
01:33:37,600 --> 01:33:43,639
what's venting.
2319
01:33:39,360 --> 01:33:46,639
may attack. But I think our PC
2320
01:33:43,639 --> 01:33:46,639
is
2321
01:33:47,050 --> 01:33:53,140
[Applause]
2322
01:33:56,199 --> 01:34:02,960
officially higher. Okay. Understand PTC.
2323
01:34:00,480 --> 01:34:05,280
Earth is coming by lower and moon is
2324
01:34:02,960 --> 01:34:06,800
coming by higher. Whatever seemed to be
2325
01:34:05,280 --> 01:34:08,800
venting would start to throw off their
2326
01:34:06,800 --> 01:34:10,800
passive thermal control role, slowly
2327
01:34:08,800 --> 01:34:14,159
adding its own wobble and procession.
2328
01:34:10,800 --> 01:34:16,800
Okay. Uh we're considering a midcourse
2329
01:34:14,159 --> 01:34:19,520
correction at 104 hours. Uh about 20
2330
01:34:16,800 --> 01:34:21,199
hours from now, 18 hours from now.
2331
01:34:19,520 --> 01:34:22,560
Ground control notices the trajectory
2332
01:34:21,199 --> 01:34:25,040
they're on would have them re-enter
2333
01:34:22,560 --> 01:34:26,800
Earth at a slightly shallow angle. They
2334
01:34:25,040 --> 01:34:28,480
plan another midcourse correction burn
2335
01:34:26,800 --> 01:34:30,080
to bring their re-entry angle back to
2336
01:34:28,480 --> 01:34:32,560
levels they're comfortable with. Uh
2337
01:34:30,080 --> 01:34:36,560
we're looking at the sheet tank pressure
2338
01:34:32,560 --> 01:34:39,040
rising. Uh we expect it to uh to blow.
2339
01:34:36,560 --> 01:34:41,520
Uh we don't know exactly what time it'll
2340
01:34:39,040 --> 01:34:44,800
go. Somewhere around 105 hours or
2341
01:34:41,520 --> 01:34:47,360
perhaps later than that. Uh we we've got
2342
01:34:44,800 --> 01:34:49,040
plenty of blowown capability and we we
2343
01:34:47,360 --> 01:34:51,520
just uh thought you ought to be
2344
01:34:49,040 --> 01:34:53,840
informed. The lunar module's engine
2345
01:34:51,520 --> 01:34:56,400
works by using helium to force fuel from
2346
01:34:53,840 --> 01:34:57,920
its tanks into its engine. This helium
2347
01:34:56,400 --> 01:35:00,400
was supplied from a super critical
2348
01:34:57,920 --> 01:35:02,159
helium tank inside of the lunar module.
2349
01:35:00,400 --> 01:35:04,000
As the tank would be warmed by sunlight
2350
01:35:02,159 --> 01:35:06,159
inside of the spacecraft, the pressure
2351
01:35:04,000 --> 01:35:07,840
would slowly rise during the mission. To
2352
01:35:06,159 --> 01:35:09,600
fix that, the tank was purposefully
2353
01:35:07,840 --> 01:35:11,440
underfilled on the ground so that as the
2354
01:35:09,600 --> 01:35:13,360
temperature rose inside the tank during
2355
01:35:11,440 --> 01:35:14,960
the mission, the helium would be at the
2356
01:35:13,360 --> 01:35:16,880
correct pressure to use the engine when
2357
01:35:14,960 --> 01:35:18,800
they got to the moon. Under usual
2358
01:35:16,880 --> 01:35:20,960
circumstances, the lunar module would
2359
01:35:18,800 --> 01:35:22,880
land on the moon and vent this helium,
2360
01:35:20,960 --> 01:35:24,960
stopping any possibility of an over
2361
01:35:22,880 --> 01:35:26,719
pressure. Apollo 13's unplanned
2362
01:35:24,960 --> 01:35:28,320
excursion meant that the lunar module's
2363
01:35:26,719 --> 01:35:30,159
helium tanks would be consistently
2364
01:35:28,320 --> 01:35:32,639
rising in temperature and pressure until
2365
01:35:30,159 --> 01:35:34,639
a burst disc breaks. Fortunately, the
2366
01:35:32,639 --> 01:35:36,480
lunar module's engine can still be used
2367
01:35:34,639 --> 01:35:38,320
even after this helium burst disc
2368
01:35:36,480 --> 01:35:40,480
breaks. Since the crew had already fired
2369
01:35:38,320 --> 01:35:41,920
the lunar module's engine, helium would
2370
01:35:40,480 --> 01:35:43,520
be trapped within the engine's fuel
2371
01:35:41,920 --> 01:35:45,679
tanks that could be used to start it up
2372
01:35:43,520 --> 01:35:47,679
again for a limited time. This feature
2373
01:35:45,679 --> 01:35:49,679
is called blowdown. With the dead
2374
01:35:47,679 --> 01:35:51,760
command service module, the lives of the
2375
01:35:49,679 --> 01:35:54,159
crew are entirely reliant on the lunar
2376
01:35:51,760 --> 01:35:56,000
module and its batteries. They need all
2377
01:35:54,159 --> 01:35:57,719
of its systems to work and are in no
2378
01:35:56,000 --> 01:36:00,080
position to deal with more unexpected
2379
01:35:57,719 --> 01:36:03,080
challenges. The crew would not be so
2380
01:36:00,080 --> 01:36:03,080
lucky.
2381
01:36:03,520 --> 01:36:08,400
Okay, man. Uh, I just heard a little
2382
01:36:06,239 --> 01:36:09,800
pump sounded like down in the descent
2383
01:36:08,400 --> 01:36:14,159
stage and
2384
01:36:09,800 --> 01:36:16,080
uh saw a new uh shower snowflakes go up
2385
01:36:14,159 --> 01:36:18,560
that looked like they were a minute down
2386
01:36:16,080 --> 01:36:20,880
that way. We don't see anything wrong.
2387
01:36:18,560 --> 01:36:23,920
For example, your sheet tank appears to
2388
01:36:20,880 --> 01:36:25,920
be okay as far as we can see. Whatever
2389
01:36:23,920 --> 01:36:28,320
blew in the lunar module's descent stage
2390
01:36:25,920 --> 01:36:30,159
was not the helium tank. It would be a
2391
01:36:28,320 --> 01:36:32,000
few hours earlier than expected and the
2392
01:36:30,159 --> 01:36:34,080
telemetry they could see told them the
2393
01:36:32,000 --> 01:36:36,080
tank was still pressurized. The lunar
2394
01:36:34,080 --> 01:36:37,639
module's descent stage contains four
2395
01:36:36,080 --> 01:36:39,840
large batteries which power the
2396
01:36:37,639 --> 01:36:41,600
spacecraft. It is believed that battery
2397
01:36:39,840 --> 01:36:43,199
2's electrolyte leaked inside of the
2398
01:36:41,600 --> 01:36:46,080
battery, creating a short circuit with
2399
01:36:43,199 --> 01:36:47,440
itself in the magnesium battery casing.
2400
01:36:46,080 --> 01:36:49,360
This short circuit through the
2401
01:36:47,440 --> 01:36:50,800
electrolyte released oxygen and hydrogen
2402
01:36:49,360 --> 01:36:52,800
gas from the electrolyte which
2403
01:36:50,800 --> 01:36:55,119
accumulated around the battery and then
2404
01:36:52,800 --> 01:36:56,960
ignited. This created a large enough
2405
01:36:55,119 --> 01:36:58,560
explosion for the crew to hear it, but
2406
01:36:56,960 --> 01:37:01,280
it wasn't destructive enough to knock
2407
01:36:58,560 --> 01:37:03,119
battery 2 off the line. The snowflakes
2408
01:37:01,280 --> 01:37:05,199
Fred Hayes were seeing were parts of his
2409
01:37:03,119 --> 01:37:06,800
own spacecraft mixed with leaked battery
2410
01:37:05,199 --> 01:37:10,360
electrolyte.
2411
01:37:06,800 --> 01:37:13,199
And Houston looks like service module
2412
01:37:10,360 --> 01:37:16,239
via at least momentarily. How about the
2413
01:37:13,199 --> 01:37:18,159
descent stage? Does uh Fred reported
2414
01:37:16,239 --> 01:37:20,719
venting down there? Uh do you still see
2415
01:37:18,159 --> 01:37:22,800
that? No. Fred hasn't seen anything else
2416
01:37:20,719 --> 01:37:24,400
in the descent stage. Fortunately, the
2417
01:37:22,800 --> 01:37:26,000
batteries would continue to function and
2418
01:37:24,400 --> 01:37:28,239
the short circuit didn't seem to have
2419
01:37:26,000 --> 01:37:29,840
any serious effects on them. How does it
2420
01:37:28,239 --> 01:37:32,600
feel, Jack?
2421
01:37:29,840 --> 01:37:34,480
I tell you, Dee, it's cold up in
2422
01:37:32,600 --> 01:37:36,239
there. I don't know whether we'll be
2423
01:37:34,480 --> 01:37:40,480
able to sleep up there tonight. It must
2424
01:37:36,239 --> 01:37:41,920
be about 35 or 40°.
2425
01:37:40,480 --> 01:37:44,159
Ro, that's what I was worried about. The
2426
01:37:41,920 --> 01:37:45,760
emergency situation the spacecraft is in
2427
01:37:44,159 --> 01:37:47,760
does not provide the crew with much
2428
01:37:45,760 --> 01:37:49,360
comfort. Usually, part of the
2429
01:37:47,760 --> 01:37:50,960
electricity the spacecraft would be
2430
01:37:49,360 --> 01:37:53,119
using would warm up the spacecraft and
2431
01:37:50,960 --> 01:37:54,960
make it comfortable to be in. With
2432
01:37:53,119 --> 01:37:57,040
electricity usage at an absolute
2433
01:37:54,960 --> 01:37:59,600
minimum, the spacecraft would plummet to
2434
01:37:57,040 --> 01:38:02,800
temperatures as low as 40° Fahrenheit or
2435
01:37:59,600 --> 01:38:05,040
4 C. Many of the water-based foods like
2436
01:38:02,800 --> 01:38:06,560
hot dogs have frozen solid. Water
2437
01:38:05,040 --> 01:38:08,480
droplets from the astronaut's breath
2438
01:38:06,560 --> 01:38:10,239
condense onto every surface, including
2439
01:38:08,480 --> 01:38:12,560
the ones behind the control panels and
2440
01:38:10,239 --> 01:38:14,800
in its wiring. The third midcourse
2441
01:38:12,560 --> 01:38:16,239
correction burn is here. This one is a
2442
01:38:14,800 --> 01:38:18,880
short burn that will help trim their
2443
01:38:16,239 --> 01:38:21,880
re-entry angle into better margins.
2444
01:38:18,880 --> 01:38:21,880
College
2445
01:38:25,560 --> 01:38:30,280
Ignition. Thrust looks good.
2446
01:38:32,159 --> 01:38:37,600
Shut down. 470.
2447
01:38:35,600 --> 01:38:39,760
Got some other information. Uh we should
2448
01:38:37,600 --> 01:38:41,920
have some good dope on your trajectory
2449
01:38:39,760 --> 01:38:44,639
in about 2 hours. Looked like to us that
2450
01:38:41,920 --> 01:38:46,080
the burn was real good, however, and uh
2451
01:38:44,639 --> 01:38:47,840
we're taking a close look at it and
2452
01:38:46,080 --> 01:38:50,800
we'll get back with you on that in about
2453
01:38:47,840 --> 01:38:53,920
2 hours. Now, another thing that we're
2454
01:38:50,800 --> 01:38:55,440
expecting to have happen uh is that uh
2455
01:38:53,920 --> 01:38:58,239
the sheet tank is going to reach its
2456
01:38:55,440 --> 01:39:00,560
burst limit. And this is uh supposed to
2457
01:38:58,239 --> 01:39:02,880
be a non-propulsive event, but you might
2458
01:39:00,560 --> 01:39:04,639
hear it and you might see something. We
2459
01:39:02,880 --> 01:39:07,760
are still watching the superc critical
2460
01:39:04,639 --> 01:39:10,400
helium pressure aboard the LM descent
2461
01:39:07,760 --> 01:39:12,679
stage increase gradually. The pressure
2462
01:39:10,400 --> 01:39:15,400
is now reading
2463
01:39:12,679 --> 01:39:18,400
1,937 lbs per square
2464
01:39:15,400 --> 01:39:20,560
in. And uh we see the pressure dropping
2465
01:39:18,400 --> 01:39:22,639
at this time. The control officer
2466
01:39:20,560 --> 01:39:24,639
reports that the burst disc has
2467
01:39:22,639 --> 01:39:27,590
ruptured. We just uh as we were making
2468
01:39:24,639 --> 01:39:30,000
this announcement. Anything?
2469
01:39:27,590 --> 01:39:31,920
[Applause]
2470
01:39:30,000 --> 01:39:34,280
Yeah, Jack, I just about ready to call
2471
01:39:31,920 --> 01:39:37,000
you. Underneath quad
2472
01:39:34,280 --> 01:39:40,639
four. I noticed a lot of
2473
01:39:37,000 --> 01:39:43,199
uh sparkly coming out.
2474
01:39:40,639 --> 01:39:45,920
Did you hear or feel anything?
2475
01:39:43,199 --> 01:39:49,800
I sure can. But, uh, I think it changed
2476
01:39:45,920 --> 01:39:51,760
our, uh, it changed our our, uh,
2477
01:39:49,800 --> 01:39:53,960
PTC. I think we're probably going to
2478
01:39:51,760 --> 01:39:57,360
have to reestablish
2479
01:39:53,960 --> 01:39:59,410
PTC. Yeah, I was in a right jaw and now
2480
01:39:57,360 --> 01:40:01,159
I'm in a left
2481
01:39:59,410 --> 01:40:05,520
[Applause]
2482
01:40:01,159 --> 01:40:05,520
jaw at a much faster rate
2483
01:40:05,560 --> 01:40:10,080
than the burst disc finally gives and
2484
01:40:08,159 --> 01:40:12,159
vents the super critical helium tank
2485
01:40:10,080 --> 01:40:14,000
into space. This event pushes the
2486
01:40:12,159 --> 01:40:15,760
spacecraft with enough force that not
2487
01:40:14,000 --> 01:40:18,000
only does it stop the passive thermal
2488
01:40:15,760 --> 01:40:19,280
control roll, but then reverses it at a
2489
01:40:18,000 --> 01:40:21,679
much faster rate than they were
2490
01:40:19,280 --> 01:40:24,080
originally spinning. Roger. Uh, have you
2491
01:40:21,679 --> 01:40:27,520
effectively established PTC in the
2492
01:40:24,080 --> 01:40:29,840
opposite direction then? Well, you can
2493
01:40:27,520 --> 01:40:31,600
say that. I I'm not too sure just what
2494
01:40:29,840 --> 01:40:34,239
kind of picture roll I got coming up
2495
01:40:31,600 --> 01:40:36,400
with for y'all. Is that what they call a
2496
01:40:34,239 --> 01:40:39,760
nonpropul?
2497
01:40:36,400 --> 01:40:42,400
Right. I'd hate to see a propulsive one.
2498
01:40:39,760 --> 01:40:45,119
Give me both. Meanwhile, back to the
2499
01:40:42,400 --> 01:40:48,480
drawing board for a non-reul.
2500
01:40:45,119 --> 01:40:51,440
The uh super critical helium burst disc
2501
01:40:48,480 --> 01:40:54,600
ruptured at about 108 hours 54 minutes
2502
01:40:51,440 --> 01:40:58,880
40 seconds after reaching a pressure of
2503
01:40:54,600 --> 01:41:00,880
1937 lb per square in. The uh pressure
2504
01:40:58,880 --> 01:41:03,600
of the escaping gas, which was thought
2505
01:41:00,880 --> 01:41:05,520
ahead of time to be a was predicted to
2506
01:41:03,600 --> 01:41:08,800
be a non-propulsive vent, turned out to
2507
01:41:05,520 --> 01:41:11,520
be uh very much a propulsive vent. Uh
2508
01:41:08,800 --> 01:41:13,679
this rotational rate was stopped by the
2509
01:41:11,520 --> 01:41:14,600
vent and uh started up again in the
2510
01:41:13,679 --> 01:41:18,320
opposite
2511
01:41:14,600 --> 01:41:19,480
direction and it is now rotating about
2512
01:41:18,320 --> 01:41:22,800
one
2513
01:41:19,480 --> 01:41:25,040
revolution every uh 2 minutes. One
2514
01:41:22,800 --> 01:41:27,199
revolution a little less than every 2
2515
01:41:25,040 --> 01:41:29,600
minutes as compared with a revolution
2516
01:41:27,199 --> 01:41:31,600
every 18 or 19 minutes in the opposite
2517
01:41:29,600 --> 01:41:33,040
direction prior to the vent. How's the
2518
01:41:31,600 --> 01:41:35,600
temperature up there, Jack? You guys
2519
01:41:33,040 --> 01:41:40,000
chopping wood to keep warm?
2520
01:41:35,600 --> 01:41:44,320
Uh Jee, it's about uh 51, I think, or 50
2521
01:41:40,000 --> 01:41:47,280
in the uh lamb, and it's about uh I
2522
01:41:44,320 --> 01:41:49,440
don't know, 45 or or a little bit less
2523
01:41:47,280 --> 01:41:52,159
in the command module. Do you believe
2524
01:41:49,440 --> 01:41:54,080
it's cold up there? Yes, we we used to
2525
01:41:52,159 --> 01:41:55,679
call the command module the bedroom, and
2526
01:41:54,080 --> 01:41:57,199
it's now the refrigerator. The near
2527
01:41:55,679 --> 01:41:58,800
freezing temperatures inside of the
2528
01:41:57,199 --> 01:42:00,480
spacecraft, combined with one crew
2529
01:41:58,800 --> 01:42:02,320
member on watch out at all times, would
2530
01:42:00,480 --> 01:42:04,560
make it near impossible to get any
2531
01:42:02,320 --> 01:42:06,480
meaningful amount of rest. By this
2532
01:42:04,560 --> 01:42:08,480
point, three full days after the
2533
01:42:06,480 --> 01:42:10,880
explosion, all crew members are
2534
01:42:08,480 --> 01:42:12,080
exhausted and dehydrated. The rationing
2535
01:42:10,880 --> 01:42:13,920
of water that the crew had been
2536
01:42:12,080 --> 01:42:15,840
undergoing had its own ill effects as
2537
01:42:13,920 --> 01:42:18,239
well. By the end of the mission, Fred
2538
01:42:15,840 --> 01:42:20,719
Hayes would lose 6 lb of body weight.
2539
01:42:18,239 --> 01:42:23,600
Jack Swagger would lose 11 lb and Jim
2540
01:42:20,719 --> 01:42:25,440
Lovel would lose 14. Fred Hayes would
2541
01:42:23,600 --> 01:42:26,880
discover he developed a urinary tract
2542
01:42:25,440 --> 01:42:28,880
infection that would later become a
2543
01:42:26,880 --> 01:42:30,480
kidney infection. He would start feeling
2544
01:42:28,880 --> 01:42:32,719
the chills in an already frozen
2545
01:42:30,480 --> 01:42:34,639
spacecraft. A small burn with the
2546
01:42:32,719 --> 01:42:36,239
reaction control thrusters is planned to
2547
01:42:34,639 --> 01:42:38,159
bring the spacecraft into the best
2548
01:42:36,239 --> 01:42:39,679
re-entry angle they could try to get.
2549
01:42:38,159 --> 01:42:43,119
Less than 2 minutes away now from
2550
01:42:39,679 --> 01:42:45,920
scheduled time of ignition.
2551
01:42:43,119 --> 01:42:50,000
Okay, it looks like we had a minus2 bias
2552
01:42:45,920 --> 01:42:51,880
47. We're burning. Copy that, Fred. Fred
2553
01:42:50,000 --> 01:42:55,040
Hayes reporting that the burn is
2554
01:42:51,880 --> 01:42:56,440
underway. We're at 137 hours 40 minutes
2555
01:42:55,040 --> 01:43:00,080
into the
2556
01:42:56,440 --> 01:43:02,239
flight. Wave shut down. Re-entry is fast
2557
01:43:00,080 --> 01:43:04,480
approaching. The service module will be
2558
01:43:02,239 --> 01:43:06,719
jettisoned before the lunar module, a
2559
01:43:04,480 --> 01:43:08,880
first in the Apollo missions. Ejecting
2560
01:43:06,719 --> 01:43:11,280
the service module will expose its true
2561
01:43:08,880 --> 01:43:13,040
damage to the crew for the first time.
2562
01:43:11,280 --> 01:43:16,159
The crew is prepared to capture this
2563
01:43:13,040 --> 01:43:18,639
event on their cameras.
2564
01:43:16,159 --> 01:43:20,960
Copy that.
2565
01:43:18,639 --> 01:43:22,880
We copied that report uh from Jim
2566
01:43:20,960 --> 01:43:28,639
Levelville of service module separation
2567
01:43:22,880 --> 01:43:32,119
at 138 hours. Uh 2 minutes 8 seconds.
2568
01:43:28,639 --> 01:43:32,119
You're being Jack.
2569
01:43:32,159 --> 01:43:37,119
And there's one whole side of that
2570
01:43:34,000 --> 01:43:40,520
spacecraft missing.
2571
01:43:37,119 --> 01:43:40,520
Is that right?
2572
01:43:40,719 --> 01:43:46,480
Right by the uh look out there.
2573
01:43:44,639 --> 01:43:48,480
Right by the high gate antenna. The
2574
01:43:46,480 --> 01:43:52,080
whole panel is blown out almost from the
2575
01:43:48,480 --> 01:43:54,800
uh base to the engine.
2576
01:43:52,080 --> 01:43:57,119
Copy that.
2577
01:43:54,800 --> 01:44:00,520
Yeah, it looks like it got to the SPS
2578
01:43:57,119 --> 01:44:00,520
bell, too.
2579
01:44:00,800 --> 01:44:07,840
You can ding the SPS engine bell, huh?
2580
01:44:04,320 --> 01:44:11,320
Way look that's just dark brown streak.
2581
01:44:07,840 --> 01:44:11,320
It's really a mess.
2582
01:44:11,840 --> 01:44:17,760
Was the belt deformed on the outside or
2583
01:44:14,239 --> 01:44:19,440
just uh nicked or what?
2584
01:44:17,760 --> 01:44:22,560
I think the explosion from what I can
2585
01:44:19,440 --> 01:44:23,920
see, Joe, had uh had fainted. I don't
2586
01:44:22,560 --> 01:44:26,760
know whether it did any actual
2587
01:44:23,920 --> 01:44:30,000
transformation or not.
2588
01:44:26,760 --> 01:44:32,800
Okay, man. That's unbelievable.
2589
01:44:30,000 --> 01:44:35,360
[Music]
2590
01:44:32,800 --> 01:44:37,280
Yeah, and Joe, looks like a lot of uh a
2591
01:44:35,360 --> 01:44:41,280
lot of debris is just hanging out to the
2592
01:44:37,280 --> 01:44:44,080
side uh near the SP antenna.
2593
01:44:41,280 --> 01:44:45,920
Roger, Jim. The crew spends the next 3
2594
01:44:44,080 --> 01:44:48,480
hours preparing to jettison their lunar
2595
01:44:45,920 --> 01:44:50,960
module. They will do so 1 hour before
2596
01:44:48,480 --> 01:44:53,199
re-entry. And uh you are go for fire
2597
01:44:50,960 --> 01:44:54,880
alarm.
2598
01:44:53,199 --> 01:44:56,719
The damaged service module and their
2599
01:44:54,880 --> 01:44:59,600
lunar module would burn up in Earth's
2600
01:44:56,719 --> 01:45:02,719
atmosphere.
2601
01:44:59,600 --> 01:45:05,520
Okay, copy that.
2602
01:45:02,719 --> 01:45:08,880
Farewell Aquarius and we thank you. This
2603
01:45:05,520 --> 01:45:10,960
is Apollo Control Houston at 141 hours
2604
01:45:08,880 --> 01:45:13,280
31 minutes into the flight. We've had
2605
01:45:10,960 --> 01:45:15,119
lunar module jettison. You're looking
2606
01:45:13,280 --> 01:45:16,960
good. We're real happy with the
2607
01:45:15,119 --> 01:45:20,000
trajectory. And a minute ago, we just
2608
01:45:16,960 --> 01:45:23,199
lost contact with your friend Aquarius.
2609
01:45:20,000 --> 01:45:25,520
Okay. Where did she go? Oh, I know.
2610
01:45:23,199 --> 01:45:27,840
She's up there somewhere. She sure was
2611
01:45:25,520 --> 01:45:29,600
good. Hey, just as I said that, we got
2612
01:45:27,840 --> 01:45:32,239
another burst of lamb data, so I guess
2613
01:45:29,600 --> 01:45:34,639
it's still ticking. Less than 7 minutes
2614
01:45:32,239 --> 01:45:37,520
now from time of entry into the Earth's
2615
01:45:34,639 --> 01:45:39,360
atmosphere. Okay, we just had one last
2616
01:45:37,520 --> 01:45:41,280
uh time around the room and everybody
2617
01:45:39,360 --> 01:45:44,080
says you're looking great. Thank you.
2618
01:45:41,280 --> 01:45:46,480
Okay, los in uh a minute or a minute and
2619
01:45:44,080 --> 01:45:49,040
a half. Uh at entry attitude, we like on
2620
01:45:46,480 --> 01:45:51,280
me, Charlie, and welcome home. Thank
2621
01:45:49,040 --> 01:45:53,280
you. During re-entry, the spacecraft
2622
01:45:51,280 --> 01:45:55,119
hits the atmosphere with enough velocity
2623
01:45:53,280 --> 01:45:57,679
that it turns the surrounding air into
2624
01:45:55,119 --> 01:45:59,199
plasma, which blocks any radio signals.
2625
01:45:57,679 --> 01:46:01,520
This is a known event that will cause
2626
01:45:59,199 --> 01:46:03,679
Apollo 13 to lose communications during
2627
01:46:01,520 --> 01:46:06,480
their most intense phase of re-entry.
2628
01:46:03,679 --> 01:46:08,719
This is known as loss of signal or loss.
2629
01:46:06,480 --> 01:46:11,159
Apollo Control Houston. We've just had
2630
01:46:08,719 --> 01:46:14,480
loss of signal from
2631
01:46:11,159 --> 01:46:16,840
Honeysuckle with Apollo 13. Our last
2632
01:46:14,480 --> 01:46:19,960
velocity reading was
2633
01:46:16,840 --> 01:46:21,719
35,837 ft per second with a range to go
2634
01:46:19,960 --> 01:46:24,040
of
2635
01:46:21,719 --> 01:46:28,239
1791 nautical
2636
01:46:24,040 --> 01:46:31,920
miles. The period of blackout for the
2637
01:46:28,239 --> 01:46:34,960
spacecraft uh should have begun about 20
2638
01:46:31,920 --> 01:46:38,119
some odd seconds ago. We have about 1
2639
01:46:34,960 --> 01:46:41,119
minute to go now from time of end to
2640
01:46:38,119 --> 01:46:44,639
blackout. Less than 10 seconds now. We
2641
01:46:41,119 --> 01:46:46,520
will attempt to contact Apollo 13
2642
01:46:44,639 --> 01:46:48,719
through one of the Oria
2643
01:46:46,520 --> 01:46:51,520
aircraft. Continuing to monitor this
2644
01:46:48,719 --> 01:46:53,920
Apollo control Houston. We've had a
2645
01:46:51,520 --> 01:46:57,639
report that Aria 4 aircraft has
2646
01:46:53,920 --> 01:46:57,639
acquisition of signal.
2647
01:46:58,400 --> 01:47:02,719
Odyssey Houston. We show you on the
2648
01:47:00,239 --> 01:47:05,840
mains. It really looks great. An
2649
01:47:02,719 --> 01:47:07,920
extremely loud applause as Apollo 13 on
2650
01:47:05,840 --> 01:47:10,000
main shoots comes through loud and clear
2651
01:47:07,920 --> 01:47:12,080
on the television display here. The
2652
01:47:10,000 --> 01:47:14,000
three exhausted astronauts land in the
2653
01:47:12,080 --> 01:47:17,520
Pacific Ocean and get picked up by the
2654
01:47:14,000 --> 01:47:20,000
helicopter carrier USS Eoima. They will
2655
01:47:17,520 --> 01:47:21,600
be going home safe. The emergency
2656
01:47:20,000 --> 01:47:23,840
measures taken to save the crew of
2657
01:47:21,600 --> 01:47:26,480
Apollo 13 after the accident were a
2658
01:47:23,840 --> 01:47:29,119
success. The moon landing on the Fromaro
2659
01:47:26,480 --> 01:47:30,960
crater, however, remained out of reach.
2660
01:47:29,119 --> 01:47:33,600
With the spectacle of the rescue now
2661
01:47:30,960 --> 01:47:37,679
concluded, focus shifted entirely to one
2662
01:47:33,600 --> 01:47:39,760
lingering question. Why did this happen?
2663
01:47:37,679 --> 01:47:42,480
A review board is assembled in order to
2664
01:47:39,760 --> 01:47:44,400
investigate the origin of the explosion.
2665
01:47:42,480 --> 01:47:46,239
Looking back at the telemetry, oxygen
2666
01:47:44,400 --> 01:47:48,560
tank 2 was showing some very strange
2667
01:47:46,239 --> 01:47:50,639
readings right before the explosion. 1
2668
01:47:48,560 --> 01:47:52,239
and 1/2 minutes before the accident, the
2669
01:47:50,639 --> 01:47:55,119
pressure within oxygen tank 2
2670
01:47:52,239 --> 01:47:58,320
unexpectedly rose extremely high. The
2671
01:47:55,119 --> 01:47:59,920
pressure maxed out at 1,08 PSI, at which
2672
01:47:58,320 --> 01:48:02,639
point a relief valve opened, which
2673
01:47:59,920 --> 01:48:04,480
lowered the pressure to 996 psi before
2674
01:48:02,639 --> 01:48:06,800
the telemetry suddenly dropped out from
2675
01:48:04,480 --> 01:48:08,800
the explosion. This unexpected pressure
2676
01:48:06,800 --> 01:48:10,800
rise could not be accounted for by any
2677
01:48:08,800 --> 01:48:13,360
of the energy entering the tank from its
2678
01:48:10,800 --> 01:48:14,960
heaters, fans, or sensors. The crew was
2679
01:48:13,360 --> 01:48:16,800
not made aware of the sudden pressure
2680
01:48:14,960 --> 01:48:19,040
rise because of previous issues around
2681
01:48:16,800 --> 01:48:20,639
the hydrogen tank. The hydrogen tank's
2682
01:48:19,040 --> 01:48:22,719
low pressure warning light happened to
2683
01:48:20,639 --> 01:48:24,560
be activated before the oxygen tank's
2684
01:48:22,719 --> 01:48:26,679
high pressure warning light. Both were
2685
01:48:24,560 --> 01:48:29,040
part of the same cryogenic warning light
2686
01:48:26,679 --> 01:48:30,320
subsystem. Since the system could not
2687
01:48:29,040 --> 01:48:32,400
display both of these errors
2688
01:48:30,320 --> 01:48:34,080
simultaneously, the hydrogen tank's
2689
01:48:32,400 --> 01:48:35,360
mundane low pressure reading had
2690
01:48:34,080 --> 01:48:36,960
overwritten the immediately
2691
01:48:35,360 --> 01:48:39,360
life-threatening oxygen tank
2692
01:48:36,960 --> 01:48:41,440
high-pressure warning. The temperature
2693
01:48:39,360 --> 01:48:43,280
probe inside of that tank also showed a
2694
01:48:41,440 --> 01:48:45,440
rapid and unexpected rise in its
2695
01:48:43,280 --> 01:48:47,360
temperature a mere 20 seconds before the
2696
01:48:45,440 --> 01:48:49,040
explosion. In addition to the
2697
01:48:47,360 --> 01:48:51,119
temperature and pressurizing before the
2698
01:48:49,040 --> 01:48:52,719
explosion, the energy usage indicated
2699
01:48:51,119 --> 01:48:55,679
electrical arcing was happening
2700
01:48:52,719 --> 01:48:57,440
somewhere inside of that tank. About 2.7
2701
01:48:55,679 --> 01:49:00,560
seconds after the cryopans were turned
2702
01:48:57,440 --> 01:49:02,320
on, an unexpected 11.1 amp spike and a
2703
01:49:00,560 --> 01:49:04,239
matching voltage drop were recorded on
2704
01:49:02,320 --> 01:49:06,400
the telemetry for that tank's electrical
2705
01:49:04,239 --> 01:49:08,560
system. Materials used inside of the
2706
01:49:06,400 --> 01:49:10,880
oxygen tank, like the Teflon insulation
2707
01:49:08,560 --> 01:49:13,119
for the wiring, are not flammable under
2708
01:49:10,880 --> 01:49:15,199
normal conditions. In an environment of
2709
01:49:13,119 --> 01:49:17,360
pure superc critical oxygen, however,
2710
01:49:15,199 --> 01:49:19,760
teflon would be able to propagate a
2711
01:49:17,360 --> 01:49:21,600
flame. The board looks into the specific
2712
01:49:19,760 --> 01:49:24,159
oxygen tank's history, which reveals
2713
01:49:21,600 --> 01:49:26,320
some alarming details. This tank was
2714
01:49:24,159 --> 01:49:28,199
intended to be flown on Apollo 10 and
2715
01:49:26,320 --> 01:49:31,119
had completed its acceptance testing
2716
01:49:28,199 --> 01:49:33,040
beforehand. It showed no issues then.
2717
01:49:31,119 --> 01:49:34,639
Due to previous Apollo flights showing
2718
01:49:33,040 --> 01:49:36,480
some issues with electromagnetic
2719
01:49:34,639 --> 01:49:38,560
interference around the vacuum pumps on
2720
01:49:36,480 --> 01:49:40,400
the cryogenic tanks, the decision was
2721
01:49:38,560 --> 01:49:42,719
made to remove and modify the shelf
2722
01:49:40,400 --> 01:49:44,639
containing the oxygen tanks. In order to
2723
01:49:42,719 --> 01:49:46,719
remove the shelf for modification, the
2724
01:49:44,639 --> 01:49:49,600
11 screws that hold the shelf onto the
2725
01:49:46,719 --> 01:49:52,080
service module had to be taken out. One
2726
01:49:49,600 --> 01:49:53,760
was forgotten. The ground crew, having
2727
01:49:52,080 --> 01:49:55,360
believed all screws were removed and
2728
01:49:53,760 --> 01:49:57,760
that the shelf was separated from the
2729
01:49:55,360 --> 01:49:59,760
service module, attempted to remove it.
2730
01:49:57,760 --> 01:50:01,520
The remaining crew pivoted the entire
2731
01:49:59,760 --> 01:50:03,760
assembly upwards, hitting the shelf
2732
01:50:01,520 --> 01:50:06,000
above it before dropping 2 in back down
2733
01:50:03,760 --> 01:50:07,920
into place. At this point, the ground
2734
01:50:06,000 --> 01:50:09,920
crew had noticed their mistake, reported
2735
01:50:07,920 --> 01:50:12,159
this incident, and properly removed the
2736
01:50:09,920 --> 01:50:13,840
shelf. Testing would have to be done in
2737
01:50:12,159 --> 01:50:15,679
order to verify that this tank drop
2738
01:50:13,840 --> 01:50:17,520
didn't damage them. With the soon
2739
01:50:15,679 --> 01:50:19,199
upcoming launch of Apollo 10 and the
2740
01:50:17,520 --> 01:50:20,800
time it would take to test, it was
2741
01:50:19,199 --> 01:50:22,800
decided that a new tank would be brought
2742
01:50:20,800 --> 01:50:25,040
in and used instead of the dropped one.
2743
01:50:22,800 --> 01:50:27,600
This decision spared Apollo 10 from this
2744
01:50:25,040 --> 01:50:29,440
oxygen tank. The tank would later be
2745
01:50:27,600 --> 01:50:31,360
tested and would verify that all of its
2746
01:50:29,440 --> 01:50:33,040
components worked. It passed these tests
2747
01:50:31,360 --> 01:50:36,320
and was installed inside of the service
2748
01:50:33,040 --> 01:50:38,239
module slated for Apollo 13. The service
2749
01:50:36,320 --> 01:50:40,080
module was moved to Kennedy Space Center
2750
01:50:38,239 --> 01:50:42,400
where the rest of the Saturn 5 was being
2751
01:50:40,080 --> 01:50:44,159
put together. The Saturn 5 was assembled
2752
01:50:42,400 --> 01:50:45,440
and then moved onto the launchpad in
2753
01:50:44,159 --> 01:50:47,760
order to complete the countdown
2754
01:50:45,440 --> 01:50:49,600
demonstration test. This was a rehearsal
2755
01:50:47,760 --> 01:50:51,840
of activating and pressurizing all of
2756
01:50:49,600 --> 01:50:53,199
the rocket systems up until launch. This
2757
01:50:51,840 --> 01:50:54,800
would verify that everything worked
2758
01:50:53,199 --> 01:50:56,960
correctly when it came time to actually
2759
01:50:54,800 --> 01:50:59,119
launch. The oxygen tanks inside of the
2760
01:50:56,960 --> 01:51:01,119
service module were part of this test.
2761
01:50:59,119 --> 01:51:02,960
They would be pressurized, tested, and
2762
01:51:01,119 --> 01:51:05,159
then depressurized. Both tanks
2763
01:51:02,960 --> 01:51:07,920
pressurized and worked normally. During
2764
01:51:05,159 --> 01:51:10,080
depressurization, however, oxygen tank 2
2765
01:51:07,920 --> 01:51:12,800
would not drain all of the way. It was
2766
01:51:10,080 --> 01:51:14,320
stuck at 65% and could not be made to
2767
01:51:12,800 --> 01:51:16,239
drain more than that. Normal
2768
01:51:14,320 --> 01:51:18,400
depressurization procedures involved
2769
01:51:16,239 --> 01:51:20,400
blowing gaseous oxygen through the vent
2770
01:51:18,400 --> 01:51:22,000
line, which would push on the oxygen and
2771
01:51:20,400 --> 01:51:23,520
force it up through a tube in the center
2772
01:51:22,000 --> 01:51:25,760
of the tank, which would then drain
2773
01:51:23,520 --> 01:51:28,000
through the fill line. It was known that
2774
01:51:25,760 --> 01:51:29,760
manufacturing tolerances around one
2775
01:51:28,000 --> 01:51:32,400
section of this fill tube, called the
2776
01:51:29,760 --> 01:51:34,480
dog's leg, were not particularly tight.
2777
01:51:32,400 --> 01:51:36,639
With manufacturing tolerances stacked
2778
01:51:34,480 --> 01:51:38,400
up, a particularly loose fill tube could
2779
01:51:36,639 --> 01:51:40,480
be jolted open from something like the
2780
01:51:38,400 --> 01:51:42,080
tank drop. This is believed to be the
2781
01:51:40,480 --> 01:51:44,719
main cause of failure to drain
2782
01:51:42,080 --> 01:51:46,719
completely. The gaseous oxygen intended
2783
01:51:44,719 --> 01:51:48,639
to push the denser oxygen up through the
2784
01:51:46,719 --> 01:51:50,400
fill tube was simply leaking back
2785
01:51:48,639 --> 01:51:52,239
through the jolted open fill tube,
2786
01:51:50,400 --> 01:51:54,080
leaving the rest of the oxygen in the
2787
01:51:52,239 --> 01:51:55,440
tank. The technicians on the ground were
2788
01:51:54,080 --> 01:51:57,599
aware of this issue and were not
2789
01:51:55,440 --> 01:51:59,119
concerned by it. The failure to drain
2790
01:51:57,599 --> 01:52:00,880
completely was not considered a problem
2791
01:51:59,119 --> 01:52:02,480
for flight as the spacecraft systems
2792
01:52:00,880 --> 01:52:04,639
would be supplied by a separate tube
2793
01:52:02,480 --> 01:52:06,239
which works fine. It was decided that
2794
01:52:04,639 --> 01:52:08,000
they would power the heaters inside of
2795
01:52:06,239 --> 01:52:10,560
that tank in order to boil off the
2796
01:52:08,000 --> 01:52:13,119
oxygen and drain it that way. The
2797
01:52:10,560 --> 01:52:15,119
technicians used the 65V ground power
2798
01:52:13,119 --> 01:52:18,400
supply to power the heater inside of
2799
01:52:15,119 --> 01:52:20,800
oxygen tank 2. Unbeknownst to the ground
2800
01:52:18,400 --> 01:52:22,639
crew, a crucial piece of information was
2801
01:52:20,800 --> 01:52:25,520
not passed up the line to the company
2802
01:52:22,639 --> 01:52:27,360
responsible for manufacturing the tank.
2803
01:52:25,520 --> 01:52:29,760
Originally, the ground power systems
2804
01:52:27,360 --> 01:52:31,760
used 28vt power and so the tank's
2805
01:52:29,760 --> 01:52:34,480
temperature limit switch was only rated
2806
01:52:31,760 --> 01:52:37,520
for 28 volt. The ground power supply
2807
01:52:34,480 --> 01:52:39,520
system was later upgraded to 65 volts.
2808
01:52:37,520 --> 01:52:41,440
The heaters rely on a thermal limit
2809
01:52:39,520 --> 01:52:43,760
switch in order to separate the circuit
2810
01:52:41,440 --> 01:52:46,239
if it gets too hot. With the upgraded
2811
01:52:43,760 --> 01:52:48,000
ground power, testing showed that the 65
2812
01:52:46,239 --> 01:52:50,080
volts flowing through the thermal limit
2813
01:52:48,000 --> 01:52:52,679
switch rated for less than half that
2814
01:52:50,080 --> 01:52:55,520
welded the switch shut, rendering it
2815
01:52:52,679 --> 01:52:57,920
useless. The heaters on that tank from
2816
01:52:55,520 --> 01:52:59,599
that moment onwards had absolutely no
2817
01:52:57,920 --> 01:53:01,599
thermal limits it could reach before
2818
01:52:59,599 --> 01:53:03,119
shutting off. Ground control was
2819
01:53:01,599 --> 01:53:04,480
watching the temperature sensor inside
2820
01:53:03,119 --> 01:53:06,239
of that tank to make sure it didn't
2821
01:53:04,480 --> 01:53:08,320
reach temperatures too high. But since
2822
01:53:06,239 --> 01:53:10,320
that sensor was not designed to display
2823
01:53:08,320 --> 01:53:12,320
temperatures higher than 84 degrees
2824
01:53:10,320 --> 01:53:14,239
Fahrenheit, they would not be aware that
2825
01:53:12,320 --> 01:53:16,239
the heaters were being operated well
2826
01:53:14,239 --> 01:53:18,800
beyond their safe temperatures. To
2827
01:53:16,239 --> 01:53:20,080
ground control, the tank was only 84°
2828
01:53:18,800 --> 01:53:21,599
and anything beyond that would be
2829
01:53:20,080 --> 01:53:24,239
stopped by the temperature limit switch
2830
01:53:21,599 --> 01:53:26,719
opening. Both assumptions were wrong.
2831
01:53:24,239 --> 01:53:28,400
The heaters, now unbound by the disabled
2832
01:53:26,719 --> 01:53:31,840
temperature limit switch, would reach an
2833
01:53:28,400 --> 01:53:34,639
estimated 1,000° F, hot enough to make
2834
01:53:31,840 --> 01:53:37,040
steel visibly glow red. The tank would
2835
01:53:34,639 --> 01:53:40,320
sit like this, cooking its own internals
2836
01:53:37,040 --> 01:53:42,239
for the next 8 hours. The extreme heat
2837
01:53:40,320 --> 01:53:44,159
inside of the tank damaged the Teflon
2838
01:53:42,239 --> 01:53:46,480
insulation for the cryofan wires,
2839
01:53:44,159 --> 01:53:48,080
exposing bare metal. Now, this meant
2840
01:53:46,480 --> 01:53:50,080
that anytime the cryofans were
2841
01:53:48,080 --> 01:53:52,480
activated, it risked creating a short
2842
01:53:50,080 --> 01:53:54,400
within the oxygen tank. Ground control,
2843
01:53:52,480 --> 01:53:56,080
unaware of the dangerous situation the
2844
01:53:54,400 --> 01:53:57,920
tank is now in, and wanting to make sure
2845
01:53:56,080 --> 01:54:00,159
that tank wouldn't act up during launch
2846
01:53:57,920 --> 01:54:02,159
procedures, decided to test the tank
2847
01:54:00,159 --> 01:54:03,679
again. The tank didn't show any other
2848
01:54:02,159 --> 01:54:05,760
issues during testing and so it was
2849
01:54:03,679 --> 01:54:07,360
decided that it would be good to launch.
2850
01:54:05,760 --> 01:54:09,040
The tank would also fail to drain
2851
01:54:07,360 --> 01:54:11,280
completely on this occasion, prompting
2852
01:54:09,040 --> 01:54:13,920
the ground crew to repeat the heating.
2853
01:54:11,280 --> 01:54:15,840
The same mistake had been made twice.
2854
01:54:13,920 --> 01:54:17,679
This tank would undergo another round of
2855
01:54:15,840 --> 01:54:19,360
extreme overheating, which continued to
2856
01:54:17,679 --> 01:54:22,080
burn off the insulation around the wires
2857
01:54:19,360 --> 01:54:23,840
for the cryopans. With the now severely
2858
01:54:22,080 --> 01:54:25,840
damaged Teflon insulation around the
2859
01:54:23,840 --> 01:54:28,000
cryofan wires and a ground crew
2860
01:54:25,840 --> 01:54:30,080
oblivious to the severe damage inside of
2861
01:54:28,000 --> 01:54:32,800
that tank, it was certified as good to
2862
01:54:30,080 --> 01:54:34,880
go and then launched into space. This
2863
01:54:32,800 --> 01:54:36,480
set the stage for the explosion. When
2864
01:54:34,880 --> 01:54:38,159
the astronauts were up in space, the
2865
01:54:36,480 --> 01:54:39,920
cryopans were activated and an
2866
01:54:38,159 --> 01:54:42,800
electrical arc was formed across the
2867
01:54:39,920 --> 01:54:44,800
wires. The teflon insulation, severely
2868
01:54:42,800 --> 01:54:46,800
degraded and sitting in a pure superc
2869
01:54:44,800 --> 01:54:49,280
critical oxygen environment, ignited
2870
01:54:46,800 --> 01:54:51,599
from the electrical spark like the fuse
2871
01:54:49,280 --> 01:54:53,599
to a bomb. This teflon insulation burned
2872
01:54:51,599 --> 01:54:55,199
for a minute and a half. The fire
2873
01:54:53,599 --> 01:54:56,639
created extra pressure inside of the
2874
01:54:55,199 --> 01:54:58,800
superc critical tank which began
2875
01:54:56,639 --> 01:55:00,239
venting. It reached the temperature
2876
01:54:58,800 --> 01:55:02,080
sensor and then the point where the
2877
01:55:00,239 --> 01:55:03,920
wires entered the superc critical oxygen
2878
01:55:02,080 --> 01:55:05,280
tank. This also happened to be the
2879
01:55:03,920 --> 01:55:06,480
weakest point in the tank where the
2880
01:55:05,280 --> 01:55:08,480
wires passed through into the
2881
01:55:06,480 --> 01:55:10,000
pressurized environment. This is the
2882
01:55:08,480 --> 01:55:12,639
part of the tank that gave out and
2883
01:55:10,000 --> 01:55:12,639
triggered the
2884
01:55:13,320 --> 01:55:17,679
explosion. It was incredibly lucky for
2885
01:55:15,760 --> 01:55:19,760
the crew that the tank exploded when it
2886
01:55:17,679 --> 01:55:21,360
did. If it were sooner, it would have
2887
01:55:19,760 --> 01:55:23,280
left the crew stranded with the same
2888
01:55:21,360 --> 01:55:25,520
resources, but a far longer journey
2889
01:55:23,280 --> 01:55:27,119
ahead of them. If it had happened later
2890
01:55:25,520 --> 01:55:28,719
and the crew had entered lunar orbit
2891
01:55:27,119 --> 01:55:31,119
like they were planned to, it would have
2892
01:55:28,719 --> 01:55:32,880
also been fatal. The service propulsion
2893
01:55:31,119 --> 01:55:35,199
system was not made to send the entire
2894
01:55:32,880 --> 01:55:36,960
Apollo stack back to Earth. If they had
2895
01:55:35,199 --> 01:55:38,960
separated, Jack Swiger would have been
2896
01:55:36,960 --> 01:55:41,840
the only one aboard the command service
2897
01:55:38,960 --> 01:55:43,679
module in lunar orbit. With the moon
2898
01:55:41,840 --> 01:55:45,119
blocking radio communications for one
2899
01:55:43,679 --> 01:55:46,719
half of that orbit, he would have
2900
01:55:45,119 --> 01:55:48,560
possibly had to deal with all of the
2901
01:55:46,719 --> 01:55:51,679
consequences of the tank's explosion
2902
01:55:48,560 --> 01:55:53,520
completely and entirely alone. Even if
2903
01:55:51,679 --> 01:55:54,960
the crew on the lunar surface managed to
2904
01:55:53,520 --> 01:55:56,639
hear about this and abort their moon
2905
01:55:54,960 --> 01:55:57,960
mission, there still would have been no
2906
01:55:56,639 --> 01:56:00,719
way to save the
2907
01:55:57,960 --> 01:56:03,199
astronauts. The descent stage containing
2908
01:56:00,719 --> 01:56:05,040
the oxygen they now needed to get home
2909
01:56:03,199 --> 01:56:07,199
would have been left on the surface of
2910
01:56:05,040 --> 01:56:09,199
the moon.
2911
01:56:07,199 --> 01:56:11,440
The wires had not ignited the first two
2912
01:56:09,199 --> 01:56:13,440
times the cryofans were stirred. It was
2913
01:56:11,440 --> 01:56:15,440
on the third stir that the wires floated
2914
01:56:13,440 --> 01:56:16,960
close enough together to arc. The rate
2915
01:56:15,440 --> 01:56:19,040
that they were stirring these fans was
2916
01:56:16,960 --> 01:56:20,719
changed from their original plans.
2917
01:56:19,040 --> 01:56:22,880
Because of that tank's quantity gauge
2918
01:56:20,719 --> 01:56:24,719
failing offscale high, ground control
2919
01:56:22,880 --> 01:56:28,560
wanted these cryotanks to be stirred at
2920
01:56:24,719 --> 01:56:32,480
a much higher rate. because of the uh O2
2921
01:56:28,560 --> 01:56:34,560
tank 2 quantity sensor dropout. Uh uh
2922
01:56:32,480 --> 01:56:37,520
ECOM wants to keep a little closer track
2923
01:56:34,560 --> 01:56:41,199
of the uh of the cryo quantities and
2924
01:56:37,520 --> 01:56:43,520
he's going to be asking you to stir all
2925
01:56:41,199 --> 01:56:45,719
the cryo tanks at slightly more frequent
2926
01:56:43,520 --> 01:56:48,719
intervals than um than have been
2927
01:56:45,719 --> 01:56:50,400
planned. And the first time is now. This
2928
01:56:48,719 --> 01:56:52,639
decision placed the third stir of the
2929
01:56:50,400 --> 01:56:54,080
oxygen tank within the only survivable
2930
01:56:52,639 --> 01:56:56,159
section of this mission where this
2931
01:56:54,080 --> 01:56:58,000
incident could happen. If this gauge
2932
01:56:56,159 --> 01:56:59,520
worked as intended, the cryos would have
2933
01:56:58,000 --> 01:57:01,599
been stirred at their normal rates,
2934
01:56:59,520 --> 01:57:04,000
placing the third stir of that cryopan
2935
01:57:01,599 --> 01:57:06,159
in lunar orbit with no way to return
2936
01:57:04,000 --> 01:57:08,000
home. During the explosion, the
2937
01:57:06,159 --> 01:57:09,920
telemetry indicated that the reactant
2938
01:57:08,000 --> 01:57:12,639
valves were just the oxygen on fuel
2939
01:57:09,920 --> 01:57:14,320
cells one and three were jolted closed.
2940
01:57:12,639 --> 01:57:15,920
The crew was not made aware of this
2941
01:57:14,320 --> 01:57:17,599
issue because the system on the service
2942
01:57:15,920 --> 01:57:19,760
module only reported if both the
2943
01:57:17,599 --> 01:57:21,679
hydrogen and oxygen reactant valves
2944
01:57:19,760 --> 01:57:23,520
closed. The hydrogen reactant valve
2945
01:57:21,679 --> 01:57:25,440
remained open and so the system showed
2946
01:57:23,520 --> 01:57:27,040
that they should still work. If the crew
2947
01:57:25,440 --> 01:57:28,560
had been made aware of this issue, they
2948
01:57:27,040 --> 01:57:30,400
could have opened those reactant valves
2949
01:57:28,560 --> 01:57:32,239
and sent oxygen from the still working
2950
01:57:30,400 --> 01:57:34,400
tank into those fuel cells to keep them
2951
01:57:32,239 --> 01:57:36,239
running. Because of this oversight, the
2952
01:57:34,400 --> 01:57:38,320
service module was stuck with a far
2953
01:57:36,239 --> 01:57:40,719
lower power output immediately following
2954
01:57:38,320 --> 01:57:42,159
the explosion. It also left mission
2955
01:57:40,719 --> 01:57:44,159
control in a position where they needed
2956
01:57:42,159 --> 01:57:46,159
to reroute their limited power onto the
2957
01:57:44,159 --> 01:57:47,599
dead AC bus 2 in order to start up
2958
01:57:46,159 --> 01:57:50,159
sensors just so they could figure out
2959
01:57:47,599 --> 01:57:51,840
what was going on. These findings along
2960
01:57:50,159 --> 01:57:53,679
with many others were used to issue
2961
01:57:51,840 --> 01:57:55,760
changes to procedure and upgrades to the
2962
01:57:53,679 --> 01:57:58,000
Saturn 5 rocket planned for future moon
2963
01:57:55,760 --> 01:57:59,599
landings. The oxygen tank would be
2964
01:57:58,000 --> 01:58:01,599
completely redesigned, removing the
2965
01:57:59,599 --> 01:58:03,520
teflon insulation and replacing it with
2966
01:58:01,599 --> 01:58:05,280
magnesium oxide, as well as sheathing
2967
01:58:03,520 --> 01:58:07,679
all of the wires together in stainless
2968
01:58:05,280 --> 01:58:09,360
steel. Now that NASA had more knowledge
2969
01:58:07,679 --> 01:58:11,280
about how superc critical oxygen moves
2970
01:58:09,360 --> 01:58:12,960
in a zeroravity environment, it was
2971
01:58:11,280 --> 01:58:15,520
decided that the cryopans could be
2972
01:58:12,960 --> 01:58:17,679
removed altogether. The quantity gauge
2973
01:58:15,520 --> 01:58:19,360
was redesigned. An emergency battery and
2974
01:58:17,679 --> 01:58:21,280
oxygen tank were added to the service
2975
01:58:19,360 --> 01:58:23,040
module. The warning alarm system was
2976
01:58:21,280 --> 01:58:24,800
redesigned and procedures for the lunar
2977
01:58:23,040 --> 01:58:27,119
module's lifeboat mode were dramatically
2978
01:58:24,800 --> 01:58:28,880
improved along with many other upgrades.
2979
01:58:27,119 --> 01:58:30,320
With the cause of the explosion tracked
2980
01:58:28,880 --> 01:58:31,920
down, the board closes their
2981
01:58:30,320 --> 01:58:34,080
investigation with this statement made
2982
01:58:31,920 --> 01:58:36,639
to the House of Representatives. The
2983
01:58:34,080 --> 01:58:38,400
Apollo 13 accident, which aborted man's
2984
01:58:36,639 --> 01:58:40,400
third mission to explore the surface of
2985
01:58:38,400 --> 01:58:42,800
the moon, is a harsh reminder of the
2986
01:58:40,400 --> 01:58:44,639
immense difficulty of this undertaking.
2987
01:58:42,800 --> 01:58:46,159
The total Apollo system of ground
2988
01:58:44,639 --> 01:58:48,000
complexes, launch vehicle, and
2989
01:58:46,159 --> 01:58:49,920
spacecraft constitutes the most
2990
01:58:48,000 --> 01:58:52,480
ambitious and demanding engineering
2991
01:58:49,920 --> 01:58:54,639
development ever undertaken by man. For
2992
01:58:52,480 --> 01:58:56,400
these missions to succeed, both men and
2993
01:58:54,639 --> 01:58:58,639
equipment must perform to near
2994
01:58:56,400 --> 01:59:00,880
perfection. That this system has already
2995
01:58:58,639 --> 01:59:02,880
resulted in two successful lunar surface
2996
01:59:00,880 --> 01:59:04,639
explorations is a tribute to those men
2997
01:59:02,880 --> 01:59:06,960
and women who conceived, designed,
2998
01:59:04,639 --> 01:59:08,800
built, and flew it. Perfection is not
2999
01:59:06,960 --> 01:59:11,520
only difficult to achieve, but difficult
3000
01:59:08,800 --> 01:59:14,320
to maintain. The imperfection in Apollo
3001
01:59:11,520 --> 01:59:16,320
13 constituted a near disaster, averted
3002
01:59:14,320 --> 01:59:17,760
only by outstanding performance on the
3003
01:59:16,320 --> 01:59:19,760
part of the crew and the ground control
3004
01:59:17,760 --> 01:59:22,080
team which supported them. The board
3005
01:59:19,760 --> 01:59:24,000
feels that the Apollo 13 accident holds
3006
01:59:22,080 --> 01:59:26,239
important lessons which when applied to
3007
01:59:24,000 --> 01:59:28,239
future missions will contribute to the
3008
01:59:26,239 --> 01:59:30,960
safety and effectiveness of man space
3009
01:59:28,239 --> 01:59:34,440
flight. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my
3010
01:59:30,960 --> 01:59:34,440
prepared statement.
3011
01:59:48,080 --> 01:59:51,679
Thanks for watching. Remember to
3012
01:59:49,520 --> 01:59:53,199
subscribe if you want to see more. I
3013
01:59:51,679 --> 01:59:54,639
also have a Blue Sky account and a
3014
01:59:53,199 --> 01:59:56,239
Discord server if you want to follow
3015
01:59:54,639 --> 01:59:58,639
those and see behind the scenes of these
3016
01:59:56,239 --> 02:00:00,159
videos. If you want some of the Blender
3017
01:59:58,639 --> 02:00:02,239
files I used in my videos, like the
3018
02:00:00,159 --> 02:00:03,920
Saturn 5 rocket I modeled for this one,
3019
02:00:02,239 --> 02:00:06,320
I'll have them up on my Patreon page
3020
02:00:03,920 --> 02:00:07,840
soon after this video is uploaded. Any
3021
02:00:06,320 --> 02:00:09,520
donations made through there or the
3022
02:00:07,840 --> 02:00:10,960
YouTube donation comment feature will
3023
02:00:09,520 --> 02:00:13,520
get a shout out at the end of my next
3024
02:00:10,960 --> 02:00:15,040
video as a thanks. Feel free to email or
3025
02:00:13,520 --> 02:00:17,920
message me on Discord for commission
3026
02:00:15,040 --> 02:00:19,599
work. I also make music videos and such.
3027
02:00:17,920 --> 02:00:21,040
If you like this video, you'll also like
3028
02:00:19,599 --> 02:00:25,320
the one I made on the Hubble Space
3029
02:00:21,040 --> 02:00:25,320
Telescope on screen now.
229354
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