All language subtitles for The Bomb February to September 1945.Engilsk

North Field, on the island
of Tinian, in the Marianas,

1500 miles south of Japan.

In the summer of 1945 this was
the biggest air base in the world.

Here, on August 5,

the world's first uranium bomb
was loaded into a B-29 bomber -

named Enola Gay
after its pilot's mother.

Next morning, before dawn,
the Enola Gay took off.

Its target - Hiroshima.

On April 12, 1945,

Franklin Roosevelt, President
of the United States, died suddenly.

The nation mourned its lost leader.

He had brought them from the depths
of economic depression 12 years before,

now he had led them
to the eve of victory in a world war.

Two months before his death,
Roosevelt had been at Yalta, in Russia,

laying the political foundations
of the post-war world.

Roosevelt and Churchill wanted
to restore democracy to Eastern Europe,

particularly Poland.

They also asked Stalin to confirm that
Russia would join the war against Japan

three months
after the defeat of Germany.

In a cheerful atmosphere,

the "big three" thought
they had reached agreement.

Yalta was really
the high point of the relationship

between the three men.

Victory was in the air,
the Germans were in retreat,

and so there was a good deal more talk,

in addition to military matters,
of the future.

Poland again became

the most troublesome point.

And it's interesting that

both Roosevelt and Churchill

felt they had an agreement with Stalin.

The problem with Poland -
as with all Eastern Europe -

was that the Western leaders wanted
a freely elected government there.

The Soviets wanted a government
friendly to Russia.

They thought the West
understood and accepted this.

Poland, from their point of view, was
not going to be an outpost of the West-

nor any of the Balkan countries.

They thought they'd had
various agreements

about spheres of influence
with Mr Churchill-

if they left Greece
pretty much in British hands,

they could have certain
proportional influences

in Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria,
particularly Poland.

My impression at Yalta

was that the Russians thought

we had in substance
accepted that demand.

After Yalta,
Roosevelt lived for only two months.

Even by then, he and Churchill
had become disillusioned

by the interpretations the Russians
were putting on what was agreed there.

The very, very tough exchange
of telegrams on both sides

between Stalin and Roosevelt

makes it very plain
that Roosevelt, before he died,

knew that Stalin
was breaking his agreements.

I think it went sour because

the military developments

strengthened Russia's hands

and that where
the Russians had felt it necessary

to be considerate of Western opinion
at Yalta,

a few months later
they didn't feel any such necessity

because the war was going so well
for them,

and therefore they swept aside
some of the engagements they'd got into.

That certainly applied
particularly about Poland.

Roosevelt had been seen
as a friend by the Russians.

His successor, Harry Truman,
was an unknown quantity -

both to them and to his own advisers.

I left, as soon as Roosevelt died,
to go back to see Mr Truman.

I wanted to be sure
that President Truman

understood the position
of our relationships,

because there had been
so much euphoria in the air

about the warm relationships
that existed with our gallant allies.

And I got home within a week
of the time Roosevelt had died.

I found, my first experience
with President Truman,

I found he was an avid reader.

I found he'd read all the telegrams

and understood from those messages
the difficulties we were going to have.

The arrival
of their foreign minister, Molotov,

in Washington on April 23 gave Truman
a chance to prove, as he put it,

that he would
"stand up to the Russians".

Even as his arrival raised
hopes on the thorny Polish question,

the world learned that Russia had
signed a 20-year pact of friendship

with Poland's Warsaw government.

This Polish government
had no pro-Western members.

They were all pro-Soviet.

The Western leaders
were angry and upset.

Molotov saw Truman and his secretary of
state, Stettinius - Alger Hiss's boss.

By that time...

the Polish situation
had, to use a gentle word, crystallised.

The Russians were moving forward.

They seemed to be paying no attention
to the kind of provisional government

that the British and Americans
had hoped for.

Therefore protests - angry protests -
were going to the Russians about that.

And Truman decided to have a showdown,
at which he was gifted.

On that occasion, as you know from
what is now part of the history books,

he accused Molotov, in effect,

of violation of the agreements,

as early as that.

This was a strange thing to do in
the midst of a war, by no means yet won,

with an important ally - but he did it.

And it ended by Molotov saying:

"I've never been talked to like this
in my life",

and Truman saying: "Well, keep
your agreements and you won't be" -

just like a schoolteacher.

Stettinius, who'd been present, told me
the next morning - he was still shaken -

he said, "I thought
the whole conference was off."

Well, that was
an unfortunate conversation.

It was one of the first diplomatic
conversations that Truman had,

and I can only say that it was not
a diplomatic statement on Truman's part.

He used good, solid Missouri language,
which was very definite,

and Molotov had talked
to other people that way,

but had had no one
talk to him that way.

So he was very much upset,

and I gained the impression that
he thought this was a new voice,

not Roosevelt any more,
but a more aggressive president.

When he was sworn in,

Truman had said he would continue
Roosevelt's policies.

But his sudden harshness with Molotov

now worried the secretary of war,
Henry Stimson.

The day after the confrontation,

Stimson told Truman about something
he thought could transform

America's dealings with Russia.

Stimson's biographer, McGeorge Bundy.

Stimson wrote to Truman,

"I think it is very important
that I should have a talk with you

as soon as possible
on a highly secret matter."

"I mentioned it to you
shortly after you took office,

but have not urged it since on account
of the pressure you've been under."

"It, however, has such a bearing
on our present foreign relations

and has such an important effect
upon all my thinking in this field,

that I think you ought to know about it
without much further delay."

The next day, April 25,
Stimson explained to Truman

that his view of foreign policy -
Stimson's -

was dominated by
the imminent prospect of atomic power,

and the terms which might be got
from Russia

in exchange for sharing atomic secrets.

It was Truman's first
detailed news of the atomic bomb

and its diplomatic potential.

He asked Stimson to head a committee
to decide its military use.

By this time, in great secrecy, two
kinds of atomic bomb had been developed,

one based on uranium, the other
on a man-made element, plutonium.

The uranium bomb did not need testing -
but there was only one.

The plutonium bombs -
easier to produce in quantity -

would have to be tested before use.

The first would be ready by July.

A special unit
of the American Air Force

had begun practising
the tactics involved

in dropping one very large bomb,
with great accuracy,

then getting away as fast as possible.

Its commander was Colonel Paul Tibbets.

Up to this point,

anything in the way of an error
in bombing up to 500 or 600 feet

was considered good bombing.

So I told them then: "if you have
a 100-foot error from 25,000 feet,

you're just a borderline case."

"I want it less than 100."

I was told immediately,
"You can't do this."

So I said, "I don't know why not."
They said, "Nobody's ever done it."

I said, "That's no reason
why it can't be done."

"Practice, they tell me, makes perfect."

"So we'll practise and you'll practise
until you do it."

From their forward bases
in the Mariana Islands,

American B-29 bombers
were already attacking Japan's cities

with more conventional weapons.

To begin with, the results were poor.

General Curtis LeMay developed a new
tactic: low-level incendiary raids.

With aerial photography
you could outline a general area,

but not precisely.

You just couldn't avoid
doing collateral damage,

and I'm sure we burned down
a lot of Japanese buildings

that had nothing to do
with the war industry at all.

This, of course, is one of the sad
things of war that can't be helped.

On March 9, 1945, 2,000 tons
of incendiaries were dropped on Tokyo,

destroying 16 square miles of the city.

80,000 civilians died -

more that night in Tokyo than
in the whole of England in the Blitz.

Most suffocated in the firestorm.

LeMay now attacked city after city.

It looked as if the B-29s alone
might defeat Japan.

It wasn't until
General Arnold asked the direct question

"How long will the war last?",

and then we sat down
and did some thinking about it,

and it indicated that we would be

pretty much out of targets
around 1 September,

and with the targets gone,

we couldn't see much of any war
going on at the time.

By the spring of 1945

Japan was helpless in the face
of American air and naval power.

Most of the Japanese merchant fleet
and navy had been sunk.

An effective blockade had cut off Japan
from her overseas army,

grounded most of her air force
for lack of fuel,

and threatened her population
with starvation.

American fighter-bombers roamed at will,
backing up the devastating fire raids.

Many Japanese politicians realised

that their country
could not hold out much longer.

April 1: American troops
land on Japanese soil -

Okinawa, only 350 miles
from the mainland.

They face fierce resistance.

But as the battle starts,
the growing peace party in Japan

secure the appointment of a new cabinet,
led by Admiral Suzuki.

When the Suzuki cabinet
came into existence,

the military situation was deplorable,

and, moreover, the economic plight
of our nation was quite apparent.

The military command...

tried to squeeze the last drop,
so to speak, of the nation's blood,

in order to prosecute harder
the useless war,

but it became evident
to any sensible man

that we were at the end of our tether.

The younger officers
in the army, the extremists,

thought that we should fight
to the bitter end,

until every man had been killed.

But the war minister, General Anami,
didn't agree.

He thought that if we fought on
until the Americans invaded the mainland

and then hit their forces hard
on the beaches once,

we could then negotiate peace
on terms more favourable to Japan.

But Truman would not negotiate.

He told Congress so in May,
after Germany's defeat.

Our demand has been,
and it remains, unconditional surrender.

I want the entire world to know

that this direction must and will remain
unchanged and unhampered.

Truman now faced
two major problems:

how to deal with the Russians in Europe,

and whether to ask them to fulfil their
pledge to join the war against Japan.

In Germany, Russian and Western troops
exchanged toasts,

but already Churchill was sending
urgent messages to Truman

warning that an iron curtain was being
drawn down in Europe by Russia.

The "big three"
must meet quickly before, as he put it,

"the armies of democracy melted".

And Truman had a new secretary of state,
James Byrnes.

Byrnes wanted to finish the war
against Japan

before the Russians could join in

and cause problems
for the West in Asia, too.

It was ever-present in my mind

that it was important

that we should have an end to the war
before the Russians came in.

But Stimson wanted to avoid

hasty decisions in Europe
or the Far East

before the bomb was ready.
He wrote to Truman:

"Over any such tangled weave
of problems,

the atomic secret would be dominant."

"It seems a terrible thing to gamble
with such big stakes in diplomacy

without having your master card
in your hand."

Truman reassured Stimson -

the "big three" meeting was postponed
until July 15

on purpose "to give us more time".

Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt's
close friend whom Stalin trusted,

was sent to Moscow in May

to take the heat temporarily
out of the Polish issue.

He reported back
that he had smoothed things over.

Stalin had also promised - unprompted -

to join the war against Japan
on August 8.

While Hopkins was in Moscow,

Stimson's committee
reached its decision.

The committee studying the atomic bomb

unanimously recommended that it be used
as soon as possible, without warning,

against a major
Japanese military establishment.

Only this, Stimson thought,

would provide the psychological blow
which might induce Japan to surrender.

Although he agreed
with some of Truman's advisers

that the Japanese
should be given an ultimatum

which made it clear
they could keep the emperor,

he opposed announcing this until
after the bomb had at least been tested.

But after the war he wrote,

"It is possible,
in the light of the final surrender,

that a clearer and earlier exposition

of American willingness
to retain the emperor

could have produced
an earlier ending of the war."

June 18: Washington.

General Eisenhower is given a hero's
welcome after his victory in Europe.

In the White House that day,

Truman is asked to approve
his joint chiefs of staff's plans

to invade Japan in November.

We gathered up our papers
and started to go out,

and Mr Truman spotted me and said:

"Mr McCloy, nobody gets out of this room

without expressing himself-

everybody else has."

"Do you think I have

any other alternative?"

I looked over at Colonel Stimson -
he liked to be called Colonel -

he'd been colonel of a regiment
in World War I,

rather than Secretary -

I looked over at Stimson
and he nodded, he said, "Go ahead."

So I started in,
and I said that I thought that

we ought to have our heads examined

if we didn't begin to think in terms
of a political culmination of the war

rather than a military one.

And I said I'd give them some terms -

I'd send a message over to them,
I'd spell out the terms.

And Mr Truman said, "Well, what
are your terms? What would you do?"

I hadn't quite prepared for
the actual dictation

of the surrender terms at that point,

but I started in and I said,

"In the first place,
I'd say you can have the mikado,

but he's got to be
a constitutional monarch -

you've got to have a representative
form of government."

"You can have access to, but
not control over, foreign raw materials

so you can have a viable economy..."
I spelled it out as best I could.

"And I'd say,
'Besides that, we've got a new force,

and it's in the form
of a new type of energy

that will revolutionise warfare,

destructive beyond any contemplation."
I said I'd mention the bomb.

Well, mentioning the bomb, even
at that late date, in that select group,

it was like they were all shocked

because it was
such a closely guarded secret.

It was comparable
to mentioning Skull and Bones at Yale,

which you're not supposed to do.

But Mr Truman said, "This is the sort
of thing I was trying to reach for -

get that all spelled out."

At that point Stimson did come in
and joined in support of my position,

but then later on Mr Byrnes,
who was then secretary of state,

who was not present,

vetoed the idea
of offering them the mikado.

One can only speculate
as to what would have happened

if we had put the message
to the Japanese

in the form that I indicated,
including the mikado.

I always had the feeling, in view of
some of the information we've had since

of the tendency on the part of some
of the real military hotheads in Japan,

to think that this was perhaps
the best way out,

that we might have been able
to avoid the dropping of the bomb.

By this time,
the battle for Okinawa is almost over.

12,000 Americans had died,

a bloody foretaste of what invasion
of the mainland might cost.

For the Japanese,
the lesson was harsher still.

100,000 died,

and, for the first time in the war,
their soldiers surrendered in thousands.

As the last resistance ended,
on June 22,

the new Japanese cabinet
made its first move towards peace.

Ultimately,
we had to conduct negotiations

with our military opponents -

that is to say, America and Britain -

but the high command
refused categorically

to entertain any idea of

starting conversations
with the enemy powers.

The only great power left out
of the enemy camp was the Soviet Union,

because of the fact that nominally

there existed still the neutrality pact,

and so this was the only window open
for peace endeavours -

and this window looked
towards the north.

And so we argued it out
with the military command,

and the military command
finally, reluctantly,

acceded to our request that we start
negotiations with the Soviet Union

in order to arrive
at the final destination,

which was Washington and London.

But it was the Chinese
foreign minister, not the Japanese,

that Stalin had been meeting.

A huge Japanese army still occupied
parts of China, including Manchuria.

The Russians and Chinese
were negotiating terms

under which
Stalin would attack that army.

When Truman sailed to Europe on July 7
to meet Stalin and Churchill,

he knew, through intercepted messages,
that Japan wanted an end to the war,

but not unconditional surrender.

Truman and Byrnes
now had several options open to them -

they could modify the surrender terms,

they could encourage the Russians
to invade Manchuria,

they could demonstrate the atomic bomb,
they could invade Japan itself.

But Truman decided that he would drop
atomic bombs on Japan without warning.

This alone, he hoped,
would end the Pacific war quickly,

before the Russians joined in.

And it would immensely strengthen
American bargaining power in Europe.

The decision had already been taken

when Truman arrived
for the "big three" meeting on July 15.

The next morning, just before dawn,
at a remote desert site in New Mexico,

Robert Oppenheimer and the team
that had built the bomb

witnessed the first atomic explosion.

I remembered
the line from the Hindu scripture,

the Bhagavad-Gita:

Vishnu is trying to persuade the prince

that he should do his duty,

and to impress him

takes on his multi-armed form

and says, "Now I am become death,

the destroyer of worlds."

I suppose we all thought that,
one way or another.

The plutonium bomb exploded
with a force of 20,000 tons of TNT.

The desert at the point of the explosion
was turned into glass.

By July 1945
Japan's economy was crumbling

and her cities were defenceless
against the B-29 raids.

Although her army
remained virtually intact,

Japan's war industries were smashed.

One million civilians had died.

Millions more were homeless.

The US Air Force had no doubts
that surrender was only weeks away.

It was a hopeless situation for 'em.

The B-29s were flying over Japan at will
and they couldn't do anything about it.

We could destroy any target at will
without much opposition.

So with this hopeless situation
they were facing,

they just didn't have the will
to continue.

In fact, they'd been trying
to get out of the war

for about three months
before they actually did.

They'd asked the Russians
to be an intermediary,

to try to negotiate them out of the war,

and the Russians had been stalling till
they'd got the European war finished

so they could get into the Pacific war
before it ended.

Stalin and Molotov
refused to see the Japanese ambassador

before they left Moscow for the last
"big three" meeting for ten years.

Also at Potsdam
was Secretary of War Stimson.

He passed on detailed news of
the atomic test to Truman and Byrnes -

who, he noted in his diary,
were immensely pleased.

"The president
was tremendously pepped up by it

and spoke to me of it again and again
when I saw him."

"He said it gave him
an entirely new feeling of confidence."

And when Stimson told Churchill
about the successful test the next day,

Churchill said he now understood

how this pepping-up of Truman
had taken place

and that he felt the same way.

The British and Americans debated

whether to tell the Russians
about the bomb.

Some argued that its full weight
as a diplomatic lever

would only become evident
after it had been dropped on Japan.

After one of our meetings,
just as we adjourned,

Truman went up
with his interpreter to Stalin

and told him briefly

what we had discovered

and what the effect
of the atomic bomb would be.

And all Stalin did was to nod his head
and say "Thank you" quite curtly,

and his expression changed in no way
and that was all there was to it.

It was a tremendous disappointment.

We thought he would be flabbergasted
at this thing but he just passed it off.

Whether he knew about it,

whether he didn't want to show
any great emotion in regard to it,

I don't know.

All I know is that he took it
very much in his stride

and, somewhat to our disappointment,
went on to the next item in the agenda.

And this rather dismayed Stimson

because he thought that,

once having disclosed this,

there would be immediately
a great rush on the part of the Soviets

to sit down and talk to us

about the future implications
of this thing

and what the future uses of it would be.

But he got no encouragement at all.

Stimson's tactics had
misfired - the "big three" had met

before the full power
of the atomic weapon was revealed.

Stimson feared that from now on,
Secretary of State Byrnes

would use the bomb to try to lever
direct concessions from the Russians.

I rather think that Mr Byrnes
had something of the thought

that this would be a sort of

point of leverage
in diplomatic exchanges,

whereas I think Mr Stimson -
or Colonel Stimson -

had a different idea
of the use of the bomb.

He wrote to the president

to urge direct negotiation
on the nuclear issue,

and argued that relations with Russia
"may perhaps be irretrievably embittered

by the way in which we approach
the solution of the bomb with Russia."

"For if we fail to approach them now

and merely negotiate with them

having this weapon
rather ostentatiously on our hip,

their suspicions and their distrust of
our purposes and motives will increase."

With the atomic weapons
now almost ready for use,

it was time for Truman to issue
a final ultimatum to the Japanese -

and again Stimson's advice was rejected.

Truman and Byrnes decided not to modify
the unconditional-surrender formula

by offering the Japanese
the chance to keep their emperor.

My hope is that
the people of Japan will now realise

that further resistance
to the forces of the nations

now united
in the enforcement of law and justice

will be absolutely futile.

There is still time -
but little time -

for the Japanese to save themselves

from the destruction
which threatens them.

The very purpose of it was to assure
them that they would have the decision,

and at the same time

not to start a controversy
among ourselves

about the position of the emperor.

When the Potsdam proclamation
was issued,

Foreign Minister Togo and I
worked together many sleepless nights,

and I took this proclamation
to the attention of the foreign minister

and explained the substance of it.

Togo at once said this was acceptable,

and he immediately went to the palace
and asked for an audience.

The emperor approved Togo's judgement
that this should be accepted

and the war be terminated at once.

Foreign Minister Togo
said in the cabinet meeting

that we can stop the war
without the question of the emperor.

We can keep the emperor all right.

But at that time we -

the Japanese government-

asked some... intermediate...

mediation... Mediation?

...mediation to the Russians,

so many cabinet ministers said,

"Well, let us see the situation
for a while."

Prime Minister Suzuki announced

that Japan would ignore
the ultimatum.

Perhaps Russia
would save Japan's honour.

After all, the Potsdam Declaration
had not been signed by Stalin -

he might still mediate.

Stalin told Truman
about the Japanese approaches.

Truman knew all about them -
the Japanese codes had been broken.

Both leaders agreed to ignore
the peace feelers

and Truman sailed home on August 3.

With no response from the Japanese,
he authorised the Air Force

to drop the atom bomb
as soon as they were ready.

The Japanese foreign minister, Togo,

in desperation
cabled his ambassador in Moscow:

"Since the loss of one day
relative to this present matter

may result
in a thousand years of regret,

it is requested you immediately
have a talk with Molotov."

But Molotov
would still not meet the ambassador.

On August 6,

two days before the Russians had said
they would attack the Japanese,

the Enola Gay set off
on its 1500-mile journey.

I noticed as I taxied out
that there were several hundred people

that were in the area
the aircraft were parked in,

there were some
in front of the control tower...

People were out there
to see what was going on

without really knowing
what they were looking at,

but it was something different,

so they wanted to be part of it,
wanted to see what was taking place.

There's one bomb and one aeroplane
was going to carry that bomb,

and that's the group commander,
Colonel Tibbets, with his full crew.

My crew was assigned

to fly in formation on his right wing

during the bombing,

for a couple of reasons -

somebody had to fly there

and I was scheduled by him
to fly the second mission,

if there were to be a second mission.

We were to have a third aircraft
flying on the left wing

who would drop back
just before the bombing -

he was equipped with cameras.

We were to fly unseen by each other
for the first three hours

and to make rendezvous at 8,000 feet
over Iwo Jima at 6am.

This was the plan.

We made the rendezvous successfully,
then we had about an hour and a half

to go along in a lazy formation on
a beautiful night out over the Pacific,

with moons and cloud puffs
that looked like powder puffs -

it was a quiet, peaceful evening,
believe me.

Nothing much went on -
a little bit of talk in the aeroplane,

but that's always normal on a mission -

but then you'd get a quiet period,

and I guess everybody was dreaming
or something, because it was quiet.

At 8:15 on the morning of August 6,

the Enola Gay, flying at 32,000 feet,
released its bomb over Hiroshima.

As soon as
the weight had left the aeroplane

I immediately went into this steep turn,

as did Sweeney and Marquart behind me,

and we tried then to place distance

between ourselves
and the point of impact.

In this particular case,
that bomb had 53 seconds

from the time it left the aeroplane
until it exploded.

That's how long it took to fall
from the bombing altitude - 53 seconds.

And this gave us adequate time,
of course, to make the turn.

Now, we had just made the turn
and rolled out in level flight

when it seemed like somebody
had grabbed hold of my aeroplane

and gave it a real hard shaking,

because this was the shock wave
that had come up.

This was something
that I was glad to feel

because it gave me a moment of relief-

after all, having worked on that bomb
for well over a year,

that 53 seconds
while I'm turning the aeroplane

I'm wondering
"Is it or is it not going to work?"

And, of course, the shock wave
hitting us was indication it had worked.

Therefore I felt that success
had been achieved.

When the bomb came
I saw a yellowish flash

and I was buried in the darkness.

The two-storeyed wooden building that
was my house, with eight rooms in it,

was blown down to pieces
and covered me up.

When I regained consciousness

everything was pitch dark all around me.

I tried to stand up,
but my leg was broken.

I tried to speak and I found
that six of my teeth had been broken.

Then I realised that my face was burnt
and my back was burnt.

There was a slash right across
from one shoulder down to the waist.

I crawled to the river bank
and when I got there

I saw hundreds of bodies
come floating down the river.

And it was then that I realised with
a shock that all Hiroshima had been hit.

The day was clear

when we dropped that bomb -

it was a clear sunshiny day
and visibility was unrestricted -

so as we came back around,

again facing the direction of Hiroshima,

we saw this cloud coming up.

The cloud by this time - now two minutes
- the cloud was up at our altitude.

We were at 33,000 feet at this time,

and the cloud was up there

and continuing to go
right on up in a boiling fashion -

it was rolling and boiling.

The surface was nothing but...
a black, boiling...

the only thing I can say,
like a barrel of tar -

probably
the best description I can give.

This was the way it looked down there.

Where before there had been a city -

distinctive houses, buildings

and everything that you could see
from our altitude -

now you couldn't see anything except
this black, boiling debris down below.

We took pictures as rapidly as we could.

My immediate concern after that
was "It's time to get out of here."

I encountered
long, ceaseless lines of escapees.

All of them had no clothes whatsoever
on their bodies.

And the skin

from their faces, arms and breast

peeling off and hanging loose -

and yet without any expression.

In deep silence they are escaping.

I thought it was a procession of ghosts.

The words went back

basically to the effect
that the bombing conditions were clear,

the target had been hit, the results
were better than had been anticipated,

and that message was sent on back.

From there on it was just a proposition

of letting everybody talk
for a few minutes

and get it out of their system.

The excitement was over -

pretty soon it became
a rather routine flight back home.

As a matter of fact,
it was routine enough

that I let Bob Lewis
and the autopilot fly that aeroplane

and went back and got some sleep
for about the first time in 30 hours -

and I was ready for it.

A long drawn-out war,

you begin to get casualties from the
side-effects of exhaustion, privation...

disease and things of that sort.

So getting it over with
as quick as possible

is a moral responsibility
of everyone concerned.

Now, it's true that we knew
the war was over

and if we just waited a little while
it would be over,

because the Japanese were negotiating,

and we knew this
because we'd broken their code

and we were listening
to their communications.

But I believe that President Truman
made the proper decision to use it...

because it probably hastened
the negotiations

and even if we just saved one day,

to me it would be worthwhile,
you have to do it.

I thought it was absolutely unnecessary,

because by the time
the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima

we were conducting negotiations
with the Soviet government,

looking towards
an early end of hostilities.

And we were completely exhausted.

And the navy and army, too,

were slowly becoming...

more amenable to the idea of peace.

It's an appalling subject to talk about,

and the United States has,
consciously and unconsciously,

a great deal of guilt complex
about its use.

But Truman made the decision on
the basis of the military necessities.

And I think an impartial analysis,

particularly from
the Japanese themselves -

more evidence is coming out that
they would've fought on fanatically.

You know, they did fight on fanatically

in some of the islands,

in spite of the surrender.

And the emperor
wouldn't have had the courage

to have called it off,
or the support to call it off.

When I heard about the atomic bomb
I was so astonished,

and I frankly said,
"The American people are brutal."

I wondered if the American people
were really civilised.

But at the same time

I thought this may become a key

for Japan to end the war.

It was two days before
the Japanese government realised

what the atomic bomb was
and what it had done.

70,000 had died in Hiroshima.

Another 70,000 were injured.

97% of the city's buildings
were destroyed or severely damaged.

President Truman, on hearing the news,

called it
"the greatest thing in history".

The peace group in the Japanese cabinet

hoped that the bomb might persuade
the war faction to accept surrender.

As the cabinet met
on the morning of August 9,

it received further shattering news.

The previous evening, in Moscow,

Molotov had finally received
the Japanese ambassador

and bluntly told him that Russia
was about to declare war on Japan.

Eight hours later - exactly three months
after the defeat of Germany,

just as Stalin had promised -

Russia attacked the Japanese army
in Manchuria.

Japanese hopes of Russian mediation
were at an end.

American hopes of finishing the war
before Russia became involved

were thwarted.

Later that same morning,

the Americans dropped
a plutonium bomb on Nagasaki.

It killed 60,000 people.

But even now the Japanese militants

held out for a surrender
without an occupation.

The peace party wanted only
to preserve the emperor's position.

For the first time,
to break the deadlock,

the emperor, Hirohito,
was called in to decide.

He chose peace.

I shall never
forget the emotion of that time.

Everybody started to cry,
so I looked at the emperor's face.

He just kept silent,

but he wore white gloves on his hands...

He wiped his own face several times,

so we could know the emperor himself,

His Majesty the emperor himself,
was crying.

I shall never forget the emotion

in this room at that time.

On August 10, the Japanese
made it known they would surrender

if the emperor were allowed to stay.

On August 12,
the Allies sent a noncommittal reply.

By this time,
Japan's army was near revolt.

Even if a thousand
atom bombs had been dropped,

and even if Japan
had been completely devastated,

you must remember
that Japan's honour was at stake,

the pride of the Japanese at that time

who felt that the only honourable way
out of the war was not to surrender,

but to die to the last man.

The Americans dropped leaflets

urging the Japanese to surrender.

These almost upset the delicate
manoeuvrings of the peace party.

That could have caused a lot of trouble.

Civilians and soldiers
all over the country

were completely unaware
of what was going on.

If they had found out that
the government was negotiating peace

with the United States,

the situation
would have become impossible.

It might even have led to a revolution.

So I felt we had to reach
a final decision as fast as possible.

Once again, on August 14,

the emperor met
a divided Supreme War Council

and told them they must accept
the Allied ultimatum.

He himself would broadcast the next day.

That night, a group of junior officers
invaded the palace

and tried to seize the recording
of the emperor's message.

They couldn't find it. The coup failed.

At noon on August 15,

the Japanese people heard their
emperor's voice for the first time.

"The war", he told them, "has developed
not necessarily to Japan's advantage."

"Moreover, the enemy has begun to use
a new and most cruel bomb."

"Should we continue to fight,

it will not only result
in an ultimate collapse

and obliteration of the Japanese nation,

but also the total destruction
of human civilisation."

"We must, therefore,
endure the unendurable."

When the emperor addressed the nation
through his broadcast,

I know that 99 men out of 100

were taken aback.

They expected the emperor
to urge them to fight on.

So the shock was tremendous.

And all the army officers,
particularly the younger ones,

who said that
they had to fight to the bitter end,

were naturally disillusioned.

Some even tried to remonstrate

with the decision
taken by the cabinet for surrender.

In a way it could be said
that the atomic bombings

and Russia's sudden attack on Japan

helped to bring about
the end of the war.

If those events had not happened,

Japan, at that stage, probably
could not have stopped fighting.

The war had ended,
but not the dying.

And radiation sickness -
which the Americans had not foreseen -

would kill thousands more
in the years to come.

The morning of September 2, 1945:

the United States battleship Missouri
is anchored in Tokyo Bay.

The new Japanese foreign minister,
Shigemitsu,

limps on board
to sign the surrender document.

The Allied commander, General MacArthur.

I now invite the representatives
of the emperor of Japan

and the Japanese government

and the Japanese Imperial
General Headquarters

to sign the instrument of surrender
at the places indicated.

The foreign minister's aide,
Kase, watched the ceremony.

I saw many thousands of sailors
everywhere on this huge vessel,

and just in front of us
were delegates of the victorious powers,

in military uniforms
glittering with gold.

And looking at them,

I wondered how Japan ever thought
she could defeat all those nations.

Let us pray that peace
be now restored to the world,

and that God will preserve it always.

These proceedings are closed.